## FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy #### Ceragon Networks IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20S, IP-20C-HP, IP-20N, IP-20A, IP-50C, IP-50E #### Firmware: 12.0.1 #### Hardware: IP-20N and IP-20A, with TEL P/N: BS-0341-2 and with components: - IP-20 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 - IP-20 TCC-U: N000082H005 - IP-20 RMC-B: N000082H004 IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20S, IP-20C-HP, IP-50C and IP-50E (Rev. 6) ###### Prepared by: Acumen Security 2400 Research Blvd Rockville, MD 20850 www.acumensecurity.net Ceragon Networks Ltd. assumes no liability resulting from any inaccuracies or omissions in this document, or from use of the information obtained herein. Ceragon reserves the right to make changes to any products described herein to improve reliability, function, or design, and reserves the right to revise this document and to make changes from time to time in content hereof with no obligation to notify any person of revisions or changes. Ceragon does not assume any liability arising out of the application or use of any product, software, or circuit described herein; neither does it convey license under its patent rights or the rights of others. It is possible that this publication may contain references to, or information about Ceragon products (machines and programs), programming, or services that are not announced in your country. Such references or information must not be construed to mean that Ceragon intends to announce such Ceragon products, programming, or services in your country. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ####### Copyrights This document, Ceragon products, and 3 rd Party software products described in this document may include or describe copyrighted Ceragon and other 3 rd Party supplied computer programs stored in semiconductor memories or other media. Laws in the United States and other countries preserve for Ceragon, its licensors, and other 3 rd Party supplied software certain exclusive rights for copyrighted material, including the exclusive right to copy, reproduce in any form, distribute and make derivative works of the copyrighted material. Accordingly, any copyrighted material of Ceragon, its licensors, or the 3 rd Party software supplied material contained in the Ceragon products described in this document may not be copied, reproduced, reverse engineered, distributed, merged or modified in any manner without the express written permission of Ceragon. Furthermore, the purchase of Ceragon products shall not be deemed to grant either directly or by implication, estoppel, or otherwise, any license under the copyrights, patents or patent applications of Ceragon or other 3rd Party supplied software, except for the normal non-exclusive, royalty free license to use that arises by operation of law in the sale of a product. ####### Restrictions Software and documentation are copyrighted materials. Making unauthorized copies is prohibited by law. No part of the software or documentation may be reproduced, transmitted, transcribed, stored in a retrieval system, or translated into any language or computer language, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission of Ceragon. ####### License Agreements The software described in this document is the property of Ceragon and its licensors. It is furnished by express license agreement only and may be used only in accordance with the terms of such an agreement. ####### High Risk Materials Ceragon and its supplier(s) specifically disclaim any express or implied warranty of fitness for any high-risk activities or uses of its products including, but not limited to, the operation of nuclear facilities, aircraft navigation or aircraft communication systems, air traffic control, life support, or weapons systems ('High Risk Use'). Any High Risk is unauthorized, is made at your own risk and you shall be responsible for any and all losses, damage or claims arising out of any High-Risk Use. Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 2 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Table of Contents | Table of Contents | Table of Contents | Table of Contents | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | Purpose ......................................................................................................................................................... | Purpose ......................................................................................................................................................... | 5 | | | Document Organization ................................................................................................................................ | Document Organization ................................................................................................................................ | 5 | | | 1. General .................................................................................................................................................. | 1. General .................................................................................................................................................. | 6 | | | 2. Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................................................... | 2. Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................................................... | 6 | | | 2.1 Cryptographic Boundary ............................................................................................................... | 2.1 Cryptographic Boundary ............................................................................................................... | 6 | | | 2.2 Modes of Operation .................................................................................................................... | 2.2 Modes of Operation .................................................................................................................... | 10 | | | 2.3 Cryptographic Algorithms ........................................................................................................... | 2.3 Cryptographic Algorithms ........................................................................................................... | 10 | | | 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces ....................................................................................................... | 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces ....................................................................................................... | 20 | | | 4. Roles, services, and authentication .................................................................................................... | 4. Roles, services, and authentication .................................................................................................... | 32 | | | 4.1 Authorized Roles ......................................................................................................................... | 4.1 Authorized Roles ......................................................................................................................... | 32 | | | 4.2 Authentication Mechanisms ....................................................................................................... | 4.2 Authentication Mechanisms ....................................................................................................... | 34 | | | 4.3 Services ....................................................................................................................................... | 4.3 Services ....................................................................................................................................... | 35 | | | 5. | Software/Firmware Security ............................................................................................................... | 40 | | | 6. Operational Environment ................................................................................................................... | 6. Operational Environment ................................................................................................................... | 41 | | | 7. Physical Security .................................................................................................................................. | 7. Physical Security .................................................................................................................................. | 41 | | | 8. Non-invasive Security .......................................................................................................................... | 8. Non-invasive Security .......................................................................................................................... | 52 | | | 9. Sensitive security parameter management ........................................................................................ | 9. Sensitive security parameter management ........................................................................................ | 53 | | | 9.1 Generation .................................................................................................................................. | 9.1 Generation .................................................................................................................................. | 62 | | | 9.2 Import/Export ............................................................................................................................. | 9.2 Import/Export ............................................................................................................................. | 62 | | | 9.3 Storage ........................................................................................................................................ | 9.3 Storage ........................................................................................................................................ | 62 | | | 9.4 Zeroization Procedures ............................................................................................................... | 9.4 Zeroization Procedures ............................................................................................................... | 62 | | | 10. Self-tests.............................................................................................................................................. | 10. Self-tests.............................................................................................................................................. | 63 | | | | | 63 | | | 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests .......................................................................................................... | 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests .......................................................................................................... | 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests .......................................................................................................... | | | 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ................................................................................................................. | 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ................................................................................................................. | 64 | | | 10.3 Self-Tests Error Handling ............................................................................................................. 11. Life-cycle assurance ............................................................................................................................ | 10.3 Self-Tests Error Handling ............................................................................................................. 11. Life-cycle assurance ............................................................................................................................ | 64 | | | 11.1 Secure Operation | | ........................................................................................................................ 65 | | | 11.2 Installation .................................................................................................................................. | 11.2 Installation .................................................................................................................................. | 65 | | | 11.3 Initialization ................................................................................................................................. | 11.3 Initialization ................................................................................................................................. | 65 | | | 11.4 Management ............................................................................................................................... | 11.4 Management ............................................................................................................................... | 67 | | | | | 67 | | | 11.4.1 SSH Usage ......................................................................................................................... | 11.4.1 SSH Usage ......................................................................................................................... | 11.4.1 SSH Usage ......................................................................................................................... | | | 11.4.2 TLS Usage .......................................................................................................................... 11.5 Maintenance ............................................................................................................................... | 11.4.2 TLS Usage .......................................................................................................................... 11.5 Maintenance ............................................................................................................................... | 67 | | | 12. Mitigation of other attacks ................................................................................................................. | 68 | 68 | 68 | | List of Tables | List of Tables | List of Tables | List of Tables | | Table 1 - Security Levels ................................................................................................................................ | Table 1 - Security Levels ................................................................................................................................ | 6 | | | Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration .............................................................................. | Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration .............................................................................. | 10 | | | Table 3 - Approved Algorithms .................................................................................................................. | Table 3 - Approved Algorithms .................................................................................................................. | 20 | | | Table 4 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation .......................... | Table 4 - Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation .......................... | 20 | | | Table 5 - IP-20G Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................... Table 6 - IP-20C Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................... | Table 5 - IP-20G Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................... Table 6 - IP-20C Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................... | 23 | | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 3 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 7 - IP-20S Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................... 24 Table 8 - IP-20C-HP Ports and Interfaces ................................................................................................... 26 Table 9 - IP-20 TCC-U: N000082H005 (IP-20N and IP-20A) Ports and Interfaces ...................................... 27 Table 10 IP-20 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 (IP-20N and IP-20A) Ports and Interfaces ....................... 28 Table 11 Table 12 Table 13 Table 14 Table 15 Table 16 Table 17 Table 18 Table 19 - - IP-20 RMC-B: N000082H004 (IP-20N and IP-20A) Ports and Interfaces ................................... 28 - IP-50C Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................... 30 - IP-50E Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................... 32 - Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output............................................................................ 34 - Roles and Authentication .......................................................................................................... 35 - Approved Services ..................................................................................................................... 40 - Non-Approved Services ............................................................................................................. 40 - Physical Security Inspection Guidelines .................................................................................... 41 - SSPs ............................................................................................................................................ 61 Table 20 - Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification ................................................ 62 ### List of Figures Figure 1 - IP-20G ........................................................................................................................................... 7 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Figure 8 - - - - - - - IP-20C ........................................................................................................................................... 7 IP-20S ........................................................................................................................................... 7 IP-20C-HP ..................................................................................................................................... 8 IP-20N and IP-20A ........................................................................................................................ 8 IP-50C ........................................................................................................................................... 8 IP-50E (Rev. 6) .............................................................................................................................. 9 IP-20G Physical Ports .................................................................................................................. 21 Figure 9 - IP-20C Physical Ports .................................................................................................................. 22 Figure 10 IP-20S Physical Ports ................................................................................................................ 24 Figure 11 Figure 12 Figure 13 Figure 14 Figure 15 Figure 16 Figure 17 Figure 18 Figure 19 Figure 20 Figure 21 Figure 22 Figure 23 Figure 24 Figure 25 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - IP-20C-HP Physical Ports .......................................................................................................... 25 IP-20 TCC-U: N000082H005 (IP-20N and IP-20A) Physical Ports ............................................. 26 IP-20 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 (IP-20N and IP-20A) Physical Ports ............................... 27 IP-20 RMC-B: N000082H004 (IP-20N and IP-20A) Physical Ports ............................................ 28 IP-50C Physical Ports ................................................................................................................ 29 IP-50E Physical Ports ................................................................................................................ 31 IP-20G TEL Application Locations ............................................................................................. 42 IP-20C TEL Application Locations ............................................................................................. 44 IP-20C-HP TEL Application Locations ....................................................................................... 45 IP-20S TEL Application Locations ............................................................................................. 48 IP-20N and IP-20A Bottom ....................................................................................................... 49 IP-20N and IP-20A Front ........................................................................................................... 49 IP-20N and IP-20A Top ............................................................................................................. 50 IP-20N and IP-20A Back ............................................................................................................ 50 IP-50C/IP-50E TEL Application Locations ................................................................................. 51 Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 4 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### Introduction This is a non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Ceragon Networks Ltd. and the following Ceragon Networks products: IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20S, IP-20C-HP, IP-20N, IP-20A, IP-50C, and IP-50E. Below are the details of the certified products: Hardware Version #: - IP-20N and IP-20A, with TEL P/N: BS-0341-2 and with components: - o IP-20 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 - o IP-20 TCC-U: N000082H005 - o IP-20 RMC-B: N000082H004 - IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20S, IP-20C-HP, IP-50C, and IP-50E (Rev. 6) Firmware Version #: 12.0.1 FIPS 140-3 Security Level: 2 ### Purpose This document was prepared as part of the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3 validation process. The document describes how the Ceragon Networks IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20S, IP-20CHP, IP-20N, IP-20A, IP-50C and IP-50E meet the security requirements of FIPS 140-3. It also provides instructions to individuals and organizations on how to deploy the product in a secure Approved mode of operation. The target audience of this document is anyone who wishes to use or integrate any of these products into a solution that is meant to comply with FIPS 140-3 requirements. ### Document Organization The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-3 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains: Vendor Evidence document Finite State Machine Other supporting documentation as additional references This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Acumen Security, LLC. under contract to Ceragon Networks. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-3 Submission Package is proprietary to Ceragon Networks and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 5 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 1. General The Ceragon Networks IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20S, IP-20C-HP, IP-20N, IP-20A, IP-50C and IP-50E (the module) are multi-chip standalone hardware modules validated at FIPS 140-3 Security Level 2. Specifically, the modules meet that following security levels for individual sections in FIPS 140-3 standard: Table 1 - Security Levels | Section | FIPS 140-3 Section Title | Security Level | |-----------|-----------------------------------------|------------------| | 1 | General | 2 | | 2 | Cryptographic module specification | 2 | | 3 | Cryptographic module interfaces | 2 | | 4 | Roles, services, and authentication | 2 | | 5 | Software/Firmware security | 2 | | 6 | Operational environment | N/A | | 7 | Physical security | 2 | | 8 | Non-invasive security | N/A | | 9 | Sensitive security parameter management | 2 | | 10 | Self-tests | 2 | | 11 | Life-cycle assurance | 2 | | 12 | Mitigation of other attacks | N/A | ## 2. Cryptographic Module Specification The IP-20 and IP-50 series radios provide a service-centric microwave platform for HetNet 1 hauling. The platform includes a full complement of wireless products that provide backhaul and fronthaul solutions. Powered by a software-defined engine and sharing a common operating system, IP-20 and IP-50 Release 12.0.1, the IP-20 and IP-50 platforms deliver ultra-high capacities while supporting any radio transmission technology, any network topology, and any deployment configuration. ### 2.1 Cryptographic Boundary The cryptographic boundary for the modules is defined as encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," and "bottom" surfaces of the case and all portions of the "backplane" of the case. The following figures provide a physical depiction of the cryptographic modules: 1 Heterogenous Network Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 6 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 1 -IP-20G Figure 2 -IP-20C Figure 3 -IP-20S Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 7 of 68 ####### FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 4 -IP-20C-HP Figure 5 -IP-20N and IP-20A Figure 6 -IP-50C Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 8 of 68 ####### FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 7 -IP-50E (Rev. 6) The IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20S, IP-20C-HP, IP-50C and IP-50E are fixed configuration. The IP-20N and IP-20A are modular configuration, and have slots to insert the following cards: - Traffic and Control Card (TCC): The Traffic Control Card (TCC) provides the control functionality for the IP-20N and IP-20A units. It also provides Ethernet management and traffic interfaces. There are two variants of this card: - o IP-20 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003: Required for Multi-Carrier ABC configurations. Provides 2 x FE Ethernet management interfaces, 2 x GbE optical interfaces, 2 x GbE electrical interfaces, and 2 x dual mode electrical or cascading interfaces. - o IP-20 TCC-U: N000082H005: Provides 6 x 1/10GE optical interfaces and 2 x RFU or 1/2.5 GbE electrical PoE interfaces. Two of the optical interfaces (1 and 2) can be configured as cascading interfaces. Supports up to two Multi-Carrier ABC groups, with capacity of 2.5 Gbps (nonconfigurable). Supports multiple high-capacity configurations with Link Bonding. - Radio Modem Card-B (IP-20 RMC-B: N000082H004): The Radio Modem Card (RMC) provides the modem interface between the Indoor Unit (IDU) and the Radio Frequency Unit (RFU). The models included in this validation have been tested in the following configurations: | Model | Hardware | Firmware Version | Distinguishing Features | |-----------|------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------------| | IP-20G | IP-20G | 12.0.1 | Fixed configuration IDU 2 . See Table 5 | | IP-20C | IP-20C | 12.0.1 | Fixed configuration ODU 3 . See Table 6 | | IP-20S | IP-20S | 12.0.1 | Fixed configuration ODU. See Table 7 | | IP-20C-HP | IP-20C-HP | 12.0.1 | Fixed configuration ODU. See Table 8 | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 9 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration | Model | Hardware | Firmware Version | Distinguishing Features | |---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | IP-20N | IP-20N with TEL P/N: BS-0341-2 and with components: o IP-20 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 o IP-20 TCC-U: N000082H005 o IP-20 RMC-B: N000082H004 | 12.0.1 | Modular IDU. • Single or dual TCC • Dual RMC -B • Dual Power supplies See Table 9, Table 10 and Table 11 | | IP-20A | IP-20A with TEL P/N: BS-0341-2 and with components: o IP-20 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 o IP-20 TCC-U: N000082H005 o IP-20 RMC-B: N000082H004 | 12.0.1 | Modular IDU. • Single or dual TCC • Dual RMC -B • Dual Power supplies See Table 9, Table 10 and Table 11 | | IP-50C | IP-50C | 12.0.1 | Fixed configuration ODU. See Table 12 | | IP-50E | IP-50E (Rev. 6) | 12.0.1 | Fixed configuration ODU. See Table 13 | Additionally, the following cards can be configured on IP-20N and IP-20A modules. These cards provide port density, but do not contain any security-relevant functionality: - Ethernet/Optical Line Interface Card (E/XLIC) - STM-1/OC3 - STM-1 RST - TDM E1/T1 - 10Gb Ethernet/Optical Line Interface Card (LIC-X-E10) - Radio Interface Card (RIC-D) ### 2.2 Modes of Operation The module operates in the Approved mode of operation (when configured as per the instructions in Section 11 of this document ) . Any usage of the non-Approved services described in Table 17 would result in a non-Approved mode of operation. ### 2.3 Cryptographic Algorithms The following table lists the Approved algorithms supported by the modules: Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 10 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | CAVP Cert | Algorith m and Standar d | Mode/Me thod | Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) | Use / Function | |----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Management Security Algorithms Implementation (Firmware) | Management Security Algorithms Implementation (Firmware) | Management Security Algorithms Implementation (Firmware) | Management Security Algorithms Implementation (Firmware) | Management Security Algorithms Implementation (Firmware) | | A2758 | AES (FIPS 197) | CBC | Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length: 128, 256 | Used for control/ management plane encryption/ decryption | | A2758 | AES (FIPS 197) | ECB | Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length: 128, 256 | Used for control/ management plane encryption/ decryption | | A2758 | AES (FIPS 197) | CTR | Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length: 128, 192, 256 Payload Length: 8-128 Increment 8 Incremental Counter Counter Tests Performed | Used for control/ management plane encryption/ decryption | | A2758 | AES (FIPS 197) | CFB128 | Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length: 128 | Used for control/ management plane encryption/ decryption | | A2758 | AES (FIPS 197) | GCM 4 | Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation: Internal IV Generation Mode: 8.2.1 Key Length: 128, 256 Tag Length: 32, 64, 96, 104, 112, 120, 128 IV Length: 96-1024 Increment 8 Payload Length: 8-65536 Increment 8 AAD Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 | Used for control/ management plane encryption/ decryption | | A2758 | AES (FIPS 197) | KW | Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt Cipher: Cipher, Inverse Key Length: 256 Payload Length: 128-524288 Increment 128 | Used for control/ management plane encryption/ decryption | | A2758 | SHS (FIPS 180-4) | SHA-1 SHA2-256 SHA2-384 SHA2-512 | Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 | Used for control/ management plane message digests. SHA-1 is permitted within SSH, TLS and IPSec protocols, and legacy signature verification only. | | A2758 | HMAC | HMAC- SHA1 | MAC: 32-160 Increment 8 Key Length: 8- 524288 Increment 8 | Used for control/ management plane | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 11 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | CAVP Cert | Algorith m and Standar d | Mode/Me thod | Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) | Use / Function | |-------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | (FIPS 198-1) | HMAC- SHA2-256 | MAC: 32-256 Increment 8 Key Length: 8- 524288 Increment 8 | message authentication | | | (FIPS 198-1) | HMAC- SHA2-384 | MAC: 32-384 Increment 8 Key Length: 8- 524288 Increment 8 | message authentication | | | (FIPS 198-1) | HMAC- SHA2-512 | MAC: 32-512 Increment 8 Key Length: 8- 524288 Increment 8 | message authentication | | | DRBG (SP800- 90Arev1) | CTR_DRBG | Capabilities: Mode: AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled: Yes Additional Input: 0-256 Increment 256 Entropy Input: 2048 Increment 128 Nonce: 128 Personalization String Length: 0-256 Increment 256 Returned Bits: 256 | Used for control/ management plane random bit generation | | | ECDSA (FIPS 186-4) | KeyGen, KeyVer, SigGen, SigVer | Capabilities: Curve: P-256 Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Secret Generation Mode: Testing Candidates | Used for control/ management plane key generation, signature generation, and signature verification | | | DSA (FIPS 186-4) | KeyGen | Capabilities: L: 2048 N: 224 L: 2048 N: 256 L: 3072 N: 256 | Used for control/ management plane FCC key generation | | | RSA (FIPS 186-4) | KeyGen | Capabilities: Key Generation Mode: B.3.3 Properties: Modulo: 2048 Primality Tests: Table C.2 Properties: Modulo: 3072 Primality Tests: Table C.2 Properties: Modulo: 4096 Primality Tests: Table C.2 Info Generated By Server Public Exponent Mode: Random Private Key Format: Standard | Used for control/ management plane key generation, signature generation, and signature verification | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 12 of 68 Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 13 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 14 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 15 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 16 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 17 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | CAVP Cert | Algorith m and Standar d | Mode/Me thod | Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) | Use / Function | |------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | KAS-FFC- SSC (SP800- 56arev3) | Diffie- Hellman | Domain Parameter Generation Methods: FB, FC, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072 Scheme: dhEphem: KAS Role: initiator, responder | Used for key transport on the management plane using Diffie- Hellman; key establishment methodology provides 112 and 128 bits of encryption strength | | | KAS-ECC- SSC (SP800- 56arev3) | Ephemeral Unified | Domain Parameter Generation Methods: P-256 Scheme: ephemeralUnified: KAS Role: initiator, responder | Used for key transport on the management plane using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength | | | CVL RFC 7627 | KDF TLSv1.2 | Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | Used for key derivation within management protocols | | | CVL RFC 8446 | KDF TLSv1.3 | HMAC Algorithm: SHA2-256, SHA2-384 KDF Running Modes: DHE, PSK, PSK-DHE | Used for key derivation within management protocols | | | CVL 5 (SP800- 135-r1) | KDF SSHv2 | AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | Used for key derivation within management protocols | | Vendor- affirmed | CKG 6 | SP800- 133rev2 | §4: Using the Output of a Random Bit Generator §5: Generation of Key Pairs for Asymmetric-Key Algorithms §6.1: The 'Direct Generation' of Symmetric Keys §6.2: Derivation of Symmetric Keys | Symmetric key and asymmetric seed generation | | A2758 A2756 | KAS-1 | | KAS-FFC-SSC Cert. #A2758 with CVL Certs. #A2758 and #A2756 | Diffie-Hellman key establishment | 5 Note that no parts of the SSH, SNMPv3, IKEv1 and TLS protocols, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. 6 In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) as per SP 800-133r2 (vendor affirmed). The resulting generated symmetric keys and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified output from an NIST SP 800-90A DRBG. Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 18 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | CAVP Cert | Algorith m and Standar d | Mode/Me thod | Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) | Use / Function | |-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072 providing 112 and 128 bits of encryption strength | using KAS-FFC-SSC with SP 800-135 SSHv2 KDF, IKEv1 KDF, RFC 7627 TLSv1.2 KDF and RFC 8446 TLSv1.3 KDF | | A2758 A2756 | KAS-2 | | KAS-ECC-SSC Cert. #A2758 with CVL Certs. #A2758, #A2756 and #A2757 P-256 providing 128 bits of encryption strength | Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman key establishment using KAS-ECC-SSC with SP 800-135 SSHv2 KDF, IKEv1 KDF, RFC 7627 TLSv1.2 KDF and RFC 8446 TLSv1.3 KDF | | IKE KDF Implementation (Firmware) | IKE KDF Implementation (Firmware) | IKE KDF Implementation (Firmware) | IKE KDF Implementation (Firmware) | IKE KDF Implementation (Firmware) | | A2756 | KDF IKEv1 CVL (SP800- 135-r1) | KDF IKEv1 | Capabilities: Authentication Method: Pre- shared Key Initiator Nonce Length: 64- 2048 Increment 8 Responder Nonce Length: 64-2048 Increment 8 Preshared Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8 Diffie- Hellman Shared Secret Length: 3072 Hash Algorithm: SHA2-256 | Used for key derivation within IPsec Not implemented on Freescale P1021 or ARM based platforms | | SNMP KDF Implementation (Firmware) | SNMP KDF Implementation (Firmware) | SNMP KDF Implementation (Firmware) | SNMP KDF Implementation (Firmware) | SNMP KDF Implementation (Firmware) | | A2757 | CVL (SP800- 135-r1) | KDF SNMPv3 | Password Length: 64, 256 Engine ID: 3078313130663331626636303532333062 64, 3078333964653663643936303437353165 63 | Used for key derivation within management protocols | | Linux Kernel Crypto Implementation (Firmware) | Linux Kernel Crypto Implementation (Firmware) | Linux Kernel Crypto Implementation (Firmware) | Linux Kernel Crypto Implementation (Firmware) | Linux Kernel Crypto Implementation (Firmware) | | A2755 | AES (FIPS 197) | CBC | Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length: 256; tested but not used on Freescale P1012 or ARM based platforms | Used for data encryption/ decryption within IPsec | | A2755 | HMAC (FIPS 198-1) | HMAC- SHA2-256 | MAC: 128; Key Length: 256; tested but not used on Freescale P1012 or ARM based platforms | Used for message authentication within IPSec | | A2755 | SHS (FIPS 180-4) | SHA2-256 | Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8; not used on Freescale P1012 or ARM based platforms | Used for message digests within IPsec | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 19 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | CAVP Cert | Algorith m and Standar d | Mode/Me thod | Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) | Description / Key Size(s) / Key Strength(s) | Use / Function | |------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | KTS-4 | | AES HMAC | AES-256 in CBC mode with HMAC SHA-256 | AES-256 in CBC mode with HMAC SHA-256 | Used for key transport on the management plane within IPsec; key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of encryption strength | | AES Core Implementation (Hardware) | AES Core Implementation (Hardware) | AES Core Implementation (Hardware) | AES Core Implementation (Hardware) | AES Core Implementation (Hardware) | AES Core Implementation (Hardware) | | AES 4014 | AES (FIPS 197) | OFB | Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length: 256 | Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length: 256 | Used for data plane encryption/ decryption (IP-20C, -20S, -20C-HP) | | A680 | AES (FIPS 197) | CTR | Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length: 256 Payload Length: 128 Incremental Counter Counter Tests Performed | Direction: Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length: 256 Payload Length: 128 Incremental Counter Counter Tests Performed | Used for data plane encryption/ decryption (IP-50C, -50E, -20G, -20A, - 20N) | | Entropy Source | Entropy Source | Entropy Source | Entropy Source | Entropy Source | Entropy Source | | ENT (P) | ENT (P) | ENT (P) | ENT (P) | Ring-oscillator noise source with no conditioning function | Ring-oscillator noise source with no conditioning function | ####### Table 3 -Approved Algorithms *Note that there are algorithms, modes, and key/moduli sizes that have been CAVP-tested but are not used by any approved service of the module. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in this table are used by an approved service of the module. | Algorithm/Function | Use/Function | |----------------------|----------------| | MD5 | RADIUS | | | TACACS+ | Table 4 -Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation ## 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces The modules provide a number of physical ports/logical interfaces to the device, and the physical ports provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-3 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy control input, and status output. The physical ports/logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following diagrams/tables: Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 20 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Figure 8 -IP-20G Physical Ports | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | (1x) FE Management Interfaces 7 (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces (2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading (2x) GbE Optical Interfaces (16x) E1/DS1s (2x) TNC Radio Interfaces | Data Input | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (FE) Data traffic (TNC, GbE, E1/DS1) | | (1x) FE Management Interfaces (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces (2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading (2x) GbE Optical Interfaces (16x) E1/DS1s (2x) TNC Radio Interfaces | Data Output | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (FE) Data traffic (TNC, GbE, E1/DS1) | | (1x) Sync In/Out RJ-45 Interface (1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface (1x) FE Management Interfaces | Control Input | Clock signaling (Sync) TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (FE) Serial console (Terminal) | | (1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface (1x) FE Management Interfaces (1x) DB9 External Alarms LEDs | Status Output | Alarm signaling (DB9) TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (FE) Serial console (Terminal) | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 21 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------| | | | Activity (LED) | | (1x) -48V DC Power Interface | Power Input | N/A | Table 5 -IP-20G Ports and Interfaces Figure 9 -IP-20C Physical Ports | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | (1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE) (1x) RJ-45 Management Interface (2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical) | Data Input | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) Data traffic (Data Port, Antenna Ports) | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 22 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | (2x) Antenna Ports | | | | (1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE) (1x) RJ-45 Management Interface (2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical) (2x) Antenna Ports | Data Output | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) Data traffic (Data Port, Antenna Ports) | | (1x) Source Sharing (1x) RJ-45 Management Interface | Control Input | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) Signaling (Source Sharing) | | (1x) RSL Indication (1x) RJ-45 Management Interface | Status Output | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) RSL signaling (RSL) | | (1x) -48V DC Power Interface (1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE) | Power Input | N/A | Table 6 -IP-20C Ports and Interfaces Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 23 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 10 -IP-20S Physical Ports Table 7 -IP-20S Ports and Interfaces | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | (1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE) (1x) RJ-45 Management Interface (2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical) (1x) Antenna Ports | Data Input | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) Data traffic (Data Port, Antenna Ports) | | (1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE) (1x) RJ-45 Management Interface (2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical) (1x) Antenna Ports | Data Output | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) Data traffic (Data Port, Antenna Ports) | | (1x) RJ-45 Management Interface | Control Input | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) | | (1x) RSL Indication (1x) RJ-45 Management Interface | Status Output | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) RSL signaling (RSL) | | (1x) -48V DC Power Interface (1x) RJ-45 Data Port (PoE) | Power Input | N/A | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 24 of 68 Figure 11 -IP-20C-HP Physical Ports | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | (1x) RJ-45 Data Port (1x) RJ-45 Management Interface (2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical) (2x) Antenna Ports | Data Input | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45 Management) Data traffic (Data Ports, Antenna Ports) | | (1x) RJ-45 Data Port (1x) RJ-45 Management Interface | Data Output | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45 Management) | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 25 of 68 | FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | | |-----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | | (2x) Data port (Electrical or Optical) (2x) Antenna Ports | | Data traffic (Data Ports, Antenna Ports) | | (1x) Source Sharing (1x) RJ-45 Management Interface | Control Input | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) Signaling (Source Sharing) | | (1x) RSL Indication (1x) RJ-45 Management Interface | Status Output | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) RSL signaling (RSL) | | (1x) -48V DC Power Interface | Power Input | N/A | Table 8 - IP-20C-HP Ports and Interfaces Table 10 -IP-20 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 (IP-20N and IP-20A) Ports and Interfaces CERAGON Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 26 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |----------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------| | (1x) ACT LED (1x) RJ45 External Alarms | | Serial console (Terminal) Activity (LED) Alarm signaling (RJ45) | Table 9 -IP-20 TCC-U: N000082H005 (IP-20N and IP-20A) Ports and Interfaces Figure 13 -IP-20 TCC-B2-XG-MC: N000082H003 (IP-20N and IP-20A) Physical Ports | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | (2x) GbE Optical Interfaces (2x) FE Management Interfaces 8 (2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces | Data Input | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (FE) Data traffic (GbE) | | (2x) GbE Optical Interfaces (2x) Dual Mode GbE Electrical or Cascading (2x) GbE Electrical Interfaces | Data Output | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (FE) Data traffic (GbE) | | (1x) Synchronization Interface (1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface (2x) FE Management Interfaces | Control Input | Clock signaling (Sync) TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (FE) Serial console (Terminal) Signaling (Synchronization) | | (1x) RJ-45 Terminal Interface (2x) FE Management Interfaces (1x) ACT LED (1x) DB9 External Alarms | Status Output | Alarm signaling (DB9) TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (FE) Serial console (Terminal) Activity (LED) Alarm signaling (DB9) | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 27 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------| | (1x) TNC RFU Interface | Data Input | Data traffic | | (1x) TNC RFU Interface | Data Output | Data traffic | | (1x) TNC RFU Interface | Control Input | Data plane control signaling | | (1x) ACT LED | Status Output | Activity | | (1x) Link LED | | | | (1x) RFU LED | | | Table 11 -IP-20 RMC-B: N000082H004 (IP-20N and IP-20A) Ports and Interfaces Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 28 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Figure 15 -IP-50C Physical Ports 9 | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | (1x) 1/2.5/10GbE Electrical Interface (1x) 1/2.5 GbE Electrical or Optical Interface (2x) 1/10GbE Electrical or Optical Interface (1x) RJ-45 GbE Management Interface (2x) Antenna Ports | Data Input | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) Data traffic (Antenna ports, GbE) | | (1x) 1/2.5/10GbE Electrical Interface (1x) 1/2.5 GbE Electrical or Optical Interface (2x) 1/10GbE Electrical or Optical Interface (1x) RJ-45 GbE Management Interface (2x) Antenna Ports | Data Output | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) Data traffic (Antenna ports, GbE) | | (1x) RJ-45 GbE Management Interface | Control Input | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 29 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | (1x) Source Sharing | | Signaling (Source Sharing) | | (1x) RJ-45 GbE Management Interface (1x) RSL Indication | Status Output | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) RSL signaling (RSL) | | (1x) -48V DC Power Interface | Power Input | N/A | Table 12 -IP-50C Ports and Interfaces Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 30 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 16 -IP-50E Physical Ports | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | (1x) 1/2.5GbE Multiband Interface (1x) 4x1/10GbE or 1x40GbE Electrical or Optical Interface (1x) 1/10GbE Electrical Interface (1x) RJ-45 GbE Management Interface (2x) Antenna Ports | Data Input | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) XPIC data (XPIC/IPsec) Data traffic (Antenna ports, GbE) | | (1x) 1/2.5GbE Multiband Interface (1x) 4x1/10GbE or 1x40GbE Electrical or Optical Interface (1x) 1/10GbE Electrical Interface (1x) RJ-45 GbE Management Interface (2x) Antenna Ports | Data Output | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) XPIC data (XPIC/IPsec) Data traffic (Antenna ports, GbE) | | (1x) RJ-45 GbE Management Interface (1x) Source Sharing (1x) Protection/XPIC | Control Input | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) XPIC data (XPIC/IPsec) Signaling (Source Sharing) | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 31 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Physical port | Logical interface | Data that passes over port/interface | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | (1x) RJ-45 GbE Management Interface (1x) RSL Indication | Status Output | TLS v1.2/1.3, SSH, IPSec, and SNMPv3 management traffic (RJ-45) XPIC data (XPIC/IPsec) RSL signaling (RSL) | | (1x) -48V DC Power Interface (1x) RJ-45 GbE Management Interface (PoE) | Power Input | N/A | | WIFI Port | N/A | This port is disabled | Table 13 -IP-50E Ports and Interfaces ## 4. Roles, services, and authentication The following sections provide details about roles supported by the module, how these roles are authenticated, and the services the roles are authorized to access. ### 4.1 Authorized Roles The module supports several different roles, including multiple Cryptographic Officer roles and a User role. Configuration of the module can occur over several interfaces and at different levels depending upon the role assigned. There are multiple levels of access for a Cryptographic Officer as follows: - Security Officer, admin, SNMP User: Entities assigned this privilege level have complete access to configure and manage the module. - Tech, Operator, Viewer: These entities have more limited access to manage the module. For example, they can only manage the configuration of the data traffic interface. The Users of the module are the remote peers to and from which backhaul traffic is transmitted. The Users are connected over a secure session protected using the Session keys. The Session keys are established from the remote peer using the Master Key to encrypt them. Successful decryption of the Session keys by the module, authenticates the User to the module. The CO is responsible for configuring the Master Key and the User role to pass encrypted data. Once the User is authenticated to the module, encrypted data can be transferred to and from the remote peer. If the CO does not configure the data-path for encryption, the User can still send un-encrypted data (bypass mode). The following table specifies roles, with corresponding service with input and output: | Role | Service | Input | Output | |----------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------| | Crypto Officer | Show Status | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 32 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Role | Service | Input | Output | |----------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------| | Crypto Officer | Perform Self- Tests | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | Crypto Officer | Change Password | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | User | Transmit/Receive Data | Data plane packets | Data plane packets | | Crypto Officer | Administrative access over SSH | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | Crypto Officer | Administrative access over Web EMS | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | Crypto Officer | SNMPv3 | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | Crypto Officer | Key Entry | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | Crypto Officer | IPSEC | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | Crypto Officer | Zeroize | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | N/A | Cycle Power | N/A | N/A | | N/A | Status LED Output | N/A | LED Status | | Crypto Officer | View Summaries | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | Crypto Officer | Platform Management | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 33 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 14 -Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output | Role | Service | Input | Output | |----------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------| | Crypto Officer | Fault Management | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | Crypto Officer | Radio Configuration | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | Crypto Officer | Ethernet Configuration | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | Crypto Officer | Sync Settings | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | Crypto Officer | Utilities | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | | Crypto Officer | RBN | Web GUI forms, CLI commands | Web GUI status, CLI return messages | ### 4.2 Authentication Mechanisms The module supports role-based authentication. Module operators must authenticate to the module before being allowed access to services, which requires the assumption of an authorized role. The module employs the authentication methods described in the table below to authenticate Crypto-Officers and Users. Unauthenticated users are only able to access the module LEDs and power cycle the module. | Role | Authentication Method | Authentication Strength | |--------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | CO | Password/Username | All passwords must be at least 8 characters and must include letters, numbers, and special characters. If (8) integers are used for an eight-digit password, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is less than one (1) in 1,000,000 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 integer digits, 33 special characters, and 52 letter characters. The calculation should be 95 8 = 6,634,204,312,890,625). Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random attempt is less than 1 in 1,000,000. In order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over 110,570,071,881,510 guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module. | | Users | AES-256 Master Key | When using AES key-based authentication, the key has a size of 256-bits. Therefore, an attacker would have a 1 in | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 34 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ####### FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 15 -Roles and Authentication | Role | Authentication Method | Authentication Strength | |--------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | 2^256 chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance. For AES based authentication, to exceed a 1 in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 3.25X10^32 attempts per minute, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the modules to support. | ### 4.3 Services The services (approved and non-approved) that require operators to assume an authorized role (CryptoOfficer or User) as well as unauthenticated services are listed in the tables below. The module supports a global indicator of 'enabled' when the module is in the Approved mode and an indicator of 'disabled' when the module is in the non-Approved mode. Please note that the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) listed below use the following indicators to show the type of access required: - G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. - R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output). - W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. - E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. - Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP. | Service | Description | Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Role s | Access rights to Keys/SSP's | Indicator | |------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------| | Show Status | Provides status of the module and module versioning | N/A | N/A | CO | N/A | N/A | | Perform Self- Tests | Used to initiate on- demand self-tests (via power- cycle) | N/A | N/A | CO | N/A | N/A | | Change Password | Update password with a new value | N/A | Crypto Officer Password CO Password Hash | CO | Crypto Officer Password (R/W) CO Password Hash (E) | N/A | | Transmit/Receiv e Data | Encrypt/Dec rypt data passing through the module | AES-OFB AES-ECB AES-CTR AES-KW | Session Key Tx Session Key Rx Master Key | User | Session Key Tx (R/W/Z) Session Key Rx (R/W/Z) Master Key (R) | Admin status (enabled) | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 35 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Service | Description | Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Role s | Access rights to Keys/SSP's | Indicator | |------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| | | (Bypass mode when feature is not enabled) | KTS (AES- KW) | | | | | | Administrative access over SSH | Secure remote command line appliance administrati on over an SSH tunnel. | AES-CTR HMAC KAS-ECC- SSC KAS-FFC- SSC KTS RSA SHS SSH KDF DRBG CKG DSA ECDSA | DRBG entropy input DRBG Seed DRBG V DRBG Key Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman Shared Secret Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman private key Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman public key SSH Private Key SSH Public Key SSH Session Key SSH Integrity Key | CO | DRBG entropy input (R) DRBG Seed (R) DRBG V (R/W/Z) DRBG Key (R/W/Z) Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman Shared Secret (R/W/Z) Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman private key (R/W/Z) Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman public key (R/W/Z) SSH Private Key (R/W) SSH Public Key (R/W) SSH Session Key (R/W/Z) SSH Integrity Key (R/W/Z) | Admin status (enabled) and session logs | | Administrative access over Web EMS | Secure remote GUI appliance administrati on over a TLS tunnel. | AES-CBC AES-GCM HMAC KAS-ECC- SSC KAS-FFC- SSC KTS SHS RSA TLSv 1.2 KDF TLS v1.3 KDF DRBG CKG | DRBG entropy input DRBG Seed DRBG V DRBG Key Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman Shared Secret Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman private key Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie | CO | DRBG entropy input (R) DRBG Seed (R) DRBG V (R/W/Z) DRBG Key (R/W/Z) Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman Shared Secret (R/W/Z) Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman private key (R/W/Z) Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman public key (R/W/Z) TLS Private Key (R/W) TLS Public Key (R/W) | Admin status (enabled) and session logs | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 36 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Service | Description | Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Role s | Access rights to Keys/SSP's | Indicator | |-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------| | | | DSA ECDSA | Hellman public key TLS Private Key TLS Public Key TLS Pre-Master Secret TLS Master Secret TLS Session Encryption Key TLS Session Integrity Key | | TLS Pre-Master Secret (G/E/Z) TLS Master Secret (G/E/Z) TLS Session Encryption Key (G/E/Z) TLS Session Integrity Key (G/E/Z) | | | SNMPv3 | Secure remote SNMPv3- based system monitoring. | AES- CFB128 HMAC SHS SNMP KDF | SNMP Session Key SNMP Session Authentication Key SNMPv3 password | CO | SNMP Session Key (R/W/Z) SNMP Session Authentication Key (R/W/Z) SNMPv3 password (R/W/Z) | Admin status (enabled) and session logs | | Key Entry | Enter key over managemen t interfaces | KTS | Master Key | CO | Master Key (R/W) | Admin status (enabled) and session logs | | IPSec 10 | Control plane traffic encryption using IKEv1 for key exchange (Self- initiated cryptograph ic output capability) | AES-CBC HMAC SHS KTS KAS-FFC- SSC DSA IKEv1 KDF | IKE session encrypt key IKE session authentication key ISAKMP preshared key IPsec encryption key IPsec authentication key Diffie Hellman Shared Secret Diffie Hellman private key | CO | IKE session encrypt key (R/W/Z) IKE session authentication key (R/W/Z) ISAKMP preshared key (R/W) IPsec encryption key (R/W/Z) IPsec authentication key (R/W/Z) Diffie Hellman Shared Secret (R/W/Z) Diffie Hellman private key (R/W/Z) Diffie Hellman public key (R/W/Z) | Admin status (enabled) | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 37 of 68 | FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Service | Security Description | Policy Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Role s | Access rights to Keys/SSP's | Indicator | |--------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------| | | | | Diffie Hellman public key | | | | | Zeroize | Zeroize all CSPs | N/A | All CSPs | CO | All CSPs (Z) | Admin status (enabled) | | Cycle Power | Reboot of module | N/A | DRBG entropy input DRBG Seed DRBG V DRBG Key Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman Shared Secret Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman private key Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman public key SSH Session Key SSH Integrity Key SNMPv3 session key SNMPv3 session authentication key TLS Pre-Master Secret TLS Master Secret TLS Session Encryption Key TLS Session Integrity Key IKE session encrypt key | N/A | DRBG entropy input (Z) DRBG Seed (Z) DRBG V (Z) DRBG Key (Z) Diffie-Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman Shared Secret (Z) Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman private key (Z) Diffie Hellman / EC Diffie Hellman public key (Z) SSH Session Key (Z) SSH Integrity Key (Z) SNMPv3 session key (Z) SNMPv3 session authentication key TLS Pre-Master Secret (Z) TLS Master Secret (Z) TLS Session Encryption Key (Z) TLS Session Integrity Key (Z) IKE session encrypt key (Z) IKE session authentication key (Z) IPsec encryption key (Z) IPsec authentication key (Z) Session Key Tx (Z) Session Key Rx (Z) | Console log | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 38 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Service | Description | Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Role s | Access rights to Keys/SSP's | Indicator | |------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------------------------|------------------------| | | | | IKE session authentication key IPsec encryption key IPsec authentication key Session Key Tx Session Key Rx | | | | | Status LED Output | View status via the modules' LEDs | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | | View Summaries | View unit summary information (Unit, Radio, Security) | N/A | N/A | CO | N/A | Admin status (enabled) | | Platform Management | Shelf managemen t, unit configuratio n, interfaces, firmware settings, activation key, and statistics | N/A | N/A | CO | N/A | Admin status (enabled) | | Fault Management | Alarm settings | N/A | N/A | CO | N/A | Admin status (enabled) | | Radio Configuration | Radio interface settings (includes Bypass setting and status) | N/A | N/A | CO | N/A | Admin status (enabled) | | Ethernet Configuration | Ethernet interface settings | N/A | N/A | CO | N/A | Admin status (enabled) | Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 39 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Service | Description | Approved Security Functions | Keys and/or SSPs | Role s | Access rights to Keys/SSP's | Indicator | |---------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|----------|-------------------------------|------------------------| | Sync Settings | Manage synchroniza tion | N/A | N/A | CO | N/A | Admin status (enabled) | | Utilities | Generic utilities | N/A | N/A | CO | N/A | Admin status (enabled) | | RBN | Bandwidth notification | N/A | N/A | CO | N/A | Admin status (enabled) | Table 16 -Approved Services | Service | Description | Algorithms Accessed | Role | Indicator | |-------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------|-------------------------| | SNMPv1/v2c | Secure remote SNMPv1, v2c- based system monitoring. | N/A | CO | Admin status (disabled) | | RADIUS | RADIUS authentication | MD5 | CO | Admin status (disabled) | | TACACS+ | TACACS+ authentication | MD5 | CO | Admin status (disabled) | | HTTP | Plaintext HTTP | N/A | CO | Admin status (disabled) | | Hot Standby | Hot Standby | N/A | CO | Admin status (disabled) | | Syslog | Audit log forwarding | N/A | CO | Admin status (disabled) | | NTP | Network Time Protocol servers | N/A | CO | Admin status (disabled) | | Telnet | Plaintext CLI access | N/A | CO | Admin status (disabled) | Table 17 -Non-Approved Services ## 5. Software/Firmware Security The module performs a Firmware Integrity Test using a 160-bit error detection code (EDC) at power-on. If the EDC fails to compute properly, the module enters a hard error state where all cryptographic functions are disabled. Repeated failures of the integrity test will result in a reset to the factory default state. The integrity test may be performed on-demand by power-cycling the module. The module also performs a firmware load test (RSA 4096 with SHA2-256) covering the entire binary image, when a new FW is uploaded to the module. The signature is calculated and verified upon uploading of the new FW. If the test fails, the image will be discarded. Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 40 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 6. Operational Environment FIPS 140-3 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable since the module is a hardware module with a limited operational environment. The module runs Release 12.0.1 which includes Wind River Linux 4.1.0 or 4.14 depending on the CPU architecture. ## 7. Physical Security The appliances have a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The appliances are contained in a hard metal chassis, which is defined as the cryptographic boundary of the module. The appliances' chassis is opaque within the visible spectrum. The enclosure of the appliances have been designed to satisfy Level 2 physical security requirements. Each of the appliances needs Tamper Evidence Labels (TELs) to meet Security Level 2 requirements. These labels are installed (as seen in the respective model images) at the factory before delivery to the customer, for the IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20S, IP-20C-HP, IP-50C and IP-50 E. For IP-20N and IP-20A, the CO must place the twenty (20) TELs according to Figure 21-24 (below). The preparation instructions of the module prior to installation of the tamper seals are as follows: - Use caution to avoid touching the adhesive in such a way as to leave fingerprints and damage the labels. - The curing time (drying time) for the labels is at least sixty minutes. - The labels must be replaced whenever cards are added to or removed from the unit. Replacement labels can be ordered from Ceragon Networks, part number BS-0341-2. - When replacing a label, gently cut the label, replace the module, and apply a new label in place of the previous label. The extra tamper seals shall be in possession of the CO at all times. The CO shall observe any changes to the module such as reconfigurations where the tamper evident seals are removed or installed to ensure the security of the module is maintained during such changes and the module is returned to an Approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer shall periodically (defined by organizational security policy, recommendation is once a month) monitor the state of all applied TELs for evidence of tampering. If tamper is detected, the CO must take the device out of commission, inspect it and if deemed safe, return it to the Approved state. | Physical Security Mechanism | Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test | Inspection/Test Guidance Details | |-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Tamper Evidence Label | During regular physical maintenance operations. At least every six months. | Inspect the labels for obvious signs of damage/removal. Placement should be according to the figures below. | Table 18 -Physical Security Inspection Guidelines Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 41 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 17 -IP-20G TEL Application Locations Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 42 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 43 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 18 -IP-20C TEL Application Locations Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 44 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 19 -IP-20C-HP TEL Application Locations Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 45 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 46 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 47 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Figure 20 -IP-20S TEL Application Locations FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 48 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 21 -IP-20N and IP-20A Bottom Figure 22 -IP-20N and IP-20A Front Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 49 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Figure 23 -IP-20N and IP-20A Top Figure 24 -IP-20N and IP-20A Back Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 50 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Figure 25 -IP-50C/IP-50E TEL Application Locations FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 51 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 8. Non-invasive Security FIPS 140-3 Non-invasive Security requirements are not applicable. Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 52 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ## 9. Sensitive security parameter management The following table identifies each of the Keys/SSPs associated with the modules: | Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation | Use & related keys | |------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | DRBG entropy input (CSP) | 256-bit | DRBG A2758 | Generated using module entropy source | N/A | N/A | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use | Used for control/ management plane random bit generation | | DRBG Seed (CSP) | 256-bit | DRBG A2758 | Generated using SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG seed construction | N/A | N/A | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use | Seed used for DRBG instantiation and reseed | | DRBG V (CSP) | 256-bit | DRBG A2758 | SP 800- 90Ar1 DRBG Internal State | N/A | N/A | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use | Used for control/ management plane random bit generation | | DRBG Key (CSP) | 256-bit | DRBG A2758 | SP 800- 90Ar1 DRBG Internal State | N/A | N/A | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use | Used for control/ management plane random bit generation | | Diffie Hellman Shared Secret (CSP) | 112 and 128 bits | KAS-FFC-SSC 2048 bits | N/A | N/A | Established using SP 800- | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or | Used for key transport on the management plane using Diffie-Hellman; key | FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation | Use & related keys | |---------------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | and 3072 bits A2758 | | | 56Arev3 KAS-SSC | | cleared after use Termination of protocol session | establishment methodology provides 112 and 128 bits of encryption strength | | EC Diffie Hellman Shared Secret (CSP) | 128-bit | KAS-ECC- SSC P-256 A2758 | N/A | N/A | Established using SP 800- 56Arev3 KAS-SSC | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for key transport on the management plane using Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength | | Diffie Hellman private key (CSP) | 112 and 128 bits | KAS-FFC-SSC 2048 bits and 3072 bits A2758; DSA A2758 | Generated according to SP 800- 56Arev3 | N/A | N/A | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for key transport on the management plane using Diffie-Hellman; key establishment methodology provides 112 and 128 bits of encryption strength | | EC Diffie Hellman private key (CSP) | 128-bit | KAS-ECC- SSC P-256 A2758; ECDSA A2758 | Generated according to SP 800- 56Arev3 | N/A | N/A | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for key transport on the management plane using Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman; key establishment methodology provides | 0.1 Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Page 54 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Version FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation | Use & related keys | |------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | | | 128 bits of encryption strength | | Diffie Hellman public key (PSP) | 112 and 128 bits | KAS-FFC-SSC 2048 and 3072 bits A2758; DSA A2758 | Generated according to SP 800- 56Arev3 | Output in plaintext | N/A | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for key transport on the management plane using Diffie-Hellman; key establishment methodology provides 112 and 128 bits of encryption strength | | EC Diffie Hellman public key (PSP) | 128-bit | KAS-ECC- SSC P-256 A2758; ECDSA A2758 | Generated according to SP 800- 56Arev3 | Output electronically in plaintext | N/A | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for key transport on the management plane using Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength | | SSH Private Key (CSP) | 112-bit | RSA 2048- bit A2758 | Generated according to FIPS 186-4 | Entered electronically in encrypted form via approved KTS-2, KTS-3 or KTS-5 | N/A | Plaintext persistently in Flash | Zeroization command | Used for control and management plane authentication | | SSH Public Key (PSP) | 112-bit | RSA 2048- bit A2758 | Generated according to FIPS 186-4 | Output electronically in plaintext | N/A | Plaintext persistently in Flash | Zeroization command | Used for control and management plane authentication | 0.1 Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Page 55 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Version FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation | Use & related keys | |--------------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| | SSH Session Key (CSP) | 128, 192 or 256- bits | AES-CTR (128, 192, 256), AES- GCM (128, 256), SSH KDF A2758 | N/A | N/A | Derived using SP 800- 135rev1 KDF | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for control and management plane privacy | | SSH Integrity Key (CSP) | 160, 256 or 512-bits | HMAC, SSH KDF A2758 | N/A | N/A | Derived using SP 800- 135rev1 KDF | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle Termination of protocol session | Used for message integrity check in the control and management plane | | SNMPv3 password (CSP) | Shared Secret, at least eight characters | SNMP KDF A2757 | N/A | Entered electronically in encrypted form via | N/A | Plaintext persistently in Flash | Zeroization command | Used for key derivation within management protocols | | SNMPv3 session key (CSP) | 128-bit | SNMP KDF A2757, AES CFB128 A2758 | N/A | N/A | Derived using SP 800- 135rev1 KDF | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for encryption/decryption within management protocols | 0.1 Page 56 of 68 Public Material - Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Version FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation | Use & related keys | |-----------------------------------------|------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | SNMPv3 session authentication key (CSP) | 160-bit | SNMP KDF A2757, HMAC A2758 | N/A | N/A | Derived using SP 800- 135rev1 KDF | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for message integrity check within management protocols | | TLS Private Key (CSP) | 112-bit | RSA 2048- bit A2758 | Generated according to FIPS 186-4 | N/A | N/A | Plaintext persistently in Flash | Zeroization command | Used for authentication within management protocols | | TLS Public Key (PSP) | 112-bit | RSA 2048- bit A2758 | Generated according to FIPS 186-4 | Output electronically in plaintext | N/A | Plaintext persistently in Flash | Zeroization command | Used for authentication within management protocols | | TLS Pre-Master Secret (CSP) | 384-bit | KAS-FFC- SSC, KAS-ECC- SSC A2758 | N/A | N/A | Established according to SP 800- 56Arev3 | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for key derivation within the TLS management protocol | | TLS Master Secret (CSP) | 384-bit | TLS 1.2 KDF A2758 | N/A | N/A | Calculated as an element of the TLS 1.2 KDF | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for key derivation within the TLS management protocol. Derived from the TLS Pre- Master Secret | 0.1 Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Page 57 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Version FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation | Use & related keys | |--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| | TLS Session Encryption Key (CSP) | 128 or 256- bits | AES GCM, AES CBC A2758 TLS KDF A2758 | N/A | N/A | Derived using SP 800- 135rev1 KDF | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for encryption/decryption within management protocols | | TLS Session Integrity Key (CSP) | 160, 256 or 384- bits | HMAC SHA- 1, SHA2- 256, SHA2- 384 A2758 TLS KDF A2758 | N/A | N/A | Derived using SP 800- 135rev1 KDF | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for message integrity check in the control and management plane | | IKE session encrypt key (CSP) | 256-bit | AES CBC A2755, IKEv1 KDF A2756 | N/A | N/A | Derived using SP 800- 135rev1 KDF | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for encryption/decryption within IPsec | | IKE session authentication key (CSP) | 256-bit | HMAC A2755, IKEv1 KDF A2756 | N/A | N/A | Derived using SP 800- 135rev1 KDF | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use | Used for message authentication within IPsec | 0.1 Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Page 58 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Version FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation | Use & related keys | |--------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | | Termination of protocol session | | | ISAKMP preshared (CSP) | Secret, 32 characters | IKEv1 KDF A2756 | N/A | Entered electronically in encrypted form via | N/A | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Zeroization command | Used for key derivation within IPsec | | IPsec encryption key (CSP) | 256-bit | AES CBC 2755, IKEv1 KDF A2756 | N/A | N/A | Derived using SP 800- 135rev1 KDF | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for encryption/decryption within IPsec | | IPsec authentication key (CSP) | 256-bit | HMAC, SHA2-256 A2755, IKEv1 KDF A2756 | N/A | N/A | Derived using SP 800- 135rev1 KDF | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or cleared after use Termination of protocol session | Used for message authentication within IPsec | | Session key Tx (CSP) | 256-bit | AES CTR A680 or | Generated using DRBG | Electronically entered and output in | N/A | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle or | Used for encryption/decryption within data plane | 0.1 Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Page 59 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Version FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy | Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Security Function and Cert. Number | Generation | Import/Export | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation | Use & related keys | |-------------------------------|------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | AES OFB 4014 | | encrypted form via approved KTS-1 or KTS- 4 | | | cleared after use Data plane rekey | | | Session key Rx (CSP) | 256-bit | AES CTR A680 Or AES OFB 4014 | Generated using DRBG | Electronically entered and output in encrypted form via approved KTS-1 or KTS- 4 | N/A | Plaintext temporarily in RAM | Device power cycle Data plane rekey | Used for encryption/decryption within data plane | | Master key (CSP) | 256-bit | AES KW AES ECB A2758 | N/A | Electronically entered via KTS-2, KTS-3 or KTS-5 | N/A | Plaintext persistently in Flash | Zeroization command | Used for session key encryption for session key exchange between local and remote units | | Crypto Officer Password (CSP) | 95 8 | N/A | N/A | Electronically entered in encrypted form via approved KTS-2, KTS-3 or KTS-5 | N/A | SHA2-512 hash persistently in Flash | Zeroization command | Used for Crypto Officer login | | CO Password Hash | SHA2-512 | SHA2-512 A2758 | Generated upon | N/A | N/A | Persistently in Flash | Zeroization command | Used to verify Crypto Officer login | 0.1 Page 60 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table 19 -SSPs | Key/SSP Name/Type | Strength | Generation | Establishment | Storage | Zeroisation | Use & related keys | |---------------------|------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|---------------|----------------------| | | | password creation | | | | | 0.1 Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Page 61 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Version ### 9.1 Generation The module generates symmetric and asymmetric keys in compliance with the requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard. Specifically, symmetric keys are generated using output of the Approved SP 800-90A DRBG and in compliance with IG D.H. Asymmetric keys are generated as part applicable key generation standards. See Table 19 for additional details. ### 9.2 Import/Export All keys are entered into or output from the module in a secure manner. Specifically, the Session Keys are output from the module encrypted with an approved KTS using a Master Key with the AES-KW algorithm. Additionally, SSPs provisioned by an operator can be entered using an approved KTS employing AES-GCM or AES and HMAC within the SSH, TLS, or IPsec protocols. See Table 19 for additional details. ### 9.3 Storage SSPs are stored in plaintext in non-volatile and volatile memory. See Table 19 for additional details. ### 9.4 Zeroization Procedures SSPs stored in volatile memory are zeroized automatically when no longer needed. SSPs stored in nonvolatile memory are zeroized after repeated failure of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests or upon hardzeroization command issued. The zeroization will permanently erase SSPs stored in Flash by overwriting with zeroes. When zeroization occurs via power cycle or the zeroization command the module provides an indicator in the console log. When zeroization occurs via session termination the zeroization indicator is provided via session log. For CSPs that are zeroized after use, the indicator is that the service continues. If there is a zeroization error, the service in process will be terminated. See Table 19 for additional details. Table 20 -Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification | Entropy Sources | Minimum number of bits of entropy | Details | |-------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | ENT (P) | The entropy source provides 2.79 bits of entropy per 8-bit sample. To achieve a security strength of 256 bits, the DBRG's deviation function will require a seed length of at least 138 samples. The DRBG is seeded with 2048 bits (256 samples) of data providing approximately 714 bits of entropy which is sufficient for generating the largest module SSPs of a maximum of 256 bits of security strength. | Ring-oscillator noise source with no conditioning function. Conformant to SP 800-90B and IG D.J and D.K | FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ## 10. Self-tests Self-tests are health checks that ensure that the cryptographic algorithms within the module are operating correctly. The self-tests identified in FIPS 140-3 broadly fall within two categories: 1. Pre-Operational Self-Tests 2. Conditional Self-Tests When the module is powered on, its power-up self-tests are executed without any operator intervention. CASTs are performed prior to first usage of an algorithm. The operator may run periodic self-tests by power-cycling the module. Conditional tests are performed when a specific condition is met, such as usage of the entropy source or generation of key-pair. ### 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests The cryptographic module performs the following Pre-Operational Self-Tests on: - o Firmware Integrity Test: 160-bit Error detection code (EDC) - o Pre-operational Bypass Test ### 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests The HW-based entropy source is conditionally tested (when entropy is consumed by any of the FW components). Tests are APT and RCT (mentioned in the SP 800-90B document). The cryptographic module performs the following conditional self-tests: - Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests: - o Management Security Algorithms Implementation (Firmware) (Cert. #A2758): - o HMAC-SHA2-256 CAST - o SHA-1 CAST - o SHA2-512 CAST - o AES-128 ECB Decrypt CAST - o AES KeyWrap Encrypt CAST - o AES KeyWrap Decrypt CAST - o AES-256 GCM Encrypt CAST - o RSA PKCS#1 Sign/Verify CASTs - o ECDSA Sign/Verify CASTs - o DH Shared Secret Computation CAST - o ECDH Shared Secret Computation CAST - o TLS 1.2 KDF CAST - o TLS 1.3 KDF CAST - o SSH KDF CAST - o DRBG CAST - o IKE KDF Implementation (Firmware) (Cert. #A2756): - o IKE KDF CAST - o SNMP KDF Implementation (Firmware) (Cert. #A2757): Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 63 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy - o SNMP KDF CAST - o Linux Kernel Crypto Implementation (Firmware) (Cert. #A2755): - o AES-256 CBC Encrypt CAST - o AES-256 CBC Decrypt CAST - o HMAC-SHA2-256 CAST - o SHA2-256 CAST - o AES Core Implementation (Hardware): - o AES-256 OFB Encrypt CAST (Cert. #AES 4014) - o AES-256 OFB Decrypt CAST (Cert. #AES 4014) - o AES-256 CTR Encrypt CAST (Cert. #A680) - o AES-256 CTR Decrypt CAST (Cert. #A680) - o Entropy Self-tests - o SP 800-90B Repetition Count Test - o SP 800-90B Adaptive Proportion Test - o SP 800-90A Health Tests - Conditional Pair-wise Consistency Self-Tests: - o Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for RSA - o Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for ECDSA - o Pairwise Consistency Test (PWCT) for DSA - Conditional software/firmware load test - o Firmware Load Test (RSA 4096/SHA2-256 Signature Verification) - Conditional Bypass Test ### 10.3 Self-Tests Error Handling If any of the identified POSTs fail, the module will not enter an operational state and will instead provide an error message 'Failed powerOnSelfTest' . If the failure persists after power-cycle, the module will then be placed in a Default State (where all keys/CSPs are zeroized) and the Approved mode enabled flag is reset to disabled. The module will enter the non-approved mode. Event logs will be updated accordingly. If either of the SP 800-90B self-tests fail, the repeated random numbers are discarded, and an error is reported. If the PWCT fails, the key pair is discarded, and an error is reported. If the Firmware Load Test fails, the new firmware is not loaded. If the conditional Bypass self-test fails, the error is reported, and the module does not transition into or out of bypass. During execution of the self-tests, firmware loading, zeroization, and while in an error state, data output is inhibited. ## 11. Life-cycle assurance This section describes the configuration and administration of the cryptographic module. Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 64 of 68 ####### FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### 11.1 Secure Operation When configured as per this section of the Security Policy, the module only runs in the Approved mode of operation, with the exception of the non-Approved Services identified in Table 17. The non-Approved services described may make use of non-compliant cryptographic algorithms or plaintext data transfers. Use of these services is prohibited in an Approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer is responsible for ensuring that any of the non-Approved Services (Table 17) in Section 4.3 are not used. Once the module is properly configured as outlined below, the non-Approved Services will not be available for use. ### 11.2 Installation The module hardware is shipped in sealed boxes to indicate tamper. Upon delivery, the recipient should inspect the package to verify that there has been no tampering. IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20S, IP-20C-HP, IP-50C, and IP-50E have a fixed configuration with TELs applied at factory. The Crypto Officer must verify at installation time that the TELs are affixed and intact. IP-20N, and IP-20A have variable configurations and the CO must verify that they are configured as per one of the approved configurations identified in Section 2.1, Table 2. Moreover, the Crypto Officer must verify at installation time that the TELs are affixed and intact. The tamper evident seals installed as indicated in Section 7 are required for the module to be operated in the Approved mode of operation. Please refer to the figures in Section 7 of this document for the proper placement of TELs. ### 11.3 Initialization The CO must follow these steps to place the module in an Approved mode of operation. For the exact CLI command syntax or GUI instructions, please refer to the below referenced sections of the FIPS Security Configuration Guide for precise details . 1. Enable Password Enforcement to enforce password strength. 7.10 Configuring Login and Password Settings - -Select Quick Configuration > Security > Access Control. - -In the Password change for first login field, select Yes. - -In the Enforce password strength field, select Yes. 2. Configure failure login attempts for wrong passwords to 3 attempts (default value). 7.10 Configuring Login and Password Settings - In the Failure login attempts to block user field, select the number of failed login attempts (3) that will trigger blocking. 3. For radio encryption mode, configure Master Key and enable Payload Encryption. 7.5 Configuring AES-256 Payload Encryption Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 65 of 68 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 4. Enable SNMP v3 (default) and disable SNMPv1 and v2. Add SNMP users as appropriate following the password complexity requirements specified for CO operators in Section 4 above. Ensure that 'AES' and 'SHA' are selected for the privacy and authentication ciphers, respectively. ### 7.9 Configuring SNMPv3 - -Select Quick Configuration > Security > Protocols . The Quick Configuration Security Protocols page opens ( Figure 41 ). - -In the SNMP Admin field, select Enable to enable SNMP - -In the V1V2 Blocked field, select Yes to block SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 access so that only SNMPv3 access will be enabled. 5. Disable Telnet ### 7.8 Blocking Telnet Access - -Select Quick Configuration > Security > Protocols . - -In the Telnet Admin field, select Disable . - -Click Apply . 6. Disable HTTP and enable HTTPS ### 7.7 Configuring HTTPS - -Select Quick Configuration > Security > Protocols . - -In the HTTP protocol field, select HTTPS 7. [Optional step] in case of External Protection configuration (relevant for IP-20G, IP-20C, IP-20S, IP-20CHP), enable Protection Admin and supply a pre-shared key. - -8.1 Encrypting the Protection Link 8. [Optional step] In case of TCC Redundancy (relevant for IP-20N, IP-20A), enable Protection Admin, and make sure TCC Protection switch mode is set to Cold Switch Over Note: Hot Switch Over (HSO) shall not be used in the Approved Mode - -Web GUI: Platform > Shelf Management > Main Card Redundancy ( In the TCC Protection switch mode field, select Cold Switch Over) 9. Change the default CO password 2. -3.4 Changing Your Password 10. Enable Approved Admin configuration, i.e., set operation mode to 'Approved mode' . Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 66 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy - -7.1 Enabling 'Approved Mode ' Once the final step is performed the module will prompt the CO to reboot. Upon successful reboot the module will enter the Approved mode of operation. Once the module has been configured, the Approved mode status can be verified by selecting the Security Summary from the Web EMS main menu. The field for 'FIPS Mode Admin' shows 'enabled'. - -6 Viewing the Security Parameters ### 11.4 Management Protocols such as Telnet, RADIUS, TACACS+, HTTP, SNMPv1, and SNMPv2, Syslog, Hot Standby, NTP are not approved for use in the Approved mode and shall remain disabled. When in FIPS 140-3 compliant mode, only the following algorithms are used for SSH and TLS communications. #### 11.4.1 SSH Usage When in the Approved mode, the module supports only the following symmetric encryption algorithm: - aes128-ctr - aes192-ctr - aes256-ctr - aes128-gcm@openssh.com - aes256-gcm@openssh.com The following Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm is supported in the Approved mode: - hmac-sha1 The following key exchange algorithms are supported in the Approved mode: - ecdh-sha2-nistp256 - ecdh-sha2-nistp384 - ecdh-sha2-nistp521 - diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 - diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 - diffie-hellman-group18-sha512 #### 11.4.2 TLS Usage When in the Approved mode, only the following cipher suites are available for TLSv1.2 communications: - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 67 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy When in the Approved mode, only the following cipher suites are available for TLSv1.3 communications: - TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 - TLS_AKE_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ### 11.5 Maintenance There are no specific maintenance actions required. ## 12. Mitigation of other attacks The module does not claim to mitigate any other attacks beyond those specified in FIPS 140-3. Ceragon Networks Ltd. © 2025 Version 0.1 Page 68 of 68 Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).