Aruba VMC-TACT Series Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers with ArubaOS FIPS Firmware Non-Proprietary Security Policy FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Version 2.1 January 2017 2| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy Copyright © 2016 Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise company. Aruba trademarks include , Aruba Networks ® , Aruba Wireless Networks ® , the registered Aruba the Mobile Edge Company logo, Aruba Mobility Management System ® , Mobile Edge Architecture ® , People Move. Networks Must Follow ® , RFprotectrotect ® , Green Island ® . All rights reserved. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Open Source Code Certain Aruba products include Open Source software code developed by third parties, including software code subject to the GNU General Public License (GPL), GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL), or other Open Source Licenses. The Open Source code used can be found at this site: http://www.arubanetworks.com/open_source Legal Notice The use of Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise company switching platforms and software, by all individuals or corporations, to terminate other vendors’ VPN client devices constitutes complete acceptance of liability by that individual or corporation for this action and indemnifies, in full, Aruba Networks, Inc. from any and all legal actions that might be taken against it with respect to infringement of copyright on behalf of those vendors. Copyright © 2016 Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise company. Aruba trademarks include, Aruba Networks®, Aruba Wireless Networks®,the registered Aruba the Mobile Edge Company logo, and Aruba Mobility Management System®. www.arubanetworks.com 1344 Crossman Avenue Sunnyvale, California 94089 Phone: 408.227.4500 Fax 408.227.4550 Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|3 Contents Contents.............................................................................................................................................................................3 1 Preface ............................................................................................................................................................................4 1.1 Purpose of this Document ......................................................................................................................................4 1.2 Related Documents.................................................................................................................................................4 1.2.1 Additional Product Information ........................................................................................................4 2 Overview .........................................................................................................................................................................5 2.1 Cryptographic Module Boundaries.........................................................................................................................7 2.2 Intended Level of Security ..................................................................................................................................8 3 Physical Security..............................................................................................................................................................9 4 Operational Environment ...............................................................................................................................................9 5 Logical Interfaces ............................................................................................................................................................9 6 Roles and Services.........................................................................................................................................................10 6.1 Crypto Officer Role................................................................................................................................................10 6.2 User Role...............................................................................................................................................................14 6.3 Authentication Mechanisms.................................................................................................................................15 6.4 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Management..........................................................................................17 6.4.1 Implemented Algorithms ...............................................................................................................17 6.5 Critical Security Parameters..................................................................................................................................20 6.6 Self-Tests...............................................................................................................................................................27 6.7 Alternating Bypass State...................................................................................................................................28 7 Installing the Module ....................................................................................................................................................29 7.1 Pre-Installation Checklist...................................................................................................................................29 7.1.1 Product Examination.....................................................................................................................29 7.1.2 Package Contents.........................................................................................................................29 8 Ongoing Management ..................................................................................................................................................30 8.1 Crypto Officer Management..............................................................................................................................30 8.2 User Guidance....................................................................................................................................................30 8.3 Setup and Configuration....................................................................................................................................31 8.4 Setting Up Your Virtual Controller....................................................................................................................31 8.5 Enabling FIPS Mode..........................................................................................................................................31 4| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy 1 Preface This security policy document can be copied and distributed freely. 1.1 Purpose of this Document This release supplement provides information regarding the Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers with FIPS 140-2 Level 1 validation from Aruba Networks. The material in this supplement modifies the general Aruba firmware documentation included with this product and should be kept with your Aruba product documentation. This supplement primarily covers the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers. This security policy describes how the module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and how to place and maintain the module in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 validation of the product. FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) website at: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html In addition, in this document, the Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers are referred to as the controller or the module. 1.2 Related Documents The following items are part of the complete installation and operations documentation included with this product:  Aruba VMC-TACT Virtual Mobility Controller Installation Guide  ArubaOS 6.4 User Guide  ArubaOS 6.4 CLI Reference Guide  ArubaOS 6.4 Quick Start Guide  ArubaOS 6.4 Upgrade Guide  Aruba AP Installation Guides 1.2.1 Additional Product Information More information is available from the following sources:  The Aruba Networks Web-site contains information on the full line of products from Aruba Networks: http://www.arubanetworks.com  The NIST Validated Modules Web-site contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the product: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|5 2 Overview Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers includes four varieties (Aruba VMC-TACT-F1, Aruba VMC- TACT-USF1, Aruba VMC-TACT8-F1 and the Aruba VMC-TACT8-USF1) which are optimized for 802.11ac and mobile app delivery. For radio regulatory reasons (with respect to how the controller manages the Access Points), the module ending with -USF1 is to be sold in the US only. The module ending with -F1 is considered ‘rest of the world’ and must not be used for deployment in the United States. However, from a FIPS perspective, both -USF1 and -F1 models are identical and fully FIPS compliant. The product image (DVD, download, etc) is universal (there is only one). The country code and 8 or full version is set by license key, post-installation. So the customer buys the version by country, and the license makes it an F1 or a USF1 and an 8 or a 32 AP version by setting it when the license is installed. Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers can support over 32,000 wireless devices and performs stateful firewall policy enforcement at speeds up to 40 Gbps – plenty of capacity for BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) and 802.11ac devices. Fully application-aware, the module prioritizes mobile apps based on user identity and offers exceptional scale for BYOD transactions and device densities. New levels of visibility, delivered by Aruba AppRF on the module, allow IT to see applications by user, including top web-based applications like Facebook and Box. The module also manages authentication, encryption, VPN connections, IPv4 and IPv6 services, the Aruba Policy Enforcement Firewall™ with AppRF Technology, Aruba Adaptive Radio Management™, and Aruba RFprotect™ spectrum analysis and wireless intrusion protection. The module configurations validated during the cryptographic module testing included:  The firmware version is ArubaOS VMC 6.4.2.0-1.3-FIPS  The tested platform is a PacStar 451 SSV Small Server (processor Intel i7 running on VMWare ESXI 5.5) Figure 1: PacStar 451 SSV Small Server 6| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy More information about PacStar 451 SSV Small Server can be found at http://pacstar.com/wp- content/uploads/2014/05/PacStar_451_Data_Sheet_patent-020216.pdf. Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|7 2.1 Cryptographic Module Boundaries For FIPS 140-2 Level 1 validation, the module has been tested as a multi-chip standalone firmware module. The logical cryptographic boundary is defined as the libraries used for the crypto function. The physical boundary is the surface of the computer chassis. Figure 2: Functional Block Diagram of the System Component Stack 8| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy 2.2 Intended Level of Security The module is intended to meet overall FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements as shown in Table 1. Table 1 Intended Level of Security Section Section Title Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1 3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2 4 Finite State Model 1 5 Physical Security 1 6 Operational Environment N/A 7 Cryptographic Key Management 1 8 EMI/EMC 1 9 Self-tests 1 10 Design Assurance 1 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Overall Overall module validation level 1 Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|9 3 Physical Security The module is a firmware module. It must be run on a production grade platform (such as a standard commercially made PC, laptop, server, etc) to meet requirements from FIPS 140-2 level 1. 4 Operational Environment The operational environment is limited and non-modifiable. The module was tested on PacStar 451 SSV Small Server (Intel i7 processor running on VMWare ESXI 5.5). The platform used during testing met Federal Communications Commission (FCC) FCC Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for business use as defined by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part15, Subpart B. 5 Logical Interfaces Interfaces on the module can be categorized as the following FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces:  Data Input Interface  Data Output Interface  Control Input interface  Status Output Interface  Power Interface All of these physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described in the following table. Table 2 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Module Virtual Interface Physical Interface Data Input Interface Virtual Ethernet Ports  Host Platform Ethernet ports  Host Platform Keyboard and Mouse Data Output Interface Virtual Ethernet Ports  Host Platform Ethernet Ports Control Input Interface Virtual Control Input Ports  Host Platform Ethernet Ports  Host Platform 10| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy Table 2 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces Keyboard and Mouse Status Output Interface Virtual Status Output Port  Host Platform Video Monitor Power Interface N/A  Host PC Power Interface Data input and output, control input, status output, and power interface are defined as follows:  Data input and output are the packets that use the firewall, VPN, and routing functionality of the modules.  Control input consists of virtual control inputs for power and reset through the power and reset interface. It also consists of all of the data that is entered into the controller while using the Host interfaces.  Status output consists of the status indicators displayed through the status data that is output from the module while using the Host management interfaces, and the log file.  The hosts console indicates the virtual state such as power-up (or rebooting), utilization level, and activation state. The log file records the results of self-tests, configuration errors, and monitoring data.  A power supply is used by the virtualization host. The module distinguishes between different forms of data, control, and status traffic over the network ports by analyzing the packets header information and contents. 6 Roles and Services The module supports role-based authentication, meeting level 2 requirements. There are two roles in the module that operators may assume: a Crypto Officer role and a User role. The Administrator maps to the Crypto-Officer role and the client Users map to the User role. 6.1 Crypto Officer Role The Crypto Officer role has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the module. Three management interfaces can be used for this purpose:  SSHv2 CLI The Crypto Officer can use the CLI to perform non-security-sensitive and security-sensitive monitoring and configuration. The CLI can be accessed remotely by using the SSHv2 secured management session over the Ethernet ports or locally over the serial port.  Web Interface The Crypto Officer can use the Web Interface as an alternative to the CLI. The Web Interface provides a highly intuitive, graphical interface for a comprehensive set of controller management tools. The Web Interface can be accessed from a TLS-enabled Web browser using HTTPS (HTTP with Secure Socket Layer) on logical port 4343. Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|11  SNMP v3 The Crypto Officer can also use SNMPv3 to remotely perform non-security-sensitive monitoring and use ‘get’ and ‘getnext’ commands. See the table below for descriptions of the services available to the Crypto Officer role. Table 3 Crypto-Officer Services Service Description Input Output CSP/Algorithm Access (please see table 9 below for details) SSHv2 Provide authenticated and encrypted remote management sessions while using the CLI SSHv2 key agreement parameters, SSH inputs, and data SSHv2 outputs and data 27, 28 (read/write/delete) SNMPv3 Provides ability to query management information SNMPv3 requests SNMPv3 responses 32, 33, 34 (read/write/delete) IKEv1/IKEv2- IPSec Provide authenticated and encrypted remote management sessions to access the CLI functionality IKEv1/IKEv2 inputs and data; IPSec inputs, commands, and data IKEv1/IKEv2 outputs, status, and data; IPSec outputs, status, and data 1,19 (read) 6,7,8 9,10,11 (read/write/delete) 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 (read/delete) Configuring Network Management Create management Users and set their password and privilege level; configure the SNMP agent Commands and configuration data Status of commands and configuration data 1,32, 33 (read) 34 (delete) 12| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy Table 3 Crypto-Officer Services Configuring Module Platform Define the platform subsystem firmware of the module by entering Bootrom Monitor Mode, File System, fault report, message logging, and other platform related commands Commands and configuration data Status of commands and configuration data None Configuring the module Define synchronization features for module Commands and configuration data Status of commands and configuration data None Configuring Internet Protocol Set IP functionality Commands and configuration data Status of commands and configuration data None Configuring Quality of Service (QoS) Configure QOS values for module Commands and configuration data Status of commands and configuration data None Configuring VPN Configure Public Key Infrastructure (PKI); configure the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv1/IKEv2) Security Protocol; configure the IPSec protocol Commands and configuration data Status of commands and configuration data 1,19 (read) 15,16, 17, 18(read) 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,25 and 26 (delete) Configuring DHCP Configure DHCP on module Commands and configuration data Status of commands and configuration data None Configuring Security Define security features for module, including Access List, Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA), and firewall functionality Commands and configuration data Status of commands and configuration data 12, 13, 14 (read/write/delete) 1 (read) Manage Certificates Install, rename, and delete X.509 certificates Commands and configuration data; Certificates and keys Status of certificates, commands, and configuration 15, 16, 17,18 (write/delete) HTTPS over TLS Secure browser connection over Transport Layer Security acting as a Crypto Officer service (web management interface) TLS inputs, commands, and data TLS outputs, status, and data 6,7,8, 29, 30 and 31 (read/write/delete ), 4,5 (read/write ) 2.3 (read) Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|13 Table 3 Crypto-Officer Services Status Function Cryptographic officer may use CLI "show" commands or view WebUI via TLS to view the controller configuration, routing tables, and active sessions; view health, temperature, memory status, voltage, and packet statistics; review accounting logs, and view physical interface status Commands and configuration data Status of commands and configurations None IPSec tunnel establishment for RADIUS protection Provided authenticated/encrypted channel to RADIUS server IKEv1/IKEv2 inputs and data; IPSec inputs, commands, and data IKEv1/IKEv2 outputs, status, and data; IPSec outputs, status, and data 12 and 19 (read/write/delete) 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 (write/delete) 1(read) 4,5 (read/write), 2.3 (read) Self-Test Perform FIPS start-up tests on demand None Error messages logged if a failure occurs None Configuring Bypass Operation Configure bypass operation on the module Commands and configuration data Status of commands and configuration data None Updating Firmware Updating firmware on the module Commands and configuration data Status of commands and configuration data 1, 39 (read) Configuring Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Responder Configuring OCSP responder functionality OCSP inputs, commands, and data OCSP outputs, status, and data 27, 28, 29, 30 (read) Configuring Control Plane Security (CPSec) Configuring Control Plane Security mode to protect communication with APs using IPSec and issue self signed certificates to APs Commands and configuration data, IKEv1/IKEv2 inputs and data; IPSec inputs, commands, and data Status of commands, IKEv1/ IKEv2 outputs, status, and data; IPSec outputs, status, and data 12 and 19 (read/write/delete) 20, 21, 23, 22, 24, 25 and 26 (write/delete) 14| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy Table 3 Crypto-Officer Services and configuration data, self signed certificates 1(read)4,5 (read/write), 2.3 (read) Zeroization The cryptographic keys stored in SDRAM memory can be zeroized by rebooting the module. The cryptographic keys (IKEv1 Pre- shared key and 802.11i Pre- Shared Key) stored in the flash can be zeroized by using command ‘ap wipe out flash’ or by overwriting with a new secret. The ‘no’ command in the CLI can be used to zeroize IKE, IPsec and CA CSPs. Please See CLI guide for details.The other keys/CSPs (KEK, RSA/ECDSA public key/private key and certificate) stored in Flash memory can be zeroized by using command ‘write erase all. Command Progress information All CSPs will be destroyed. 6.2 User Role Table 4 below lists the services available to User role: Table 4 User Service Service Description Input Output CSP Access (please see table 9 below for CSP details) IKEv1/IKEv2- IPSec Access the module's IPSec services in order to secure network traffic IPSec inputs, commands, and data IPSec outputs, status, and data 6,7,8, 9,10,11 (read, write, delete) 15,16,17,18 (read) 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 (read/delete) 4,5 (read/write), 2.3 (read) HTTPS over TLS Access the module’s TLS services in order to secure network traffic TLS inputs, commands, and data TLS outputs, status, and data 6,7,8, 9, 10, 11. 29, 30, 31 (read/write/delete) 4,5 (read/write), 2.3 (read) Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|15 EAP-TLS termination Provide EAP-TLS termination EAP-TLS inputs, commands and data EAP-TLS outputs, status and data 6,7,8, 29, 30, 31 (read/delete), 4,5 (read/write) 2.3 (read) 802.11i Shared Key Mode Access the module’s 802.11i services in order to secure network traffic 802.11i inputs, commands and data 802.11i outputs, status and data 35, 36, 37 and 38 (create/read/delete) 4,5 (read/write) 802.11i with EAP- TLS Access the module’s 802.11i services in order to secure network traffic 802.11i inputs, commands and data 802.11i outputs, status, and data 15,16,17,18 (read) 35, 36, 37 and 38 (read/delete) 4,5 (read/write) 6.3 Authentication Mechanisms The module supports role-based authentication. Role-based authentication is performed before the Crypto Officer enters privileged mode using admin password via Web Interface or SSHv2 or by entering enable command and password in console. Role-based authentication is also performed for User authentication. This includes password and RSA/ECDSA-based authentication mechanisms. The strength of each authentication mechanism is described below. Table 5 Estimated Strength of Authentication Mechanisms Authentication Type Role Strength Password-based authentication Crypto Officer Passwords are required to be a minimum of eight characters and a maximum of 64 with a minimum of one letter and one number. Given these restrictions, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 3,608,347,333,959,680 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total. The calculation should be 94^8 (Total number of 8-digit passwords) – 84^8 (Total number of 8-digit passwords without numbers) – 42^8 (Total number of 8-digit passwords without letters) + 32^8 (Total number of 8-digit passwords without letters or numbers, added since it’s double-counted in the previous two subtractions) = 3,608,347,333,959,680). At optimal network conditions (assuming 1ms round-trip latency), an attacker would only get 60,000 guesses per minute. Therefore the associated probability of a successful random attempt during a one-minute period is 60,000/3,608,347,333,959,680, which is less than 1 in 100,000 required by FIPS 140-2. 16| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy Password-based authentication (802.11i Pre-shared secret) User Same authentication mechanism strength as CO role above. Password-based authentication (User Password) User Same authentication mechanism strength as CO role above. Password-based authentication (IKEv1) User A 64 ASCII (128 HEX) character pre-shared string is randomly chosen by the administrator. It may consist of upper and lower case alphabetic characters, numeric characters and 32 special characters. The probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 94^64. This calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total. Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random attempt is approximately 1 in 94^64, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2. At optimal network conditions (assuming 1ms round- trip latency), an attacker would only get 60,000 guesses per minute. Therefore the associated probability of a successful random attempt during a one-minute period is 60,000/94^64, which is less than 1 in 100,000 required by FIPS 140-2. RSA-based authentication (IKEv1, IKEv2 and TLS) User The module supports 2048-bit RSA key authentication during IKEv1, IKEv2 and TLS. RSA 2048 bit keys correspond to 112 bits of security. Assuming the low end of that range, the associated probability of a successful random attempt is 1 in 2^112, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2. At optimal network conditions (assuming 1ms round-trip latency), an attacker would only get 60,000 guesses per minute. Therefore the associated probability of a successful random attempt during a one-minute period is 60,000/2^112, which is less than 1 in 100,000 required by FIPS 140- 2. ECDSA-based authentication IKEv1, IKEv2 and TLS User ECDSA signing and verification is used to authenticate to the module during IKEv1/IKEv2. Both P-256 and P-384 curves are supported. ECDSA P-256 provides 128 bits of equivalent security, and P-384 provides 192 bits of equivalent security. Assuming the low end of that range, the associated probability of a successful random attempt during a one-minute period is 1 in 2^128, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2. At optimal network conditions (assuming 1ms round-trip latency), an attacker would only get 60,000 guesses per minute. Therefore the associated probability of a successful random attempt during a one-minute period is 60,000/2^128, which is less than 1 in 100,000 required by FIPS 140- 2. Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|17 6.4 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Management 6.4.1 Implemented Algorithms The module contains the following cryptographic algorithm implementations/crypto libraries to implement the different FIPS approved cryptographic algorithms that will be used for the corresponding security services supported by the module in FIPS mode:  ArubaOS OpenSSL library algorithm implementation  ArubaOS Crypto library algorithm implementation  AOS VMC GRUB Bootloader library algorithm implementation. Note that not all algorithm modes that appear on the module’s CAVP certificates are utilized by the module, and the table below lists only the algorithm modes that are utilized by the module. The module supports the following cryptographic implementations.  ArubaOS OpenSSL library implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms: Table 6 Cryptographic Algorithms implemented by ArubaOS OpenSSL library Algorithms Algorithm Certificates Used and Tested during the Power Up Self-Tests AES #3778  CBC (128, 192 and 256 bits)  CFB128 (128 bits)  AES CCM (128 bits) CVL (SP800-135) #718  IKEv1, TLS, SSH and SNMP KDF DRBG #1044  AES-256 CTR_DRBG ECDSA #813  FIPS 186-4, PKG: CURVES( P-256 P-384);  SigGen: CURVES( P-256: (SHA-256, 384) P-384: (SHA- 256, 384);  SigVer: CURVES( P-256: (SHA-256, 384) P-384: (SHA- 256, 384) HMAC #2474  HMAC-SHA1, HMAC- SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 and HMAC-SHA512. Please note that the module performs the Power On Self-Test to HMAC- SHA512, but not use it in other security services at this time. 18| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy KBKDF (SP800-108) #80  CTR_Mode RSA #1945  186-4KEY(gen); 2048  ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5] SIG(gen) (2048 SHA(256 , 384 , 512 )); SIG(Ver) (2048 SHA(1, 256 , 384)) NOTE: Only SHA-256 used for signing in this module SHS #3145  SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. Please note that the module performs the Power On Self-Test to SHA- 512, but not use it in other security services at this time. Triple-DES #2099  TCBC (3-key Triple-DES)  ArubaOS Common Cryptographic library implementation supports the following FIPS Approved Algorithms: Table 7 Cryptographic Algorithms implemented by ArubaOS Common Cryptographic library Algorithms Algorithm Certificates Used and Tested during the Power Up Self-Tests AES #3845  CBC (128, 192 and 256 bits),  AES GCM (128 and 256 bits)1 CVL #734  SP800-135 IKEv2 and TLS KDF ECDSA #830  FIPS 186-4, PKG: CURVES( P-256 P-384);  SigGen: CURVES( P-256: (SHA-256, 384) P-384: (SHA- 256, 384);  SigVer: CURVES( P-256: (SHA-256, 384) P-384: (SHA- 256, 384) HMAC #2494  HMAC-SHA1, HMAC- SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 and HMAC-SHA512.Please note that the module performs the 1 The IV is generated internally using section 8.2.2 (as listed in Cert. #3845). Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|19 Power On Self-Test to HMAC- SHA512, but not use it in other security services at this time. RSA #1964  186-4KEY(gen); 2048  ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5] SIG(gen) (2048 SHA(256 , 384)); SIG(Ver) (2048 SHA(1 , 256, 384)) SHS #3167  SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. Please note that the module performs the Power On Self-Test to SHA- 512, but not use it in other security services at this time. Triple-DES #2118  TCBC (3-key Triple-DES)  AOS VMC GRUB Bootloader library implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms: Table 8 – Cryptographic Algorithms implemented by AOS VMC GRUB Bootloader library Algorithms Algorithm Certificates Used and Tested during the Power Up Self-Tests RSA #2082  FIPS186-4: ALG[RSASSA- PKCS1_V1_5] SIG(Ver) (2048 SHA(1,256)) SHS #3338  SHA-1  SHA-256 Non-FIPS Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms  Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)  EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 128 or 192 bits of encryption strength)  NDRNG  RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength) NOTE: IKEv1, IKEv2, TLS, SSH and SNMP protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP. 20| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy 6.5 Critical Security Parameters The following are the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) used in the module. Table 9 CSPs/Keys Used in the module # Name Algorithm/Key Size Generation/Use Storage Zeroization General Keys/CSPs 1 Key Encryption Key (KEK) Triple-DES (192 bits) Hardcoded during manufacturing. Used only to protect keys stored in the flash, not for key transport. Stored in Flash memory (plaintext). Zeroized by using command ‘write erase all’. 2 DRBG entropy input SP800-90a CTR_DRBG (512 bits) Entropy inputs to the DRBG function used to construct the DRBG seed. 64 bytes are gotten from the entropy source on each call by any service that requires a random number. Testing estimates 505.26 bits of entropy are returned in the 512 bit string. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext) Zeroized by rebooting the module 3 DRBG seed SP800-90a CTR_DRBG (384-bits) Input to the DRBG that determines the internal state of the DRBG. Generated using DRBG derivation function that includes the entropy input from the entropy source, , by any service that requires a random number Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext) Zeroized by rebooting the module 4 DRBG Key SP800-90a CTR_DRBG (256 bits) This is the DRBG key used for SP800-90a CTR_DRBG. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext) Zeroized by rebooting the module Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|21 Table 9 CSPs/Keys Used in the module 5 DRBG V SP800-90a CTR_DRBG V (128 bits) Internal V value used as part of SP800-90a CTR_DRBG Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext) Zeroized by rebooting the module 6 Diffie-Hellman private key Diffie-Hellman Group 14 (224 bits) Generated internally by calling FIPS approved DRBG (cert #1044) during Diffie-Hellman Exchange. Used for establishing DH shared secret. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 7 Diffie-Hellman public key Diffie-Hellman Group 14 (2048 bits) Generated internally by calling FIPS approved DRBG (cert #1044) during Diffie-Hellman Exchange. Used for establishing DH shared secret. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 8 Diffie-Hellman shared secret Diffie-Hellman Group 14 (2048 bits) Established during Diffie- Hellman Exchange. Used for deriving IPSec/IKE cryptographic keys. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 9 EC Diffie-Hellman private key EC Diffie-Hellman (Curves: P-256 or P- 384). Generated internally by calling FIPS approved DRBG (cert #1044) during EC Diffie- Hellman Exchange. Used for establishing ECDH shared secret. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 10 EC Diffie-Hellman public key EC Diffie-Hellman (Curves: P-256 or P- 384). Generated internally by calling FIPS approved DRBG (cert #1044) during EC Diffie- Hellman Exchange. Used for establishing ECDH shared secret. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 22| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy Table 9 CSPs/Keys Used in the module 11 EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret EC Diffie-Hellman (Curves: P-256 or P- 384) Established during EC Diffie-Hellman Exchange. Used for deriving IPSec/IKE cryptographic keys. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 12 RADIUS server shared secret 8-128 characters shared secret Entered by CO role. Used for RADIUS server authentication. Stored in Flash memory (ciphertext) encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by using command ‘write erase all’ or by overwriting with a new secret 13 Enable secret 8-64 characters password Entered by CO role. Used for CO role authentication. Stored in Flash memory (ciphertext) encrypted with KEK Zeroized by using command ‘write erase all’ or by overwriting with a new secret 14 User Password 8-64 characters password Entered by CO role. Used for User role authentication. Stored in Flash memory (ciphertext) encrypted with KEK Zeroized by using command ‘write erase all’ or by overwriting with a new secret 15 RSA Private Key RSA 2048 bit private key This key is generated by calling FIPS approved DRBG (cert #1044) in the module. Used for IKEv1, IKEv2, TLS, OCSP (signing OCSP messages) and EAP-TLS peers authentication. Stored in Flash memory (ciphertext) encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by using command ‘write erase all’ 16 RSA public key RSA 2048 bits public key This key is generated by calling FIPS approved DRBG (cert #1044) in the module. Used for IKEv1, IKEv2, TLS, OCSP (verifying OCSP messages) and EAP-TLS peers authentication. Stored in Flash memory (ciphertext) encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by using command ‘write erase all’ 17 ECDSA Private Key ECDSA suite B P-256 and P-384 curves This key is generated by calling FIPS approved DRBG (cert #1044) in the module. Used for IKEv1, IKEv2, TLS and EAP- TLS peers authentication. Stored in Flash memory (ciphertext) encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by using command ‘write erase all’ Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|23 Table 9 CSPs/Keys Used in the module 18 ECDSA Public Key ECDSA suite B P-256 and P-384 curves This key is generated by calling FIPS approved DRBG (cert #1044) in the module. Used for IKEv1, IKEv2, TLS and EAP- TLS peers authentication. Stored in Flash memory (ciphertext) encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by using command ‘write erase all’. IPSec/IKE 19 IKEv1 Pre-shared secret Shared secret (64 ASCII or 128 HEX characters) Entered by CO role. Used for IKEv1 peers authentication. Stored in Flash memory (ciphertext) encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by using command ‘write erase all’ or by overwriting with a new secret 20 skeyid Shared Secret (160/256/384 bits) A shared secret known only to IKE peers. It was established via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1). Used for deriving other keys in IKE protocol implementation. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module. 21 skeyid_d Shared Secret (160/256/384 bits) A shared secret known only to IKE peers. It was derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1). Used for deriving IKE session authentication key. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 22 SKEYSEED Shared Secret (160/256/384 bits) A shared secret known only to IKE peers. It was derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it will be used for deriving IKE session authentication key. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 24| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy Table 9 CSPs/Keys Used in the module 23 IKE session authentication key HMAC-SHA- 1/256/384 (160/256/384 bits) The IKE session (IKE Phase I) authentication key. This key is derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2). Used for IKEv1/IKEv2 payload integrity verification. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 24 IKE session encryption key Triple-DES (192 bits) /AES (128/192/256 bits) The IKE session (IKE Phase I) encrypt key. This key is derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2). Used for IKE payload protection. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 25 IPSec session encryption key Triple-DES (192 bits) / AES and AES-GCM (128/256 bits) NOTE: 192 bit CAVS tested, but not used. The IPsec (IKE phase II) encryption key. This key is derived via a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2). Used for IPSec traffics protection. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 26 IPSec session authentication key HMAC-SHA-1 (160 bits) The IPsec (IKE Phase II) authentication key. This key is derived via using the KDF defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv1/IKEv2). Used for IPSec traffics integrity verification. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module SSHv2 27 SSHv2 session key AES (128/192/256 bits) This key is derived via a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (SSHv2). Used for SSHv2 traffics protection. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|25 Table 9 CSPs/Keys Used in the module 28 SSHv2 session authentication key HMAC-SHA-1 (160- bit) This key is derived via a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (SSHv2). Used for SSHv2 traffics integrity verification. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module TLS 29 TLS pre-master secret 48 bytes secret This key is transferred into the module, protected by TLS RSA public key. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 30 TLS session encryption key AES 128/192/256 bits This key is derived via a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (TLS). Used for TLS traffics protection. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 31 TLS session authentication key HMAC-SHA- 1/256/384 (160/256/384 bits) This key is derived via a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (TLS). Used for TLS traffic integrity verification. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module SNMPv3 32 SNMPv3 authentication password 8-64 characters password Entered by CO role. User for SNMPv3 authentication. Stored in Flash memory (ciphertext) encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by using command ‘write erase all’ or by overwriting with a new secret 33 SNMPv3 engine ID 8-64 characters password Entered by CO role. A unique string used to identify the SNMP engine. Stored in Flash memory (ciphertext) encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by using command ‘write erase all’ or by overwriting with a new secret 26| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy Table 9 CSPs/Keys Used in the module 34 SNMPv3 session key AES-CFB key (128 bits) This key is derived via a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (SNMPv3). Used for SNMPv3 traffics protection. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 802.11i 35 802.11i Pre-shared secret Shared secret (8-64 characters) Entered by CO role. Used for 802.11i client/server authentication Stored in Flash memory (ciphertext) encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by using command ‘write erase all’ or by overwriting with a new secret 36 802.11i Pair-Wise Master key (PMK) Shared secret (256 bits) The PMK is transferred to the module, protected by IPSec secure tunnel. Used to derive the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) for 802.11i communications. Stored in SDRAM (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module 37 802.11i Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) Shared secret (512 bits) This key is used to derive 802.11i session key by using the KDF defined in SP800-108. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext) Zeroized by rebooting the module 38 802.11i session key AES-CCM (128 bits) Derived during 802.11i 4-way handshake by using the KDF defined in SP800-108. Stored in SDRAM memory (plaintext). Zeroized by rebooting the module Factory Key 39 Factory CA Public Key RSA (2048 bits) This is RSA public key. Loaded into the module during manufacturing. Used for Firmware verification. Stored in Flash encrypted with KEK Zeroized by using command ‘ap wipe out flash’ Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|27 6.6 Self-Tests The module performs Power On Self-Tests on power up. In addition, the module also performs Conditional tests after being configured into the FIPS mode. In the event any self-test fails, the module will enter an error state, log the error, and reboot automatically. The module performs the following POSTs (Power On Self-Tests):  ArubaOS OpenSSL library o AES encrypt KAT o AES decrypt KAT o AES-CCM encrypt KAT o AES-CCM decrypt KAT o DRBG KAT (plus all required health checks specified in SP800-90a, section 11.3) o ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test o HMAC (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 and HMAC-SHA512) KATs o RSA sign KAT o RSA verify KAT o SHS (SHA1, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512) KATs o Triple-DES encrypt KAT o Triple-DES decrypt KAT  ArubaOS Common Cryptographic library o AES encrypt KAT o AES decrypt KAT o AES-GCM encrypt KAT o AES-GCM decrypt KAT o ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test o HMAC (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 and HMAC-SHA512) KATs o RSA sign KAT o RSA verify KAT o SHA (SHA1, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512) KATs o Triple-DES encrypt KAT o Triple-DES decrypt KAT  AOS VMC GRUB Bootloader library o Firmware Integrity Test: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature verification with SHA-1 The module performs the following Conditional Tests:  ArubaOS OpenSSL library o Bypass Tests (Wired Bypass Test and Wireless Bypass Test) o CRNG Test on Approved DRBG o ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test o RSA Pairwise Consistency Test o Firmware Load Test- RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature verification with SHA-256 28| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy  ArubaOS Common Cryptographic library  ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test  RSA Pairwise Consistency Test  AOS VMC GRUB Bootloader library o Firmware Load Test - RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature verification with SHA-256  CRNG Test for NDRNG Self-test results are logged in a log file. Upon successful completion of the power-up self tests, the module logs a KATS: passed message into a log file. Confirm the file update by checking the associated time of the file. In the event of the KATs failure, the log file records a message. The following are typical example messages depending on the algorithm being tested:  AES256 HMAC-SHA1 hash failed  AES256 Encrypt failed  AES256 Decrypt Failed  3DES HMAC-SHA1 hash failed  3DES Encrypt failed  3DES Decrypt Failed  AESCCM Encrypt Failed This text is followed by this message: The POST Test failed!!!! Rebooting… 6.7 Alternating Bypass State The module implements an alternating bypass state when:  a port is configured in trusted mode to provide unauthenticated services  a configuration provides wireless access without encryption The alternating bypass status can be identified by retrieving the port configuration or the wireless network configuration. Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|29 7 Installing the Module This chapter covers the installation of the VMC-TACT Controllers with FIPS 140-2 Level 1 validation. The Crypto Officer is responsible for ensuring that the following procedures are used to install the module properly. This chapter covers the following installation topics:  Requirements for the module components  Selecting a proper environment for the module  Install the module on the hypervisor server  Power on the module using virtual machine management client 7.1 Pre-Installation Checklist You will need the following during installation:  Aruba VMC-TACT Controller components (host server, VM Host SW and Aruba VMC-TACT installation disk).  Cool, non-condensing air 0 to 40 ºC (32 to 104 ºF). May require air conditioning.  Management Station (PC) with 10/100 Mbps Ethernet port and virtual machine management client software. 7.1.1 Product Examination The units are shipped to the Crypto Officer in factory-sealed boxes using trusted commercial carrier shipping companies. The Crypto Officer should examine the carton for evidence of tampering. Tamper-evidence includes tears, scratches, and other irregularities in the packaging. 7.1.2 Package Contents The product carton should include the following:  Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controller CD  Aruba User Documentation CD 30| Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy 8 Ongoing Management The Aruba VMC-TACT Controllers meet FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements. The information below describes how to keep the controller in FIPS-approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer must ensure that the controller is kept in a FIPS- approved mode of operation. 8.1 Crypto Officer Management The Crypto Officer must ensure that the controller is always operating in a FIPS-approved mode of operation. This can be achieved by ensuring the following:  The admin role must be root.  Passwords must be at least eight characters long.  VPN services can only be provided by IPsec or L2TP over IPsec.  Access to the controller Web Interface is permitted only using HTTPS over a TLS tunnel. Basic HTTP and HTTPS over SSL are not permitted.  Only SNMP read-only may be enabled.  Only FIPS-approved algorithms can be used for cryptographic services (such as HTTPS, L2, AES-CBC, SSH, and IKEv1/IKEv2-IPSec), which include AES, Triple-DES, SHA-1, HMAC SHA-1, and RSA signature and verification.  TFTP can only be used to load backup and restore files. These files are: Configuration files (system setup configuration), the WMS database (radio network configuration), and log files. (FTP and TFTP over IPsec can be used to transfer configuration files.)  The controller logs must be monitored. If a strange activity is found, the Crypto Officer should take the controller off line and investigate.  The ‘no’ command in the CLI can be used to zeroize IKE, IPsec and CA CSPs. Please See CLI guide for details. 8.2 User Guidance The User accesses the controller VPN functionality as an IPsec client. The user can also access the controller 802.11i functionality as an 802.11 client. Although outside the boundary of the controller, the User should be directed to be careful not to provide authentication information and session keys to others parties. Aruba VMC-TACT Series Virtual Controllers FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Security Policy|31 8.3 Setup and Configuration The Aruba VMC-TACT Controllers meet FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements. The sections below detail the FIPS-approved mode of operation. 8.4 Setting Up Your Virtual Controller To set up your controller: 1. Make sure that the module is not connected to any device on your network. 2. Boot up the module. 3. Connect your PC or workstation to a physical port mapped to the module interface. For further details, see the ArubaOS 6.4 Quick Start Guide. 8.5 Enabling FIPS Mode  The Module operates in the FIPS Approved mode. No action needs to be taken to put the module in FIPS Approved mode. Taking the module out of FIPS Approved mode is not an Aruba approved mode of operation and is not supported. To verify FIPS mode, issue the command “show fips,” This should always return the affirmative result.