Document Version 2.2 Page 1 of 11
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 Cryptographic Module
Hardware version 1.1 and 2.1
Firmware version 1.1
Icom Inc.
1-1-32, Kamiminami, Hirano-ku
Osaka 547-0003 Japan
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Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 3
1.1. PURPOSE............................................................................................................ 3
1.2. DIGITAL UNIT IMPLEMENTATION..................................................................3
1.3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY........................................................................3
1.4. LOGICAL INTERFACE AND PHYSICAL INTERFACE......................................... 4
2. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY LEVEL...............................................................................5
3. ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION....................................................5
3.1. ROLES.................................................................................................................5
3.2. SERVICES...........................................................................................................6
3.3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION.....................................................7
4. SECURE OPERATION AND RULES..................................................................... 7
4.1. SECURITY RULES...................................................................................................... 7
4.2. PHYSICAL SECURITY............................................................................................... 7
4.3. SECURE OPERATION INITIALIZATION................................................................ 7
4.4. KEY LOADING INSTRACTION…………..…………………………………..……..8
4.5. SELF TESTS…..…………………………………………………………………….....8
4.6. ENTROPY FOR DRBG...…………………………………………………………...…8
5. ACCESS CONTROL POLICY..................................................................................9
6. MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS....................................................................10
7. UT-125 FIPS #11 Block Diagram………................................................................. 11
8. UT-125 FIPS #21 Block Diagram…......................................................................... 11
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1. Introduction
This document details the security policy for the cryptographic module UT-125
FIPS #11 version 1.1 and UT-125 FIPS #21 version 2.1 implementing firmware
version 1.1, herein identified as the optional encryption unit, UT-125 FIPS #11 and
UT-125 FIPS #21 for Icom Inc. radios. This non-proprietary security policy may be
freely reproduced and distributed only in its entirety without revision.
1.1 Purpose
The secure operation of the UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 are detailed
in this document to include the requirements of FIPS 140-2 and those imposed by
Icom Inc. as applicable to the initialization, roles, and responsibilities of security
related data and components management.
1.2 Cryptographic module Implementation
The UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 are multiple-chip embedded
cryptographic modules as defined by FIPS 140-2. The UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125
FIPS #21 can be incorporated into any Icom Inc. radio which requires FIPS 140-2
level 1 cryptographic security.
1.3 Cryptographic Boundary
The UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 cryptographic boundary utilize the
entire printed circuit board as depicted in Figure 1.
#11
#21
Top Bottom
Figure 1
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1.4 Logical interfaces and physical interfaces
The logical and physical interface of UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21
cryptographic modules are detailed in Table 1.
Table 1 Ports and Interface Information on UT-125 FIPS #11 and #21
Logical Interface Port Physical Interface Description
Data Input McBSP
Interface
Clock input
Frame sync input
Data input
Data Output McBSP
Interface
Clock output
Frame sync output
Data output
Control Input McBSP
Interface
Frame sync input
Clock input
Data input
Reset signal input
Wake up signal input
Status Output McBSP
Interface
Data output
Power --- External electrical power and ground
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2. FIPS 140-2 Security Level
The UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 meet the security requirements
established in FIPS 140-2 for an overall module security of Level 1 with the
individual requirements and corresponding security levels detailed in Table 2.
Table 2 UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 Security Levels
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirement Area Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security 1
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 1
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility 1
Self Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
3. Roles, Services, and Authentication
3.1 Roles
The UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 support the roles of Crypto Officer
and User.
Crypto Officer:
Assumption of the Crypto Officer role is implied when any of the services
specific to a Crypto Officer are executed.
The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the keys and firmware of the UT-125
FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21. The management of keys, such as loading, reading
and writing, is the domain of the Crypto Officer. The main tool for key management
utilized by the Crypto Officer is an approved key loading device.
The Crypto Officer role will also manage firmware updating and checking
procedures.
User:
Assumption of the User role is implied when any of the services specific to a User
are executed.
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The User role is primarily consists of the services which conduct the encryption
and decryption of communication, invoke self tests, and indicate the status of the UT-
125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21.
3.2 Services
The security services and functions available in the UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125
FIPS #21 in conjunction with the applicable operator role for each service and
function can be found in Table 3 below.
Table 3 UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 Services and Roles
Service
Crypto
Officer
User Algorithms Used
Allowed in
FIPS mode
Show Status ○ ○ Yes
Self Test
○ ○
AES Yes
HMAC Yes
CTR_DRBG Yes
Power Off ○ ○ Yes
Power Save ○ ○ Yes
Encryption
○ ○
AES OFB Yes
DES OFB No
Decryption
○ ○
AES OFB Yes
DES OFB No
Key Load ○ Yes
Key Zeroization ○ ○ Yes
Show OTAR Status ○ ○ Yes
OTAR Management
○ ○
CTR_DRBG Yes
AES MAC Yes
FIPS 186-2 RNG No
DES MAC No
AES ECB1
Yes
DES ECB No
Firmware Update ○ HMAC Yes
System Management ○ ○ Yes
The UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 support the following approved security
functions:
 FIPS 197 AES 256-bit encryption and decryption with CBC, ECB, and
OFB modes from SP 800-38A (Cert. # 3842)
 FIPS 198-1 HMAC with SHA-1 (Cert. # 2492)
 FIPS 180-4 SHS supporting SHA-1 (Cert. # 3165)
 SP 800-90A AES_CTR DRBG with AES-256 (Cert #1087)
1
AES ECB is not an approved key wrapping method and is considered equivalent to plaintext in this
context. This is allowed as per FIPS 140-2 IG 1.23.
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The UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 also support the following non-
approved security functions:
 AES MAC (AES Cert. #3842, vendor affirmed; P25 AES OTAR)
 DES
 DES-MAC
 RNG
 AES Key Wrapping (Key Wrapping using ECB is not an Approved
method and is considered equivalent to plaintext)
3.3 Identification and Authentication
Operator identification and authentication of roles are not required or supported
by the UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21.
4. Secure Operation and Rules
This section details the security rules which should be enforced for the secure use
of the UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 and the physical security employed.
4.1 Security Rules
The security rules presented below are a combination of those required by FIPS
140-2 for Level 1 secure use and the security rules separately implemented by Icom
Inc.
FIPS 140-2 Security Rules:
The following rule is required to operate in accordance with FIPS 140-2:
Only FIPS-approved or allowed (AES MAC) cryptographic algorithms can be
used. The use of RNG, DES and DES MAC is not allowed in the FIPS approved
mode of operation.
4.2 Physical Security
The UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 are composed of production grade
components which do not require any maintenance or inspection by the user to insure
security.
4.3 Secure Operation Initialization
The UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 have algorithms that are not FIPS
140-2 approved. Therefore in order to operate the module in a secure manner, only
FIPS 140-2 approved algorithms or algorithms allowed in FIPS mode (AES MAC)
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must be used. In addition, a proper seed key value must be loaded into the module2
.
The use of RNG, DES and DES MAC is not allowed in the FIPS approved mode of
operation.
4.4 Key Loading Instructions
The crypto-officer may load keys into the module using a key loader device that
communicates to the module through a port that is exposed on the radio into which
the module is installed. Each key loaded in this manner has an associated Key ID,
which is used to associate the key with a given radio channel.
When operating in the FIPS mode of operation, the crypto-officer should only
load AES keys in this manner. DES is not allowed in FIPS mode.
4.5 Self Tests
The UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 supports both power-on self-tests
and continuous self-tests as shown below.
 Power-on self-tests:
- HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test
- Non-approved RNG Known Answer Test
- AES-256 Known Answer Test (encrypt and decrypt, ECB, OFB,
and CBC modes)
- DRBG Known Answer Test
- Firmware Integrity Test (CRC-32)
 Conditional self-tests:
- Firmware load test (HMAC-SHA1 w/ 64-byte key)
- 32-bit CRC check on Electronically Entered keys
- Continuous random number generator tests (Non-approved RNG,
DRBG)
4.6 Entropy for DRBG
The DRBG of UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 are provided with 256 bits
of entropy from outside the cryptographic boundary. This entropy is received in 16
bit chunks using the Entropy Setting command until the full 256 bits of entropy is
populated.
2
Note that when the module is installed in a compatible Icom radio, this step is performed automatically by
the radio processor without any operator intervention.
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5. Access Control Policy
Table 4 UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
Definition
Keys and CSPs Generation/Entry Methods Description
Secret Key - 256-bit AES Cryptographic Key
Traffic
Encryption Key
Traffic Encryption Key is
generated from key loader
or OTAR KMF, and
externally input plaintext or
AES-256 ECB3
encrypted
key into the module.
This is a Traffic Key, and is used for
encryption/decryption of voice traffic
through the module's host radio.
Key Encryption
Key
Key Encryption Key is
generated from key loader
or OTAR KMF, and
externally input plaintext or
AES-256 ECB3
encrypted
key into the module.
This is a Key Wrapping Key, and is
used for encryption/decryption of
other cryptographic Key in OTAR
mode.
Warm Start Key Warm Start Key is
generated from OTAR
KMF, and externally input
plaintext or AES-256 ECB3
encrypted key into the
module.
Warm Start Key is used by OTAR,
and initiated from OTAR KMF.
Reverse Warm
Start Key
Reverse Warm Start Key is
generated by the module
using the approved
CTR_DRBG.
Reverse Warm Start Key is used by
OTAR, and initiated from OTAR.
HMAC Key This Key is hard-coded into
the module.
64-byte key used as part of module's
HMAC-SHA-1 firmware-load test.
CTR_DRBG
V counter
CTR_DRBG V counter is
derived as part of the
CTR_DRBG algorithm.
128bit V counter used by
CTR_DRBG algorithm.
CTR_DRBG
Key
CTR_DRBG Key is derived
as part of the CTR_DRBG
algorithm.
256bit Key used by CTR_DRBG
algorithm.
Entropy Input Entropy Input is externally
input into the module in
plaintext.
256bit Entropy input supplied from
outside of cryptographic boundary,
used by CTR_DRBG algorithm.
CTR_DRBG
Seed
CTR_DRBG Seed is derived
as part of the CTR_DRBG
algorithm
384bit seed used by the CTR_DRBG
algorithm.
3
AES-256 ECB is not an approved key wrapping method and is considered equivalent to plaintext in this
context. This is allowed as per FIPS 140-2 IG 1.23.
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Table 5 UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 Services, Keys, and Access
Service Cryptographic Keys and CSPs Type(s) of Access
Show Status - -
Self-Test - -
Power-Off - -
Power Save - -
Encryption Any Secret Key4
U
Decryption Any Secret Key U
Key Load Any Secret Key E, W
Key Zeroization Any Secret Key E
Show OTAR Status - -
OTAR Management Any Secret Key E, U, R, W
CTR_DRBG V counter, CTR_DRBG
Key, and CTR_DRBG Seed
E, U, R, W
Entropy Input U, W
Firmware Update HMAC Key U
System Management HMAC Key E
In Table 5 above the following key should be used:
E = Erase
R = Read (Encrypted Key)
U = Use
W = Write
Where each of the above references the type of access the service has to the listed
keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSP) on Table 5.
6. Mitigation of Other Attacks
The UT-125 FIPS #11 and UT-125 FIPS #21 have not been designed to mitigate
attacks outside of those required within the FIPS 140-2 document.
4
Any Secret Key refers to the four “sub-keys” identified in Table 5 (Traffic Encryption Key, Key
Encryption Key, Warm Start Key, and Reverse Warm Start Key)
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７．UT-125 FIPS #11 Block Diagram
８．UT-125 FIPS #21 Block Diagram