7705 Series FIPS-140-2 Security Policy
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, 2023 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 1/23
Corporation
7705 SAR-OS SAR-A/M Cryptographic Module
(SARCM 3.1SAR-OS 21.10R5)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level:1
Document Version: 1.9
December 8th, 2023
7705 Series FIPS-140-2 Security Policy
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................................................................3
1. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................................5
1.1 PURPOSE......................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 VERSIONS AVAILABLE FOR FIPS.................................................................................................................5
2. SAR-OS CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE OVERVIEW ................................................................................6
2.1 SARCM CHARACTERISTICS........................................................................................................................6
2.2 SARCM APPROVED ALGORITHMS..............................................................................................................7
2.3 SARCM NON-APPROVED BUT ALLOWED ALGORITHMS .............................................................................9
2.4 SARCM INTERFACES..................................................................................................................................9
3. SARCM ROLES AND SERVICES................................................................................................................11
4. PHYSICAL SECURITY .................................................................................................................................12
5. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..............................................................................................................13
6. KEY TABLE ....................................................................................................................................................14
6.1 KEYS/CSPS ALGORITHMS IN FIPS-140-2 MODE ......................................................................................14
7. EMC/EMI (FCC COMPLIANCE).................................................................................................................17
8. SELF TESTS ....................................................................................................................................................18
8.1 SELF TESTS ON THE CSM..........................................................................................................................18
8.1.1 Cryptographic DRBG Startup Test......................................................................................................18
8.1.2 RSA Startup test ...................................................................................................................................19
8.2 CONDITIONAL TEST ON THE CSM .............................................................................................................19
9. FIPS-140 USER GUIDANCE .........................................................................................................................21
9.1 FIPS-140-2 MODE CONFIGURATION .........................................................................................................21
9.2 CONFIGURATIONS NOT ALLOWED WHEN RUNNING IN FIPS-140-2 MODE ................................................21
9.3 NON-FIPS-140-2 MODE............................................................................................................................22
10. REFERENCES ...............................................................................................................................................23
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2-1: SARCM Diagram of Logical and Physical Boundaries...................................6
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GLOSSARY
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BGP Border Gateway Protocol
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CFM Control / Forwarding Module
CLI Command Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSM Control Switch Module
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CVL Component Validation List
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
ICV Integrity Check Value
IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec IP Security
LDP Label Distribution Protocol
LSP Label Switched Path
MPLS Multi-protocol label switching
NDRNG Non-Deterministic RNG
NGE Network Group Encryption
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy
RNG Random Number Generator
SA Security Association
SAM Service Aware Manager
SFM Switch Fabric Module
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
SPI Security Parameter Index
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TLS Transport Layer Security
TM Traffic Management
VPLS Virtual Private LAN Service
Table 1 - Glossary
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This document describes the non-proprietary SAR-OS (Service Aggregation Router Operating
System) Cryptographic Module (SARCM) Security Policy for the 7705 Service Aggregation
Router (SAR) product family. These are referenced in the document as either 7705 or SAR.
This security policy provides the details for configuring and running the 7705 products in a
FIPS-140-2 mode of operation and describes how the module meets the level 1 requirements of
FIPS 140-2. Please see the references section for a full list of FIPS 140-2 requirements.
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 2 - Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
1.2 Versions Available for FIPS
The following platforms of the 7705 products that implement the module are either tested or
compatible for running SARCM in a FIPS approved mode:
Platform Model(s)
7705 Service Aggregation Router (SAR)
non-IPsec/NGE
SAR-A, SAR-M
Table 3 - FIPS Capable Platforms and Models
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2. SAR-OS CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE OVERVIEW
The section provides an overview of the SAR-OS Cryptographic Module (SARCM) and the
FIPS validated cryptographic algorithms used by services requiring those algorithms. The
SARCM doesn’t implement any services or protocols directly. Instead, it provides the
cryptographic algorithm functions needed to allow SAR-OS to implement cryptography for those
services and protocols that require it.
2.1 SARCM Characteristics
Figure 2-1: SARCM Diagram of Logical and Physical Boundaries
The SARCM logical and physical properties and boundary considerations is illustrated in Figure
2-1. The solid blue line represents the physical boundary of the cryptographic module that
represents the hardware system on which SAR-OS is running and hence where SARCM is also
running. The dashed blue line indicates the logical cryptographic boundary of the SARCM
within SAR-OS. The SARCM is available as a cryptographic service for any SAR-OS services
or protocols that require cryptographic operations.
The SARCM provides the cryptographic services required for the control plane (ie routing
protocols etc). On the 7705 SAR-A and SAR-M, all the control plane functionality is part of the
Control and Switching Module (CSM), while the data plane is managed by the Winpath network
processor. It should be noted on these platforms the CSM and line cards are physically on the
same hardware, but logically separate. The Winpath network processor on these platforms are
not encryption capable.
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The SARCM is part of two SAR-OS binary files (both.tim and support.tim) that are used to run
the full SAR-OS application. SARCM is classified as a multi-chip standalone software module
and SARCM is statically included within the SAR-OS application code. SARCM has been
validated on each CSM used by the hardware platforms listed in the following table. Note that
the CSM is integrated into the chassis of 7705 SAR-M and A variants
Platform Hardware running
SAR-OS
Processor
SAR-A 1 core @ 300 MHz on
chassis
Cavium Octeon Plus
SAR-M 1 core @ 500 MHz on
chassis
Cavium Octeon Plus
Table 4 – Validated Hardware and FIPS Compatible Platforms
The software version used to validate version 3.1 of the SARCM was SAR-OS 21.10R5.
2.2 SARCM Approved Algorithms
There are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAV tested but not used by the module.
Only the algorithms, modes, and key lengths in this table are used by the module.
The SARCM uses the following FIPS approved algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP Cert
(21.10R5)
AES CBC (e/d; 128, 192, 256); CFB128 (e/d;128); CTR (e only; 128,
192, 256)
C2073
CKG
SP 800 133
Seeds used for generating symmetric & asymmetric keys are
unmodified output from Module’s DRBG. Section 5 & 6
Vendor affirmed
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Triple-DES (TCBC) (e/d; keying option 1) C2073
RSA
FIPS186-2:ANSI X9.31 1024-bit & 1536-bit& 2048-bit & 3072-bit &
4096-bit signature verification
FIPS186-2: PKCS v1.5 1024-bit & 1536-bit& 2048-bit & 3072-bit &
4096-bit Signature Verification
FIPS186-2: PKCSPSS 1024-bit & 1536-bit& 2048-bit & 3072-bit &
4096-bit Signature Verification
FIPS186-4: ANSI X9.31 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature Generation
FIPS186-4: PKCS v1.5 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature Generation
FIPS186-4: PKCSPSS 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature Generation
FIPS186-4: 3072-bit Key Pair Generation [FIPS186-4_Fixed_e
(10001)
FIPS186-4: ANSI X9.31 1024-bit, 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature
Verification
FIPS186-4: PKCS v1.5: 1024-bit, 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature
Verification
FIPS186-4: PKCSPSS: 1024-bit, 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature
Verification
C2073
HMAC (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256,
HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512)
C2073
AES-GCM
• Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt
• IV Generation: External
• Key Length: 256
• Tag Length: 128
• IV Length: 96
• Payload Length: 8, 128, 256, 408
• AAD Length: 8, 128, 256, 408
AES-GMAC
• Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt
• IV Generation: External
• Key Length: 256
• Tag Length: 128
• IV Length: 96
• AAD Length: 8, 128, 256, 408
C2073
CMAC AES-128 Generation
o Capabilities:
▪ Direction: Generation
▪ Key Length: 128
▪ MAC: 64, 96, 128
▪ Message Length: 0, 128, 320, 480,
512, 524288
o Capabilities:
▪ Direction: Verification
▪ Key Length: 128
▪ MAC: 64, 96, 128
C2073
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▪ Message Length: 0, 128, 320, 480,
512, 524288
SHS (SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512) C2073
DRBG CTR_DRBG (AES-256) C2073
DSA
FIPS186-4: 2048-bit & 3072-bit PQG Generation
FIPS186-4: 1024-bit & 2048-bit & 3072-bit PQG Verification
FIPS186-4: 2048-bit & 3072-bit Key Pair Generation [(2048,256)
; (3072,256)]
FIPS186-4: 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature Generation [(2048,224 &
256) ; (3072,256)]
FIPS186-4: 1024-bit, 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature
Verification [(1024,160) ; (2048,224 & 256) ; (3072,256)]
C2073
CVL
SSH KDF
(SHA-1) SHA, (SHA-2) SHA2-512, SHA2-256, (128-bit, 192-bit,
256-bit) AES-CBC, TDES-CBC
C2073
KAS-SSC per SP 800-56Arev3:
FFC: dhEphem scheme per Section 6.1.2.1 in SP 800-56Arev3.
A3135
KAS
KAS-SSC per SP 800-56Arev3:
(Cert. #A3135)
FFC: dhEphem scheme per Section 6.1.2.1 in SP 800-56Arev3.
SP 800-135 CVL:
(Cert. C2073)
KAS-SSC (Cert. #
#A3135) with CVL
(Cert. C2073)
Table 5 – Approved Algorithm Implementations
2.3 SARCM non-Approved but Allowed Algorithms
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are:
• NDRNG seeded with 256 bits of entropy.
2.4 SARCM Interfaces
The physical ports used by SARCM within SAR-OS are the same as those available on the
system which is running SAR-OS per the platforms specified in the previous section. The
logical interface is a C-language application program interface (API).
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The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API procedures and includes
plaintext and/or cipher text data.
The Data Output interface consists of the output parameters of the API procedures and includes
plaintext and/or cipher text data.
The Control Input interface consists of API functions that specify commands and control data
used to control the operation of the module. The API may specify other functions or procedures
as control input data.
The Status Output includes the return status, data and values associated with the status of the
module.
The module provides logical interfaces to the other services within SAR-OS and those other
SAR-OS services use the following logical interfaces for cryptographic functions: data input,
data output, control input, and status output.
Interface Description
Data Input API input parameters including plaintext and/or cipher text data
Data Output API output parameters including plaintext and/or cipher text data
Control Input API procedure calls that may include other function calls as input, or
input arguments that specify commands and control data used to control
the operation of the module.
Status Output API return code describing the status of SARCM
Table 6 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings
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3. SARCM ROLES AND SERVICES
The SARCM meets all FIPS 140-2 level 1 requirements for Roles and Services, implementing
support for both the Crypto Officer and User roles within the SARCM. The support for both
Crypto Officer and User roles within the SARCM is classed as a process. As allowed by FIPS
140-2, the SARCM does not support user authentication for these roles. Only one role may be
using the SARCM at a time and the module does not allow concurrent operators to access the
SARCM.
The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing the services
implemented by the SARCM:
• Installation and initialization of the SARCM which is embedded in the SAR-OS image
and installed on the SAR-OS platforms is assumed implicitly as the Crypto Officer when
installation and initialization occurs.
The services available by the SARCM in FIPS mode to the Crypto Officer and User roles consist
of the following:
Services Access Critical Security Parameters Crypto
Officer
User
Encryption Execute Symmetric keys AES, Triple-DES X X
Decryption Execute Symmetric keys AES, Triple-DES X X
Hash (HMAC) Execute HMAC SHA keys X X
Key generation Write/execute Symmetric key AES, Triple-DES,
Asymmetric RSA, DSA, Diffie-Hellman
public and private keys
X X
Key agreement Execute DH public/private key X X
Perform Self-Tests Execute/read NA X X
DRBG Execute Seed input X X
Show Status Execute NA X X
Signature signing Execute Asymmetric private key DSA, RSA X X
Signature verification Execute Asymmetric public key DSA, RSA, X X
Zeroization Execute Symmetric key, asymmetric key, HMAC-
SHA keys, seed key, seed
X X
Module Initialization Execute All CSPs X
Table 7 – Module Services
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4. PHYSICAL SECURITY
The module obtains its physical security from any platform running SAR-OS with production
grade components and standard passivation as allowed by FIPS 140-2 level 1.
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5. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The SARCM was tested on the following platforms that represent the required HW components
that runs SAR-OS and the SARCM.
Platform used for
testing/validation
Hardware running SAR-OS
SAR-A 1 core @ 300 MHz on chassis, Cavium Octeon Plus
SAR-M 1 core @ 500 MHz on Chassis, Cavium Octeon Plus
Table 8 – Hardware and Platforms Used to Test Module
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6. KEY TABLE
6.1 Keys/CSPs Algorithms In FIPS-140-2 Mode
The following keys and CSPs are available when running in FIPS-140-2 mode for the SARCM:
Key or CSP Usage
(Service)
Storage Generation/Input Zeroization Access
Role
(R,W,X)
AES-128-CFB SNMPv3 Non-Volatile memory
(Encrypted*)
Operator –
Manually
Command R, W
AES-128-CBC SSHv2,
Secure
Copy,
SFTP
DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-192-CBC SSHv2,
Secure
Copy,
SFTP
DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-256-CBC SSHv2,
Secure
Copy
DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-128-CTR SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-192-CTR SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-256-CTR SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
Triple DES-CBC SSHv2, AA
Local List
File
DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
DSA Public Key 1K SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
DSA Private Key 1K SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-CMAC SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-GCM SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-1 OSPF, IS-
IS, RSVP,
Software
Integrity
DRAM
(plaintext)
Operator –
Manually
Command R, W
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Key or CSP Usage
(Service)
Storage Generation/Input Zeroization Access
Role
(R,W,X)
HMAC-SHA-1 SSHv2, DRAM
(plaintext)
Operator –
Manually
Command R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-1 SNMPv3 DRAM
(plaintext)
Operator –
Manually
Command R, W
HMAC-SHA-256 OSPF, IS-
IS, RSVP
DRAM
(plaintext)
Operator –
Manually
Command R, W
HMAC-SHA-256 SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-512 SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
RSA Public Key – 2048, 3074
bits
SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
RSA Private Key - 2048, 3074
bits
SSHv2 DRAM (plaintext) Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
Diffie-Hellman Public Key
Group 14 (P=>2048 prime
numbers, q>224)
SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
Diffie-Hellman Private Key
Group 14 (P=>2048 prime
numbers, q>224)
SSHv2 DRAM (plaintext) Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
DRBG Seed Key
generation
DRAM
(plaintext)
Internally
Generated
Reboot R, W
DRBG Entropy Key
generation
DRAM
(plaintext)
Internally
Generated
Reboot R, W
DRBG ‘V’ Value Key
generation
DRAM
(plaintext)
Internally
Generated
Reboot R, W
DRBG ‘Key’ Value Key
generation
DRAM
(plaintext)
Internally
Generated
Reboot R, W
Table 9 – Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
* Encrypted via AES-128-CBC
Access roles include “R”- Read, “W” – Write, and “X” – Execute.
No network protocols including SNMP or SSH have been reviewed or tested by the CAVP or
CMVP. SSH KDF was tested.
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The user is responsible for ensuring the module limits the number of encryptions with the same
Triple-DES key to 2^16.
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7. EMC/EMI (FCC COMPLIANCE)
The SAR chassis where the CSM, SAR-OS and SARCM runs were tested and found conformant
to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B,
Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (business use).
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8. SELF TESTS
8.1 Self Tests on the CSM
When FIPS-140-2 mode is enabled the node performs the following startup tests:
• Software integrity check on startup using HMAC-SHA-256
• DRBG KAT and health test
• Triple-DES encrypt KAT
• Triple-DES decrypt KAT
• AES CBC 128, 192, 256 encrypt KAT
• AES CBC 128, 192, 256 decrypt KAT
• AES CFB128 encrypt KAT
• AES CFB128 decrypt KAT
• AES CTR 128, 192, 256 encrypt KAT
• AES GCM 256 encrypt KAT
• AES GCM 256 decrypt KAT
• AES GMAC 256 encrypt KAT
• AES GMAC 256 decrypt KAT
• AES CMAC 128 KAT
• HMAC SHA-1 KAT, HMAC SHA-224 KAT, HMAC-SHA-256 KAT, HMAC SHA-384
KAT, HMAC SHA-512 KAT
• SHA-1 KAT, SHA-224 KAT, SHA-256 KAT, SHA-384 KAT, SHA-512 KAT
• RSA sign and verify
• A DSA pairwise consistency test
• KAS-FFC-SSC KAT
• SSH KDF
Should any of these tests fail, the SARCM does not allow the node to continue booting the
image. An error is displayed on the console port that indicates the failed test and the SARCM
forces a reboot to attempt the self-tests again.
8.1.1 Cryptographic DRBG Startup Test
A known answer test is used by the DRBG on startup (by using a known seed). If the startup test
fails then an error message is printed on the console and the node will attempt the boot sequence
again.
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8.1.2 RSA Startup test
SARCM performs an initial startup test with a known public key, a known digital signature and a
test that verifies it can perform a proper verification of the known signature with the known
public key. If the SARCM fails to successfully perform this startup test, then a message is
printed on the console, the SARCM causes the node to reboot and tries to perform all the startup
tests successfully again from the beginning.
8.2 Conditional Test on the CSM
When FIPS-140-2 mode is enabled the node performs the following conditional self tests during
normal operation of the node:
• Manual Key Entry Tests
• Pairwise Consistency Test for RSA / DSA
• DRBG and NDRNG Continuous Random Number Generator Test (CRNGT)
Descriptions of the tests are described in the following sections.
SARCM Failure
When a Conditional Test (e.g. the pairwise consistency tests or the CRNGT test) fails, then the
SARCM is considered as failed. The node will print a message on the console that indicates that
the SARCM has failed.
Manual Key Entry Tests
Cryptographic key or key components manually entered into the cryptographic
module are entered using duplicate entries. If the duplicate entries do not match, the test shall
fail.
Pairwise Consistency Test for RSA, DSA
The Pairwise Consistency Test is performed whenever public or private keys are generated. The
consistency of RSA/DSA keys is tested by the calculation and verification of a digital signature.
If the digital signature cannot be verified, the test shall fail.
An additional test is performed on RSA key pairs. A plaintext value is encrypted by the RSA
public key. The resulting ciphertext value is compared to the original plaintext value. If the two
values are equal, then the test shall fail. If the two values differ, then the private key is used to
decrypt the ciphertext and the resulting value are compared to the original plaintext value. If the
two values are not equal, the test shall fail.
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Continuous Random Number Generator Test (CRNGT)
The CRNGT is performed for every RNG call. Each call to a RNG produces blocks of 128 bits.
The first 128-bit block generated after power-up, initialization, or reset is not used, but is saved
for comparison with the next 128-bit block to be generated. Each subsequent generation
of an 128-bit block is compared with the previously generated block. The test shall fail if any
two compared 128-bit blocks are equal.
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9. FIPS-140 USER GUIDANCE
The following sections described the SAR-OS user guidance for configuring the SAR systems
where the SARCM is embedded and accessed by SAR-OS.
9.1 FIPS-140-2 Mode Configuration
To enable FIPS-140-2 on the 7705 a configurable parameter is available in the bof.cfg file. The
command “/bof fips-140-2” needs to be typed in and followed by a “/bof save” and reboot of the
node. When configured in the bof.cfg, the node boots in FIPS-140-2 mode and the following
behaviors are enabled on the node:
• Only FIPS-140-2 approved algorithms (except for two-key Triple-DES and Diffie-
Hellman with key sizes less than 2048 bits) are available for encryption and
authentication for any cryptographic function on the CSM where SAR-OS and the
SARCM reside
• Diffie-Hellman with non-compliant key sizes must not be used in FIPS mode; otherwise
the module will enter a non-FIPS mode.
• Startup tests are executed on the CSM when the node boots
• Conditional tests are executed when required during normal operation (e.g. manual key
entry test, pairwise consistency checks and RNG tests)
The current state of the bof and the parameters used for booting can be verified with the
following CLI commands:
*A:bkvm12>show bof
*A:bkvm12>show bof booted
The output of "show bof booted" would show "fips-140-2" instead of "no fips-140-2".
Note the FIPS-140-2 parameter in the bof.cfg does not take effect until the node has been
rebooted. When running in FIPS mode the system will display a value in the system command
that indicates this is the case.
9.2 Configurations Not Allowed when running in FIPS-140-2 Mode
When the node is configured in FIPS-140-2 mode the following disallowed algorithms are
visible in CLI but not available. The User must not configure the following algorithms and
functions when running in FIPS-140-2 mode or reverse the configuration steps in Section 9.1:
• MD5
o SNMP, OSPF, BGP, LDP, NTP authentication, multi-chassis redundancy
• HMAC-MD5
SNMP, IS-IS, RSVP
• HMAC-MD5-96
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o SNMP
• HMAC-SHA-1-96
o SNMP, OSPF, BGP, LDP
• AES-128-CMAC-96
o BGP, LDP
9.3 Non-FIPS-140-2 Mode
The module supports the Crypto Officer and User roles while in the non-Approved mode of
operation.
To disable FIPS-140-2 on the SAR-A/M, the User must configure the bof with “no fips-140-2”
and reboot the system to transition to the non FIPS-140-2 mode. The User must delete persistent
keys before switching mode.
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10.REFERENCES
[FIPS 140-2] FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May
25, 2001, CHANGE NOTICES (12-03-2002).
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf
[FIPS 140-2 DTR] Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements
for Cryptographic Modules, January 4, 2011 Draft.
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-
2/FIPS1402DTR.pdf
[FIPS 140-2 IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic
Module Validation Program, May 10, 2012.
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-
2/FIPS1402IG.pdf