Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
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SanDisk Technologies Inc
Ultrastar® DC SN650 BiCS5 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD, SED
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.1
Date: 04/17/2026
Protection of Data at Rest
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Table of Contents
1 – General................................................................................................................................ 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 – Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................................... 6
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 8
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 9
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................10
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................14
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................14
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................15
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................16
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................16
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................17
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................17
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................18
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................18
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................18
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................20
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................60
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................60
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................61
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................61
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................61
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................62
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................62
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions ...........................................................................62
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................63
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................63
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................64
8.1 Mitigation Techniques......................................................................................................64
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................65
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9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................65
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................65
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................65
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................67
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................88
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................88
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................88
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................90
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................90
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................91
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................92
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................92
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................93
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................93
11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................93
11.5 Maintenance Requirements...........................................................................................94
11.6 End of Life .....................................................................................................................95
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................96
References and Definitions .......................................................................................................97
NIST Specifications ...............................................................................................................97
Trusted Computing Group Specifications ..............................................................................97
NVMe and PCIe Specifications..............................................................................................98
Corporate References ...........................................................................................................98
Other References..................................................................................................................98
Definitions.................................................................................................................................99
Acronyms................................................................................................................................102
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 7
Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 8
Table 4: Approved Algorithms.................................................................................................... 9
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................10
Table 6: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................13
Table 7: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................14
Table 8: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................14
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................17
Table 10: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................18
Table 11: Roles.........................................................................................................................19
Table 12: Approved Services ....................................................................................................60
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................63
Table 14: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................65
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................65
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................67
Table 17: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................75
Table 18: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................87
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................88
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................89
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................90
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................90
Table 23: Error States...............................................................................................................91
List of Figures
Figure 1 - Security Subsystem Components .............................................................................. 6
Figure 2 - Ultrastar®
DC SN650, EDSFF-L-9.5mm..................................................................... 7
Figure 3 - Symmetric Key Tree .................................................................................................15
Figure 4 - Asymmetric Key Tree................................................................................................61
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1 – General
The Security Policy is non-proprietary.
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Ultrastar®
DC SN650
BiCS5, NVMe®
TCG Opal SSD, SED. It contains the security rules under which the module
must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB
140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security
Level 1 module.
1.2 Security Levels
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 – Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Module Type: Hardware
Description - The Ultrastar®
DC SN650BiCS5 NVMe®
TCG Opal SDD, SED, hereafter referred
to as Ultrastar®
DC SN650, Cryptographic Module, cryptographic module, or CM is a self-
encrypting drive (SED) that complies in general with the specifications listed in 13.2 Trusted
Computing Group Specifications and specifically with the TCG Storage Architecture Core
Specification [TCG Core] and Trusted Computing Group) Storage Security Subsystem Class:
Opal Specification (TCG Storage SSC: Opal) [TCG Opal].
The TCG Storage SSC: Opal specification defines a management interface for a host
application to activate, provision, and manage encryption of user data. The specification
includes data structures, their required content, and mechanisms for managing and configuring
Authentication Credentials and access controls. The security architecture provides a locking
mechanism by which an Authentication Credential (i.e., a password) can be set by an operator
to enable control of access to user data. After an operator authenticates to the appropriate role
and locks access to user data access user data is inaccessible. This implementation complies
with the lock-based authentication model specified in IG 4.1.A.
Figure 1 illustrates a logical view of the top-level firmware components that constitute the
security subsystem. The Security Core is the most secure portion of the security subsystem. It
forms a security boundary that provides assurances for firmware integrity, SSP integrity, and
data-at-rest security within the CM. The Security Protocol and Services ring contains the TCG
Storage SSC: Opal security protocol. Components in this ring communicate to the security core
using a Security Core API. The rest of the Cryptographic Module’s firmware resides in the
Security Application Client ring. The security application client firmware, collectively known as
the “Base FW”, interfaces with the Security Protocol and Services Layer. The Host system
communicates with the Cryptographic Module through the Security Application Client layer.
Figure 1 - Security Subsystem Components
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Purpose - The Cryptographic Module’s intended use is by US Federal agencies or other markets
that require FIPS 140-3 validated hardware modules. The primary function of the Cryptographic
Module is to provide data encryption, access control, and cryptographic erase of the data stored
within solid-state memory devices within the CM. The operator of the Cryptographic Module
interfaces with the Cryptographic Module through applications that reside within a host system.
• Module Type - Hardware
• Module Embodiment - Multi-chip embedded.
• Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) – The physical
enclosure of the CM defines the TOEPP’s physical perimeter.
• TOEPP and Cryptographic Boundary - The cryptographic boundary consists of CM’s
physical enclosure and all firmware implementations within the immutable Security Core
firmware that resides within the ROM of the Western Digital FE2-PG4 ASIC and the
mutable Security Protocol and Services and Security Application Client firmware layers.
The Cryptographic Module writes mutable firmware from disk media into DRAM memory
on power up.
• Diagram, Schematic, or Photograph - Figure 2 below is representative of all
Cryptographic Modules within the scope of this validation. The hard opaque surface of
the enclosure defines the cryptographic boundary. All components within this boundary
satisfy FIPS 140-3 requirements.
Figure 2 - Ultrastar
®
DC SN650, EDSFF-L-9.5mm
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Embedded
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
The Ultrastar®
DC SN650 cryptographic module was tested on the following operational
environment.
Model and/or Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
WUS5BB1A1E9ELE8 0TS2411 RA210003
ARM Cortex-M3, ARM Cortex-
A53, ARM Cortex-R5
N/A
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
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The Cryptographic Module operates within a limited operational environment. When operational,
the Cryptographic Module prohibits operator or process-initiated additions, deletions, or
modification of the code working set. For firmware upgrades, the Cryptographic Module uses an
authenticated download service, which complies with ISO 19790 7.4.3.4, to upgrade the
mutable firmware in its entirety. The immutable security firmware stored in ROM, which is
essential and integral to the operation of the module is non-modifiable. If the download
operation is successful, authorized, and verified, the Cryptographic Module begins operating
with the new code working set after successfully executed all required pre-operational self-tests
that comply with ISO 19790 7.10.2.2. Firmware loaded into the Module that is not on the FIPS
140-3 certificate is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3
validation.
The Cryptographic Module’s security design utilizes common security protections, policies, and
processes. It utilizes a hardware security Access Control Module (ACM) that incorporates a
hardware Root of Trust (RoT). Security firmware leverages the RoT, hardware cryptographic
algorithms and accelerators to implement a secure environment that assures firmware integrity,
port access and the secure storage of plaintext secrets, user data, keys, and Sensitive Security
Parameters (SSP) within the Cryptographic Module. The CM only supports CMVP approved
security functions defined in NIST SP 800-140C and SP 800-140D.
The hardware Root of Trust assures,
1. The isolation of security firmware and sensitive security parameters from the Security
Application Client firmware (aka Base firmware) or firmware installed on embedded
components within the cryptographic boundary.
2. The verification of Cryptographic Module firmware and security objects before usage
3. A Key Management tree secured by a root key stored in HW RoT OTP bits.
4. Support for HW based Symmetric Key Generation
5. Cryptographic Algorithm Acceleration
6. End-to-End Protect between ACM & Key Server
2.3 Excluded Components
The Cryptographic Module does not have excluded components.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
isFIPS
The cryptographic
module is operating
as a FIPS 140-3
compliant module
Approved
1. The Level 0 Discovery service returns a value
of 1 from the in FIPS global indicator data field
and 2. The Firmware Download Control
LockOnReset field is set to PowerCycle and 3.
The LockOnReset attribute for each configured
Locking SP User is set to PowerCycle .
Table 3: Modes List and Description
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Section 11.1 of this document specifies the recommended and mandatory steps necessary for
the secure installation, initialization, and start-up of the cryptographic module as a FIPS 140-3
SL1 compliant module. The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the mandatory
configuration requirements remain unchanged. When correctly configured, the Cryptographic
Module always powers up isFIPS mode.
The Cryptographic Module does not support non-approved or non-allowed security functions.
Mode Change Instructions and Status :
The table above specifies the conditions that must be true for the Cryptographic Module to
operate in isFIPS mode. Any action by the operator that results in the negation of the Firmware
Download Control's lock on PowerCycle setting transitions the CM to a noncompliant state. Any
action by the operator that negates the Locking SP User attribute settings, specified the "Modes
List and Description" Table above for LockOnReset, ReadLockEnabled, or WriteLockEnabled
transitions the CM to a noncompliant state.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms
The Module implements the FIPS Approved cryptographic algorithms listed the table below.
Algorithm
CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC AES 3580
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A3410
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB AES 3580
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-KWP A3374
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38F
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0
A3410
Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128
SP 800-38E
Counter DRBG A3374
Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC
2280
- FIPS 198-1
PBKDF A3374
Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 2-
1024 Increment 1
Password Length - Password Length:
32
SP 800-132
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A3374
Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 2048
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A3375
Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 2048
FIPS 186-4
SHA2-256 SHS 2942
Message Length - Message Length:
8-51200 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
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Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
The Cryptographic Module implements the listed FIPS Vendor Affirmed cryptographic
algorithms.
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG-Direct
Key
Type:Symmetric
N/A
SP 800-133rev2 Section 4 example
#1, Section 6.1 and IG D.H
CKG-
Combined
Key
Type:Symmetric
N/A
SP 800-133rev2 Section 6.3 example
#2 and IG D.H
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Authority_Digest_Generation
MAC
SHA
Generates an
HMAC
message
digest of an
Authentication
Credential
PIN
Publication:[FIPS
198-1] [IG10.3.A]
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(HMAC
2280)
Authority_Digest_Verification
MAC
SHA
Verifies the
HMAC digest
of an
Authentication
Credential
PIN.
Publication:[FIPS
198-1] [IG 10.3.A]
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(HMAC
2280)
Decryption
BC-
UnAuth
Decrypts
objects
Publication:[FIPS
197] [SP 800-38A]
[IG 10.3.A]
AES-CBC:
(AES 3580)
Key Size: :
256
Key
Strength::
256 bits
Derived_Key_Generation PBKDF
Generates
derived
Publication:[SP
800-132] [IG
10.3.A] [IG D.N]
PBKDF:
(A3374)
HMAC-
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
authority keys
Ka and Ku
[FIPS 198-1] [IG
10.3.A]
SHA2-256:
(HMAC
2280)
Digest_Generation SHA
Generates
message
digest
Publication:[FIPS
180-4] [IG 10.3.A]
[IG C.B]
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
Digest_Verification SHA
Verifies a
message
digest
Publication:[FIPS
180-4] [IG 10.3.A]
[IG C.B]
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
Encryption
BC-
UnAuth
Encrypts
objects
Publication:[FIPS
197] [SP 800-38A]
[IG 10.3.A]
AES-CBC:
(AES 3580)
Key Size:
256
Key
Strength:
256 bits
FW_Authenticity
DigSig-
SigVer
SHA
Verifies the
authenticity of
a firmware
image
Publication:[FIPS
186-4] [IG C.F]
[FIPS 180-4] [IG
10.3.A] [IG C.B]
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4): (A3374)
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
FW_Integrity
DigSig-
SigVer
SHA
Verifies the
integrity of a
firmware
image
Publication:[FIPS
186-4] [IG C.F]
[FIPS 180-4] [IG
10.3.A] [IG C.B]
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4): (A3375)
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
Key Wrap BC-Auth
Key Wrapping
Key
Unwrapping
Publication:[SP
800-38F] [IG D.G]
[FIPS 197] [IG
10.3.A]
AES-KWP:
(A3374)
AES-ECB:
(AES 3580)
Key Size::
256
Key
Strength::
256 bits
Keyed_Digest_Generation
MAC
SHA
Generates an
HMAC
message
digest to sign
encrypted
SSPs
Publication:[FIPS
198-1] [IG 10.3.A]
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(HMAC
2280)
Keyed_Digest_Verification
MAC
SHA
Verifies the
HMAC
message
digest
signature of
Publications:[FIPS
198-1] [IG 10.3.A]
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(HMAC
2280)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
an encrypted
SSPs
MEK Generation BC-Auth
XOR of LRK
and NSK
Publication:[IG
C.I]
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision
2.0:
(A3410)
Payload
Length::
4096 -
32768
Increment: :
128
Tweak
mode:
Number
Key Size:
256
Key
Strength:
256 bits
AES-ECB:
(A3410)
Key Size: :
256
Key
Strength:
256 bits
RBG DRBG
Random
number
generator
Publication:[SP
800-90A] [IG
10.3.A] [IG D.L]
[IG D.R]
Counter
DRBG:
(A3374)
RBG Seeding
DRBG
ENT-ESV
Seeds DRBG
with entropy
data
Publication:[SP
800-90B] [IG
9.3.A] [IG 10.3.A]
[IG D.J] [IG D.K]
Counter
DRBG:
(A3374)
SecureLoader _ Integrity
DigSig-
SigVer
SHA
Verifies the
integrity of the
Secure
Loader
firmware
image
Publication:[FIPS
186-4] [IG C.F]
[FIPS 180-4] [IG
10.3.A] [IG C.B]
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4): (A3374)
SHA2-256:
(SHS 2942)
User_Data_Decryption
BC-
UnAuth
LBA data
decryption
Publication:[FIPS
197] [SP 800-38E]
[IG 10.3.A] [IG
C.I]
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision
2.0:
(A3410)
Payload
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Length::
4096 -
32768
Increment::
128
Tweak
Mode::
Number
Key Size:
256
Key
Strength::
256 bits
AES-ECB:
(A3410)
Key Size:
256
Key
Strength:
256 bits
User_Data_Encryption
BC-
UnAuth
LBA data
encryption
Publication:[FIPS
197] [SP 800-38E]
[IG 10.3.A] [IG
C.I]
AES-XTS
Testing
Revision
2.0:
(A3410)
Payload
Length:
4096 -
32768
Increment::
128
Tweak
Mode::
Number
Key Size::
256
Key
Strength::
256 bits
AES-ECB:
(A3410)
Key Size:
256
Key
Strength:
256 bits
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
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2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
AES-XTS Key Pair Generation
The Cryptographic Module performs a key comparison test on each LRK.AESKey/LRK.XTS and
NSK.AESKey/NSK.XTS keyset to assure compliance with FIPS 140-3 [IG C.I] XTS-AES Key
Generation Requirements every time the CM generates an LRK.AESKey/LRK.XTS and
NSK.AESKey/NSK.XTS keyset, to assure compliance for all derived MEKs. The only use of any
AES-XTS key pair is the encryption and decryption of data-at-rest within the cryptographic
module in a storage application.
PBKDF2
The password consists of a minimum of twelve (12) hexadecimal bytes values and a maximum
of thirty-two (32) hexadecimal bytes values that range from 0x00 to 0xFF. The probability that a
random attempt correctly guesses a twelve (12) byte password, or a false acceptance occurs is
equal to 1 in 7.92E+28. The probability that a random attempt correctly guesses a thirty-two (32)
byte password, or a false acceptance occurs is equal to 1 in 1.16E+7728.
The default 1024 iteration count, 256-bit Salt and HMAC-SHA2-256 (Cert #HMAC 2280)
algorithm conforms to SP 800-132, Option 2a. The Master key (MK) encrypts and decrypts data
protection keys using AES-KWP (Cert. #A3374).
The PBKDF2 password derived keys, Ku, and Ka, encrypt data protection keys used in a data
storage application.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The SP 800-90A rev1-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG), implemented as
a CTR_DRBG mechanism, uses an AES-256 block cipher derivation function to generate
encryption keys for use within the cryptographic boundary of the Cryptographic Module. The
paragraphs titled Entropy Information and RBG Information summarize the characteristics of the
entropy noise source that resides within the cryptographic boundary and seeds the
CTR_DRBG.
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E5 Western Digital Corporation
Table 7: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
ESV,
E5
Physical
20-82-10047-A1, Tested Assy, IC,
Thunderbird FE2-PG4, Rev A1,
ARM Cortex M3, ARM Cortex-R5
32 bits 2.69 None
Table 8: Entropy Sources
Entropy Information
The hardware-based ring oscillator noise source referenced in the "Entropy Sources" Table
consists of eight (8) identical groups of four (4) independent ring oscillator circuits. Within each
group, there are four (4) distinct logic inverter gate designs that consist of 19, 23, 31, and 39
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gates. The oscillators are physically isolated from other active traces within the FE2-PG4 ASIC.
No configuration steps are necessary to operate the entropy source in a compliant manner. As
stated in the Public Use Document for E5, on power up the Cryptographic Module executes an
entropy source initialization sequence that collects sufficient samples of raw noise to verify the
health of the entropy noise source prior to seeding the RBG. If the initialization sequence
returns false, the Cryptographic Module transitions to an error state that blocks the execution of
all security services.
RBG Information
The output of the entropy source referenced in in the "Entropy Sources" Table consists of the
raw data generate from thirty-two (32) free running ring oscillators. Eight (8) identical groups of
four (4) variable length inverter chains define the implementation. Each 32-bit sample produces
at least 2.69 bits of entropy. Each time the CTR_DRBG is instantiated or reseeded, one
hundred sixty (160) 32-bit samples are concatenated to seed the CTR_DRBG. This equates to
5120 bits of entropy data and translates to at least 430 bits of min-entropy. This seeds the
CTR_DRBG with approximately 287 bits of security strength (~287 bits of entropy input and
~143 bits of nonce). Seeding the DRBG with at least 287 bits of security strength exceeds the
requirement to seed the CTR_DRBG with 256 bits of security strength.
2.9 Key Generation
The Cryptographic Module utilizes an SP 800-90A rev1-compliant CTR_DRBG to generate
symmetric cryptographic keys, which comply with sections 6.1, 6.2.3 and 6.3 of SP 800 133r2.
Each symmetric keyset consists of an encryption key and a signing key. Specifically,
• the Root Keyset consists of a 256-bit Root Encryption Key and 256-bit Root Signing Key
• the Global Active Keyset (AEK) consists of a 256-bit Global Active Encryption Key and a
256-bit Global Active Signing Key
• the SED Active Keyset consists of a 256-bit SED Active Encryption Key and a 256-bit
SED Active Signing Key
• the SED AdminSP Active Keyset consists of a 256-bit SED AdminSP Active Encryption
Key and a 256-bit SED AdminSP Active Signing Key
• SED LockingSP Active Keyset consists of a 256-bit SED LockingSP Active Encryption
Key and a 256-bit SED Locking SP Active Signing Key
Figure 3 - Symmetric Key Tree
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2.10 Key Establishment
Key Agreement Information
The cryptographic module does not support a key establishment scheme.
Key Transport Information
The cryptographic module does not support a key transport scheme.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The Cryptographic Module supports the TCG Storage SSC: Opal [TCG Opal] security protocol.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
As a hardware module, the Cryptographic Module uses the EDSFF connector that conforms to
the mechanical requirements within SFF-TA-1002 [SFF-8639]. The following table identifies the
Cryptographic Module’s ports and interfaces. The three-wire UART serial port connector
consists of UART_TX, UART_RX, and ground.
The NVMe protocol provides the primary communication channel between the Cryptographic
Module and the Host. The NVM Express®
NVM Command Set Specification [NVMe Command]
defines the format of input data and control information sent from the Host to the CM. Services
provided by the Cryptographic Module that require the processing of Host issued commands
include TCG Storage SSC: Opal configuration settings, the reading and writing of user data, and
retrieval of status data.
The Cryptographic Module does not support a trusted channel communication link between the
CM and the operator.
Physical Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
EDSFF
connector
Control Input Operator issued NVMe commands [12]
UART
Connector
Control Input Operator issued NVMe commands [12]
EDSFF
connector
Data Input
User data and firmware update images are transmitted from
the operator to the Cryptographic Module.
UART
Connector
Data Input
User data and firmware update images are transmitted from
the operator to the Cryptographic Module.
EDSFF
connector
Data Output
User data is transmitted from the Cryptographic Module to the
operator
UART
Connector
Data Output
User data is transmitted from the Cryptographic Module to the
operator
EDSFF
connector
Status
Output
Status data is transmitted from the CM to the operator
UART
Connector
Status
Output
Status data is transmitted from the CM to the operator
EDSFF
connector
Power Power connector
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
Role-based
Authentication
- Credential
PIN
Authentication
Authenticates
a 12-byte to
32-byte
Authentication
Credential PIN
Byte value
range (ea.):
0x00 to 0xFF.
Authority_Digest_Verification
Lowest:
12-byte
PIN: 96
bits Up
to: 32-
byte PIN:
256 bits
For 12-byte
PIN:
Permutations:
7.92E+28
Authentication
Time: 2.094965
msec Guess
Probability (1
min): 3.61E-25
For 32-byte
PIN:
Permutations:
1.16E+77
Authentication
Time: 2.094965
msec Guess
Probability (1
min): 2.47E-73
Table 10: Authentication Methods
Note: E = log2(RL), where E = authentication strength, R = pool of unique characters and L =
password length defines the security strength of an Authentication Credential PIN. See
Calculating Password Entropy [PW].
4.2 Roles
The Cryptographic Module enforces role separation by requiring a role identifier and
authentication credential in the form of a Personal Identification Number (PIN). The
Cryptographic Module does not support concurrent operators. The Cryptographic Module
enforces role dependent service access rules. Section 4.3 maps services to Crypto Officer and
User roles. Access Control is implemented in layers. The top layer of the implementation
consists of Access Control Lists (ACLs). ACLs are lists of Access Control Elements (ACEs). The
boolean state of an ACE associated with an authority within a role determines access to a
service. When an authority is authenticated, its associated ACE boolean expression is set to be
True. If the authority has not been authenticated, its associated ACE boolean expression is set
to False. Closing a TCG session or powering off the Cryptographic Module disables all
previously authenticated authorities by setting the ACE Boolean expression associated with all
authenticated authorities to False. After powering up the CM and opening a new TCG session,
the operator must execute the Authenticate service to enable an authority within the Crypto
Officer and User roles.
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The Cryptographic Module encrypts and signs all authentication data, associated with a role,
stored outside the ACM. The ACM imports the encrypted and signed authentication, verifies the
signature, and decrypts the authentication data. Before validating the operator supplied
authentication data, the ACM checks for try limit violations.
The lock-based authentication method implemented by the Cryptographic Module remains
secure because the purpose of the implementation is to protect data-at-rest and the host
operating system in communication with the CM acts as the operator and is considered a
trusted machine.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Admin SP Admin1 Role CO
Role-based Authentication
- Credential PIN
Authentication
Admin SP Maintenance Role Maintenance
Role-based Authentication
- Credential PIN
Authentication
SID Role CO
Role-based Authentication
- Credential PIN
Authentication
Anybody Role User None
Locking SP Admin Role CO
Role-based Authentication
- Credential PIN
Authentication
Locking SP User Role CO
Role-based Authentication
- Credential PIN
Authentication
NVMe User Role User
Role-based Authentication
- Credential PIN
Authentication
Table 11: Roles
The CM supports both Crypto Officer (CO) and User roles. Except for the Anybody Authority,
operators must authenticate to the corresponding TCG Authority to assume a Crypto Officer,
User or Maintenance role.
• Crypto Officer Roles
o Secure ID (SID)
▪ This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the TPer owner within the Admin SP
Authority as defined in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal
Specification [TCG Opal].
o Admin SP Admin1
▪ This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the Admin SP Admin1 authority defined
in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification [TCG Opal].
o Locking SP Admin
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▪ This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the Locking SP Admin Authority as
defined in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification
[TCG Opal]. The Cryptographic Mode supports up to four (4) Locking SP
Admin authorities.
o Locking SP User
▪ This Crypto Officer role corresponds to the Locking SP User Authority as
defined in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification [TCG
Opal]. The Cryptographic Mode supports up to ten (10) Locking SP User
authorities.
• User Roles
o NVMe User
▪ This Crypto Officer role utilizes the NVM Express™
(NVMe™
) interface protocols,
which are designed to provide an efficient peer-to-peer communication link, for a
Host to send commands to the Cryptographic Module and receive responses.
Authentication to the SID authenticates the Drive Owner to the Crypto Officer
role. The NVMe User may execute services that were previously enabled by
another authenticated role.
o Anybody
▪ This user role corresponds to the Locking SP Anybody Authority as defined in
the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification [TCG Opal]. As
specified in the TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification [TCG Core], the
Anybody authority is always considered "authenticated" within a session, even if
the Anybody authority was not specifically called out during session startup. The
Anybody authority executes services that do not require authentication or were
previously enabled by an authenticated role.
• Maintenance Role
o Admin SP Maintenance
For error injection purposes, the SID authenticates to the Admin SP Maintenance authority,
enables the error injection service, and issues Vendor Unique Commands to determine if the
CM report the correct Device Panic status data. Prior to authenticating to the Admin SP
Maintenance role, the Crypto Officer shall execute Revert to zeroize all SSPs. After disabling
the error injection service, the Crypto Officer shall execute Revert to zeroize all SSPs. Power
cycling the Cryptographic Module automatically negates authentication to Admin SP
Maintenance authority and disables the error injection service. While authenticated to the Admin
SP Maintenance authority, modification of the operational environment is blocked.
4.3 Approved Services
The following table lists approved services implemented by the Cryptographic Module.
The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as:
• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W =Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module (SSP is input).
• E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
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• Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Activate
Activate,
is an
Opal
SSC [2]
specific
method
that
allows
the TPer
owner to
"turn on"
a
Security
Provider
created
in
manufact
uring.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
5.1.1 Activate
- Admin
Template SP
Object Method
[2] 3.1.1
Activate [8]
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
Authority_Digest
_Generation
Derived_Key_G
eneration
Encryption
Key Wrap
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
MEK Generation
RBG
RBG Seeding
User_Data_Decr
yption
SID
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest:
G,E
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,W,E
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range): G
- Admin
Authority
Key (Ka):
G,E
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AES
Key
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E
- User
Manage
ment Key
(UMK):
G,E
-
Namesp
ace
Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AE
S Key
NSK.XT
S Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key:
G,W,E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key:
G,W,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: Z
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: E
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key: E
-
DRBG.S
eed: E
-
Anybody
User
Access
Key
(UAKa):
G
Activate, Single
User Mode [5]
Activate,
is an
Opal
SSC [2]
specific
method
that
allows
the TPer
owner to
"turn on"
a
Security
Provider
created
in
manufact
uring.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
See 3.1.2.1
Activate [5]
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
None
SID
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest:
G,W,E
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
-
DRBG.S
eed: E
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Authenticate
PSID
PSID
character
string
authentic
ation
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
PSID
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
Decryption
Keyed_Digest_V
erification
SID
- PSID:
E,W
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
- PSID
Digest: E
Anybody
- PSID:
E,W
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
- PSID
Digest: E
Authenticate
TCG Authority
Authentic
ation
Credentia
l
authentic
ation
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
Authentication
Credential PIN
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
Authority_Digest
_Verification
SID
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: W,E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest: E
- Admin
SP
Maintena
nce PIN:
W,E
- Admin
SP
Maintena
nce PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Admin
[1-4] PIN:
W,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
Admin
SP
Admin1
- SID
PIN: W,E
- SID PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN:
W,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest: E
- SED
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Active
Signing
Key: E
Admin
SP
Maintena
nce
- SID
PIN: W,E
- SID PIN
Digest: E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: W,E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN:
W,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
Locking
SP
Admin
- SID
PIN: W,E
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- SID PIN
Digest: E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: W,E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN:
W,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
Locking
SP User
- SID
PIN: W,E
- SID PIN
Digest: E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: W,E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Digest: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN:
W,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
Anybody
- SID
PIN: W,E
- SID PIN
Digest: E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: W,E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN:
W,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: E
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W,E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
BootFlashIntegr
ity
An RSA
digital
signature
verifies
the
authentici
ty of a
binary
firmware
image.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
RSA 2048
PKCS1 v1.5
signed
firmware
image
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
SecureLoader _
Integrity
Unauthe
nticated
- Storage
Device
Certificati
on
Authority
Key
(SD_CA
Key): E
Error Injection
This
service
allows
the
operator
to test
the CM's
adverse
condition
response
by
injected
an error
condition.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
See §4.11 [17]
See
§4.11
[17]
Authority_Digest
_Verification
SID
- SID
PIN: E,W
- SID PIN
Digest: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
Admin
SP
Maintena
nce
- Admin
SP
Maintena
nce PIN:
E,W
- Admin
SP
Maintena
nce PIN
Digest: E
- SED
Active
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Signing
Key: E
FIPS 140
Compliance
Descriptor
(Show Version)
This
service
reports
the FIPS
140
revision
as well
as the
Cryptogr
aphic
Module's
overall
security
level,
hardware
revision,
firmware
revision
and
module
name.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
Security
Protocol IN
(0x0, 0x2,
0x2)
FIPS
140
Compli
ance
Descrip
tor
table
data or
UEC
failure
code
None
NVMe
User
Firmware
Download
ADigital
signature
verificatio
n of a
binary
firmware
image.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
RSA 2048
PKCS1 v1.5
signed
firmware
image
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
FW_Authenticity
SID
- OEM
Firmware
Key
(OEM
FW Key):
E
- Product
Group
Key
(PROD
GROUP
Key): E
Firmware
Download
Control
Enable or
disable
access to
the
Firmware
Downloa
d service
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
FW_DOWNL
OAD_PORT
bit within the
AdminSP
Logical Port
Table
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
None SID
Firmware
Integrity
An RSA
digital
signature
verifies
isFIP
S
mod
RSA 2048
PKCS1 v1.5
signed
Succes
s or
UEC
FW_Integrity
Unauthe
nticated
- OEM
Firmware
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
the
authentici
ty of a
binary
firmware
image.
e is
true
firmware
image
failure
code
Key
(OEM
FW Key):
E
- Security
Core
Firmware
Key
(SC_FW
Key): E
- Security
Protocol
Firmware
Key
(SP_FW
Key): E
- OEM
Original
Factory
State
Key
(OEM_O
FS Key):
E
- Storage
Device
Boot FW
Key
(SD_BF
W Key):
E
- Storage
Device
Certificati
on
Authority
Key
(SD_CA
Key): E
Format_NVM_
SecureErase
Cryptogr
aphic
zeroizatio
n of user
data..
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
See §5.23,
§5.24 [10],
§4.1.2 [12]
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
MEK Generation
RBG
RBG Seeding
User_Data_Encr
yption
NVMe
User
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
-
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Namesp
ace
Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AE
S Key
NSK.XT
S Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AES
Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Signing
Key: E
Generate
Random
TCG
Random
method
that
generate
s a
random
number
from the
SP 800-
90A
CTR_DR
BG
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
Byte count
Byte
string
RBG
Anybody
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
Get
Reads
data
structure;
access
control
enforcem
ent
occurs
per data
structure
field
IsFIP
S
globa
l
indic
ator
=1
See §5.3.3.6
Basic Table
Method Group
- Get (Table
and Object
Method) [1]
Get
method
table
data
Decryption
Keyed_Digest_V
erification
Anybody
- MSID:
R
Get DataStore
Read a
stream of
bytes
from
unstructu
red
storage
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
See §3.2.13.9
Read data
from the
DataStore
table [7]
DataSt
ore
plainte
xt data
or UEC
failure
code
None Anybody
Get Range
Attributes
Returns
the data
stored in
the
Locking
SP table
for an
LBA
Range
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
Band_UID
[12]
Range
attribut
e data
None
Anybody
Locking
SP User
Level 0
Discovery
TCG
'Level 0
Discover
y'
discloses
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
See §3.3.6
Level 0
Discovery,
§3.3.6.2 IF-
Level 0
Discov
ery
Respo
nse
None Anybody
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
basic
configura
tion data
about the
Cryptogr
aphic
Module,
both
current
and
potential
RECV
Command [1]
data
See
§3.3.6
Level 0
Discov
ery [1]
Locking SP
User Password
Update
Allows
Locking
SP
Admins
to update
the PIN
of a user
that in
not in
Single
User
Mode
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
Locking SP
UserPIN
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
Authority_Digest
_Generation
Decryption
Derived_Key_G
eneration
Encryption
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
RBG
Locking
SP
Admin
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
- KDF
Salt
(Unique
to Admin
SP
Admin1,
each
Locking
SP
Admin
and each
Locking
SP
User): G
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- User
Manage
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 35 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
ment Key
(UMK): E
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
Reactivate
In Single
User
Mode,
the
reactivate
service
allows
the
hostoper
ator to
define
which
ranges
are under
the
control of
a Single
User
authority.
In
addition,
it allows
the host
to define
range
ownershi
p within
non-
Global
Range
Locking
objects.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
See §3.1.1.1
Reactivate [5]
and §3.1.1
Reactivate [8]
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
None
Locking
SP
Admin
- Admin
Authority
Key (Ka):
G,E
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest: G
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 36 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Volatile
Signing
Key: E
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- User
Manage
ment Key
(UMK): E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN:
W
Read User
Data
Reads
ciphertext
from a
specified
LBA
range
and
outputs
the user
data as
plaintext.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
See §3.2.4
Read
Command [12
]
Plainte
xt user
data or
UEC
failure
code
User_Data_Decr
yption
NVMe
User
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range): E
Reset Module
Power on
Reset
isFIP
S
None
Drive
Ready
Derived_Key_G
eneration
Unauthe
nticated
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 37 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
mod
e is
true
Indicat
or or
UEC
failure
code
Encryption
Key Wrap
RBG
RBG Seeding
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
- ESV: G
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: G
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: G
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G
- User
Manage
ment Key
(UMK): G
Revert
The TCG
Revert
method
cryptogra
phically
erases
CSPs
and
returns
the
Cryptogr
aphic
Module
to its
original
manufact
ured
state.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
PSID
Drive
Ready
Indicat
or or
UEC
failure
code
Encryption
Key Wrap
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
MEK Generation
RBG
SID
- SID PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 38 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key:
G,Z
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: G,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key:
G,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key: G,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Encryptio
n Key:
G,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key: G,Z
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key:
G,Z
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: G,Z
- PSID:
W
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Global
Active
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 39 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK):
G,E,Z
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest:
G,E,Z
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,E,Z
- Admin
Authority
Key (Ka):
G,E,Z
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AES
Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 40 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Manage
ment Key
(UMK):
G,E,Z
-
Namesp
ace
Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AE
S Key
NSK.XT
S Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Root
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- Root
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- MSID:
E
- MSID
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 41 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Digest: E
Anybody
- SID PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,Z
- Admin
Authority
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 42 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key (Ka):
G,E,Z
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AES
Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Manage
ment Key
(UMK):
G,E,Z
-
Namesp
ace
Keyset
(NSK)
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 43 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
NSK.AE
S Key
NSK.XT
S Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Root
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- Root
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK):
G,E,Z
- Global
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key:
G,Z
- SED
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 44 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- PSID:
W
- MSID:
E
- MSID
Digest: E
RevertSP
The
RevertSP
method
cryptogra
phically
erases
CSPs
and
returns
the
Cryptogr
aphic
Module
to its
original
manufact
ured
state.
IsFIP
S
mod
e is
true
See §5.1.3
RevertSP -
Base
Template SP
Method [2]
Drive
Ready
Indicat
or or
UEC
failure
code
Encryption
Key Wrap
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
MEK Generation
RBG
Anybody
- SID PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 45 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
DRBG.S
eed: G,E
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,E,Z
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AES
Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 46 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Manage
ment Key
(UMK):
G,E,Z
-
Namesp
ace
Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AE
S Key
NSK.XT
S Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Root
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- Root
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK):
G,E,Z
- Global
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key:
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 47 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
G,E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SID
PIN: E
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN: E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN:
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 48 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: E
- MSID:
E
- MSID
Digest: E
SID
- SID PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Admin
SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest:
G,Z
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN
Digest:
G,Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: G
-
DRBG.S
eed: G
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 49 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,Z
- Admin
Authority
Key (Ka):
G,E,Z
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AES
Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- User
Manage
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 50 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
ment Key
(UMK):
G,E,Z
-
Namesp
ace
Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AE
S Key
NSK.XT
S Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,E,Z
- Root
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- Root
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK):
G,E,Z
- Global
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Active
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 51 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key:
G,E,Z
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key:
G,E,Z
- MSID:
E
Self-Test
The
Cryptogr
aphic
Module
performs
self-tests
when it
powers
up
N/A None
Drive
Ready
or UEC
failure
code
Decryption
Derived_Key_G
eneration
Digest_Generati
on
Digest_Verificati
on
Encryption
FW_Integrity
Key Wrap
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
Keyed_Digest_V
erification
RBG
Unauthe
nticated
-
DRBG.K
ey: G,E
-
DRBG.V:
G,E
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 52 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Set
Write
data
structure
s; access
control
enforcem
ent
occurs
per data
structure
field. This
service
can
change
Authentic
ation
Credentia
l PINs
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
See §5.3.3.7
Basic Table
Method Group
- Set [1]
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
Encryption
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
SID
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: E
- SID
PIN: W
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
Anybody
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Active
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 53 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: E
- MSID:
E
Admin
SP
Admin1
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 54 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Locking
SP
Admin
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
LockingS
P
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: E
- Admin
Authority
Key (Ka):
E
- Locking
SP
Admin
[1-4] PIN:
W
Locking
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 55 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
SP User
- Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK): E
- Global
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Active
Signing
Key: E
- SED
LockingS
P
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
LockingS
P
Signing
Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key: E
- SED
Volatile
Signing
Key: E
- Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- Locking
SP User
[1-10]
PIN: W
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 56 of 103
Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Set Range
Attributes
Writes
configura
tion data
to a
Locking
SP table
for an
LBA
Range
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
LBA range
configuration
data [2]
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
Encryption
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
Locking
SP User
Set DataStore
Write a
stream of
bytes to
unstructu
red
storage.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
See §3.2.13.6
Write data to
the DataStore
table [7]
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
None
Anybody
Locking
SP User
Show Status
The
NVMe
Controller
Health
status
poll
comman
d
requests
NVMe
storage
device
(e.g.,
Cryptogr
aphic
Module)
status
informati
on
N/A
Input
parameters
are defined
within NVM
Express®
Management
Interface [11]
Output
data is
defined
within
NVM
Expres
s®
Manag
ement
Interfac
e [11]
None
NVMe
User
TCG Erase,
Single User
Mode
TCG
Erase
cryptogra
phically
erases
user data
within a
defined
data
range.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
[NVMe
Command]
defines the
input
parameters.
Return
request
ed
module
data or
UEC
failure
code.
Encryption
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
MEK Generation
RBG
Locking
SP
Admin
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AES
Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: E
-
DRBG.V:
E
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
Locking
SP User
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,E,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AES
Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: E
-
DRBG.V:
E
- Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
- User
Manage
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
ment Key
(UMK): E
TCG GenKey
TCG
GenKey
cryptogra
phically
erases
user data
within a
defined
data
range.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
See §5.3.3.16
Key Related
Method Group
- GenKey [1]
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
Encryption
Keyed_Digest_
Generation
MEK Generation
RBG
Locking
SP User
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range):
G,E,Z
- Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AES
Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique):
G,Z
-
DRBG.K
ey: E
-
DRBG.V:
E
- User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique):
E
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Name
Descripti
on
Indic
ator
Inputs
Output
s
Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Write User Data
Transfor
ms
plaintext
user data
into
ciphertext
and
writes the
data to a
specified
LBA
band.
isFIP
S
mod
e is
true
Operation
Code, LBA,
Transfer
Length, Data-
Out Buffer
[NVMe
Command]
Succes
s or
UEC
failure
code
User_Data_Encr
yption
NVMe
User
- MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AE
SEnc
Key
MEK.AE
SDec
Key
MEK.XT
S Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range): E
Table 12: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The Cryptographic does not support non-approved services.
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The Cryptographic Module utilizes RSA public key cryptography to verify that the firmware
downloaded to the module is authentic. The Cryptographic Module uses RSA 2048 PKCS1 v1.5
with SHA2-256 to verify the digital signature of all downloaded firmware binary image. RSA
Public/Private key pairs used in the firmware signing process are generated and stored within a
Hardware Security Module (HSM), which resides in a secure Western Digital facility. The
Cryptographic Module rejects a downloaded firmware binary image if the FW_Authenticity
security function fails.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The Cryptographic Module utilizes RSA public key cryptography to verify the integrity of all
firmware binary images within the CM prior to execution.
The firmware integrity tests ensure that prior to executing any firmware image the storage
device verifies the firmware is from an authenticated Western Digital source. Current storage
devices typically implement a multi-stage loader system to boot the drive. Each loader stage is
responsible for loading and verifying the next image before transferring control to the next
image. This process establishes a chain of trust during the boot process.
The Cryptographic Module’s Boot ROM code loads the secure loader image. The secure loader,
which is signed by the SD_CA Key, enables the boot process to use other keys besides the
SD_CA Key for boot time RSA digital signature check (i.e., SD_BFW Key). For example, the
secure loader loads the SD_BFW public key certificate and verifies the SD_CA Key RSA digital
signature of the certificate. The secure loader then loads the next image(s) from boot flash,
verifies the signature of the next image(s) using the SD_BFW public key, and transfers control
to the next image.
Figure 4 - Asymmetric Key Tree
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The operator initiates the integrity test on demand by power cycling the Cryptographic Module.
SD_CA Key
SD_BFW Key
SD_SM Key
SD_FW Key
Prod_Group Key
OEM_FW Key
OEM_OFS Key
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
While operational, the Cryptographic Module prohibits additions, deletions, or modification of the
code working set. For firmware upgrades, the Cryptographic Module uses an authenticated
download service to upgrade its firmware in its entirety. The immutable security firmware stored
in ROM, which is essential and integral to the operation of the module is non-modifiable. If the
download operation is successful, authorized, and verified, the Cryptographic Module will begin
operating with the new code working set after successfully executing all pre-operational self-
tests.
Firmware loaded into the Cryptographic Module that is not on the FIPS 140-3 certificate is out of
the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
The Cryptographic Module blocks the installation of firmware images that contain a Code ID that
is inconsistent with the Cryptographic Module’s SoC ASIC, hardware interface type (e.g., SAS,
SATA, PCIe, etc.) and security type (e.g., TCG Enabled, FIPS Enabled, etc.).
The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the LockOnReset parameter of the logical
firmware download port is set to PowerCycle. The Cryptographic Module is in noncompliant
state when the LockOnReset parameter is not set to PowerCycle. The Crypto Officer is
responsible for assuring the logical firmware download port remains locked unless the CO
intends to execute the Firmware Download service. The CO shall lock the firmware download
port after the Firmware Download service completes. Consult the Ports section of the Ultrastar®
DC SN650 Specification [Product Manual] for guidance.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the Locking SP User Authentication PIN
Credential for all configured Locking SP Users does not equal the MSID value. LBA ranges
associated with a Locking SP User with a default authentication PIN values are considered
plaintext.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the LockOnReset attribute for any configured
Locking SP User is set to PowerCycle. The Cryptographic Module is in noncompliant state when
the state of the LockOnReset attribute of any configured Locking SP User is not set to
PowerCycle.
The Crypto Officer is responsible for assuring that the ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled
attribute for any configured Locking SP User is set to True. The Cryptographic Module is in a
noncompliant state when the state of the ReadLockEnabled or WriteLockEnabled attribute of
any configured Locking SP User is set to False.
Consult the TCG Storage SSC: Opal Specification [TCG Opal] for guidance.
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7 Physical Security
The Cryptographic Module is a multiple-chip embedded module that complies with FIPS 140-3
Level 1 security. An ambient temperature from 0° to 70°C defines the Cryptographic Module’s
environmental operating range [Datasheet].
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
The Cryptographic Module does not make claims in the Physical Security area beyond FIPS
140-3 Level 1 security. Therefore, the CM does not employ any fault induction mitigation
techniques or an EFP feature that immediately zeroise all unprotected SSPs if the temperature
or voltage falls outside of the Cryptographic Module's normal operating range. The CM will
institute a thermal safety shutdown to preserve data integrity if the operating temperature
reaches 83°C. The thermal safety shutdown process does not zeroize SSPs.
• All components are production-grade materials with standard passivation.
• The enclosure is opaque.
• Engineering design supports opacity requirements.
Mechanism
Inspection
Frequency
Inspection
Guidance
N/A N/A N/A
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required
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8 Non-Invasive Security
8.1 Mitigation Techniques
The Cryptographic Module lacks features to mitigate any non-invasive security attacks beyond
the scope of the requirements within FIPS 140-3 Security Level 1.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
The Cryptographic Module manages the SSPs listed in Section 9.4 of this document. The
Cryptographic Module does not support the output of SSPs beyond the cryptographic boundary.
The Cryptographic Module does not support non-approved algorithms or key lengths.
9.1 Storage Areas
Calling processes implemented in firmware control Cryptographic Module access to SSPs.
Zeroization services cryptographically erase SSPs.
Storage Area Name Description
Persistence
Type
DRAM General purpose system memory Dynamic
IRAM Memory internal to the ACM Dynamic
NOR Flash SSP and boot code storage Static
NAND Flash SSP storage and firmware image storage Static
One-time Programable (OTP) Root Key and Certificate Authority Key storage Static
Table 14: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
The CM limits the input of SSPs to plaintext Authentication Credential PINs and RSA-2048
public keys. RSA-2048 public key input only occurs during the manufacturing process. Instead
of storing PIN values as plaintext, the CM stores an HMAC SHA-256 Digest of the PIN. A
Hardware Security Module (HSM), which resides within a secure Western Digital facility,
generates, and stores the RSA Public/Private key pairs input during the manufacturing process.
The CM does not support the output of intermediate values generated during key generation.
The module does not support the output of SSPs beyond the cryptographic boundary of the
module.
Name From To
Format
Type
Distributio
n Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Authenticatio
n Credential
PIN
Operato
r
Cryptographi
c Module
Plaintex
t
Automated
Electroni
c
FW_Authenticit
y
Public Key HSM
Cryptographi
c Module
Plaintex
t
Automated
Electroni
c
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3374)
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization of persistent SSPs complies with the cryptographic erasure requirements for solid
state drives within [SP 800-88], Guidelines for Media Sanitization. The Cryptographic Module
zeroizes ephemeral SSPs by overwriting the SSP memory location with all zeros within the
scope of the function call.
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Zeroization Method Description Rationale
Operator
Initiation
Format_NVM_SecureErase
Format_NVM_SecureErase
cryptographically erases user
data regardless of location
(e.g., within an exposed LBA,
within a cache, within
deallocated LBAs, etc.) by
regenerating the Namespace
Keyset (NSK) and Media
Encryption Keyset (MEK)
All SSPs within
the scope of this
zeroization
method are
encrypted and
signed.
Therefore, the
rationale
specified under
item e of
VE09.30.01 is
not applicable.
The operator
issues a
Format NVM
command as
specified in
[12].
Power Cycle
Power cycling involves
disconnecting and
reconnecting the CM to its
source of power.
Plaintext SSPs
stored in IRAM
memory within
the ACM are
destroyed
instantaneously
when power is
removed.
The operator
physically or
remotely
disconnects
the CM from
its source of
power.
Revert
The Revert method
cryptographically erases
CSPs. Revert removes the
owner's Authentication
Credentials and returns the
Cryptographic Module to its
original manufactured state
All SSPs within
the scope of this
zeroization
method are
encrypted and
signed.
Therefore, the
rationale
specified under
item e of
VE09.30.01 is
not applicable.
The operator
transmits a
TCG IF-
SEND
command to
the CM as to
instruct the
TPer to
initiate a
zeroization
process.
RevertSP
The RevertSP method
cryptographically erases
CSPs. RevertSP removes
the owner's Authentication
Credentials and returns the
Cryptographic Module to its
original manufactured state.
Global Range data is
preserved if the
KeepGlobalRangeKey
parameter is set to True.
All SSPs within
the scope of this
zeroization
method are
encrypted and
signed.
Therefore, the
rationale
specified under
item e of
VE09.30.01 is
not applicable.
The operator
transmits a
TCG IF-
SEND
command to
the CM as to
instruct the
TPer to
initiate a
zeroisation
process.
TCG Erase
In Single User Data mode,
executing the TCG Erase
method cryptographically
All SSPs within
the scope of this
zeroization
The operator
transmits a
command to
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Zeroization Method Description Rationale
Operator
Initiation
erases user data by
regenerating and replacing
the Locking Range Key
(LRK) and Media Encryption
Key (MEK) associated with a
data range.
method are
encrypted and
signed.
Therefore, the
rationale
specified under
item e of
VE09.30.01 is
not applicable.
the CM as to
instruct the
TPer to
initiate a
user data
erasure
process.
TCG GenKey
In Single User Data mode
and non-Single User Mode,
executing the TCG GenKey
method cryptographically
erases user data by
regenerating and replacing
the Locking Range Key
(LRK) and Media Encryption
Key (MEK) associated with a
data range
All SSPs within
the scope of this
zeroization
method are
encrypted and
signed.
Therefore, the
rationale
specified under
item e of
VE09.30.01 is
not applicable.
The operator
transmits a
command to
the CM as to
instruct the
TPer to
initiate a key
generation
process.
Secure Manufacturing
Reconfiguration Process
The secure manufacturing
reconfiguration processes
incorporates a hardware
security module (HSM) and
supporting security software
to inject cryptographic keys,
digital certificates and assure
only authentic firmware is
installed on the
Cryptographic Module.
All SSPs within
the scope of this
zeroization
method are
encrypted and
signed.
Therefore, the
rationale
specified under
item e of
VE09.30.01 is
not applicable.
The operator
transmits
proprietary
commands
to the CM to
initiate a
rebuild
process that
zeroizes and
regenerates
the
symmetric
and
asymmetric
key trees
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in Section 4.3
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Name Description
Size -
Stren
gth
Type -
Catego
ry
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
Admin
Authority
Key (Ka)
The Ka key
encrypts and
decrypts UAKs
and the UMK.
256
bits -
256
bits
Derive
d
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
PBKDF
(A3374)
AES-CBC (AES
3580)
Admin SP
Admin1
PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
for the Admin SP
Admin1
Authority.
12 to
32
bytes
- 96 to
256
bits
Plainte
xt -
CSP
Admin SP
Admin1
PIN
Digest
Authenticates
the Admin SP
Admin1
Authority.
256
bits -
256
bits
Messa
ge
Digest
- CSP
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
(HMAC
2280)
Admin SP
Maintena
nce PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
for the Admin SP
Admin1
Authority.
12 to
32
bytes
- 96 to
256
bits
Plainte
xt -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Ge
neration
Derived_Key_Gener
ation
Admin SP
Maintena
nce PIN
Digest
Authenticates
the Admin SP
Admin1
Authority.
256
bits -
256
bits
Messa
ge
Digest
- CSP
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
(HMAC
2280)
Authority_Digest_Ve
rification
Anybody
User
Access
Key
(UAKa)
The Anybody
Authority uses
UAKa to decrypt
the RAK of
unlocked LBA
bands.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
AES-CBC (AES
3580)
DRBG.Ke
y
Internal state
associated with
the [SP 800-90A]
CTR_DRBG
using AES-256
256
bits -
256
bits
Entrop
y -
CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
Counter DRBG
(A3374)
DRBG.Se
ed
Internal state
associated with
the [SP 800-90A]
CTR_DRBG
using AES-256.
128
bits -
128
bits
Entrop
y -
CSP
RBG
Seedin
g
Counter DRBG
(A3374)
DRBG.V
Internal state
associated with
the [SP 800-90A]
128
bits -
Entrop
y -
CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
Counter DRBG
(A3374)
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Name Description
Size -
Stren
gth
Type -
Catego
ry
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
CTR_DRBG
using AES-256.
128
bits
ESV
Entropy source
input to the [SP
800-90A]
CTR_DRBG
32-bit
sampl
e -
2.69
bits
per
32-bit
sampl
e
Entrop
y -
CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
Counter DRBG
(A3374)
Global
Active
Encryptio
n Key
(AEK)
The Global
Active
Encryption Key
encrypts and
decrypts the
SED Active
Encryption Key,
SED Active
Signing Key,
NSK and the
UAKa key.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
AES-CBC (AES
3580)
Global
Active
Signing
Key
Signs the
encrypted SED
Active
Encryption Key
and SED Active
Signing Key.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
HMAC-SHA2-256
(HMAC 2280)
KDF Salt
(Unique
to Admin
SP
Admin1,
each
Locking
SP Admin
and each
Locking
SP User)
KDF Salts are
integral to the
PBKDF2
generation of
each Ka and Ku
derived authority
key.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- PSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
HMAC-SHA2-256
(HMAC 2280)
Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AES
Key
LRK.XTS
LRKs in
combination with
the NSKs derive
MEKs, which
encrypt LBA
bands
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
MEK Generation
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Name Description
Size -
Stren
gth
Type -
Catego
ry
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique)
Locking
SP Admin
[1-4] PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
for a Locking SP
Admin Authority
12 to
32
bytes
- 96 to
256
bits
Plainte
xt -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Ge
neration
Derived_Key_Gener
ation
Locking
SP Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest
Authenticates
the associated
Locking SP
Admin Authority
256
bits -
256
bits
Messa
ge
Digest
- CSP
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
(HMAC
2280)
Authority_Digest_Ve
rification
Locking
SP User
[1-10] PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
for a Locking SP
User Authority
12 to
32
bytes
- 96 to
256
bits
Plainte
xt -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Ge
neration
Derived_Key_Gener
ation
Locking
SP User
[1-10] PIN
Digest
Authenticates
the associated
for Locking SP
User Authority
256
bits -
256
bits
Messa
ge
Digest
- CSP
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
(HMAC
2280)
Authority_Digest_Ve
rification
MEK -
Media
Encryptio
n Keyset
MEK.AES
Enc Key
MEK.AES
Dec Key
MEK.XTS
Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range)
MEKs encrypt
and decrypt LBA
bands. An
MEK.AESDec
key is the last
entry of the key
schedule for an
MEK.AESEnc
key.
256
bits -
256
bits
Derive
d
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
MEK
Genera
tion
User_Data_Encrypti
on
MSID
The MSID string
is the default
password for the
SID and Admin
SP Admin1
authorities.
32
bytes
-
162.8
bits
Plainte
xt -
CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
Digest_Generation
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Name Description
Size -
Stren
gth
Type -
Catego
ry
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
Inserted during
the
manufacturing
process, this
thirty-two-
character value
is generated by
the CM by
processing a
CTR-DRBG
generated
random number
through an
Alphanumeric
Character
Conversion
algorithm. The
algorithm's
output is limited
to a thirty-four-
element
character set.
MSID
Digest
Authenticates
the MSID PIN
256
bits -
256
bits
Messa
ge
Digest
- CSP
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
(HMAC
2280)
Derived_Key_Gener
ation
Namespa
ce Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AES
Key
NSK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique)
NSKs in
combination with
the LRKs derive
MEKs, which
encrypt LBA
bands
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
MEK Generation
Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique)
Ku keys encrypt
and decrypt all
UAKs except
UAKa.
256
bits -
256
bits
Derive
d
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
PBKDF
(A3374)
AES-CBC (AES
3580)
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Name Description
Size -
Stren
gth
Type -
Catego
ry
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
OEM
Firmware
Key
(OEM FW
Key)
The OEM FW
Key verifies the
overall download
firmware image.
2048-
bits -
112
bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A3374)
OEM
Original
Factory
State Key
(OEM_O
FS Key)
The OEM_OFS
Key verifies the
OEM Original
Factory Settings
files.
2048-
bits -
112
bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A3374)
Product
Group
Key
(PROD
GROUP
Key)
The PROD
GROUP Key
verifies OEM FW
Key certificates.
2048-
bits -
112
bits
Public
Key -
PSP
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A3374)
PSID
The PSID string
serves as
authentication
data and proof of
physical
presence for the
Zeroise Service.
Inserted during
the
manufacturing
process, this
thirty-two-
character value
is generated by
the CM by
processing a
CTR-DRBG
generated
random number
through an
Alphanumeric
Character
Conversion
algorithm. The
algorithm's
output is limited
to a thirty-four-
element
character set.
32
bytes
-
162.8
bits
Plainte
xt -
PSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
Digest_Generation
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 73 of 103
Name Description
Size -
Stren
gth
Type -
Catego
ry
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
PSID
Digest
HMAC-SHA2-
256 digest of
PSID
256
bits -
256
bits
Messa
ge
Digest
- CSP
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
(HMAC
2280)
Digest_Verification
Range
Access
Key
(RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique)
RAKs encrypt
and decrypt
LRKs.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
AES-CBC (AES
3580)
Root
Encryptio
n Key
The Root
Encryption Key
encrypts the
Global Active
Encryption Key,
Global Active
Signing Key.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
AES-CBC (AES
3580)
AES-ECB (AES
3580)
AES-KWP (A3374)
AES-ECB (A3410)
Root
Signing
Key
Signs the
encrypted Global
Active
Encryption Key,
Global Active
Signing Key.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
HMAC-SHA2-256
(HMAC 2280)
Security
Core
Firmware
Key
(SC_FW
Key)
The SC_FW Key
verifies ACM
security core
firmware.
2048-
bits -
112
bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A3374)
Security
Protocol
Firmware
Key
(SP_FW
Key)
The SP_FW Key
verifies ACM
security protocol
and services
firmware.
2048-
bits -
112
bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A3374)
SED
Active
Encryptio
n Key
The SED Active
Encryption Key
encrypts and
decrypts the
SED AdminSP
Encryption Key,
SED AdminSP
Signing Key,
SED LockingSP
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
AES-CBC (AES
3580)
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 74 of 103
Name Description
Size -
Stren
gth
Type -
Catego
ry
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
Encryption Key,
and SED
LockingSP
Signing Key.
SED
Active
Signing
Key
Signs the
encrypted SED
AdminSP
Encryption Key
and SED
AdminSP
Signing Key.
Signs the
encrypted SED
LockingSP
Encryption Key
and SED
LockingSP
Signing Key.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
HMAC-SHA2-256
(HMAC 2280)
SED
AdminSP
Encryptio
n Key
Encrypts and
decrypts an
Admin SP Object
Tables.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
AES-CBC (AES
3580)
SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key
Signs an
encrypted Admin
SP Object Table.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
HMAC-SHA2-256
(HMAC 2280)
SED
LockingS
P
Encryptio
n Key
Encrypts and
decrypts a
Locking SP
Object Tables.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
AES-CBC (AES
3580)
SED
LockingS
P Signing
Key
Signs an
encrypted
Locking SP
Object Table.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
SHA2-256 (SHS
2942)
SED
Volatile
Encryptio
n Key
Encrypts, and
decrypts LRKs
and MEKs.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
AES-CBC (AES
3580)
SED
Volatile
Signing
Key
Signs encrypted
LRKs and MEKs.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
HMAC-SHA2-256
(HMAC 2280)
SID PIN
Authentication
Credential PIN
for the Admin SP
12 to
32
bytes
Plainte
xt -
CSP
Authority_Digest_Ge
neration
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 75 of 103
Name Description
Size -
Stren
gth
Type -
Catego
ry
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
SID
Authority.Authent
ication
Credential
- 96 to
256
bits
SID PIN
Digest
Authenticates
the SID
Authority.
256
bits -
256
bits
Messa
ge
Digest
- CSP
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
(HMAC
2280)
Authority_Digest_Ve
rification
Storage
Device
Boot FW
Key
(SD_BFW
Key)
The SD_BFW
Key is public key
used to verify all
boot flash
images.
2048-
bits -
112
bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A3374)
Storage
Device
Certificati
on
Authority
Key
(SD_CA
Key)
The SD_CA Key
is the Master
RSA 2048 public
key. It verifies
the authenticity
of the other key
certificates and
the Secure
Loader image
2048-
bits -
112
bits
Public
Key -
Neither
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A3374)
User
Access
Key
(UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique)
Encrypts and
decrypts RAKs
associated with a
Locking SP
User.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
AES-CBC (AES
3580)
User
Managem
ent Key
(UMK)
Encrypts and
decrypts UAKs.
All enabled
Locking SP
Admins and the
Admin SP
Admin1 share
the UMK.
256
bits -
256
bits
Symme
tric Key
- CSP
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
AES-CBC (AES
3580)
Table 17: SSP Table 1
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 76 of 103
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
Admin
Authority
Key (Ka)
IRAM:Plainte
xt
Epheme
ral
Destroye
d after
use.
Power Cycle
User Access
Key (UAK)
(Locking SP
User
unique):Encryp
ts
User
Management
Key
(UMK):Encrypt
s
Admin SP
Admin1
PIN:Derived
From
KDF Salt
(Unique to
Admin SP
Admin1, each
Locking SP
Admin and
each Locking
SP
User):Derived
From
Locking SP
Admin [1-4]
PIN:Derived
From
Admin SP
Admin1
PIN
Authenticat
ion
Credential
PIN
Epheme
ral
Destroye
d after
use.
Power Cycle
Admin SP
Admin1 PIN
Digest:Paired
With
KDF Salt
(Unique to
Admin SP
Admin1, each
Locking SP
Admin and
each Locking
SP
User):Paired
With
Admin
Authority Key
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 77 of 103
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
(Ka):Paired
With
Admin SP
Admin1
PIN Digest
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
Admin SP
Admin1
PIN:Generated
from
SED AdminSP
Signing
Key:Generated
from
Admin SP
Maintenan
ce PIN
Authenticat
ion
Credential
PIN
DRAM:Plaint
ext
Epheme
ral,
destroye
d after
use
Power Cycle
Admin SP
Maintenance
PIN
Digest:Paired
With
Admin
Authority Key
(Ka):Paired
With
KDF Salt
(Unique to
Admin SP
Admin1, each
Locking SP
Admin and
each Locking
SP
User):Paired
With
Admin SP
Maintenan
ce PIN
Digest
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
Admin SP
Maintenance
PIN:Generated
from
SED AdminSP
Signing
Key:Generated
from
Anybody
User
Access
Key
(UAKa)
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
IRAM:Plainte
xt
Power
up to
power
down
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
Range Access
Key (RAK)
(Locking SP
User
unique):Decryp
ts
DRBG.Key
IRAM:Plainte
xt
Power
up to
Power Cycle
DRBG.Seed:P
aired With
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 78 of 103
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
power
down
DRBG.V:Paire
d With
DRBG.Se
ed
IRAM:Plainte
xt
Power
up to
power
down
Power Cycle
DRBG.V:Paire
d With
DRBG.Key:Pai
red With
DRBG.V
IRAM:Plainte
xt
Power
up to
power
down
Power Cycle
DRBG.Seed:P
aired With
DRBG.Key:Pai
red With
ESV
IRAM:Plainte
xt
Power
up to
power
down
Power Cycle
DRBG.Seed:P
aired With
Global
Active
Encryption
Key (AEK)
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
Secure
Manufacturing
Reconfiguration
Process
SED Active
Signing
Key:Encrypts
SED Active
Signing
Key:Decrypts
Namespace
Keyset (NSK)
NSK.AES Key
NSK.XTS Key
(Locking SP
User
unique):Encryp
ts
Namespace
Keyset (NSK)
NSK.AES Key
NSK.XTS Key
(Locking SP
User
unique):Decryp
ts
User Access
Key (UAK)
(Locking SP
User
unique):Encryp
ts
User Access
Key (UAK)
(Locking SP
User
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 79 of 103
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
unique):Decryp
ts
SED Active
Encryption
Key:Encrypts
SED Active
Encryption
Key:Decrypts
Global
Active
Signing
Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
Secure
Manufacturing
Reconfiguration
Process
Global Active
Encryption Key
(AEK):Derived
From
SED Active
Encryption
Key:Derived
From
SED Active
Signing
Key:Derived
From
KDF Salt
(Unique to
Admin SP
Admin1,
each
Locking
SP Admin
and each
Locking
SP User)
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
Admin SP
Admin1
PIN:Paired
With
Locking SP
Admin [1-4]
PIN:Paired
With
Locking SP
User [1-10]
PIN:Paired
With
Admin
Authority Key
(Ka):Paired
With
Locking
Range
Keyset
(LRK)
LRK.AES
Key
LRK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique)
DRAM:Encry
pted
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
Generati
on to
power
down
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
TCG Erase
TCG GenKey
Namespace
Keyset (NSK)
NSK.AES Key
NSK.XTS Key
(Locking SP
User
unique):Paired
With
MEK - Media
Encryption
Keyset
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 80 of 103
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
MEK.AESEnc
Key
MEK.AESDec
Key MEK.XTS
Tweak Key (16
total - 1 per
LBA
range):Paired
With
SED Volatile
Encryption
Key:Encrypts
Range Access
Key (RAK)
(Locking SP
User
unique):Encryp
ts
Locking
SP Admin
[1-4] PIN
Authenticat
ion
Credential
PIN
DRAM:Plaint
ext
Epheme
ral
Destroye
d after
use.
Power Cycle
Locking SP
Admin [1-4]
PIN
Digest:Paired
With
KDF Salt
(Unique to
Admin SP
Admin1, each
Locking SP
Admin and
each Locking
SP
User):Paired
With
Locking
SP Admin
[1-4] PIN
Digest
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
Locking SP
Admin [1-4]
PIN:Generated
from
Locking
SP User
[1-10] PIN
Authenticat
ion
Credential
PIN
DRAM:Plaint
ext
Epheme
ral
Destroye
d after
use.
Power Cycle
Locking SP
User [1-10]
PIN
Digest:Paired
With
Non-Admin
Authority Key
(Ku) (Locking
SP User
unique):Paired
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 81 of 103
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
With
KDF Salt
(Unique to
Admin SP
Admin1, each
Locking SP
Admin and
each Locking
SP
User):Paired
With
Locking
SP User
[1-10] PIN
Digest
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
Locking SP
User [1-10]
PIN:Generated
from
SED
LockingSP
Signing
Key:Derived
From
MEK -
Media
Encryption
Keyset
MEK.AES
Enc Key
MEK.AES
Dec Key
MEK.XTS
Tweak
Key (16
total - 1
per LBA
range)
DRAM:Encry
pted
Generati
on to
power
down
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
Locking Range
Keyset (LRK)
LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key
(Locking SP
User
unique):Gener
ated from
Namespace
Keyset (NSK)
NSK.AES Key
NSK.XTS Key
(Locking SP
User
unique):Gener
ated from
SED Volatile
Encryption
Key:Encrypts
MSID
IRAM:Plainte
xt
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
Epheme
ral
Destroye
d after
use.
Power Cycle
SED Active
Signing
Key:Derived
From
MSID
Digest:Paired
With
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 82 of 103
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
MSID
Digest
IRAM:Plainte
xt
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
Epheme
ral
Destroye
d after
use
Power Cycle
MSID:Generat
ed from
SED Active
Signing
Key:Generated
from
Namespac
e Keyset
(NSK)
NSK.AES
Key
NSK.XTS
Key
(Locking
SP User
unique)
DRAM:Encry
pted
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
Generati
on to
power
down.
Format_NVM_Secure
Erase
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
Locking Range
Keyset (LRK)
LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key
(Locking SP
User
unique):Paired
With
MEK - Media
Encryption
Keyset
MEK.AESEnc
Key
MEK.AESDec
Key MEK.XTS
Tweak Key (16
total - 1 per
LBA
range):Paired
With
Global Active
Encryption Key
(AEK):Encrypts
Non-
Admin
Authority
Key (Ku)
(Locking
SP User
unique)
Epheme
ral
Destroye
d after
use
Power Cycle
Locking SP
User [1-10]
PIN:Derived
From
KDF Salt
(Unique to
Admin SP
Admin1, each
Locking SP
Admin and
each Locking
SP
User):Derived
From
Anybody User
Access Key
(UAKa):Encryp
ts
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 83 of 103
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
OEM
Firmware
Key (OEM
FW Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
N/A
Product Group
Key (PROD
GROUP
Key):Verified
by
OEM
Original
Factory
State Key
(OEM_OF
S Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
N/A
Product Group
Key (PROD
GROUP
Key):Verified
by
Product
Group Key
(PROD
GROUP
Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
N/A
Storage Device
Certification
Authority Key
(SD_CA
Key):Verified
by
PSID
IRAM:Plainte
xt
Epheme
ral
Destroye
d after
use.
Power Cycle
PSID
Digest:Paired
With
SED Active
Encryption
Key:Encrypts
SED Active
Signing
Key:Signed by
PSID
Digest
IRAM:Plainte
xt
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
Epheme
ral
Destroye
d after
use.
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
PSID:Generate
d from
SED Active
Signing
Key:Generated
from
Range
Access
Key (RAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique)
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
Anybody User
Access Key
(UAKa):Encryp
ted by
Locking Range
Keyset (LRK)
LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key
(Locking SP
User
unique):Encryp
ts
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 84 of 103
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
Root
Encryption
Key
One-time
Programable
(OTP):Encry
pted
Secure
Manufacturing
Reconfiguration
Process
Global Active
Encryption Key
(AEK):Encrypts
Global Active
Signing
Key:Encrypts
Root Signing
Key:Wraps
Root
Signing
Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
Secure
Manufacturing
Reconfiguration
Process
Global Active
Encryption Key
(AEK):Signs
Root
Encryption
Key:Wraps
Security
Core
Firmware
Key
(SC_FW
Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
N/A
Storage Device
Certification
Authority Key
(SD_CA
Key):Verified
by
Security
Protocol
Firmware
Key
(SP_FW
Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
N/A
Storage Device
Certification
Authority Key
(SD_CA
Key):Verified
by
SED
Active
Encryption
Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
SED AdminSP
Encryption
Key:Encrypts
SED AdminSP
Signing
Key:Encrypts
SED
LockingSP
Encryption
Key:Encrypts
SED
LockingSP
Signing
Key:Encrypts
SED
Active
Signing
Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
SED AdminSP
Encryption
Key:Signs
SED AdminSP
Signing
Key:Signs
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 85 of 103
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
SED
LockingSP
Encryption
Key:Signs
SED
LockingSP
Signing
Key:Signs
SED
AdminSP
Encryption
Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
Admin SP
Admin1
PIN:Encrypts
Admin SP
Admin1 PIN
Digest:Encrypt
s
SED
AdminSP
Signing
Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
Admin SP
Admin1
PIN:Signs
Admin SP
Admin1 PIN
Digest:Signs
SED
LockingSP
Encryption
Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
Locking SP
Admin [1-4]
PIN:Encrypts
Locking SP
Admin [1-4]
PIN
Digest:Encrypt
s
Locking SP
User [1-10]
PIN:Encrypts
SED
LockingSP
Signing
Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
Locking Range
Keyset (LRK)
LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key
(Locking SP
User
unique):Signs
SED
Volatile
Encryption
Key
IRAM:Plainte
xt
Power
up to
power
down
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
Locking Range
Keyset (LRK)
LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key
(Locking SP
User
unique):Encryp
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe® TCG Opal SSD FIPS 140-3 Cryptographic Module Non-Proprietary Security
Policy
Page 86 of 103
Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
ts
MEK - Media
Encryption
Keyset
MEK.AESEnc
Key
MEK.AESDec
Key MEK.XTS
Tweak Key (16
total - 1 per
LBA
range):Encrypt
s
SED
Volatile
Signing
Key
IRAM:Plainte
xt
Power
up to
power
down
Power Cycle
Revert
RevertSP
Locking Range
Keyset (LRK)
LRK.AES Key
LRK.XTS Key
(Locking SP
User
unique):Signs
MEK - Media
Encryption
Keyset
MEK.AESEnc
Key
MEK.AESDec
Key MEK.XTS
Tweak Key (16
total - 1 per
LBA
range):Signs
SID PIN
Authenticat
ion
Credential
PIN
IRAM:Plainte
xt
Epheme
ral
Destroye
d after
use.
Power Cycle
SID PIN
Digest:Paired
With
SID PIN
Digest
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
SID
PIN:Generated
from
SED AdminSP
Signing
Key:Generated
from
AdminSP
Signing
Key:Signed by
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Name
Input -
Output
Storage
Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroization Related SSPs
Storage
Device
Boot FW
Key
(SD_BFW
Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Encryp
ted
N/A
Storage Device
Certification
Authority Key
(SD_CA
Key):Verified
Storage
Device
Certificatio
n Authority
Key
(SD_CA
Key)
Public Key
NOR
Flash:Plainte
xt
One-time
Programable
(OTP):Encry
pted
N/A
Storage Device
Boot FW Key
(SD_BFW
Key):Signs
Security Core
Firmware Key
(SC_FW
Key):Signs
Security
Protocol
Firmware Key
(SP_FW
Key):Signs
User
Access
Key (UAK)
(Locking
SP User
unique)
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
Range Access
Key (RAK)
(Locking SP
User
unique):Encryp
ts
User
Managem
ent Key
(UMK)
NAND
Flash:Encryp
ted
Revert
RevertSP
Anybody User
Access Key
(UAKa):Encryp
ts
Table 18: SSP Table 2
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10 Self-Tests
The Cryptographic Module performs pre-operational and conditional self-tests automatically at
powered up. Pre-operational self-tests tests ensure that the Cryptographic Module is not
corrupted. The conditional self-tests assure that the cryptographic algorithms comply with their
associated certificate. The Cryptographic Module inhibits all data output via the “data output”
interface and the execution of loaded or modified approved security functions while executing
the pre-operational self-tests.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The Cryptographic Module performs the pre-operational self-test listed below at power up, in
response to a self-initiated reset and prior to booting to a new firmware image. Upon failure, the
Cryptographic Module transitions to a Device Unavailable Error state.
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
ESV
Sequential
data
collection
Adaptive
Proportion Test
Critical
Function
Pass: Next test
Fail: Device
Unavailable
Error
APT
Threshold
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A3374,
A3375, SHS
2942
2048-bit,
PKCS1
v1.5w/SHA2-
256
SW/FW
Integrity
Pass: Next test
Fail: Device
Unavailable
Error
Verify
Digital
Signature
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES CBC
Encrypt
256-bit key KAT CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Encrypt,
verify
Power up
AEs CBC
Decrypt
256-bit key KAT CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Decrypt,
verify
Power up
AES ECB
Encrypt
256-bit key KAT CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Encrypt,
verify
Power up
AES ECB
Decrypt
256-bit key KAT CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Decrypt,
verify
Power up
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Counter
DRBG
(A3374)
5120-bit
seed
KAT CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Device
Unavailable
Error
SP 800-
90ARev1
section 11.3
health test
(Instantiate,
generate
and reseed)
Power up
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(HMAC
2280)
Message,
256-bit key,
256-bit
hash digest
KAT CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Verify Power up
PBKDF
(A3374)
256-bit Salt
Iteration
Count:
1024
KAT CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Verify Power up
RSA
SigVer
KAT
2048- bit
public key,
256-bit
hash digest
KAT CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Verify Power up
RSA
SigVer for
Load Test
2048- bit
public key,
256-bit
hash digest
Digital
Signature
Verification
SW/FW
Load
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Verify Power up
SHA2-256
(SHS
2942)
Message,
256-bit
hash digest
KAT CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Verify Power up
AES KWP
Encrypt
256-bit
KEK
KAT CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Encrypt,
Verify
Power up
AES KWP
Decrypt
256-bit
KEK
KAT CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Decrypt,
Verify
Power up
ESV APT
RCT
threshold
Health
Test
CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Verify
Power-up or
after 2^32
CTR_DRBG
reseeds.
ESV RCT
APT
threshold
Health
Test
CAST
Pass: Next
test Fail:
Degraded
Error
Verify
Power-up or
after 2^32
CTR_DRBG
reseeds.
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests
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10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period
Periodic
Method
ESV
Adaptive
Proportion Test
Critical Function N/A Power cycle
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
2048-bit, PKCS1
v1.5w/SHA2-256
SW/FW Integrity N/A Power cycle
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period
Periodic
Method
AES CBC
Encrypt
KAT CAST N/A Power cycle
AEs CBC
Decrypt
KAT CAST N/A Power cycle
AES ECB
Encrypt
KAT CAST N/A Power cycle
AES ECB
Decrypt
KAT CAST N/A Power cycle
Counter DRBG
(A3374)
KAT CAST N/A Power cycle
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (HMAC
2280)
KAT CAST N/A Power cycle
PBKDF (A3374) KAT CAST N/A Power cycle
RSA SigVer
KAT
KAT CAST N/A Power cycle
RSA SigVer for
Load Test
Digital Signature
Verification
SW/FW Load N/A Power cycle
SHA2-256 (SHS
2942)
KAT CAST N/A Power cycle
AES KWP
Encrypt
KAT CAST N/A Power cycle
AES KWP
Decrypt
KAT CAST N/A Power cycle
ESV APT Health Test CAST N/A Power cycle
ESV RCT Health Test CAST N/A Power cycle
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions
Recovery
Method
Indicator
Degraded
Error
This error indicates that a fatal
failure occurred from which the
CM could not recover itself.
Conditional
test failure
Power
cycle
UEC failure
code
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Name Description Conditions
Recovery
Method
Indicator
Device
Unavailable
Error
This error indicates that a boot
initialization, security subsystem
initialization or firmware integrity
failure event occurred. In this
state, the CM does not respond
to any command received via the
data input port.
Pre-
operational
test failure
Power
cycle
Device is
unresponsive
Table 23: Error States
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The operator may initiate an on-demand periodic self-test by power cycling the CM.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
After initialization, the CM operates and powers up in isFIPS mode. Prior to configuring the CM
to comply with isFIPS mode configuration requirements it operates in a noncompliant state.
Regardless, the CM functions as a Secure Erase Drive (SED) that is compliant with the TCG
Storage SSC: Opal Specification [TCG Opal].
Installation and Initialization:
The Crypto Officer is responsible for executing a Take-Ownership scenario to configure the
Cryptographic Module to operationally comply with operator site requirements and assure that
the Cryptographic Module is compliant with FIPS 140-3 at SL1
Informative
Having the MSID Authentication Credential PIN electronically available to the operator
constitutes a risk to the overall security of the Cryptographic Module. Therefore, the Crypto
Officer should execute a Take-Ownership scenario the first time the Cryptographic Module is
inserted into a system and replace any Authentication Credential PIN that is set to the default
MSID value with a value that is different from the MSID value and between 12 and 32 bytes in
length. This assures compliance with ISO/IEC19790, Section 7.4.4 which states that, “…If
default authentication data is used to control access to the module, then default authentication
data shall [04.46] be replaced upon first-time authentication. This default authentication data
does not need to meet the zeroization requirements (7.9.7).”
Take-Ownership Scenario Example
1. Authenticate to the SID.
a. If the default MSID was used to authenticate to the SID, change the SID PIN to a
random value between 12 and 32 bytes in length.
2. Use the Get service to determine if the logical firmware download port is set to lock on
PowerCycle.
a. If the logical firmware download port’s LockOnReset attribute is not set to
PowerCycle utilize the Set service to set the LockOnReset attribute to PowerCycle.
3. Authenticate to Admin SP Admin1.
a. If the Crypto Officer authenticated to Admin SP Admin1 with the default MSID value,
change the Admin SP Admin1 PIN to a random value between 12 and 32 bytes in
length.
4. Authenticate to each Locking SP Admin that is within the scope of the operator site
requirements.
a. If the Crypto Officer authenticated to a Locking SP Admin with the default MSID
value, change the Locking SP Admin PIN to a random value between 12 and 32
bytes in length.
5. Authenticate to each Locking SP User that is within the scope of the operator site
requirements.
a. If the default MSID was used to authenticate to a Locking SP User, change the
Locking SP User PIN to a random value between 12 and 32 bytes in length.
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b. Utilize the Get Range Attributes service to determine the state of the Locking SP
User’s LockOnReset attribute. If the LockOnReset attribute is not set to PowerCycle,
use the Set Range Attribute service to set the LockOnReset attribute to Power Cycle.
c. Utilize the Get Range Attributes service to determine the state of the Locking SP
User’s ReadLockEnabled attribute. If the ReadLockEnabled attribute is not set to
True, use the Set Range Attribute service to set the ReadLockEnabled attribute to
True.
d. Utilize the Get Range Attributes service to determine the state of the Locking SP
User’s WriteLockEnabled attribute. If the WriteLockEnabled attribute is not set to
True, use the Set Range Attribute service to set the WriteLockEnabled attribute to
True.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Solid-state drives can be fragile. Do not drop or jar the drive. Handle the drive only by the
enclosure.
SSD electronics are sensitive to static electricity. Do not remove the CM from its antistatic
container until ready to install. The operator engaged in the installation process should wear an
antistatic wrist strap to ground to assure the discharge static electricity from any item or surface
that my touch the CM. Handle the drive only by the metal case surrounding the drive. Avoid
contacting with the EDSFF connector.
To assure proper installation and operation, verify all cooling requirements are met prior to
initiating the installation instructions within the Ultrastar®
DC SN650 Product Manual [Product
Manual].
The Ultrastar®
DC SN650 Product Manual [Product Manual] provides administrator guidance.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
Inspect the CM for damage to the case or EDSFF connector. Return the CM for warranty
replacement service if any damage is detected.
The Ultrastar®
DC SN650 Product Manual [Product Manual] provides non-administrator
guidance.
11.4 Design and Rules
On power-up, if previously configured to comply with isFIPS mode, the Cryptographic Module
automatically initializes to isFIPS mode without operator intervention. After successfully
completing pre-operational and conditional self-tests, the CM transitions to an isFIPS mode
operational state. In this state, the module awaits service requests from the operator.
The implemented security features protect against remote and physical attacks across the
complete product cycle from manufacturing build time to returns and failure analysis. The
secure firmware boot and firmware download process assure firmware image integrity and
prevents compromised firmware attacks. These features prevent the counterfeiting of the CM,
hacking and unauthorized access to CM ports. The authentication scheme enforces port
restrictions for processes that are only allowed within a secure manufacturing environment.
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These security features utilize cryptographically secure messages to block unauthorized access
to CM ports and imposes manufacturing command set restrictions. The CM utilizes a
cryptographic encryption and HMAC signing scheme to assure the protection of all SSPs stored
outside the ACM RoT.
Rules of Operation
1. The Cryptographic Module provides three distinct operator roles: User, Maintenance and
Cryptographic Officer.
2. The Cryptographic Module provides role-based authentication.
3. On power cycle the Module clears previous authentications.
4. The Cryptographic Module complies with the lock-based authentication model. On power
cycle, the Module locks unlocked services that require authentication to unlock (IG
4.1.A).
5. Accept as allowed under the lock-based authentication model, the operator does not have
access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
6. The Cryptographic Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power
cycling power or resetting the Module.
7. All self-tests do not require any operator action.
8. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to
a compromise of the Cryptographic Module.
10. The Cryptographic Module implements multiple zeroization service that vary in scope. The
scope of each zeroization service is defined in Section 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods.
11. The Cryptographic Module does not support concurrent operators.
12. The Cryptographic Module supports a maintenance role.
13. The Cryptographic Module does not support manual SSP establishment method.
14. The Cryptographic Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices
used for entry/output of data.
15. The Cryptographic Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
16. The Cryptographic Module does not store any plaintext CSPs.
17. The Cryptographic Module does not output intermediate key values.
18. The Cryptographic Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
The CM does not require periodic maintenance actions to maintain functional or secure
operation.
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11.6 End of Life
All CSPs stored within the volatile memory of the CM’s ACM RoT are inaccessible from outside
the ACM RoT. The CM encrypts and signs all CSPs before storing them in volatile or non-
volatile memory outside ACM RoT. Removing power instantaneously erases all CSPs stored
within the CM’s volatile memory.
Prior to the environmentally disposal of the CM owner should cryptographically erase the CM.
For this purpose, the CM supports the TCG Opal Revert method [TCG Opal]. Revert enables
the CM’s owner to cryptographically erase all CSPs and overwrite existing TCG settings to the
default values that were set during manufacturing. If environmental disposal requirements
require the zeroization of the Root Keyset, which consists of the Root Encryption Key and Root
Signing Key, the CM owner must return the CM to Western Digital. Western Digital’s proprietary
Secure Manufacturing Reconfiguration Process supports Root Keyset zeroization.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Cryptographic Module lacks features to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of
the requirements within FIPS 140-3 SL1.
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References and Definitions
The Security Policy refers to the following specifications, references, and definitions.
NIST Specifications
Abbreviation Specification Name
[FIPS 140 IG]
Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, August 2024
[FIPS 140]
Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-3, NIST, March
2019
[FIPS 180] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, NIST, August 2015
[FIPS 186] Digital Signature Standard, FIPS PUB 186-5, NIST, February 2023
[FIPS 197] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, NIST, May 2023
[FIPS 198] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, FIPS PUB 198-1, July 2008
[SP 800 131A]
Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths (Revision 2), NIST, March 2019
[SP 800 132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, NIST, December 2010
[SP 800 133] Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation (Revision 2), NIST, June 2020
[SP 800 140B]
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) Security Policy Requirements:
CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC 24759 and ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B
(Revision 1), NIST, November 2023
[SP 800 140C]
CMVP Approved Security Functions: CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC
24759 (Revision 2), NIST, July 2023
[SP 800 140D]
CMVP Approved Sensitive Security Parameter Generation and Establishment
Methods: CMVP Validation Authority Updates to ISO/IEC 24759 (Revision 2), NIST,
July 2023
[SP 800 38A]
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques,
NIST, December 2001
[SP 800 38E]
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices, NIST, January 2010
[SP 800 38F]
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping,
NIST, December 2012
[SP 800 57] Recommendation for Key Management – Part I General (Revision 5), NIST, May 2020
[SP 800 88] Guidelines for Media Sanitization (Revision 1), NIST, December 2014
[SP 800 90A]
Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators (Revision 1), NIST, June 2015
[SP 800 90B]
Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, NIST,
January 2018
Trusted Computing Group Specifications
Abbreviation Specification Name
[TCG Core]
TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Version 2.01 Revision 1.00
(August 5, 2015)
[TCG Namespace]
TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Configurable Namespace Locking,
Specification Version 1.00, Final Revision 1.33 (February 22, 2019)
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Abbreviation Specification Name
[TCG Opal Guideline]
TCG Storage Opal Integration Guidelines, Version 1.00, Final Revision 1.00
(March 16, 2016)
[TCG Opal]
TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification, Version 2.01,
Final Revision 1.00 (August 5, 2015)
[TCG PSID]
TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: PSID, Specification Version 1.00, Final
Revision 1.00 (August 5, 2015)
[TCG SIIS]
TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification (SIIS), Version 1.07, (January
30, 2018)
[TCG Opal Single
User]
TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Single User Mode Specification, Version
1.00, Final Revision 1.00 (February 24, 2012)
[TCG Opal Datastore]
TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Additional DataStore Tables,
Specification Version 1.00
NVMe and PCIe Specifications
Abbreviation Specification Name
[NVMe Base] NVM Express® Base Specification, Revision 1.3.c, May 24, 2018
[NVMe Command] NVM Express® NVM Command Set Specification, Revision 1.0, May 18, 2021
[NVMe Management]] NVM Express® Management Interface, Revision 1.1, April 29, 2019
[PCIe Base] PCI Express® Base Specification, Revision 3.0, November 10 ,2010
Corporate References
Abbreviation Specification Name
[Product
Manual]
Ultrastar® DC SN650 NVMe Solid-State Drive Product Manual,
https://www.westerndigital.com/support
[Datasheet] Ultrastar® DC SN650 Datasheet, https://www.westerndigital.com/support
Other References
Abbreviation Reference Name
[IETF] IETF RFC 2119, 1997, “Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels.”
[ISO 19790] ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology - Security techniques - Security
requirements for cryptographic modules, International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), December 2015
[OCP Datacenter]
Open Computing Project, Datacenter NVMe® SSD Specification, Version 2.0,
July 30, 2021
[OCP NVMe Cloud]
Open Compute Project, NVMe Cloud SSD Specification, Version 1.0, March 18,
2020
[PW] Calculating Password Entropy:
https://www.pleacher.com/mp/mlessons/algebra/entropy.html
[SFF-8639]
SFF-8639, SFF-TA-1001 Specification for Universal x4 Link Definition for SFF-
8639, Rev 1.1 May 28, 2018
[SFSC] Security Features for SCSI Commands, Revision 2, September 2015
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Definitions
Name Definition
Access Control Entry (ACE)
Access control entries are entries in an access control list containing
information describing the access rights related to a particular
security identifier or user.
Access Control List (ACL)
Access control list refers to the permissions attached to an object
that specify which users have access to that object and the
operations the user can perform.
Allowed
NIST approved, i.e., recommended in a NIST Special Publication, or
acceptable, i.e., no known security risk as opposed to deprecated,
restricted, and legacy use. [SP 800 131A]
Anybody A formal TCG term for an unauthenticated role. [TCG Core]
Approved mode of operation
A mode of the Cryptographic Module that employs only approved
security functions. [FIPS 140]
Approved [FIPS 140] approved or recommended in a NIST Special Publication.
Authenticate Prove the identity of an Operator or the integrity of an object.
Authentication Credential
PIN
An authentication credential (i.e., a password) associated with the
SID, Admin SP Admin1, Locking SP Admin or Locking SP User
Authority as defined in the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class
Opal, Specification [TCG Core].
Authorize Grant an authenticated Operator access to a service or an object.
Ciphertext Encrypted data transformed by an Approved security function.
Confidentiality
A cryptographic property that blocks disclosure of sensitive
information to unauthorized parties.
Credential
A formal TCG term for data used to authenticate an Operator. [TCG
Core]
Critical Security Parameter
(CSP)
Security-related information (e.g., secret, and private cryptographic
keys, and authentication data such as credentials and PINs) whose
disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a
Cryptographic Module. [FIPS 140]
Crypto Officer
An Operator performing cryptographic initialization and management
functions. [FIPS140]
Cryptographic Boundary
An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the
physical and/or logical bounds of a Cryptographic Module and
contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a
Cryptographic Module. [FIPS 140]
Cryptographic Key
A sequence of symbols that controls the operation of a cryptographic
transformation. A cryptographic transformation can include but not
limited to encipherment, decipherment, cryptographic check function
computation, signature generation, or signature verification.
Cryptographic Module
The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware used to implement
approved security functions contained within the cryptographic
boundary. [FIPS 140]
Data at Rest
User data residing on the storage device media rather than in
transition.
Discovery
A TCG method that provides the properties of the TCG device. [TCG
Opal]
Global Active Keyset (AEK)
Set defined by the 256-bit Global Active Encryption Key and the 256-
bit Global Active Signing Key
Hardware Security Module
(HSM)
A hardware security module is a physical computing device that
safeguards and manages digital keys, performs encryption and
decryption functions for digital signatures, strong authentication, and
other cryptographic functions.
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Name Definition
IF-RECV
An interface command used to retrieve security protocol data from
the TPer [TCG Core].
IF-SEND
An interface command used to transmit security protocol data to the
TPer [TCG Core].
Integrity
A cryptographic property that blocks the modification or deletion of
sensitive in an unauthorized and undetected manner.
Interface
A logical entry or exit point of a Cryptographic Module that provides
access to the Cryptographic Module for logical information flows.
[FIPS 140]
Key Derivation Function
(KDF)
An Approved cryptographic algorithm that derives one or more keys
from a secret value and other information.
Key Encrypting Key (KEK) A cryptographic key used to encrypt or decrypt other keys.
Key Management
The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other
related security parameters during the entire life cycle of the
Cryptographic Module. The handling of authentication data is
representative of a key management activity.
Key Wrap
An Approved cryptographic algorithm that uses a KEK to provide
Confidentiality and Integrity.
LBA Range
A formal term that defines a contiguous logical block range
(sequential LBAs) to store encrypted User Data; ramgess do not
overlap, and each has its own unique encryption key and other
settable properties.
Manufactured SID (MSID)
A unique default value assigned to each SED during manufacturing.
An externally visible MSID value is not required if the user can derive
the MSID from other information printed on the drive. The MSID is
readable with the TCG protocol. It is the initial and default value for
all Authentication Credentials. [TCG Core]
Method
A remote procedure call to an SP that initiates an action on the SP.
[TCG Core]
Object
An object is any row of an object table. The object type is defined by
the object table in which the object occurs. The columns of the object
table define the contents of each object in it. [TCG Core]
Object Table
Object tables provide storage for data that binds a set of methods
and access controls to that data. [TCG Core]
ObjectUID
The Unique ID (UID) of an Object. Each object table has a column
named UID. This column contains an 8-byte unique identifier for that
row. [TCG Core]
OFS file
The CM uses an OFS file to reset the Cryptographic Module’s
configuration back to its original factory setting during Revert and
RevertSP operations.
One Time Programable (OTP)
OTP memory is a special type of write once read only non-volatile
memory.
Operator
A consumer, either human or automation, of cryptographic services
that is external to the Cryptographic Module. [FIPS 140]
Personal Identification
Number (PIN)
A formal TCG term designating a string of octets used to
authenticate an identity. [TCG Core]
Plaintext Unencrypted data.
Port
A physical entry or exit point of a Cryptographic Module that. A port
provides access to the Cryptographic Module’s physical signals.
[FIPS 140]
PSID (Physical Security
Identifier)
A SED unique value printed on the Cryptographic Module’s label
used as authentication data and proof of physical presence for the
Zeroise Service.
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Name Definition
Public Security Parameters
(PSP)
Public information, that if modified can compromise the security of
the Cryptographic Module (e.g., a public key).
Read Data An external request to transfer User Data from the SED.
Reserved Area
Internal data on the storage medium within the cryptographic
boundary that is not accessible to an operator.
Root Keyset
A set of 256-bit keys that consist of the Root Encryption Key and
Root Signing Key.
SD_CA Key
Storage Device Certification Authority Key (X509v3). This key serves
as the Cryptographic Module’s Master RSA Public Key and is the
root source of verification for all other key certificates. The SD_CA
Key signs the SecureLoader. A manufacturing process injects the
SD_CA Key within the CM and stores a hash of the SD_CA Key in
OTP memory
Security Identifier (SID)
The authority that represents the TPer owner. Crypto Officer serves
in this role. [TCG Core]
Security Provider (SP)
A TCG term used to define a collection of Tables and Methods with
access control.
SED Active Keyset
A set of 256-bit keys that consists of the SED Active Encryption Key
and the SED Active Signing Key.
SED AdminSP Active Keyset
A set of 256-bit keys that consists of the SED AdminSP Active
Encryption Key and the SED AdminSP Active Signing Key.
SED Global Active Keyset
A set of 256-bit keys that consists of the Global Active Encryption
Key (AEK) and the Global Active Signing Key.
SED LockingSP Active
Keyset
A set of 256-bit keys that consists of the SED LockingSP Active
Encryption Key and the SED LockingSP Active Signing Key. The
keyset protects TCG protocol LockingSP CSPs.
SED Volatile Keyset
A set of 256-bit keys that consists of the SED Volatile Key and the
SED Volatile Signing Key.
Self-Encrypting Drive (SED)
A storage device that provides data storage services, which
automatically encrypts all user data written to the device and
automatically decrypts all user data read from the device.
Session
A formal TCG term that envelops the lifetime of an Operator’s
authentication. [TCG Core]
Small Form Factor (SFF)
Small form factor is a computer form factor designed to minimize the
volume and footprint of a desktop computer.
Storage Medium
The non-volatile, persistent storage location within a SED partitioned
into disjointed sets defined by a User Data area, and a Reserved
Area.
Table
The basic data structures within a Security Provider (SP). Object
tables store persistent SP state data defined in TCG Core
specification. [TCG Core]
TableUID
The Unique ID (UID) of a Table. Each object table has a column
named UID. This column contains an 8-byte unique identifier for that
row. [TCG Core]
TPer
A Trusted Peripheral. The TPer manages trusted storage-related
functions and data structures. [TCG Core]
TPer Owner The SID Authority (Crypto Officer) represents TPer Owner.
Triple Level Cell (TLC)
Triple level cells refer to NAND flash devices that store three bits of
information per cell, with eight total voltage states.
User Data
Data transferred from/to a SED using the NVMe Read and Write
commands.
User An Operator that consumes cryptographic services. [FIPS 140]
Write Data An external request to transfer User Data to a SED.
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Name Definition
Zeroise Invalidate a Critical Security Parameter. [FIPS 140]
Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AEK Active Encryption Key
AEN Asynchronous Event Notification
AES Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS 197)
ACE Access Control Entry
ACL Access Control List
CBC Cipher Block Chaining, an operational mode of AES
CM Cryptographic Module
CO Crypto Officer [FIPS 140]
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSP Critical Security Parameter [FIPS 140]
DEE Data Encryption Engine
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EDC Error Detection Code
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FID Flash Internal Data
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FSEC Flash Security Data
HSM Hardware Security Module
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KEK Key Encrypting Key
LBA Logical Block Address
MEK Media Encryption Key
MSID Manufactured Security Identifier
NAND Negative AND Flash Memory technology
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NOR Negative OR Flash Memory technology
OFS Original Factory Setting
OTP One Time Programable
PBKDF2 Password Base Key Derivation Function
PIN Personal Identification Number
POR Power on Reset
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Acronym Definition
PSID Physical Security Identifier
PSP Public Security Parameter
RID Reserved Area Internal Data
SAS Serial Attached SCSI
SD_CA Storage Device Certification Authority
SECD Security Data
SED Self-Encrypting Drive
SFF Small Form Factor
SID Security Identifier, The TCG authority representing the TPer Owner (Cryptographic Officer)
SIO Serial Input/Output
SOC System-on-a-Chip
SP Security Provider [TCG Core], also Security Policy [FIPS 140]
SSC Subsystem Class
SWG Storage Work Group
TCG Trusted Computing Group
TLC Triple Level Cell
UEC Universal Error Code
UID Unique Identifier
XTS A mode of AES that utilizes "Tweakable" block ciphers