CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page1 of 1
Security Policy for
CypherCell
ATM Encryptor
Compliant to FIPS PUB 140-1
Copyright 2001 CTAM Pty. Ltd.
ACN 080 481 947
Reproduction is authorised provided
the security policy is copied in its entirety.
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page2 of 2
Version
Version2.1 21 November 2001
Release of non-proprietary version 2.1 of CypherCell Security Policy
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page3 of 3
Table Of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................................4
1.1 OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 IDENTIFICATION ...............................................................................................................................................................4
1.3 FIPS PUB 140-1 SECURITY LEVEL .............................................................................................................................6
1.4 REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................................6
1.5 GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS............................................................................................................................................6
2. CYPHERCELL DESCRIPTI
ON .....................................................................................................................................8
2.1 OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................................................................8
2.2 EXTERNAL INTERFACES ...............................................................................................................................................10
3. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT........................................................................................................................................11
3.1 ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................................................................11
3.2 THREATS.........................................................................................................................................................................13
3.3 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES .....................................................................................................................13
4. CYPHERCELL ROLES AND SERVICES .................................................................................................................14
4.1 REMOTE MANAGEMENT ACCESS SECURITY POLICY...............................................................................................14
4.1.1 Identification and Authentication Policies ......................................................................................................14
4.1.2 Identity Based Access Control..........................................................................................................................14
4.2 LOCAL MANAGEMENT ACCESS SECURITY POLICY..................................................................................................18
4.2.1 Identification and Authentication Policies ......................................................................................................18
4.2.2 Identity Based Access Control..........................................................................................................................18
4.3 CONFIGURATION ROLE.................................................................................................................................................21
4.4 USER ROLE.....................................................................................................................................................................22
4.5 NETWORK USER SERVICES ..........................................................................................................................................23
4.6 SECURITY POLICY ENFORCING FUNCTION SUMMARY ............................................................................................25
5. PHYSICAL SECURITY PO LICY.................................................................................................................................27
6. INITIALISATION POLICY ...........................................................................................................................................27
7. FIRMWARE UPGRADE POLICY...............................................................................................................................31
8. CRYPTOGRAPHY............................................................................................................................................................31
8.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ..................................................................................................................................31
8.2 KEY MANAGEMENT ......................................................................................................................................................31
8.3 KEY GENERATION.........................................................................................................................................................32
8.4 PRIVATE/PUBLIC KEY AND USER PASSWORD PROTECTION...................................................................................32
9. SELF-TESTS........................................................................................................................................................................32
10. FIPS PUB 140 -1 MODE OF OPERATION ............................................................................................................32
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
This document provides a complete and consistent statement of the security policy of CypherCell, a high-
speed ATM security module.
The Security Policy details the module’s security requirements and the countermeasures proposed to
address the perceived threats to the assets protected by the module.
1.2 Identification
CypherCell ATM Encryptor- Firmware Version 2.1.0, Hardware Revision 3
The following interface and power supply configurations are available. The interface and power supply
configurations combinations are excluded from the requirements of FIPS 140-1 because they do not affect
the secure operation of the module. The tamper-evident seals, as outlined in this document, protect these
different configurations ensuring that the cryptographic boundary’s physical security is maintained
Description
OC3/STM-1 Multimode Fibre Network Interface
OC3/STM-1 Multimode Fibre Local Interface
DES Algorithm 155Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
110 to 240VAC
OC3/STM-1 Singlemode Fibre Network Interface
OC3/STM-1 Singlemode Fibre Local Interface
DES Algorithm 155Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
110 to 240VAC
OC3/STM-1 Singlemode Fibre Network Interface
OC3/STM-1 Multimode Fibre Local Interface
DES Algorithm 155Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
110 to 240VAC
OC3/STM-1 Multimode Fibre Network Interface
OC3/STM-1 Multimode Fibre Local Interface
DES Algorithm 155Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
24 to 48VDC
OC3/STM-1 Singlemode Fibre Network Interface
OC3/STM-1 Singlemode Fibre Local Interface
DES Algorithm 155Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
24 to 48VDC
OC3/STM-1 Singlemode Fibre Network Interface
OC3/STM-1 Multimode Fibre Local Interface
DES Algorithm 155Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
24 to 48VDC
T3 BNC Network Interface
T3 BNC Local Interface
DES Algorithm 45Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
110 to 240VAC
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Description
E3 BNC Network Interface
E3 BNC Local Interface
DES Algorithm 34Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
110 to 240VAC
E1 BNC Network Interface
E1 BNC Local Interface
DES Algorithm 2Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
110 to 240VAC
T1 RJ45 Network Interface
T1 RJ45 Local Interface
DES Algorithm 1.5Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
110 to 240VAC
T3 BNC Network Interface
T3 BNC Local Interface
DES Algorithm 45Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
24 to 48VDC
E3 BNC Network Interface
E3 BNC Local Interface
DES Algorithm 34Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
24 to 48VDC
E1 BNC Network Interface
E1 BNC Local Interface
DES Algorithm 2Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
24 to 48VDC
T1 RJ45 Network Interface
T1 RJ45 Local Interface
DESAlgorithm 1.5Mbps throughput
1024 virtual circuits
24 to 48VDC
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
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1.3 FIPS PUB 140-1 Security Level
CypherCell meets the overall requirements applicable to FIPS PUB 140-1 Level 2. It meets the
requirements as a multi-chip standalone module.
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module 3
Module Interfaces 3
Roles and Services 3
Finite State Machine 3
Physical Security 2
EFP/EFT N/A
Software Security 3
Operating System Security N/A
Key Management 3
Cryptographic Algorithms 3
EMI/EMC 3
Self Test 3
1.4 References
1. FIPS 140-1 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules January 11, 1994
2. Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-1, Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules
3. FIPS 46-2 Data Encryption Standard
4. FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption Standard
5. FIPS 81 DES Modes of Operation
6. FIPS 181-1 Secure Hash Standard
7. AF-SEC-0100.00 ATM Forum Security Specification Version 1.0 February 1999
8. RFC2574 User-based Security Model for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol
The Internet Society – April 1999
9. RFC2459 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure – January 1999
10. Public Key Cryptography Standards #1 (PKCS #1), “RSA Encryption Standard,” RSA
Laboratories, Version 1.5, November 1993 (Also available as RFC2313, March 1998).
1.5 Glossary of Key Terms
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode
CLP Cell Loss Priority
DES Data Encryption Standard
GFC Generic Flow Control
HEC Header Error Check
MASTER KEY Key used to encrypt session keys
MBPS Megabits per second
MIB Management Information Block
OAM Operation and Maintenance management cells
OID ObjectIdentifier
OSP Organisational Security Policy
PTI Payload Type Indicator
PVC Permanent Virtual Circuit
PVP Permanent Virtual Path
RFC Request for Comment
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RSA Public Key Algorithm
SEF Security Enforcing Function
SESSION KEY Key used to encrypt the payload of an ATM cell
SFP Security Function Policy
SNMPv3 Simple Network Management Protocol Version 3
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
TSP TOE Security Policy
UAT User Account Table
VCAT Virtual Channel Action Table
VC Virtual Circuit
VP Virtual Path
VPI/VCI Virtual Path Identifier/Virtual Channel Identifier
X.509 Digital Certificate Standard RFC 2459
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2. CYPHERCELL Description
2.1 Overview
CypherCell is a high-speed encryptor specifically designed to secure voice, data and video information
transmitted over Asynchronous Transfer Mode Networks (ATM) at data rates from 1.5Mbps to 155Mbps.
CypherCell provides confidentiality of the transmitted information by encrypting the 48-byte payload of the
ATM cell but leaving the five-byte ATM header unchanged, which enables switching of the cell through
ATM networks. The format of an ATM Cell is shown in Figure 1.
Figure1 - ATM Cell Format
CypherCell is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module with the outer casing defining the
cryptographic boundary. The steel case completely encloses CypherCell to protect it from tampering. Any
attempt to remove the top cover will automatically erase all sensitive information stored internally in the
encryptor.
CypherCell provides access control and authentication between secured sites and confidentiality of
transmitted information by cryptographic mechanisms. The unit can be added to an existing ATM network
with complete transparency to the end user and network equipment. An example installation of the
CypherCell encryptor is shown in Figure 2.
Figure2 – A Secure ATM Network
CypherCell supports single or triple 2/3 key DES in cipher feedback mode.
Any combination of encrypted or unencrypted virtual circuits can be configured up to a maximum of
65,536 active connections. Each encrypted virtual circuit uses different encryption keys. Any Virtual Path
Identifier/Virtual Channel Identifier (“VPI/VCI”) combination can be mapped to one of the 65,536
available connections. Support is provided for both Permanent Virtual Paths (“PVP”) and Permanent
Virtual Circuits (“PVC”) modes of operation.
GFC
4 bits
VPI
8 bits
VCI
16 bits
PTI
3 bits
CLP
1 bit
Payload
48 bytes
Checksum
8 bits
2Mbps
2Mbps
34Mbps
155Mbps
Public
ATM
Network
ATM Switch
Mainframe
Mainframe
ATM Switch
Mini Computer
Mini Computer
ATM Switch
Server
ATM Switch
Server
CYPHERCELL
Ethernet
CYPHERCELL
CYPHERCELL
CYPHERCELL
CypherManager
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Operation and Maintenance (“OAM”) cells and PVP cells with VCI values of 0 to 31 can be selectivity
excluded from the encryption process enabling full ATM network management functions to be maintained.
Virtual circuits with these VCI addresses must not be used for user data.
Key management and authentication are based on the ATM Forum Security Specification Version 1.0 and
use RSA public key cryptography and X.509 certificates providing a fully automated key management
system. Master keys and initial session keys are transferred between encryptors using X.509 certificate
authenticated RSA public key cryptography. Session key updates are transferred between encryptors using
the master key and SHA-1 and can be set to change according to time or the number of cells encrypted.
CypherCell provides access control by discarding cells if the access rules for that particular virtual circuit
are violated. Access controls may be set for any VPI/VCI as encrypt, bypass (all cells pass through
unaltered) or discard with an additional control that discards cells that violate defined times of access.
CypherCell connects to the local and remote network using SONET OC-3c/STM1 multimode/single mode
fibre, a T3, E3 or E1 BNC coaxial connection or T1 RJ45 connection. When operating at full bandwidth,
CypherCell will not discard any valid cells for all modes of operation.
CypherManager, which uses SNMPv3 management sessions, provides secure remote management of the
unit. Depending on the network security policy, an operator may be required to have both an authentication
password and a privacy password for remote management sessions. By default, CypherManager enforces
the requirement for authentication passwords, and privacy passwords are enabled at the option of the
CypherCell/CypherManager administrator. The dedicated Ethernet management port on CypherCell
supports 10BaseT andAUI connections.
Local management is also available via an RS232 port supporting a command line interface. Using a basic
terminal emulator, an operator is required to present their user name and authentication password directly to
the CypherCell encryptor before a local management session is allowed. Operators of the module cannot
use the local management RS232 port to initialize the CypherCell encryptor with an X.509 certificate. This
functionality is restricted to SNMPv3 management sessions.
CypherCell supports different types of operator roles with different privileges according to a set of pre-
defined roles. The four defined Crypto-Officer roles are Administrator, Supervisor, Operator, and
Configure and a Maintenance role called Crypto-Maintain. The one defined User Role is Network User
Services, which is another encryptor requesting a secure connection.
Only the Crypto-Officer Administrator has unrestricted access to the security features of the CypherCell
encryptor which include viewing all configuration parameters, audit logs, and status, adding, modifying,
and deleting entries to the UAT and VCAT tables, installing signed X.509 certificates, clearing audit logs,
and modifying configuration parameters. No other defined role can activate X.509 certificates, which are
required for CypherCell to commence operation.
The Crypto-Officer Supervisor roles are a subset of the Crypto-Officer Administrator roles excluding
activating X.509 certificates, adding, modifying, and deleting entries to the UAT table, and c
learing the
audit logs.
The Crypto-Officer Operator can only view all configuration parameters, audit logs, and status.
The Crypto-Officer Configure role can change the local and network interface modules and the power
supply input voltage.
The Crypto-Maintain role is mainly for installing firmware upgrades but they can view all configuration
parameters, audit logs, and status.
The Network Services User role is to provide cryptographic services to ATM cells received and transmitted
to another encryptor on the local and network interfaces for specified virtual circuits.
CypherCell provides an audit capability to support the effective management of the security features of the
device. The audit capability records all management activity for security relevant events.
Any organization using the CypherCell encryptor should ensure that an appropriate operational
environment is maintained that satisfies those assumptions listed in section 3.1 of this Security Policy.
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
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2.2 External Interfaces
CypherCell is housed in a steel case that is compatible with 19inch rack systems and is 1 rack unit in
height.
The front panel interfaces are:
• RJ45 connector for remote management via an IP/Ethernet based network
• AUI connector for remote management via an IP/Ethernet based network
(Note: only one of the Ethernet connections can be active at a time)
• DB9 RS232 connector for local configuration by a console
• Nine indictors show the status of internal functions of the unit. The indicators are either red,
orange or green or flashing depending on the status of the function
• Two line display for operator output
• Keypad for operator input
• Two PCMCIA slots that are used for program upgrades.
• Smartcard reader. The smart card reader is disabled and does not provide any functionality.
The rear panel interfaces are:
• Local OC3-c/STM-1 fiber connector, BNC coaxial or RJ45 connectors for connection to the
protected network.
• Network OC3-c/STM-1 fiber connector, BNC coaxial or RJ45 connectors for connection to
the unprotected network. (This interfaceconnects to the far end encryptor).
The rear panel also has a power entry module for connection of the unit to electrical power. Loss of
electrical power results in the destruction of all DES keys used to secure the transmitted information.
A tamperproof seal is also placed across the join between the top cover and the bottom of the chassis, as
shown above. Any attempt to remove the top cover will destroy the integrity of the tamperproof seal.
CypherManager is a Windows based application that is used to securely remotely manage CypherCell
encryptors. It presents to operators a Graphical User Interface (GUI), which is used to set and monitor the
CypherCell internal configuration parameters. CypherManager communicates with CypherCell encryptors
using SNMPv3 commands over an IP/Ethernet network. The IP/Ethernet network connects to CypherCell
using the RJ45 or AUI connector on the front panel of the encryptor or via the local and network interfaces
where the SNMPv3 commands are extracted from a designated VCI.
S
E
CURITY SE
A
L
Network Port Local Port
CTAM
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3. Security Environment
3.1 Assumptions
CypherCell is intended for use in organizations that need to provide confidentiality of information
transmitted over ATM networks and access control to prevent unauthorized connection to the protected
ATM network. The following assumptions about the operating environment and intended use of the
CypherCell and CypherManager apply.
A.CERTIFICATE
Each unit has a valid X.509 certificate loaded into the unit before commencement of secure operation.
The CypherCell encryptor cannot operate securely without a valid X.509 certificate loaded in the module.
A.PRIVATEKEY
It is assumed that a password used to protect the private key of the CypherManager remote management
station is restricted to only Crypto-officer Administrators of the CypherCell ATM encryptor. Operators
other than Crypto-officer administrators could attempt to use the key to sign X.509 certificate requests, if
they could recover the CypherManager private key.
A.ENCRYPTION
Only encryption of the ATM cell payloads is required and that single DES or TDES in cipher feedback
mode is appropriate for the classification of information to be protected.
A.KEYEXCHANGE
It is assumed that a communications pathway exists for each virtual circuit or path, for automated key
exchange using RSA public key cryptography, to transfer an initial master key and session key between
units, and that RSA public key cryptography is appropriate for transfer of keys between units. Exchange
of session keys, based on time or number of cells encrypted, is set in accordance with the defined network
securitypolicy.
A.AUTHENTICATE
It is assumed that X.509 certificate based authentication is appropriate for authentication of RSA key
exchange. Correctly implemented X.509 certificate based authentication provides a stronger
authentication mechanism than password based authentication mechanisms.
A.ACCESS
Access control rules on the cell traffic, determined by the VPI/VCI address, which forms part of the cell
header are defined, and that the rules to be applied are configured for each VPI/VCI address value and
set in accordance with the defined network security policy. Defining access control rules that do not
comply with the defined network security policy may result in an insecure network.
The access control rules that can be applied are encrypt, bypass (the cell passes through unchanged) or
discard. Additionally, for each VPI/VCI address an access time period can be set with cells received
outside this time period being discarded.
A.AUDIT
It is assumed that appropriate audit logs are maintained and regularly examined in accordance with
network security policy. Without capturing security relevant events or performing regular examination of
audit records, a compromise of security may go undetected.
A.ROLES
It is assumed there is an administrator who is responsible for controlling who has access to the unit for
configuration and monitoring activities through use of defined roles. There are five roles:
Crypto-officer administrator who has full access rights;
Crypto-officer supervisor who has full access rights except they cannot add, delete
or modify user accounts, they cannot install X.509
certificates or delete audit logs; and
Crypto-officer operator who can view all available information, except passwords
of the other Crypto-officers, but cannot delete, add or
modify the information.
Crypto-officer configure who can change the local and network interface modules
and the power supply input voltage.
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
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Crypto-Maintain who can install firmware upgrades and view all available
information but cannot delete, add or modify the
information.
Each user is allocated a user name and authentication and privacy passwords and an appropriate role.
Having defined roles provides a means of limiting access to security functions of the module to only
those authorized operators who need to access those security functions.
A.MANAGEMENT
It is assumed that a console port or remote secure SNMPv3 management station is provided for managing
the security features of the module. A means of securely managing the module must be provided to
control its security features.
A.INSTALL
It is assumed that CypherCell is installed between the secure local ATM switch and an insecure network
switch. CypherCell needs to be installed between a secure ATM switch and the insecure ATM network to
ensure confidentiality of transmitted information.
A.REMOTEMANAGEMENT
It is assumed that only the CypherManager management station is used for remote management of
CypherCell. If remote management is required then the dedicated Ethernet management port on the unit
must be connected to an IP network that has connectivity to the management station. If inband
management is enabled the encryptor connected to CypherManager can act as a gateway to the other
encryptors in the secure network as long as a virtual connection is configured between the gateway
encryptor and the other encryptors in the network.
It is assumed that CypherManager will be installed on a PC with the following minimum system
configuration:
- Windows 95/98/NT4.0/2000 or higher
- 166MHz or higher speed processor
- 64MB of memory
- Hard disk drive with a minimum of 5MB of available application space
- CD drive for installation
- 3.5” floppy drive for (for RSA private key backup)
- SVGA or better display resolution
- Mouse or other pointing device
- Network adapter card
- TCP/IP connectivity
A.SNMP
It is assumed that the IP network connected to the dedicated Ethernet management port is capable of
passing the SNMPv3 packets used to securely manage remote CypherCell encryptors.
A.PEER
Any other systems with which the module communicates are assumed to operate under the same security
policy constraints, otherwise the confidentiality of the information sent to/from a remote instance of the
module could not be assured.
A.LOCATE
It is assumed that the CypherCell is located in a secure area at the boundary of the site to be protected. It
is required to be in a secure area to ensure that the unit is not physically bypassed.
A.CYPHERMANAGER
CypherManager is assumed to be located within controlled access facilities, which will aid in preventing
unauthorized operators from attempting to compromise the security functions of the module. For
example, unauthorized physical access to the private key used to sign CypherCell X.509certificates.
A.ADMIN
It is assumed that one or more Crypto-officer administrators, together with any other Crypto-officer
supervisors or Crypto-officer operators, who are assigned as authorized operators are competent to
manage the module and who can be trusted not to deliberately abuse their privileges so as to undermine
security.
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3.2 Threats
This section identifies the threats, which CypherCell is designed to counter.
T.CAPTURE An attacker may eavesdrop on or otherwise capture data being transmitted
across a public ATM network in order to recover information that was to be kept
confidential.
T.CONNECT An attacker (insider or outsider) may attempt to make unauthorized connections
to another ATM network and transmit information that was to be kept
confidential, to another destination.
T.ABUSE An undetected compromise of information may occur as a result of an
authorized user of the module (intentionally or otherwise) performing actions
the individual is authorized to perform.
T.ATTACK An undetected compromise of information may occur as a result of an attacker
(insider or outsider) attempting to perform actions that the individual is not
authorized to perform.
T.LINK An attacker may be able to observe multiple uses of services by an entity and,
by linking these uses, be able to deduce information, which the entity wishes to
be kept confidential.
T.OBSERVE An attacker could observe the legitimate use of the remote management service
by an authorized user when that authorized user wishes their use of that remote
management service to be kept confidential.
T.PHYSICAL Security critical parts of the module may be subject to physical attack, which
may compromise security.
T.PRIVILEGE A compromise of information may occur as a result of actions taken by careless,
willfully negligent or hostile administrators or other authorized operators.
3.3 Organisational Security Policies
P.CRYPTO All encryption services including, confidentiality, authentication, key generation
and key management, must conform to standards specified by NIST.
P.FILTER Traffic flow is controlled on the basis of the information in the ATM cell
header, the Virtual Channel Action Table and the granting, by an authorized
user, of explicit access controls. Any ATM cells, for which there is no VCAT
entry, are discarded. By default, all ATM cells are discarded. This
Organisational Security Policy must conform to the Cell Control SFP enforced
by the module as defined in section 4.3. The P.FILTER OSP ensures that the
correct protective action is applied to any given ATM cell received by the
module.
P.ROLES Administration of the module is controlled through the definition of roles, which
assign different privilege levels to different types of authorized operators
(administrators, supervisors, and operators). This Organisational Security Policy
must conform to the Remote Management Access Control SFP and the Local
Management Access Control SFP enforced by the module as defined in section
4.1 and 4.2. The P.ROLES OSP ensures that administration of the module is
performed in accordance with the concept of leastprivilege.
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4. CypherCell Roles and Services
4.1 Remote Management Access Security Policy
The Remote Management Access SP is used to protect the User Account Table (UAT), the Virtual Channel
Action Table (VCAT) and other configuration parameters from unauthorized modification.
4.1.1 Identification and Authentication Policies
The UAT table contains a list of operator accounts. Operators listed in the User Account Table (UAT) have
access to the internal configuration parameters in the encryptor. Operators are identified by a unique user
name. Authentication for each operator is achieved by the use of an authentication password.
For SNMPv3 remote access the user name, authentication and privacy passwords are used as specified in
RFC2274.
For each operator the following security information is specified:
• Username
• User authentication password
• User privacy password
• User role
• Account Active/Inactive
Note: Access is denied if the account is inactive.
Refer to section 10 for a description of FIPS PUB 140-1 Mode of Operation.
4.1.2 Identity Based Access Control
The roles that can be assigned to an operator who has remote management access privilege are Crypto-
officer Administrator, Crypto-officer Supervisor, Crypto-officer Operator or Crypto-Maintain.
All roles can view the UAT (except for user passwords) and VCAT tables and configuration parameters.
Actions that can be performed by each role are:
Crypto-officer Administrators
• View all configuration parameters
• View audit log
• View status
• Add, modify and delete entries to the UAT table
• Add, modify and delete entries to the VCAT table
• Install signed X.509 certificates
• Clear the audit log
• Modify configuration parameters
Crypto-officer Supervisors
• View all configuration parameters
• View audit log
• View status
• Add, modify and delete entries to the VCAT table
• Modify configuration parameters
Crypto-officer Operators
•View all configuration parameters
• View audit log
• View status
Crypto-Maintain
• View all configuration parameters
• View audit log
• View status
•Install firmware upgrades
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Access to the internal configuration parameters is determined by the following rule.
If the user name AND user authentication password is listed in the UAT table AND the user account
status is active AND the SNMPv3 command can be decrypted then access is allowed as specified by
the role otherwise access is denied.
The following diagrams demonstrate the relationship of Remote Management TOE Security Policy (TSP)
model.
User Name Valid
FIA_UID.2.1
FDP_ACF.1.1.B
User
Authentication Password Valid
FIA_UAU.2.1
FDP_ACF.1.1.B
Yes
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4B
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4B
User Administrator
FMT_SMR.1.2
Yes
Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.B
Access Granted
FDP_ACF.1.2.B
FMT_MTD.1.1
Add, Modify, Delete
User Account
FDP_ACC.1.1.B
No
Yes
Command decrypted
FDP_ACF.1.3.B
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4B
Yes
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User Name Valid
FIA_UID.2.1
FDP_ACF.1.1.B
User
Authentication Password Valid
FIA_UAU.2.1
FDP_ACF.1.1.B
Yes
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.B
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.B
User
Administrator or Supervisor
FMT_SMR.1.2
Yes
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.B
Access Granted
FMT_MSA.1.1.B
FMT_MTD.1.1
Install X.509 Certificate
Clear Audit Log
Upgrade Firmware
Add, Modify, Delete VCAT Entry
Modify Configuration
Parameters
FDP_ACC.1.1.B
Yes
Action
Install X.509 Certificate
Yes
No
Action
Clear Audit Log
Yes
No
User
Administrator
FMT_SMR.1.2
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.B
Yes
Access Granted
FMT_MSA.1.1.B
FMT_MTD.1.1
User
Administrator
FMT_SMR.1.2
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.B
Yes
Access Granted
FMT_MSA.1.1.B
FMT_MTD.1.1
Command decrypted
FDP_ACF.1.3.B
Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.B
Yes
No
Action
Upgrade Firmware
Yes
No
User
Maintain
FMT_SMR.1.2
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.B
Yes
Access Granted
FMT_MSA.1.1.B
FMT_MTD.1.1
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 17 of 17
As shown above the remote management a
ccess control SFP traces to the following TSF functions which
are, FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MSA.1.1.B, FDP_ACC.1.1.B and FDP_ACF.1.1.B,
FDP_ACF.1.2.B, FDP_ACF.1.3.B FDP_ACF.1.4.B and FMT_MTD.1.1
These are mapped to the remote user interface of the module. At this interface it accepts a username, an
authentication password and an encrypted SNMPv3 command and associates a user with a role.
User Name Valid
FIA_UID.2.1
FDP_ACF.1.1.B
User
Authentication Password Valid
FIA_UAU.2.1
FDP_ACF.1.1.B
Yes
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.B
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.B
Access Granted
FMT_MTD.1.1
View Configuration Parameters
FDP_ACC.1.1.B
Yes
Command decrypted
FDP_ACF.1.3.B
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.B
Yes
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 18 of 18
4.2 Local Management Access Security Policy
The Local Management Access SP is used to protect the User Account Table (UAT), the Virtual Channel
Action Table (VCAT) and other configuration parameters from unauthorized modification.
4.2.1 Identification and Authentication Policies
The UAT table contains a list of operator accounts. Operators listed in the User Account Table (UAT) have
access to the internal configuration parameters in the encryptor. Operators are identified by a unique user
name. Authentication for each operator is achieved by the use of an authentication password.
For local access via the local console port the user name and authentication password are used as specified
in RFC2274. These are the same security mechanisms used for remote access using SNMPv3.
For each operator the following security information is specified:
• Username
• User authentication password
• User privacy password
• User role
• Account Active/Inactive
Note: Access is denied if the account is inactive.
4.2.2 Identity Based Access Control
The roles that can be assigned to an operator who has local management access privilege are Crypto-officer
Administrator, Crypto-officer Supervisor, Crypto-officer Operator or Crypto-Maintain.
All roles can view the UAT (except for user passwords) and VCAT tables and configuration parameters.
Actions that can be performed by each role are:
Crypto-officer Administrators
• View all configuration parameters
• View audit log
• View status
• Add, modify and delete entries to the UAT table
• Add, modify and delete entries to the VCAT table
• Clear the audit log
• Modify configuration parameters
• Install firmware upgrades
Crypto-officer Supervisors
• View all configuration parameters
• View audit log
• View status
• Add, modify and delete entries to the VCAT table
• Modify configuration parameters
Crypto-officer Operators
• View all configuration parameters
• View audit log
• View status
Crypto-Maintain
• View all configuration parameters
• View audit log
• View status
•Install firmware upgrades
Access to the internal configuration parameters is determined by the following rule.
If the user name AND user authentication password is listed in the UAT table AND the user account
status is active then access is allowed as specified by the role otherwise access is denied.
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 19 of 19
The following diagrams demonstrate the relationship of the Local Management TOE Security Policy
(TSP) model.
User Name Valid
FIA_UID.2.1
FDP_ACF.1.1.C
Yes
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.C
User Administrator
FMT_SMR.1.2
Yes
Access Granted
FDP_ACF.1.2.C
FMT_MTD.1.1
Add, Modify, Delete
User Account
FDP_ACC.1.1.C
No
User
Authentication Password Valid
FIA_UAU.2.1
FDP_ACF.1.1.C
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.C
Yes
Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.C
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 20 of 20
User Name Valid
FIA_UID.2.1
FDP_ACF.1.1.C
User
Authentication Password Valid
FIA_UAU.2.1
FDP_ACF.1.1.C
Yes
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.C
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.C
User
Administrator or Supervisor
FMT_SMR.1.2
Yes
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.C
Access Granted
FMT_MSA.1.1.C
FMT_MTD.1.1
Install X.509 Certificate
Clear Audit Log
Upgrade Firmware
Add, Modify, Delete VCAT Entry
Modify Configuration
Parameters
FDP_ACC.1.1.C
Yes
Action
Install X.509 Certificate
Yes
No
Action
Clear Audit Log
Yes
No
User
Administrator
FMT_SMR.1.2
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.C
Yes
Access Granted
FMT_MSA.1.1.C
FMT_MTD.1.1
User
Administrator
FMT_SMR.1.2
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.C
Yes
Access Granted
FMT_MSA.1.1.C
FMT_MTD.1.1
Command decrypted
FDP_ACF.1.3.C
Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.C
Yes
No
Action
Upgrade Firmware
Yes
No
User
Maintain
FMT_SMR.1.2
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.C
Yes
Access Granted
FMT_MSA.1.1.B
FMT_MTD.1.1
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 21 of 21
As shown above the remote management access control SFP traces to the following TSF functions which
are, FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2, FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MSA.1.1.C, FDP_ACC.1.1.C, FDP_ACF.1.1.C,
FDP_ACF.1.2.C, FDP_ACF.1.3.C FDP_ACF.1.4.C, FMT_MTD.1.1
These are mapped to the local operator interface of the module. At this interface it accepts a username and
authentication password and associates a operator with a role.
4.3 Configuration Role
The configuration role provides the facility to change the local and network interfaces to match the ATM
networks requirements and to change the power entry module to match the required input voltage. A list of
the interface and power supply configurations is listed at the beginning of the Security Policy. These
configurations do not affect any of the FIPS relevant functions and therefore does not affect the FIPS 140-1
validation. This role does not have any access rights to any Management Information Block (MIB)
variable. Access to the unit results in automatic and immediate erase of all plain text key m
aterial and user
passwords.
The operator changes the physical local and network interface modules to match the physical ATM
network configuration and the power supply module to match the required power input requirements.
After changing the internal modules the operator secures the unit by placing a new tamperproof seal on the
unit as described in section 2.2.
The configuration role is undertaken before the module is delivered to the end-user.
Actions that can be performed by the crypto-officer configure roleare:
Crypto-officer Configure
•Select local interface as OC3 single mode, OC3 multimode, T3, E3, E1 or T1
•Select network interface as OC3 single mode, OC3 multimode, T3, E3, E1 or T1
•Select 110-240VAC power
User Name Valid
FIA_UID.2.1
FDP_ACF.1.1.C
User
Authentication Password Valid
FIA_UAU.2.1
FDP_ACF.1.3.C
Yes
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.C
No Access Denied
FDP_ACF.1.4.C
Access Granted
FMT_MTD.1.1
View Configuration Parameters
FDP_ACC.1.1.C
Yes
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 22 of 22
•Select 24-48VDC power
4.4 User Role
There is only one user role, which is another encryptor that wishes to communicate securely with the
module.
Actions that can be requested by the User Role are:
User
•Request secure connection with encryptor.
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 23 of 23
4.5 Network User Services
The VCAT table contains a list of VPI/VCI addresses and the action to take when a cell with that address is
received on the protected or unprotected interface ports. Only operators with the role of Crypto-officer
administrator or Crypto-officer supervisor can add, modify or delete VCAT entries.
The initial state of the VCAT table has no entries hence all cells are discarded.
There are three possible actions for a received cell, which are:
• Encrypt/Decrypt The cell is encrypted if received on the protected interface port, and
decrypted if received on the unprotected interface port.
• Bypass The cell is passed though the encryptor without any modification of the
payload
• Discard Received cells are discarded.
The action to take for each received cell is determined by two rules. These rules are:
• VPI/VCI Address Implement the action specified for this VPI/VCI address
• Access Time Discard the cell if it is received outside the specified access time for this
VPI/VCIaddress
The following diagrams demonstrate the relationship of VCAT Based Access Control module Security
Functional Requirements.
VPI/VCI
address in VCAT table
FDP_ACF.1.1A FDP_ACF.1.2A
FMT_MSA.1.1A
Cell received on
local port
FDP_ACC.1.1.A
No Discard Cell
FDP_ACF.1.4.A
Yes
Action
Encrypt
FDP_ACF.1.3A
Yes
Encrypt Cell
Payload
FDP_UCT.1.1
No
Action
Bypass
FDP_ACF.1.3A
Yes
Bypass Cell
FDP_UCT.1.1
No
Discard Cell
Access Time
Valid
FDP_ACF.1.1A
FDP_ACF.1.2A
Yes
No Discard Cell
FDP_ACF.1.4.A
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 24 of 24
As shown above the Cell Control SFP traces to the following TSF functions, which are FDP_ACC.1.1A,
FDP_ACF.1.1.A, FDP_ACF.1.2.A, FDP_ACF.1.3.A, FDP_ACF.1.4.A and FDP_UCT.1.1 and are
mapped to the local and network interface of the module. At these interfaces cells are processed as
required by the functional requirements.
VPI/VCI
address in VCAT table
FDP_ACF.1.1A FDP_ACF.1.2A
FMT_MSA.1.1A
Cell received on
network port
FDP_ACC.1.1.A
No Discard Cell
FDP_ACF.1.4.A
Yes
Action
Encrypt
FDP_ACF.1.3A
Yes
Decrypt Cell
Payload
FDP_UCT.1.1
No
Action
Bypass
FDP_ACF.1.3A
Yes
Bypass Cell
FDP_UCT.1.1
No
Discard Cell
Access Time
Valid
FDP_ACF.1.1A
FDP_ACF.1.2A
Yes
No Discard Cell
FDP_ACF.1.4.A
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 25 of 25
4.6 Security Policy Enforcing Function Summary
The following security policy enforcing functions in the module implement the required functionality to
enforce the Security Policy as described in section 4.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associateoperators with roles.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
FDP_ACC.1.1.A The TSF shall enforce thecell control SFP on ATMcells received on the interfaces.
FDP_ACC.1.1.B The TSF shall enforce the Remote Management Access Control SFP on all encrypted
SNMPv3 packets received on the CypherCell Ethernet management port interface.
FDP_ACC.1.1.C The TSF shall enforce the Local Management Access Control SFP on all data
received on the CypherCell console port interface.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1.A The TSF shall enforce the cell control SFP to objects based on the VPI/VCI address
contained in the cell header and time of day.
FDP_ACF.1.1.B The TSF shall enforce the Remote Management Access Control SFP to objects based
on the user ID field of the SNMPv3 packet and the user’s local authentication
password.
FDP_ACF.1.1.C The TSF shall enforce the Local Management Access Control SFP to objects based on
theuser’s ID and the user’s local authentication password.
FDP_ACF.1.2.A The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
- If the VPI/VCI address in the cell header is listed in the VCAT then the
defined operation in the VCAT is allowed
- If the VPI/VCI address in the cell header is listed in the VCAT and the cell is
received within the defined access times in the VCAT then the defined
operation is allowed.
FDP_ACF.1.2.B The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlledsubjects and controlled objects is allowed:
- If the User ID field in the encrypted SNMPv3 packet is listed in the User
Table and the local authentication password is correct then the management
operation is allowed subject to the operators defined role.
FDP_ACF.1.2.C The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
- If the User ID received on the console port interface is listed in the User
Table and the local authenticated password is correct then console mode
logon is allowed.
FDP_ACF.1.3.A The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
rules:
- If the cell is received within the access times defined in the VCAT then the
operation defined for that cell will be performed.
- If the operation in the VCAT is defined as “encrypt” then the cell will be
passed with the cell payload encrypted/decrypted.
- If the operation in the VCAT is defined as “bypass” then the cell will be
passed without modification.
- If the operation in the VCAT is defined as “discard” then the cell will be
discarded without further action.
FDP_ACF.1.3.B The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
rules:
- If the encrypted SNMPv3 packet can be decrypted and the management data
is authentic then the management operation is allowed but subject to the
operators defined role.
FDP_ACF.1.3.C The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
rules:
- If the user ID presented on the console interface is listed in the user table,
and the user’s authentication password presented on the console interface is
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 26 of 26
correct then a local management session is started, allowing access to the
security management functions, based on the operators defined role.
Certificate Loading is never permitted from the console interface.
FDP_ACF.1.4.A The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
rules:
- If the VPI/VCI address in the cell header is not listed in the VCAT then the
cell will be discarded.
- If the VPI/VCI address in the cell header is listed in the VCAT but the cell is
not received within the access times defined in the VCAT then the cell will be
discarded.
FDP_ACF.1.4.B The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
rules:
- If the user ID field of the SNMPv3 packet is not listed in the user table then
the management data is discarded.
- If the user ID field of the SNMPv3 packet is listed in the user table and the
data cannot be decrypted, then the management data is discarded.
- If the user ID field of the SNMPv3 packet is listed in the user table and the
data can be decrypted, but the authentication check fails then the
management data is discarded.
- If the user ID field of the SNMPv3 packet is listed in the user table, the data
can be decrypted and the authentication check passes, but the user role is
invalid then the management data is discarded.
FDP_ACF.1.4.C The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
rules:
- If the user ID received on the console port interface is not listed in the user
table then access to the management functions of the module is denied.
- If the user ID received on the console port is listed in the user table and local
authentication password is incorrect then access to the management function
requested of the module is denied.
- If the user ID received on the console port is listed in the user table and local
authentication password is correct but the user role is invalid then access to
the management function requested of the module is denied.
FDP_UCT.1 Inter-TSF User Data Confidentiality Transfer Protection
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Cell Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive objects
ina manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MSA.1.1.A The TSF shall enforce the Cell Control SFP to restrict the ability to encrypt, bypass, or
discard the ATM cells received at the module interface to those cells whose VPI/VCI
address is listed in the VCAT.
FMT_MSA.1.1.B The TSF shall enforce the Remote Management Access Control SFP to restrict the
ability to:
- change_default, modify or delete the entries in the VCAT table to
Crypto-officer administrator andCrypto-officer supervisor
- add, delete, or modify user accounts to Crypto-officer administrators
- upgrade the modules firmware to Crypto- Maintain
- activate the X.509 certificates to Crypto-officer administrators.
FMT_MSA.1.1.C The TSF shall enforce the Locale Management Access Control SFP to restrict the
ability to:
- change_default, modify,or delete the entries in the VCAT table to
Crypto-officer administrator andCrypto-officer supervisor
- add, delete, or modify user accounts to Crypto-officer administrators
- upgrade the modules firmware to Crypto- Maintain
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to
- change_default, query, modify, delete and clear the VCAT table, User
Account table, X.509 certificate activation to Crypto-officer
administrators
- change_default, query, modify, delete and clear the VCAT table and
query the User Accounttable to Crypto-officer supervisors
- query the VCAT and User Account tables to Crypto-officer operators
- clear the audit log to Crypto-officer administrators
- set the system time to Crypto-officer administrators and Crypto-officer
supervisors
- upgrade the modules firmware toCrypto- Maintain
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 27 of 27
5. Physical Security Policy
CypherCell has been designed to satisfy FIPS PUB 140-1 Level 2 physical security requirements.
CypherCell is housed in an opaque steel housing with external connections to the protected and unprotected
network, management connections and the LCD display and keypad. The keypad ENT key can be
disabled, which disables all keypad input functionality.
A tamper proof seal is provided between the removable top cover and the base. Removing the cover will
destroy the seal and also activate tamper micro switches. When the micro switches are activated internal
private DES keys are automatically erased irrespective of whether the unit is powered-on or powered-off.
The Crypto-Officer Administrator should regularly check that the tamper proof seal is intact. If broken the
encryptor should be returned to CTAM to ensure that the encryptors internal configuration has not been
tampered with.
6. Initialisation Policy
The following installation proceed must be followed in order to ensure the secure configuration the
encryptor.
CypherManager provides a GUI to enable operators to remotely set or modify security parameters. Only
CypherManager screens that have an impact on the security of the encryptor are described in this section.
CypherManager, using SNMPv3 commands, provides access to the following security parameters in
CypherCell encryptors.
1. Installation of signed X.509 certificates
2. Creation, modification or deletion of Operators.
Each operator when created is assigned a operator name, operator passwords and a role. Roles
are Crypto-officer administrator, Crypto-officer supervisor, Crypto-officer operator and Crypto-
maintain.
3. Creation, modification or deletion of VCAT entries.
A VCAT entry specifies:
VPI address
VCI address
Action – Encrypt, Bypass or Discard
Mode – CFB or Counter, Single or Triple Two/Three key mode
Session key update parameters
Allowed access time
4. Audit Trail analysis and review. Crypto-officer administrators can also clear the audit trial.
The GUI security interfaces presented to operators are as follows:
When CypherManager is started the operator is presented with a log on s
creen. Operators are required to
enter their user name, authentication password and privacy password if enabled. CypherManager does not
store operator passwords. They are used to authenticate and encrypt the SNMPv3 commands.
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 28 of 28
If CypherManager is being run for the first time and it has been selected as the CA, it will generate a
private and public RSA key that will be used to sign X.509 certificates. The RSA keys are stored in an
internal database or external file. Before the private key is stored it is encrypted using a password that has
been entered by the administrator. The following screen allows the Crypto-officer administrator to enter the
password, which must be at least 8 characters in length.
The Certificate default settings screen allows the Crypto-officer administrator to set default department,
organisation and country values for the issuer and subject fields that will appear in the X.509 certificate.
These values are stored in the internal database.
The next screen is used to install X.509 certificates into the encryptors. Only Crypto-officer administrators
can request an unsigned X.509 certificate, sign it and then load it into the remote encryptor.
Note: The initial X.509 certificate must be loaded into the encryptor using a direct connection from the
management station that is running CypherManager. The Crypto-officer administrator must ensure that no
other connections can be made to the encryptor by any other device during the certificate loading process.
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 29 of 29
X.509 certificates can only be loaded into an encryptor that is set to Certificate Mode. Refer to section 2.2.3
for further details.
The process to install a X.509 certificate is as follows.
The administrator clicks the Generate X.509 Certificate button. The encryptor will return its public key
and name. The information returned is hashed using SHA-1 and the hash value is displayed as the
validation code.
After verification of the validation code the Crypto-officer administrator clicks the Sign X.509 Certificate
button. The following screen is then displayed.
The Crypto-officer administrator must enter the private key password and Crypto-officer administrator
account details. CypherManager prompts the user to re-enter the authentication and privacy passwords for
verification.
Each time a new X.509 certificate is installed into an encryptor a new Crypto-officer administrator account
is created if the user name is different from the existing administrator account. If the user name exists the
authentication and privacy passwords will be updated with the new values. Note: If the Crypto-officer
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 30 of 30
administrator account is the default Crypto-officer administrator account (that is a valid X.509 certificate
has not been loaded in the encryptor) it is always deleted and replaced by the new account.
After the Crypto-officer administrator clicks the OK button CypherManager signs the X.509 certificate and
sends it to the remote encryptor. The contents of the certificate are hashed and the hash value is displayed
as the validation code. The X.509 certificate can also be saved in an internal database by clicking the Save
X.509 Certificate button.
After an X.509 certificate has been installed the Crypto-officer administrator can create supervisor and
operator accounts.
Crypto-officer administrators a
nd supervisors can also configure the VCAT table. For each defined PVP or
PVC the VPI/VCI address must be entered together with the required operating mode and session key
updateparameters.
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
Issue Date: 21 November 2001 Version 2.1 Page 31 of 31
7. Firmware Upgrade Policy
CypherCell has been designed to allow the firmware to be upgraded in the field. The upgrade firmware is
shipped in a PCMCIA flash memory card, which has been digitally signed by CTAM using the RSA digital
signature. During the upgrade process the encryptor authenticates the new firmware using CTAM’s public
key before it is loaded. If the authentication fails the upgrade process is terminated.
The encryptor firmware can only be upgraded when the encryptor is placed in upgrade mode, which is
selected from the front panel. Only a user who has the role of Crypto-Maintain can perform the upgrade.
The upgrade command can be issued from the console port or remotely from the following screen in
CypherManager.
8. Cryptography
8.1 Cryptographic Algorithms
CypherCell uses the following cryptographic algorithms and modes of operation.
• DES and TDES encryption as specified in FIPS 46-2 and FIPS 46-3 to protect ATM cells. Cells
sent over the ATM network use DES or 3
-DES in 64-bit Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode, as defined
in FIPS 81, providing a self-synchronising security solution.
• SNMPv3 commands use SHA-1 for authentication and DES in CBC mode for privacy. Sensitive
information, such as user passwords, are also encrypted using the public key of the module before
being encapsulated in the SNMPv3 command.
• RSA public key c
ryptography is used to exchange master and sessions keys between encryptors as
specified in the AF-SEC-0100.00 ATM Security Specification Version 1.0 February 1999 and to
sign X.509 certificates.
8.2 Key Management
CypherCell encryptors exchange master and session keys for each configured virtual circuit or path using
RSA public key and X.509 certificates for authentication. Master keys are used to transfer periodic session
keys between encryptors. Session keys are used to encrypt the payload of the ATM cell.
During installation of CypherCell, a public and private RSA key pair, are generated. When requested by
CypherManager, the encryptor will send the public key to CypherManager. CypherManager creates an
X.509 certificate and signs it with its private key. The signed X.509 certificate is sent back to the encryptor.
The X.509 certificate is then used to authenticate CypherCell encryptors during the key exchange process.
The initial X.509 certificate must be loaded into CypherCell using a direct connection from
CypherManager to the front panel Ethernet port.
CTAM Pty. Ltd. CYPHERCELL Security Policy
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8.3 Key Generation
All DES and RSA key pairs, except the SNMPv3 privacy key, which is derived from the user privacy
password using SHA-1, as defined in RFC2574, are generated using a FIPS approved Pseudo-Random
Generator as defined in FIPS PUB 186-1. The seed is sourced from an internal hardware random noise
source.
8.4 Private/Public Key and User Password Protection
The internally generated RSA private/public key pair and the user table, which contains a hashed value o
f
user passwords, are encrypted using three key TDES in 64-bit CBC mode and are stored in non-volatile
memory. The three DES keys are stored in battery backed SRAM. These keys are automatically erased if
the cover is removed.
9. Self-Tests
CypherCell performs the following self-tests during the start-up process:
• Management Subsystem module firmware test
• Local Interface module firmware test
• Network Interface module firmware test
• Management Subsystem module DES test known answer test
• Management Subsystem module exponentiation test
• Management Subsystem module RSA known answer test
• Management Subsystem module SHA-1 known answer test
• Encrypt module DES & TDES known answer test
• Decrypt module DES & TDES known answer test
• Bypass mode test
• RNG Test
o The Monobit test
o The Poker test
o The Runs test
o The Long Runs test
During normal operation the continuous RNG test is executed every time a request is made to the RNG
process.
During normal operation, each time a private and public key pair is generated the pair-wise consistency test
is executed.
The results of start-up self-tests are written to the event log. If any of the self-test fails during start-up or
during an on-demand call, the module will be automatically configured to discard all ATM cells received
on the local and network interfaces. An error message is displayed in the LCD display and the System LED
will be set too red.
10. FIPS PUB 140-1 Mode of Operation
The FIPS PUB 140-1 mode of operation is defined as a mode in which only FIPS allowed or approved
security mechanisms are used. These allowed/approved mechanisms are:
• DES/3DES in 64-bit CFB mode
• DES in 64-bit CBC mode
• SHA-1
• RSA public key and digital signature
The FIPS mode is controlled by customized builds of the module firmware. In order to comply with FIPS
140-1, firmware version 2.1.0 should be loaded into the module.