© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this
Copyright Notice.
Cisco ASR 9000 Aggregated Services Routers
Firmware version:
IOS-XR 7.1.2
- ASR-9006-SYS, ASR-9010-SYS, ASR-9901, ASR-9904, ASR-9906,
ASR-9910, ASR-9912, ASR-9922
- RSPs A9K-RSP880-TR, A99-RP3-TR, A9K-RSP5-TR
- LCs: A99-8X100GE-TR, A99-12X100GE, A9K-16X100GE-TR,
A99-32X100GE-TR
- MACSEC: ASR-9901
FIPS-140 Non-Proprietary Security Policy- Security Level 1
Document Version 1.1
Cisco Systems, Inc.
i
Table of Contents
1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 References ............................................................................................................ 4
1.2 FIPS 140-2 Submission Package.......................................................................... 4
2 Module Description .................................................................................................... 5
ASR 9000 Series Aggregated Services Routers (9006, 9010, 9901,9904, 9906, 9910,
9912, 9922) ..................................................................................................................... 5
2.1 Line Card and Route Processor for Modular Chassis .......................................... 9
2.2 Module Validation Level ................................................................................... 11
3 Cryptographic Boundary........................................................................................... 13
4 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces ............................................................ 14
5 Roles, Services, and Authentication ......................................................................... 19
5.1 User Services...................................................................................................... 19
5.2 Cryptographic Officer Services.......................................................................... 20
5.3 Unauthenticated User Services........................................................................... 22
6 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management...................................................................... 23
7 Cryptographic Algorithms ........................................................................................ 26
7.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ................................................................ 26
7.2 Non-Approved Algorithms allowed for use in FIPS-mode ............................... 28
7.3 Non-Approved Algorithms ................................................................................ 28
8 Self-Tests .................................................................................................................. 29
9 Physical Security....................................................................................................... 32
10 Secure Operation....................................................................................................... 33
10.1 System Initialization and Configuration ............................................................ 33
10.2 Remote Access ................................................................................................... 34
10.3 Key Strength....................................................................................................... 34
11 Related Documentation............................................................................................. 35
ii
12 Obtaining Documentation......................................................................................... 35
12.1 Cisco.com........................................................................................................... 35
12.2 Product Documentation DVD............................................................................ 35
12.3 Ordering Documentation.................................................................................... 36
13 Documentation Feedback.......................................................................................... 36
14 Cisco Product Security Overview............................................................................. 36
14.1 Reporting Security Problems in Cisco Products ................................................ 36
15 Obtaining Technical Assistance................................................................................ 37
15.1 Cisco Technical Support & Documentation Website ........................................ 37
15.2 Submitting a Service Request ............................................................................ 38
15.3 Definitions of Service Request Severity ............................................................ 38
16 Obtaining Additional Publications and Information................................................. 39
17 Definitions List ......................................................................................................... 40
List of Figures
Figure 1 - ASR-9006-SYS....................................................................................................5
Figure 2 - ASR-9010-SYS....................................................................................................6
Figure 3 - ASR-9901.............................................................................................................6
Figure 4 - ASR-9904.............................................................................................................7
Figure 5 - ASR-9906.............................................................................................................7
Figure 6 - ASR-9910.............................................................................................................8
Figure 7 - ASR-9912.............................................................................................................8
Figure 8 - ASR-9922.............................................................................................................9
Figure 9 - A9K-RSP880-TR.................................................................................................9
Figure 10 - A99-RP3-TR ....................................................................................................10
Figure 11 - A9K-RSP5-TR.................................................................................................10
Figure 12 - A99-8X100GE-TR...........................................................................................10
Figure 13 - A99-12X100GE ...............................................................................................10
Figure 14 - A9K-16X100GE-TR........................................................................................10
Figure 15 - A99-32X100GE-TR.........................................................................................10
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List of Tables
Table 1 - Module Validation List........................................................................................11
Table 2 - Module Validation Level.....................................................................................11
Table 3 - A9K-RSP880-TR Interfaces................................................................................14
Table 4 - A9K-RSP5-TR Interfaces....................................................................................15
Table 5 - A99-RP3-TR Interfaces.......................................................................................16
Table 6 - A99-8X100GE-TR Interfaces .............................................................................17
Table 7 - A99-12X100GE Interfaces..................................................................................17
Table 8 - A9K-16X100GE-TR Interfaces...........................................................................17
Table 9 - A99-32X100GE-TR Interfaces ...........................................................................17
Table 10 - ASR-9901 Interfaces .........................................................................................18
Table 11 - User Services (r = read, w = write, d = delete)..................................................19
Table 12 - Crypto-Officer Services (r = read, w = write, d = delete) .................................21
Table 13 - Keys and CSPs ..................................................................................................25
Table 14 - FIPS-Approved Algorithms for use in FIPS Mode ...........................................27
Table 16 - Non-FIPS-Approved Algorithms not to be used in FIPS Mode........................29
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© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc.
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1 Introduction
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Cisco ASR 9000
Aggregated Services Routers; referred to in this document as ASR9k or the module. This
security policy describes how the modules meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-2
Level 1 and how to run the modules in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation and may be freely
distributed.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation
program is available on the NIST website at
https://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
1.1 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module, in the technical
terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is
available on the module from the following sources:
• The Cisco Systems website (http://www.cisco.com) contains information on the
full line of products from Cisco Systems.
• The NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program website
(https://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information
for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.2 FIPS 140-2 Submission Package
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition
to this document, the Submission Package contains:
• Vendor Evidence
• Finite State Machine
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the Cisco ASR 9000 Aggregated Services
Routers and explains the secure configuration and operation of the module. This
introduction section is followed by Section 2 through Section 8, which details the general
features and functionality of the appliances. Section 9 specifically addresses the required
configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation
Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate
non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco
Systems.
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© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc.
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2 Module Description
ASR 9000 Series Aggregated Services Routers (9006, 9010,
9901,9904, 9906, 9910, 9912, 9922)
Networks are pressured to evolve more rapidly to keep pace with the increasing demand
for ultra-low latency connections across both mobile and wireline networks. Edge
networks need the capacity to scale, and feature-richness to support a wide array of high
demand applications such as distributed provider edge, Internet peering, and metro
aggregation. By delivering unparalleled feature richness and with the ability to scale in
support of 400 GbE, the Cisco ASR 9000 series is changing the architectural economics
for edge networks. Edge network architectures are becoming more distributed to enable
new revenue generating services and bring edge compute and storage closer to the end
user. This edge evolution requires both hardware and software to deliver scale,
simplicity, trust, and security - a combination that can only be found in the Cisco
portfolio.
Figure 1 - ASR-9006-SYS
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Figure 2 - ASR-9010-SYS
Figure 3 - ASR-9901
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© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc.
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Figure 4 - ASR-9904
Figure 5 - ASR-9906
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© Copyright 2022 Cisco Systems, Inc.
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Figure 6 - ASR-9910
Figure 7 - ASR-9912
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Figure 8 - ASR-9922
2.1 Line Card and Route Processor for Modular Chassis
The Cisco ASR 9000 Series Aggregated Services Routers RSPs and LCs included with
this module are as follows:
Figure 9 - A9K-RSP880-TR
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Figure 10 - A99-RP3-TR
Figure 11 - A9K-RSP5-TR
Figure 12 - A99-8X100GE-TR
Figure 13 - A99-12X100GE
Figure 14 - A9K-16X100GE-TR
Figure 15 - A99-32X100GE-TR
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The validated platforms consist of the following components:
Chassis
Hardware Configuration
Route Processor Line Cards
ASR-9901 Fixed Chassis Fixed Chassis
ASR-9006-SYS
A9K-RSP880-TR,
A99-RP3-TR,
A9K-RSP5-TR
A99-8X100GE-TR,
A99-12X100GE,
A9K-16X100GE-TR,
A99-32X100GE-TR
ASR-9010-SYS
ASR-9904
ASR-9906
ASR-9910
ASR-9912
ASR-9922
Table 1 - Module Validation List
2.2 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 1
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Overall module validation level 1
Table 2 - Module Validation Level
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2.4 FIPS and non-FIPS modes of operation
The Cisco ASR 9000 Aggregated Services Routers supports a FIPS and non-FIPS mode
of operation. The non-FIPS mode of operation is not a recommended operational mode
but because the module allows for non-approved algorithms and non-approved key sizes,
a non-approved mode of operation exists. The following services are available in both a
FIPS and a non-FIPS mode of operation:
• SSH
• SNMPv3
• TLS
• MACsec
When the services are used in non-FIPS mode they are considered to be non-compliant.
To determine the mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer should run the following
command:
- Use the “show logging | i fips” command to filter FIPS specific
logging messages.
If the device is in the non-FIPS mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must
follow the instructions in Section 10 of this security policy to transfer the module into a
FIPS approved mode of operation. The FIPS Approved mode supports the approved and
allowed algorithms, functions and protocols identified in Sections 5 and 7 of this
document. The FIPS Approved mode of operation is entered when the module is
configured for FIPS mode (detailed in Section 10) and successfully passes all the power
on self-tests (POST).
In the FIPS mode of operation, there are two Approved modes of operation as follows:
• Standard Mode
• Recovery Mode
The FIPS Standard mode of operation is entered when the module is configured for FIPS
mode and successfully passes all the power on self-tests (POST). The FIPS Standard
Mode supports the approved and allowed algorithms, functions and protocols identified
in Sections 5 and 7 of this document.
The FIPS Recovery mode of operation is entered when the module is configured for FIPS
mode passes all the power on self-tests (POST) with the exception being that the POSTs
related to the MACsec functionality fail. If the module is configured with more than one
MACsec line card, then failure of any POST on a line card will cause that line card to be
disabled, thus there is the potential for at least some of the MACsec functionality to be
available to the module. If module does not have the capability to have more than one
MACsec line card, or only has one MACsec line card and a POST failure is detected
(related to the MACsec functionality) then the module may still operate except now all
MACsec hardware is disabled but the remained crypto functionality and services are still
available to the module.
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Anyone of these modules, which has MACsec capability, can take on the role of either
the Peer or the Authenticator in reference to the MACsec protocol. The link between the
Peer and the Authenticator should be secured to prevent the possibility for an attacker to
introduce foreign equipment into the local area network.
When supporting the MACsec protocol in the FIPS approved modes of operation, the
module should only be used together with other CMVP-validated modules providing
either the remaining Peer or Authenticator functionality.
It should be noted that the module contains two separate and independent versions of the
FIPS-approved AES-GCM algorithm.
The implementation contained in firmware (see CAVP cert A2414) conforms to IG A.5,
scenario #3, when operating in a FIPS approved mode of operation. AES GCM IVs are
generated both internally and deterministically and are a minimum of 96-bits in length as
specified in SP 800-38D, Section 8.2.1.
The implementation contained in hardware (see CAVP cert AES 4369) is used in support
of line rate MACsec functionality and conforms to IG A.5, scenario #2, when operating
in a FIPS-approved mode of operation. AES GCM IVs are generated externally (to the
AES-GCM implementation on the chip but still within the module’s boundary) using the
module’s FIPS-approved DRBG (CAVP algorithm cert A2414) and are a minimum of
96-bits in length as specified in SP 800-38D, Section 8.2.2.
3 Cryptographic Boundary
The cryptographic boundary for the Cisco ASR 9000 Aggregated Services Routers is
defined as encompassing the “top,” “bottom,” “front,” “back,” “left” and “right” surfaces
of the case. Included in this physical boundary is the ACT2Lite module (certificate #3637).
ACT2Lite module is solely used as NDRNG (entropy source) and is neither used for directly
generating any symmetric keys or seed for asymmetric keys nor used for any services
implemented by the module. The minimum number of bits of entropy generated by the
ACT2Lite module is 256 bits.
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4 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
Each module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the
physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2 defined
logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. The logical
interfaces and their mapping are described in the following tables:
A9K-RSP880-TR Physical Interfaces A9K-RSP880-TR Logical
Interfaces
- 100/1000BASE-T (RJ-45) Management Ethernet (2)
- Connectivity Management Processor (CMP) port
- Inter-Chassis Sync ports—nVSync1 is shared with
RS232/422 GPS TOD RJ-45 ports (2)
- SFP+ External Interfaces (4)
Data Input Interface
Data Output Interface
- 100/1000BASE-T (RJ-45) Management Ethernet (2)
- Connectivity Management Processor (CMP) port
- Inter-Chassis Sync ports—nVSync1 is shared with
RS232/422 GPS TOD RJ-45 port
- EIA/TIA-232 RJ232 serial RJ-45 ports—one each for
Console and Auxiliary modem ports
- USB Port (not used)
- IEEE1588 RJ-45 Timestamp port
- 10 MHz and 1 PPS clock input SMB ports
- Alarm Cut Off (ACO) and Lamp Test momentary push
buttons
- SFP+ External Interfaces (4)
Control Input Interface
- Alarm Output DB9 port
- 100/1000BASE-T (RJ-45) Management Ethernet (2)
- Connectivity Management Processor (CMP) port
- EIA/TIA-232 RJ232 serial RJ-45 ports—one each for
Console and Auxiliary modem ports
- Inter-Chassis Sync ports—nVSync1 is shared with
RS232/422 GPS TOD RJ-45 ports (2)
- four-character 5x7 LED dot matrix display and discrete
status LEDs
- Status LED indicators (9)
Status Output interface
Table 3 - A9K-RSP880-TR Interfaces
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A9K-RSP5-TR Physical Interfaces A9K-RSP5-TR Logical Interfaces
- Inter-Chassis Sync ports—nVSync1 is
shared with RS232/422 GPS TOD RJ-45
ports (2)
- 100/1000BASE-T (RJ-45) Management
Ethernet (2)
- Connectivity Management Processor
(CMP) port
Data Input Interface
Data Output Interface
- RJ-45 Sync timing ports with Link and
Fault LEDs built into the RJ-45 (2)
- IEEE1588 RJ-45 Timestamp port
- Inter-Chassis Sync ports—nVSync1 is
shared with RS232/422 GPS TOD RJ-45
ports (2)
- 10 MHz and 1 PPS clock input SMB
ports
- External USB2, class-A port
- 100/1000BASE-T (RJ-45) Management
Ethernet (2)
- EIA/TIA-232 RJ232 serial RJ-45 ports—
one each for Console and Auxiliary
modem ports
- Alarm Cut Off (ACO) and Lamp Test
momentary push buttons
Control Input Interface
- RJ-45 Sync timing ports with Link and
Fault LEDs built into the RJ-45 (2)
- Alarm Output DB9 port with three alarm
outputs
- 100/1000BASE-T (RJ-45) Management
Ethernet (2)
- Connectivity Management Processor
(CMP) port
- Inter-Chassis Sync ports—nVSync1 is
shared with RS232/422 GPS TOD RJ-45
ports (2)
- EIA/TIA-232 RJ232 serial RJ-45 ports—
one each for Console and Auxiliary
modem ports
- four-character 5x7 LED dot matrix
display and discrete status LEDs
- Status LED indicators (9)
Status Output interface
Table 4 - A9K-RSP5-TR Interfaces
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A99-RP3-TR Physical Interfaces A99-RP3-TR Logical Interfaces
- Inter-Chassis Sync ports—nVSync1 is
shared with RS232/422 GPS TOD RJ-45
ports (2)
- 100/1000BASE-T (RJ-45) Management
Ethernet (2)
- Connectivity Management Processor
(CMP) port
Data Input Interface
Data Output Interface
- RJ-45 Sync timing ports with Link and
Fault LEDs built into the RJ-45 (2)
- IEEE1588 RJ-45 Timestamp port
- Inter-Chassis Sync ports—nVSync1 is
shared with RS232/422 GPS TOD RJ-45
ports (2)
- 10 MHz and 1 PPS clock input SMB
ports
- External USB2, class-A port
- 100/1000BASE-T (RJ-45) Management
Ethernet (2)
- EIA/TIA-232 RJ232 serial RJ-45 ports—
one each for Console and Auxiliary
modem ports
- Alarm Cut Off (ACO) and Lamp Test
momentary push buttons
Control Input Interface
- RJ-45 Sync timing ports with Link and
Fault LEDs built into the RJ-45 (2)
- Alarm Output DB9 port with three alarm
outputs
- 100/1000BASE-T (RJ-45) Management
Ethernet (2)
- Connectivity Management Processor
(CMP) port
- Inter-Chassis Sync ports—nVSync1 is
shared with RS232/422 GPS TOD RJ-45
ports (2)
- EIA/TIA-232 RJ232 serial RJ-45 ports—
one each for Console and Auxiliary
modem ports
- four-character 5x7 LED dot matrix
display and discrete status LEDs
- Status LED indicators (9)
Status Output interface
Table 5 - A99-RP3-TR Interfaces
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A99-8X100GE-TR Physical Interfaces A99-8X100GE-TR Logical Interfaces
100 GE QSFP28 Connectors (6)
400 GE QSFP-DD Connectors (2)
Data Input Interface
Data Output Interface
100 GE QSFP28 Connectors (6)
400 GE QSFP-DD Connectors (2)
Control Input Interface
LEDs Status Output interface
Table 6 - A99-8X100GE-TR Interfaces
A99-12X100GE Physical Interfaces A99-12X100GE Logical Interfaces
100 GE QSFP28 Connectors (12) Data Input Interface
Data Output Interface
100 GE QSFP28 Connectors (12) Control Input Interface
LEDs Status Output interface
Table 7 - A99-12X100GE Interfaces
A9K-16X100GE-TR Physical Interfaces A9K-16X100GE-TR Logical Interfaces
100 GE QSFP28/QSFP+ Connectors (16) Data Input Interface
Data Output Interface
100 GE QSFP28/QSFP+ Connectors (16) Control Input Interface
LEDs Status Output interface
Table 8 - A9K-16X100GE-TR Interfaces
A99-32X100GE-TR Physical Interfaces A99-32X100GE-TR Logical Interfaces
100 GE QSFP28 Connectors (32) Data Input Interface
Data Output Interface
100 GE QSFP28 Connectors (32) Control Input Interface
LEDs Status Output interface
Table 9 - A99-32X100GE-TR Interfaces
ASR-9901 Physical Interfaces ASR-9901 Logical Interfaces
- RJ-45 Console port
- RJ-45 Auxiliary Port
- 100/1000BASE-T (RJ-45) Management
Ethernet (2)
- 1G SFP Ports (16)
- 1G/10G Dual Rate SFP Ports (24)
- 100G SFP Ports (2)
Data Input Interface
Data Output Interface
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ASR-9901 Physical Interfaces ASR-9901 Logical Interfaces
- External USB port
- Fixed SFP+ ports (2)
- RJ-45 Console port
- RJ-45 Auxiliary Port
- RJ-45 Service LAN
- RJ-45 ToD port
- SYNC (BITS/J.211) ports (2)
- 10MHz and 1PPS ports
- 100/1000BASE-T (RJ-45) Management
Ethernet (2)
- SFP Cluster ports (2)
- 1G SFP Ports (16)
- 1G/10G Dual Rate SFP Ports (24)
- 100G SFP Ports (2)
Control Input Interface
- Status LED indicators (9)
- four-character 5x7 LED dot matrix
- 100/1000BASE-T (RJ-45) Management
Ethernet (2)
Status Output interface
AC/DC Power connections (2) Power Interface
Table 10 - ASR-9901 Interfaces
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5 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The module supports identity-based authentication. There are two roles in the module that
the operators may assume in the FIPS mode: the Crypto Officer role and the User role. The
administrator of the router assumes the Crypto Officer role in order to configure and
maintain the router using Crypto Officer services, while the Users exercise only the basic
User services. A complete description of all the management and configuration capabilities
of the modules can be found in the Cisco ASR 9000 Series Aggregated Services Routers
Software Configuration Guide Manual1
and in the online help for the modules.
It should be noted that the same services are available to both Users and Crypto-officer,
regardless of whether or not they are in a non-FIPS approved mode of operation or a
FIPS approved mode of operation.
5.1 User Services
A User enters the system by accessing the console port with a terminal program or SSH
v2 session to a LAN port or the management Ethernet port. The module prompts the User
for their username/password combination. If the username/password combination is
correct, the User is allowed entry to the module management functionality. The services
available to the User role consist of the following:
The services available to the User role consist of the following:
Services &
Access Description Keys & CSPs
System Status • The LEDs show the network
activity (“Green” if the interfaces
are up and running, “Flashing
yellow” if the interfaces are
coming up and no LED activity
when there is no connection to the
network interfaces), view state of
interfaces, protocols and firmware
version.
N/A
Random Number
Generation
• Key generation and seeds for
asymmetric key generation
DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed,
DRBG v, DRBG Key – r, w, d
Key Exchange • Key exchange as per SP800-
56Arev3 over Diffie-Hellman and
EC Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-
Hellman private key, Diffie-Hellman
shared secret, EC Diffie-Hellman
Public Key, EC Diffie-Hellman
Private Key, EC Diffie-Hellman
shared secret – w, d
Module Read-only
Configuration
• Viewing of configuration settings N/A
Table 11 - User Services (r = read, w = write, d = delete)
1
Software configuration guides are linked in Section 10.
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5.2 Cryptographic Officer Services
A Crypto Officer enters the system by accessing the console/auxiliary port with a
terminal program or SSH v2 session to a LAN port or the management Ethernet port. The
Crypto Officer authenticates in the same manner as a User. The Crypto Officer is
identified by accounts that are part of the usergroup “root-lr”. A Crypto Officer may
assign permission to access the Crypto Officer role to additional accounts, thereby
creating additional Crypto Officers.
The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration and maintenance of the
router. The Crypto Officer services consist of the following:
Services & Access Description Keys & CSPs
Self-Test and
Initialization
• Cryptographic algorithm tests,
firmware integrity tests, module
initialization.
N/A (No keys are accessible)
System Status • The LEDs show the network
activity (“Green” if the interfaces
are up and running, “Flashing
yellow” if the interfaces are
coming up and no LED activity
when there is no connection to
the network interfaces), overall
operational status (“Red”
indicates module failure and
“Green” indicates that module
is operational) and the
command line “status
commands” output system status
(indicates whether the module is
in FIPS mode or not).
N/A (No keys are accessible)
Define Rules and Filters • Create packet Filters that are
applied to User data streams on
each interface. Each Filter consists
of a set of Rules, which define a set
of packets to permit or deny based
on characteristics such as protocol
ID, addresses, ports, TCP
connection establishment, or
packet direction.
Operator password – r, w, d
Random Number
Generation
• Key generation and seeds for
asymmetric key generation
DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed,
DRBG v, DRBG Key – r, w, d
Key Exchange • Key exchange as per SP800-
56Arev3 over Diffie-Hellman
and EC Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-
Hellman private key, Diffie-
Hellman shared secret, EC Diffie-
Hellman Public Key, EC Diffie-
Hellman Private Key, EC Diffie-
Hellman shared secret – w, d
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Zeroization • Zeroize CSPs and cryptographic
keys by cycling power to zeroize
all cryptographic keys stored in
DRAM. The CSPs stored in
Flash can be zeroized by
overwriting with a new value.
All Keys and CSPs will be
destroyed
– d
Module Configuration • Selection of non-cryptographic
configuration settings
N/A
Power Cycle • Reboot/reloading the module All ephemeral Keys and CSPs will
be destroyed - d
Secured Dataplane • Secure communications at data
link layer between module and
peer device using MACsec.
MACsec Security Association Key
(SAK), MACsec Connectivity
Association Key (CAK), MACsec
Key Encryption Key (KEK),
MACsec Integrity Check Key
(ICK), Pairwise Master Key
(PMK), Pairwise Transient Key
(PTK) – r, w, d
SNMPv3 • Non-security related monitoring
by the CO using SNMPv3
snmpEngineID, SNMPv3
Password, SNMP session key –
w, d
SSH • Establishment and subsequent
data transfer of a SSH session for
use between the module and the
CO.
SSH encryption key, SSH integrity
key, SSH RSA private key – r, w,
d
HTTPS/TLS (Client) • Establishment and subsequent
data transfer using a TLS session.
• Protection of syslog messages
HTTPS/TLS Pre-Master secret,
HTTPS/TLS Master secret,
HTTPS/TLS Encryption Key,
HTTPS/TLS Integrity Key,
HTTPS/TLS RSA/ECDSA private
key – w, d
Table 12 - Crypto-Officer Services (r = read, w = write, d = delete)
User and CO Authentication
The Crypto Officer role is assumed by an authorized CO connecting to the module via
CLI and SSH. The OS prompts the CO for their username and password, if the password
is validated against the CO’s password in memory, the operator is allowed entry to
execute CO services. Each username is unique and configurable by Crypto-Officer. The
password feedback mechanism does not provide information that could be used to
determine the authentication data. The User role monitors the module via CLI and SSH.
The Crypto Officer and User passwords and all shared secrets must each be at least eight
(8) characters long, including at least one (1) special character and at least one (1)
number, in length (enforced procedurally by policy) along with six additional characters
taken from the 26 upper case, 26 lower case, 10 numbers and 32 special characters. See
the Secure Operation section for more information. If six (6) special/alpha/number
characters, one (1) special character and one (1) alphabet are used without repetition for
an eight (8) character long, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is
one (1) in 164,290,949,222,400 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the
typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52
alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in
total. Since it is claimed to be for 8 digits with no repetition, then the calculation should
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be 32x10x92x91x90x89x88x87). Therefore, for each attempt to use the authentication
mechanism, the associated probability of a successful random attempt is approximately 1
in 164,290,949,222,400, which is less than the 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
The maximum number of possible attempts per minute is 5 for Password Authentication
via console. Therefore, the probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in
a one-minute period is 5/164,290,949,222,400 which is less than the 1 in 100,000
required by FIPS 140-2.
The module only supports sixteen (16) concurrent SSH sessions and maximum number of
possible attempts per minute is 8 for each SSH session. Therefore, the probability of a
success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is (8*16)/
164,290,949,222,400 which is less than the 1 in 100,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
SSH Public-key Authentication: The CO and User role also supports public key
authentication for remotely accessing the module via SSH. RSA has modulus size of
2048 bit, thus providing 112 bits of strength. An attacker would have a 1 in 2112
chance of
randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million-chance
required by FIPS 140-2. The fastest network connection supported by the modules over
management interfaces are 10 Gb/s. Hence, at most 10 ×109
× 60s = 6 × 1011
=
600,000,000,000 bits of data can be transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the probability
that a random attempt will succeed, or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is:
1:( 2112
possible keys/(6 × 1011
bits per minute)/112 bits per key))
1:( 2112
possible keys/5,357,142,857 keys per minute)
1:9.7×1023
Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random attempt for a minute is
approximately 1 in 9.7×1023
, which is less than the 1 in 100,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
5.3 Unauthenticated User Services
The following are the list of services for Unauthenticated Operator:
System Status: An unauthenticated operator may observe the System Status by viewing
the LEDs on the module, which show network activity and overall operational status.
Unauthenticated operator can also view boot up/power on self-test logs on console port
which does not disclose any security relevant information.
Power Cycle: This operator can power cycle the module. A solid green LED indicates
normal operation and the successful completion of self-tests.
The module does not support a bypass capability.
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6 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The module securely administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security
parameters such as passwords. All keys are also protected by the password-protection on
the Crypto Officer operator logins and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer.
The module supports the following critical security parameters (CSPs):
Key/CSP Name Algorithm Description
Key
Size Storage
zeroizatio
n
DRBG entropy input SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
HW-based entropy source
output used to construct
seed.
256-bits DRAM Power cycle
DRBG seed SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Input to the DRBG that
determines the internal
state of the DRBG.
Generated using DRBG
derivation function that
includes the entropy input
from a hardware-based
entropy source.
384 bits DRAM Power cycle
DRBG V SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Internal V value used as
part of SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
128 bits DRAM Power cycle
DRBG Key SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
This is the 256-bit DRBG
key used for SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG..
256 bits DRAM Power cycle
Diffie-Hellman public
key
Diffie-
Hellman
The public key used in
Diffie-Hellman (DH)
Exchange.
2048-
8192
bits
DRAM Power cycle
Diffie-Hellman private
key
Diffie-
Hellman
The private key used in
Diffie-Hellman (DH)
Exchange.
224-384
bits
DRAM Power cycle
Diffie-Hellman shared
secret
Diffie-
Hellman
The shared key used in
Diffie-Hellman (DH)
Exchange. Created per the
Diffie-Hellman Protocol.
2048-
8192
bits
DRAM Power cycle
EC Diffie-Hellman
public key
Diffie-
Hellman
(Groups 19,
20 and 21)
P-256, P-384 public key
used in EC Diffie-Hellman
exchange. This key is
derived per the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement.
P-256,
P-384
and P-
521
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
EC Diffie-Hellman
private key
Diffie-
Hellman
(Groups 19,
20 and 21)
P-256 and P-384 private
key used in EC Diffie-
Hellman exchange.
Generated by calling the SP
800-90A CTR-DRBG.
P-256,
P-384
and P-
521
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
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Key/CSP Name Algorithm Description
Key
Size Storage
zeroizatio
n
EC Diffie-Hellman
shared secret
Diffie-
Hellman
(Groups 19,
20 and 21)
P-256 and P-384 shared
secret derived in EC Diffie-
Hellman exchange.
P-256,
P-384
and P-
521
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
Operator password Shared
Secret, at
least eight
characters
The password of the
operator. This CSP is
entered by the
Cryptographic Officer.
Variabl
e (8+
characte
rs)
Flash
(plaintext)
Overwrite
with new
password
snmpEngineID Shared secret Unique string to identify
the SNMP engine.
32-bits Flash
(plaintext)
Overwrite
with new
engine ID
SNMPv3 Password
Shared Secret This secret is used to derive
HMAC-SHA1 key for
SNMPv3 Authentication.
32 bytes Flash
(plaintext)
Overwrite
with new
password
SNMPv3 session key AES-CFB Encrypts SNMPv3 traffic. 128-bit DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
SSH Encryption Key AES-CTR
and AES
CBC
Symmetric AES key for
encrypting SSH.
128-
256-bits
AES
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
SSH Integrity Key HMAC Used for SSH integrity
protection.
160/256
/512
bits
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
SSH Public/Private Key
Pair
RSA and
ECDSA
PKCS#1 v.1.5, P-
256/384/521 generated by
calling the SP 800-90A
CTR-DRBG.
MOD
2048/30
72/4096
P-
256/384
/521
Flash
(plaintext)
SSH
private/public
key is
zeroized by
either
deletion (via
# crypto key
zeroize rsa or
ecdsa) or by
overwriting
with a new
value of the
key
HTTPS/TLS Pre-Master
secret
Shared secret Internal generation by
FIPS-approved DRBG.
Used to establish
HTTPS/TLS Master Secret
.
48 bytes DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
HTTPS/TLS Master
secret
Shared secret Derived from the
HTTPS/TLS Pre-Master
Secret. Used for computing
the Encryption and
Integrity Keys.
48 bytes DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
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Key/CSP Name Algorithm Description
Key
Size Storage
zeroizatio
n
HTTPS/TLS Encryption
Key
AES-CBC,
AES-GCM.
AES key used to encrypt
TLS data.
128 and
256 bits
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
HTTPS/TLS Integrity
Key
HMAC HMAC key used for
HTTPS integrity
protection.
160-384
bits
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle
HTTPS/TLS
public/private key
ECDSA, RSA PKCS#1 v.1.5, P-256 and
P-384 generated by calling
the SP 800-90A CTR-
DRBG.
ECDSA
(P-256
and P-
384)
RSA
(MOD
2048/30
72)
Flash
(plaintext)
HTTPS/TLS
Server RSA
private/public
key is
zeroized by
either
deletion (via
# crypto key
zeroize rsa or
crypto key
zeroize ecdsa
nistp(256/384
/521) or by
overwriting
with new
value of the
key.
MACsec Connectivity
Association Key
(CAK)
Hex string A CO configured pre-
shared secret key
possessed by members
of a MACsec
connectivity association
to secure control plane
traffic.
16 or
32
bytes
NVRAM
(plaintext
)
Overwritten
with new a
key.
MACsec Integrity
Check Key (ICK)
AES-GCM Used to prove an
authorized peer sent the
message. Derived from
the CAK using the
SP800-108 KDF.
128/25
6 bits
DRAM
(plaintext
)
Automatical
ly when
session
expires or
power cycle.
MACsec Key
Encryption Key
(KEK)
AES-CMAC Used to transmit
Security Association
Key (SAK) to other
peers of a MACsec
connectivity association.
Derived from the CAK
using the SP800-108
KDF.
128/25
6 bits
DRAM
(plaintext
)
Automatical
ly when
session
expires or
power cycle.
MACsec Security
Association Key
(SAK)
AES-GCM Derived from the CAK
and used by the device
network ports for
securing User network
traffic.
128/25
6bits
DRAM
(plaintext
)
Automatical
ly when
session
expires or
power cycle
Table 13 - Keys and CSPs
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7 Cryptographic Algorithms
7.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The Cisco ASR 9000 Series Aggregated Services Routers support many different
cryptographic algorithms. However, only FIPS approved algorithms may be used while
in the FIPS mode of operation. The following table identifies the approved algorithms
included in the ASR 9000 Series Aggregated Services Routers for use in the FIPS mode
of operation. Not all algorithms/modes tested on the CAVP validation certificates are
implemented in the module.
Algorithm Supported Mode Cert. #
CiscoSSL FOM 6.2b
AES ECB (128, 192, 256); CBC (128,
192, 256); CFB128 (128, 192, 256),
CTR (128, 192, 256), GCM (128,
192, 256)
A2414
SHS SHA-1, -256, -384, and -512 (Byte
Oriented)
HMAC SHS SHA-12
, -256, -384, and -512
DRBG CTR (using AES-256)
ECDSA Key Generation (P-256, P-384 and P-
521)
Key Verification (P-256, P-384 and
P-521)
Signature Generation (P-256 with
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512,
P-384 with SHA2-384, SHA2-512
and P-521 with SHA2-521)
Signature Verification (P-256 with
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512,
P-384 with SHA2-384, SHA2-512
and P-521 with SHA2-521)
RSA FIPS186-4
RSA Key Generation: MOD 2048
with SHA2-256, MOD 3072 with
SHA2-256
PKCS#1 v.1.5, 2048-3072 bit key
SigGen, MOD: 2048, 3072
SigVer, MOD 2048 – 3072.
2
SHA-1 is used for Digital signature verification (RSA SigVer) and Non-digital-signature applications
(KDF IKEv2, KDF SP800-108, KDF SSH) as per SP800-131Ar2.
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Algorithm Supported Mode Cert. #
CVL (SP800-135) TLS KDF, IKEv2 KDF, SSH KDF,
SNMP KDF
Note: The TLS, IKEv2, SSH, and
SNMP protocols have not been
reviewed or tested by the CAVP and
CMVP.
KAS-SSC (SP800-56a
rev3)
KAS FFC SSC:
Mod Sizes: FB, FC, ffdhe2048,
ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144,
ffdhe8192, modp-2048, modp-3072,
modp-4096, modp-6144, modp-8192
Scheme: dhEphem
KAS ECC SSC:
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Scheme: Ephemeral Unified
CKG (SP800-133rev2) Vendor Affirmed
Table 14 - FIPS-Approved Algorithms for use in FIPS Mode
• KTS (AES Cert. #A2414 and HMAC Cert. #A2414; key establishment
methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
• KAS (KAS-SSC Cert. #A2414, CVL Cert. #A2414; key establishment
methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
The KAS FFC and KAS ECC strengths are as follows:
o KAS-ECC-SSC: 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength
o KAS-FFC-SSC: 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength
Note 1: The module’s AES-GCM implementations conforms to IG A.5 Provision #1
following RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and provides
support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1.
Method ii) was used by the tester to demonstrate the module’s compliance with the TLS
provision for the AES GCM IV generation in IG A.5. The counter portion of the IV is set
by the module within its cryptographic boundary. The restoration of the IV is in
accordance with scenario 3 in IG A.5 in that, a new AES GCM key is established. When
the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first
party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a
new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for
use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established which is in accordance
with scenario 3 in IG A.5.
For the SSH Encryption GCM key, the IV construction is in accordance with RFC 5647
Section 7. A 96-bit IV is constructed using a 32-bit fixed field and a 64-bit invocation
counter field. The invocation field is treated as a 64-bit integer and is incremented after
each invocation of AES-GCM to process a binary packet. A 32-bit block counter is also
used. The counter is initially set to 1 and incremented as each keystream block of 128-
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bits is produced. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its
cryptographic boundary. The use of AES GCM for SSH meets FIPS 140-2 IG A.5
scenario #4.
Note 2: CVL Cert. #A2414 support the KDF (key derivation function) used in each of
TLS, SSH and SNMPv3 protocols. TLS, SSH and SNMPv3 protocols have not been
reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Please refer IG D.11, bullet 2 for more
information.
Note 3: CKG (vendor affirmed) Cryptographic Key Generation; SP 800-133rev2. In
accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic
Key Generation as per scenario 1 of section 4 in SP800-133rev2. The resulting generated
symmetric key and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified
output from SP800-90A DRBG.
Note 4: There are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAVP tested but not
implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key
lengths/curves/moduli shown in this table are implemented by the module.
7.2 Non-Approved Algorithms allowed for use in FIPS-mode
The Cisco ASR 9000 Series Aggregated Services Routers cryptographic module
implements the following non-Approved algorithms that are allowed for use in FIPS-
mode:
• RSA3
(key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of
encryption strength. RSA with less than 112-bit of security strength is non-
compliant and may not be used).
• NDRNG
7.3 Non-Approved Algorithms
The Cisco ASR 9000 Series Aggregated Services Routers cryptographic module, in
addition to the above listed FIPS approved algorithms, can operate in a non-FIPS mode
of operation. This is not a recommended operational mode but because the associated
RFCs for the following protocols allow for non-approved algorithms and non-approved
key sizes, a non-approved mode of operation exist. So those services listed above with
their FIPS approved algorithms in addition to the following services with their non-
approved algorithms and non-approved keys sizes are available to the User and the
Crypto Officer. Prior to using any of the non-Approved services, the Crypto Officer must
zeroize all CSPs which places the module into the non-FIPS mode of operation.
The Cisco ASR 9000 Series Aggregated Services Routers cryptographic module
implements the following non-approved algorithms that are not permitted for use in FIPS
140-2 mode of operations:
3
As per IG D.9, the RSA Key Wrapping uses RSA modulus of 2048 and 3072 bit long that uses PKCS#1-
v1.5 scheme and is not complaint with any revision of SP800-56B.
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Service4
Non-Approved Algorithm
SSH
(non-compliant)
Symmetric: Triple-DES
Asymmetric: 512-bit RSA,1024-bit RSA, Diffie-Hellman group 1
TLS
(non-compliant)
Asymmetric: 512-bit RSA, 1024-bit RSA
SNMP
(non-compliant)
Hashing: MD5,
MACing: HMAC MD5
Table 15 - Non-FIPS-Approved Algorithms not to be used in FIPS Mode
8 Self-Tests
The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically
during operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all
components are functioning correctly.
Power On Self-Tests Performed:
• Firmware Integrity Test 2048-bit/SHA-256 RSA
CiscoSSL FOM algorithm implementation
• AES ECB (128-bit) encryption KAT
• AES ECB (128-bit) decryption KAT
• AES GCM (256-bit) encryption KAT
• AES GCM (256-bit) decryption KAT
• HMAC SHA-1 KAT
• HMAC SHA2-256 KAT
• HMAC SHA2-384 KAT
• HMAC SHA2-512 KAT
• KAS FFC Primitive “Z” KAT using 2048 bit (SP800-56a rev3)
• KAS ECC Primitive “Z” KAT using P-256 (SP800-56a rev3)
• ECDSA P-256 sign and verify KATs
• RSA 2048 sign and verify KATs
• SP800-135 KDF KATs: IKEv2 KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF, SSH KDF, SNMP KDF
• SP 800-90A AES-CTR DRBG KAT
• SP 800-90A Section 11 Health Tests
4
These non-approved algorithms are not to be used in FIPS mode.
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As per IG 9.1 and IG 9.2, the module performs the HMAC SHA self-tests and these tests
pass, thus assuring the health of underlying SHS implementations for CiscoSSL FOM
algorithm implementation.
The module performs all power-on self-tests automatically at boot. All power-on self-
tests must be passed before a role can perform services. The power-on self-tests are
performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the initialization of
the LAN’s interfaces; this prevents the module from passing any data during a power-on
self-test failure.
Conditional Tests Performed:
• Continuous Random Number Generator Test for the FIPS-approved DRBG
• Repetition Count Test and APT on digitized output of the noise source
• ECDSA pairwise consistency test
• RSA pairwise consistency test
• Firmware Load test using a 2048-bit/SHA-256 RSA-Based integrity test to verify
firmware to be loaded into the module.
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9 Physical Security
The modules are production grade multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules that
meet level 1 physical security requirements.
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10 Secure Operation
The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped
only to authorized operators by the vendor, and the module is shipped in Cisco boxes
with Cisco adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Follow the setting
instructions provided below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this
module without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS
approved mode of operation. Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on
the module certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS
140-2 validation.
Upon initial boot from the factory, the module is in a non-FIPS mode of operation. To
transition from a non-FIPS mode of operation to a FIPS mode of operation, the Crypto-
Officer must follow all steps detailed in section 10.1 of this security policy.
10.1System Initialization and Configuration
Step 1 - Initially the router does not have any user configuration. The system prompts
you to specify the username of the root user as well as a secret (password).
- Enter root-system username: [USERNAME]
- Enter secret: [PASSWORD]
- Enter secret again: [PASSWORD]
Enter the root-system username and password.
- Username: [USERNAME]
- Password: [PASSWORD]
Step 2- CO assigns passwords to users for Identification and Authentication.
- Configure Terminal
- line con 0
- password [PASSWORD]
- Login Local
Step 3 - Configure Management port
- configure terminal
- interface MgmtEth [rack/slot/port]
- ipv4 address [ipv4-address subnet-mask]
- no shutdown
- exit
- router static address-family ipv4 unicast
[0.0.0.0.0/0 default-gateway]
- commit
Step 4 - Configure SSH
- configure terminal
- hostname [hostname]
- domain-name [domain-name]
- commit
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- exit
- crypto key generate rsa [keypair-label]
- configure terminal
- ssh server v2
- commit
Step 5 - Enable FIPS 1402- logging
- configure Terminal
- logging buffered debugging
- commit
Step 6 - Enable FIPS mode.
- configure terminal
- crypto fips-mode
- commit
- reload location all
On either reboot or reload the device will be in the FIPS Approved Mode of Operation.
NOTE: The keys and CSPs generated in the cryptographic module during FIPS mode of
operation cannot be used when the module transitions to non-FIPS mode and vice versa.
While the module transitions from FIPS to non-FIPS mode or from non-FIPS to FIPS
mode, all the keys and CSPs are to be zeroized by the Crypto Officer.
To transition from a FIPS mode of operation to a non-FIPS mode of operation, the
Cryptographic Officer shall zeroize all keys and CSP’s that were generated and remove
the FIPS mode command from the configuration. For key zeroization, please refer to the
“Zeroization” column in Section 6 of this security policy. To remove the FIPS mode
command from the configuration, follow the steps below:
To disable FIPS mode
- configure terminal
- no crypto fips-mode
- commit
- reload location all
On reboot/reload device will be in the non-FIPS Approved Mode of Operation.
10.2Remote Access
SSH access to the module is allowed in FIPS approved mode of operation, using SSH v2
and a FIPS approved algorithm.
SNMPv3 communications with the module are allowed in FIPS approved mode.
10.3Key Strength
Key sizes with security strength of less than 112-bits shall not be used in FIPS mode of
operation.
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11 Related Documentation
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the security appliances in
the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic device security policy. More
information is available on the security appliances from the sources listed in this section
and from the following source:
• The NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program website
(https://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information
for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the security appliances.
For LED related information, please review the following document:
• Hardware Installation Guide for ASR 9000 Series Aggregated Services Routers
Modular Routers. Chapter: LEDs
(https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/iosxr/asr9000/hardware-install/hig/b-
asr9k-hardware-installation-guide/b-asr9k-hardware-installation-
guide_chapter_010.html
12 Obtaining Documentation
Cisco documentation and additional literature are available on Cisco.com. Cisco also
provides several ways to obtain technical assistance and other technical resources. These
sections explain how to obtain technical information from Cisco Systems.
12.1Cisco.com
You can access the most current Cisco documentation at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/techsupport
You can access the Cisco website at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com
You can access international Cisco websites at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/public/countries_languages.shtml
12.2Product Documentation DVD
Cisco documentation and additional literature are available in the Product Documentation
DVD package, which may have shipped with your product. The Product Documentation
DVD is updated regularly and may be more current than printed documentation.
The Product Documentation DVD is a comprehensive library of technical product
documentation on portable media. The DVD enables you to access multiple versions of
hardware and software installation, configuration, and command guides for Cisco
products and to view technical documentation in HTML. With the DVD, you have access
to the same documentation that is found on the Cisco website without being connected to
the Internet. Certain products also have .pdf versions of the documentation available.
The Product Documentation DVD is available as a single unit or as a subscription.
Registered Cisco.com users (Cisco direct customers) can order a Product Documentation
DVD (product number DOC-DOCDVD=) from Cisco Marketplace at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/go/marketplace/
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12.3Ordering Documentation
Registered Cisco.com users may order Cisco documentation at the Product
Documentation Store in the Cisco Marketplace at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/go/marketplace/
Nonregistered Cisco.com users can order technical documentation from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. (0800 to 1700) PDT by calling 1 866 463-3487 in the United States and Canada, or
elsewhere by calling 011 408 519-5055. You can also order documentation by e-mail at
tech-doc-store-mkpl@external.cisco.com or by fax at 1 408 519-5001 in the
United States and Canada, or elsewhere at 011 408 519-5001.
13 Documentation Feedback
You can rate and provide feedback about Cisco technical documents by completing the
online feedback form that appears with the technical documents on Cisco.com.
You can send comments about Cisco documentation to bug-doc@cisco.com.
You can submit comments by using the response card (if present) behind the front cover
of your document or by writing to the following address:
Cisco Systems
Attn: Customer Document Ordering
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134-9883
We appreciate your comments.
14 Cisco Product Security Overview
Cisco provides a free online Security Vulnerability Policy portal at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
From this site, you can perform these tasks:
• Report security vulnerabilities in Cisco products.
• Obtain assistance with security incidents that involve Cisco products.
• Register to receive security information from Cisco.
A current list of security advisories and notices for Cisco products is available at this
URL:
https://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
If you prefer to see advisories and notices as they are updated in real time, you can access
a Product Security Incident Response Team Really Simple Syndication (PSIRT RSS)
feed from this URL:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/rss.x?i=44
14.1Reporting Security Problems in Cisco Products
Cisco is committed to delivering secure products. We test our products internally before
we release them, and we strive to correct all vulnerabilities quickly. If you think that you
might have identified vulnerability in a Cisco product, contact PSIRT:
• Emergencies — security-alert@cisco.com
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An emergency is either a condition in which a system is under active attack or a condition
for which a severe and urgent security vulnerability should be reported. All other
conditions are considered non-emergencies.
• Non-emergencies — psirt@cisco.com
In an emergency, you can also reach PSIRT by telephone:
• 1 877 228-7302
• 1 408 525-6532
Tip
We encourage you to use Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) or a compatible product to encrypt
any sensitive information that you send to Cisco. PSIRT can work from encrypted
information that is compatible with PGP versions 2.x through 8.x. Never use a revoked or
an expired encryption key. The correct public key to use in your correspondence with
PSIRT is the one linked in the Contact Summary section of the Security Vulnerability
Policy page at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
The link on this page has the current PGP key ID in use.
15 Obtaining Technical Assistance
Cisco Technical Support provides 24-hour-a-day award-winning technical assistance.
The Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website on Cisco.com features extensive
online support resources. In addition, if you have a valid Cisco service contract, Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC) engineers provide telephone support. If you do not
have a valid Cisco service contract, contact your reseller.
15.1Cisco Technical Support & Documentation Website
The Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website provides online documents and
tools for troubleshooting and resolving technical issues with Cisco products and
technologies. The website is available 24 hours a day, at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Access to all tools on the Cisco Technical Support & Documentation website requires a
Cisco.com user ID and password. If you have a valid service contract but do not have a
user ID or password, you can register at this URL:
https://tools.cisco.com/RPF/register/register.do
Note
Use the Cisco Product Identification (CPI) tool to locate your product serial number before
submitting a web or phone request for service. You can access the CPI tool from the Cisco
Technical Support & Documentation website by clicking the Tools & Resources link
under Documentation & Tools. Choose Cisco Product Identification Tool from the
Alphabetical Index drop-down list, or click the Cisco Product Identification Tool link
under Alerts & RMAs. The CPI tool offers three search options: by product ID or model
name; by tree view; or for certain products, by copying and pasting show command output.
Search results show an illustration of your product with the serial number label location
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highlighted. Locate the serial number label on your product and record the information
before placing a service call.
15.2Submitting a Service Request
Using the online TAC Service Request Tool is the fastest way to open S3 and S4 service
requests. (S3 and S4 service requests are those in which your network is minimally
impaired or for which you require product information.) After you describe your situation,
the TAC Service Request Tool provides recommended solutions. If your issue is not
resolved using the recommended resources, your service request is assigned to a Cisco
engineer. The TAC Service Request Tool is located at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/techsupport/servicerequest
For S1 or S2 service requests or if you do not have Internet access, contact the Cisco TAC
by telephone. (S1 or S2 service requests are those in which your production network is
down or severely degraded.) Cisco engineers are assigned immediately to S1 and S2
service requests to help keep your business operations running smoothly.
To open a service request by telephone, use one of the following numbers:
Asia-Pacific: +61 2 8446 7411
Australia: 1 800 805 227
EMEA: +32 2 704 55 55
USA: +1 800 553-2447
For a complete list of Cisco TAC contacts, go to this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/techsupport/contacts
15.3Definitions of Service Request Severity
To ensure that all service requests are reported in a standard format, Cisco has established
severity definitions.
Severity 1 (S1) – Your network is “down,” or there is a critical impact to your business
operations. You and Cisco will commit all necessary resources around the clock to
resolve the situation.
Severity 2 (S2) – Operation of an existing network is severely degraded, or significant
aspects of your business operation are negatively affected by inadequate performance of
Cisco products. You and Cisco will commit full-time resources during normal business
hours to resolve the situation.
Severity 3 (S3) – Operational performance of your network is impaired, but most
business operations remain functional. You and Cisco will commit resources during
normal business hours to restore service to satisfactory levels.
Severity 4 (S4) – You require information or assistance with Cisco product capabilities,
installation, or configuration. There is little or no effect on your business operations.
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16 Obtaining Additional Publications and Information
Information about Cisco products, technologies, and network solutions is available from
various online and printed sources.
• Cisco Marketplace provides a variety of Cisco books, reference guides,
documentation, and logo merchandise. Visit Cisco Marketplace, the company
store, at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/go/marketplace/
• Cisco Press publishes a wide range of general networking, training and
certification titles. Both new and experienced users will benefit from these
publications. For current Cisco Press titles and other information, go to Cisco
Press at this URL:
https://www.ciscopress.com
• Packet magazine is the Cisco Systems technical user magazine for maximizing
Internet and networking investments. Each quarter, Packet delivers coverage of
the latest industry trends, technology breakthroughs, and Cisco products and
solutions, as well as network deployment and troubleshooting tips, configuration
examples, customer case studies, certification and training information, and links
to scores of in-depth online resources. You can access Packet magazine at this
URL:
https://www.cisco.com/packet
• Internet Protocol Journal is a quarterly journal published by Cisco Systems for
engineering professionals involved in designing, developing, and operating public
and private internets and intranets. You can access the Internet Protocol Journal at
this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/ipj
• Networking products offered by Cisco Systems, as well as customer support
services, can be obtained at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/index.html
• Networking Professionals Connection is an interactive website for networking
professionals to share questions, suggestions, and information about networking
products and technologies with Cisco experts and other networking professionals.
Join a discussion at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/discuss/networking
• World-class networking training is available from Cisco. You can view current
offerings at this URL:
https://www.cisco.com/en/US/learning/index.html
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17 Definitions List
ACL Access Control List
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DRAM Dynamic RAM
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EDC Error Detection Code
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
Gbps Gigabits per second
GigE Gigabit Ethernet
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
ISSU In-service software upgrade
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
LAN Local Area Network
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVRAM Non-Volatile Random-Access Memory
PIN Personal Identification Number
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
RP Route Processor
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman method for asymmetric encryption
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
USB Universal Serial Bus
VPN Virtual Private Network