FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Aegis Secure Key 3NX Cryptographic Module
Author: Victor Nguyen
Date: 2020-06-09
Document Issue: 1.1
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Aegis Secure Key 3NX Cryptographic Module Cryptographic Module Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1. References .............................................................................................................. 3
2. Target Audience ........................................................................................................ 3
3. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 4
3.1 Purpose of the Security Policy.............................................................................................. 4
3.2 Cryptographic Module Description ...................................................................................... 4
4. Security Levels.......................................................................................................... 7
5. Interfaces and Ports.................................................................................................. 7
6. Cryptographic Key and CSP Management.............................................................. 8
6.1 AES Master Key ................................................................................................................... 8
6.2 PIN Access Codes................................................................................................................. 8
6.3 Random Number Generation................................................................................................ 8
6.4 EC DH Key Establishment ................................................................................................... 9
7. Identification and Authentication Policy................................................................. 9
7.1 Roles ..................................................................................................................................... 9
7.2 Authentication..................................................................................................................... 10
8. Access Control Policy ............................................................................................ 11
9. Physical Security Policy......................................................................................... 13
10. Regulatory Compliance ........................................................................................ 13
11. Security Rules ....................................................................................................... 14
11.1 Initialization Period of the Cryptographic Module........................................................... 14
11.2 FIPS Approved Mode ....................................................................................................... 15
12. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy....................................................................... 17
13. Acronyms............................................................................................................... 17
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Revision History
8.27.19 1.0
6.9.20 1.1
Table 1 – Revision History
1. References
Author Title
NIST
FIPS PUB 140-2: Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules,
December, 2002
NIST Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2, January, 2011
NIST
Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic
Module Validation Program, August 16, 2019
NIST FIPS 197
NIST FIPS 180-4
NIST SP800-90A Revision 1
NIST SP800-38E
NIST SP800-56A
Table 2 - References
2. Target Audience
• NIST, CCCS, Accredited Laboratory and the FIPS 140-2 Validation Group
• Developers Working on the Release
• Product Verification
• Documentation
• Product and Development Managers
• Security Assurance
• Administrator and General User
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3. Introduction
This security policy document contains a description of the Aegis Secure Key 3NX
Cryptographic Module (also referred to herein as the cryptographic module, or simply
the module). This document contains a specification of the security rules under which
the module must operate as derived from the requirements of FIPS 140-2.
3.1 Purpose of the Security Policy
There are three major reasons that this security policy is defined for, and must be
followed by, the cryptographic module:
• This document is required for FIPS 140-2 validation.
• This document allows individuals and organizations to determine whether
the cryptographic module, as implemented, satisfies the stated security
policy.
• This document describes the capabilities, protection, and access rights
provided by the cryptographic module, allowing individuals and
organizations to determine whether it will meet their security requirements.
3.2 Cryptographic Module Description
The Aegis Secure Key 3NX Cryptographic Module is a multi-chip standalone
cryptographic module. Specifically, the module is a USB 3.1 to Data Storage
Memory Module which implements hardware encryption dependent on operator
authentication.
The module provides secure encrypted (AES-XTS 256) storage, ensuring that
only authorized operators have access to the protected data.
Access is granted by use of an embedded alpha-numeric keypad whereby the
authorized operator inputs a personal identification number (PIN) to access and
unlock the secured data. Three (3) LEDs, each a different color, indicate the
module status during authentication and operation.
Electronic components containing all critical security parameters (CSPs) are
encapsulated within a hard, opaque, tamper-evident, production-grade epoxy.
The module also incorporates a strong, tamper-resistant, non-removable, hard
metal enclosure that defines the cryptographic boundary.
This software-free, embedded authentication approach allows the module to
work with any mass storage compliant operating system whether it has a
keyboard or not, and never shares any CSPs with the host.
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The cryptographic module is designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 3 cryptographic
module requirements for the storage of user credentials and file systems. The
module will only operate in the “FIPS Approved” mode of operation. It must be
configured according to the initial setup instructions in Section 11.1 before being
operational. A non-Approved FIPS mode is not supported.
The Aegis Secure Key 3NX Cryptographic Module (Figure 1 below), represents
the physical boundary of the device and the cryptographic boundary as outlined
by the red marking.
Figure 1 - Aegis Secure Key 3NX Cryptographic Module
Aegis Secure Key 3NX Cryptographic Module
Firmware Version 1.5
Hardware Version Rev A1
Part Numbers
ASK3NX-2GB
ASK3NX-4GB
ASK3NX-8GB
ASK3NX-16GB
ASK3NX-32GB
ASK3NX-64GB
ASK3NX-128GB
Table 3 – Cryptographic Module Versions
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List of all Approved Security Functions:
The cryptographic module offers FIPS Approved cryptographic security functions
including the following:
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard
Mode /
Method
Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli
Use
C968 AES
SP 800-38A
SP 800-38E
ECB
XTS
256-bits
Data Encryption / Decryption
Note: This mode is only approved
for storage applications, and
AES-XTS-128 is NOT supported
by the cryptographic module.
C967 AES SP 800-38A CBC 256-bits Data Decryption
Vendor
Affirmed
CKG
SP 800-133
Rev 1
Non-modified
output
Key Generation
Sections 5.2 Key Pairs for Key
Establishment, 6.1 “Direct
Generation” of Symmetric Keys,
6.3 Symmetric Keys Generated
Using Key-Agreement Schemes
C1032 DRBG
SP 800-90A
Revision 1
HASH_Based
DRBG
(SHA-256)
Security strength
is 256 bits
Deterministic Random Bit
Generation
C1033 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 PKG, PKV P-256 Prerequisite to KAS
C1033 KAS EC-DH SP 800-56A ECC P-256 Key Agreement
C1029 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-256 Message Digest
Table 4 – List of All Approved Security Functions
List of All Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions:
Algorithm Use
Hardware NDRNG
Seeding for the HASH DRBG with 256
bits of security. A 1024-bit seed is used.
Table 5 – List of All Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions
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4. Security Levels
The cryptographic module meets an overall security of FIPS 140-2 Level 3. The FIPS
140-2 specification defines security requirements that are grouped into Security
Requirement Areas. These areas are tested individually for a specific level of
achievement. The table below defines the targeted level in each section for the module.
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirement Target Level
Cryptographic Module Specification Level 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces Level 3
Roles, Services and Authentication Level 3
Finite State Model Level 3
Physical Security Level 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management Level 3
EMI/EMC Level 3
Self-Tests Level 3
Design Assurance Level 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 6 – FIPS Security Levels
5. Interfaces and Ports
There are three physical ports on the cryptographic module: a Super Speed Universal
Serial Bus (USB 3.1), a Keypad Input, and signals to drive three external status LEDs.
Physical Port Description Logical Interface
Super Speed Universal Serial
Bus (USB 3.1)
Super Speed Universal Serial
Bus Signals (USB 3.1)
Data Input/ Data Output/ Power/
Control Input/ Status Output
Keypad Keypad Input
Data Input/ Control Input (manual
controls)
LEDs output (Red, Blue, Green) Output LEDs Status Output
Table 7 – Interfaces and Ports
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6. Cryptographic Key and CSP Management
6.1 AES Master Key
The cryptographic module uses an AES Master Key (an AES-XTS 256-bit key) to
encrypt/decrypt protected data. The AES-XTS 256-bit key is generated using the
FIPS Approved deterministic random bit generator.
6.2 PIN Access Codes
On the cryptographic module, each personal identification number (PIN) has a
minimum of seven (7) digits and maximum of sixteen digits. The module supports
one Admin PIN, one User PIN, one Self-Destruct PIN, and four Recovery PINs.
The Admin PIN is used by the cryptographic officer to administer the device or
access the storage area.
The User PIN is used to access the storage area.
The Recovery PIN is used to create a new User PIN that will overwrite the
current User PIN.
The Self-Destruct PIN zeroizes all PINs and the AES Master key, then resets to a
new AES Master key and new Admin PIN.
6.3 Random Number Generation
The cryptographic module contains a non-deterministic hardware random
number generator (NDRNG) that uses an internal, unpredictable physical source
of entropy that is outside of human control. Random numbers generated by the
NDRNG are used as seeding values for the FIPS Approved Deterministic
Random Bit Generator. Continuous RNG tests are performed on the outputs of
the NDRNG.
The HASH DRBG Internal State (V and C) is the DRBG’s working state.
The HASH DRBG Seed is used to seed the DRBG. The seed is 1024 bits and
includes the Entropy Input and Nonce.
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6.4 EC DH Key Establishment
AES-CBC Decryption Key (AES-256) is used to decrypt the data sent from the
host.
Client ECDH Public Key (P-256) is used to create secure communication with the
host.
Client ECDH Private Key (P-256) is used to create a public key and shared
secret.
Client ECDH Shared Secret "Z" is used to generate a key derivation function.
Client ECDH Secret Keying Material is used for generating in the creation of the
key derivation function.
Host ECDH Public Key (P-256) is used to create secure communication with the
Client.
Client ECDH KDF Internal State is used to generate the Client ECDH Secret
Keying Material.
7. Identification and Authentication Policy
7.1 Roles
The cryptographic module performs identity-based authentication via verification
of the PIN code for the Administrator role and General User role. Alternatively,
the Administrator role may authenticate using the Configurator service, which
utilizes EC Diffie-Hellman.
The individual that takes physical possession of the module and initializes the
PIN for the first time is the Administrator. The first-time user of the Configurator
tool is also considered the Administrator. The Administrator role is the
Cryptographic Officer role as defined in the FIPS 140-2 standard. The
Administrator role is responsible for the overall security of the module.
The Administrator can change his/her own personal identification number (PIN)
and can access all the data stored within the device, set or modify all device
settings, as well as add and erase a General User.
The General User role is the User role as defined in the FIPS 140-2 standard.
The General User role has limited privileges and access to limited services of the
module. The General User can change his/her own personal identification
number (PIN) and access all the data stored within the storage device.
The cryptographic module supports up to two (2) authenticated operators; at
least one authenticated operator will be an Administrator.
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7.2 Authentication
The cryptographic module requires a minimum of seven (7) digits and maximum
of sixteen (16) digits for a personal identification number (PIN). When the module
is powered on, it will allow a maximum of ten (10) attempts to correctly enter the
PIN code. The individual that takes physical possession of the module, or uses
the Configurator service, and initializes the PIN for the first time is the
Administrator.
Upon a total of ten (10) consecutive failed authentication attempts (as described
above), the module will lock the keypad and require a pre-defined command
sequence to be entered to allow the Administrator or General User another ten
(10) attempts at entering the correct PIN code depending on the settings
controlled by the Administrator when the device is setup. Brute Force setting is
programmable between 4 - 20 consecutive failed attempts.
If the module does not receive the correct PIN code within the maximum of
twenty (20) attempts (described above), all critical security parameters will be
actively zeroized. In such case any encrypted data remaining on the external
storage device(s) will be useless (unrecoverable).
Role
Type of
Authentication
Authentication Data
Administrator
(Cryptographic Officer)
Identity-based Personal Identification Number (PIN)
Identity-based EC Diffie-Hellman (Configurator Service)
General User (User) Identity-based Personal Identification Number (PIN)
Table 8 - Roles and Required Authentication
Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism
PIN code verification
A minimum seven-digit PIN is used, with each digit selected from
ten (10) possible characters. There are 10^7 (ten million) possible
PIN combinations.
Therefore, the probability of a random attempt to authenticate to the
module is 1/10,000,000 which is much less than 1/1,000,000.
The probability of multiple consecutive attempts to authenticate to
the module during a one-minute period is 20/10,000,000 which is
much less than 1/100,000.
EC Diffie-Hellman
Since EC Diffie-Hellman with P-256 is used, the probability that a
random attempt to authenticate to the module is 1/(2^128) which is
much less than 1/1,000,000.
Five (5) authentication attempts are allowed before a reboot must
occur and a reboot takes approximately 10 seconds, therefore
there could be ~30 attempts per minute. Given this, the probability
of multiple consecutive attempts to authenticate to the module
during a one-minute period is 30/(2^128) which is much less than
1/100,000.
Table 9 – Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
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8. Access Control Policy
The cryptographic module supports two roles: Administrator and General User. The
types of services corresponding to each of the supported roles are described below.
Administrator
General
User
Unauthenticated
Service Description
X X Login/Unlock Authenticates the operator to the module.
X X Logout/Lock De-authenticates the operator and locks the module.
X X Write Data Receives plaintext data from the host and AES XTS encrypt
the data to internal storage.
X X Read Data AES XTS decrypts data from internal storage and output
plaintext data to the host.
X X Establish User PIN Establishes a User PIN if to create a general user role.
X X Change PIN Updates the PIN.
X Set Self-Destruct Enables the self-destruct feature.
X X Set Self-Destruct PIN Prepares the module for duress event.
X X Self-Destruct Reinitializes the module.
X Delete All User PINs Overwrites and supersedes all PINs.
X Set Unattended Auto Lock Sets idle timeout value in minutes.
X X Set Read Only When set, does not allow writing of data to the storage. If the
Admin sets the device to read only, the user is prevented from
overriding this setting.
X Set Lock Override Sets the device to ignore re-enumeration over the USB bus.
X Create Recovery PINs Admin sets a PIN used to create a recovery PIN.
X X Use Recovery PIN Creates a new User PIN after using the recovery PIN.
X Setup Forced Enrollment Admin sets the drive to require a PIN setup on the next use.
X Set Minimum PIN Length Admin setting for minimum digit length of PINs.
X Set LED Flicker LED to flash when buttons are pressed.
X* Configurator Sends configuration data to device.
X X X Run Diagnostic Mode Verifies proper keypad function and check firmware version.
X Set Brute Force Attempts Sets the number of tries before the drive will lock.
X X X Self-Test Performs required power-up self-tests.
X X X Self-Test (On-Demand) Performs on-demand self-tests.
X X X Get Status Status outputs.
X* Zeroize Destroys all CSPs except the ECDH Keys.
X X X User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) Resets the module and zeroize all CSPs.
X Format Storage as FD or RM Formats the storage as fixed disks or removable media
*Note: This Admin service uses the EC Diffie-Hellman authentication scheme. All others use the PIN.
Table 10 – Roles and Services
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The table below shows the how CSPs and Public Keys are accessed by the module’s
services. The modes of access shown in the table are defined as:
• G = Generate: The service generates or derives the CSP.
• I = Input: The service inputs the CSP from outside of the module.
• O = Output: The service outputs the CSP to outside of the module.
• E = Execute: The service uses the CSP.
• S = Store: The service stores the CSP persistently.
• Z = Zeroize: The service zeroizes the CSP.
Service
CSPs and Public Keys
AES
Master
Key
User
PIN
Admin
PIN
Recovery
PIN
Self-Destruct
PIN
HASH
DRBG
Internal
State
HASH
DRBG
Seed
AES-CBC
Decryption
Key
Client
ECC
CDH
Public
Key
Client
ECC
CDH
Private
Key
Client
ECC
CDH
Shared
Secret
"Z"
Client
ECC
CDH
Secret
Keying
Material
Host
ECC
CDH
Public
Key
Client
ECC
CDH
KDF
Internal
State
Login/Unlock E IE IE - - - - - - - - - - -
Logout/Lock - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Write Data E - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Read Data E - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Establish User PIN - IGES IGES - - - - - - - - - - -
Change PIN - ZIGES ZIGES - - - - - - - - - - -
Set Self-Destruct - - - - Z - - - - - - - - -
Set Self-Destruct PIN - - - - IGES - - - - - - - - -
Self-Destruct ZGES Z ZGS Z ZIE ZGE G - - - - - - -
Delete All User PINs - Z - Z Z - - - - - - - - -
Set Unattended Auto lock - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Set Read Only - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Set Lock Override - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Create Recovery PINs - - - IS - - - - - - - - - -
Use Recovery PIN - ZIGS - IEZ - - - - - - - - - -
Setup Forced Enrollment - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Set Minimum PIN Length - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Set LED Flicker - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Configurator - IS IS IS IS GE G GE GEO E GE GE EI GE
Run Diagnostic Mode - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Set Brute force Attempts - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Self-Test - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Self-Test (On-Demand) - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Get Status - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z - Z Z - Z
User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) ZGS Z Z Z Z ZGE ZG Z Z ZG Z Z - Z
Format Storage as FD or RM - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Table 11 – CSP and Public Key Access by Service
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9. Physical Security Policy
Epoxy coating
The module incorporates a hard, opaque, tamper-evident, production-grade epoxy
coating encapsulating all electrical components containing critical security parameters.
Attempts to remove the epoxy will cause damage to these components.
Tamper-Resistance
The module incorporates a strong, tamper-resistant, hard metal enclosure that defines
the cryptographic boundary.
Note: The module hardness testing was only performed at an ambient, single temperature (i.e. 73.4° F)
and no assurance is provided for Level 3 hardness conformance at any other temperature.
Physical Security
Mechanisms
Recommended Frequency
of Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Hard, opaque,
tamper-evident,
production-grade
epoxy coating and
metal enclosure
In accordance with the
Administrator role
organizational security policy
or every 3 months.
Inspect the cryptographic boundary for scratches,
gouges, scrapes, deformations, and any other
suspicious signs of malice and tampering. If any
evidence of tampering exists, the Administrator
role is required to cease use of the cryptographic
module immediately.
Table 12 – Physical Security
10. Regulatory Compliance
The cryptographic module has been tested for and passes the following:
EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart
B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B.
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11. Security Rules
11.1 Initialization Period of the Cryptographic Module
The Administrator role is responsible for the overall security of the module and
initializing the cryptographic module into the FIPS Approved mode of operation.
The Administrator shall perform one (1) of the following two (2) procedures to
initialize the module into FIPS mode:
1. Wake up the module by pressing the Unlock button. The BLUE and
GREEN LEDs will glow solidly.
a. Press UNLOCK + 9 at the same time. The BLUE LED will glow solidly
and the GREEN LED will be blinking.
b. Enter the series of numbers that you will use for the Admin PIN and
press the UNLOCK button.
c. Re-enter that same PIN and press the UNLOCK button again. The
GREEN LED will illuminate for one second followed by the BLUE LED
glowing solidly by itself.
d. Push the Lock button.
2. Execute the “Configurator” service to perform the initialization of the module
with the following settings:
a. Amount of brute-force attempts of incorrect authentication data before
the module locks: maximum of ten (10) attempts
b. Minimum PIN length: seven (7) digits
The Configurator GUI application is outside of the module’s FIPS 140-2
validation scope. It resides on the host pc used by the Cryptographic Officer
during module initialization.
Upon completion of the initialization period, the module’s LED status will indicate
a solid RED LED.
The cryptographic module only supports a FIPS Approved mode of operation,
therefore a non-compliant configuration is out of scope for this validation.
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11.2 FIPS Approved Mode
• The cryptographic module always runs in a FIPS Approved mode of operation (i.e.,
non-FIPS mode is not supported). It is possible to determine that the module is in
FIPS mode by waking up the module and observing LED status as follows: RED
LED is solid to indicate self-tests completed successfully; RED LED flashes to
indicate an error state, including failure of a power-up self-test as well as failure of a
conditional self-test.
• Power on self-tests are run automatically when the device is initially powered. This
can happen at the time of manufacture or when power is applied through the USB
and the batteries have been depleted.
• On-demand self-tests can be performed from the standby state. To invoke these
tests, first ensure the device is not plugged into a powered USB port (this prevents
damaging the USB plug) and wake the device by pressing the UNLOCK button. Next
press the LOCK + 8 buttons simultaneously. The solid red LED will transition to a
blinking green LED for 10 seconds. Within these ten seconds, plug the device into a
powered USB port and the device will automatically perform on-demand self-tests.
Otherwise, the device will time out and return to standby state. Successful self-tests
completion will be indicated by the following LED sequence: solid RED followed by
solid GREEN followed by solid BLUE. The device will then return to standby state.
• The firmware revision can be determined by the following procedure:
1. Push the Unlock button to bring the module out of a sleep state or plug into a
powered USB port.
2. Push the Lock + 1 keys at the same time and release
3. Push and hold the 0 key. The LEDs will flash Red and Blue for 5 seconds
then all the LEDs will come on for 1 second. Release the 0 key.
4. The LEDs will flash the firmware revision:
Example:
a. 1 Blue LED blink = 1
b. Then 1 Red blink = .
c. Then 5 Blue blinks = 5 (if zero, then no blue blinks)
d. Then Red LED on solid = end of sequence
This firmware revision shows 1.5
• The cryptographic module enforces separation of all data inputs, data outputs,
control inputs, status outputs via defined ports and interfaces.
• The cryptographic module receives power via its defined power interface either via
usb or the internal battery.
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• The cryptographic module does not support a maintenance interface or bypass
capability.
• The cryptographic module does not support the output of any cryptographic keys or
CSPs in any form.
• During error states, the cryptographic module: enforces the inhibition of all data
outputs, ceases to provide any cryptographic or otherwise security relevant services,
and provides non-security relevant error status.
• The cryptographic module supports Identity-based authentication.
• The Administrator and General User roles are explicitly prohibited from sharing PINs
with any other operator. In the event that the Administrator role shares his or her
PIN, the cryptographic module is deemed non-compliant and unfit for service to
protect sensitive but unclassified data.
• The cryptographic module provides a hard, opaque, tamper-evident, production-
grade epoxy encapsulating all electrical components containing CSPs.
• The cryptographic module incorporates a strong, tamper-resistant, non-removable,
hard metal enclosure that defines the cryptographic boundary.
• The cryptographic module enforces a non-modifiable operational environment.
• The cryptographic module protects all critical security parameters from unauthorized
disclosure, modification, and substitution.
• The cryptographic module provides a non-Approved non-deterministic hardware
random number generator strictly for the purposes of seeding the Approved
deterministic random bit generator.
• The cryptographic module does not support manual key entry.
• The cryptographic module supports zeroization to destroy all critical security
parameters. All CSPs are destroyed with the User Reset (FIPS Zeroize) service.
• The cryptographic module conforms to applicable EMI/EMC requirements.
• The cryptographic module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are a
minimum 256 bits of entropy.
• As per IG A.9, the AES-XTS implementation verifies that Key_1 ≠ Key_2, before the
keys are to be used.
• The cryptographic module performs all required self-tests:
o Power-up Self-tests
1. SHA-256 KAT
2. SP800-90A HASH DRBG KAT and Health Check
3. AES-XTS Encrypt KAT
4. AES-XTS Decrypt KAT
5. AES-CBC Decrypt KAT
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6. SP 800-56A Self-tests per IG 9.6 (includes Primitive Z test and KDF
KAT; prerequisites are tested separately with SHA and DRBG KATs)
7. Firmware integrity test (16-bit EDC)
o Conditional Self-tests
1. NDRNG Continuous Test
2. ECDH Pairwise Consistency Test
3. SP 800-56A conditional tests per IG 9.6 (includes assurances per SP
800-56A sections 5.5.2 & 5.6.2.3 and ECDH pairwise consistency test)
4. DRBG Continuous Test: N/A as allowed by IG 9.8
5. Firmware load test: N/A
6. Manual key entry test: N/A
7. Bypass test: N/A
12. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS
140-2.
Other Attacks Mitigation Mechanism Specific Limitations
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable
Table 13 – Mitigation of Other Attacks
13. Acronyms
- AES: Advanced Encryption Standard
- CBC: Cipher Block Chaining
- CCCS: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
- CMVP: Cryptographic Module Validation Program
- CSP: Critical Security Parameters
- DRBG: Deterministic Random Bit Generator
- ECC CDH: Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman
- EDC: Error Detection Code
- EMI/EMC: Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
- FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standards
- KAT: Known Answer Test
- LED: Light Emitting Diode
- NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology
- NDRNG: Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
- N/A: Not Applicable
- PIN: Personal Identification Numbers
- RNG: Random Number Generator
- SHA: Secure Hashing Algorithm
- USB: Universal Serial Bus
- XTS: XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with Ciphertext Stealing