

Avaya WLAN 9100 Access Points

Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Document *Version 1.2*

Avaya Inc.

July 29, 2015

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References and Definitions

The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.

Table 1 – References

Abbreviation	Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2]	<i>Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001</i>
[SP800-131A]	<i>Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, January 2011</i>

Table 2 – Acronyms and Definitions

Acronym	Definition
CLI	Command line interface.
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IP	Internet Protocol
RFC	Request for Comment; IETF RFCs are the public internet standards followed for TLS, SSH and numerous other protocols.
WMI	Web management interface.

1 Introduction

The Avaya WLAN 9100 Access Points (hereafter denoted the Module) are multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules used for secure wireless IP networking.

Table 3 lists all configurations of the Module. All configurations use the same general design and firmware, but are packaged in two form factors as shown in Figure 1 below. All of the Avaya Wi-Fi models, with the exception of the WAO912200-E6GS, must be secured in the WAB910003-E6 enclosure. All of the modules run either version of firmware and enter FIPS approved mode identically. Functionally the units have different numbers and types of radio modules.

NOTE: Each configuration includes all necessary tamper-evident seals. Replacement seals can be ordered using SKU WLB910001-E6.

Table 3 - Part Numbers

Model/SKU	Enclosure (Form Factor)	Firmware	Distinguishing Features
WAO912200-E6GS	WAO912200-E6GS	AOS-7.1; AOS-7.2.6	-2 main PCB, 2 radio, 2x2 stream
WAP913200-E6GS	WAB910003-E6	AOS-7.1; AOS-7.2.6	-2 main PCB, 2 radio, 2x2 stream
WAP913300-E6GS	WAB910003-E6	AOS-7.1; AOS-7.2.6	-2 main PCB, 2 radio, 3x3 stream
WAP917300-E6GS	WAB910003-E6	AOS-7.1; AOS-7.2.6	-4 main PCB, 4 radio, 3x3 stream
SKU WLB910001-E6	WAO912200-E6GS or WAB910003-E6	N/A	Replacement Tamper-evident seals

The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:

Table 4 – Security Level of Security Requirements

Security Requirement	Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
Finite State Model	2
Physical Security	2
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	2
EMI/EMC	2
Self-Tests	2
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A


1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary

The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1. The cryptographic boundary of the Module is defined as the entire physical enclosure. The Module does not rely on external input/output devices.

Figure 1 – Module Packaging



WAB910003-E6 Enclosure (bottom)



WAB910003-E6 Enclosure (top, connector port)



WAO912200-E6GS (top)



WAO912200-E6GS (bottom, connectors)

Table 5 – Ports and Interfaces

Port	Model (Qty)	Logical Interface Type
Gigabit Ethernet POE	WAO912200-E6GS (1); WAP913200-E6GS (1); WAP913300-E6GS (1); WAP917300-E6GS (1)	Power, Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
RS-232 Serial	WAP917300-E6GS (1)	Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Radio RF	WAO912200-E6GS (2); WAP913200-E6GS (2); WAP913300-E6GS (2); WAP917300-E6GS (4)	Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out

1.2 Modes of Operation

The Module may be configured in a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode of operation or a non-Approved mode of operation. The procedure in Sections 9 and 10 lists simple steps that must be followed exactly to configure the module for compliance to FIPS 140-2, Level 2. The procedure includes physical actions, and parameters that must be set in Web Management Interface (WMI) windows in the Security section and in other sections.

The non-Approved mode is a superset of the Approved mode; the following functionality is disabled in the Approved mode:

- SNMP v1, v2, and v3
- SSHv1, Telnet, FTP, TFTP, HTTP
- SSL 2.0 and 3.0
- RADIUS (internal or external)
- WEP, WPA (TKIP or EAP)
- Entry of PSK as passphrase (the firmware requires entry of the complete 64-character hex value for the pre-shared key in the Approved mode).
- All non-Approved ciphers or ciphersuites: blowfish, Camellia, CAST, IDEA, RC4, SEED, MD5 (except in TLS KDF and for storage of passwords).

MD5 is used in the Approved mode only for TLS and obfuscation of stored parameters, with no security claim for these usages.

2 Cryptographic Functionality

The Module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in the tables below. Table 8 lists the high level protocols implemented by the Module.

Table 6 – Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions

Algorithm	Description	Cert #
AES 1	[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38C] 128-bit ECB mode encryption, 128-bit CCM encryption and decryption.	2450
AES 2	[FIPS 197, SP 800-38A] 128-bit and 256-bit CBC encryption and decryption.	2833
DRBG	[SP 800-90A] Hash_DRBG (SHA-256).	490
HMAC	[FIPS 198-1] HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256 generation and verification.	1774
KDF TLS	[SP 800-135] TLS v1.0/1.1 and v1.2 KDF	257 (CVL)
KDF SSHv2	[SP 800-135] SSHv2 KDF	258 (CVL)
KDF 802.11i	[IG 7.2, IG 7.10, SP 800-108] 802.11i HMAC-SHA-1 shared key derivation.	24 (KDF)
RSA	[FIPS 186-4] key pair generation, PKCS1.5 signature generation, and signature verification using only RSA-2048.	1475
SHA	[FIPS 180-4] Signature generation and verification (SHA-256); non-Digital Signature Applications (SHA-1, SHA-256).	2374
Triple-DES	[SP 800-20] 3-key TCBC mode encryption and decryption.	1693

Note: The TLS and SSHv2 protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

Table 7 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions

Algorithm	Description
Non-SP 800-56A Compliant DH	[IG D.8] Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength)
Non-SP 800-56B Compliant RSA Key Transport	[IG D.9] RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength).
MD5 within TLS	[IG D.2] MD5 usage in TLS KDF, and for obfuscation of stored passwords.
NDRNG	[Annex C] Hardware Non-Deterministic RNG; 64 bits per access, used to seed the FIPS Approved DRBG.

Table 8 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode

Protocol/KDF	RFC String
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.0/1.1	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
TLSv1.2	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLSv1.2	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLSv1.2	TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLSv1.2	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLSv1.2	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
TLSv1.2	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
SSHv2	diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
SSHv2	ssh-rsa
SSHv2	3des-cbc; aes128-cbc; aes256-cbc
SSHv2	hmac-sha1

SSHv2 and TLS v1.0/v1.1/v1.2 usage are in accordance with IG D.8 and SP 800-135.

In the RFC strings in the table above, the following shorthand is used by the IETF TLS and SSH RFCs:

DH: Diffie-Hellman.

diffie-hellman-group-14-sha1: Diffie-Hellman using $p = 2048$ (this implementation uses $q = 1024$).

ECDH: Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman.

ECDHE: Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman, ephemeral.

3DES: 3-Key Triple-DES; 3des-cbc: 3-Key Triple-DES in CBC mode.

PSK: Pre-shared Key.

SHA: in TLS RFC strings, HMAC-SHA-1 integrity.

SHA256: in TLS RFC strings, corresponds to HMAC-SHA-256 integrity.

ssh-rsa: in SSH strings, RSA public key authentication (this implementation uses 2048-bit RSA only).

hmac-sha1: in SSH strings, HMAC-SHA1 integrity.

aes128-cbc: in SSH strings, AES-128 in CBC mode

aes256-cbc: in SSH strings, AES-256 in CBC mode

2.1 Critical Security Parameters

All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. Refer also to Table 15 (CSP Access Rights within Services).

Table 9 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

CSP	Description / Usage
CO-PW	<u>Crypto Officer Password</u> : 5 (min) to 50 (max) ASCII printable characters, for CO authentication.
DRBG-S	<u>DRBG State</u> : SP 800-90A Hash_DRBG state (V, C).
FW-IK	<u>Firmware Integrity Key</u> : HMAC key for HMAC-SHA-1 power-on firmware integrity test.
SSH-SK	<u>SSH2 Session Keys</u> : AES-128, AES-256 or 3-Key Triple-DES key and HMAC key for SSH2.
SSH-SS	<u>SSH2 Shared Secret</u> : Secret value used to derive SSH2 Session keys.
SSH-KEX-PRI	<u>SSH2 Key Exchange Private Key</u> : Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman 2048 private key for SSH2 key exchange.
SSH-AUTH-PRI	<u>SSH2 Authentication Private Key</u> : RSA 2048 private key for SSH authentication.
TLS-SK	<u>TLS Session Keys</u> : AES-128, AES-256, or 3-Key Triple-DES keys and HMAC keys for https.
TLS-SS	<u>TLS shared Secret</u> : Secret value used to derive TLS Session keys.
TLS-KEX-PRI	<u>TLS Key Exchange Private Key</u> : Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman 2048, RSA 2048 or EC P-256 private key for TLS key exchange.
TLS-AUTH-PRI	<u>TLS Authentication Private Key</u> : RSA 2048 private key used to decrypt TLS Pre-Master Secret.
WL-DSK	<u>Wireless Derived AES Session Key</u> : AES-128 802.11i session encryption/decryption key.
WL-PSK	<u>Wireless Pre-Shared Key</u> : 256 bit secret value used for KDF 802.11i derivation of DSK.

2.2 Public Keys

Table 10 – Public Keys

Key	Description / Usage
SSH2-KEX-PUB	<u>SSH2 Key Exchange Public Key</u> : Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman 2048 public key for SSH key exchange.
SSH2-AUTH-PUB	<u>SSH2 Authentication Public Key</u> : Diffie-Hellman 2048 public key provided to clients for SSH authentication.
TLS-KEX-PUB	<u>TLS Key Exchange Public Key</u> : Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman 2048, RSA 2048 or EC P-256 public keys for TLS key exchange.
TLS-AUTH-PUB	<u>TLS Authentication Public Key</u> : RSA 2048 public key provided to clients for TLS host authentication.

3 Roles, Authentication and Services

3.1 Assumption of Roles

The cryptographic module supports two distinct operator roles (User and Crypto Officer). Operators authenticated to the Crypto Officer role manage the module via the serial command line interface (CLI) or web management interface (WMI). The User role corresponds to operators using the Module for wireless client traffic. Authentication of operators to roles is cleared when power is removed or the module is rebooted. The module supports multiple concurrent Users and Crypto Officers.

Table 11 – Roles Description

ID	Role	Authentication Method
CO	Crypto Officer	Identity-based operator authentication using username and password.
User	User	Role-based operator authentication using an 802-11i pre-shared key.

3.2 Authentication Methods

Table 12 - Authentication Methods

Authentication Method	Probability of false authentication (1.0E-06 required)	Probability of false authentication in a one-minute period (1.0E-05 required)
Passphrase verification	Minimum length: 5 characters Character set: ASCII printable (94) $1/(94^5) = 1.4E-10$	The communications rate imposes an upper limit of authentication attempts to 60,000 attempts/minute (1000 per second). $60,000/(94^5)=8.2E-6$
802.11i Auth	Authentication of 128 bit secret during 802.11i handshake. $1/(2^{128}) = 2.9E-39$	The communications rate imposes an upper limit of authentication attempts to 60,000 attempts/minute (1000 per second). $60,000/(2^{128}) = 1.8E-34$

3.3 Services

All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below. Each service description also describes all usage of CSPs by the service.

Note: All services are available in both the Approved and non-Approved modes of operation.

Table 13 – Unauthenticated Services

Service	Description
Local reset	Power cycle the Module. Invokes power-up self-tests.

Table 14 – Authenticated Services

Service	Description	CO	U
Configure	Configure device parameters, non-security relevant: routing, radio function, etc.	X	
Configure security	Configure TLS, SSH, 802.11 and operator accounts.	X	
Connect (802.11i)	Establish and use a 802.11i connection used for wireless traffic.		X
Connect (TLS)	Establish and use a TLS connection used for the WMI, inclusive of authentication (login) process completion.	X	
Connect (SSH)	Establish SSH secure channel for the CLI, inclusive of authentication (login) process completion.	X	
Factory Reset	Factory Reset destroys all Module's CSPs, except the FW-IK. This service is equivalent to the FIPS 140-2 required <i>Zeroize</i> service	X	
Remote reset	Trigger a reset remotely. Invokes power-up self-tests.	X	
Show status	Show status and configuration information.	X	
Update firmware	Load and manage a new firmware image. Overwrites FW-IK.	X	
Wireless traffic	802.11 network communications by end User.		X

Note: CSPs are not output from the module.

Table 15 defines the relationship between access to CSPs and the different module services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:

- G = Generate: The service generates the CSP.
- E = Execute: The service uses the CSP.
- W = Write: The CSP is entered or established into the Module by the service.
- Z = Zeroize: The CSP is destroyed by the service.
- -- = The service does not access the CSP.

Note: CSPs are not output from the module.

Table 15 – CSP Access Rights within Services

Service	CSPs												
	CO-PW	DRBG-S	FW-IK	SSH-SK	SSH-SS	SSH-KEX-PRI	SSH-AUTH-PRI	TLS-SK	TLS-SS	TLS-KEX-PRI	TLS-AUTH-PRI	WL-DSK	WL-PSK
Configure	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Configure security	W	--	--	E	--	--	GZ	--	--	--	GZ	--	W
Connect (802.11i)	--	W	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	GE	E
Connect (TLS)	E	W	--	E	--	--	--	GE	GE	GE	E	--	--
Connect (SSH)	E	W	--	GE	GE	GE	E	E	--	--	--	--	--
Factory Reset	Z	Z	--	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
Show status	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Reset (Local or Remote)	--	Z	--	Z	Z	Z	--	Z	Z	--	--	Z	--
Update firmware	--	--	EWZ	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Wireless traffic	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	E	--

4 Self-tests

Each time the Module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self-tests are available on demand by power cycling the module.

On power up or reset, the Module performs the self-tests described in Table 16 below. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module.

If one of the KATs fails, the Module enters the Auto_Recovery error state.

The operator is notified of a power-up or conditional self-test failure by an error message on active SSH sessions, an active console session, and an error log.

Table 16 – Power Up Self-tests

Test Target	Description
Firmware Integrity	HMAC-SHA-1 (tests embedded SHA-1).
AES 1	Separate authenticated encrypted and authenticated decrypt AES CCM KATs using AES-128, inclusive of underlying AES encrypt
AES 2	Separate encrypt and decrypt KATs using a 128-bit key in ECB mode.
DRBG	Hash_DRBG KAT using SHA-256.
RSA	Separate generate and verify KATs using 2048-bit key pair and SHA-256.
HMAC-SHA-256	HMAC-SHA-256 KAT (tests embedded SHA-256).
Triple-DES	Separate encrypt and decrypt KATs using TECEB 3-Key.

Table 17 – Conditional Self-tests

Test Target	Description
NDRNG	The AS.09.42 Continuous Random Number Test is performed each time a random value is requested from the NDRNG.
DRBG	The AS.09.42 Continuous Random Number Test is performed each time a random value is requested from the DRBG.
RSA PCT	RSA Pairwise Consistency Test performed on every RSA key pair generation.
Firmware Load	HMAC-SHA-1 signature verification performed on firmware load.

5 Physical Security Policy

The multi-chip standalone cryptographic module includes the following physical security mechanisms:

- Production-grade components and production-grade opaque enclosure
- Tamper evident seals. The tamper evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. (Refer to Section 10 for installation instructions.)

The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the following:

- Controlling any unused tamper evident seals.
- Controlling and observing changes to the module (e.g., reconfigurations) where the seals are removed or installed.
- Periodically inspecting the tamper evident seals.

The Crypto Officer is responsible for proper deployment and inspection of all Security Labels within the FIPS network. Additional Security Labels may be ordered from Avaya using SKU WLB910001-E6. Security Labels should be inspected for signs of tampering which may include tears, cuts, speckling, curling, rips, and/or wrinkles. Peeled labels will clearly display a stipple pattern over the face of the label. The Crypto Officer should consider any unit displaying signs of tampering to be compromised and should immediately take it out of service. The compromised unit should not be redeployed into the network under any circumstances. If a replacement unit is needed only brand new Avaya product should be used.

6 Operational Environment

The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions. The Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.

7 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The module has not been designed to mitigate attacks that are outside of the scope of FIPS 140-2.

8 Security Rules and Guidance

The Module design corresponds to the Module security rules. This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 2 module.

1. When the Module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic services.
2. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
3. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
4. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
5. The module does not support manual key entry.
6. The module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
7. The module does not output intermediate key values.

9 Approved Mode Configuration Instructions

9.1 Configuring the Module to operate in the FIPS 140-2 Approved mode using the WMI

To implement FIPS 140-2, Level 2 using WMI:

1. Enable HTTPS using the CLI if it is not already enabled, using the following command:

```
Avaya-AP(config)# https on
```

This allows the Web Management Interface to be used for the rest of this procedure. HTTPS is enabled on the Module by default.

2. Select the Management Control from the Security window.




Figure 10 – Security Management Control Window

3. Set FIPS 140-2, Level 2 Security to On (Figure 10). Click to accept any warnings about the FIPS settings.
4. The Module will automatically save the new configuration and reboot. Once rebooted, FIPS mode will be ON.

9.2 Configuring the Module to operate in the FIPS 140-2 Approved mode using the CLI

1. The following CLI command will perform all of the settings required to put the Module in FIPS mode:

```
Avaya-AP (config-mgmt)# fips on
```

This command saves the current FIPS-related attribute values. They will be restored if you use the **fips off** command.

2. A prompt will appear indicating that FIPS mode is about to be enabled. Type 'yes' to confirm. The FIPS-related attributes will be automatically configured and saved.
3. The Module will automatically reboot and will be configured for FIPS operation upon completion.
4. Use the **fips off** command if you would like to revert the FIPS settings back to the values they had before you entered the **fips on** command.

```
Avaya-AP (config-mgmt)# fips off
```

9.3 Determining if the Module is in the FIPS 140-2 Approved mode of operation

You may determine whether or not the Module is running in FIPS mode by verifying that the settings described in the previous procedures are in effect.

10 Tamper Seal Installation

The tamper-evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation.


The Crypto-Officer role is responsible for controlling any unused seals and for controlling/observing the installation, removal, and replacement of the seals (as applicable).

NOTE: If necessary, replacement tamper seals may be ordered using SKU WLB910001-E6.

10.1 Tamper seals on the WAO912200-E6GS

The tamper seals are pre-installed on the WAO912200-E6GS modules at the factory, in the locations shown below. To apply replacement seals, follow the steps below.

1. Using alcohol-based cleaning pads, clean the surface area of any grease, dirt, oil, or adhesive.
2. Apply the two seals, one on either side of the module about 180° apart from each other, wrapping over the side as indicated in the figures below.




Tamper seals on WAO912200-E6GS (2x)




Tamper seal wrapping over the side of the module

10.2 Applying tamper seals to the WAB910003-E6 Enclosure

1. The WAB910003-E6 enclosure is used for the WAP913200-E6GS; WAP913300-E6GS, and WAP917300-E6GS.
2. Mount the Array or AP in the WAB910003-E6 square enclosure according to mounting instructions.
3. Close and lock the enclosure.
4. Using alcohol-based cleaning pads, clean the surface area of any grease, dirt, or oil.
5. Apply four seals, each near the middle of the straight edge of each side of the enclosure and straddling the slight gap between the metal backing and the plastic cover as illustrated below.



Module mounted in WAB910003-E6 enclosure



Tamper seals on WAB91003-E6 enclosure (4x)



Tamper seal applied over small gap between metal backing and plastic cover