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Juniper Networks SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 Services
Gateways
Non‐Proprietary FIPS 140‐2 Cryptographic Module Security
Policy
Version: 1.3
Date: August 25, 2016
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................4
1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary.........................................................................6
1.2 Mode of Operation.................................................................................................................... 11
1.3 Firmware Load........................................................................................................................... 12
1.4 Zeroization................................................................................................................................. 13
2 Cryptographic Functionality........................................................................................... 14
2.1 Disallowed Algorithms............................................................................................................... 16
2.2 Critical Security Parameters...................................................................................................... 17
3 Roles, Authentication and Services................................................................................ 19
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles ...................................................................... 19
3.2 Authentication Methods ........................................................................................................... 19
3.3 Services...................................................................................................................................... 19
4 Self‐tests........................................................................................................................ 20
5 Physical Security Policy.................................................................................................. 24
5.1 General Tamper Seal Placement and Application Instructions................................................. 24
5.2 SRX5400 (13 seals) .................................................................................................................... 24
5.3 SRX5600 (17 seals) .................................................................................................................... 25
5.4 SRX5800 (24 seals) .................................................................................................................... 27
6 Security Rules and Guidance.......................................................................................... 29
7 References and Definitions............................................................................................ 30
List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations.......................................................................................... 4
Table 2 ‐ Security Level of Security Requirements........................................................................................ 5
Table 3 ‐ Ports and Interfaces .................................................................................................................... 11
Table 4 ‐ Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions ............................................................14
Table 5 ‐ Non‐Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions.................................................................15
Table 6 ‐ Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode .................................................................................................. 15
Table 7 ‐ Critical Security Parameters (CSPs).............................................................................................. 17
Table 8 ‐ Public Keys....................................................................................................................................17
Table 9 ‐ Authenticated Services ................................................................................................................ 19
Table 10 ‐ Unauthenticated traffic.............................................................................................................. 20
Table 11 ‐ CSP Access Rights within Services.............................................................................................. 20
Table 12 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ....................................................................................24
Table 13 – References.................................................................................................................................30
Table 14 – Acronyms and Definitions ......................................................................................................... 30
Table 15 – Datasheets.................................................................................................................................31
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List of Figures
Figure 1 – SRX5400 Front View..................................................................................................................... 6
Figure 2 – SRX5400 Bottom View ................................................................................................................. 7
Figure 3 – SRX5600 Profile View ................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 4 – SRX5600 Rear View ...................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 5 – SRX5600 Left View ....................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 6 – SRX5800 Top View........................................................................................................................ 9
Figure 7 – SRX5800 Rear View .................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 8 – SRX5800 Left View ..................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 9 ‐ SRX5400‐ Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations on Front‐ Six Seals....................................................25
Figure 10 ‐ SRX5400‐ Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations on Rear‐ Seven Seals..............................................25
Figure 11 ‐ SRX5600‐ Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations on Front‐11 Seals ...................................................26
Figure 12 ‐ SRX5600‐ Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations on Rear‐ Seven Seals..............................................26
Figure 13 ‐ SRX5800‐ Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations on Front‐ 19 Seals ..................................................27
Figure 14 ‐ SRX5800‐ Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations on Rear‐ Five Seals .................................................28
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1 Introduction
The Juniper Networks SRX Series Services Gateways are a series of secure routers that provide essential
capabilities to connect, secure, and manage work force locations sized from handfuls to hundreds of
users. By consolidating fast, highly available switching, routing, security, and applications capabilities in
a single device, enterprises can economically deliver new services, safe connectivity, and a satisfying end
user experience. All models run Juniper’s JUNOS firmware – in this case, a specific FIPS‐compliant
version called JUNOS‐FIPS, version 12.1X46‐D40. The firmware image is junos‐srx5000‐12.1X46‐D40.4‐
fips.tgz and the firmware Status service identifies itself as in the “Junos 12.1X46‐D40.4 (FIPS edition)”.
This Security Policy covers the SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 models. They are meant for service
providers, large enterprise networks, and public‐sector networks.
The cryptographic modules are defined as multiple‐chip standalone modules that execute JUNOS‐FIPS
firmware on any of the Juniper Networks SRX‐Series gateways listed in the table below.
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations
Model Hardware Versions Firmware Distinguishing Features
SRX5400
SRX5400B2‐AC
SRX5400B2‐DC
SRX5400BB‐AC
SRX5400BB‐DC
with
SRX5K‐SPC‐2‐10‐40
SRX5K‐SPC‐4‐15‐320
JUNOS‐FIPS
12.1X46‐D40 2 SPC slots; 2 IOC slots
SRX5600
SRX5600BASE‐AC
SRX5600BASE‐DC
with
SRX5K‐SPC‐2‐10‐40
SRX5K‐SPC‐4‐15‐320
JUNOS‐FIPS
12.1X46‐D40
8 slots, with a maximum of 5 SPCs and 5
IOCs
SRX5800
SRX5800BASE‐AC
SRX5800BASE‐DC
with
SRX5K‐SPC‐2‐10‐40
SRX5K‐SPC‐4‐15‐320
JUNOS‐FIPS
12.1X46‐D40
14 slots with a maximum of 11 SPCs and
11 IOCs
All JNPR‐FIPS‐TAMPER‐LBLS Tamper‐Evident Seals
The modules are designed to meet FIPS 140‐2 Level 2 overall:
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Table 2 ‐ Security Level of Security Requirements
Area Description Level
1 Module Specification 2
2 Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles and Services 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC 2
9 Self‐test 2
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 2
The modules have a limited operational environment as per the FIPS 140‐2 definitions. They include a
firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this
validation must be validated through the FIPS 140‐2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into these
modules are out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140‐2 validation.
The modules do not implement any mitigation of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140‐2.
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1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary
The physical forms of the module’s various models are depicted in Figures 1‐11 below. For all models
the cryptographic boundary is defined as the outer edge of the chassis. The modules exclude the power
supply and fan components from the requirements of FIPS 140‐2. The power supplies and fans do not
contain any security relevant components and cannot affect the security of the module. The excluded
components are identified with red borders in the following figures. The module does not rely on
external devices for input and output.
Figure 1 – SRX5400 Front View
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Figure 2 – SRX5400 Bottom View
Figure 3 – SRX5600 Profile View
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Figure 4 – SRX5600 Rear View
Figure 5 – SRX5600 Left View
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Figure 6 – SRX5800 Top View
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Figure 7 – SRX5800 Rear View
Figure 8 – SRX5800 Left View
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Table 3 ‐ Ports and Interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
Ethernet LAN Communications Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Serial Console serial port Control in, Status out
Power Power connector Power
Reset Reset Control in
LED Status indicator lighting Status out
USB Firmware load port Control in, Data in
WAN SHDSL, VDSL, T1, E1 Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
1.2 Mode of Operation
Follow the instructions in Section 5 to apply the tamper seals to the module. Once the tamper seals have
been applied as shown in this document, the JUNOS‐FIPS firmware image is installed on the device, and
integrity and self‐tests have run successfully on initial power‐on, the module is operating in the
approved mode. The Crypto‐Officer must ensure that the backup image of the firmware is also a JUNOS‐
FIPS image by issuing the request system snapshot command.
If the module was previously in a non‐Approved mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must
zeroize the CSPs by following the instructions in Section 1.3.
Then, the CO must run the following commands to configure SSH to use FIPS approved and FIPS allowed
algorithms:
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh hostkey-algorithm ssh-ecdsa
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh hostkey-algorithm no-ssh-rsa
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh hostkey-algorithm no-ssh-dss
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh hostkey-algorithm no-ssh-ed25519
co@fips-srx# commit
The CO can change the preference of SSH key exchange methods using the following command:
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh key-exchange <algorithm>
<algorithm> - dh-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384,
group-exchange-sha1, or group-exchange-sha2
Note: These methods are always proposed during SSH session negotiation. Explicitly specifying a method
moves the algorithm up in the list of proposed algorithms during the SSH session establishment.
The CO can change the preference of SSH cipher algorithms using the following command:
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh ciphers <algorithm>
<algorithm> - 3des-cbc, aes128-cbc, aes128-ctr, aes192-cbc, aes192-ctr,
aes256-cbc, aes256-ctr
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Note: These algorithms are always proposed during SSH session negotiation. Explicitly specifying an
algorithm moves the algorithm up in the list of proposed algorithms during the SSH session
establishment.
The CO can change the preference of SSH MAC algorithms or enable additional Approved algorithms
using the following command:
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh macs <algorithm>
<algorithm> - hmac-sha1, hmac-sha1-96, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512,
hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-
etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
Note: hmac‐sha1 and hmac‐sha1‐96 are always proposed during SSH session negotiation. Explicitly
specifying either algorithm moves it up in the list of proposed algorithms during the SSH session
establishment. Specifying any other MAC algorithm adds it to the list of algorithms proposed.
For each IPsec tunnel configured, the CO must run the following command to configure the algorithms:
co@fips-srx# set system security ipsec <name> authentication-algorithm
<algorithm>
<algorithm> - hmac-sha-256-128, hmac-sha1-96
co@fips-srx# set system security ipsec <name> encryption-algorithm
<algorithm>
<algorithm> - 3des-cbc, aes-128-cbc, aes-128-gcm, aes-192-cbc, aes-192-
gcm, aes-256-cbc, aes-256-gcm
Note: Use of AES‐GCM is only FIPS approved when it is configured for use in conjunction with IKEv2.
The “show version” command will indicate if the module is operating in FIPS mode (e.g. JUNOS Software
Release [12.1X46‐D40] (FIPS edition)), run “show system services ssh”, and run “show security
ipsec” to verify that only the FIPS approved and FIPS allowed algorithms are configured for SSH and
IPsec as specified above.
1.3 Firmware Load
The cryptographic module implements a firmware load service allows the loading of legacy firmware
(legacy‐use of digital signature verification using SHA‐1 as defined by SP800‐131Ar1). To comply with SP
800‐131Ar1, the Crypto Officer must manually determine when a legacy firmware load is being
performed and determine if the correct type of signature is being verified.
Warning: Legacy firmware might not be FIPS 140‐2 Validated or meet SP 800‐131Ar1 requirements. The
Crypto Officer must determine whether legacy firmware meets their organization’s compliance and
certification requirements.
When newer firmware is being loaded, the Crypto Officer must verify the presence of an ECDSA
signature for the junos and junos‐boot portions of the image by running:
% tar ztf <firmware_image>.tgz | grep esig
The Crypto Officer must verify the output show presence of an esig file for both the junos and junos‐
boot portions of the image. For example:
% tar ztf junos-srx5000-12.1X46-D40.4-fips.tgz | grep esig
junos-boot-srx5000-12.1X46-D40.4-fips.esig
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junos-srx5000-12.1X46-D40.4-fips.esig
If the two esig files are not present, the Crypto Officer must not install the image.
If the two esig files are present or the Crypto Officer is installing a legacy image, installation may
continue using the following command:
co@fips-srx> request system software add [no-validate] [no-copy]
<firmware_image>.tgz [reboot]
The module will automatically verify that the image signature(s) are valid.
1.4 Zeroization
The cryptographic module provides a non‐Approved mode of operation in which non‐approved
cryptographic algorithms are supported. When transitioning between the non‐Approved mode of
operation and the Approved mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must run the following
commands to zeroize the Approved mode CSPs:
co@fips-srx> start shell
co@fips-srx% rm –P <keyfile>
<keyfile> - each persistent private or secret key other than the SSH
host keys and the X.509 keys for IKE.
co@fips-srx% rm –P /var/db/certs/common/certificate-request/*
co@fips-srx% exit
co@fips-srx> request system zeroize
Note: The Cryptographic Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
The module implements the FIPS Approved and Non‐Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in the tables below. Table 6 summarizes the high level protocol algorithm support. The module
does not implement algorithms that require vendor affirmation.
Table 4 ‐ Approved and CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions
Implementation Reference Mode Functions Strength Cert
IPsec Triple‐DES SP 800‐20 TCBC Encrypt and decrypt 112 (3‐Key)
2037,
2038
IPsec AES
FIPS 197
SP 800‐38A
SP 800‐38D
CBC
GCM1 Encrypt and decrypt 128, 192, 256
3662,
3663
IPsec SHA FIPS 180‐4 Hash generation
80 (SHA‐1)
128 (SHA‐256)
3080,
3081
IPsec HMAC FIPS 198‐1 HMAC Gen, Ver
128 (HMAC‐SHA‐1)
256 (HMAC‐SHA‐
256)
2412,
2413
IKE Triple‐DES SP 800‐20 TCBC Encrypt and decrypt 112 2035
IKE AES
FIPS 197
SP 800‐38A
CBC Encrypt and decrypt 128, 192, 256 3656
IKE SHA FIPS 180‐4 Hash generation
80 (SHA‐1)
128 (SHA‐256)
192 (SHA‐384)
3074
IKE HMAC FIPS 198‐1 HMAC Gen, Ver
128 (HMAC‐SHA‐1)
256 (HMAC‐SHA‐
256, HMAC‐SHA‐
384)
2406
IKE KDF SP 800‐135 IKE v1/v2 KDF 112‐256 659
IKE ECDSA FIPS 186‐4 KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer
128 (P‐256)
192 (P‐384)
769,
770
IKE RSA FIPS 186‐4 SigGen, SigVer 112 (2048 bit)
1895,
1896
IKE DSA FIPS 186‐4 KeyGen 112 (2048 bit)
1032,
1033
SSH Triple‐DES SP 800‐20 TCBC Encrypt and decrypt 112 (3‐Key) 2036
SSH AES
FIPS 197
SP 800‐38A
CBC
CTR
Encrypt and decrypt 128, 192, 256 3650
SSH SHA FIPS 180‐4 Hash generation
80 (SHA‐1)
128 (SHA‐256)
256 (SHA‐512)
3068
SSH HMAC FIPS 198‐1 HMAC Gen, Ver
128 (HMAC‐SHA‐1)
256 (HMAC‐SHA‐
256, HMAC‐SHA‐
2400
1
The SRX5K‐SPC‐2‐10‐40 does not support GCM.
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512)
SSH RSA FIPS 186‐4
KeyGen, SigVer 112 (2048 bit)
1885
SigVer 128 (3072 bit)
SSH ECDSA FIPS 186‐4 KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer
112 (P‐224)
128 (P‐256)
192 (P‐384)
758
SSH DSA FIPS 186‐4 KeyGen 112 (2048 bit) 1022
DRBG SP 800‐90A HMAC Random generation
256 (HMAC‐SHA‐
256)
981
SSH KDF SP 800‐135 SSHv2 KDF 112‐256 660
Table 5 ‐ Non‐Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Reference
Non‐SP 800‐56A Compliant
Diffie‐Hellman
[IG] D.8 Diffie‐Hellman (key agreement; key establishment
methodology provides between 112 and 192 bits of encryption
strength).
Non‐SP 800‐56A Compliant
Elliptic Curve Diffie‐Hellman
[IG] D.8 EC Diffie‐Hellman (key agreement; key establishment
methodology provides 128 or 192 bits of encryption strength).
NDRNG
[IG] 7.11 Hardware Non‐Deterministic RNG used to seed the FIPS
Approved DRBG.
HMAC‐SHA‐1‐96
[IG] A.8 Hash Message Authentication Code truncated to 96‐bits.
Allowed for use in FIPS mode.
Table 6 ‐ Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Auth Cipher Integrity
IKEv1/v2
Oakley Group 14 (DH L = 2048
bit, N = 224 bit)
Oakley Group 19 (P‐256)
Oakley Group 20 (P‐384)
Oakley Group 24 (DH L = 2048
bit, N = 224 bit)
RSA 2048
Pre‐Shared
Secret
ECDSA P‐256
ECDSA P‐384
3 Key Triple‐DES
AES CBC
128/192/256
HMAC‐SHA‐
1‐96
HMAC‐SHA‐
256
HMAC‐SHA‐
384
IPsec ESP
IKEv1 with optional:
 Oakley Group 14 (DH L =
2048 bit, N = 224 bit)
 Oakley Group 19 (P‐256)
 Oakley Group 20 (P‐384)
 Oakley Group 24 (DH L =
2048 bit, N = 224 bit)
IKEv1
3 Key Triple‐DES
AES CBC
128/192/256 HMAC‐SHA‐
1‐96
HMAC‐SHA‐
256‐128
IKEv2 with optional:
 Oakley Group 14 (DH L =
2048 bit, N = 224 bit)
 Oakley Group 19 (P‐256)
 Oakley Group 20 (P‐384)
IKEv2
3 Key Triple‐DES
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES GCM
128/192/256 16
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 Oakley Group 24 (DH L =
2048 bit, N = 224 bit)
octet ICV2
SSHv2
Diffie‐hellman‐group‐
exchange‐sha1 (L = 2048 bit,
3072 bit, 4096 bit, 6144 bit,
7680 bit, or 8192 bit; N = 256
bit, 320 bit, 384 bit, 512 bit, or
1024 bit)
Diffie‐hellman‐group‐
exchange‐sha2 (L = 2048 bit,
3072 bit, 4096 bit, 6144 bit,
7680 bit, or 8192 bit; N = 256
bit, 320 bit, 384 bit, 512 bit, or
1024 bit)
Diffie‐hellman‐group14‐sha1 (L
= 2048 bit; N = 256 bit, 320 bit,
384 bit, 512 bit, or 1024 bit)
ECDH‐sha2‐nistp256
ECDH‐sha2‐nistp384
ECDSA P‐256
3 Key Triple‐DES
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES CTR
128/192/256
HMAC‐SHA‐
1‐96
HMAC‐SHA‐1
HMAC‐SHA‐
256
HMAC‐SHA‐
512
These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
The IKE and SSH algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and
integrity. In Table 6 above, each column of options for a given protocol is independent, and may be used
in any viable combination.
2.1 Disallowed Algorithms
These algorithms are non‐Approved algorithms that are disabled when the module is operated in an
Approved mode of operation. These security functions are available in the SSH connect (non‐compliant)
service.
 ssh‐dss (DSA non‐compliant)
 dh‐group1‐sha1 (Diffie‐Hellman (non‐compliant key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
 hmac‐md5
 hmac‐md5‐96
 hmac‐md5‐96‐etm@openssh.com
 hmac‐md5‐etm@openssh.com
 hmac‐ripemd160
 hmac‐ripemd160‐etm@openssh.com
 umac‐128‐etm@openssh.com
 umac‐64‐etm@openssh.com
 umac‐64@openssh.com
 arcfour
 arcfour128
2
The SRX5K‐SPC‐2‐10‐40 does not support GCM.
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 arcfour256
 blowfish‐cbc
 cast128‐cbc
2.2 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section.
Table 7 ‐ Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage
DRBG_Seed Seed material used to seed or reseed the DRBG
DRBG_State V and Key values for the HMAC_DRBG
SSH PHK
SSH Private host key. 1st
time SSH is configured, the keys are generated. ECDSA P‐256.
Used to identify the host.
SSH DH
SSH Diffie‐Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie‐Hellman private key used in SSH.
DH (N = 256 bit, 320 bit, 384 bit, 512 bit, or 1024 bit3
), ECDH P‐256, or ECDH P‐384
SSH‐SEK SSH Session Key; Session keys used with SSH. TDES (3key), AES, HMAC.
ESP‐SEK IPSec ESP Session Keys. TDES (3 key), AES, HMAC.
IKE‐PSK Pre‐Shared Key used to authenticate IKE connections.
IKE‐Priv IKE Private Key. RSA 2048, ECDSA P‐256, or ECDSA P‐384
IKE‐SKEYID IKE SKEYID. IKE secret used to derive IKE and IPsec ESP session keys.
IKE‐SEK IKE Session Keys. TDES (3 key), AES, HMAC.
IKE‐DH‐PRI
IKE Diffie‐Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie‐Hellman private key used in IKE.
DH N = 224 bit, ECDH P‐256, or ECDH P‐384
CO‐PW ASCII Text used to authenticate the CO.
User_PW ASCII Text used to authenticate the User.
Table 8 ‐ Public Keys
Name Description and usage
SSH‐PUB SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. ECDSA P‐256.
SSH‐DH‐PUB
Diffie‐Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie‐Hellman public key used in SSH key
establishment. DH (L = 2048 bit, 3072 bit, 4096 bit, 6144 bit, 7680 bit, or 8192 bit), ECDH P‐
256, or ECDH P‐384
IKE‐PUB IKE Public Key RSA 2048, ECDSA P‐256, or ECDSA P‐384
IKE‐DH‐PUB
Diffie‐Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie‐Hellman public key used in IKE key
establishment. DH L = 2048 bit, ECDH P‐256, or ECDH P‐384
Auth‐UPub
User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the module. ECDSA P256 or P‐
384
Auth‐COPub CO Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module. ECDSA P256 or P‐384
3
SSH generates a Diffie‐Hellman private key that is 2x the bit length of the longest symmetric or MAC
key negotiated.
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Root‐CA
JuniperRootCA. RSA 2048 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package‐
CA at software load.
RootEC CA
JuniperRootEC CA. ECDSA P‐256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper
Package CA at software load and also at runtime for integrity.
Package‐CA
PackageCA. RSA 2048 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of legacy Juniper Images at
software load.
PackageEC
CA
PackageEC CA. ECDSA P‐256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity the Juniper Image at
software load and also at runtime for integrity.
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles
The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent
operators, but does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the
separation of roles using either identity‐based operator authentication.
The Cryptographic Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As
root or super‐user, the Cryptographic Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module
The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The user role may not change the
configuration.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements two forms of Identity‐Based authentication, Username and password over the
Console and SSH as well as Username and public key over SSH.
Password authentication: The module enforces 10‐character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the
96 human readable ASCII characters. The maximum password length is 20‐characters.
The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming 0
time to process), no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5‐second
delay. Each failed attempt thereafter results in an additional 5‐second delay above the previous (e.g. 4th
failed attempt = 10‐second delay, 5th
failed attempt = 15‐second delay, 6th
failed attempt = 20‐second
delay, 7th
failed attempt = 25‐second delay).
This leads to a maximum of seven (7) possible attempts in a one‐minute period for each getty. The best
approach for the attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts, and wait for a new getty to be
spawned. This would allow the attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute (576 attempts per
hour/60 mins); this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no such thing as 0.6
attempts. Thus the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1 million.
The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one‐minute period is 9/(9610
), which
is less than 1/100,000.
ECDSA signature verification: SSH public‐key authentication. Processing constraints allow for a maximum
of 5.6e7 ECDSA attempts per minute. The module supports ECDSA (P‐256 and P‐384). The probability of
a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one‐minute period is 5.6e7/(2128
).
3.3 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 11 lists the access to CSPs
by each service.
Table 9 ‐ Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure
security
Security relevant configuration x
Configure Non‐security relevant configuration x
Secure Traffic IPsec protected connection (ESP) x
Status Show status x x
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs x
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SSH connect
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
IPsec connect Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) x
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset Software initiated reset x
Table 10 ‐ Unauthenticated traffic
Service Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
Table 11 ‐ CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
DRBG_Seed
DRBG_State
SSH
PHK
SSH
DH
SSH‐SEK
ESP‐SEK
IKE‐PSK
IKE‐Priv
IKE‐SKEYI
IKE‐SEK
IKE‐DH‐PRI
CO‐PW
User‐PW
Configure
security
‐‐ E GW ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ W GW ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
W W
Configure ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
Secure traffic ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ E ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ E ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
Status ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
Zeroize ‐‐ Z Z ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ Z Z ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ Z Z
SSH connect ‐‐ E E GE GE ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ E E
IPsec connect ‐‐ E ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ G E E G G G ‐‐ ‐‐
Console
access
‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
E E
Remote reset GE G ‐‐ Z Z Z ‐‐ ‐‐ Z Z Z Z Z
Local reset GE G ‐‐ Z Z Z ‐‐ ‐‐ Z Z Z Z Z
Traffic ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output)
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP
W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the module
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
3.4 Non‐Approved Services
The following services are available in the non‐Approved mode of operation. The security functions
provided by the non‐Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts with the exception of
SSH Connect (non‐compliant). SSH Connect (non‐compliant) supports the security functions identified in
Section 2.1 and the SSHv2 row of Table 6.
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Table 12 ‐ Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security (non‐
compliant)
Security relevant configuration x
Configure (non‐
compliant)
Non‐security relevant configuration x
Secure Traffic (non‐
compliant)
IPsec protected connection (ESP) x
Status (non‐compliant) Show status x x
Zeroize (non‐compliant) Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect (non‐
compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring
and control (CLI)
x x
IPsec connect (non‐
compliant)
Initiate IPsec connection (IKE) x
Console access (non‐
compliant)
Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset (non‐
compliant)
Software initiated reset x
Table 13 ‐ Unauthenticated traffic
Service Description
Local reset (non‐
compliant)
Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic (non‐
compliant)
Traffic requiring no cryptographic services
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4 Self‐tests
Each time the module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and
that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power‐up self–tests are available on demand by power
cycling the module.
On power up or reset, the module performs the self‐tests described below. All KATs must be completed
successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the KATs fails, the module
enters the Critical Failure error state.
The module performs the following power‐up self‐tests:
 Firmware Integrity check using ECDSA P‐256 with SHA‐256
 QuickSec JSF Hardware Accelerated KATs
o AES‐CBC Encrypt KAT
o ASE‐CBC Decrypt KAT
o AES‐GCM Encrypt KAT (Note: Except on SRX5K‐SPC‐2‐10‐40 which does not support AES
GCM)
o ASE‐GCM Decrypt KAT (Note: Except on SRX5K‐SPC‐2‐10‐40 which does not support AES
GCM)
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA‐256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2448 w/ SHA‐256 Verify KAT
o ECDSA P‐256 w/ SHA‐256 Sign/Verify PCT
 QuickSec Hardware Accelerated KATs
o Triple‐DES‐CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple‐DES‐CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC‐SHA‐1 KAT
o HMAC‐SHA‐256 KAT
 OpenSSL KATs
o SP 800‐90A HMAC DRBG KAT
 Health‐tests initialize, re‐seed, and generate.
o ECDSA P‐256 Sign/Verify PCT
o ECDH P‐256 KAT
 Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA‐256 Sign KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA‐256 Verify KAT
o Triple‐DES‐CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple‐DES‐CBC Decrypt KAT
o HMAC‐SHA‐1 KAT
o HMAC‐SHA‐256 KAT
o HMAC‐SHA‐384 KAT
o HMAC‐SHA‐512 KAT
o SHA‐256 KAT
o AES‐CBC Encrypt KAT
o ASE‐CBC Decrypt KAT
o KDF‐SSH KAT
 QuickSec KATs
o Triple‐DES‐CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple‐DES‐CBC Decrypt KAT
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o HMAC‐SHA1 KAT
o HMAC‐SHA‐256 KAT
o HMAC‐SHA‐384 KAT
o AES‐CBC Encrypt KAT
o ASE‐CBC Decrypt KAT
o KDF‐IKE‐V1 KAT
o KDF‐IKE‐V2 KAT
 Critical Function Test
o The cryptographic module performs a verification of a limited operational environment,
and verification of optional non‐critical packages.
The module also performs the following conditional self‐tests:
 Continuous RNG Test on the SP 800‐90A HMAC‐DRBG
 Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG
 Pairwise consistency test when generating DSA, ECDSA, and RSA key pairs.
 Firmware Load Test (ECDSA or RSA signature verification)
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5 Physical Security Policy
The modules physical embodiment is that of a multi‐chip standalone device that meets Level 2 Physical
Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated,
cold rolled steel, plated steel and brushed aluminum enclosure. There are no ventilation holes, gaps,
slits, cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow for any sort of observation of any component contained
within the cryptographic boundary. Tamper‐evident seals allow the operator to tell if the enclosure has
been breached. These seals are not factory‐installed and must be applied by the Cryptographic Officer.
(Seals are available for order from Juniper using part number JNPR‐FIPS‐TAMPER‐LBLS.) The tamper‐
evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS mode of operation.
The Cryptographic Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused seals
and the direct control and observation of any changes to the module such as reconfigurations where the
tamper‐evident seals or security appliances are removed or installed to ensure the security of the
module is maintained during such changes and the module is returned to a FIPS Approved state.
Table 14 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper seals, opaque
metal enclosure.
Once per month by the
Cryptographic Officer.
Seals should be free of any tamper
evidence.
5.1 General Tamper Seal Placement and Application Instructions
For all seal applications, the Cryptographic Officer should observe the following instructions:
 Handle the seals with care. Do not touch the adhesive side.
 Before applying a seal, ensure the location of application is clean, dry, and clear of any residue.
 Place the seal on the module, applying firm pressure across it to ensure adhesion. Allow at least
1 hour for the adhesive to cure.
5.2 SRX5400 (13 seals)
Tamper‐evident seals shall be applied to the following locations:
 Front Pane:
o Two seals, vertical, connected to the topmost (non‐honeycomb) sub‐pane. They extend
to the thin pane below and the honeycomb panel above.
o One seal, vertical, across the thin pane. Extends to the blank pane below and the sub‐
pane above.
o Three seals, vertical, one on each “long” horizontal sub‐pane. Each attaches to the sub‐
pane above and the one below (or the chassis, if it’s the bottommost sub‐pane). Ensure
one of the seals extends to the left sub‐pane below the thin sub‐pane.
 Back Pane:
o Four seals, vertical: one on each of the top four sub‐panes, extending to the large
chassis plate below.
o One seal, vertical: on the horizontal screwed‐in plate resting on the large central chassis.
Should extend to the chassis in both directions.
o Two seals, horizontal: placed on the low side sub‐panes, extending to the large central
chassis area and wrapping around to the neighboring side panes.
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Figure 9 ‐ SRX5400‐ Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations on Front‐ Six Seals
Figure 10 ‐ SRX5400‐ Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations on Rear‐ Seven Seals
5.3 SRX5600 (17 seals)
Tamper‐evident seals must be applied to the following locations:
 Front Pane:
o Eleven seals, vertical: one for each horizontal sub‐pane (excluding the honeycomb plate
on the top and the thin sub‐pane a little below), a second for the top (non‐honeycomb)
sub‐pane, and an extra for the bottom. The seals should attach to vertically adjacent
sub‐panes. The extra on the bottom attaches to the lowermost sub‐pane and wraps
around attaching to the bottom pane. It should be ensured that one of the seals spans
across the thin plate with ample extra distance on each side.
 Back Pane:
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o Four seals, vertical: one on each of the upper four sub‐panes, attaching to the large
plate below.
o Two seals, horizontal: one on each of the vertical side sub‐panes, extending to both the
large central plate and the side panes.
Figure 11 ‐ SRX5600‐ Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations on Front‐11 Seals
Figure 12 ‐ SRX5600‐ Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations on Rear‐ Seven Seals
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5.4 SRX5800 (24 seals)
Tamper‐evident seals shall be applied to the following locations:
 Front Pane:
o Fourteen (14) seals, horizontal: one on each of the long vertical sub‐panes, extending to
the neighboring two. If on an end sub‐pane, seal should wrap around to the side.
o Three seals, vertical: One over each of the thin panes – two near the bottom, one near
the top of the lower half.
o Two seals, vertical: both on the console area at the top of the module, one extending to
the top and the other extending to the chassis area below.
 Back Pane:
o Five seals, horizontal: Three spanning the gaps between the vertical sub‐panels, and
then two more, one each on the far edges of the left and right panels. (These last two
should wrap around to the sides.)
Figure 13 ‐ SRX5800‐ Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations on Front‐ 19 Seals
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Figure 14 ‐ SRX5800‐ Tamper‐Evident Seal Locations on Rear‐ Five Seals
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6 Security Rules and Guidance
The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term must in this context specifically
refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all other statements
indicate a security rule implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services.
3. Power up self‐tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self‐tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires to independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputing plaintext
CSPs.
11. The cryptographic officer must determine whether firmware being loaded is a legacy use of the
firmware load service.
12. The cryptographic officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
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7 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 15 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140‐2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800‐131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, January 2011
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140‐2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
Table 16 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DH Diffie‐Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie‐Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed‐Hash Message Authentication Code
ICV Integrity Check Value (i.e. Tag)
IKE Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IOC Input/Output Card
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
MD5 Message Digest 5
NPC Network Processing Card
RE Routing Engine
RSA Public‐key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SPC Services Processing Card
SSH Secure Shell
Triple‐DES Triple ‐ Data Encryption Standard
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Table 17 – Datasheets
Model Title URL
SRX5400
SRX5600
SRX5800
SRX Series Service
Gateways for service
provider, large
enterprise, and
public
sector networks.
http://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datasheets/1000254‐
en.pdf