Cisco Firepower 4100 and Cisco Firepower 9300 Series
FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Documentation Version 0.9
January 7, 2021
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 3
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 3
1.3 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 3
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 4
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 4
2 CISCO FIREPOWER 4100 AND 9300 SERIES OVERVIEW......................................... 5
2.1 CISCO FX-OS CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE .......................................................................... 6
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE CHARACTERISTICS ................................................................... 6
2.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY............................................................................................. 6
2.4 MODULE INTERFACES......................................................................................................... 7
4100 Series Front................................................................................................................................................................. 8
4100 Series Rear.................................................................................................................................................................. 9
9300 Series Front................................................................................................................................................................. 9
9300 Series Rear................................................................................................................................................................ 10
2.5 ROLES AND SERVICES....................................................................................................... 10
2.6 USER SERVICES ................................................................................................................ 11
2.7 CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES.............................................................................................. 12
2.8 NON-FIPS MODE SERVICES .............................................................................................. 13
2.9 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES ......................................................................................... 14
2.10 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.......................................................................................... 14
2.11 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY/CSP MANAGEMENT...................................................................... 14
2.12 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................ 19
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ................................................................................................................................ 19
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode ................................................................................................. 20
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 21
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms from Embedded Module ........................................................................................ 21
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode from Embedded Module.......................................................... 22
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms from Embedded Module ................................................................................ 22
2.13 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 23
2.14 PHYSICAL SECURITY......................................................................................................... 24
Opacity Shield installation................................................................................................................................................. 24
Tamper Evidence Label (TEL) Placement......................................................................................................................... 26
Appling Tamper Evidence Labels ..................................................................................................................................... 33
3 SECURE OPERATION ...................................................................................................... 33
3.1 CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE - SYSTEM INITIALIZATION .................................................. 33
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is the non-proprietary Security Policy for Cisco Firepower 4100 and Cisco Firepower 9300
Series running firmware version 2.6. This security policy describes how this module meets the
security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2 and how to run the module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of
operation. This Security Policy may be freely distributed.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program
is available on the NIST website at https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-
validation-program.
1.2 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 2
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 2
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 2
Table 1 Module Validation Level
1.3 References
This document deals with the specification of the security rules listed in Table 1 above, under
which the Cisco Firepower 4100 and Cisco Firepower 9300 Series will operate, including the
rules derived from the requirements of FIPS 140-2, FIPS 140-2 IG and additional rules imposed
by Cisco Systems, Inc. More information is available on the module from the following sources:
The Cisco Systems website contains information on the full line of Cisco Systems security.
Please refer to the following website:
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/index.html
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/fxos/roadmap/fxos-roadmap.html
For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco
Systems website at www.cisco.com.
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The NIST Validated Modules website (https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-
validation-program/validated-modules) contains contact information for answers to technical or
sales-related questions for the module.
1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco Firepower 4100 and Cisco Firepower 9300 Series identified are
referred to as Cisco FX-OS Cryptographic Module, FX-OS, Module
or the System.
1.5 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the Cisco FX-OS Cryptographic Module identified
above and explains the secure layout, configuration and operation. This introduction section is
followed by Section 2, which details the general features and functionality of the appliances.
Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation
Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 5
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2 Cisco Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series Overview
The Cisco Firepower 4100 security appliance is a standalone modular security services platform
with a one RU form factor. It is capable of running multiple security services simultaneously and
so is targeted at the data center as a multi-service platform. It comprises a front-end “Management
IO” (MIO) function and one Security Service card with x86 CPU complex. The MIO cards are
the central place for all customer and management traffic as well as inter-card communications.
Image 1 Firepower 4110, 4115, 4120, 4125, 4140, 4145 and 4150
The 4100 Series has dual multi-core processors, dual AC power supply modules, one 200 to 400-
GB SSD, and 64 to 256-GB of DDR4 RAM depending on the model.
Cisco Firepower 4100 Security Appliance includes:
• FPR4110-NGFW-K9
• FPR4115-NGFW-K9
• FPR4120-NGFW-K9
• FPR4125-NGFW-K9
• FPR4140-NGFW-K9
• FPR4145-NGFW-K9
• FPR4150-NGFW-K9
The Cisco Firepower 9300 security appliance is a next generation network and content security
platform. Its modular standalone chassis offers high-performance and flexible I/O options that
enables it to run multiple security services simultaneously. The Firepower 9300 security
appliance contains a supervisor management I/O card called the Firepower 9300 Supervisor. The
Supervisor provides chassis management.
Image 2 Firepower 9300
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Cisco Firepower 9300 Security Appliance with High Performance Security Module (SM)
• FPR9K-Sup (SM-24)
• FPR9K-Sup (SM-36)
• FPR9K-Sup (SM-40)
• FPR9K-Sup (SM-44)
• FPR9K-Sup (SM-48)
• FPR9K-Sup (SM-56)
The Cisco Firepower 4100 and Cisco Firepower 9300 Series, when deployed as next-generation
firewall (NGFW) appliances, use FX-OS Cryptographic Module and the embedded Cisco®
Adaptive Security Appliance Cryptographic Module (ASA-CM). The ASA-CM has been
certified with FIPS 140-2 Cert. #3789. Thus, the sections throughout this SP detail the FIPS
compliance of FX-OS.
2.1 Cisco FX-OS Cryptographic Module
The Firepower eXtensible Operating System (FX-OS) provides a web interface that makes it
easy to configure platform settings and interfaces, provision devices, and monitor system status.
The management I/O card found in both the 4100 and 9300 units runs the Cisco Firepower
eXtensible Operating System (FX-OS) version 2.6, a next-generation network and content
security solutions. The FX-OS is part of the Cisco Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI)
Security Solution and provides an agile, open, built for scalability, consistent control, and
simplified management. The FX-OS provides the following features:
• Modular chassis-based security system—provides high performance, flexible
input/output configurations, and scalability.
• Firepower Chassis Manager—graphical user interface provides streamlined, visual
representation of current chassis status and simplified configuration of chassis features.
• FX-OS CLI—provides command-based interface for configuring features, monitoring
chassis status, and accessing advanced troubleshooting features.
• FX-OS REST API—allows users to programmatically configure and manage their
chassis.
2.2 Cryptographic Module Characteristics
The Cisco FX-OS Cryptographic Module is contained on the Management I/O (MIO) card in the
4100 and 9300 Series appliances. This Cryptographic Module contains the crypto services for
SSHv2, SNMPv3, HTTPS/TLSv1.2 and StrongSwan (IPSec/IKEv2).
2.3 Cryptographic Boundary
The module is a hardware, multi-chip standalone crypto module. The cryptographic boundary is
defined as the 4100/9300 series chassis unit encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right,"
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“rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case (the red dashed area surround the black box representing
the module’s physical perimeter). In the diagram 1, the Management I/O card (inside the blue
rectangle) is the hardware platform executing FX-OS cryptographic module, and the FIPS 140-2
validated, embedded ASA blade (the red rectangle) executes the ASA-CM’s firmware.
Diagram 1 Block Diagram
2.4 Module Interfaces
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The module provided
no power to external devices and takes in its power through normal power input/cord. The
logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following table:
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface 4100 and 9300 Physical Interfaces
Data Input MGMT Port
Console port
SFP/SFP+ Ethernet and/or RJ-45 GigE Ports
Data Output MGMT Port
Console port
SFP/SFP+ Ethernet and/or RJ-45 GigE Ports
Control Input MGMT Port
Mgmt Port Console
ASDM over
SFP
Data via
SFP
4100/9300 chassis
PCI
Port
PCI
Port
Management I/O
(MIO)
ASA
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Console port
SFP/SFP+ Ethernet and/or RJ-45 GigE Ports
Status Output MGMT Port
Console port
SFP/SFP+ Ethernet and/or RJ-45 GigE Ports
LEDs
Table 2 Hardware/Physical Boundary Interfaces
Note: Each module has a USB port, but it is considered to be disabled once the Crypto-Officer
has applied the TEL label.
4100 Series Front
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4100 Series Rear
9300 Series Front
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9300 Series Rear
In addition, for details of the Cryptographic Boundary and the associated physical/logical
interfaces of the embedded Cisco ASA Cryptographic Module (ASA-CM), please refer to the
corresponding Security Policy for more information. The ASA-CM module has been certified
with FIPS 140-2 Cert. #3789.
2.5 Roles and Services
The appliances can be accessed in one of the following ways:
• SSHv2
• HTTPS/TLSv1.2
• IPSec/IKEv2
• SNMPv3
Authentication is identity-based. As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles that operators
may assume: a Crypto Officer role and User role. The module upon initial access to the module
authenticates both of these roles. The module also supports RADIUS and TACACS+ as another
means of authentication, allowing the storage of usernames and passwords on an external server
as opposed to using the module’s internal database for storage.
The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all other shared secrets must each be at least eight
(8) characters long, including at least one six (6) alphabetic characters, (1) integer number and
one (1) special character in length (enforced procedurally). See the Secure Operation section for
more information. Given these restrictions, the probability of randomly guessing the correct
sequence is one (1) in 6,326,595,092,480 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the
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typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic
characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total). The
calculation should be 52x52x52x52x52x52x32x10 = 6,326,595,092,480. Therefore, the
associated probability of a successful random attempt is approximately 1 in 6,326,595,092,480,
which is less than the 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
In addition, for multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a one-minute
period, under the optimal modern network condition, if an attacker would only get 60,000
guesses per minute. Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random attempt during
a one-minute period is 60,000/ 6,326,595,092,480 = 1/105,443,251, which is less than 1 in
100,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
Additionally, when using RSA based authentication, RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048
bits, thus providing 112 bits of strength, which means an attacker would have a 1 in 2^112
chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chances
required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key
guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.65x10^31 (2^112
/60 = 8.65 x 10^31) attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the
module to support.
2.6 User Services
A User enters the system by either SSHv2 or HTTPS/TLSv1.2. The User role can be
authenticated via either Username/Password or RSA based authentication method. The module
prompts the User for username and password. If the password is correct, the User is allowed
entry to the module management functionality. The other means of accessing the console is via
an IPSec/IKEv2 session. This session is authenticated either using a shared secret or RSA digital
signature authentication mechanism. The services available to the User role accessing the CSPs,
the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the
CSPs are listed below:
Services Description Keys and CSPs Access
Status Functions View the module configuration, routing tables,
active sessions health, and view physical interface
status.
N/A
Terminal Functions Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal,
adjust flow control).
N/A
Directory Services Display directory of files kept in flash memory. N/A
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand. N/A
IPSec VPN Negotiation and encrypted data transport via IPSec
VPN.
Operator password, Diffie-Hellman private key, Diffie-
Hellman public key, Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret, EC
Diffie-Hellman private key, EC Diffie-Hellman public
key, EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret, skeyid,
skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE session encrypt key, IKE
session authentication key, ISAKMP preshared, IKE
authentication private Key, IKE authentication public
key, IPSec encryption key, IPSec authentication key,
DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V and DRBG
key (r, w, d)
SSHv2 Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via
SSHv2.
Operator password, Diffie-Hellman private key, Diffie-
Hellman public key, Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret, EC
Diffie-Hellman private key, EC Diffie-Hellman public
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Services Description Keys and CSPs Access
key, EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret, SSH Traffic
Keys, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V and
DRBG key (r, w, d)
HTTPS Functions
(TLSv1.2)
Negotiation and encrypted data transport via
HTTPS/TLSv1.2.
Operator password, DRBG entropy input, DRBG Seed,
DRBG V, DRBG Key, TLS RSA private key, TLS RSA
public key, TLS pre-master secret and TLS encryption
keys and TLS Integrity Key (r, w, d)
Table 3 User Services
2.7 Crypto Officer Services
A Crypto Officer (CO) enters the system by accessing SSH v2 or HTTPS/TLSv1.2. The CO role
can be authenticated via either Username/Password or RSA based authentication method. The
other means of accessing the console is via an IPSec/IKEv2 session. This session is authenticated
either using a shared secret or RSA digital signature authentication mechanism. A Crypto Officer
may assign permission to access the Crypto Officer role to additional accounts, thereby creating
additional Crypto Officers.
The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration of the module. The services available
to the Crypto Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and
zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:
Services Description Keys and CSPs Access
Configure the Security Define network interfaces and settings, create
command aliases, set the protocols the appliance will
support, enable interfaces and network services, set
system date and time, and load authentication
information.
ISAKMP preshared, Diffie-Hellman private key, Diffie-Hellman
public key, Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret, EC Diffie-Hellman
private key, EC Diffie-Hellman public key, EC Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret, Operator password, Enable password, IKE session
encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, IKE authentication
private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPSec encryption key,
IPSec authentication key (r, w, d)
Firmware integrity Execute firmware integrity verification Integrity test key (r, w, d)
RADIUS / TACACS+
functions
Provide entry of shared secret CSP RADIUS secret, TACACS+ secret (r, w, d)
Define Rules and Filters Create packet Filters that are applied to User data
streams on each interface. Each Filter consists of a set
of Rules, which define a set of packets to permit or
deny based on characteristics such as protocol ID,
addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or
packet direction.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
View Status Functions View the appliance configuration, routing tables,
active sessions health, temperature, memory status,
voltage, packet statistics, review accounting logs, and
view physical interface status.
N/A
HTTPS/TLS (TLSv1.2) Configure HTTPS/TLS parameters, provide entry and
output of CSPs.
DRBG entropy input, DRBG Seed, DRBG V, DRBG Key, TLS
RSA private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS pre-master secret, TLS
master secret, TLS encryption keys and TLS integrity key (r, w, d)
IPSec VPN Functions Configure IPSec VPN parameters, provide entry and
output of CSPs.
ISAKMP preshared, Diffie-Hellman private key, Diffie-Hellman
public key, Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret, EC Diffie-Hellman
private key, EC Diffie-Hellman public key, EC Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret, skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE session encrypt
key, IKE session authentication key, IKE authentication private
Key, IKE authentication public key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG
Seed, DRBG V, DRBG Key, IPSec encryption key, IPSec
authentication key (r, w, d)
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SSHv2 Functions Configure SSHv2 parameter, provide entry and
output of CSPs.
Diffie-Hellman private key, Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-
Hellman Shared Secret, EC Diffie-Hellman private key, EC Diffie-
Hellman public key, EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret, SSHv2
Private Key, SSHv2 Public Key, SSHv2 integrity key, SSHv2
session key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG Seed, DRBG V and
DRBG Key (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand. N/A
User services The Crypto Officer has access to all User services. Operator password (r, w, d)
SNMPv3 Functions Configure SNMPv3 MIB and monitor status. SNMPv3 Password, SNMPv3 engineID, SNMP session key (r, w, d)
Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys/CSPs by running the
zeroization methods classified in table 6, Zeroization
column.
All CSPs (d)
Table 4 Crypto Officer Services
2.8 Non-FIPS mode Services
The cryptographic module in addition to the above listed FIPS mode of operation can operate in
a non-FIPS mode of operation. This is not a recommended operational mode but because the
associated RFC’s for the following protocols allow for non-approved algorithms and non-
approved key sizes a non-approved mode of operation exist. So those services listed above with
their FIPS approved algorithms in addition to the following services with their non-approved
algorithms and non-approved keys sizes are available to the User and the Crypto Officer. Prior
to using any of the Non-Approved services in Section 2.8, the Crypto Officer must zeroize all
CSPs which places the module into the non-FIPS mode of operation.
Services 1
Non-Approved Algorithms
SSH
Hashing: MD5,
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
IPSec
Hashing: MD5,
MACing: MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: RSA (key transport), Diffie-Hellman
TLS
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
Table 5 Non-approved algorithms in the Non-FIPS mode services
Neither the User nor the Crypto Officer are allowed to operate any of these services while in
FIPS mode of operation.
1
These approved services become non-approved when using any non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or
curve sizes. When using approved algorithms and key sizes these services are approved.
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To put the module back into the FIPS mode from the non-FIPS mode, the CO must zeroize all
Keys/CSPs used in non-FIPS mode, and then strictly follow up the steps in section 3 of this
document to put the module into the FIPS mode.
All services available can be found at Cisco Firepower 4100/9300 FXOS CLI Configuration
Guide, 2.6(1). Updated: July 2, 2020
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/fxos/fxos261/cli-
guide/b_CLI_ConfigGuide_FXOS_261.html. This site lists the configuration guidance.
2.9 Unauthenticated Services
The services for someone without an authorized role are to view the status output from the
module’s LED pins and cycle power.
In addition, for details regarding the Roles, Services and Authentication provided by the
embedded ASA-CM cryptographic module, please refer to the Security Policy for more
information. The ASA-CM module has been certified with FIPS 140-2 Cert. #3789.
2.10 Operational Environment
The module is a hardware module. The module’s operating system is non-modifiable. Thus, the
requirements from FIPS 140-2 level 2, section 4.6.1, are not applicable to the module.
2.11 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The module administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as
passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-protection of the Crypto Officer
role login, and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of overwriting the
memory that stored the key or refreshing the volatile memory. Keys are both manually and
electronically distributed but entered electronically. Persistent keys with manual distribution are
used for pre-shared keys whereas protocols such as IKE, TLS and SSH are used for electronic
distribution.
All pre-shared keys are associated with the CO role that created the keys, and the CO role is
protected by a password. Therefore, the CO password is associated with all the pre-shared keys.
The Crypto Officer needs to be authenticated to store keys. Only an authenticated Crypto Officer
can view the keys. All Diffie-Hellman (DH)/ECDH keys agreed upon for individual tunnels are
directly associated with that specific tunnel only via the IKE protocol. RSA Public keys are
entered into the modules using digital certificates which contain relevant data such as the name
of the public key's owner, which associates the key with the correct entity. All other keys are
associated with the user/role that entered them. The entropy source falls into IG 7.14, Scenario
#1a: A hardware module with an entropy-generating NDRNG inside the module’s cryptographic
boundary. The entropy source provides at least 256 bits of entropy to seed SP800-90a DRBG for
the use of key generation.
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
DRBG entropy
input
SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG (AES-256)
384-bits This is the entropy for SP 800-
90A CTR_DRBG, used to
construct the seed.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG Seed SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG (AES-256)
384-bits Input to the DRBG that
determines the internal state of
the DRBG. Generated using
DRBG derivation function that
includes the entropy input.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG V SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG (AES-256)
128-bits The DRBG V is one of the
critical values of the internal
state upon which the security of
this DRBG mechanism
depends. Generated first during
DRBG instantiation and then
subsequently updated using the
DRBG update function.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG Key SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG (AES-256)
256-bits Internal critical value used as
part of SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG. Established per
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
DH 2048 - 4096 bits The shared secret used in
Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange.
Established per the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
private key
DH 224 – 384 bits The private key used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. This
key is generated by calling
SP800-90A DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
public key
DH 2048 - 4096 bits The public key used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. This
key is derived per the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie-
Hellman Shared
Secret
ECDH P-256, P-384,
P-521 Curves
The shared secret used in
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) exchange.
Established per the Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
protocol.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
EC Diffie
Hellman private
key
ECDH P-256, P-384,
P-521 Curves
Used in establishing the session
key for an IPSec session. The
private key used in Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
exchange. This key is
established per the EC Diffie-
Hellman key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie
Hellman public
key
ECDH P-256, P-384,
P-521 Curves
Used in establishing the session
key for an IPSec session. The
public key used in Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
exchange. This key is
established per the EC Diffie-
Hellman key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
skeyid Keying material 160 bits A shared secret known only to
IKE peers. It was established
via key derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF and
it will be used for deriving
other keys in IKE protocol
implementation.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
skeyid_d Keying material 160 bits A shared secret known only to
IKE peers. It was derived via
key derivation function defined
in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2)
and it will be used for deriving
IKE session authentication key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
SKEYSEED Keying material 160 bits A shared secret known only to
IKE peers. It was derived via
key derivation function defined
in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2)
and it will be used for deriving
IKE session authentication key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IKE session
encrypt key
Triple-DES/AES 192 bits Triple-
DES or
128/192/256 bits
AES
The IKE session (IKE Phase I)
encrypt key. This key is derived
via key derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when IPsec
session is
terminated
IKE session
authentication
key
HMAC-SHA-1 160 bits The IKE session (IKE Phase I)
authentication key. This key is
derived via key derivation
function defined in SP800-135
KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when IPsec
session is
terminated
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 17
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
ISAKMP
preshared
Pre-shared secret Variable 8 plus
characters
The secret used to derive IKE
skeyid when using preshared
secret authentication. This CSP
is entered by the Crypto
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Erase the secret
IKE
authentication
private Key
RSA RSA (2048 bits) RSA private key used in IKE
authentication. This key is
generated by calling SP800-
90A DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
IKE
authentication
public key
RSA RSA (2048 bits) RSA public key used in IKE
authentication. This key is
derived in compliance with
FIPS 186-4 RSA key pair
generation method in the
module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
IPsec encryption
key
Triple-DES, AES and
AES-GCM
192 bits Triple-
DES or
128/192/256 bits
AES
The IPsec (IKE phase II)
encryption key. This key is
derived via a key derivation
function defined in SP800-135
KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when IPsec
session is
terminated
IPsec
authentication
key
HMAC-SHA-1 160 bits The IPsec (IKE Phase II)
authentication key. This key is
derived via a key derivation
function defined in SP800-135
KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when IPsec
session is
terminated
Operator
password
Password 8 plus characters The password of the User role.
This CSP was entered by the
User.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Erase the
password
Enable password Password 8 plus characters The password of the CO role.
This CSP was entered by the
Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Erase the
password
RADIUS secret Shared Secret 16 characters The RADIUS shared secret.
Used for RADIUS
Client/Server authentication.
This CSP is entered by the
Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Erase the secret
TACACS+
secret
Shared Secret 16 characters The TACACS+ shared secret.
Used for TACACS+
Client/Server authentication.
This CSP is entered by the
Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Erase the secret
SSHv2 private
Key
RSA 2048 bits
modulus
The SSHv2 private key used in
SSHv2 connection. This key is
generated by calling SP 800-
90A DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 18
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
SSHv2 public
Key
RSA 2048 bits
modulus
The SSHv2 public key used in
SSHv2 connection. This key is
derived in compliance with
FIPS 186-4 RSA key pair
generation method in the
module
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
SSHv2 session
key
Triple-DES/AES 192 bits Triple-
DES or
128/192/256 bits
AES
This is the SSHv2 session key.
It is used to encrypt all SSHv2
data traffics traversing between
the SSHv2 Client and SSHv2
Server. This key is derived via
key derivation function defined
in SP800-135 KDF (SSH).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SSH
session is
terminated
SSHv2 integrity
key
HMAC-SHA-1 160 bits Used for SSHv2 connections
integrity to assure the traffic
integrity. This key is derived
via key derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF
(SSH).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SSH
session is
terminated
TLS RSA
private key
RSA 2048 bits Identity certificates for the
security appliance itself and
also used in TLS session
negotiations. This key is
derived in compliance with
FIPS 186-4 RSA key pair
generation method in the
module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
TLS RSA public
key
RSA 2048 bits Identity certificates for the
security appliance itself and
also used in TLS session
negotiations. This key is
derived in compliance with
FIPS 186-4 RSA key pair
generation method in the
module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
TLS pre-master
secret
Shared Secret At least eight
characters
Shared secret created/derived
using asymmetric cryptography
from which new HTTPS/TLS
session keys can be created.
This key entered into the
module in cipher text form,
encrypted by RSA public key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
TLS master
secret
keying material 48 Bytes Keying material used to derive
other HTTPS/TLS keys. This
key was derived from TLS pre-
master secret during the TLS
session establishment
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 19
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
TLS encryption
keys
Triple-DES/AES/AES-
GCM 128/192/256;
192 bits Triple-
DES or
128/192/256 bits
AES
Used in HTTPS/TLS
connections to protect the
session traffic. This key was
derived in the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
TLS integrity
key
HMAC-
SHA1/256/384/512
160-512 bits Used for TLS integrity to
assure the traffic integrity. This
key was derived in the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
SNMPv3
password
Password 256 bits The password use to setup
SNMPv3 connection. This key
is entered by Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Erase the
password
SNMPv3
authentication
key
HMAC-SHA-1 160 bits Authentication key used to
protect SNMP traffic integrity.
This key is derived via key
derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (SNMPv3).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SNMP
session is
terminated
SNMPv3
session key
AES 128 bits Encryption key used to protect
SNMP traffic. This key is
derived via key derivation
function defined in SP800-135
KDF (SNMPv3).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SNMP
session is
terminated
Integrity test key RSA-2048 Public key 2048 bits A hard coded key used for
firmware power-up/load
integrity verification.
Hard coded
for firmware
integrity
testing
Zeroized by
erasing the
firmware image
Table 6 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
In addition, for details of the Cryptographic Keys and CSPs provided by the embedded Cisco
ASA Cryptographic Module (ASA-CM), please refer to the corresponding Security Policy for
more information. The ASA-CM module has been certified with FIPS 140-2 Cert. #3789.
2.12 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Algorithm Cisco Security Crypto
(Firmware)
AES (128/192/256 bits CBC, GCM) C784
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key) C784
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512) C784
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HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) C784
RSA (PKCS1_V1_5; KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; 2048 bits) C784
DRBG (CTR_DRBG) C784
CVL Component (IKEv2, TLSv1.2, SSHv2, SNMPv3) C784
CKG (vendor affirmed)
Table 7 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Number
Note:
• There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not used by the module. Only the
algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in this
table.
• The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC
5288 for TLS and RFC 7296 for IPSec/IKEv2. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2
and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1,
Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key
establishment scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the
module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its
cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values
for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will
trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost
and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be
established. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret
SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. The operations of
one of the two parties involved in the IKE key establishment scheme shall be performed
entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. When the IV
exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party,
client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new
encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use
with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
• No parts of the SSH, TLS, SNMP and IPSec protocols, other than the KDF’s, have been
tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
• Each of TLS, SSH and IPSec protocols governs the generation of the respective Triple-DES
keys. Refer to RFC 5246 (TLS), RFC 4253 (SSH) and RFC 6071 (IPSec) for details relevant
to the generation of the individual Triple-DES encryption keys. The user is responsible for
ensuring the module limits the number of encryptions with the same key to 220
.
• In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation as depicted in section 6 of SP800-133. The resulting
generated symmetric key and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the
unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG.
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in
the FIPS approved mode:
• Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #C784, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
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• EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #C784, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
• NDRNG (entropy source)
• RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength)
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used
in FIPS mode of operation:
• DES
• Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of
encryption strength; non-compliant)
• HMAC-MD5
• HMAC-SHA-1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits
• MD5
• RC4
• RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of encryption
strength; non-compliant)
In addition, the embedded ASA-CM cryptographic module (FIPS Cert. #3789) also provides the
following FIPS approved algorithm certificates and non-approved algorithms.
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms from Embedded Module
The embedded module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Table 7 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Numbers
Note:
• There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module.
Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown
in this table.
Cisco Security
Crypto
(Firmware)
On-board Chip
(Cavium
Nitrox III)
On-board Chip
(Cavium
Nitrox V)
AES (128/192/256 CBC, GCM) 4905/C784 2034/2035 C1026
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key) 2559/C784 1311 C1026
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512) 4012/C784 1780 C1026
HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) 3272/C784 1233 C1026
RSA (KeyGen, SigGen and SigVer;
PKCS1_V1_5; 2048bits)
2678/C784
ECDSA (PKG, SigGen and SigVer; P-256, P-384,
P-521)
1254/C784
CTR_DRBG (AES-256) 1735/C784
HASH_DRBG (SHA-512) 197 C1026
CVL Component (IKEv2, TLSv1.2, SSHv2) 1521/C784
CKG (vendor affirmed)
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 22
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• The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC
5288 for TLS and RFC 7296 for IPSec/IKEv2. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2
and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1,
Section 3.3.1. The operations of one of the two parties involved in the TLS key
establishment scheme were performed entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the
module being validated. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its
cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values
for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will
trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost
and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be
established. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret
SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. The operations of
one of the two parties involved in the IKE key establishment scheme shall be performed
entirely within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. When the IV
exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party,
client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new
encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use
with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
• No parts of the SSH, TLS and IPSec protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by
the CAVP and CMVP.
• Each of TLS, SSH and IPSec protocols governs the generation of the respective Triple-
DES keys. Refer to RFC 5246 (TLS), RFC 4253 (SSH) and RFC 6071 (IPSec) for details
relevant to the generation of the individual Triple-DES encryption keys. The user is
responsible for ensuring the module limits the number of encryptions with the same key
to 220
.
• In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation as depicted in section 6 of SP800-133. The resulting
generated seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified output from
SP800-90A DRBG.
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode from Embedded
Module
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in
the FIPS approved mode:
• Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #1521 and #C784, key agreement; key establishment
methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
• RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength)
• NDRNG (entropy source)
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms from Embedded Module
The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used
in FIPS mode of operation:
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 23
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• Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of
encryption strength; non-compliant)
• RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of encryption
strength; non-compliant)
• DES
• HMAC-MD5
• MD5
• RC4
• HMAC-SHA1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits
In addition, the embedded cryptographic module with FIPS 140-2 Cert. #3789 also provides the
following FIPS approved algorithm certificates and non-approved algorithms.
2.13 Self-Tests
The modules include an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during
operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to ensure all components are
functioning correctly.
Self-tests performed
• POSTs
o AES-CBC Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
o DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A Section 11.3 are
performed)
o Firmware Integrity Test (using RSA 2048 with SHA-512)
o HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) KATs
o RSA KATs (separate KAT for signing; separate KAT for verification)
o SHA-1 KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
• Conditional tests
o RSA pairwise consistency test
o CRNGT to SP800-90A DRBG
o CRNGT to NDRNG (entropy source)
The security appliances perform all power-on self-tests automatically when the power is applied.
All power-on self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The
power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the
initialization of the LAN’s interfaces; this prevents the security appliances from passing any data
during a power-on self-test failure. In the unlikely event that a power-on self-test fails, an error
message is displayed on the console followed by a security appliance reboot.
In addition, for details of the Self-Tests conducted by the embedded ASA-CM cryptographic
module, please refer to the Security Policy for more information. The ASA-CM module has been
certified with FIPS 140-2 Cert. #3789.
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 24
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2.14 Physical Security
The FIPS 140-2 level 2 physical security requirements for the modules are met by the use of
opacity shields covering the front panels of modules to provide the required opacity and tamper
evident seals to provide the required tamper evidence.
The following table shows the tamper labels and opacity shields that shall be installed on the
modules to operate in a FIPS approved mode of operation. The CO is responsible for using,
securing and having control at all times of any unused tamper evident labels. Actions to be taken
when any evidence of tampering should be addressed within site security program.
Models Number
Tamper
labels
Tamper Evident
Labels
Number
Opacity
Shields
Opacity Shields
FPR4110, 4115, 4120, 4125, 4140,
4145 and 4150
15 Cisco_TEL.FIPS_Kit 1 69-100250-01
FPR9300 (SM24, SM-36, SM-40,
SM-44, SM-48 and SM-56)
12 Cisco_TEL.FIPS_Kit 1 800-102843-01
Opacity Shield installation
4100 Series
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© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 26
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9300 Series
Inspection of the opacity shields should be incorporated into facility security posture to include
how often to inspect and any recording of the inspection. It is recommended 30 days but this is
the facilities Security Manager decision.
Tamper Evidence Label (TEL) Placement
The tamper evident seals (hereinafter referred to as tamper evident labels (TEL)) shall be
installed on the security devices containing the module prior to operating in FIPS mode. TELs
shall be applied as depicted in the figures below. Any unused TELs must be securely stored,
accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location.
Should the CO have to remove, change or replace TELs (tamper-evidence labels) for any reason,
the CO must examine the location from which the TEL was removed and ensure that no residual
debris is still remaining on the chassis or card. If residual debris remains, the CO must remove
the debris using a damp cloth.
Any deviation of the TELs placement such as tearing, misconfiguration, removal, change,
replacement or any other change in the TELs from its original configuration as depicted below
by unauthorized operators shall mean the module is no longer in FIPS mode of operation.
Returning the system back to FIPS mode of operation requires the replacement of the TEL as
depicted below and any additional requirement per the site security policy which are out of scope
of this Security Policy.
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 27
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To seal the system, apply tamper-evidence labels as depicted in the figures below.
Figure 1: FPR4100 Series Front view (no TEL present on front)
#1
Figure 2: FPR4100 Series Right Side
(Right side has TEL #1 overlapping top and side)
#2
Figure 3: FPR4100 Series Left Side
(Left side has TEL #2 overlapping top and side)
#3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10
Figure 4: FPR4100 Series Rear view
(Rear has TEL #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9 and #10 overlapping top and plug-in)
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 28
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Figure 5: FPR4100 Series Top view
(Top shows TEL #11 and #12 overlapping opacity shield and 4000 chassis, also present is TEL
#1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
#11 #12
#3
#4
#5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10
#1 #2
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 29
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# 13 #14
Figure 6: FPR4100 Series Bottom view
(Bottom shows TEL #13 and # 14 overlapping opacity shield and 4000 chassis)
#1 #2
Figure 7: FPR9300 Series Front view
(Front opacity shield has TEL #1 and #2)
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 30
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Figure 8: FPR9300 Series Right view (Right side has no TELs)
Figure 9: FPR9300 Series Left view (Left side has no TELs)
#3 #4 #7 #5 #6
Figure 10: FPR9300 Series Rear view
(Rear has TEL #3, #4, #5, #6, each overlapping chassis and plug-in and #7 on bottom)
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 31
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#8 #9 #12 (used to cover USB port)
Figure 11: FPR9300 Series Top view
(Top has TEL #8 and #9 overlapping opacity shield and top of chassis, also present is TEL #3, #4, #5 and #6 listed
on Back view. TEL #12 partially obscured inside the opacity shield, overlapping front of chassis and top of chassis
covering the USB)
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 32
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Figure 12: FPR9300 Series Bottom view
(Bottom has TEL #10 and #11 overlapping opacity shield and bottom of chassis, also present is TEL #7 overlapping
bottom and back of plug-in)
Please note that the 4100 and 9300 series modules provide the described level 2 physical security
protections. These protections also secure the embedded cryptographic module (which was
validated for level 1 physical security).
#11
#10
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 33
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Appling Tamper Evidence Labels
Step 1: Turn off and unplug the system before cleaning the chassis and applying labels.
Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels.
Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose.
Step 3: Apply a label to cover the security appliance as shown in figures above and allow the
label to cure for a minimum of 12 hours.
The tamper evident seals are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive
backing. Any attempt to open the device will damage the tamper evident seals or the material of
the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident seals have non-repeated serial numbers,
they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that
the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident seals can also be inspected
for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices. The word
“OPEN” may appear if the label was peeled back.
Inspection of the tamper seals should be incorporated into facility security to include how often
to inspect and any recording of the inspection. It is recommended 30 days but this is the
facilities Security Manager decision.
3 Secure Operation
The module meets all the Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped only to
authorized operators by the vendor, and the modules are shipped in Cisco boxes with Cisco
adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Follow the setting instructions provided
below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining
the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Initialization
The Cisco FX-OS Cryptographic Module was validated with FX-OS version 2.6, which is the
only allowable firmware for the current FIPS-approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer
must configure and enforce the following initialization steps.
The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps:
Step 1: The Crypto Officer must install opacity shields as described in Section 2.13 of
this document.
Step 2: The Crypto Officer must apply tamper evidence labels as described in Section
2.13 of this document.
Step 3: Install for Smart Licensing for Triple-DES/AES licenses to require the security
appliances to use Triple-DES and AES (for data traffic and SSH).
© Copyright 2021 Cisco Systems, Inc. 34
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Step 4: Enable “FIPS Mode” to allow the security appliances to internally enforce FIPS-
compliant behavior, such as run power-on self-tests and bypass test, using the following
command:
security # [enable | disable] fips-mode
security # commit-buffer
security # connect local-mgmt
security # reboot
Step 5: After step 4, please issue the following command to verify the FIPS mode:
security # show fips-mode
Note: the output from ‘show fips-mode’ should be “FIPS Mode Admin State: Enabled”
Step 6: SSH host key created during first-time setup of a device was hard coded to 1024
bits, you must destroy this old host key and generate a new one.
system/services # delete ssh-server host-key
system/services # commit-buffer
system/services # set ssh-server host-key rsa 2048
system/services # commit-buffer
system/services # create ssh-server host-key
system/services # commit-buffer
system/services # show ssh-server host-key
Step 7: If using a RADIUS/TACACS+ server for authentication, please configure an
IPSec/TLS tunnel to secure traffic between the module and the RADIUS/TACACS+
server. The RADIUS/TACACS+ shared secret must be at least 8 characters long.
Step 8: Reboot the security appliances.
In addition, for the Secure Operations steps required for the embedded cryptographic module
(ASA-CM), please refer to the Security Policy for more information. The ASA-CM module has
been certified with FIPS 140-2 Cert. #3789.