Copyright Viasat, Inc. 2018. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Enhanced Bandwidth Efficient Modem
(EBEM) Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Number 1179470, Rev. 012
October 29, 2018
Prepared by:
Viasat, Inc.
6155 El Camino Real
Carlsbad, CA 92009
Viasat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 012,
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Record of Review and History
Document
Number
Rev. Rationale Release Date Affected Pages
1148155 001 Initial Release in Agile October 31, 2012 All
1179470 001 Updated for Simplex Encryption/TxPI/AH
ECP
March 13, 2015 All
1179470 002 Updated in response to InfoGard and CMVP
Comments for Simplex Encryption/TxPI/AH
ECP
August 7, 2015 All
1179470 003 Updated in response to InfoGard and CMVP
Comments
October 7, 2015 All
1179470 004 Updated in response to CMVP Comments October 16, 2015 All
1179470 005 Updated in response to CMVP Comments October 27, 2015 3, 5
1179470 006 Updated for FW v02.07.02. November 12,
2015
1, 3, 4
1179470 007 Updated for Remote Administrator and ESEM
Services and PPPoE Enhancements ECP
March 25, 2016 All
1179470 008 Updated in response to CMVP Comments June 22, 2016 3 - 5
1179470 009 Updated in response to CMVP Comments June 26, 2016 1, 6
1179470 010 Updated for FW v02.09.06 January 3, 2017 4
1179470 011 Updated for FW v02.11.06 IA Enhancements June 26, 2018 All
1179470 012 Updated in response to CMVP Comments October 29, 2018 All
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. MODULE OVERVIEW..........................................................................................................................................1
2. SECURITY LEVEL................................................................................................................................................2
3. MODES OF OPERATION.....................................................................................................................................3
APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION ...............................................................................................................................3
4. PORTS AND INTERFACES..................................................................................................................................7
5. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY.................................................................................7
ASSUMPTION OF ROLES..............................................................................................................................................7
6. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY............................................................................................................................10
ROLES AND SERVICES..............................................................................................................................................10
DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS)......................................................................................12
DEFINITION OF PUBLIC KEYS: .................................................................................................................................14
DEFINITION OF CSPS AND PUBLIC KEY MODES OF ACCESS ....................................................................................15
7. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT....................................................................................................................20
8. SECURITY RULES ..............................................................................................................................................20
9. SELF-TESTS .........................................................................................................................................................22
10. PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY.....................................................................................................................24
PHYSICAL SECURITY MECHANISMS.........................................................................................................................24
OPERATOR REQUIRED ACTIONS ..............................................................................................................................24
11. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY...........................................................................................28
12. REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................29
13. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS...................................................................................................................29
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Image of the Cryptographic Module .............................................................................................1
Figure 2: Block Diagram ..............................................................................................................................2
Figure 3: Tamper Seal locations on the Strategic EBEM (Eight Seals)......................................................26
Figure 4: Tamper Seal locations on the Tactical EBEM (Eight Seals).......................................................27
Figure 5: Tamper Seal Location of Expansion Port with Blank Plate Installed (Two Seals).....................27
Figure 6: Tamper Seal Location on Expansion Port with ESEM Installed (One Seal)...............................27
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Module Security Level Specification .............................................................................................2
Table 2: Approved Algorithms and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions..........................................3
Table 3: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication...................................................................7
Table 4: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms.......................................................................................8
Table 5: Services Authorized for Roles......................................................................................................10
Table 6: CSP Access Rights within Services..............................................................................................16
Table 7: Public Key Access Rights within Services...................................................................................19
Table 8: Power Up Self-tests ......................................................................................................................22
Table 9: Conditional Self-tests....................................................................................................................24
Table 10: Critical Function Tests................................................................................................................24
Table 11: Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms ................................................................26
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1. Module Overview
The Enhanced Bandwidth Efficient Modem (EBEM) Cryptographic Module is a multi-chip
standalone module as defined in the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2.
The module has multiple configurations as shown below:
Category Hardware Version Firmware Versions
Strategic P/N 1010162 Version 1 02.11.06
P/N 1010162 with ESEM Version 1
(also referred to as P/N 1091549)
02.11.06
P/N 1075559 Version 1 02.11.06
P/N 1075559 with ESEM Version 1
(also referred to as P/N 1091551)
02.11.06
P/N 1047117: Tamper seal applied over the
ESEM
N/A
Tactical P/N 1010163 Version 1 02.11.06
P/N 1010163 with ESEM Version 1
(also referred to as P/N 1091550)
02.11.06
P/N 1075560 Version 1 02.11.06
P/N 1075560 with ESEM Version 1
(also referred to as P/N 1091552)
02.11.06
P/N 1047117: Tamper seal applied over the
ESEM
N/A
The cryptographic boundary is realized as the external surface of the EBEM enclosure. The
EBEM is a high-speed, high performance, flexible and compatible Single Channel Per Carrier
(SCPC) modem. The EBEM incorporates the latest technology in advanced modulation and
coding, while providing backwards interoperability with the majority of existing SCPC modems.
It offers optimal power and bandwidth efficiency with 16-ary modulation and Turbo-coding. It
supports a large range of user data rates, from 64 kbps up to 155 Mbps.
Figure 1: Image of the Cryptographic Module
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Figure 2: Block Diagram
2. Security Level
The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 2 security of
FIPS 140-2.
Table 1: Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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3. Modes of Operation
Approved mode of operation
In FIPS mode, the cryptographic module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms:
Table 2: Approved Algorithms and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm
Implementation
Algorithm Description CAVP Cert. #
EBEM AES CTR 1 AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption,
Decryption (in FPGA for data)
Modes: ECB (Encryption only),
CTR (Encryption and
Decryption)
Key sizes: 256 bits
3449
EBEM AES CTR 2 AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption,
Decryption (in FPGA for data)
Modes: ECB (Encryption only),
CTR (Encryption and
Decryption)
Key sizes: 256 bits
3450
EbemCrypto AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption,
Decryption (in Processor for
CSPs)
Modes: ECB, KW
Key sizes: 256 bits
5475
CKG [SP 800-133]
Asymmetric Key Generation (§
6) and Symmetric Key
Generation (§ 7) without further
post processing (i.e.,
unmodified output from the
DRBG).
Vendor
Affirmed
DRBG [SP 800-90A]
Functions: CTR DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
2154
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: Signature
Verification (for firmware
images, and feature files)
Curves/SHA sizes: P-521 with
SHA-512
1466
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Algorithm
Implementation
Algorithm Description CAVP Cert. #
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: Key Pair
Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature
Verification (for key transport
messages)
Curves/SHA sizes: P-384 with
SHA-384
1466
KTS [SP 800-38F]
Functions: Wrap, Unwrap (for
CSPs)
Key sizes: 256 bits
Caveat: Key establishment
methodology provides 192 bits
of encryption strength.
5475
HMAC [FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Generation,
Verification (for SMAT and
PBKDF2 authentication)
SHA sizes: SHA-384, SHA-512
3630
KAS [SP 800-56A]
Schema: Ephemeral Unified
Parameter sets/Key sizes: EE
Supports 256 bits of security.
182
KAS [SP 800-56A]
Schema: One Pass DH
Parameter sets/Key sizes: ED
Supports 192 bits of security.
182
SHA [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature
Generation, Digital Signature
Verification, non-Digital
Signature Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-384, and
SHA-512
4393
NetSNMP*
KDF KDF [SP 800-135]
Functions: SNMP KDF
1930 (CVL)
OpenSSH* Algorithms KDF [SP 800-135]
Functions: SSH KDF
1929 (CVL)
*
No parts of this protocol, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
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Algorithm
Implementation
Algorithm Description CAVP Cert. #
KAS [SP 800-56A]
Schema: Ephemeral Unified
Parameter sets/Key sizes: EC,
ED, EE
Supports 128, 192, and 256 bits
of security.
1928 (CVL)
OpenSSL Algorithms AES [FIPS 197, SP 800-38A]
Functions: Encryption,
Decryption
Modes: ECB, CBC, CFB, CTR
Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits
5476
CKG [SP 800-133]
Asymmetric Key Generation (§
6) without further post
processing (i.e., unmodified
output from the DRBG).
Vendor
Affirmed
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4]
Functions: Asymmetric Key
Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature
Verification
Curves: P-256, P-384, and P-
521
SHA sizes: SHA-256, SHA-
384, and SHA-512
1467
HMAC [FIPS 198]
Functions: Keyed Hash
SHA sizes: SHA1, SHA-256,
SHA-512
3631
SHA [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Message Digests
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
4394
SHA-256 uClibc SHA [FIPS 180-4]
Functions: non-Digital
Signature Applications
SHA sizes: SHA-256
2689
In FIPS mode, the cryptographic module supports the following non-Approved, but allowed
algorithms and protocols:
 NDRNG – Hardware Non-Deterministic RNG. The NDRNG output is used to seed the
FIPS Approved DRBG. The NDRNG produces entropy in 128 byte (1024 bit) blocks and
384 bytes (3072 bits) are generated to seed the Approved DRBG. At 0.174 bits of min-
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entropy per bit, the module’s DRBG seed contains 3072 * 0.174 > 534 bits of entropy
which exceeds the required 384 bits (256 bits of entropy input plus 128 bits of nonce).
 SSH – Uses the following algorithms:
o Protocol Defined Algorithm Names:
 Ciphers: aes128-ctr, aes192-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-cbc, aes192-cbc,
aes256-cbc
 Key Exchange Algorithms: ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384,
ecdh-sha2-nistp521
 Public Key Algorithms: Ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, Ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,
Ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
 MACs: hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512
o Corresponding FIPS Algorithms:
 Ciphers: AES (Cert. # 5476)
 Key Exchange Algorithms: EC Diffie-Hellman KAS (CVL Certs. #1928
and #1929 with curves P-256, P-384 and P-521; provides 128, 192, or 256
bits of strength), SHA (Cert. # 4394)
 Public Key Algorithms: ECDSA (Cert. # 1467), SHA (Cert. # 4394)
 MACs: HMAC (Cert. # 3631), SHA (Cert. # 4394)
 SFTP – Uses the following algorithms:
o Same as SSH above.
 Telnet –Uses no algorithms.
 SNMPv1 –Uses no algorithms.
 FTP – Uses no algorithms.
 SNMPv3 – Uses the following algorithms:
o Protocol Defined Algorithm Names: HMAC-SHA, AES
o Corresponding FIPS Algorithms: HMAC (Cert. # 3631), SHA (Cert. # 4394),
AES (Cert. # 5476)
In FIPS mode, the cryptographic module supports the following no security claimed algorithm:
 SP 800-132 PBKDF2 – no security is claimed. Anything imported into the module
encrypted using PBKDF2 keys is considered plaintext for the purposes of this module.
This is allowed in FIPS mode because the Viasat EBEM's proprietary FIPS Approved
key establishment and encryption algorithms (as shown in Table 2) protect sensitive
information that is sent encrypted by PBKDF2 keys. Corresponding FIPS Algorithm:
PBKDF2 (no security claimed).
The EBEM cryptographic module does not contain a non-Approved mode of operation. The
FIPS Approved mode of operation is indicated by the banner. When an Operator or
Administrator connects to the module using Telnet, SSH, FTP, or SFTP, the banner indicates that
the module is in FIPS Approved mode (“Module is in FIPS Approved Mode”). Additionally, if
the firmware version is one that has a FIPS certificate, then the user knows they are operating in
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a FIPS Approved mode of operation. The unauthenticated service “Display status” allows a user
to view the firmware version by scrolling to “GeneralSW Version”.
Detailed instructions for module installation, initialization, and start-up are provided in Viasat,
Inc.’s EBEM Crypto Officer & User Guide and Software/Firmware Installation Guide, Viasat
document number 1153093.
4. Ports and Interfaces
The cryptographic module provides the following physical ports and logical interfaces:
 J1 OVERHEAD (NON-INTELSAT): Data input, data output
 J3 EXT REF: Control input
 J4 DATA 1 (422/530): Data input, data output, control input
 J5 DATA 2 (COMSEC): Data input, data output, control input
 J7 DATA 3 (HSSI): Data input, data output
 J6 TX L-BAND: Data output, status output
 J8 RX L-BAND: Data input, control input
 J9 TX 70/140 MHz: Data output, status output
 J12 RX 70/140 MHz: Data input, control input
 J20 10/100/1000 (only available with ESEM installed): Data input, data output, status
output (status is only PADQ link quality packets during an active PPPoE session)
 100-240V~ 60Hz/50Hz: Power port, power input
 J13 ANT HANDOVER (only available in Tactical versions): Control input
 J10 ALARM: Status output
 J11 SERIAL: Data input, data output, control input, status output
 J2 10/100 BASE-T: Data input, data output, control input, status output
 Keypad: Control input, data input
 LCD: Status output, Data output
 Zeroize buttons: Control input
 LEDs: Status outputs
 Speaker: Status outputs
5. Identification and Authentication Policy
Assumption of roles
The EBEM cryptographic module supports five distinct operator roles (Operator, Administrator,
Peer Modem, and Viasat, Inc.). The cryptographic module shall enforce the separation of roles
using role-based and identity-based operator authentication.
Table 3: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Description
Type of
Authentication
Authentication Data
Operator A “User” from the FIPS
140-2 perspective.
Identity-based User name and Password
Administrator A “Crypto Officer” from Identity-based User name and Password
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Role Description
Type of
Authentication
Authentication Data
the FIPS 140-2
perspective.
Peer Modem The modem at the other
end of the RF link, with
whom the TEK
negotiation occurs.
Role-based
Identity-based
HMAC Key, also referred to as
SMAT (Shared Modem
Authentication Token)
Identity and Authentication (IA)
FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Signature
Key Pair
Viasat, Inc. Signer of firmware
image files and feature
files. A Viasat trust
anchor used to validate
authenticity when
loading these files on
modem.
Identity-based FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Signature
Key
Table 4: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication
Mechanism
Strength of Mechanism
Password The password is a minimum of 8-characters chosen from upper and
lowercase letters, 10 digits, and 10 special characters. The probability
that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is
1/72^8 which is less than 1/1,000,000.
An administrator is able to configure the modem to allow an unlimited
number of login attempts for a given user. One bottleneck that limits the
number of login attempts is the 10/100 Ethernet network interface of the
module. Ignoring any other limiting factors, this bottleneck can be used to
examine the probability of a successful authentication. See the table
below for information regarding each authentication method (besides the
front panel which is far too slow to be considered), the number of bytes
the modem sends over the network to the client during an authentication
attempt, and the maximum probability of a successful authentication
given that info. Each probability is less than 1/100,000.
Authentication
Method
Authentication
Attempt Size (Bytes)
Approx. Probability
of Authentication
SSH 194 5.353E-09
Telnet 3977 2.611E-10
FTP 1759 5.904E-10
SNMPv1 96 1.082E-08
SNMPv3 307 3.383E-09
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Authentication
Mechanism
Strength of Mechanism
HMAC Key The probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance
will occur is the strength of the embedded SHA-384 function 1 / 2^192
which is less than 1/1,000,000.
When the HMAC key is manually entered at the front panel. No more
than 10 unique authentication attempts can occur in any one minute
period. The probability of successfully authenticating to the module
within one minute is 10 / 2^192 which is less than 1/100,000.
When the HMAC key is entered (encrypted) over the SSH M&C interface
via the LCT, it takes 20 seconds to fill so no more than 3 attempts can
occur in any one minute period. The probability of successfully
authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 3 / 2^192
(which is < 1/100,000) due to a maximum of three attempts per minute.
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA IA
Signature Key
Using the EBEM’s ECDSA implementation, the probability that a random
attempt will succeed is the strength of the embedded SHA-384 function,
or 1 / 2^192, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
The IA key pair takes 20 seconds to fill so no more than 3 attempts can
occur in any one minute period. The probability of successfully
authenticating to the module within a one minute period is 3 / 2^192
(which is < 1/100,000) due to a maximum of three attempts per minute.
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA
Firmware/Feature
Signature Key
Using the EBEM’s ECDSA implementation, the probability that a random
attempt will succeed is the strength of the embedded SHA-512 function,
or 1 / 2^256, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
If the signature verification fails, the user must reboot before transferring
a different firmware image to the modem and trying the validation again.
The probability of successfully authenticating to the module within a one
minute period is 1 / 2^256 (which is < 1/100,000) due to a maximum of
one attempt per minute.
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6. Access Control Policy
Roles and Services
Table 5: Services Authorized for Roles
Service Description
Operator
Administrator
Peer
Modem
Viasat,
Inc.
Unauthenticated
Telnet, SSH, SNMPv1,
SNMPv3, FTP, or
SFTP Access
Remotely connect to the EBEM using
Telnet, SSH, SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP
or SFTP. These protocols are used to
establish access to the module for the
Operator and Administrator to perform
other services, as described in this table.
X X
Circuit Establishment Configure an encrypted or unencrypted
circuit
X X
Encryption
Establishment and
Authentication
Use HMAC (with SMAT) or ECDSA
signature verification (with IA PKC) to
authenticate the AES encrypted
pipeline.
X
Change Own
Password
One may change one’s own password
after authentication with the module
X X
Set/Change
Administrator,
Operator User Names
& Passwords
Set Administrator and Operator’s User
Names & Passwords. Unlock accounts
and change role type.
X
Set/Change SNMPv1
Password
Initialize or change the password for
authenticating the SNMPv1 user.
X
Enable/Disable
encryption
Configure module exclusive bypass
settings
X
SMAT Entry and
Rollover
SMAT Entry (may initiate SMAT
rollover if a circuit is established)
X
Encryption Perform encryption on an established
encrypted circuit with a peer modem.
X
Cryptographically
Validate image
Cryptographically validate and load an
uploaded firmware image or feature file.
X
Zeroize (authenticated) Actively overwrite all CSPs. Then the
module must be powered down. Note:
Zeroize not available from Front Panel
menu (only unauthenticated zeroize
available)
X X
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Service Description
Operator
Administrator
Peer
Modem
Viasat,
Inc.
Unauthenticated
Configure System
Time
Adjust the module’s system time. X
Configure Access to
Unsecure Protocols
Enable/disable remote access via FTP,
SNMPv1, and Telnet.
X
Configure password
policy
Set minimum password
length/complexity requirement and
password expiration period.
X
Change/Monitor
Modem and ESEM
configuration, view
statistics
Adjust all modem and ESEM
parameters. Monitor status of all
modem parameters and statistics.
X X
View or clear audit log View or clear audit log, which logs
actions of all users and the associated
access method. (Only available over
remote connection)
X
Upload/Install Feature
File or Firmware Image
Upload a firmware image or a feature
file. This will later be validated by the
Viasat, Inc. role. (Only available over a
remote connection)
X
Issue/Fill/Delete
Simplex PKI Key
Material
Issue/Fill/Delete key material needed for
authentication and key establishment for
PKI circuits. This includes: Trust
Anchor, Certificate Authority
certificates, CRLs, IA /KE certificates,
and IA/KE private keys.
X
View Filled PKI
Information
View IDs and type of key material that
is filled in the modem.
X X
User Login Login to the modem configuration
interfaces (i.e. SSH, Telnet, (S)FTP,
Front Panel, and SNMP)
X
Power On Power on the modem X
Power Off Power off the modem X
Reset Reset the modem X X X
Display Status Show non-security relevant status of the
cryptographic module via the front
panel.
X
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Service Description
Operator
Administrator
Peer
Modem
Viasat,
Inc.
Unauthenticated
Zeroize
(unauthenticated)
Actively overwrite all Critical Security
Parameters (CSPs) through SNMPv1, or
the front panel. Then the module must
be powered down.
X
Self-Tests Perform a suite of Power On Self Tests
(POSTs). All POSTs are initiated
automatically without operator
intervention
X
Antenna Handover
Service
Command sent from ship to modem to
switch antennas
X
Local/Remote Switch to Local (which only allows
commands through the Front Panel) or
switch to Remote (which allows access
via remote protocols like SSH).
X
Alarm Mute Mute the audible alarm. X
Note: Operator and Administrator roles are permitted access to the module via the front panel as well as remote
interfaces (Telnet, SSH, FTP, SFTP, SNMPv1, and SNMPv3).
Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The following are CSPs contained in the module:
 SMAT (HMAC Key): Used to authenticate the peer modem role (within a given
community of modems) during the initial key agreement messages related to secure
circuit establishment. This key is used during re-key operations to authenticate a peer
modem. The HMAC algorithm in the EBEM uses the SMAT as input, so only EBEMs
configured with the same SMAT will correctly authenticate each other. Authentication
of peer modem using this parameter takes place while the modems are performing ECC
CDH in key agreement, and the authentication is a 512-bit value.
 DRBG Seed: 384 bytes (3072 bits) of random data generated from an entropy source
(non-deterministic) used to initialize the Deterministic Random Bit Generator (per NIST
SP 800-90A).
 DRBG Internal State: The internal state of the NIST SP 800-90A CTR DRBG. These
are values “V” and “Key”.
 SMAT Circuit TxTEK (Transmit Traffic Encryption Key): A 256-bit AES CTR mode
traffic encryption key. This key is used to protect data sent over SMAT-authenticated RF
circuits from modems to peer modems.
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 SMAT Circuit RxTEK (Receive Traffic Encryption Key): A 256-bit AES CTR mode
traffic decryption key. This key is used to decrypt protected data sent over SMAT-
authenticated RF circuits from peer modems. This key is an exact match of a peer
modem’s TxTEK for symmetric AES cryptographic communication.
 PKI Circuit TxTEK (Transmit Traffic Encryption Key): A 256-bit AES CTR mode traffic
encryption key. This key is used to protect data sent over PKI-authenticated RF circuits
from modems to peer modems.
 PKI Circuit RxTEK (Receive Traffic Encryption Key): A 256-bit AES CTR mode traffic
decryption key. This key is used to decrypt protected data sent over PKI-authenticated
RF circuits from peer modems. This key is an exact match of a peer modem’s TxTEK
for symmetric AES cryptographic communication.
 PKI Circuit KEK: A 256-bit AES key used to encrypt the TxTEK for PKI-authenticated
circuits before it is output in the Key Transport message.
 Static IA Private Key: Used to digitally sign the Ephemeral KE public key sent in Key
Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment.
 Ephemeral KE Private Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK to encrypt the TEK sent
in Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment.
 Static KE Private Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK used to decrypt the TEK
received in Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment.
 SMAT Circuit Ephemeral Private Key: Module’s private key used for SMAT-based
circuit establishment with peer modem, per NIST SP800-56A C (2e, 0s, ECC CDH).
 Key Fill Ephemeral Private Key: Private key used for Key Fill KEK establishment with
LCT, per NIST SP800-56A C (2e, 0s, ECC CDH).
 Key Fill KEK: A 256-bit AES key used to encrypt private keys filled into the modem.
 ECC CDH Primitive Shared Secret: FIPS SP800-56A C(2e, 0s, ECC CDH) and C(1e, 1s,
ECC CDH), key agreement schemes and used with the Concatenation KDF to establish
key material for SMAT/PKI authenticated circuits and private key fill.
 Bypass Flag: Determines if a circuit is processed as plaintext or ‘encryption enabled.’
 Administrator Password(s): 8-character minimum, 20-character maximum, chosen from
upper and lowercase letters, 10 digits, and 10 special characters; used to authenticate the
Administrator and will lockout after 3 to 5 (configurable by Administrator) failed
attempts.
 Operator Password(s): 8-character minimum, 20-character maximum, chosen from upper
and lowercase letters, 10 digits, and 10 special characters; used to authenticate the
Operator and will lockout after 3 to 5 (configurable by Administrator) failed attempts.
 Local Unique Key (LUK): A 256-bit AES key used to encrypt CSPs so they can be stored
on the RAM or flash file system.
 SSH Ephemeral Private Key: A 256-bit ECDSA ephemeral key (configurable up to 384-
bit and 512-bit) used by the SSH protocol to generate shared secret between the server
and client.
 SSH Static Private Key: A 256-bit ECDSA static key used by the SSH protocol to
authenticate the host server to the client.
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 SSH Shared Secret: Derived as the shared secret ‘k’ value (as specified in RFC4253)
during the key agreement phase (as specified in NIST SP 800-56A) of the SSH (SecSH)
protocol.
 SSH Exchange Hash: Derived as the exchange hash ‘H’ value (as specified in RFC4253)
during the key agreement phase of the SSH (SecSH) protocol.
 SSH Encryption Key: Derived as the encryption key value (as specified in RFC4253)
during the key agreement phase of the SSH (SecSH) protocol. Used by OpenSSL AES
CBC and CTR with a key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits.
 SSH Authentication Key: Derived as the authentication key value (as specified in
RFC4253) during the key agreement phase of the SSH (SecSH) protocol. Used by
OpenSSL HMAC with a size of 160 bits for SHA-1, 256 bits for SHA-256, or 512 bits
for SHA-512.
 SNMP Ephemeral Private Authentication Key: 160-bit key generated from a user
supplied passphrase per RFC 3414. This key is used in an HMAC to provide user
authentication for SNMPv3 messages per RFC 3414.
 SNMP Ephemeral Private Encryption Key: A 160-bit key generated from a user-supplied
passphrase per RFC 3414. This key is used to encrypt and decrypt SNMPv3 messages
using CFB128-AES-128 per RFC 3826.
Definition of Public Keys:
The following are the public keys contained in the module.
 Firmware/Feature Trust Anchor – FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Public Key: Used to validate the
authenticity of signed code images and/or feature files
 SMAT Circuit Ephemeral Public Key: Module’s public key used for SMAT-
authenticated circuit establishment with peer modem, per NIST SP800-56A C (2e, 1s,
ECC CDH).
 SMAT Circuit Remote Modem’s Ephemeral Public Key: Peer Modem’s public key used
for circuit establishment, per NIST SP800-56A C (2e, 1s, ECC CDH).
 PKI Circuit Trust Anchor – ECDSA Public Key: Used to validate ECDSA signatures of
CA, IA and KE public key certificates for PKI-authenticated circuits.
 PKI CA Public Key – Certificate Authority public key used to validate ECDSA
signatures of IA and KE public key certificates for PKI-authenticated circuits.
 Static IA Public Key: Used to digitally sign (per FIPS 186-4 ECDSA) and validate the
signature the KE Public Key sent in Simplex Key Agreement messages for PKI-
authenticated circuit establishment.
 Ephemeral KE Public Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK used to encrypt/decrypt
the AES-wrapped TEK for PKI-authenticated circuits, per NIST SP 800-56A C (1e, 1s,
ECC CDH).
 Receiver Static KE Public Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK used to
encrypt/decrypt the AES-wrapped TEK for PKI-authenticated circuits, (per FIPS 186-4
ECDSA). Received over the air.
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 Remote IA Public Key: Used to validate authenticity (digital signature) of received Key
Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit establishment, (per FIPS 186-4
ECDSA). Received over the air.
 Remote Ephemeral KE Public Key: Used to derive the PKI Circuit KEK used to decrypt
the AES-wrapped TEK received in Key Transport messages for PKI-authenticated circuit
establishment, per NIST SP 800-56A C (1e, 1s, ECC CDH).
 Key Fill Ephemeral Public Key: Ephemeral public key generated and used when
inputting a static private key or SMAT into the modem (per NIST SP 800-56A C (2e, 0s,
ECC CDH).
 LCT Key Fill Remote Ephemeral Public Key: Ephemeral public key received from the
LCT and used when inputting a static private key or SMAT into the modem (per NIST
SP 800-56A C (2e, 0s, ECC CDH). Received over an authenticated connection from the
LCT.
 SSH Ephemeral Public Key: A 256-bit ECDSA ephemeral key (configurable up to 384-
bit and 512-bit) used by the SSH protocol to generate a shared secret between the server
and client.
 SSH Static Public Key: A 256-bit ECDSA static key used by the SSH protocol to allow
the client to uniquely identify the host server.
 SSH Remote Client Ephemeral Public Key: A 256-bit ECDSA ephemeral key
(configurable up to 384-bit and 512-bit) used by the SSH protocol to generate a shared
secret between the server and client.
Definition of CSPs and Public Key Modes of Access
Table 6 defines the relationship between CSPs and only those module services that access CSPs.
The modes of access shown in the Table 6 are defined as follows.
 Input (I): the data item is entered into the cryptographic module
 Output (O): the data item is output (Note: CSPs that are output are encrypted).
 Store (S): the data item is set into the persistent storage
 Use (U): the data item is used within its corresponding security function
 Establish (E): the data item is established via a commercially available key establishment
technique
 Generate (G): the data item is generated
 Zeroize (Z): the data item is actively overwritten
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Table 6: CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
SMAT
(HMAC
Key)
DRBG
Seed
and
DRBG
Internal
State
SMATCircuit
TxTEK
SMAT
Circuit
RxTEK
PKI
Circuit
TxTEK
PKI
Circuit
RxTEK
PKI
Circuit
KEK
Static
IA
Private
Key
Ephemeral
KE
Private
Key
Static
KE
Private
Key
SMAT
Circuit
Ephemeral
Private
Key
Key
Fill
Ephemeral
Private
Key
Key
Fill
KEK
ECC
CDH
Primitive
Shared
Secret
Bypass
Flag
Administrator
Password
Operator
Password
Local
Unique
Key
Telnet, SSH, SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP,
or SFTP Access
I,U I,U
Circuit Establishment U I, U I, U
Encryption Establishment and
Authentication
U G, U E E G,O I E, U U G, U U G, U E, U U I, U I, U
Change Own Password I,U,S I,U,S U
Set/Change Admin, Operator User
Names & Passwords
I, S I, S U
Set/Change SNMPv1 Password I,S U
Enable/Disable encryption I,S I, U
SMAT Entry and Rollover I, S G, U G, U E,U E, U I,U U
Encryption U U U U
Cryptographically Validate image
Zeroize (Authenticated) Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Configure System Time I,U
Configure Access to Unsecure
Protocols
I,U
Configure password policy I,U
Change/Monitor Modem and ESEM
configuration, view statistics
I,U I,U
View or clear audit log I,U
Upload/Install Feature File or Firmware
Image
I,U
Issue/Fill/Delete Simplex PKI Key
Material
G, U I,U,
S
I,U,
S
G, U E,U E, U I,U U
View Filled PKI Information I,U I,U
User Login I, U I, U U
Power On G, U G,S
Power Off Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Reset
Display status O
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Service
CSPs
SMAT
(HMAC
Key)
DRBG
Seed
and
DRBG
Internal
State
SMATCircuit
TxTEK
SMAT
Circuit
RxTEK
PKI
Circuit
TxTEK
PKI
Circuit
RxTEK
PKI
Circuit
KEK
Static
IA
Private
Key
Ephemeral
KE
Private
Key
Static
KE
Private
Key
SMAT
Circuit
Ephemeral
Private
Key
Key
Fill
Ephemeral
Private
Key
Key
Fill
KEK
ECC
CDH
Primitive
Shared
Secret
Bypass
Flag
Administrator
Password
Operator
Password
Local
Unique
Key
Zeroize (Unauthenticated) Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Self-tests G, U G
Antenna Handover Service
Local/Remote
Alarm Mute
Service
CSPs
SSH
Ephemeral
Private
Key
SSH
Static
Private
Key
SSH
Shared
Secret
SSH
Exchange
Hash
SSH
Encryption
Key
SSH
Authentication
Key
Net-SNMP
Ephemeral
Private
Authentication
Key
Net-SNMP
Ephemeral
Private
Encryption
Key
Telnet, SNMPv1, or FTP Access
SSH, SFTP G, U, Z G, U, S E, U, Z E, U, Z E, U, Z E, U, Z
SNMPv3 G, U G, U
Circuit Establishment
Encryption Establishment and
Authentication
Change Own Password
Set/Change Admin, Operator User
Names & Passwords
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Service
CSPs
SSH
Ephemeral
Private
Key
SSH
Static
Private
Key
SSH
Shared
Secret
SSH
Exchange
Hash
SSH
Encryption
Key
SSH
Authentication
Key
Net-SNMP
Ephemeral
Private
Authentication
Key
Net-SNMP
Ephemeral
Private
Encryption
Key
Set/Change SNMPv1 Password
Enable/Disable encryption
SMAT Entry and Rollover
Encryption
Cryptographically Validate image
Zeroize (Authenticated) Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Configure System Time
Configure Access to Unsecure
Protocols
Configure password policy
Change/Monitor Modem and ESEM
configuration, view statistics
View or clear audit log
Upload/Install Feature File or Firmware
Image
Issue/Fill/Delete Simplex PKI Key
Material
View Filled PKI Information
User Login
Power On
Power Off Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Reset
Display status
Zeroize (Unauthenticated) Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Self-tests G G G G
Antenna Handover Service
Local/Remote
Alarm Mute
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Table 7: Public Key Access Rights within Services
Service
Public Keys
Firmware/
Feature
Trust
Anchor
SMAT
Circuit
Ephemeral
Public
Key
SMAT
Circuit
Remote
Modem’s
Ephemeral
Public
Key
PKI
Circuit
Trust
Anchor
PKI
CA
Public
Key
Static
IA
Public
Key
Ephemeral
KE
Public
Key
Receiver
Static
KE
Public
Keys
Remote
IA
Public
Key
Remote
Ephemeral
KE
Public
Key
Key
Fill
Ephemeral
Public
Key
LCT
Key
Fill
Remote
Ephemeral
KE
Public
Key
SSH
Ephemeral
Public
Key
SSH
Static
Public
Key
SSH
Remote
Client
Ephemeral
Public
Key
Telnet, SSH, SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP, or SFTP Access
SSH, SFTP G, U,
O, Z
G, U, S,
O
I, U,
Z
Circuit Establishment
Encryption Establishment and Authentication G, U,
O
I,U U U U,O G,U,
O
U I,U I, U
Change Own Password
Set/Change Admin, Operator User Names & Passwords
Set/Change SNMPv1 Password
Enable/Disable encryption
SMAT Entry and Rollover
Encryption
Cryptographically Validate image I,S
Zeroize (Authenticated) Z
Configure System Time
Configure Access to Unsecure Protocols
Configure password policy
Change/Monitor Modem and ESEM configuration,
view statistics
View or clear audit log
Upload/Install Feature File or Firmware Image U
Issue/Fill/Delete Simplex PKI Key Material I,S I,S I,S I,S G,U,O I,U
View Filled PKI Information
User login
Power On
Power Off Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Reset
Display status
Zeroize (Unauthenticated) Z
Self-tests
Antenna Handover Service
Local/Remote
Alarm Mute
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7. Operational Environment
The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the
EBEM device contains a limited operational environment; the cryptographic module only
supports the loading and execution of code ECDSA digitally authenticated firmware signed by
Viasat, Inc.
8. Security Rules
This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement
the security requirements of FIPS 140-2, Level 2.
 The cryptographic module supports defined roles with a defined set of corresponding
services. The defined roles shall be:
o Operator (FIPS 140-2 “User”)
o Administrator (FIPS 140-2 “Crypto Officer”)
o Peer Modem
o Viasat, Inc.
 Separation of roles: The cryptographic module requires distinct authentication for each
role. Simultaneous service is permitted, but authentication is always required when
switching between roles
 The cryptographic module does not support a maintenance role or maintenance interface.
 The purpose, function, service inputs, and service outputs performed by each role are
defined and appropriately restricted.
 The cryptographic module does not support the output of plaintext CSPs.
 The cryptographic module design ensures that services that do not require authentication
do not provide the ability to modify, disclose, or substitute any module CSPs, use
Approved security functions, or otherwise affect module security.
 The cryptographic module supports exclusive bypass capabilities. The cryptographic
module requires two independent internal actions to enter into the bypass state. The
authorized operator shall be able to determine when bypass capability is selected as
follows: Bypass LED illuminated
 A defined methodology shall be enforced to control access to the cryptographic module
prior to initialization. The module shall arrive to the end customer with a default
Administrator password that shall be changed before any services are allowed.
 Re-authentication is required upon power cycling the module.
 The cryptographic module supports role-based or identity-based authentication for all
security relevant services; re-authentication is required to change roles.
 Feedback provided during the authentication process shall not weaken the strength of the
implemented authentication mechanisms. During password entry, the module will not
display the entered values in a readable form; all inputs will be echoed back to the display
as asterisks.
 The cryptographic module’s finite state machine shall provide a clear description of all
states and corresponding state transitions. The design of the cryptographic module
disallows the ability to simultaneously occupy more than one state at a time.
 The cryptographic module’s physically contiguous cryptographic boundary is defined
including all module components and connections (ports), information flows, processing,
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and input/output data. All vendor-defined non-security relevant circuitry are argued for
exclusion from the cryptographic boundary.
 All cryptographic module data output is inhibited when the module is in an error state
during any self-test.
 Data output is logically disconnected from the processes performing key generation,
manual key entry, and zeroization.
 All physical ports and logical interfaces shall be defined; the cryptographic module
distinguishes between data and control for input and data and status for output. In
addition, the cryptographic module supports a power interface.
 All of the implemented integrated circuits are standard quality, production-grade
components.
 The cryptographic module contains an opaque tamper evident enclosure.
 CSPs are protected against unauthorized disclosure, modification, and substitution.
Public keys and critical settings are protected against unauthorized modification and
substitution.
 The cryptographic module supports key generation using an Approved RNG listed in
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex C.
 The cryptographic module enforces an entity association for all keys that are input
to/output from the cryptographic module; an entity association is enforced for all keys
stored within the cryptographic boundary.
 Key establishment techniques supported by the cryptographic module shall be
commercially available as allowed under the requirements of FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex D.
 The cryptographic module provides the ability to zeroize all plaintext CSPs. Note: To
fully complete the Zeroize Service, the unit must be manually power-cycled.
 Power-up self-tests shall not require operator actions. The cryptographic module
provides an indicator upon successful self-test completion as follows:
o Fault LED off
 The cryptographic module enters an error state upon failure of any self-test and provides
an indicator upon failure as follows:
o Fault LED on
 Upon entering an error state, the cryptographic module inhibits all data outputs, inhibits
cryptographic operations, and provides error status. The status output does not contain
any CSPs or other sensitive information that could be used to compromise the
cryptographic module.
 The loading of non-FIPS-validated firmware versions will invalidate the FIPS module.
 The tamper evident seals described in Section 10 shall be installed for the module to
operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation.
 The module has the following restrictions on concurrent operators:
o While an Administrator, or Operator is logged into the Front Panel, SSH,
SNMPv1, SNMPv3, FTP, and SFTP protocols users cannot configure the EBEM.
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9. Self-Tests
The cryptographic module shall support the following self-tests:
Table 8: Power Up Self-tests
Test Target Description
Firmware Integrity 32-bit EDC performed over all executable code
FPGA AES Encrypt KATs: EBEM AES CTR 1 Encryption only (because CTR mode
utilizes ECB encrypt for both encryption and decryption)
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 256 bits
FPGA AES Decrypt KATs: EBEM AES CTR 2 Encryption only (because CTR mode
utilizes ECB encrypt for both encryption and decryption)
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 256 bits
EbemCrypto AES KATs: EbemCrypto, separate encryption and decryption tests
Modes: ECB
Key sizes: 256 bits
OpenSSL AES KATs: OpenSSL, separate encryption and decryption tests
Modes: CBC, CFB, CTR
Key sizes: 256 bits, 128 bits, 256 bits (respectively)
EbemCrypto KTS KATs: Separate wrap and unwrap tests.
Key sizes: 256 bits
EbemCrypto DRBG KATs: CTR DRBG
Security Strengths: 256 bits
EbemCrypto ECDSA KAT: FIPS 186-4 Signature Verification
Curves/Key sizes: P-521 with SHA-512
EbemCrypto ECDSA PCT: FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Curves/Key sizes: P-384 with SHA-384
OpenSSL ECDSA PCT: FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation, Signature Verification
Curves/Key Sizes: P-384 with SHA-384
EbemCrypto HMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-384, SHA-512
OpenSSL HMAC KATs: Generation, Verification
SHA sizes: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
EbemCrypto KAS KATs: Ephemeral Unified, per IG 9.6 – ECCCDH Primitive
Computation and KDF using P-521 curve.
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: EE
EbemCrypto KAS KATs: One Pass DH, per IG 9.6 – ECCCDH Primitive Computation
and KDF using P-384 curve.
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: ED
OpenSSH KAS KATs: Ephemeral Unified, per IG 9.6 – ECCCDH Primitive
Computation using P-384 curve.
Parameter Sets/Key sizes: ED
NetSNMP KDF KATs: SNMP KDF
OpenSSH KDF KATs: SSH KDF
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EbemCrypto SHA KATs: EbemCrypto SHA-384, SHA-512
OpenSSL SHA KATs: OpenSSL SHA SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
Note: SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-512 are also tested in OpenSSL
HMAC self-tests. SHA-384 omitted (per IG 9.4)
uClibc SHA KATs: SHA-256 uClibc SHA-256
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Table 9: Conditional Self-tests
Test Target Description
NDRNG NDRNG Continuous Test performed when a random value is
requested from the NDRNG.
EbemCrypto DRBG DRBG Continuous Test performed when a random value is
requested from the DRBG.
EbemCrypto ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every ECDSA key
pair generation (static and ephemeral per IG 9.9).
OpenSSL ECDSA ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every ECDSA key
pair generation (per IG 9.9 and FIPS PUB 140-2 Section 4.9.2).
Firmware Load FIPS 186-4 ECDSA P-521 with SHA-512 signature verification
performed when firmware is loaded.
EbemCrypto DRBG
Health Checks
Performed conditionally per SP 800-90A Section 11.3. Required per
IG C.1.
SP 800-56A
Assurances
Pairwise key validation (per IG 9.6) for EbemCrypto Ephemeral
Unified KAS and EbemCrypto One Pass DH KAS. Partial validation
of OpenSSH Ephemeral Unified KAS.
Exclusive Bypass Test Bypass Test verifies which mode (Bypass or Encryption) the module
is in by checking a flag value, which is stored in FLASH and whose
integrity is verified by a 32-bit EDC (CRC).
Manual Key Entry Manual Key Entry Test performed via Error Detection Code
Table 10: Critical Function Tests
Test Target Description
BIT Verification of FPGA loading
10. Physical Security Policy
Physical Security Mechanisms
The EBEM multi-chip standalone cryptographic module includes the following physical security
mechanisms.
 Production-grade components
 Production-grade opaque enclosure with 10 (ten) tamper evident seals applied during
manufacturing if the Expansion Port on the module has the Blank Plate installed
 Production-grade opaque enclosure with nine (9) tamper-evident seals if the EBEM
contains an ESEM card (eight (8) seals applied during manufacturing and one (1)
rectangular tamper-evident seal applied by the Crypto-Officer
 Protected vents
Operator Required Actions
The Administrator (FIPS 140-2 “Crypto Officer”) is required to periodically inspect the tamper
evident seals, enclosure, and vents as shown in Table 11. If suspicious markings are found, the
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cryptographic module should be zeroized and returned to the manufacturer (contact Viasat, Inc.
at www.viasat.com) for inspection/maintenance.
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Table 11: Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms
Physical Security
Mechanisms
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance
Details
Tamper Evident Seals As specified per end user
policy
Visually inspect the seals for
tears, rips, dissolved adhesive,
and other signs of malice.
Opaque enclosure As specified per end user
policy
Visually inspect the enclosure for
broken screws, bent casing,
scratches, and other questionable
markings.
Protected vents As specified per end user
policy
Visually inspect the vents for
tears, bent baffles, and other signs
of tampering.
The following diagrams depict the tamper seal locations (circled in blue):
Figure 3: Tamper Seal locations on the Strategic EBEM (Eight Seals)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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Figure 4: Tamper Seal locations on the Tactical EBEM (Eight Seals)
Figure 5: Tamper Seal Location of Expansion Port with Blank Plate Installed (Two Seals)
Figure 6: Tamper Seal Location on Expansion Port with ESEM Installed (One Seal)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
9
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All tamper seals are installed at the factory except the one shown in Figure 6 for the ESEM. In
the case of an EBEM that contains an ESEM (i.e., as in Figure 6, the one (1) tamper seal must be
installed by the Administrator (FIPS 140-2 “Crypto Officer”). Prior to installation, the
Administrator (FIPS 140-2 “Crypto Officer”) is responsible for securing and having control at all
times of any unused seals. Detailed instructions for the ESEM and tamper seal installation are
provided in Viasat, Inc.’s EBEM Crypto Officer & User Guide and Software/Firmware
Installation Guide, Viasat document number 1153093, Section 11.
The tamper evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode
of operation.
Note: The tamper seal applied over the ESEM is HW P/N 1047117; however, the Administrator
(FIPS 140-2 “Crypto Officer”) cannot order additional tamper seals from Viasat, Inc. If the
device is found to be tampered, the unit should be returned to the factory for a repair inspection.
11. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The module has not been designed to mitigate specific attacks outside of the scope of FIPS 140-
2.
Viasat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 012,
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12. References
 FIPS PUB 140-2
 FIPS PUB 180-1
 FIPS PUB 180-2
 FIPS PUB 186-4
 FIPS PUB 198
 FIPS PUB 46-3
 FIPS PUB 186-2
 NIST SP 800-56A
 NIST SP 800-90A
 NIST SP 800-132
 NIST SP 800-38F
13. Definitions and Acronyms
Acronym DEFINITION
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BIT Built-in Test
CAVS Cryptographic Algorithm Validation System
CSP Critical Security Parameter (as defined per FIPS 140-2)
CTR Counter (i.e. AES Counter mode)
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EBEM Enhanced Bandwidth Efficient Modem
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC CDH Elliptic Curve Cryptography Co-factor Diffie-Hellman
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESEM Ethernet Service Expansion Module
FIFO First-in, First-out (data buffer)
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FTP File Transfer Protocol
FW Firewall
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IA Identity and Authentication
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KW Key Wrap (AES Key Wrap without Padding from SP
80038-F)
LCT Local Control Terminal
LED Loop Encryption Device
Mbps Million Bits per Second
Modem Modulator/Demodulator
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Function
Viasat, Inc. EBEM Cryptographic Module Security Policy, 1179470, Rev. 012,
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Viasat, Inc.
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PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RNG Random Number Generator
RX Receiver
SCPC Single Channel Per Carrier
SFTP Secure File Transfer Protocol
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMAT Shared Message Authentication Token
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
TX Transmit