FIPS 140-2 Security Level: 2 Non-
Proprietary Security Policy
Bomgar Corporation
B200™, B300™, and B400™ Remote Support Appliances
Firmware Version: 3.3.2FIPS, 3.4.0FIPS,3.4.1FIPS,3.5.1FIPS; Software Version: 12.1.6FIPs,
13.1.3FIPS,14.3.3FIPS
Hardware Version:
B200 with Tamper Evident Label Kit: TEL135325
B300r1 with Tamper Evident Label Kit: TEL135325 and Front Bezel: FB000300
B300r2 with Tamper Evident Label Kit: TEL135325 and Front Bezel: FB000300
B400r1 with Tamper Evident Label Kit: TEL135325 and Front Bezel: FB000400
FIPS 140-2 Security Level: 2
Document Version: 2.3
Security Policy, Version 2.3 June 15, 2015
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................4
1.1 PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................................................................4
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION............................................................................................................................4
2 B200,B300,ANDB400APPLIANCES.............................................................................................5
2.1 OVERVIEW.............................................................................................................................................................5
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................7
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ..........................................................................................................................................9
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES.........................................................................................................................................12
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role..............................................................................................................................................12
2.4.2 Instance-Admin Role...........................................................................................................................................13
2.4.3 Instance-User Role..............................................................................................................................................13
2.4.4 Services...................................................................................................................................................................13
2.4.5 Unauthenticated Operator Services..............................................................................................................15
2.4.6 Authentication Mechanism...............................................................................................................................15
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY...........................................................................................................................................16
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.........................................................................................................................16
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................16
2.8 EMI/EMC............................................................................................................................................................19
2.9 SELF-TESTS ..........................................................................................................................................................19
2.9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests............................................................................................................................................19
2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests.........................................................................................................................................19
2.10 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ..................................................................................................................19
3 SECURE OPERATION .........................................................................................................20
3.1 INITIAL SETUP......................................................................................................................................................20
3.1.1 B200 Hardware Setup......................................................................................................................................20
3.1.2 B200 Label Inspection.......................................................................................................................................20
3.1.3 B300 Hardware Setup......................................................................................................................................21
3.1.4 B300 Label Inspection.......................................................................................................................................22
3.1.5 B400 Hardware Setup......................................................................................................................................24
3.1.6 B400 Label Inspection and Application .......................................................................................................24
3.1.7 Firmware/Software Version Verification.......................................................................................................28
3.2 FIPS MODE COMPLIANCE.................................................................................................................................29
3.3 CRYPTO-OFFICER GUIDANCE..........................................................................................................................31
3.3.1 Management ........................................................................................................................................................31
3.3.2 Status Monitoring................................................................................................................................................31
3.3.3 Zeroization ............................................................................................................................................................31
3.4 INSTANCE-ADMIN AND INSTANCE-USER GUIDANCE...................................................................................31
4 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................................33
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – BOMGAR B200 (TOP), B300R1, B300R2, AND B400R1 .................................................................................5
FIGURE 2 – TYPICAL DEPLOYMENT.........................................................................................................................................6
FIGURE 3 – BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR B200 WITH CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY...............................................................8
FIGURE 4 – BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR B300 AND B400 WITH CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY ...........................................9
FIGURE 5 – FRONT AND REAR VIEW OF THE B200........................................................................................................... 10
FIGURE 6 – FRONT AND REAR VIEW OF THE B300R1 AND B300R2.............................................................................. 10
FIGURE 7 – FRONT AND REAR VIEW OF THE B400R1 ...................................................................................................... 10
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FIGURE 8 – TAMPER-EVIDENT LABEL APPLIED TO TOP OF B200, OVERLAPPING THE GALVANIZED METAL COVER
AND THE FRONT PANEL............................................................................................................................................... 21
FIGURE 9 – TAMPER-EVIDENT LABEL APPLIED TO REAR OF B200, OVERLAPPING THE GALVANIZED METAL COVER
AND THE REAR STEEL BEZEL........................................................................................................................................ 21
FIGURE 10 – REAR METALLIC BEZEL SEAL (LEFT) AND SEALED TOP COVER (RIGHT) OF B300R1 AND B300R2 .... 23
FIGURE 11 – SEALED FRONT BEZEL TO CHASSIS TOP (LEFT) AND SEALED FRONT BEZEL TO CHASSIS BOTTOM
(RIGHT) OF B300R1AND B300R2.............................................................................................................................. 23
FIGURE 12 – SEALED TOP CHASSIS TO LEFT POWER SUPPLY (LEFT) AND SEALED TOP CHASSIS TO RIGHT POWER
SUPPLY (RIGHT) OF B300R1 AND B300R2 ............................................................................................................... 23
FIGURE 13 – SEALED TOP COVER OF B400R1................................................................................................................... 25
FIGURE 14 – SEALED POWER SUPPLY #1 TO CHASSIS BOTTOM (LEFT) AND SEALED POWER SUPPLY #2 TO CHASSIS
TOP (RIGHT) OF B400R1............................................................................................................................................. 25
FIGURE 15 – SEALED FRONT BEZEL TO CHASSIS BOTTOM (LEFT) AND SEALED FRONT BEZEL TO CHASSIS TOP
(RIGHT) OF B400R1..................................................................................................................................................... 25
FIGURE 162 – SUPPORT PAGE .............................................................................................................................................. 30
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION .........................................................................................................6
TABLE 2 - FIRMWARE / SOFTWARE VERSIONS .......................................................................................................................7
TABLE 3 – PHYSICAL PORTS AND LOGICAL INTERFACES.................................................................................................. 11
TABLE 4 – LED DESCRIPTIONS............................................................................................................................................. 11
TABLE 5 – MAPPING OF AUTHENTICATED OPERATOR SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF
ACCESS........................................................................................................................................................................... 13
TABLE 6 – UNAUTHENTICATED OPERATOR SERVICE ....................................................................................................... 15
TABLE 7 – AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM USED BY THE MODULES ............................................................................. 15
TABLE 8 – FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS .......................................................................................... 16
TABLE 9 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS................................. 17
TABLE 10 – ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................................................ 33
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the B200, B300, and B400 Remote
Support Appliances from Bomgar Corporation. This Security Policy describes how the B200, B300, and
B400 Remote Support Appliances meet the security requirements of FIPS1
140-2 and how to run the
modules in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2
validation of the modules.
FIPS 140-2 – Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules details the U.S. and Canadian
Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and
validation program is available on the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website, which
is maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communications
Security Establishment Canada (CSEC): http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.
The B200, B300, and B400 Remote Support Appliances are referred to in this document as the Bomgar
Appliances, the cryptographic modules, or the modules.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the modules in the technical terms of a FIPS
140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the modules from the
following sources:
• The Bomgar website (http://www.bomgar.com/fips) contains information on the full line of
products from Bomgar Corporation.
• The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm)
contains contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related questions for the
modules.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
• Vendor Evidence document
• Finite State Model
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation are produced by Bomgar
Corporation. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation
Documentation is proprietary to Bomgar Corporation and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Bomgar Corporation.
1
FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standard
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2 B200, B300, and B400 Appliances
2.1 Overview
Bomgar Corporation specializes in appliance-based solutions for remote support. Their remote support
appliances give support technicians secure remote control of computers over the Internet, LAN2
, or WAN3
.
The software works through firewalls with no pre-installed client on the remote computer. With the
Bomgar Appliances, a support technician can see the screen and control the remote system virtually as if
physically present.
Figure 1 – Bomgar B200 (top), B300r1, B300r2, and B400r1
The B200, B300, and B400 Appliances (shown in Figure 1 above) enable the use of remote support in
multiple areas of an organization in a way that is secure, integrated and manageable. The Bomgar
Appliances can integrate with LDAP4
for secure user management, prevent sensitive data from being
routed outside the organization, and support extensive auditing and recording of support sessions. The
logging is performed by the Bomgar Appliances, which allows for the review of all Customer and Support
Representative interactions, including playback of all desktop screen data. The appliances also integrate
with leading systems management and identity management solutions and include an Application
Programming Interface (API) for deeper integration. With Bomgar, support managers can create support
teams, customize queues, and report on all support activity. Network administrators can also monitor the
Bomgar Appliances using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
The Bomgar Appliances enable remote access to multiple common operating systems, including various
Linux distributions. They also enable remote control of various kinds of systems, including laptops,
desktops, servers, kiosks, point-of-sale systems, smartphones, and network devices.
The Bomgar Appliances can work over internal and extended networks and can be internet-accessible. This
allows support organizations to reduce less effective means of support by driving requests through custom
support portals hosted on the appliances. The Bomgar Appliances can route support requests to the
appropriate technician or team and mediate connections between Customers and Support Representatives,
2
LAN – Local Area Network
3
WAN – Wide Area Network
4
LDAP – Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
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allowing chat sessions, file downloads/uploads, screen-sharing, remote control of desktops, and access to
system and diagnostic information.
To enable the functionality described above, Bomgar has implemented architecture that places the Bomgar
Appliances at the center of all communications (see Figure 2 below for a typical deployment scenario). The
Bomgar Appliances provide a platform upon which one or more support sites are constructed. Sites
represent individual help centers, and multiple sites can be set up to support multiple departments or groups
in a company. Each site would offer a web site interface using Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) for
unauthenticated services and HTTP over TLS5
(HTTPS) for authenticated services, in addition to accepting
direct client connections over a protocol running on top of TLS.
Figure 2 – Typical Deployment6
The Bomgar Appliances have two primary components that provide the appliances’ functionality. The first
is the Firmware that provides system-level configuration of the Bomgar Appliances. Settings such as IP7
addresses and SSL/TLS configuration are all configured via the Firmware interface. The second component
is made up of the software that provides site-level configuration, as well as the software clients that users
interact with. The web interface behind the /login page is part of the software, as are the Representative
Console, Customer Client, Connection Agent, and all other clients which are downloadable from the
Bomgar Appliances.
The B200, B300, and B400 Remote Support Appliances are validated at the FIPS 140-2 Section levels in
Table 1.
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Modules Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Modules Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
5
TLS – Transport Layer Security
6
Rep – Representative; SSL – Secure Sockets Layer; DMZ – Demilitarized Zone; POS – Point of Sale; AD – Active Directory
7
IP – Internet Protocol
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Section Section Title Level
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A8
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC9
2
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.2 Module Specification
The B200, B300, and B400 Appliances (running Firmware Version: 3.3.2FIPS, 3.4.0FIPS, 3.4.1FIPS,
3.5.1FIPS; Software Version: 12.1.6FIPs, 13.1.3FIPS,14.3.3FIPS) are multi-chip standalone modules that
meet overall Level 2 FIPS 140-2 requirements.
Each hardware module must be running a specific version of the software to be in compliance. This is
demonstrated in the table below.
Table 2 - Firmware / Software Versions
Module Base Version / Software Version
B200
3.3.2FIPS / 12.1.6FIPS
3.4.0FIPS / 13.1.3FIPS
3.4.1FIPS / 13.1.3FIPS
3.5.1FIPS / 14.3.3FIPS
B300r1
3.3.2FIPS / 12.1.6FIPS
3.4.0FIPS / 13.1.3FIPS
3.4.1FIPS / 13.1.3FIPS
3.5.1FIPS / 14.3.3FIPS
B300r2 3.5.1FIPS / 14.3.3FIPS
B400r1 3.3.2FIPS / 12.1.6FIPS
Physically, the modules are composed of the components of a standard server platform. Figure 3 and Figure
4 show block diagrams for the B200, B300, and B400 respectively and identify the various components,
connections and information flows. The cryptographic boundary of each module (denoted by the dotted
lines in Figure 3 and Figure 4) is defined by the outer case of the appliance, which surrounds the complete
set of hardware, firmware, and software components. Note that the B300 has four hard disks and the B400
has eight to support RAID10
functionality.
8
N/A – Not applicable
9
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
10
RAID – Redundant Array of Independent Disks
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Figure 3 – Block Diagram for B200 with Cryptographic Boundary
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Figure 4 – Block Diagram for B300 and B400 with Cryptographic Boundary
2.3 Module Interfaces
The modules’ design separates the physical ports into four logically distinct and isolated categories. They
are:
• Data Input
• Data Output
• Control Input
• Status Output
In addition, the modules receive power via a defined power input interface.
Data input/output are the network data packets utilizing the services provided by the modules. These
packets enter and exit the modules through the network ports. Control input consists of both configuration
and administration data entering the modules through the web interface and also the input for the power and
reset buttons. Status output consists of status information relayed via the LED11
indicators and the web
interface.
The physical ports and interfaces of the modules are depicted in Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 below.
11
LED – Light Emitting Diode
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Figure 5 – Front and Rear View of the B200
Figure 6 – Front and Rear View of the B300r1 and B300r2
Figure 7 – Front and Rear View of the B400r1
Of the ports and interfaces depicted in the figures above, only the following are enabled to be used in FIPS
mode of operation:
• Network ports
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• Power button
• Reset button
• Power connector(s)
• LEDs
The mouse port, keyboard port, network port, 2 USB ports, serial port and VGA port behind the rear bezel
are inaccessible. These ports are excluded components for the FIPS 140-2 validation of the modules.
Table 3 lists the physical interfaces available in the Bomgar Appliances and also provides the mapping
from the physical interfaces to logical interfaces as defined by FIPS 140-2.
Table 3 – Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Logical
Interface
Bomgar Appliance
Physical Port
Data Input Network ports
Data Output Network ports
Control Input
Network ports, power
button, reset button
Status Output LEDs, network ports
Power Input Power connector(s)
The cryptographic modules have a number of LEDs which indicate the state of the modules. The
descriptions for the LEDs for each module are listed in Table 4 below.
Table 4 – LED Descriptions
Model LED Condition Description
B200
Power
On System on
Off System off
Hard Disk Drive
(HDD)
On IDE channel activity
Blink
SAS/SATA drive or DVD-ROM drive
activity
Off No HDD activity
LAN1/LAN2
On Linked
Blink Network activity
Off Disconnected
Overheat/Fan
On System overheat condition
Blink Fan failure
Off System normal
B300r1 / Power On System on
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Model LED Condition Description
B300 r2 Off System off
Hard Disk Drive
(HDD)
Blink HDD activity
Off No HDD activity
LAN1/LAN2
On Linked
Blink Network activity
Off Disconnected
Universal
Information
Fast Blink Red (1x/
sec)
Fan fail
Solid Red CPU overheat
Slow Blink Red (1x/
4 sec)
Power fail
Solid Blue
Local Unit Identifier (UID) button
depressed
B400r1
Power
On System on
Off System off
Hard Disk Drive
(HDD)
On/Blink HDD activity
Off No HDD activity
LAN 1/LAN2
On Linked
Blink Network activity
Off Disconnected
Overheat/Fan
On System overheat condition
Blink Fan failure
Off System normal
Power fail
On Power supply failure
Off System off
2.4 Roles and Services
As required by FIPS 140-2, the modules support a Crypto-Officer (CO) role and a User role. The User role
comprises an Instance-Admin role and an Instance-User role.
The modules support role-based authentication for the Crypto-Officer and identity-based authentication for
the Instance-Admin and Instance-User roles. Operators explicitly assume the role of Instance-Admin or
Instance-User based on the authentication credentials used. The credentials used determine the services
available to the operator.
2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role
The Crypto-Officer role is the administrator for the module and is responsible for the initial setup and
configuration. The Crypto-Officer has administrator rights to monitor and manage the firmware
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component’s configuration, manage the CO account, and reset the default Instance-Admin account
passwords.
2.4.2 Instance-Admin Role
The Instance-Admin has administrator rights to monitor and manage the software instance’s configuration,
manage Instance-Admin accounts, and manage Instance-User accounts.
2.4.3 Instance-User Role
The Instance-User can access the support services in the module based on the permissions set by the
Instance-Admin. The Instance-Admin has to grant access to Instance-Users to access services on the
module.
2.4.4 Services
All services available in FIPS mode are also available in non-FIPS mode.
Services provided to authenticated operators are listed in Table 5 below. Please note that the keys and
Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) listed indicate the type of access required:
• Read: The CSP is read
• Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized.
Table 5 – Mapping of Authenticated Operator Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type
of Access
Service Description Operator Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Manage
Bomgar
Appliance
settings
Configure IP12
and TLS settings
CO Command Command
response
• RSA13
public key – Read, Write
• RSA private key – Read, Write
• Session key – Read, Write
• Session integrity key – Read,
Write
• PRNG14
seed/seed key – Read,
Write
• CO Password – Read
• Firmware update key – Read,
Write
Manage CO
account
Manage CO
account
password
CO Command Command
response
• RSA public key – Read
• RSA private key – Read
• Session key – Read, Write
• Session integrity key – Read,
Write
• PRNG seed/seed key – Read,
Write
• CO Password – Read, Write
12
IP – Internet Protocol
13
RSA – Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
14
PRNG – Pseudo Random Number Generator
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Service Description Operator Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Reset Instance-
Admin
password
Reset Instance-
Admin account
password
CO Command Command
response
• RSA public key – Read
• RSA private key – Read
• Session key – Read, Write
• Session integrity key – Read,
Write
• PRNG seed/seed key – Read,
Write
• Instance-Admin Password –
Write
Configure
Instance-Admin
accounts
Set up and
monitor
Instance- Admin
accounts
CO,
Instance-
Admin
Command Command
response
• RSA public key – Read
• RSA private key – Read
• Session key – Read, Write
• Session integrity key – Read,
Write
• PRNG seed/seed key – Read,
Write
• Instance-Admin Password –
Read, Write
Configure
Instance-User
accounts
Set up and
monitor
Instance-User
accounts
Instance-
Admin,
Instance-
User
Command Command
response
• RSA public key – Read
• RSA private key – Read
• Session key – Read, Write
• Session integrity key – Read,
Write
• PRNG seed/seed key – Read,
Write
• Instance-User Password – Read,
Write
Execute self-
tests
Perform power-
up self-tests on
demand
CO Command Command
response
• None
Monitor status Monitor the
status of the
modules
CO Command Status
information
• RSA public key – Read
• RSA private key – Read
Zeroize keys Zeroize plaintext
keys
CO Command Command
response
• All CSPs – Write
Perform
Representative
Console
service
Access and
perform services
for
Representative
Consoles
Instance-
Admin,
Instance-
User
Command Command
response
• RSA public key – Read
• RSA private key – Read
• Session key – Read, Write
• Session integrity key – Read,
Write
• PRNG seed/seed key – Read,
Write
• Instance-Admin Password –
Read
• Instance-User Password – Read
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Service Description Operator Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Manage
instance
settings
Manage instance
configuration
settings
Instance-
Admin,
Instance-
User
Command Command
response
• RSA public key – Read
• RSA private key – Read
• Session key – Read, Write
• Session integrity key – Read,
Write
• PRNG seed/seed key – Read,
Write
Update
Firmware
Install new
firmware package
CO Command Command
response
• RSA public key – Read
• RSA private key – Read
• Session key – Read, Write
• Session integrity key – Read,
Write
• PRNG seed/seed key – Read,
Write
• CO Password – Read
• Firmware update public key –
Read, Write
2.4.5 Unauthenticated Operator Services
The modules provide a service to unauthenticated operators as listed in Table 6 below.
Table 6 – Unauthenticated Operator Service
Service Description Input Output
CSP and Type
of Access
Generate nonce Generate a nonce to prevent
replay attacks via web browser
Command Command
response
None
Start an
unauthenticated
Support Session
An unauthenticated user
request support service
Command Command
response
None
Power-up self-
tests and module
state monitoring
Power cycle the module by
pressing the power button to
initiate power-up self-tests
Press the
Power
button
LEDs show
state
None
2.4.6 Authentication Mechanism
The Crypto-Officer can access the module remotely over a TLS session. The Crypto-Officer authenticates
to the module using a user ID and password. Instance-Admins and Instance-Users authenticate themselves
with a user ID and password combination. Instance-Admins and Instance-Users can also authenticate to the
module via one of the following configurable methods: LDAP, Kerberos, or RADIUS.
Table 7 lists the authentication mechanisms used by the modules.
Table 7 – Authentication Mechanism Used by the Modules
Authentication Type Strength
Password Passwords are required to be at least 6 characters in length and can be a
maximum of 64 characters in length. Numeric, alphabetic (upper and lower
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cases), and keyboard/extended characters can be used, for a total of 95
characters to choose from. A six-character password will yield a total of
956
= 735,091,890,625 possible combinations. Any failed authentication
attempt will result in at least one second delay in response. Hence there
cannot be more than 60 invalid attempts in any given minute and
probability that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will
occur is 60 x 1/ 735,091,890,625 in one minute.
2.5 Physical Security
The B200, B300, and B400 Appliances are multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules. Each is enclosed
in a hard and opaque metal case that completely encloses all of the internal components of the module.
Tamper-evident labels are applied to the cases to provide physical evidence of attempts to gain access to
the modules’ internal components. All of the modules’ components are production grade. The placement of
tamper-evident labels can be found in Sections 3.1.2, 3.1.4, and 3.1.6 of this document.
2.6 Operational Environment
The operational environment requirements do not apply to the Bomgar Appliances. The modules provide
only a limited operational environment; they do not provide a general-purpose operating system
environment.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The modules implement the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 8.
Table 8 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations
Algorithm
Bomgar Appliance
Certificate
Number
Reference
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in CBC15
, ECB16
,
OFB17
, and CFB18
128 modes (with 128-bit, 192-bit,
and 256-bit keys)
2219, 2543, 3033,
3340
FIPS 197
Triple Data Encryption Standard (Triple DES) – CBC,
ECB, OFB, CFB8, and CFB64 modes (with 2-key19
and
3-key)
1389, 1538, 1774,
1909
FIPS 46-3
ANSI X.952-1998
RSA ANSI20
X9.31 (key generation19
) – 1024-, 1536-,
and 2048-bit
1136, 1297, 1575,
1715
FIPS 186-2
ANSI X.931-1998
RSA Public Key Cryptography Standard #1 (PKCS#1)
v1.5 (sign/verify) – 1024-, 2048-, 3072-, and 4096-bit
1136, 1297, 1575,
1715
FIPS 186-2
RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) (sign/verify)
– 1024-, 2048-, 3072-, and 4096-bit
1136, 1297, 1575,
1715
FIPS 186-2
15
CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
16
ECB – Electronic Codebook
17
OFB – Output Feedback
18
CFB – Cipher Feedback
19
SP800-131A provides guidance for transitions to use the stronger cryptographic keys.
20
ANSI – American National Standards Institute
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Algorithm
Bomgar Appliance
Certificate
Number
Reference
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, and SHA-512
1910, 2143, 2531,
2774
FIPS 180-2
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC19
)
using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-
512
1350, 1564, 1915,
2130
FIPS 198
ANSI X9.31 A.2.4 PRNG19
1113, 1208, 1311,
1372
NIST-Recommended
RNG Based on ANSI
X9.31 Appendix A.2.4
Using the AES
Algorithm, January 31,
2005
The modules also support the following non-FIPS-Approved algorithms:
• RSA key transport: 1024-, 1536-, 2048-, 3072- 4096-bits (key wrapping; key establishment
methodology provides between 80 and 150 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than
112 bits of encryption strength)
• RC421
• RC4-40
• DES
• DES-40
• MD522
The modules support the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) in Table 9.
Table 9 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
CSP CSP Type Generation
/ Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
RSA
private
key
1024-, 1536-,
2048-, 3072-, or
4096-bit RSA
private key
Internally
generated or
imported via
a secure TLS
session
Exits only via
a secure TLS
session
Hard disk in
plaintext
By command or
overwritten by
another key or by
factory reset
Key exchange
for TLS
sessions
RSA
public key
1024-, 1536-,
2048-, 3072-, or
4096-bit RSA
public key
Internally
generated or
imported via
a secure TLS
session
Exits in
plaintext
form
Hard disk in
plaintext
By command or
overwritten by
another key or by
factory reset
Key exchange
for TLS
sessions
21
RC4 – Rivest Cipher 4
22
MD5 – Message Digest 5
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CSP CSP Type Generation
/ Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
Session
key
• 128-bit AES
CBC 128 key
• 256-bit AES
CBC 256 key
• 192-bit Triple
DES CBC 112
key
Internally
generated
Exits in
encrypted
form during
TLS
handshake
Resides on
volatile
memory
only in
plaintext
By power cycle
or session
termination
Data encryption
and decryption
for TLS
sessions
Session
integrity
key
• HMAC-SHA
Key length: 20
bytes
Internally
generated
Exits in
encrypted
form during
TLS
handshake
Resides on
volatile
memory
only in
plaintext
By power cycle
or session
termination
Ensure
authenticity of
encrypted TLS
session data
Crypto-
Officer
password
6-character
minimum
password
Enters the
modules in
encrypted
form
Never exits
the modules
Hard disk in
hashed form
Overwritten by
another password
or zeroized by
factory reset
Authenticates
the CO
Instance-
Admin
password
6-character
minimum
password
Enters the
modules in
encrypted
form
Never exits
the modules
Hard disk in
hashed form
Overwritten by
another password
or zeroized by
factory reset
Authenticates
the Instance-
Admin
Instance-
User
password
6-character
minimum
password
Enters the
modules in
encrypted
form
Never exits
the modules
Hard disk in
hashed form
Overwritten by
another password
or zeroized by
factory reset
Authenticates
the Instance-
User
PRNG
seed key
32 bytes of
random value
Internally
generated
Never exits
the modules
Resides on
volatile
memory
only in
plaintext
By power cycle,
session
termination, or
factory reset
Seeds the FIPS-
Approved
PRNG
PRNG
seed
16 bytes of
random value
Internally
generated
Never exits
the modules
Resides on
volatile
memory
only in
plaintext
By power cycle,
session
termination, or
factory reset
Seeds the FIPS-
Approved
PRNG
Firmware
update
key
4096-bit RSA
public key
Generated by
Bomgar
Corp. and
enters the
module in
encrypted
form.
Never exits
the module
Hard disk in
plaintext
Overwritten by
another key
distributed by
Bomgar Corp.
Used to verify
the authenticity
(signature) of
module
firmware
updates
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2.8 EMI/EMC
The modules were tested and found conformant to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of
Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (i.e., for
business use).
2.9 Self-Tests
2.9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
The Bomgar Appliances perform the following self-tests at power-up to verify the integrity of the
software/firmware and the correct operation of the FIPS-Approved algorithm implementations employed
by the modules:
• Software/firmware integrity check using a SHA-1 EDC23
• AES Known Answer Test (KAT) (encrypt/decrypt)
• Triple DES KAT (encrypt/decrypt)
• RSA KAT (sign/verify)
• HMAC KATs (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512)
• SHA-1 KAT (note that all SHA-2 implementations are tested as part of the underlying mechanism
of the HMAC SHA self-tests)
• ANSI X9.31 PRNG KAT
If any of the power-up self-tests fail, then the module enters an error state, logs the error to a file, and
disables all cryptographic operations.
2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The Bomgar Appliances perform the following conditional self-tests:
• ANSI X9.31 A.2.4 PRNG Continuous RNG test: Verifying the correct operation of the PRNG
algorithm implementation.
• RSA pair-wise consistency check (sign/verify and encrypt/decrypt): Verifying that a newly
generated RSA key pair works properly.
• Software/firmware load test: Verifying the upgrade packages. Upgrade packages are digitally-
signed using RSA-4096, and are only loaded once the digital signature is verified.
If any of the conditional self-tests fail, then the module enters a soft error state until the error can be
cleared.
2.10Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The modules do not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2
Level 2 requirements for this validation.
23
EDC – Error Detection Code
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3 Secure Operation
The B200, B300, and B400 Appliances meet Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to ensure
that the modules are running securely.
3.1 Initial Setup
The following sections provide the necessary step-by-step instructions for the secure hardware installation of the B200, B300,
and B400 Appliances, as well as the steps necessary to configure the modules for a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. If you
have any questions or if issues arise at any point during the installation and configuration of your Bomgar Appliances, contact
the Bomgar support team toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2.
3.1.1 B200 Hardware Setup
In order to set up the Bomgar B200, the following steps will need to be performed by the Crypto-Officer:
1. Inspect the tamper-evident labels as described in Section 3.1.2 below. The tamper evident labels must be applied for
the module to operate in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. If you find a label that is questionable in appearance,
contact Bomgar support toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2.
2. Follow the procedures included in the Hardware Setup Guide to install your B200 in your server rack.
3. After you have installed the B200 per the Hardware Setup Guide, refer to the included Bomgar Hardware Installation
Guide to configure your network settings.
4. Once the B200’s network settings are correctly configured, return to Section 3.1.6.1 in this document to configure
your B200 for FIPS mode.
3.1.2 B200 Label Inspection
The B200 with tamper-evident label kit – part # TEL135325 – and front bezel – part # FB000200 – will be shipped from the
factory with two labels pre-applied (see Figure 8 and Figure 9 below). Upon delivery, the Crypto-Officer should ensure that the
module was not tampered with during shipment and that the labels have been applied properly. Also, tamper-evident labels
shall be routinely inspected for damage by the Crypto-Officer. If the Crypto-Officer finds a label that is questionable in
appearance, contact Bomgar support toll-free at 1 877 826 6427 x2 or internationally at +01 601 519 0123 x2. If any additional
labels are needed contact Bomgar support toll-free at 1 877 826 6427 x2 or internationally at +01 601 519 0123 x2 with part #
TEL135325. The Crypto-Officer is also responsible for securing and having control of the additional tamper-evident labels at
all times.
Inspect all tamper-evident labels that shipped pre-applied to the B200 chassis (see Figure 8 and Figure 9), ensuring that each
label shows no sign of tampering and is properly placed. Any attempt to reposition or remove the label will result in the
voiding of that label and leave a residue on the surface. If you find a label that is questionable in appearance, contact Bomgar
support toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2.
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Figure 8 – Tamper-Evident Label Applied to Top of B200, Overlapping the Galvanized Metal Cover and the
Front Panel
Figure 9 – Tamper-Evident Label Applied to Rear of B200, Overlapping the Galvanized Metal Cover and the
Rear Steel Bezel
3.1.3 B300 Hardware Setup
B300r1 and B300r2 are referred as B300 when the information is same for both the models. In order to set up the Bomgar
B300, the following steps will need to be performed by the Crypto-Officer:
1. Unpack the B300 and remove the front bezel from the front of the B300:
a. Loosen the set screw on the right-hand side of the front bezel. This screw keeps the tab in place during
shipping.
b. Press the tab on the right side of the front bezel and pull the front bezel towards you, right side first.
Pre-Applied
Tamper Evident
Label 2
Pre-Applied
Tamper Evident
Label 1
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2. Reseat the hard drives:
a. Remove each of the hard drives by pressing the dark red buttons to unlatch the drive carrier handles. Use the
handles to pull the drives about halfway out of the B300 chassis.
b. As you reinsert each of the drives, the carrier handles will begin to close. Close the handles (you will feel
them lock) and fully insert the drives into the B300 by firmly pressing on the left and right edges of the front
of the drive carriers. Even if no movement is felt, this helps to ensure that the disk is completely engaged.
3. Reattach the B300’s front bezel:
a. Engage the left side of the faceplate first, taking care to align the stubs of the faceplate with the drilled holes
in the left ear.
b. Repeat on the right side and then tighten the set screw. Take care not to over tighten this screw.
4. Inspect the tamper-evident labels as described in Section 3.1.4 below. The tamper evident labels must be applied for
the module to operate in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. If you find a label that is questionable in appearance,
contact Bomgar support toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2.
5. Follow the procedures included in the Hardware Setup Guide to install your B300 in your server rack.
6. After you have installed the B300 per the Hardware Setup Guide, refer to the included Bomgar Hardware Installation
Guide to configure your network settings.
7. Once the B300’s network settings are correctly configured, return to Section 3.1.6.1 in this document to configure
your B300 for FIPS mode.
3.1.4 B300 Label Inspection
The B300r1 and B300r2 with tamper-evident label kit – part # TEL135325 – and front bezel – part # FB000300 – will be
shipped from the factory with six labels. Four labels are pre-applied at factory (see Figure 10 and Figure 12 below). Two labels
are to be applied by the Crypto-Officer on chassis top and bottom overlapping the front bezel (see Figure 11 below). This is to
allow the end-user to reseat the drives upon receipt before affixing the front bezel to the appliance. Upon delivery, the Crypto-
Officer should ensure that the module was not tampered with during shipment and that the labels have been applied properly.
Also, tamper-evident labels shall be routinely inspected for damage by the Crypto-Officer. If the Crypto-Officer finds a label
that is questionable in appearance, contact Bomgar support toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or internationally at
+01-601-519-0123 x2. If any additional labels are needed contact Bomgar support toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or
internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2 with part # TEL135325. The Crypto-Officer is also responsible for securing and
having control of the additional tamper-evident labels at all times.
1. Inspect all tamper-evident labels that shipped pre-applied to the B300 chassis (see Figure 10 below), ensuring that
each label shows no sign of tampering and is properly placed. Any attempt to reposition or remove the label will result
in the voiding of that label and leave a residue on the surface. If you find a label that is questionable in appearance,
contact Bomgar support toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2.
2. To apply the front bezel labels, first you must clean the top surface and front bezel of the B300 with isopropyl alcohol
in the area where the tamper-evident labels will be placed.
3. Holding the label by the edges, place the label on the surface as indicated in Figure 11 and Figure 12.
4. Apply the included tamper-evident labels by rubbing gently across the entire label to ensure adhesion to the surface.
NOTE: Any attempt to reposition or remove the label will result in the voiding of that label and leave a residue on the
surface.
5. Allow the labels to fully adhere to the B300 within 24 hours in a physically secure environment before placing the
B300 in the intended environment.
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Figure 10 – Rear Metallic Bezel Seal (Left) and Sealed Top Cover (Right) of B300r1 and B300r2
Figure 11 – Sealed Front Bezel to Chassis Top (Left) and Sealed Front Bezel to Chassis Bottom (Right) of
B300r1and B300r2
Figure 12 – Sealed Top Chassis to Left Power Supply (Left) and Sealed Top Chassis to Right Power Supply
(Right) of B300r1 and B300r2
Pre-Applied
Tamper
Evident
Label 1
Pre-Applied
Tamper
Evident
Label 2
Tamper
Evident
Label 3
Tamper
Evident
Label 4
Pre-Applied
Tamper Evident
Label 5
Pre-Applied
Tamper
Evident
Label 6
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3.1.5 B400 Hardware Setup
In order to set up the Bomgar B400, the following steps will need to be performed by the Crypto-Officer:
1. Unpack the B400.
2. Reseat the hard drives:
a. Remove each of the hard drives by pressing the dark red buttons to unlatch the drive carrier handles. Use the
handles to pull the drives about halfway out of the B400 chassis.
b. As you reinsert each of the drives, the carrier handles will begin to close. Close the handles (you will feel
them lock) and fully insert the drives into the B400 by firmly pressing on the left and right edges of the front
of the drive carriers. Even if no movement is felt, this helps to ensure that the disk is completely engaged.
3. Attach the B400’s front bezel by engaging first the left side of the faceplate and then the right side.
4. Inspect the tamper-evident labels as described in Section 3.1.6 below. The tamper evident labels must be applied for
the module to operate in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. If you find a label that is questionable in appearance,
contact Bomgar support toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2.
5. Follow the procedures included in the Hardware Setup Guide to install your B400 in your server rack.
6. After you have installed the B400 per the Hardware Setup Guide, refer to the included Bomgar Hardware Installation
Guide to configure your network settings.
7. Once the B400’s network settings are correctly configured, return to Section 3.1.6.1 in this document to configure
your B400 for FIPS mode.
3.1.6 B400 Label Inspection and Application
The B400r1 with tamper evident label kit – part # TEL135325 – and front bezel – part # FB000400 – will be shipped from the
factory with five labels. Three labels are pre-applied at factory (see Figure 13 and Figure 14 below). Two labels are to be
applied by the Crypto-Officer on chassis top and bottom overlapping the front bezel (see Figure 15 below). This is to allow the
end-user to reseat the drives upon receipt before affixing the front bezel to the appliance.
Upon delivery, the Crypto-Officer should ensure that the module was not tampered with during shipment and that the labels
have been applied properly. Also, tamper-evident labels shall be routinely inspected for damage by the Crypto-Officer. If the
Crypto-Officer finds a label that is questionable in appearance, contact Bomgar support toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or
internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2. If any additional labels are needed contact Bomgar support toll-free at
1-877-826-6427 x2 or internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2 with part # TEL135325. The Crypto-Officer is also responsible
for securing and having control of the additional tamper-evident labels at all times.
1. Inspect all tamper-evident labels that shipped pre-applied to the B400 chassis (see Figure 13, Figure 14, and Figure 15
below), ensuring that each label shows no sign of tampering and is properly placed. Any attempt to reposition or
remove the label will result in the voiding of that label and leave a residue on the surface. If you find a label that is
questionable in appearance, contact Bomgar support toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or internationally at
+01-601-519-0123 x2.
2. To apply the front bezel labels, first you must clean the surface and front bezel of the B400 with isopropyl alcohol in
the area where the tamper-evident labels will be placed.
3. Holding the label by the edges, place the label on the surface as indicated below (see Figure 15).
4. Apply the included tamper-evident labels by rubbing gently across the entire label to ensure adhesion to the surface.
NOTE: Any attempt to reposition or remove the label will result in the voiding of that label and leave a residue on the
surface.
5. Allow the labels to fully adhere to the B400 within 24 hours in a physically secure environment before placing the
B400 in the intended environment.
Security Policy, Version 2.3 June 15, 2015
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Figure 13 – Sealed Top Cover of B400r1
Figure 14 – Sealed power supply #1 to chassis bottom (Left) and Sealed power supply #2 to chassis top
(Right) of B400r1
Figure 15 – Sealed front bezel to chassis bottom (Left) and Sealed front bezel to chassis top (Right) of B400r1
Pre-Applied
Tamper Evident
Label 1
Tamper Evident
Label 4
Tamper Evident
Label 5
Pre-Applied
Tamper Evident
Label 2
Pre-Applied
Tamper Evident
Label 3
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3.1.6.1 B200, B300, and B400 FIPS Mode Configuration
Once all necessary initialization procedures have been performed as described in the preceding sections, the
modules need to be configured to comply with FIPS 140-2 requirements. Once configured as described in this
section, the modules will be considered to be in FIPS-Approved mode, which can be verified at any time by
viewing the IP Configuration page and the SSL Configuration page and ensuring they match Figure and
Figure below.
FIPS-Approved Mode Configuration
Log into the Bomgar Appliance Administrative Interface (e.g., support.example.com/appliance) and configure your settings as
described below24
:
1. Navigate to the IP Configuration page under the Networking tab (see Figure below).
2. Click the default 169.254.1.1 IP address to edit it.
3. Set the Telnet Server setting to Simplified.
24
NOTE: The module comes preloaded with a default password. The Crypto-Officer is responsible for changing this password before proceeding with the
configuration steps.
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4. Click the Save Changes button to commit these configuration changes.
Figure 17– IP Configuration Page
Navigate to the SSL Configuration page under the Security tab (see
5. Figure below).
6. Disable SSLv3 by ensuring that the Allow SSL v3 checkbox is cleared.
Security Policy, Version 2.3 June 15, 2015
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7. Ensure that only FIPS-Approved cipher suites are enabled:
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
8. Click the Save button to commit these configuration changes.
9. Navigate to Basics under Status tab and click on Reboot This Appliance (see Figure below).
Figure 18– SSL Configuration Page
3.1.7 Firmware/Software Version Verification
To ensure that the modules are running the validated versions of the module Firmware and Software, operators should compare
the running versions to those documented in this Security Policy. To obtain the version of the Firmware, an operator must visit
the /appliance site, which is the interface used by the Crypto-Officer. To obtain the software version, an operator must visit the
/login site, which requires the use of the credentials of the Instance-Admin role. Upon signing in, both display the Status page
by default, showing the version number ([“3.3.2fips (FIPS140-2) (38611)” and “12.1.6fips (38611)”], [“3.4.0fips (FIPS 140-2)
Security Policy, Version 2.3 June 15, 2015
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(48368)” and “13.1.3fips (48024)”], [“3.4.1fips (FIPS 140-2) (53641)” and “13.1.3fips (48024)”] , or) [“3.5.1fips (FIPS 140-2)
(56959)” and “14.3.3fips (56803)”].
3.2 FIPS Mode Compliance
Any time the modules deviate from the configuration detailed in Section 3.1.6.1 above, the modules will be considered to be in
a non-FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
Additionally, the guidance provided below must be followed to ensure that the modules remain in a FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. Failure to do so will result in non-compliance.
• When entering OR leaving FIPS-Approved mode, navigate to the Basics page under the Status tab of the /appliance
interface and clear all existing CSPs by clicking the Reset Appliance to Factory Defaults button.
NOTE: All Firmware and Software will be completely uninstalled after reset.
Figure 19–
Status Basics Page
• Never install software or firmware versions other than those listed on the cover page of this security policy. Only the
software and firmware versions listed are considered part of the validated configuration.
• When using the module’s administrative interface, do not use the Advanced Support page under the Support tab of
the /appliance interface. Doing so will result in non-compliance.
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Figure 0 – Advanced Support Page
• Enforce minimum password requirements for the Instance-Admin and Instance-User roles using the Security page
under the Management tab of the /login interface.
Figure 1 – Security Page
• When using the management interface, do not use the Support page under the Management tab of the /login
interface.
Figure 162 – Support Page
• Never install a Bomgar software package via the Software Management page under the Management tab of the
/login interface. Instead, ensure that any received Bomgar software packages are FIPS-Approved, and upload them
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from the Updates page under the Support tab of the appliance administrative interface (e.g.
support.example.com/appliance). You should always upload updates manually rather than using the auto-update
feature. Do not use the Appliance Key Check for Updates functionality. To maintain compliance, only the software
update versions listed in this security policy are to be used.
3.3 Crypto-Officer Guidance
The Crypto-Officer can initiate the execution of self-tests and can access the module’s status reporting capability. Self-tests can
be initiated at any time by power cycling the modules.
3.3.1 Management
It is the responsibility of the Crypto-Officer to ensure that the modules are set up to run securely. Please refer to Section 3.2
above for guidance that the Crypto-Officer must follow for the modules to be considered in a FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. Additionally, the Crypto-Officer should be careful to protect any secret/private keys in their possession.
For details regarding the management of the modules, please refer to the appropriate Bomgar Appliance Administrative User’s
Guide.
3.3.2 Status Monitoring
Error message and status review is the responsibility of the Crypto-Officer. When any of a module’s self-tests fail, the module
reports an error message which can be viewed over a network connection. This connection is set using the IP Configuration
page under the Networking tab as shown in Figure in Section 3.1.6.1 above. Issuing the command "telnet [ip-address-
assigned-to-network-port]" brings up the following options:
1. Show Error Message
2. Shutdown the Device
3. Reboot the Device
4. Reset the Device to Factory Default
5. Done
Issuing the Show Error Message command will display the reported error message.
3.3.3 Zeroization
Session keys are zeroized at the termination of the session but are also cleared when the module is power-cycled. All other
CSPs may be zeroized by either:
• issuing the Reset Appliance to Factory Defaults command (found on the Basics page under the Status tab of the
/appliance interface) and rebooting the module, or
• selecting the Reset the Device to Factory Default option from a telnet session and rebooting the module.
The zeroization of keys and CSPs is immediate, providing insufficient time for an attacker to compromise them. The Crypto-
Officer must wait until the module has successfully rebooted in order to verify that zeroization has completed.
3.4 Instance-Admin and Instance-User Guidance
The Instance-Admins do not have the ability to configure sensitive information on the modules, with the exception of the
Instance-User and their own passwords. The Instance-Admin has the ability to configure the password strength policy for
Instance-Admins and Instance-Users. Please refer to Section 3.2 above for guidance that should be followed for the modules to
be considered in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
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Instance-Users do not have the ability to configure sensitive information on the modules, with the exception of their own
passwords. The Instance-Admins and Instance-Users must employ strong passwords that meet or exceed the password strength
requirements documented in Section 2.4.6 of this document and must not reveal their passwords to anyone.
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4 Acronyms
This section describes the acronyms used in this document.
Table 10 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AD Active Directory
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CFB Cipher Feedback
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto-Officer
CSEC Communication Security Establishment Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
ECB Electronic Codebook
EDC Error Detection Code
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HDD Hard Disk Drive
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol over TLS
IP Internet Protocol
KAT Known Answer Test
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LED Light Emitting Diode
MD Message Digest
N/A Not Applicable
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OFB Output Feedback
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
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Acronym Definition
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standard
POS Point of Sale
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks
RC Rivest Cipher
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
Triple DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
UID Unit Identifier
USB Universal Serial Bus
WAN Wide Area Network