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D2iQ BoringCrypto Cryptographic Security Module
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Software version:
66005f41fbc3529ffe8d007708756720529da20d
Date:10/22/2020
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Introduction
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but
Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and
Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE) Cryptographic Module Validation Program
(CMVP) run the FIPS 140 program. The NVLAP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140
testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS 140 validation. Validated is the term given to a
module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140 criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for D2iQ BoringCrypto Cryptographic Security
Module from D2iQ Inc. provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets
the overall Level 1 security requirements of FIPS 140-2.
D2iQ BoringCrypto Cryptographic Security Module may also be referred to as the “module” in this
document.
Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
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Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................2
About this Document ..............................................................................................................................2
Notices....................................................................................................................................................2
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................6
2. FIPS 140-2 Security Levels................................................................................................................7
3. Cryptographic Module Specification ................................................................................................8
3.1 Cryptographic Boundary...........................................................................................................8
4. Modes of Operation.........................................................................................................................9
5. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces .....................................................................................9
6. Roles, Authentication and Services ................................................................................................10
7. Physical Security............................................................................................................................12
8. Operational Environment ..............................................................................................................12
9. Cryptographic Algorithms & Key Management...............................................................................13
9.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms.......................................................................................13
9.2 Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms.........................................................................................14
9.3 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms...............................................................................14
9.4 Cryptographic Key Management ............................................................................................14
9.5 Public Keys.............................................................................................................................15
9.6 Key Generation ......................................................................................................................15
9.7 Key Storage............................................................................................................................16
9.8 Key Zeroization ......................................................................................................................16
10. Self-tests....................................................................................................................................17
10.1 Power-On Self-Tests...............................................................................................................17
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests.............................................................................................................17
11. Mitigation of other Attacks ........................................................................................................18
12. Guidance and Secure Operation.................................................................................................19
12.1 Installation Instructions..........................................................................................................19
12.2 Secure Operation ...................................................................................................................20
12.2.1 Initialization....................................................................................................................20
12.2.2 Usage of AES OFB, CFB and CFB8 ....................................................................................20
12.2.3 Usage of AES-GCM..........................................................................................................20
12.2.4 Usage of Triple-DES ........................................................................................................20
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12.2.5 RSA and ECDSA Keys.......................................................................................................20
13. References and Standards..........................................................................................................22
14. Acronyms and Definitions ..........................................................................................................22
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Tested Operational Environments ............................................................................................6
Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section ......................................................................................7
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces .................................................................................................................9
Table 4 – Approved Services, Roles and Access Rights............................................................................10
Table 5 – non-Approved or non-security relevant services.....................................................................10
Table 6 - Non-Security Relevant Services ...............................................................................................11
Table 7 – Approved Algorithms and CAVP Certificates ...........................................................................13
Table 8 – Allowed Algorithms ................................................................................................................14
Table 9 – Non-Approved Algorithms......................................................................................................14
Table 10 – Keys and CSPs supported......................................................................................................15
Table 11 – Public keys supported...........................................................................................................15
Table 12 – Power-on Self-tests ..............................................................................................................17
Table 13 – Conditional Self-tests............................................................................................................17
Table 14 – References and Standards ....................................................................................................22
Table 15 – Acronyms and Definitions.....................................................................................................23
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Logical Boundary.....................................................................................................................8
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1. Introduction
D2iQ BoringCrypto Cryptographic Security Module (hereafter referred to as the “module”) is an open-
source, general-purpose cryptographic library which provides FIPS 140-2 approved cryptographic
algorithms to serve BoringSSL and other user-space applications. The validated version of the library is
66005f41fbc3529ffe8d007708756720529da20d. For the purposes of the FIPS 140-2 validation, its
embodiment type is defined as multi-chip standalone.
The cryptographic module was tested on the following operational environments on the general-
purpose computer (GPC) platforms detailed below:
# Operational
Environment
Processor Family Platform Compiler
1 Debian Linux 4.9.0
(Rodete)
Intel Xeon E5-2680
(with PAA)
Clang (6.0.1)
2 Debian Linux 4.9.0
(Rodete)
Intel Xeon E5-2680
(without PAA)
Clang (6.0.1)
3 Ubuntu Linux 18.04 POWER9 (with
PAA)
Clang (6.0.1)
4 Ubuntu Linux 18.04 POWER9 (without
PAA)
Clang (6.0.1)
5 Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 7
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Platinum 8156
(with PAA)
DELL PowerEdge R740 gcc v4.8.5
6 Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 8
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Platinum 8156
(with PAA)
DELL PowerEdge R740 gcc v8.3.1
Table 1 – Tested Operational Environments
The cryptographic module is also supported on the following operating environments for which
operational testing and algorithm testing was not performed:
• Linux 4.X executing on x86_64 architecture;
• Linux 4.X executing on POWER9 architecture;
As per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance G.5, compliance is maintained for other versions of the
respective operational environments where the module binary is unchanged. No claim can be made as
to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys if any source
code is changed and the module binary is reconstructed.
The GPC(s) used during testing met Federal Communications Commission (FCC) FCC Electromagnetic
Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for business use as defined
by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B. FIPS 140-2 validation compliance is maintained
when the module is operated on other versions of the GPOS running in single user mode, assuming that
the requirements outlined in NIST IG G.5 are met.
The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of
the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation
certificate.
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2. FIPS 140-2 Security Levels
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:
FIPS 140-2 Section Title Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section
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3. Cryptographic Module Specification
3.1 Cryptographic Boundary
The module is a software library providing a C-language application program interface (API) for use by
other processes that require cryptographic functionality. All operations of the module occur via calls
from host applications and their respective internal daemons/processes. As such there are no untrusted
services calling the services of the module.
The physical cryptographic boundary is the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed.
The logical cryptographic boundary of the D2iQ BoringCrypto Cryptographic Security Module is a single
object file named bcm.o which is statically linked to BoringSSL. The module performs no
communications other than with the calling application (the process that invokes the module services)
and the host operating system.
Figure 1 shows the logical relationship of the cryptographic module to the other software and hardware
components of the computer.
Figure 1 – Logical Boundary
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4. Modes of Operation
The module supports two modes of operation: Approved and Non-approved. The module will be in FIPS-
approved mode when all power up self-tests have completed successfully, and only Approved
algorithms are invoked. See Table 7 below for a list of the supported Approved algorithms and Table 8
for allowed algorithms. The non-Approved mode is entered when a non-Approved algorithm is invoked.
See Table 9 for a list of non-Approved algorithms.
5. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions. The Data Output
interface consists of the output parameters of the API functions. The Control Input interface consists of
the actual API input parameters. The Status Output interface includes the return values of the API
functions.
FIPS Interface Physical Ports Logical Interfaces
Data Input Physical ports of the tested platforms API input parameters
Data Output Physical ports of the tested platforms API output parameters and return
values
Control Input Physical ports of the tested platforms API input parameters
Status Output Physical ports of the tested platforms API return values
Power Input Physical ports of the tested platforms N/A
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside module scope. However, when the module
is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the module’s logical data output interfaces is
inhibited.
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6. Roles, Authentication and Services
The cryptographic module implements both User and Crypto Officer (CO) roles. The module does not
support user authentication. The User and CO roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing
services implemented by the module. A user is considered the owner of the thread that instantiates the
module and, therefore, only one concurrent user is allowed.
The Approved services supported by the module and access rights within services accessible over the
module’s public interface are listed in the table below.
Service Approved security
functions
Keys and/or CSPs Roles Access rights to keys
and/or CSPs
Module Initialization N/A N/A CO N/A
Symmetric
encryption/decryption
AES, Triple-DES AES, Triple-DES
symmetric keys
User, CO Execute
Keyed hashing HMAC-SHA HMAC key User, CO Execute
Hashing SHS None User, CO N/A
Random Bit
Generation
CTR_DRBG DRBG seed, internal
state V and Key
values
User, CO Write/Execute
Signature generation/
verification
CTR_DRBG
RSA
ECDSA
RSA, ECDSA private
key
User, CO Write/Execute
Key Transport RSA RSA private key User, CO Write/Execute
Key Agreement KAS ECC EC DH private key User, CO Write/Execute
Key Generation CTR_DRBG
RSA
ECDSA
RSA, ECDSA private
key
User, CO Write/Execute
On-Demand
Self-test
None None User, CO Execute
Zeroization None All keys User, CO Write/Execute
Show status None None User, CO N/A
Table 4 – Approved Services, Roles and Access Rights
The module provides the following non-Approved services which utilize algorithms listed in Table 9:
Service Non-Approved Functions Roles Keys and/or CSPs
Symmetric
encryption/decryption
AES (non-compliant),
DES, Triple-DES (non-
compliant)
User, CO N/A
Hashing MD4, MD5, POLYVAL User, CO N/A
Signature generation/
verification
RSA (non-compliant)
ECDSA (non-compliant)
User, CO N/A
Key Transport RSA (non-compliant) User, CO N/A
Key Generation RSA (non-compliant)
ECDSA (non-compliant)
User, CO N/A
Table 5 – non-Approved or non-security relevant services
The module also provides the following non-Approved or non-security relevant services over a non-
public interface:
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Service Approved Security
Functions
Roles Access rights to keys
and/or CSPs
Large integer operations None User, CO N/A
Disable automatic
generation of CTR_DRBG
"additional_input"
parameter"
CTR_DRBG User, CO N/A
Wegman-Carter hashing
with POLYVAL
None User, CO N/A
Table 6 - Non-Security Relevant Services
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7. Physical Security
The cryptographic module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.
8. Operational Environment
The cryptographic module operates under Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7, Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8,
Ubuntu Linux 18.04 and Debian Linux 4.9.0. The module runs on a GPC running one of the operating
systems specified in Table 1. Each approved operating system manages processes and threads in a
logically separated manner. The module’s user is considered the owner of the calling application that
instantiates the module.
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9. Cryptographic Algorithms & Key Management
9.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements the following FIPS 140-2 Approved algorithms:
CAVP Cert # Algorithm Standard Mode/Method Use
5612
C1867
AES SP 800-38A
FIPS 197
SP 800-38F
128, 192, 256 CBC, ECB,
CTR, GCM, GMAC
Encryption, Decryption,
Authentication
5612
C1867
KTS SP 800-38F KW Key Wrapping, Key
Unwrapping,
2035
C1867
CVL SP 800-135rev1 TLS 1.0/1.1 and 1.2 KDF Key Derivation
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG SP 800-133 Cryptographic Key
Generation
Key Generation
2253
C1867
DRBG SP 800-90Arev1 AES-256 CTR_DRBG Random Bit Generation
1520
(CVL)
2034
C1867
ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation
Component, Key Pair
Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature
Verification, Public Key
Validation
P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
512
Digital Signature Services
3743
C1867
HMAC FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-
224, HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-
SHA-512
Generation,
Authentication
2033
C1867
KAS ECC
(CVL)
SP 800-56A Ephemeral Unified Key agreement scheme
3020
C1867
RSA FIPS 186-4 Key Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature
Verification
(1024, 2048, 3072)
Note: Key size 1024 is
only used for Signature
Verification
Digital Signature Services
4509
C1867
SHA FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
Digital Signature
Generation, Digital
Signature Verification,
non-Digital Signature
Applications
2825
C1867
Triple-DES SP 800-67
SP 800-38A
TCBC, TECB Encryption, Decryption
Table 7 – Approved Algorithms and CAVP Certificates
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9.2 Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following non-FIPS 140-2 Approved but allowed algorithms that may be used
in the Approved mode of operation.
Algorithm Use
EC Diffie-Hellman CVL Certs. #2033, #C1867 and CVL Certs. #2035, #C1867; key agreement;
key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
RSA Key Transport Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
MD5 When used with the TLS protocol
NDRNG Used only to seed the Approved DRBG
Table 8 – Allowed Algorithms
9.3 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module employs the methods listed in Table 9, which are not allowed for use in a FIPS-Approved
mode. Their use will result in the module operating in a non-Approved mode.
MD5, MD4 DES
AES-GCM (non-compliant) AES (non-compliant)
ECDSA (non-compliant) RSA (non-compliant)
POLYVAL Triple-DES (non-compliant)
Table 9 – Non-Approved Algorithms
9.4 Cryptographic Key Management
The table below provides a complete list of Private Keys and CSPs used by the module:
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Key/CSP Name Key Description Generated/ Input Output
AES Key AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt
key
Input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
AES-GCM Key AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt
/ generate / verify key
Input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
AES Wrapping Key AES (128/192/256) key wrapping key Input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
Triple-DES Key Triple-DES (3-Key) encrypt / decrypt
key
Input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
ECDSA Signing Key ECDSA (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521)
signature generation key
Internally Generated
or input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
EC DH Private Key EC DH (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521)
private key
Internally Generated
or input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
HMAC Key Keyed hash key
(160/224/256/384/512)
Input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
RSA Key (Key
Transport)
RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key
decryption (private key transport)
key
Internally Generated
or input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
RSA Signature
Generation Key
RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) signature
generation key
Internally Generated
or input via API in
plaintext
Output via API in
plaintext
TLS Master Secret Shared Secret; 48 bytes of pseudo-
random data
Internally Derived via
key derivation
function defined in
SP 800-135 KDF
(TLS).
Output via API in
plaintext
CTR_DRBG V (Seed) 128 bits Internally Generated Does not exit the
module
CTR_DRBG Key 256 bits Internally Generated Does not exit the
module
CTR_DRBG Entropy
Input
384 bits Input via API in
plaintext
Does not exit the
module
Table 10 – Keys and CSPs supported
9.5 Public Keys
The table below provides a complete list of the Public keys used by the module:
Public Key Name Key Description
ECDSA Verification Key ECDSA (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521)
signature verification key
EC DH Public Key EC DH (P-224/P-256/P-384/P-521) public
key
RSA Key (Key Transport) RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key encryption
(public key transport) key
RSA Signature Verification
Key
RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature
verification public key
Table 11 – Public keys supported
9.6 Key Generation
The module supports generation of ECDSA, EC Diffie-Hellman and RSA key pairs as specified in Section 5
of NIST SP 800-133. The module employs a NIST SP 800-90A random bit generator for creation of the
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seed for asymmetric key generation. The module requests a minimum number of 128 bits of entropy
from its Operational Environment per each call.
The output data path is provided by the data interfaces and is logically disconnected from processes
performing key generation or zeroization. No key information will be output through the data output
interface when the module zeroizes keys.
9.7 Key Storage
The cryptographic module does not perform persistent storage of keys. Keys and CSPs are passed to the
module by the calling application. The keys and CSPs are stored in memory in plaintext. Keys and CSPs
residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be accessed
using the module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space from
unauthorized access.
9.8 Key Zeroization
The module is passed keys as part of a function call from a calling application and does not store keys
persistently. The calling application is responsible for parameters passed in and out of the module. The
Operating System and the calling application are responsible to clean up temporary or ephemeral keys.
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10. Self-tests
FIPS 140-2 requires the module to perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the
correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. Some functions require conditional tests
during normal operation of the module. The supported tests are listed and described in this section.
10.1 Power-On Self-Tests
Power-on self-tests are run upon the initialization of the module and do not require operator
intervention to run. If any of the tests fail, the module will not initialize. The module will enter an error
state and no services can be accessed.
The module implements the following power-on self-tests:
Type Test
Integrity Test HMAC-SHA-512
Known Answer
Test
AES KAT (encryption and decryption. Key size: 128-bits)
AES-GCM KAT (encryption and decryption. Key size: 128-bits)
Triple-DES KAT (encryption and decryption. Key size: 168-bits)
ECDSA KAT (signature generation/signature verification. Curve: P-256)
HMAC KAT (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-512)
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG KAT (Key size: 256-bits)
RSA KAT (signature generation/signature verification and
encryption/decryption. Key size: 2048-bit)
SHA KAT (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512)
Table 12 – Power-on Self-tests
Each module performs all power-on self-tests automatically when the module is initialized. All power-on
self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The Power-on self-tests can
be run on demand by power-cycling the host platform.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are run during operation of the module. If any of these tests fail, the module will
enter an error state, where no services can be accessed by the operators. The module can be re-
initialized to clear the error and resume FIPS mode of operation. Each module performs the following
conditional self-tests:
Type Test
Pair-wise
Consistency Test
ECDSA Key Pair generation
RSA Key Pair generation
CRNGT Performed on NDRNG per IG 9.8
DRBG Health
Tests
Performed on DRBG, per SP 800‐90A Section 11.3. Required per IG
C.1.
Table 13 – Conditional Self-tests
Pairwise consistency tests are performed for both possible modes of use, e.g. Sign/Verify and
Encrypt/Decrypt.
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11. Mitigation of other Attacks
The module is not designed to mitigate against attacks which are outside of the scope of FIPS 140-2.
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12. Guidance and Secure Operation
12.1 Installation Instructions
The following steps shall be performed to build, compile and statically link the D2iQ BoringCrypto
Cryptographic Security Module to BoringSSL on the tested Operational Environments. The cryptographic
module
The below tools are required in order to build and compile the module:
• Clang compiler version 6.0.1 (http://releases.llvm.org/download.html)
• Go programming language version 1.10.3 (https://golang.org/dl/)
• Ninja build system version 1.8.2 (https://github.com/ninja-build/ninja/releases)
Once the above tools have been obtained, issue the following command to create a CMake toolchain file
to specify the use of Clang:
printf "set(CMAKE_C_COMPILER \"clang\")\nset(CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER \"clang++\")\n" >
${HOME}/toolchain
The FIPS 140-2 validated release of the module can be obtained by downloading the tarball containing
the source code at the following location:
https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-boringssl-docs/fips/boringssl-
66005f41fbc3529ffe8d007708756720529da20d.tar.xz
or by issuing the following command:
wget https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-boringssl-docs/fips/boringssl-
66005f41fbc3529ffe8d007708756720529da20d.tar.xz
The set of files specified in the archive constitutes the complete set of source files of the validated
module. There shall be no additions, deletions, or alterations of this set as used during module build.
The downloaded tarball file can be verified using the below SHA-256 digest value:
b12ad676ee533824f698741bd127f6fbc82c46344398a6d78d25e62c6c418c73
By issuing the following command:
• sha256sum boringssl-66005f41fbc3529ffe8d007708756720529da20d.tar.xz
After the tarball has been extracted, the following commands will compile the module:
1. cd boringssl
2. mkdir build && cd build && cmake -GNinja -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=${HOME}/toolchain -
DFIPS=1 -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release ..
3. ninja
4. ninja run_tests
Upon completion of the build process. The module’s status can be verified by issuing:
• ./tool/bssl isfips
The module will print “1” if it is in a FIPS 140-2 validated mode of operation.
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12.2 Secure Operation
12.2.1 Initialization
The cryptographic module is initialized by loading the module before any cryptographic functionality is
available. In User Space the operating system is responsible for the initialization process and loading of
the library. The module is designed with a default entry point (DEP) which ensures that the power-up
tests are initiated automatically when the module is loaded.
12.2.2 Usage of AES OFB, CFB and CFB8
In approved mode, users of the module must not utilize AES OFB, CFB and CFB8.
12.2.3 Usage of AES-GCM
In the case of AES-GCM, the IV generation method is user selectable and the value can be computed in
more than one manner.
Following RFC 5288 for TLS, the module ensures that it's strictly increasing and thus cannot repeat.
When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party,
client or server, to encounter this condition may either trigger a handshake to establish a new
encryption key in accordance with RFC 5246, or fail. In either case, the module prevents and IV
duplication and thus enforces the security property.
The module’s IV is generated internally by the module’s Approved DRBG. The DRBG seed is generated
inside the module’s physical boundary. The IV is 96-bits in length per NIST SP 800-38D, Section 8.2.2 and
FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 scenario 2.
The selection of the IV construction method is the responsibility of the user of this cryptographic
module. In approved mode, users of the module must not utilize GCM with an externally generated IV.
Per IG A.5, in the event module power is lost and restored the consuming application must ensure that
any of its AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
12.2.4 Usage of Triple-DES
In accordance with CMVP IG A.13, when operating in a FIPS approved mode of operation, the same
Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 220
or 216
64-bit data blocks.
The TLS protocol governs the generation of the respective Triple-DES keys. Please refer to IETF RFC 5246
(TLS) for details relevant to the generation of the individual Triple-DES encryption keys. The user is
responsible for ensuring that the module limits the number of encrypted blocks with the same key to no
more than 220
when utilized as part of a recognized IETF protocol.
For all other uses of Triple-DES the user is responsible for ensuring that the module limits the number of
encrypted blocks with the same key to no more than 216
.
12.2.5 RSA and ECDSA Keys
The module allows the use of 1024 bits RSA keys for legacy purposes including signature generation,
which is disallowed to be used in FIPS Approved mode as per NIST SP 800-131A. Therefore, the
cryptographic operations with the non-approved key sizes will result in the module operating in non-
Approved mode implicitly.
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Approved algorithms shall not use the keys generated by the module’s non-Approved key generation
methods.
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13. References and Standards
The following Standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25 2001
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic
Module Validation Program, January 11, 2016.
SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of
Ciphertext Stealing for CBC Mode
SP 800-38D Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter
Mode (GCM) and GMAC
SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key
Wrapping
SP 800-67 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA)
Block Cipher
SP 800-56A Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography
SP 800-90A Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators
Table 14 – References and Standards
14. Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Crypto Module Validation Program
CO Cryptographic Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter-mode
CVL Component Validation List
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB Electronic Code Book
EC DH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Authority
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GPC General Purpose Computer
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Acronym Definition
HMAC key-Hashed Message Authentication Code
IG Implementation Guidance
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest algorithm MD5
N/A Non Applicable
NDRNG Non Deterministic Random Number Generator
OS Operating System
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
Table 15 – Acronyms and Definitions