1 Jul 2, 2026
KIOXIA Corporation
KIOXIA FIPS TC58NC1137GTC Crypto Sub-Chip Class A1
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Rev 1.4.0
2 Jul 2, 2026
Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
1.3 Additional Information....................................................................................................... 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 6
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 6
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 7
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 7
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 7
2.6 Security Function Implementations................................................................................... 9
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................10
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................10
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................10
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................10
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................10
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................11
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................11
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................11
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................11
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................11
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................12
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................21
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................21
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................21
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................21
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................21
5.3 Open-Source Parameters................................................................................................21
5.4 Additional Information......................................................................................................22
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................22
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................22
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................22
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................22
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................23
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................23
3 Jul 2, 2026
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................23
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................23
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................23
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................24
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................26
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................26
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................26
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................28
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................29
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................30
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................30
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................30
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................31
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................31
11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................31
11.5 Maintenance Requirements...........................................................................................31
11.6 End of Life .....................................................................................................................31
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................31
4 Jul 2, 2026
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 7
Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 7
Table 4: Approved Algorithms.................................................................................................... 8
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ......................................................................................... 8
Table 6: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................10
Table 7: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................10
Table 8: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................10
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................11
Table 10: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................11
Table 11: Roles.........................................................................................................................12
Table 12: Approved Services ....................................................................................................21
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................22
Table 14: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................23
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................23
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................24
Table 17: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................25
Table 18: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................26
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................26
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................28
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................28
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................29
Table 23: Error States...............................................................................................................30
List of Figures
Figure 1: Block Diagram............................................................................................................. 6
Figure 2: TC58NC1137GTC 0003 SoC.....................................................................................23
5 Jul 2, 2026
1 General
1.1 Overview
This document explains precise specification of the security rules about KIOXIA FIPS
TC58NC1137GTC Crypto Sub-Chip Class A1. The Cryptographic Module (CM) meets the
requirements of FIPS 140-3 Security Level 2 Overall.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle assurance 2
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APT Adaptive Proportion Test
CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CM Cryptographic Module
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
HMAC The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication code
KAT Known Answer Test
LBA Logical Block Address
LMS Leighton-Micali Signature
POST Power on Self-Test
PSID Printed SID
RCT Repetition Count Test
SED Self-Encrypting Drive
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SID Security ID
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
TCG Trusted Computing Group
6 Jul 2, 2026
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
KIOXIA FIPS TC58NC1137GTC Crypto Sub-Chip Class A1 (listed in Section2.2 Tested and
Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification) is used for solid state drive data security.
The CM is a single chip hardware module implemented as a sub-chip compliant with IG 2.3.B in
the TC58NC1137GTC 0003 SoC (see Figure 2 in Section 7.1). The CM is embedded in TCG
OPAL compliant solid state drive controllers which provides user data encryption/decryption
through build-in HW engines.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Single Chip
Module Characteristics: SubChip
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the set of TC58NC1137GTC CPRT module as soft
circuity core and SC02DN as associated firmware, and the physical perimeter is defined as the
surface of TC58NC1137GTC 0003 SoC.
Components of the CM is shown with gray background include processor and memories
(volatile and non-volatile memory) and HW circuitry for cryptographic processing. Physical ports
bordering outside the CM’s boundary and the data passing over them are also indicated (see
Section 3.1 for details on physical ports and interfaces).
Overview block diagram of the CM is shown below.
Figure 1: Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
7 Jul 2, 2026
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
KIOXIA FIPS
TC58NC1137GTC
Crypto Sub-Chip Class
A1
0003 SC02DN Cortex-M3 Single-Chip:
TC58NC1137GTC-0003;
Soft Circuitry core: CPRT
module 0002
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
N/A for this module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
Approved
mode
Approved The service indicators in Table 12 are equivalent
to the indicator for approved mode.
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The CM has one approved mode of operation and CM is always in approved mode of operation
after initial operations are performed (See Section 11.1).
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
8 Jul 2, 2026
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A7087 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A7087 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0
A7087 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38E
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7223 Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7223 Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
FIPS 186-5
Hash DRBG A7173 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - SHA2-256
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A7087 Key Length - Key Length: 256 FIPS 198-1
KDF SP800-108 A7174 KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths:
512
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
LMS SigVer A7297 LMS Modes - LMS_SHA256_M32_H15 SP 800-208
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7087 Modulo - 2048, 3072
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
FIPS 186-5
SHA2-256 A7087 Message Length - Message Length: 8-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A7087 Message Length - Message Length: 8-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
ECB mode is used as a prerequisite of XTS mode. ECB is not directly used in services of the
Cryptographic Module. The CM performs a check that the XTS Key1 and XTS Key2 are
different according to IG C.I. AES-XTS is only used for encryption/decryption of data stored in
solid state drives equipped with this CM.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key Type:Symmetric N/A SP800-133 r2, Section 4, example 1
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
9 Jul 2, 2026
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KDK Generation CKG Generate KDK
with random
number
Hash DRBG:
(A7173)
CKG: ()
MEKs Generation KBKDF Derive MEKs
to be used in
external AES
circuit based
on KDK
KDF SP800-
108: (A7174)
HMAC
Generation/Verification
MAC HMAC
generation and
verification for
arbitrary data
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A7087)
KTS KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
Transport data
to/from
external
memory area
IG
D.G:approved
method from
IG D.G
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 256
bits of security
strength
AES-CBC:
(A7087)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A7087)
User Data
Encryption/Decryption
BC-UnAuth Encryption /
Decryption of
user data
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0:
(A7087)
AES-ECB:
(A7087)
FW digital signature
verification 1
DigSig-SigVer Signature
verification for
firmware image
using LMS
LMS SigVer:
(A7297)
SHA2-256:
(A7087)
FW digital signature
verification 2
DigSig-SigVer Signature
verification for
firmware image
using RSA
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A7087)
SHA2-384:
(A7087)
Signature Generation DigSig-SigGen Signature
generation for
arbitrary data
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7223)
Signature Verification DigSig-SigVer Signature
verification for
arbitrary data
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A7223)
Hash calculation SHA Calculate hash
for the arbitrary
data
SHA2-256:
(A7087)
10 Jul 2, 2026
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SHA2-384:
(A7087)
Random Number
Generation
DRBG Generate
Random
Number
Hash DRBG:
(A7173)
Entropy Generation ENT-ESV Entropy
Source (E275)
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
The CM does not implement any Non-Approved Security Function Implementations in the
Approved Mode of Operation.
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
N/A for this module.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E275 KIOXIA Corporation
Table 7: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Entropy Source Physical TC58NC1137GTC-0003 1 bit 0.667 N/A
Table 8: Entropy Sources
The Entropy Source is a hardware module inside the CM boundary. The Entropy Source
supplies the Hash_DRBG with 1024 bits entropy input. From Table 8 this input contains about
683 bits of entropy, which is sufficient entropy to obtain 256 bits of security strength.
2.9 Key Generation
Please refer to Section 9.4.
2.10 Key Establishment
N/A for this module.
2.11 Industry Protocols
N/A for this module.
11 Jul 2, 2026
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Mailbox Data Input Mailbox input parameter
Mailbox Data Output Mailbox output parameter
Mailbox Control Input Mailbox command information
Mailbox Status Output Mailbox command result
AES circuit Data Input User data
AES circuit Data Output User data
DMAC Data Input Mailbox input parameter
DMAC Data Output Mailbox output parameter
Lock Checker Data Input Read/Write destination address information
Lock Checker Control Input Lock status confirmation request signal
Lock Checker Status Output Lock status confirmation result signal
Power PIN Power Power
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
Control output is omitted in the table above because the CM does not implement this type of
interface.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
PIN Verifying the PIN entered by the
user matches the information
stored inside the CM (Memorized
secrets) .
SHA2-256
(A7087)
Probability
of 1/2^64
Probability of
60,000/2^64
Table 10: Authentication Methods
The CM refuses to set a PIN less than 8 bytes, and responds with an error if such a setting is
attempted. Therefore, the probability that a random attempt will succeed is 1 / 2^64 < 1 /
1,000,000 (the CM accepts any value (0x00-0xFF) as each byte of PIN). The CM waits 1ms
when authentication attempt fails, so the maximum number of authentication attempts is 60,000
times in 1 min. Therefore, the probability that random attempts in 1min will succeed is 60,000 /
2^64 < 1 / 100,000.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
AdminSP.SID Role CO PIN
12 Jul 2, 2026
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
AdminSP.Admin1 Role CO PIN
LockingSP.Admin1-4 Role CO PIN
LockingSP.UserX (X=1,
...192)
Role CO PIN
Table 11: Roles
The CM only supports Crypto Officer Role.
The CM supports the configuration of roles and services. The authenticated operator is
expected to configure locked bands for data storage, the associated role and the lock-based
authentication data (PIN) per Table 11 (refer to section 11 for detail settings to maintain secure
operation). Bands that are not configured are considered unprotected or plaintext. This
configuration enables Data Read/Write service using the lock-based authentication model (IG
4.1.A). To Read/Write data from/to each band, an operator must unlock the bands with
appropriate authenticated roles. Once the bands are unlocked, Read and Write access to the
bands must be controlled by a trusted operator outside of the module who has authenticated the
associated role until powered off. The module prevents Data read/write service for locked
bands. If Read and Write access needs to be inhibited prior to power off, the operator who
authenticates the role must set the bands to the locked state again.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Band
Lock/Unloc
k
Lock or
unlock
read / write
of user
data in a
band.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK: E
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
Band
Lock/Unloc
k for Band
of Single
User Mode
Lock or
unlock
read / write
of user
data in
band "X" of
single user
mode
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- KDK: E
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
Check
Lock State
Check a
lock state
of band
that read /
write user
data.
N/A Lock
status
confirma
tion
request
signal
Lock
status
confirma
tion
result
signal
None Unauthenticat
ed
Data
Read/Write
Encryption
/
Decryption
of user
Reada
ble /
Writabl
e
LBA,
User
Data of
ciphertex
LBA,
User
Data of
plaintext
User Data
Encryption/Decr
yption
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- MEKs: E
LockingSP.Us
13 Jul 2, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
data to /
from
unlocked
band of
SSD.
signal
from
Lock
Check
er
t /
plaintext
(read /
write)
/
ciphertex
t (read /
write)
erX (X=1,
...192)
- MEKs: E
Cryptograp
hic Erase
Erase user
data (in
cryptograp
hic means)
by
changing
the key
that
derives the
data
encryption
key.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
KTS
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Cryptograp
hic Erase
for Band of
Single
User Mode
Erase user
data in
band "X" of
single user
mode (in
cryptograp
hic means)
by
changing
the key
that
derives the
data
encryption
key.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
KTS
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
- MEKs: G,Z
Cryptograp
hic Erase
and
Initialize
Band State
Erase user
data in
band "X" of
single user
mode (in
cryptograp
hic means)
by
changing
the key
that
derives the
data
encryption
key, and
initialize
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
KTS
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
14 Jul 2, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
the band
state
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Download
Port
Lock/Unloc
k
Lock /
unlock
firmware
download
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
None AdminSP.SID
Firmware
Verification
1
Digital
signature
verification
for the
entire
firmware of
SSD
equipped
with this
CM using
LMS
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
FW digital
signature
verification 1
Unauthenticat
ed
Firmware
Verification
2
Digital
signature
verification
for the
entire
firmware of
SSD
equipped
with this
CM using
RSA
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
FW digital
signature
verification 2
Unauthenticat
ed
Firmware
Download
Download
a firmware
image
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
FW digital
signature
verification 2
AdminSP.SID
- PubKey1:
W,E,Z
Random
Number
Generation
Provide a
random
number
generated
by the CM.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
Random
Number
Generation
Unauthenticat
ed
- DRBG
Internal Value:
E
Set Band
Position
and Size
Set the
location
and size of
the band
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
KTS
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
15 Jul 2, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- System Enc
Key: E
Set Band
Position
and Size
for Band of
Single
User Mode
Set the
location
and size of
the band
"X" of
single user
mode
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
KTS
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- MEKs: G,Z
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Set PIN for
Band of
Single
User Mode
Set PIN
(authentica
tion data)
of authority
for band X
of single
user mode
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KTS
Hash calculation
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- PINs: R,W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Set PIN Set PIN
(authentica
tion data)
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KTS
Hash calculation
AdminSP.SID
- PINs: R,W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
AdminSP.Adm
in1
- PINs: R,W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- PINs: R,W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
16 Jul 2, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Key: E
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- PINs: R,W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Authority
Enable/Dis
able
Enable/Dis
able the
authority.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KTS AdminSP.SID
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Revert Initialize
the band
State and
disable
band lock
setting.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
KTS
Hash calculation
AdminSP.SID
- PINs: R,W,E
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
AdminSP.Adm
in1
- PINs: R,W,E
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- PINs: R,W,E
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
17 Jul 2, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Data
Locking
Protection
Enable
Enable
Data
protection
with band
lock
setting.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KTS
Hash calculation
AdminSP.SID
- PINs: R,W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- PINs: R,W,E
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Sanitize Erase all
user data
(in
cryptograp
hic means)
by
changing
the key
that
derives the
data
encryption
key.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
KTS
AdminSP.SID
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
AdminSP.Adm
in1
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Format
Namespac
e
Erase user
data (in
cryptograp
hic means)
on
Namespac
e by
changing
the key
that
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
KTS
AdminSP.SID
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
AdminSP.Adm
in1
18 Jul 2, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
derives the
data
encryption
key.
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Namespac
e
Create/Del
ete
Create and
delete
Namespac
e.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
KTS
AdminSP.SID
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
AdminSP.Adm
in1
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
19 Jul 2, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
LockingSP.Us
erX (X=1,
...192)
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Band Set
Enable
Set the
location,
size and
lock state
of the
band.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
KTS
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Band Set
Disable
Initialize
the
location,
size and
lock state
of the
band.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
KDK Generation
MEKs
Generation
HMAC
Generation/Verifi
cation
KTS
LockingSP.Ad
min1-4
- KDK:
G,R,W,E,Z
- MEKs: G,Z
- System MAC
Key: E
- System Enc
Key: E
Signature
Generation
Generate a
signature
of the data
by using a
private key
entered
from
outside of
the CM.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
Signature
Generation
Unauthenticat
ed
- Key Pair
Private Key:
W,E,Z
Signature
Verification
Verify input
signature
by using a
public key
entered
from
outside of
the CM.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
Signature
Verification
Unauthenticat
ed
- Key Pair
Public Key:
W,E,Z
20 Jul 2, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Calculate
Hash
Digest
Hash the
data
entered
from
outside of
the CM
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
Hash calculation Unauthenticat
ed
Show
Status
(Show
Version)
Report
status of
the CM
and
versioning
information
.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
None Unauthenticat
ed
Zeroization Zeroize
SSPs.
Mailbo
x
comm
and
result
Mailbox
comman
d / input
paramet
er
Mailbox
Comman
d Result
None Unauthenticat
ed
- RKey: Z
- KDK: Z
- MEKs: Z
- PINs: Z
- System MAC
Key: Z
- System Enc
Key: Z
- DRBG
Internal Value:
Z
Reset
(Power-
OFF)
Delete
SSPs in
SRAM.
N/A N/A N/A None Unauthenticat
ed
- KDK: Z
- MEKs: Z
- PINs: Z
- System MAC
Key: Z
- System Enc
Key: Z
- DRBG
Internal Value:
Z
Reset
(Power-
ON) (Self
Test)
Runs
various
self-tests
to be
performed
at power-
on (
POSTs,
CASTs,
Firmware
N/A N/A N/A MEKs
Generation
KTS
FW digital
signature
verification 2
Hash calculation
Entropy
Generation
Unauthenticat
ed
- RKey: E
- KDK: W
- PINs: W
- System MAC
Key: G,E
- System Enc
Key: G,E
- DRBG
21 Jul 2, 2026
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Load test )
and
generate /
import
some
SSPs.
Internal Value:
G
- DRBG Seed:
G,E,Z
- PubKey1:
W,E,Z
Table 12: Approved Services
Need to input PSID, which is public drive-unique value used for the zeroization service.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The CM performs signature verification on Firmware loaded from external memory using
RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5 (SHA2-384, 3072-bit key). The Firmware is verified at separated
memory from the current firmware, and it is loading if the firmware verification is successful.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
Firmware Security of components in this CM is shown below.
MaskROM Code:
・ Form of the executable code: Binary
・ Integrity verification method: 32bit CRC
Firmware image (User Code):
・ Form of the executable code: Binary
・ Integrity verification method: Approved signature verification (RSASSA-PKCS#1-v1_5)
5.2 Initiate on Demand
MaskROM Code, Firmware image (User Code)
・ Initiate on demand integrity verification: Power cycling
5.3 Open-Source Parameters
N/A for this module.
22 Jul 2, 2026
5.4 Additional Information
The CM supports the partial loading that replaces the current Firmware image, excluding the
MaskROM Code, with a new Firmware image loaded from outside the module. In this case the
CM becomes another validated one.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
How Requirements are Satisfied:
Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the CM does not employ
operating systems and operates in a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3
definitions. Any firmware/software loaded into this module that is not shown on the module
certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a success of firmware load test and
a separate FIPS 140-3 validation
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection
Guidance
Passivated opaque package N/A N/A
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required
The CM is a sub-chip enclosed in a single chip that is an opaque package. Gathering
information of the module’s internal construction or components is impossible without forcibly
opening the package. Consequently, tampering with the module's components is impossible
without leaving evidence of tampering.
The CM is used by being in the SSD, and the SSD's enclosure surrounds it.
Front Back
23 Jul 2, 2026
Figure 2: TC58NC1137GTC 0003 SoC
8 Non-Invasive Security
The CM does not apply Non-invasive security.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
S1 OTP: One Time Programmable area Static
S2 SRAM: Storage area to store FW components and SSPs as volatile
information
Dynamic
S3 AES Circuit HW Register: Write Only Storage area to store MEKs of
unlock band
Dynamic
S4 DRAM: Outside the cryptographic module Dynamic
Table 14: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
IE1 S2 S4 Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS
IE2 S4 S2 Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS
IE3 S4 S2 Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
24 Jul 2, 2026
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Z1 Overwriting S1
with All 1
S1 is overwritten, All
1 key is not allowed.
Zeroization
Z2-1 Overwriting S2
with All 0
S2 is overwritten, All
0 key is not allowed.
Zeroization, Services that allow
setting the range length to zero*
Z2-2 Overwriting S3
with All 0
S3 is overwritten, All
0 key is not allowed.
Zeroization, Services that allow
setting the range length to zero;
Services that allow locking the
corresponding band**
Z3-1 Overwriting S2
with random
value
S2 is overwritten
with newly
generated random
value.
Services that update key***
Z3-2 Overwriting S3
with random
value
S3 is overwritten
with newly
generated random
value.
Services that update key
Z4 Overwriting
immediately
after use
The CM overwrites
SSP with All 0
immediately
N/A
Z5 Clear the data in
volatile memory
S2 and S3, S4 are
cleared when
Power-off
Reset(Power-OFF) service
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods
* Services that allow setting the range length to zero: Set Band position and Size, Set Band
Position and Size for Band of Single User Mode, Namespace Create/Delete, Band Set Enable
and Band Set Disable.
** Services that allow locking the corresponding band: Band Lock/Unlock, Cryptographic Erase
and initialize Band State, Revert, and Band Set Enable.
*** Services that update key: The following service are applicable, Cryptographic Erase,
Cryptographic Erase for Band of Single User Mode, Cryptographic Erase and Initialize Band
State, Set Band Position and Size, Revert, Sanitize and Format Namespace.
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Streng
th
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
RKey Derivation of
System Enc Key
and System
MAC Key
256 -
256
Symmetric
- CSP
Hash
DRBG
(A7173)
KDF SP800-108
(A7174)
Syste
m Enc
Key
Data Encryption
/ Decryption for
KTS
256 -
256
Symmetric
key
encryption
and
decryption
key - CSP
KDF
SP800-
108
(A7174)
KTS
25 Jul 2, 2026
Name Description Size -
Streng
th
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establish
ed By
Used By
Syste
m
MAC
Key
Message
Authentication
Code generation
and verification
for KTS
256 -
256
MAC
algorithm
key for
symmetric
authenticat
ion - CSP
KDF
SP800-
108
(A7174)
HMAC
Generation/Verific
ation
KTS
KDK Derivation of
MEKs
256 -
256
Symmetric
- CSP
KDK
Generati
on
KTS MEKs Generation
MEKs Data
encryption/decry
ption
512 -
256
Symmetric
- CSP
MEKs
Generati
on
User Data
Encryption/Decry
ption
PINs User
authentication
PIN
256 -
128
PIN - CSP KTS
Hash calculation
Key
Pair
Private
Key
Imported Private
Key for ECDSA
384 -
192
Private -
CSP
Signature
Generation
DRBG
Interna
l Value
DRBG state(V:
440 bits, C: 440
bits)
880 -
256
DRBG
Internal
State -
CSP
Random Number
Generation
DRBG
Seed
DRBG seed 1024 -
256
Seed -
CSP
Entropy
Generati
on
Hash DRBG
(A7173)
PubKe
y1
Signature
verification key
for RSA
3072 -
128
Public -
PSP
FW digital
signature
verification 2
Key
Pair
Public
Key
Imported Public
key for ECDSA
384 -
192
Public -
PSP
Signature
Verification
Table 17: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
RKey S1:Plaintext Until zeroization Z1 System Enc
Key:Derives
System MAC
Key:Derives
System
Enc Key
S2:Plaintext Until Power-Off Z2-1
Z5
RKey:Derived
From
KDK:Wraps
PINs:Wraps
System
MAC Key
S2:Plaintext Until Power-Off Z2-1
Z5
RKey:Derived
From
26 Jul 2, 2026
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
KDK:Wraps
PINs:Wraps
KDK IE1
IE2
S2:Plaintext While the band
exist, Until Power-
Off
Z2-1
Z2-2
Z3-1
Z5
System Enc
Key:wrapped by
System MAC
Key:wrapped by
MEKs:Derives
MEKs S3:Plaintext While the band is
unlocked, Until
Power-Off
Z2-2
Z3-2
Z5
KDK:Derived
From
PINs IE1
IE2
IE3
S2:Obfuscated Until Power-Off Z2-1
Z4
Z5
System Enc
Key:wrapped by
System MAC
Key:wrapped by
Key Pair
Private Key
IE3 S2:Plaintext While in use Z4
DRBG
Internal
Value
S2:Plaintext Until Power-Off Z2-1
Z5
DRBG
Seed
S2:Plaintext While in use Z4
PubKey1 IE3 S2:Plaintext
S1:Obfuscated
While in use Z4
Key Pair
Public Key
IE3 S2:Plaintext While in use Z4
Table 18: SSP Table 2
PINs are stored in S2, and PubKey1 is stored in S1 as hashed value. “Obfuscated” in “Storage”
column of these SSPs means hashed value.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
Firmware
integrity test
integrity 32 bit
CRC
SW/FW
Integrity
Implicit error
reporting by
stopping the startup
sequence
Verify MaskROM
code integrity with
32bit CRC
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Firmware load test is also run at the time of Power-up, and the integrity of the Firmware loaded
into the CM can be confirmed.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
27 Jul 2, 2026
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
(A7087) -
Encrypt
Key Size:
256 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x24
Encrypt Power-on
AES-CBC
(A7087) -
Decrypt
Key Size:
256 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x24
Decrypt Power-on
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0
(A7087) -
Encrypt
Key Size:
256 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x23
Encrypt Power-on
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision 2.0
(A7087) -
Decrypt
Key Size:
256 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x23
Decrypt Power-on
SHA2-256
(A7087)
Digest Size
: 256 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x25
Digest Power-on
Hash DRBG
(A7173)
Hash
based:
SHA2-256
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x18/0x19
DRBG Power-on
SHA2-384
(A7087)
Digest Size:
384 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x25
Digest Power-on
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A7087)
Key Size:
256 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x26
Digest Power on
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A7087)
Key Size:
2048 and
3072 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x27
Signature
Verification
Power-on
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A7223)
Curve: P-
384
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x36
Signature
Verification
Before first
use
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A7223)
Curve: P-
384
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x36
Signature
Generation
Before first
use
KDF SP800-
108 (A7174)
HMAC-
SHA2-256
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x28
KDF Power-on
Entropy
Source
(Health tests
of noise
source at
startup)
Cut off RCT:
61, APT:
752
RCT,
APT
CAST 0x01 or
0x2C/2D
Entropy
Generation
Power-on
Entropy
Source
(Continuous
noise source
Cut off RCT:
61, APT:
752
RCT,
APT
CAST 0x01 or
0x2C/2D
Entropy
Generation
Entropy
output
request
28 Jul 2, 2026
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
health tests
during
operation)
LMS SigVer
(A7297)
Key Size:
448 bits
KAT CAST 0x01 or
0x37
Signature
Verification
Power-on
Firmware load
test at Power
on
hash type:
SHA2-384;
key length:
3072 bit.
sigVer SW/FW
Load
0x01 or
0x13/0x38
Verify
signature of
loaded
firmware
image
Power-on
Firmware load
test at FW
download
hash type:
SHA2-384;
key length:
3072 bit
sigVer SW/FW
Load
0x01 or
0x13/0x38
Verify
signature of
downloaded
firmware
image
FW
download
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests
If the Conditional Self-Tests are successful, the CM will return 0x01 as an indicator; if they fail, it
will return Error Code in Table20.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Firmware
integrity test
32 bit CRC SW/FW Integrity On Demand Power cycling
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-CBC
(A7087) -
Encrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
AES-CBC
(A7087) -
Decrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
AES-XTS
Testing Revision
2.0 (A7087) -
Encrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
AES-XTS
Testing Revision
2.0 (A7087) -
Decrypt
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
SHA2-256
(A7087)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
Hash DRBG
(A7173)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
29 Jul 2, 2026
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
SHA2-384
(A7087)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A7087)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A7087)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A7223)
KAT CAST On Demand First provided
service after
power cycling
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A7223)
KAT CAST On Demand First provided
service after
power cycling
KDF SP800-108
(A7174)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
Entropy Source
(Health tests of
noise source at
startup)
RCT, APT CAST On Demand Power cycling
Entropy Source
(Continuous
noise source
health tests
during
operation)
RCT, APT CAST On Demand Provided service
with generating
entropy
LMS SigVer
(A7297)
KAT CAST On Demand Power cycling
Firmware load
test at Power on
sigVer SW/FW Load On Demand Power cycling
Firmware load
test at FW
download
sigVer SW/FW Load On Demand Provided service
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Boot Error
State
The CM has failed
Pre-operational self-
test, cryptographic
algorithm test
excluded ECDSA,
and health tests of
noise source at
startup
Pre-operational self-
test, cryptographic
algorithm test
excluded ECDSA,
and health tests of
noise source at
startup Failure
Power-off Indicated Error
Code: 0x23
0x24, 0x25,
0x26, 0x18,
0x19, 0x27,
0x28, 0x2C,
0x2D, 0x37
and/or no
response
30 Jul 2, 2026
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error State
(Conditional
Test)
The CM has failed
ECDSA algorithm test
and continuous noise
source health tests
ECDSA algorithm
test and continuous
noise source health
tests Failure
Power-off Indicated Error
Code: 0x2C, 0x
2D, 0x36
Power Up
Load Test
Error State
The CM has failed FW
Load at power up
FW Load at power up
Failure
Power-off Indicated Error
Code: 0x13 ,
0x38
Conditional
Load Test
Error State
The CM has failed FW
update
FW update Failure N/A Indicated Error
Code: 0x13,
0x38
Table 23: Error States
If the self-tests fail, the CM reports error status and enters to the error state. In this case, the
CM must be powered-off to clear error condition (i.e. Recovery Method). When power-on is
executed again, self-tests are also executed like an on-demand operator reset. If the CM
continuously enters in error state in spite of several trials of reboot, the CM may be sent back to
factory to recover from error state. When the CM is in an error state except for Conditional Load
Test Error State, cryptographic functions cannot be executed by the CM. If the CM enters
Conditional Load Test Error State, it reports Error code and transitions from error state to
normal state, and continues to operate with FW before download.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
Operator can also initiate self-test on-demand for periodic testing by using the Reset service
which is automatically invoked when the module is powered-off and powered-on (rebooted).
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
In the SSD’s manufacturing process, installation is executed as below:
1. The Firmware described in Section 2.2 is downloaded into the CM.
2. Initial SSPs are generated.
3. Initial authentication information is set to the CM.
4. System area including SSPs generated in Step2 and Step3 are encrypted and calculated
message authentication code.
Initial operations to setup this CM are following:
 Load Firmware into the CM.
 Load system area including SSPs into the CM.
 Execute range state setting method (Set the location and size of all range).
 Execute download port setting method (Lock / unlock firmware download).
 Execute namespace setting method (Create Namespace).
 Execute service execution state setting method (Enable CM settings (location and size of all
range, lock/unlock firmware download, namespace status)).
31 Jul 2, 2026
The CM switches to approved mode after the initial operation success. When the initial
operation succeeds, the CM indicates success on the Status Output interface. Operators can
confirm that the CM is in approved mode by executing Show Status (Show Version) service and
checking that the startup is successfully completed.
For secure operation, the following settings must be maintained:
⚫ Data Locking Protection is Enabled
⚫ Each Band is set to be locked when power-on. Bands that are not configured are
considered unprotected or plaintext.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
After the procedure written in section 11.1, the CM can be used as an approved mode. Users
can confirm that the CM is in approved mode by executing Show Status (Show Version) service
and checking that the startup is successfully completed. Guidance for this module is provided to
solid state drive developers who embed the CM. The usage and maintenance of solid state
drives with the CM built-in are outside of the scope of this document.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
The module implements only the Crypto Officer. There is no guidance for non-administrators.
11.4 Design and Rules
N/A for this module.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
As described in Section 2, the CM is used by being embedded in the solid state drive.
Therefore, there are no maintenance requirements for the CM alone.
11.6 End of Life
The user needs to erase CPSs by executing Revert service for secure sanitization.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The CM does not mitigate other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3 requirements.