© 2011 CISCO
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Cisco Systems
Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence
Systems
(Firmware Version: TC5.0.2)
(Hardware Version: v1)
FIPS 140-2
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Document Version 1.0
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.0 March 19, 2012
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Revision History
Version Modification Date Modified By Description of Changes
1.0 2011-11-10 Espen Holmbakken Initial version
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction 4
1.1 Purpose 4
1.2 References 4
2 Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems 5
2.1 Module Overview 5
2.2 Module Ports and Interfaces 12
2.3 Roles and Services 12
2.3.1 Crypto Officer Role 13
2.3.2 User Role 14
2.4 Cryptographic Key Management 15
2.4.1 Key Generation 17
2.4.2 Key Input/Output 17
2.4.3 Key Storage 18
2.4.4 Key Zeroization 18
2.5 Self­Tests 18
2.6 Mitigation of Other Attacks 19
3 Secure Operation 20
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance 20
3.2 Approved Algorithms 21
3.3 Non­Approved Algorithms 22
3.4 Physical Security 22
3.5 Acronyms 27
Table of Tables
TABLE 1 - SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION...................................................................................................5
TABLE 2 - MAPPING OF FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACES TO EX SERIES TELEPRESENCE SYSTEM INTERFACES..........12
TABLE 3 – CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES ........................................................................................................................13
TABLE 4 - USER SERVICES............................................................................................................................................15
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems.
This policy describes how the Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems meet the requirements of FIPS 140-2.
This document also includes instructions for configuring the security appliances in FIPS 140-2 mode.
This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation for the Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence
systems.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS
140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/.
In this document, the Cisco EX series Telepresence system is referred to as the module or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2
cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:
• The Cisco website (http://www.cisco.com) contains information on the full line of products from Cisco.
• The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/) contains contact information for answers to technical or
sales-related questions for the module.
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2 Cisco EX60 and EX90 TelePresence systems
The Cisco TelePresence portfolio creates an immersive, face-to-face experience over the network—empowering you
to collaborate with others like never before. Through a powerful combination of technologies and design that allows
you and remote participants to feel as if you are all in the same room, the Cisco TelePresence portfolio has the
potential to provide great productivity benefits and transform your business. Many organizations are already using it
to control costs, make decisions faster, improve customer intimacy, scale scarce resources, and speed products to
market.
The Cisco EX series Telepresence system is one of the most powerful, flexible TelePresence and collaboration
engine available delivering crisp, clear 1080p end-to-end HD video, HD collaboration, and HD embedded Cisco
TelePresence MultiSite (MultiSite). With more inputs and outputs than ever before, the integration possibilities are
endless.
Cisco TelePresence provides full standard protocol H.323 (for Ethernet) and SIP (for Ethernet). Using these
protocols, secure video conferencing is offered using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption for point-to-
point calls and multipoint calls on Ethernet with the speed of up to 6000 kbps on the full Cisco TelePresence product
line.
2.1 Module Overview
The Cisco EX series telepresence system (version TC5.0.2) is the firmware installed in the Cisco EX series
telepresence product line. The firmware supports the following Cisco TelePresence systems: EX60 and EX90.
The Cisco EX60 and EX90 Telepresence systems support a FIPS-Approved mode of operation and a non-FIPS-
Approved mode of operation. The Cisco EX60 and EX90 Telepresence systems are validated at the following FIPS
140-2 Section levels (when operated in the FIPS-Approved mode).
Table 1 - Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 2
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
In Table 1, N/A indicates “Not Applicable”. EMI and EMC refer to Electromagnetic Compatibility and
Electromagnetic Interference, respectively.
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Figure 1 - EX60 Front Figure 2 - EX60 Back
Figure 3 - EX60 Right Side Figure 4 - EX60 Left Side
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Figure 5 - EX60 Top
Figure 6 - EX60 Bottom
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Figure 7 - EX60 Ports close-up
Figure 8 - EX60 corner ports
Ethernet
Power
Proprietary Touch Screen
Device Connector Video
Audio
RJ45
Console
Audio
USB
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Figure 9 - EX90 Front Figure 10 - EX90 Back
Figure 11 - EX90 Right Side Figure 12 - EX90 Left Side
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Figure 13 - EX90 Top w/ camera down
Figure 14 - EX90 Bottom
Console port
for service
and
maintenance
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Figure 15 - EX90 Ports close-up
Figure 16 - EX90 corner ports
Power
Input
Ethernet
Ports Proprietary
Connector for
touch screen
device
DVI Port
Optional
Audio
Port
HDMI Ports
USB
USB
Audio
Console port for
service and
maintenance
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2.2 Module Ports and Interfaces
Each module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided
by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and
status output. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in Table 2. The following is a list of the logical
interfaces implemented in the module:
• Data Input Interface
• Data Output Interface
• Control Input interface
• Status Output Interface
• Power Interface
Table 2 maps the telepresence system interfaces with the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces.
Table 2 - Mapping of FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces to EX series telepresence system Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Cisco EX series telepresence system Server Port/Interface
Data Input Microphone , Audio Line input, DVI input Ethernet 1 and 2, HDMI input
Data Output
Audio Line output, DVI output, Ethernet 1 and 2, HDMI output, Audio line
output
Control Input Touch Screen Control, Ethernet 1 and 2
Status Output
Audio Line output, DVI output, Ethernet 1 and 2, LEDs, HDMI output, Audio
line output
Power Power socket
2.3 Roles and Services
The modules support two authorized roles: Crypto Officer and User. The services of a Crypto Officer include
module management, settings, and firmware upgrades. The User role places and answers videoconferencing calls
with or without security features as specified by the security configurations of itself and other parties to the call.
Both roles can access the module through one of the following interfaces:
• Touch Screen Control
• HTTPS
• SSHv2
• RS232
The Touch Screen Control provides the operator with a menu-driven interface. The HTTP/HTTPS protocol provides
a web-based interface. The SSHv2 and serial interfaces are command-line based.
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Authentication is identity-based. Each user is authenticated upon initial access to the module. As required by FIPS
140-2, there are two main roles in the security appliances that operators may assume: a Crypto Officer role and User
role. The administrator of the module assumes the Crypto Officer role in order to configure and maintain the module
using Crypto Officer services, while the Users exercise only the basic User services.
The User and Crypto Officer passwords and PINs must each be at least eight (8) characters long, and the minimum
number of character groups to three (numerical special characters, upper case and lower case characters), and
maximum number of consecutive characters in password to be 2.
-For access on the over RS232, HTTPS or SSH, the operator needs to type in a username and password. A password
must, at the very minimum, satisfy all password criteria listed in section 3.1. That is, the password must be at least 8
characters, contain at least one alphabet letter (uppercase or lowercase), one special character, maximum two
consecutive characters, and an integer. Therefore, the minimum password contains six (6) integers, one (1) special
character and one (1) alphabet. The probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in
1,091,750,400. In FIPS mode, the module limits entering a password on the serial port and SSH by enforcing a four
second delay between each password entry. Therefore, an attacker will be able to input 15 passwords in one minute
with this four second delay. The probability that a random success or false acceptance is 15 out of 1,091,750,400,
which is much less than 1 in 100,000. The web interface restriction is different, as an attacker is limited to 1500
attempts per minute. Therefore the probability of a random success is 1500 in 1,091,750,400 which is less than one
in 100,000. Including the rest of the alphanumeric characters drastically decreases the odds of guessing the correct
sequence.
Likewise, when logging into the module using the Touch Screen Control, the operator needs to enter a PIN. Since
the PIN consists of 8 (eight) integers with a maximum 2 consecutive digits, the probability of randomly guessing the
correct sequence is one (1) in 53,144,100. Since the touch screen is connected to the module via an SSH
connection, the module enforces the four second delay on the PIN entry. Therefore, in one minute, only 15 PINs can
be entered, which brings the probability of a random success within one minute to 15 in 53,144,100. Increasing the
number of digits in the PIN further lowers the probability.
2.3.1 Crypto Officer Role
Table 3 shows the services for the Crypto Officer role in the FIPS mode of operation. The purpose of each service is
shown in the first column (“Service”), and the corresponding function is described in the second column
(“Description”).
Table 3 – Crypto Officer Services
Service Description Input Output
Keys/CSPs and
Type of Access
User and password
management
Create users, assign
roles and change
passwords of users.
Web interface Users with Crypto
Officer (admin) or
User role. Status,
success or failure
Write SHA-256
password hashes
Enable FIPS mode Enter FIPS
operational mode
Command System reboot,
system boots up in
FIPS mode
None
Reset to factory
default
Reset the module
server system
Command Uninstalled module,
this exits FIPS mode
of operation
None
Login through Touch
Screen Control
Crypto Officer logs in
the module through
Touch Screen
Control
Physical access,
username and PIN
Status, success or
failure
Verifies PIN Hash
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Service Description Input Output
Keys/CSPs and
Type of Access
Login through
HTTPS
Crypto Officer logs in
the module through
HTTPS
Module’s IP
address,
username/password
or certificate
Status, success or
failure
RSA keys – Read
DSA keys – Read
AES key – Read,
Write, and Delete
TDES keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
Verifies Password
Hash
Login through SSH Crypto Officer logs in
the module through
SSH
Module’s IP
address,
username/password
or certificate
Status, success or
failure
DSA keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
AES key – Read,
Write, and Delete
TDES keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
Verifies Password
Hash
Login through
RS232
Crypto Officer logs in
the module through
RS232
Physical access,
username/password
Status, success or
failure
Verifies Password
Hash
Configure system
settings
Configure network
parameters that are
necessary for
placing/answering
calls and system
parameters
Configuring module
video, audio camera
settings
Command, network
parameters such as
IP addresses,
Status, success or
failure
None
Configure security
settings
Enable/disable
HTTPS/SSH/Serial
port
Command, options Status, success or
failure
None
Install certificates Install certificates for
TLS sessions for
HTTPS connections
and certificates for
IEEE 802.1.x
Command,
certificates, private
keys
Status, success or
failure
RSA or DSA key
pair- Write
Get logfiles Access the logs
stored on the
module
Command, options Event log, None
Get Status Get status of the
module
Command Status None
Zeroize Zeroize the keys
used by the module
during a call or
connection
Command, Hard
Reset (power
button)
Status AES keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
TDES keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
HMAC keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
Diffie-Hellman keys
– Read, Write, and
Delete
RSA keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
DSA keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
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2.3.2 User Role
Table 4 shows the services for the User role under the FIPS mode of operation. Similar to Table 3, the purpose of
each service is shown in the first column (“Service”), and the corresponding function is described in the second
column (“Description”). Notice that, depending on what services the operator will be requesting after login, the
login procedures for the Touch Screen Control, HTTP/HTTPS, SSH, and RS232 can be grouped as either Crypto
Officer or User services.
Table 4 - User Services
Service Description Input Output
Keys/CSP and
Type of Access
Login through Touch
Screen Control
User logs in the
module through
Touch Screen
Control
Physical access,
username and PIN
Status, success or
failure
Verifies PIN Hash
Login through
HTTPS
User logs in the
module through
HTTPS
Module’s IP address Status, success or
failure
RSA keys – Read
DSA keys – Read
AES key – Read,
Write, and Delete
TDES keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
Verifies Password
Hash
Login through SSH User logs in the
module through SSH
Module’s IP address Status, success or
failure
DSA keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
AES key – Read,
Write, and Delete
TDES keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
Verifies Password
Hash
Login through
RS232
User logs in the
module through
RS232
None Status, success or
failure
Verifies Password
Hash
Videoconferencing
Calls
Place outgoing calls
or answer incoming
calls
Command, number
of the receiver
(when placing an
outgoing call)
Status, success or
failure
AES keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
Configure user
settings
Configure user
settings like volume,
background picture,
layout, video input.
command Status, success or
failure
None
Get Status Get status of the
module
Command Status None
Zeroize Zeroize the keys
used by the module
during a call or
connection
Command, Hard
Reset (power
button)
Status AES keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
TDES keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
HMAC keys – Read,
Write, and Delete
Diffie-Hellman keys
– Read, Write, and
Delete
2.4 Cryptographic Key Management
The module uses a variety of keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSP’s)
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Table 5 - List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
Key/
Key Component
Type Generation Storage Zeroization Use
SSH host private
key
DSA-1024 Generated
based on
random data
On Flash At factory
reset
SSH session handshake
SSH Session
authentication key
HMAC-SHA1
key
Agreed upon
server and
client as part of
ssh session
setup
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Data authentication for SSH
sessions
SSH Session
encryption key
Triple-DES
CBC key
AES CBC
128bit key
Derived via the
SSH protocol
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Data encryption/decryption
for SSH sessions
Diffie-Hellman
private exponent
Diffie-Hellman
1024
Generated by
calling the
Approved
DRBG
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Used to derive the shared
secret in the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange
Diffie-Hellman
shared secret
Diffie-Hellman
1024
Negotiated in
the Q.931
phase of the
H323 call setup
according to
H.235
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Used to derive the H323
call setup master key
H323 call setup
master key 1024 bit
shared secret
Derived from
Diffie-Hellman
key exchange
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Used to derive subsequent
H323 keys
H323 Session key
wrapping key
AES-128 Derived from
the H323 call
setup master
key
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Used to AES encrypt the
H323 Session key
H323 Session key AES-128 Generated by
calling the
Approved
DRBG
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Used to encrypt the H323
session traffic.
User PIN Operator PIN Provided by
crypto officer or
User upon
login.
Stored
hashed
using SHA-
1 on flash
At factory
reset
This is used for H323 RAS
authentication
sRTP master key Shared Secret Derived from
TLS handshake
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Master key used for session
key derivation
sRTP session
authentication key
(HMAC)
HMAC SHA-1 Derived from
the sRTP
master key
using pseudo
random function
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Keys used to authenticate
sRTP packets
sRTP session
encryption key
AES128 CTR Derivedfrom the
sRTP master
key using
pseudo random
function
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Key used to encrypt/decrypt
sRTP packets
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Key/
Key Component
Type Generation Storage Zeroization Use
sRTP salting key Salting key Generated
using the
module’s
Approved
DRBG
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
termintated
Used to generate the
Initialization vector of the
SRTP encryption stream
SIP TLS session
keys
HMAC-SHA1
AES128
Derived
according to the
TLS protocol
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Used for user
authentication/encryption
over TLS connection on SIP
SIP TLS certificate
private key
RSA/DSA Provided by
Crypto Officer
Stored on
flash in
plaintext
On factory
reset
With SIP TLS client
certificate
HTTPS TLS
session key
HMAC-SHA1 Derived
according to the
TLS protocol
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Data
authentication/encryption
for TLS sessions (HTTPS
client, HTTPS server,
Syslog)
HTTPS TLS
certificate and
private key
RSA/DSA Provided by
Crypto Officer
Stored on
flash in
plaintext
On factory
reset
With HTTPS TLS
handshake
HTTPS TLS
session encryption
key
Triple-DES
AES CBC 128
bit
Derived
according to the
TLS protocol
Stored in
volatile
memory
When
session is
terminated
Data encryption for TLS
sessions
RNG seed key Seed key Using non-
Approved RNG
Stored on
flash
On factory
reset
Used for RNG operations
Passwords Operator
password
Generated each
time a user
changes his/her
password
Hashed
using SHA-
256 and
stored on
flash
On factory
reset
Password hashes for users
are stored on flash.
Passwords are not stored in
cleartext
File storage
cryptographic key
AES-128 Generated from
random data on
module
initialization
Stored on
NOR-Flash
On factory
reset
Used for encrypting the file
storage on NAN-Flash
Firmware Integrity
Key
DSA public
key
Exists within the
firmware binary
Stored on
flash
Public key
– not
required to
be
zeroizable
Used for checking integrity
of the firmware on every
power-up
2.4.1 Key Generation
The module uses SP800-90 DRBG RNG to generate cryptographic keys. This RNG is FIPS-Approved as indicated
by FIPS PUB 140-2.
The seed for the SP800-90 DRBG RNG is provided by a non-Approved RNG, which collects entropy from the
Ethernet receiver.
2.4.2 Key Input/Output
RSA/DSA key pairs used for TLS are generated externally and input to the modules in plaintext. RSA, DSA, and
DH private keys never exit the module, while the public keys are output in plaintext. In H.323 symmetric keys that
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are input into and output from the module are encrypted by 128-bit AES. For SIP master key is sent over TLS,
which is used to generate the session keys. In HTTPS, session keys exit the module in encrypted form during TLS
handshakes (protected within RSA key transport). Other CSPs and keys, such as the DSA keys for integrity tests
never output from the module.
2.4.3 Key Storage
The DSA and RSA public and private key pairs and the DSA public keys for integrity tests are stored in the
module’s flash memory in plaintext. Session key and Diffie-Hellman public and private key pairs are held in volatile
memory (SDRAM) in plaintext.
2.4.4 Key Zeroization
For the SIP and H.323 protocol, all Diffie-Hellman keys, symmetric keys, HMAC keys, and key components are
zeroized when they are no longer needed, usually at the end of the session, or when encryption is disabled during a
call. For the SSH protocol, a session key is zeroized at the end of the session, or when a new session key is
generated after a certain timeout. A DSA key pair is zeroized when the module exits FIPS mode. For the HTTPS
protocol, the TLS session key is zeroized at the end of the session. The RSA and DSA key pairs are not
automatically zeroized. The DSA public key for the firmware integrity test and keys for other power-up self-tests are
hard-coded. This is allowed by FIPS 140-2 according to Section 7.4 of the Implementation Guidance.
The keys are stored on an AES-128 encrypted file storage, and zeroization is done by overwriting the key with
zeros.
2.5 Self-Tests
Implementation Tests Performed
Module Software ‐DSA Firmware Integrity Test
OpenSSL
-AES KAT
-Triple-DES KAT
-SHA-1 KAT
-DSA Sign/Verify
-ECDSA Sign/Verify
-RSA Sign/Verify
-SP800-90 DRBG KAT
‐HMAC‐SHA‐1 KAT
‐HMAC‐SHA‐224 KAT (covers self‐test for
SHA‐224)
‐HMAC‐SHA‐256 KAT (covers self‐test for
SHA‐256)
‐HMAC‐SHA‐384 KAT (covers self‐test for
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SHA‐384)
‐HMAC‐SHA‐512 KAT (covers self‐test for
SHA‐512)
The module performs all power-on self-tests automatically at boot when FIPS mode is enabled. All power-on self-
tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The power-on self-tests are performed after
the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the initialization of the LAN’s interfaces; this prevents the
module from passing any data during a power-on self-test failure. In the unlikely event that a power-on self-test
fails, an error message is written to /var/log/fipslog followed by a security appliance reboot.
Implementation Tests Performed
OpenSSL -DSA, ECDSA, and RSA Pairwise Consistency Tests
-SP800-90 DRBG and non-Approved RNG Continuous
Random Number Generator Tests
If conditional self-tests fail, an error message will be written to /var/log/fipslog. Failure of a pair-wise consistency
test for asymmetric keys or a continuous RNG test leads to reboot of the module.
If the integrity test for the running software fails, the system will reboot and an error message will be written to
/var/log/fipslog.
2.6 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks in a FIPS approved mode of operation above and beyond the
protection inherently provided by the module.
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3 Secure Operation
The Cisco EX series Telepresence systems meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2.
As stated in Session 2.4, an operator can access the module through one of the following interfaces:
(1) Touch Screen Control
(2) HTTPS
(3) SSH
(4) RS232
The Touch Screen Control provides the operator with a menu interface and the HTTPS protocol provides a web-
based interface. The other three interfaces are command-line based.
The client application (web browser) used for HTTPS connections must support TLS version 1 or later. For SSH
connections, the client application must support SSH version 2 or later.
The sections below describe how to place and keep the module in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation and how to
make secure calls.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
In order to have the Cisco EX series TelePresence system work in the FIPS-Approved mode, a Crypto Officer
should perform the following operations:
1. The tamper-evident labels shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of
operation. Refer to Section ‘Physical Security’ of this document for directions to apply the tamper-
evident labels.
2. Log in to SSH or RS232. If the unit has not been previously used, the module should be on a
closed network. The username is “admin” and the password is blank.
3. Switch from non-FIPS mode to FIPS mode, by inputting the command “xCommand Security
FIPSmode Activate Confirm: Yes” and hit the “enter” key on your keyboard. The connection will
be terminated because the module is being rebooted.
4. Log into SSH again, and enforce password policy by entering “systemtools securitysettings ask”,
and change the following settings when prompted and set them to the values displayed in the
square brackets (all other prompts can be left unaltered by pressing enter):
Max consecutive equal digits in PINs [2]?
Minimum number of digits in PINs [8]?
Minimum number of characters in passwords [8]?
Max consecutive identical characters in passwords [2]?
Minimum number of character groups in passwords [3]?
5. Change the password of the Crypto Officer by using the command “systemtools passwd” and
typing in the old password and new password twice.
6. Require that users and crypto officers log in to the GUI interface by setting the command
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“xconfiguration Video OSD LoginRequired: on”
7. Log into the web interface as the Crypto Officer. Here you can go to “Maintenance” then “User
Administration” to create users with USER role, or other Crypto Officers with ADMIN role.
8. The first time the crypto officer and all new users log onto GUI they must change their PIN (from
blank if not specified when created). They might also be required to change their password the
first time they log into web/ssh if this was a condition when creating the user.
In FIPS mode, encryption services for video calls between two modules are always required. This means that a call
will only be accepted if both endpoints (modules) support encryption.
3.2 Approved Algorithms
The appliances support many different cryptographic algorithms; however, only the following FIPS approved
algorithms may be used while in the FIPS mode of operation:
•AES encryption/decryption
•Triple DES encryption/decryption
•SHA (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512)
•HMAC-SHA-1 for hashed message authentication
•RSA sign and verify
•DSA sign and verify
•ECDSA sign and verify
•DRBG
The Tandberg EX60 and EX90 have earned the CAVP algorithm certifications listed below
Algorithm Certificate number
AES 1928
Triple-DES 1255
DSA 612
SHS 1693
RSA 994
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HMAC 1162
ECDSA 276
DRBG 168
Caveat:
The following Non-Approved algorithms are allowed for use for key establishment purposes in the FIPS-Approved
mode of the module:
• Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment provides 80-bits of encryption strength)
• RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 80, 112, or 150 bits of encryption strength)
• AES (Cert. #1928, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 128 bits of encryption strength)
3.3 Non-Approved Algorithms
The modules implement the following non-FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms:
• DES
• RC4
• RC2
• MD5
• MD5 HMAC
• Blowfish
• Camellia
Note: Non-FIPS approved algorithms cannot be used in FIPS mode of operation.
3.4 Physical Security
All Critical Security Parameters are stored and protected within each appliance's enclosure which is protected using
tamper-evident labels (TELs). The Crypto Officer is responsible for properly placing all tamper evident labels. The
tamper-evident labels required for FIPS 140-2 compliance are provided in the FIPS Kit (Part Number CISCO-FIPS-
KIT=). The FIPS kit includes 4 TELs for the EX60 and 3 TELs for the EX90, as well as a document detailing the
number of seals required per platform and placement information. These security labels are very fragile and cannot
be removed without leaving signs of tampering.
The EX60 module requires four (4) tamper-evident labels while the EX90 module requires three (3) tamper-evident
labels. The Crypto-Officer must first take note of where the labels are to be placed on the module. Then, the Crypto-
Officer must ensure that the surfaces of the module (where the TELs are to be placed) are cleaned with rubbing
alcohol. The Crypto-Officer can use a small paper towel with a dab of rubbing alcohol or an alcoholic swab to clean
the surfaces. After the rubbing alcohol dries, the Crypto-Officer must apply these TELs in the positions shown in the
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photos of the modules below before making the module available for use in the FIPS-Approved mode. The Crypto-
Officer shall inspect the module enclosure and the TELs periodically for signs of tampering.
Figure 17 - EX60 Front
Figure 18 - EX60 Bottom
TEL 1 TEL 2
Status LEDs
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Figure 19 - EX60 Back
Figure 20 - EX60 Right Side Figure 21 - EX60 Left Side
TEL 3
TEL 4
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Figure 22 - EX90 Back
Figure 17 - EX90 Top w/ camera down
TEL 1
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Figure 24 - EX90 Bottom
TEL 2 TEL 3
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3.5 Acronyms
Table 5 - Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
BIOS Basic Input/Output System
BRI Basic Rate Interface
CA Certification Authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CVS Concurrent Versions System
DCE Data Communications Equipment
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DSP Digital Signal Processor
DVI Digital Visual Interface
ECB Electronic Codebook
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GPIO General Purpose Input/Output
HD High-Definition
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security
IP Internet Protocol
KAT Known Answer Test
LAN Local Area Network
LED Light-Emitting Diode
MCU Multiple Control Unit
MPS Media Processing System
N/A Not Applicable
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PRI Primary Rate Interface
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Acronym Definition
RCA Radio Corporation of America
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
RTOS Real-Time Operating System
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TEL Tamper-Evident Label
TLS Transport Layer Security
USB Universal Serial Bus
XOR Exclusive-or