1
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
Cohesity FIPS Object Module For OpenSSL
Version 1.0.1 and 1.0.2
By
Cohesity, Inc.
October 16, 2019
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
2
References
Reference Full Specification Name
[ANS X9.31] Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry (rDSA)
[FIPS 140­2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic modules, May 25, 2001
[FIPS 180­4] Secure Hash Standard
[FIPS 186­4] Digital Signature Standard
[FIPS 197] Advanced Encryption Standard
[FIPS 198­1] TheKeyed­HashMessageAuthenticationCode(HMAC)
[SP 800­38B] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
[SP 800­38C] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for
Authentication and Confidentiality
[SP 800­38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)
and GMAC
[SP 800­56A] Recommendation for Pair­Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography
[SP 800­
67R2]
Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
[SP800­89] Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications
[SP800­90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random
Bit Generators
[SP 800­
131A]
Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 4
2 Tested Configurations...................................................................................................................... 6
3 Ports and Interfaces.......................................................................................................................... 7
4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality............................................................. 8
4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys....................................................................................14
5 Roles, Authentication and Services............................................................................................... 14
6 Self-test................................................................................................................................................ 16
7 Operational Environment................................................................................................................ 18
8 Mitigation of other Attacks............................................................................................................. 19
Appendix A Installation and Usage Guidance................................................................................. 20
Appendix B Controlled Distribution File Fingerprint................................................................... 23
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
1 Introduction
This document is the security policy for the Cohesity FIPS Object Module, hereafter referred to
as the Module.
The Module is a software library providing a C-language application program interface (API)
for use by other processes that require cryptographic functionality. The Module is classified
by FIPS 140-2 as a software module, multi­chip standalone module embodiment. The physical
cryptographic boundary is the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed.
The logical cryptographic boundary of the Module is the fipscanister object module, a single
object module file named fipscanister.o (Linux®1
).The Module performs no communications
other than with the calling application (the process that invokes the Module services).
The FIPS 140­2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security NA
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self­Tests 1
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks NA
Table 1 - Security Level of Security Requirements
1
Linux is registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries.
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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Figure 1 – Module Block Diagram
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2 Tested Configurations
The Module has been validated on the following platform and no claims can be made as to
correct operation of the Module or the security strengths of the generated keys when
operating on a platform that is not listed on the validation certificate:
Module
Version
Operational
Environment
Processor Hardware Optimizations
(Target)
EC B
1.0.1 CentOS 7.2 Intel Xeon E5-2630 (x86) C2500; C2300 AES-NI P U2
1.0.2 CentOS 7.5 Intel Xeon E5-2630 (x86) C2510 AES-NI P U2
Table 2 - Tested Configurations (B = Build Method; EC = Elliptic Curve Support). The EC column indicates support for prime curve only
(P)
In addition to the above validation, Cohesity has tested and affirms that the following list of
configurations are also supported as part of FIPS 140-2 compliance:
• CentOS 7.x (x86)
• All hardware platform models sold by Cohesity
• Cloud Edition supported on Azure, AWS and Google clouds
• Virtual Edition supported on VMware
• 3rd
party whitelist hardware
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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3 Ports and Interfaces
The physical ports of the Module are the same as the computer system on which it is
executing. The logical interface is a C­language application program interface (API).
Logical interface type Description
Control input API entry point and corresponding stack parameters
Data input API entry point data input stack parameters
Status output API entry point return values and status stack parameters
Data output API entry point data output stack parameters
Table 3 - Logical interfaces
As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside module scope. However,
when the module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the logical
data output interface is inhibited. The module is single-threaded and in error scenarios
returns only an error value (no data output is returned).
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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4 Modes of Operation & Cryptographic
Functionality
The Module supports only a FIPS 140­2 Approved mode. Below tables list the Approved and
Non­approvedbutAllowedalgorithms,respectively.
TABLE FOR MODULE VERSION 1.0.2
Function Algorithm Options Cert #
Random Number
Generation;
Symmetric key
generation2
[SP800­90A]DRBG3
Prediction resistance
supported for all
variations
Hash DRBG
HMAC DRBG
CTR DRBG (AES)
2117
Encryption,
Decryption and
CMAC
[SP800­67R1]
3­KeyTriple-DESTECB,TCBC,TCFB,TOFB;
CMAC generate and verify
Note: There is a limit of 2^16 encryptions
with the same key, and this limit is
imposed by policy.
2724
[FIPS 197] AES 128/ 192/256 ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB 1,
CFB8, CFB 128, CTR, CCM; GCM;
CMAC
generate and verify
128/256 XTS
Note: XTS can only be used for Storage
applications.
5426
[SP 800­38B]CMAC
[SP800­38C]CCM
[SP800­38D]GCM4
[SP800­38E]XTS
Message Digests [FIPS 180­4] SHA­1, SHA­2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 4353
Keyed Hash
[FIPS 198-1] HMAC SHA­1, SHA­2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 3591
Digital Signature and
Asymmetric Key
Generation2
[FIPS186­2]RSA
SigVer9.31, SigVerPKCS1.5, SigVerPSS
(1024/1536/2048/3072/4096 with all SHA­2
sizes)
2906
[FIPS186­4]DSA
PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen (2048/3072 with
all SHA­2 sizes)
Sig Gen (2048/3072 with SHA1 and all
SHA­2 sizes)
PQG Ver, Sig Ver (1024/2048/3072 with
SHA1 and all SHA­2 sizes)
1395
2
Keys/CSPs generated in FIPS mode cannot be used in non-FIPS mode, and vice versa.
3
For all DRBGs the "supported security strengths" is just the highest supported security strength per [SP800­90A] and [SP800­57].
4
The module’s AES GCM implementation meets IG A.5. The IV is generated deterministically, as per the guidance in SP800-38D section 8.2.1.
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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[FIPS186­4]ECDSA
PKG: CURVES( P­224 P­256 P­384 P­521 ­
521 ExtraRandomBits TestingCandidates )
PKV: CURVES( ALL­P) SigGen: CURVES(
P­224: (SHA­224, 256, 384,
512) P­256: (SHA­224, 256, 384, 512) P­384:
(SHA­224, 256, 384, 512) P­521: (SHA­224,
256, 384, 512))
SigVer: CURVES( P­192: (SHA­1, 224, 256,
384, 512) P­224: (SHA­1, 224, 256, 384, 512)
P­
256: (SHA­1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P­384: (SHA­
1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P­521: (SHA­1, 224,
256,
384, 512))
1442
ECC CDH (KAS) [SP 800­56A](§5.7.1.2)
All NIST defined P curves except sizes 163
and 192
CVL
Cert.#
1876
TABLE FOR MODULE VERSION 1.0.1
Function Algorithm Options Cert #
Random Number
Generation;
Symmetric key
generation5
[SP800­90A]DRBG6
Prediction resistance
supported for all
variations
Hash DRBG
HMAC DRBG
CTR DRBG (AES)
1162
Encryption,
Decryption and
CMAC
[SP800­67R1]
3­KeyTriple-DESTECB,TCBC,TCFB,TOFB;
CMAC generate and verify
Note: There is a limit of 2^16 encryptions
with the same key, and this limit is
imposed by policy.
2176
[FIPS 197] AES 128/ 192/256 ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB 1,
CFB8, CFB 128, CTR, CCM; GCM;
CMAC
generate and verify
128/256 XTS
Note: XTS can only be used for Storage
applications.
3967
[SP 800­38B]CMAC
[SP800­38C]CCM
[SP800­38D]GCM7
[SP800­38E]XTS
Message Digests [FIPS 180­4] SHA­1, SHA­2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 3271
Keyed Hash [FIPS 198-1] HMAC SHA­1, SHA­2 (224, 256, 384, 512) 2585
Digital Signature and
Asymmetric Key
[FIPS186­2]RSA
SigVer9.31, SigVerPKCS1.5, SigVerPSS
(1024/1536/2048/3072/4096 with all SHA­2
2027
5
Keys/CSPs generated in FIPS mode cannot be used in non-FIPS mode, and vice versa.
6
For all DRBGs the "supported security strengths" is just the highest supported security strength per [SP800­90A] and [SP800­57].
7
The module’s AES GCM implementation meets IG A.5. The IV is generated deterministically, as per the guidance in SP800-38D section 8.2.1.
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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Generation2
sizes)
[FIPS186­4]DSA
PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen (2048/3072 with
all SHA­2 sizes)
Sig Gen (2048/3072 with SHA1 and all
SHA­2 sizes)
PQG Ver, Sig Ver (1024/2048/3072 with
SHA1 and all SHA­2 sizes)
1081
[FIPS186­4]ECDSA
PKG: CURVES( P­224 P­256 P­384 P­521 ­
521 ExtraRandomBits TestingCandidates )
PKV: CURVES( ALL­P) SigGen: CURVES(
P­224: (SHA­224, 256, 384,
512) P­256: (SHA­224, 256, 384, 512) P­384:
(SHA­224, 256, 384, 512) P­521: (SHA­224,
256, 384, 512))
SigVer: CURVES( P­192: (SHA­1, 224, 256,
384, 512) P­224: (SHA­1, 224, 256, 384, 512)
P­
256: (SHA­1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P­384: (SHA­
1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P­521: (SHA­1, 224,
256,
384, 512))
873
ECC CDH (KAS) [SP 800­56A](§5.7.1.2)
All NIST defined P curves except sizes 163
and 192
CVL
Cert.# 796
Table 4 - FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions
The Module supports only NIST defined curves for use with ECDSA and ECC CDH. The
Module supports one operational environment configurations for elliptic curve; NIST prime
curve only (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "P").
Category Algorithm Description
Key Agreement EC DH Non­compliant (untested) DH scheme using elliptic curve, supporting all
NIST defined P curves. Key agreement is a service provided for calling
process use, but is not used to establish keys into the Module.
Key Encryption,
Decryption
RSA The RSA algorithm may be used by the calling application for
encryption or decryption of keys. No claim is made for SP 800­56B
compliance, and no CSPs are established into or exported out of
the module using these services.
Table 5 - Non­FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions
The Module implements the following services which are Non­Approved per the SP 800­131A
transition:
Function Algorithm Options
Random Number Generation; [ANS X9.31] RNG AES 128/192/256
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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Symmetric key generation
Random Number Generation;
Symmetric key generation
[SP800­90A]DRBG Dual EC DRBG
(note the Dual EC DRBG algorithm
shall not be used in the FIPS
Approved mode of operation)
Digital Signature and Asymmetric
Key Generation8
[FIPS186­2]RSA GenKey9.31, SigGen9.31,
SigGenPKCS1.5, SigGenPSS
(1024/1536 with all SHA sizes,
2048/3072/4096 with SHA­1,
2048/3072/4096 with all SHA­2
sizes)
[FIPS186­2]DSA PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen
(1024 with all SHA sizes,
2048/3072 with SHA­1)
[FIPS186­4]DSA PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen
(1024 with all SHA sizes,
2048/3072 with SHA­1)
[FIPS186­2]ECDSA PKG: CURVES( P192 K163 B-
163 ) SIG(gen): CURVES( P192 P-
224 P256 P384 P521 K163 K-
233 K283 K409 K571 B163 B-
233 B283 B409 B571 )
[FIPS186­4]ECDSA PKG: CURVES( P192 K163 B-
163 ) SigGen: CURVES( P-
192: (SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-
224:(SHA1) P256:(SHA1) P384:
(SHA1) P521:(SHA1) K163: (SHA-
1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K233:(SHA-
1) K283:(SHA1) K409:(SHA1) K-
571:(SHA1) B163: (SHA1,
224, 256, 384, 512) B233:(SHA-
1) B283: (SHA1) B409:(SHA1) B-
571:(SHA1) )
ECC CDH (CVL) [SP 800­56A](§5.7.1.2) NIST Recommended P curves sizes
163 and 192
All NIST Recommended B and K
curves
Table 6 – FIPS Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions
X9.31 RNG is Non­Approved effective December 31, 2015, per the CMVP Notice "X9.31
RNG transition, December 31, 2015".
These algorithms shall not be used when operating in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.
EC DH Key Agreement provides a maximum of 256 bits of security strength. RSA Key
Wrapping provides a maximum of 256 bits of security strength.
8
Keys/CSPs generated in FIPS mode cannot be used in non-FIPS mode, and vice versa
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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The Module requires an initialization sequence (see IG 9.5): the calling application invokes
FIPS_mode_set()9
, which returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. If
FIPS_mode_set() fails then all cryptographic services fail from then on. The application
can test to see if FIPS mode has been successfully performed.
The Module is a cryptographic engine library, which can be used only in conjunction with
additional software. Aside from the use of the NIST defined elliptic curves as trusted third
party domain parameters, all other FIPS 186-4 assurances are outside the scope of the
Module, and are the responsibility of the calling process.
4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All access to these CSPs by
Module services are described in Section 4. The CSP names are generic, corresponding to
API parameter data structures.
CSP Name Description
RSA SGK RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) signature generation key
RSA KDK RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key decryption (private key transport) key
DSA SGK [FIPS186­4]DSA(2048/3072)signaturegenerationkey
ECDSA SGK ECDSA (All NIST defined P curves) signature generation key
EC DH Private EC DH (All NIST defined P curves) private key agreement key.
AES EDK AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt key
AES CMAC AES (128/192/256) CMAC generate / verify key
AES GCM AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt / generate / verify key
AES XTS AES (256/512) XTS encrypt / decrypt key
Triple-DES
EDK
Triple-DES(3­Key)encrypt/decryptkey
Triple-DES
CMAC
Triple-DES(3­Key) CMACgenerate /verifykey
HMAC Key Keyed hash key (160/224/256/384/512)
Hash_DRBG
CSPs
V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
CTR_DRBG
CSPs
V (128 bits) and Key (AES 128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on security
strength)
CO­AD­Digest Pre­calculated HMAC­SHA­1 digest used for Crypto Officer role authentication
User­AD­Digest Pre­calculated HMAC­SHA­1 digest used for User role authentication
Table 7 - Critical Security Parameters
Authentication data is loaded into the module during the module build process, performed
by an authorized operator (Crypto Officer), and otherwise cannot be accessed.
9
The function call in the Module is FIPS_module_mode_set() which is typically used by an application via the FIPS_mode_set() wrapper
function.
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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The module does not output intermediate key generation values.
CSP Name Description
RSA SVK RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) signature verification public key
RSA KEK RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key encryption (public key transport) key
DSA SVK [FIPS186­4]DSA(2048/3072)signatureverificationkey
ECDSA SVK ECDSA (All NIST P curves) signature verification key
EC DH Public EC DH (All NIST defined P curves) public key agreement key
Table 8 - Public Keys
For all CSPs and Public Keys:
Storage: RAM, associated to entities by memory location. The Module stores DRBG
state values for the lifetime of the DRBG instance. The module uses CSPs passed in by
the calling application on the stack. The Module does not store any CSP persistently
(beyond the lifetime of an API call), with the exception of DRBG state values used for
the Modules' default key generation service.
Generation: The Module implements SP 800­90A compliant DRBG services for
creation of symmetric keys, and for generation of DSA, elliptic curve, and RSA keys as
shown in Table 4. The calling application is responsible for storage of generated keys
returned by the module.
Entry: All CSPs enter the Module’s logical boundary in plaintext as API parameters,
associated by memory location. However, none cross the physical boundary.
Output: The Module does not output CSPs, other than as explicit results of key
generation services. However, none cross the physical boundary.
Destruction: Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function
calls for temporarily stored CSPs. In addition, the module provides functions to
explicitly destroy CSPs related to random number generation services. The calling
application is responsible for parameters passed in and out of the module.
Private and secret keys as well as seeds and entropy input are provided to the Module by
the calling application, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function
calls. Keys residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API
call) can only be accessed using the Module defined API. The operating system protects
memory and process space from unauthorized access. Only the calling application that
creates or imports keys can use or export such keys. All API functions are executed by
the invoking calling application in a non­overlapping sequence such that no two API
functions will execute concurrently. An authorized application as user (Crypto­Officer and
User) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the Module.
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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In the event Module power is lost and restored the calling application must ensure that
any AES­GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
Module users (the calling applications) shall use entropy sources that meet the security
strength required for the random number generation mechanism as shown in [SP
800­90A] Table 2 (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG), Table 3 (CTR_DRBG) and Table 4
(Dual_EC_DRBG). This entropy is supplied by means of callback functions. Those
functions must return an error if the minimum entropy strength cannot be met.
5 Roles, Authentication and Services
The Module implements the required User and Crypto Officer roles and requires
authentication for those roles. Only one role may be active at a time and the Module does
not allow concurrent operators. The User or Crypto Officer role is assumed passing the
appropriate password to the FIPS_module_mode_set() function. The password values may be
specified at build time and must have a minimum length of 16 characters. Any attempt to
authenticate with an invalid password will result in an immediate and permanent failure
condition rendering the Module unable to enter the FIPS mode of operation, even with
subsequent use of a correct password.
Authentication data is loaded into the Module during the Module build process, performed by
the Crypto Officer, and otherwise cannot be accessed.
Since minimum password length is 16 characters, the probability of a random successful
authentication attempt in one try is a maximum of 1/25616
, or less than 1/1038
. The Module
permanently disables further authentication attempts after a single failure, so this probabilityis
independent of time.
Both roles have access to all of the services provided by the Module.
• User Role (User): Loading the Module and calling any of the API functions.
• Crypto Officer Role (CO): Installation of the Module on the host computer system
and calling of any API functions.
All services implemented by the Module are listed below, along with a description of service
CSP access:
Service Role Description
Initialize User, CO Module initialization. Does not access CSPs.
Self­test User, CO Perform self tests (FIPS_selftest). Does not access CSPs.
Functions that provide module status information:
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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Show status User, CO
Version (as unsigned long or const char *)
FIPS Mode (Boolean)
Does not access CSPs.
Zeroize User, CO
Functions that destroy CSPs:
fips_drbg_uninstantiate: for a given DRBG context, overwrites DRBG CSPs
(Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs)
All other services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in allocated
memory. Stack cleanup is the responsibility of the calling application.
Random number
generation User, CO
Used for random number and symmetric key generation.
Seed or reseed a DRBG instance
Determine security strength of a DRBG instance
Obtain random data
Uses and updates Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG
CSPs.
Asymmetric key
generation User, CO
Used to generate DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys:
RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK
There is one supported entropy strength for each mechanism and algorithm
type, the maximum specified in SP800­90A
Symmetric
encrypt/decrypt
User, CO Used to encrypt or decrypt data.
Executes using AES EDK, Triple-DES EDK (passed in by the calling process).
Symmetric
digest
User, CO Used to generate or verify data integrity with CMAC.
Executes using AES CMAC, Triple-DES, CMAC (passed in by the calling
process).
Message digest User, CO Used to generate a SHA­1 or SHA­2 message digest. Does not access CSPs.
Keyed Hash User, CO Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC. Executes using HMAC
Key (passed in by the calling process).
Key
transport10
User, CO
Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling process (does
not establish keys into the module).
Executes using RSA KDK, RSA KEK (passed in by the calling process).
Key agreement User, CO
Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the calling process
(does not establish keys into the module).
Executes using EC DH Private, EC DH Public (passed in by the calling
process).
Digital signature
User, CO
Used to generate or verify RSA, DSA or ECDSA digital signatures.
Executes using RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA
SGK,
ECDSA SVK (passed in by the calling process).
10
“Key transport” can refer to a) moving keys in and out of the module or b) the use of keys by an external application. The latter definition is
the one that applies to the Module.
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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Utility User, CO Miscellaneous helper functions. Does not access CSPs.
Table 9 - Services and CSP Access
6 Self-test
The Module performs the self-tests listed below on invocation of Initialize or Self-test.
Algorithm Type Test Attributes
Software integrity KAT HMAC­SHA1
HMAC KAT One KAT per SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512
Per IG 9.3, this testing covers SHA POST requirements.
AES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 128 bit key length
AES CCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 192 key length
AES GCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 256 key length
XTS­AES KAT 128, 256 bit key sizes to support either the 256­bit key size (for
XTS­AES­128) or the 512-bit key size (for XTS­AES­256)
AES CMAC KAT Sign and verify CBC mode, 128, 192, 256 key lengths
Triple-DES KAT Separate encrypt anddecrypt, ECBmode, 3­Key
Triple-DES CMAC KAT CMAC generate and verify, CBC mode, 3­Key
RSA KAT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA­256, PKCS#1
DSA PCT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA­384
DRBG KAT CTR_DRBG: AES, 256 bit with and without derivation
function HASH_DRBG: SHA256
HMAC_DRBG: SHA256 Dual_EC_DRBG: P­256 and SHA256
ECDSA PCT Keygen, sign, verify using P­224, K­233 and SHA512. The K­233 self­test is
not performed for operational environments that support prime curve only
(see Table 2).
ECC CDH KAT Shared secret calculation per SP 800­56A §5.7.1.2, IG 9.6
Table 10 - Power On Self Tests (KAT = Known answer test; PCT = Pairwise consistency test)
The Module is installed using one of the set of instructions in Appendix A, as appropriate for
the target system. The HMAC­SHA­1 of the Module distribution file as tested by the CMT
Laboratory and listed in Appendix A is verified during installation of the Module file as
described in Appendix A.
The FIPS_mode_set()8 function performs all power-up self-tests listed above with no
operator intervention required, returning a “1” if all power-up self-tests succeed, and a “0”
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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otherwise. If any component of the power-up self-test fails an internal flag is set to prevent
subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. The module will only enter the FIPS
Approved mode if the module is reloaded and the call to FIPS_mode_set()11
succeeds.
The power-up self-tests may also be performed on-demand by calling FIPS_selftest(),
which returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. Interpretation of this return code is the
responsibility of the calling application.
The Module also implements the following conditional tests:
Algorithm Test
DRBG Testedas required by[SP800­90A] Section 11
DRBG FIPS 140­2 continuous test forstuck fault
DSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
ECDSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
RSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
Table 11 - Conditional Tests
In the event of a DRBG self-test failure the calling application must uninstantiate and re­
instantiate the DRBG per the requirements of [SP 800-90A]; this is not something the Module
can do itself.
Pairwise consistency tests are performed for both possible modes of use, e.g. Sign/Verify and
Encrypt/Decrypt.
The Module supports two operational environment configurations for elliptic curve: NIST
prime curves only (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "P") and all NIST defined
curves (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "BKP").
11
FIPS_mode_set() calls Module function FIPS_module_mode_set()
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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7 Operational Environment
The tested operating systems segregate user processes into separate process spaces. Each
process space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating system software
and hardware. The Module functions entirely within the process space of the calling
application, and implicitly satisfies the FIPS 140­2 requirement for a single user mode of
operation.
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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8 Mitigation of other Attacks
The module is not designed to mitigate against attacks which are outside of the scope of FIPS
140-2.
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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Appendix A Installation and Usage Guidance
The FIPS 140-2 Inside Cohesity software is made available post-purchase and at the time of
deployment. The tested module is part of the Cohesity Software download. It is available
regardless of the mode of deployment, be it on Cohesity appliances, Cisco, HP, Dell, Lenovo or
other 3rd
party whitelist hardware, in the cloud or in a virtualization environment.
Cohesity provides FIPS-mode as the default manner for operation post 5.0.2 release.
Please note that the module is unavailable for public downloads.
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
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Appendix B Controlled Distribution
The module is distributed as part of the Cohesity solution. It is unavailable as a stand-alone
library.