



Qualcomm® Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library

FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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1. Introduction

This document is a FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library. This document contains a specification of the rules under which the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library must operate and describes how it meets the requirements as specified in Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 (FIPS PUB 140-2) for a Security Level 1 module. It is intended for the FIPS 140-2 testing lab, Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), developers working on the release, administrators and users of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library.

For more information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program, refer to the NIST website at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html>.

1.1. Purpose of the Security Policy

There are three major reasons that a security policy is required

- It is required for FIPS 140-2 validation.
- It allows individuals and organizations to determine whether the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library satisfies the stated security policy.
- It allows individuals and organizations to determine whether the described capabilities, the level of protection, and access rights provided by the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library meet their security requirements.

2. Cryptographic Module Specification

2.1. Module description

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is a single-chip software-hybrid cryptographic module.

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is used by secure applications. It is part of the common library, and provides APIs to the secure applications for cryptography and hashing functions.

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is determined to be a FIPS 140-2 validated module by blowing the TZ_SW_CRYPT0_FIPS_ENABLE fuse and by determining the version number based on its hash value combined with the register value of fuse.

The software-hybrid cryptographic module is specified in the following table:

Table 1-1: Components of the Software-hybrid Cryptographic Module

Component	Type	Version Number	Operating Environment
Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library	Software-hybrid	5.8-00049	Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment TZ.XF.5.8

The modules have been tested on the following platform:
Qualcomm® Snapdragon™ 865 Mobile Platform

Table 1-2 describes the software component versions that comprise the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library while Table 1-3 describes the fuse setting that enables the FIPS validated module. The FIPS validated Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library comprises of a combination of the software component versions and fuse setting combined together.

Table 1-2: Software component versions for Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library

Software component	HMAC hash value
Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library (32 bit)	ef514c6436fa3404c633054d6fe10f733a53058d314f936d5adcf59209fccb41
Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic library (64 bit)	f1b250c6d0829917b5d5d9510e0fb08dce2f0c90d03bee102d44762878b133bf

Table 1-3: Fuse setting

Fuse name	1-bit fuse value	Descriptions
TZ_SW_CRYPTTO_FIPS_ENABLE	1	Enable FIPS compliance for Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library. Disable by default and blow to enable.

2.1.1. Software description

The software cryptographic module consists of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library. The cryptographic functions are implemented within the library. The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is bound to the on-chip Qualcomm® Pseudo Random Number Generator module with version 2.3.1 validated under FIPS 140-2 Cert. #3114. The bound module resides within the same physical boundary of the binding module.

2.1.2. Module Validation Level

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is intended to meet requirements of FIPS 140-2 at an overall Security Level 1. The following table shows the security level claimed for each of the eleven sections that comprise the validation:

Table 2-1 Security Levels

FIPS 140-2 Section		Security Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	1
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
3	Roles, Services and Authentication	1
4	Finite State Model	1
5	Physical Security	1
6	Operational Environment	1
7	Cryptographic Key Management	1
8	EMI/EMC	1
9	Self-Tests	1
10	Design Assurance	1
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	1
Overall Level		1

2.2. Description of Modes of Operations


The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library supports two modes of operation: FIPS approved mode and a non-approved mode. The mode of operation is implicitly assumed depending on the service invoked. The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library enters FIPS approved mode after successful completion of the power up self-tests. Invoking a non-approved service will result in the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library implicitly switching to non-approved mode. After completion of the service the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library will immediately switch back to the FIPS approved mode and then depending on the next service call it will either remain in FIPS mode or will transition to non-approved mode. All CSPs are kept separate between the two modes.

Table 4-1 lists the roles and Table 4-2 along with Table 4-3 illustrates the services available to each role (Crypto Officer and User).

2.3. Cryptographic Module Boundary

The physical boundary of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is the physical boundary of the device that contains it. Consequently, the embodiment of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is a single-chip software-hybrid cryptographic module.

Figure 1: Cryptographic Boundary



3. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

Table 3-1 Ports and interfaces

FIPS Interface	Ports
Data Input	Input parameters of API calls
Data Output	Output parameters of API calls
Control Input	API calls
Status Output	Return values of API calls
Power Input	Physical power connector

As indicated in Table 3-1, all status ports and control ports are directed through the interface of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library's logical boundary, which is its software APIs.

The User or Crypto Officer interacts with the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library in two distinct ways:

1. Initializing the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library
2. The application services (API's) invoked by users

For the application services, the logical interfaces of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library are the library APIs. In detail, these interfaces are the following:

- Data input and data output are provided in the variables passed in the API and callable service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers.
- Control inputs are provided through dedicated parameters.
- Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for each API lists possible return codes.

Once Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library initializes and the self-tests complete successfully, all cryptographic functions are made available. If its integrity test or KATs fail, the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library goes into error state. To recover from a failure, the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library will need to be re-initialized. When the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is in the error state, the data output is inhibited. The only way to recover from an integrity test failure is to reinstall the software and re-initialize.

Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers. The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library ensures that there is no means to obtain data from itself by performing key zeroization. There is no means to obtain sensitive information from the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library.

4.Roles, Services and Authentication

4.1.Roles

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library supports two roles: a Crypto Officer role and a User role. Roles are implicitly assumed based on the services requested.

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library supports multiple application sessions. Each application session is started with a separate instance of the library. Each session is protected by memory separation, process isolation and access control provided by the kernel.

4.1.1.Crypto Officer Role

The Crypto Officer role exists only while provisioning the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library by the OEM.

4.1.2.User Role

The software applications assume the User role when requesting any services provided by the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library. The User role has access to all its services except installation and configuration.

Table 4-1 Roles

Role	Services
User	Utilization of cryptographic services and re-initialization from Error state
Crypto Officer	Installation and Configuration

4.2.Services

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library does not provide a bypass capability through which some cryptographic operations are not performed or where certain controls are not enforced.

Services are accessed through documented API interfaces from the calling application.

Additional services are provided by bound Pseudo Random Number Generator module on the Snapdragon 865 Mobile Platform SoC. This Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library utilizes the random number generation service from the bound Pseudo Random Number Generator module.

The following tables (Table 4-2 and Table 4-3) illustrate the role and corresponding services of the Crypto Officer and User

Table 4-2 Approved, Allowed or Vendor Affirmed Services

Service	Roles		CSP	Modes	Is FIPS Approved? If Yes Cert #	Access (Read, Write)	Standard
	User	CO					
Symmetric Algorithms							
AES encryption and decryption	✓		AES Symmetric key (128, 192, 256 bit)	CBC, ECB, CTR, CCM	32-bit - Cert. #A115	Read/Write	FIPS 197, SP800-38A
			AES Symmetric key (128 and 256 bit)	XTS	64-bit - Cert. #A116		
AES cipher text stealing	✓		AES Symmetric key (128, 192, 256 bit)	AES-CBC-CS (CBC-CS2)	(vendor affirmed)	Read/Write	SP800-38A Addendum
Triple-DES encryption and decryption	✓		Triple DES Symmetric key (192 bits)	CBC, ECB	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Read/Write	SP 800-67r1 , SP800-38A
Hash Functions							
SHA-1	✓		None	N/A	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	N/A	FIPS 180-4
SHA-224	✓		None	N/A	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	N/A	FIPS 180-4
SHA-256	✓		None	N/A	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	N/A	FIPS 180-4

Service	Roles		CSP	Modes	Is FIPS Approved? If Yes Cert #	Access (Read, Write)	Standard
	User	CO					
SHA-384	✓		None	N/A	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	N/A	FIPS 180-4
SHA-512	✓		None	N/A	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	N/A	FIPS 180-4
Message Authentication Codes (MACs)							
HMAC SHA-1	✓		HMAC SHA-1 key (key length between 112 bits and 512 bits)	N/A	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Read/Write	FIPS 198-1
HMAC SHA-224	✓		HMAC SHA-224 key (key length between 112 bits and 512 bits)	N/A	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Read/Write	FIPS 198-1
HMAC SHA-256	✓		HMAC SHA-256 key (key length between 112 bits and 512 bits)	N/A	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Read/Write	FIPS 198-1
HMAC SHA-384	✓		HMAC SHA-384 key (key length between 112 bits and 512 bits)	N/A	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Read/Write	FIPS 198-1

Service	Roles		CSP	Modes	Is FIPS Approved? If Yes Cert #	Access (Read, Write)	Standard
	User	CO					
HMAC SHA-512	✓		HMAC SHA-512 key (key length between 112 bits and 512 bits)	N/A	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Read/Write	FIPS 198-1
Public Key Algorithms							
ECDH shared secret computation	✓		shared secret for P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 curves	5.7.1.2 ECC CDH Primitive	32-bit - CVL Cert. #A115 64-bit - CVL Cert. #A116	Write	SP 800-56A
ECDSA/ECDH Key-Pair	✓		ECDSA/ECDH public/private key pair for P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 curves	B.4.2	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Write	FIPS 186-4 SP800-133 (CKG) vendor affirmed
ECDSA Sig Gen	✓		ECDSA private key according to P-224 to P-521 curves	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Read/Write	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA Sig Gen - component	✓		ECDSA private key according to P-224 to P-521 curves	SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	32-bit - CVL Cert. #A115 64-bit - CVL Cert. #A116	Read/Write	FIPS 186-4
ECDSA Sig Verify	✓		ECDSA public key according to P-192 to P-521 curves	SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Read	FIPS 186-4

Service	Roles		CSP	Modes	Is FIPS Approved? If Yes Cert #	Access (Read, Write)	Standard
	User	CO					
RSA KeyGen 9.31	✓		RSA public and private key pair with 2048/3072/4096-bit modulus size	B.3.3	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Write	FIPS 186-4 SP800-133 (CKG) vendor affirmed
RSA SigGen PKCS1.5	✓		RSA private key with 2048/3072/4096-bit modulus size	SHA-256, SHA-384- SHA-512	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Read/Write	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer PKCS1.5	✓		RSA public key with 1024/2048/3072/4096-bit modulus size	SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA384, SHA-512	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Read	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGenPSS	✓		RSA private key with 2048/3072/4096-bit modulus size	SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Read/Write	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVerPSS	✓		RSA public key with 1024/2048/3072/4096-bit modulus size	SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	32-bit - Cert. #A115 64-bit - Cert. #A116	Read	FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen - Primitive	✓		RSA private key with 2048-bit modulus size	N/A	32-bit - CVL Cert. #A115 64-bit - CVL Cert. #A116	Read/Write	FIPS 186-4
Key Derivation							

Service	Roles		CSP	Modes	Is FIPS Approved? If Yes Cert #	Access (Read, Write)	Standard
	User	CO					
PBKDF2	✓		Password and derived key	SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512	vendor affirmed ¹	Read/Write	SP 800-132
Miscellaneous							
Installation and Configuration	✓		None	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
re-initialization from Error state	✓		None	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Self-Tests	✓		None	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Zeroization	✓		All CSPs	N/A	N/A	W	N/A
Show Status	✓		None	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
DRBG bound module							
SHA-256	✓		None	N/A	Certs. #A49, #A50	N/A	FIPS 180-4
SHA-256 Hash DRBG	✓		Seed, (i.e., entropy input string and nonce), Personalization string	SHA-256	Cert. #A50	Read/Write	SP800-90A
				NDRNG - used to seed DRBG; provides 256 bits of entropy	N/A (Allowed in FIPS mode)	Read	N/A

¹ Although PBKDF2 has CAVP certificates Cert. #A115 for 32-bit and Cert. #A116 for 64-bit, the corresponding KAT is not implemented. Therefore, this algorithm is listed as vendor affirmed

Table 4-3 Non-Approved Services

Service	Roles		Access (Read, Write)
	User	CO	
Symmetric Algorithms			
DES	✓		Read/Write
GCM/GMAC ²	✓		Read/Write
HMAC SHA-1/SHA-256/SHA-384/ SHA-512 with key sizes below 112 bits	✓		Read/Write
MD5	✓		Read/Write
SM3	✓		Read/Write
SM4	✓		Read/Write
Asymmetric algorithms			
ECDH key pair/shared secret computation using P-160/P-192	✓		Read/Write
ECDSA key pair/signer with P-160/ P-192 and sigver with P-160	✓		Read/Write
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)	✓		Read/Write
RSA key wrapping with RSA OAEP	✓		Read/Write
RSA keygen with 1024 bit keys and signer with 1024 bit keys	✓		Read/Write
SM2	✓		Read/Write

² GCM is CAVP certified with CAVP Certs. #A115 and #A116. However, there are two requirements from FIPS IG A.5 below that contributed to the non-compliance: 1) the IV uniqueness must be enforced by the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library ; 2) FIPS required that only 2^{32} cipher operations are performed with a given key.

4.3.Operator Authentication

There is no operator authentication; assumption of role is implicit by action.

5. Physical Security

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is a software-hybrid module implemented as part of the Snapdragon 865 Mobile Platform SoC, which is the physical boundary of the single-chip software-hybrid module. The Snapdragon 865 Mobile Platform SoC is a single chip with a production grade enclosure and hence conform to the Level 1 requirements for physical security.

6.Operational Environment

6.1.Applicability

The operating system shall be restricted to a single operator mode of operation. The procurement, build and configuring procedure are controlled. The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is installed into a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) mobile device by the customer.

7. Cryptographic Key Management

7.1. Key Establishment/Key Derivation

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library implements Password-Based Key Derivation version 2 (PBKDFv2) as defined in [SP800-132]. The PBKDFv2 function is provided as a service and returns the key derived from the provided password to the caller. The supported option is 1a from Section 5.4 of SP 800-132, whereby the Master Key (MK) is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK). The length of the salt should be at least 128 bits and the length of the password or passphrase should be at least 8 characters, which provides the probability of guessing this password or passphrase to be $(1/10)^8$ assuming a scenario where all characters are digits. The caller shall observe all requirements and should consider all recommendations specified in SP800-132 with respect to the strength of the generated key, including the quality of the password, the quality of the salt as well as the number of iterations. The keys derived from passwords, as shown in SP 800-132, may only be used for storage applications.

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library also implements key agreement scheme based on SP800-56A without KDF. The EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation with curves P-224 through P-521, provides between 112 and 256 bits equivalent security strength.

7.2. Key Generation

Key Generation uses an approved DRBG algorithm provided as an approved service through the bound Pseudo Random Number Generator module.

The Key Generation methods implemented in the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library for Approved services in FIPS mode are compliant with SP800-133. RSA and ECDSA key generation is done according to FIPS Pub 186-4 [8]. EC Diffie-Hellman key generation is similar ECDSA key generation. For generating RSA and ECDSA keys, the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library implements asymmetric key generation services compliant with FIPS Pub 186-4 and SP800-90A. A seed (i.e. the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is directly obtained from the SP800-90A DRBG. The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library does not generate symmetric keys.

7.3. Key Entry /Output

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library does not support manual key entry or intermediate key generation key output. The keys are provided to it via API input parameters in plaintext form and output via API output parameters in plaintext form. The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library does not enter or output keys in plaintext format outside its physical boundary.

7.4. Key Storage

All keys are output from and entered into the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library to and from the calling process, and are destroyed from memory when released. It does not perform persistent storage of keys. The keys and CSPs are stored encrypted in the RAM when the application is run out of protected memory. If the application chooses to run on un-protected memory or if protected memory is not supported in some hardware variants, the keys and CSPs will be stored temporarily in plaintext in the RAM.

7.5. Key Zeroization

The memory occupied by keys is allocated by regular memory allocation calls. The application is responsible for calling the appropriate zeroization functions provided in the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library’s API.

Table 7-1 - Life cycle of Keys

Name	Generation	Entry and Output	Storage	Zeroization
AES keys	Not Applicable. Keys are provided by the calling application.	The key is passed into the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library via API input parameters in plaintext.	temporarily stored in RAM	when the caller requests to clear the key
Triple-DES keys				
HMAC key				
RSA private key	Key pairs are generated using FIPS 186-4 key generation method, and the random value used is generated using the SP800-90A DRBG.	The key is passed into the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library via API input parameters in plaintext. The key is passed out of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library via API output parameters in plaintext.	temporarily stored in RAM	when the caller requests to clear the key
ECDH private key				
ECDSA private key				
ECDH shared secret	The shared secret is computed using SP800-56A	The shared secret is passed out of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library via API output parameters in plaintext.	temporarily stored in RAM	when the caller requests to clear the key
Password	The Password is provided by the calling application	The password is passed into the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library via API input parameters in plaintext.	temporarily stored in RAM	when the caller requests to clear the key

Name	Generation	Entry and Output	Storage	Zeroization
Derived key	The derived key is generated by the PBKDF.	The derived key is passed out of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library via API output parameters in plaintext.	temporarily stored in RAM	when the caller requests to clear the key

8. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment component cannot be certified by the FCC as it is not a standalone device. It is a software-hybrid module imbedded in the Snapdragon 865 Mobile Platform SoC, which is also not a standalone device. Instead, Snapdragon 865 Mobile Platform is intended to be used within a COTS device which would undergo standard FCC certification for EMI/EMC.

According to 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment is not subject to EMI/EMC regulations because it is a subassembly that is sold to an equipment manufacturer for further fabrication. That manufacturer is responsible for obtaining the necessary authorization for the equipment with the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment embedded prior to further marketing to a vendor or to a user.

9. Power up Tests

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library performs power-up self-tests when it is loaded into memory, without operator intervention. Power-up self-tests ensure that it is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. The power-up self-tests consists of software integrity test and the known-answer tests.

While the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is executing the power-up self-tests, services are not available, and input and output are inhibited. It is not available to be used by the calling application until the power-up self-tests are completed successfully.

The integrity of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is verified by checking a HMAC-SHA-256-based hash value of each Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library binary prior to being utilized. The binaries' hash values are generated during the final phase of the build process.

If any power-up test fails, the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library enters an error state. The Trusted Application loading process will fail, so the application cannot be initialized and run. To recover from the error state, re-initialization is possible by successful execution of the power up tests which can be triggered by a power-off/power-on cycle. If the power-up tests complete successfully, the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library will accept cryptographic operation service requests.

Pair-wise Consistency tests are run whenever the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library generates a private-public key-pair. The private key structure always contains either the data of the corresponding public key or information sufficient for computing the corresponding public key.

If the pair-wise consistency check fails, the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library enters an error state and returns an error status code. The calling application must recognize this error and handle it in a FIPS 140-2 appropriate manner, for example, by reinitializing the library instance.

The Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library implements the following self-tests to ensure its proper functioning. The implemented self-tests include power up self-tests of all approved algorithms.

9.1. Cryptographic Algorithm Tests

Table 9-1 Power up Tests

Algorithm	Test
AES encryption (CCM)	KAT
AES decryption (CCM)	KAT
AES decryption (ECB)	KAT
Triple-DES encryption (ECB)	KAT
Triple-DES decryption (ECB)	KAT
HMAC SHA-1	KAT
HMAC SHA-256	KAT
HMAC SHA-512	KAT
RSA Signature Generation/Signature Verification	KAT

Algorithm	Test
ECDSA Signature Generation/Signature Verification	KAT
ECDH primitive Z computation	KAT
HMAC SHA-256	Integrity test

Table 9-2 Pair-wise Consistency Tests

Algorithm	Test
RSA	PCT
ECDSA	PCT

10.Design Assurance

10.1.Configuration Management

Perforce Visual Client(P4V), a version control system from Perforce, is used to manage the revision control of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment software code. The Perforce Visual Client provides version control, branching and merging of code lines, and concurrent development.

Git, a version control system from Open Source Community., is also used to manage the revision control of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment unified crypto software code. The Git product provides version control, branching and merging of code lines, and concurrent development.

10.2.Crypto Officer Guidance

To enable FIPS for the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library, the fuse must be set according to Table 1. The fuse enablement is mandatory to run as a FIPS validated module. This step is required to perform only once during initial configuration.

The information required for the Crypto Officer to verify the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is provided by the `qsee_get_fips_info()` function in `qsee_fips_services.h`. To verify that a Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is FIPS certified, the Crypto Officer should verify the following:

- The HMAC of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library is on a list of HMACs of certified crypto modules.
 - This can be done by calling `qsee_get_fips_info()` with the `info_type` parameter set to `QSEE_FIPS_MODULE_HMAC` (0). The `buffer` parameter should point to a buffer which is at least 32 bytes long, and the `buffer_len` parameter should be at least 32.
 - The result buffer should contain the SHA256 HMAC of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library.
 - To get the HMAC of the 32bit Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library, this should be run from a 32 bit Trusted Application. To get the HMAC of the 64bit Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library, this should be run from a 64 bit Trusted Application.
- The FIPS enablement fuse is blown.
 - This can be done by calling `qsee_get_fips_info()` with the `info_type` parameter set to `QSEE_FIPS_FUSE_STATUS` (1). The `buffer` parameter should point to a 4-byte buffer (`sizeof(uint32)`) and the `buffer_len` parameter should equal 4.
 - The result buffer should contain the value `QSEE_FIPS_FUSE_BLOWN` (1).
- The crypto self test has passed.
 - This can be done by calling `qsee_get_fips_info()` with the `info_type` parameter set to `QSEE_FIPS_SELFTEST_STATUS` (2). The `buffer` parameter should point to a 4-byte buffer (`sizeof(uint32)`) and the `buffer_len` parameter should equal 4.
 - The result buffer should contain the value `QSEE_CRYPTO_SELFTEST_PASSED` (1).
 - If the self test fails, the TZ runtime environment will not be able to load Trusted Applications.

10.3. User Guidance

The operation of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library does not need FIPS 140-2 specific guidance. The FIPS 140-2 functional requirements are always invoked.

Once operational, if the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library enters Error state, the User needs to re-initialize the library instance in order recover from the Error state.

For using the cryptographic services of the Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Software Cryptographic Library, please refer to 80-NH537-4: Qualcomm Trusted Execution Environment Version 5.0 User Guide.

NOTE:

- AES counter mode uses a 128-bit counter. The counter will roll over after 2^{128} blocks of encrypted data
- According to IG A.13, the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 2^{16} 64-bit blocks of data and the user is responsible to ensure that this compliance is met.
- The AES algorithm in XTS mode can be only used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices, as specified in [SP800-38E]. In addition, the length of a single data unit encrypted with the AES-XTS shall not exceed 2^{20} AES blocks.

11. Mitigation of Other Attacks

The RSA implementation uses Montgomery Ladder and base/modulus blinding technique to help prevent against timing and side-channel attacks. Blinding countermeasures add randomness to private key operations, making determination of secrets from observations more difficult for the attacker.

In ECC, the base points are blinded. In ECDSA, the multiplication of d and the private key are blinded.

Terms and Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Specification
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CM	Cryptographic Module
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
COTS	Commercial Off The Shelf
CO	Crypto Officer
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DES	Data Encryption Standard
ECIES	Elliptic Curve Integrated Scheme
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
HMAC	Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT	Known Answer Test
NIST	National Institute of Science and Technology
OEM	Original Equipment Manufacturer
OTP	One-Time Programmable
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SoC	System on Chip
TZ	Trust Zone

References

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- [2] FIPS 140-2 Standard, <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/standards>
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- [5] FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard, <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips>
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- [7] FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips>
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- [16] NIST SP 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/sp>