YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 1/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
MORPHO
YPSID
NON PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
Contract n°: N/A
Reference: 0000067307-06
Issue: 11/03/2011
0000067307-06 – 11/03/2011
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 2/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
YPSID
NON PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY
0000067307-06 11/03/2011
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 3/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
APPROVAL
COMPANY NAME FUNCTION DATE SIGNATURE
Established by: Morpho DEBOYSER Fabien R&D
Approved by: Morpho PICON Romain RdP
Safety Assurance: Morpho
Purchase
Department:
Morpho
Quality Assurance: Morpho BASTIEN Thomas IQP
Authorized by: Morpho MARAND Loïc HRD
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 4/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DOCUMENT EVOLUTION____________________________________________________________________________7
1 Introduction _____________________________________________________________________________________8
1.1 Scope ______________________________________________________________________________________8
1.2 Product description __________________________________________________________________________8
1.3 Product Identification _______________________________________________________________________10
1.4 Security level _______________________________________________________________________________10
1.5 algorithms _________________________________________________________________________________11
1.6 FIPS Mode of Operation _____________________________________________________________________11
2 Cryptographic module specification _________________________________________________________________12
2.1 Overview __________________________________________________________________________________12
2.2 Cryptographic module boundary ______________________________________________________________12
2.3 Description ________________________________________________________________________________12
3 Cryptographic module ports and interfaces ___________________________________________________________13
3.1 Physical ports ______________________________________________________________________________13
3.1.1 ISO physical interface_____________________________________________________________________13
3.1.2 USB physical interface ____________________________________________________________________13
3.2 Logical ports _______________________________________________________________________________14
3.2.1 ISO logical interface______________________________________________________________________14
3.2.2 USB logical interface _____________________________________________________________________15
4 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY _____________________________________________________________________16
4.1 Roles______________________________________________________________________________________16
4.2 authentication ______________________________________________________________________________16
4.2.1 Role authentication mechanisms_____________________________________________________________16
4.2.2 Role authentication strength ________________________________________________________________18
4.3 Services ___________________________________________________________________________________18
4.3.1 Services description ______________________________________________________________________18
4.3.2 Services Access Control ___________________________________________________________________20
4.4 CSPs______________________________________________________________________________________21
4.4.1 CSPs description_________________________________________________________________________21
4.4.2 CSPs Access control______________________________________________________________________22
5 Physical security ________________________________________________________________________________23
5.1 [FIPS 140-2] level 4 requirements______________________________________________________________23
5.2 Security mechanisms ________________________________________________________________________23
5.3 Module encapsulation________________________________________________________________________23
6 Operational environment__________________________________________________________________________24
7 Cryptographic Key management____________________________________________________________________25
7.1 Key overview_______________________________________________________________________________25
7.2 Key generation _____________________________________________________________________________25
7.3 entry/output________________________________________________________________________________25
7.4 Storage____________________________________________________________________________________25
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 5/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
7.5 zeroization _________________________________________________________________________________26
8 EMI/EMC _____________________________________________________________________________________27
9 Self-Tests ______________________________________________________________________________________28
9.1 Power Up self-tests __________________________________________________________________________28
9.2 conditional Self-tests_________________________________________________________________________28
9.3 Self-Tests On Demand _______________________________________________________________________28
9.4 Self-tests failure_____________________________________________________________________________28
10 Mitigation of other attacks ______________________________________________________________________29
11 SECURITY RULES____________________________________________________________________________30
11.1 Secure operation security rules ________________________________________________________________30
11.2 Authentication security rules__________________________________________________________________30
11.3 Key management security rules________________________________________________________________30
11.4 Physical security rules _______________________________________________________________________31
11.5 Self-tests security rules_______________________________________________________________________31
Appendix A: Future module functionality ________________________________________________________________32
Appendix B: Glossary ________________________________________________________________________________34
Appendix C: Reference documents______________________________________________________________________35
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 6/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
FIGURES
Figure 1: YpsID cryptographic module diagram ...........................................................8
Figure 2: YpsID cryptographic module........................................................................9
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 7/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
DOCUMENT EVOLUTION
Date Version Author Revision
02/2008 01 Audrey Allard Document creation
08/2009 02 Audrey Allard
Hardware identification update.
Firmware identification update.
Zeroization mechanism update.
ATR’s Historical byte H13 update.
01/2010 03 Philippe Gislard
§ 1.2: Adding diagram of the module
§ 9.1: Specifying the type of test that is
performed to satisfy the EEPROM FW during
Power up Integrity Test
10/2010 04 Philippe Gislard Responses to CMVP comments.
11/2010 05 Philippe Gislard Responses to CMVP comments.
03/2011 06 Fabien Deboyser Document updated for YpsID version 4
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 8/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 SCOPE
This document is the non-proprietary security policy for the YpsID cryptographic module,
version 4. This security policy represents the completed YpsID product with an overall
security level 3 requirements for [FIPS 140-2] and a security level 4 for physical security.
1.2 PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
Figure 1: YpsID cryptographic module diagram
NB:
On Figure 1, the dotted line represents the cryptographic boundary of the module.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 9/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Figure 2: YpsID cryptographic module
The YpsID module is an ISO and USB interface smart card platform with a Javacard operating
system compliant with Sun Java Card ™ 2.2.1 [JCS] and Global Platform 2.1.1 [GP]
specifications. The YpsID hardware is based on the ATMEL AT90SC 256 72 RCT-USB chip.
Java technology is the leading multiple application operating system for smart cards. It
offers developers a convenient platform on which to develop and implement smart card
applets. The YpsID module has been designed to offer a modular and open solution based on
reliable and standardized technologies. To that end, the YpsID module contains an
implementation of the Sun Java Card ™ 2.2.1 [JCS] specifications. It allows implementing
multiple applications associated with a high security level to execute the applications by
providing context independence between each of them. The YpsID module is also compliant
with the Global Platform 2.1.1 [GP] specifications, for secure management of the card life
cycle and of the applications.
The YpsID module design takes full benefit of the ROM space available on the card micro
controller by hard masking the operating system. Therefore, the full space of the 64-KB
E²PROM is available for loading and instantiating applets.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 10/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
1.3 PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION
The identification number of the YpsID module is given below:
Module
Identification number
Hardware Firmware
YpsID AT90SC25672RCT-USB
01029069 – FFFFFFF
or
02000202 - FFFFFFF
The identification number of the YpsID module can be retrieved at any time.
1.4 SECURITY LEVEL
The YpsID product is designed to meet the overall requirements applicable to the Level 3 of
the [FIPS 140-2] specifications. Moreover, the YpsID module is compliant with the Level 4
requirements for physical security ([FIPS 140-2], Area 5). The area-specific security levels
are described in Tab 1.
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3
Roles, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 3
Physical Security 4
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of other Attacks 3
Tab 1: YpsID area specific levels
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 11/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
1.5 ALGORITHMS
The algorithms used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation of the YpsID module are listed
in Tab 2. All of them offer FIPS Approved functionalities.
Algorithm
s
Standard Description
SHA-1 [FIPS 180-2] Hash (for signature)
SHA-256 [FIPS 180-2] Hash (for signature)
RSA [PKCS#1 v2.1] RSA Signature
RSA Signature verification
TDES [ANSI X9.52] Data encryption / decryption in ECB mode
Data encryption / decryption in CBC mode
TDES MAC [ISO 9797] Data integrity – MAC calculation / verification
P-RNG [ANSI X9.31], Appendix A.2.4 Random number generation
Tab 2: YpsID FIPS Approved algorithms
The YpsID module employs a non-deterministic hardware random number generator of the
ATMEL AT90SC 256 72 RCT-USB chip to seed the FIPS Approved [ANSI X9.31] P-RNG
function. A CRC16 (based on the ISO/IEC 3309 standard) is used for Firmware integrity by a
CRC16 calculation. Triple-DES (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 80
bits of encryption strength).
1.6 FIPS MODE OF OPERATION
The YpsID cryptographic module only supports a FIPS Approved mode of operation.
This YpsID module FIPS Approved mode of operation is indicated by a specific value of a
dedicated byte in the ATR: the historical byte H13 must have the following value:
B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 B1 B0
x 1 1 x x x x x
Therefore it is possible to check that the module is indeed working in a FIPS Approved mode
of operation:
 at power up by looking at the value of the ATR,
 at any time by asking the module to output the value of the ATR.
Instructions for determining the secure delivery of the module may be found in the [CO
GUIDE].
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 12/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION
2.1 OVERVIEW
In the scope of this document, the cryptographic module is embodied by a single-chip
Integrated Circuit with its embedded firmware. The base chip is the ATMEL chip AT90SC 256
72 RCT-USB revision D with reference AT58829D.
The YpsID firmware is composed of an operating system complying with the [JCS] and [GP]
standards.
The YpsID cryptographic module is designed to be encased in a hard opaque resin that can
be embedded into a plastic card, a USB key or any other support structure. However, neither
the resin nor the support structure resides within the cryptographic boundary.
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE BOUNDARY
The cryptographic module boundary is realized as the external surface of the ATMEL AT90SC
256 72 RCT-USB single-chip microprocessor and does not include any embodiment elements
(resin, micro-bonds, smart card contact plate, fixation glue). The boundary contains all of
the relevant module components (processors performing cryptography, etc.) consistent with
[FIPS 140-2]. There are no component exclusions from the boundary.
2.3 DESCRIPTION
The YpsID cryptographic module is composed of the ATMEL AT90SC 256 72 RCT-USB single-
chip microprocessor, which includes:
 256 KB of ROM
 72 KB of E²PROM
 8 KB of RAM
The YpsID cryptographic module operates using the ISO interface or the USB interface. The
module automatically detects which interface is being used and answers to the terminal
using the same interface.
In any case, the module does not operate using both interfaces at the same time. The YpsID
module remains in FIPS mode of operation regardless of the communication interface (ISO
or USB).
The module has no internal power supply (battery, capacitor, etc.). All power to the module,
provided by the host (smart card reader, USB key reader), enters the power input interface
through the voltage bond pad. The defined voltage range for normal conditions of use is:
1.62 V to 5.5 V.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 13/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES
3.1 PHYSICAL PORTS
The physical ports of the YpsID cryptographic module consist of both the ISO and the USB
physical interfaces of the chip. Both physical interfaces fulfill all the Level 3 requirements for
ports and interfaces ([FIPS 140-2], area 2).
3.1.1 ISO physical interface
For the ISO interface, the physical ports of the YpsID module consist of the ISO bond pad
locations of the chip and conform to the [ISO 7816-2] specifications. Tab 3 lists the
physical ports of the module for the ISO interface.
Physical ports Description
VCC Power supply (Voltage)
RST Reset signal
CLK Clock signal
GND Ground
IN/OUT 0 Input/Output
Tab 3: Description of the ISO physical ports
3.1.2 USB physical interface
For the USB interface, the physical ports of the YpsID cryptographic module consist of the
USB endpoints of the chip.
Tab 4 lists the physical ports of the module for the USB interface.
USB physical ports Description
VCC Power supply (Voltage)
GND Ground
IN/OUT 0 Input/Output
USB D+ Input/Output
USB D- Input/Output
USB-Xin Clock signal
USB-Xout Clock signal
Tab 4: Description of the USB physical ports
The ports used by the USB interface are physically different from the ports used by the ISO
interface, except for those that are explicitly shared between both interfaces:
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 14/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
 The voltage physical ports (VCC and GND) are common to the ISO and the USB
interfaces.
 The IN/OUT 0 physical port may also be used by the USB interface.
3.2 LOGICAL PORTS
The logical ports of the YpsID cryptographic module consist of both the ISO and the USB
logical interfaces. Both interfaces fulfill all the Level 3 requirements for ports and interfaces
([FIPS 140-2], area 2).
3.2.1 ISO logical interface
The YpsID module adheres to the [ISO 7816-3] specifications regarding the ISO interface,
which describe the relationship between the cryptographic module and its host (e.g. smart
card reader) as one of “slave” and “master,” respectively.
Communications are established by the host, which sends signals to the cryptographic
module through the bond pads defined in § 3.1.1. Communication then continues by the
cryptographic module sending an appropriate response back to the host. The communication
channel is single-threaded: once the host sends a command to the cryptographic module, it
waits until a response is received. No overlapping between multiple command-response pairs
is allowed.
Messages between the cryptographic module and the host are conveyed using the T=0 link
level protocol defined in [ISO 7816-3].
The cryptographic module receives and executes a well-defined set of APDU commands sent
by the host and answers with APDU responses according to the [ISO 7816-4] specifications.
The APDU communication protocol defines the following four logical interfaces:
 Data Input Interface
 Data Output Interface
 Control Input Interface
 Status Output Interface
All logical interfaces are mapped to appropriate physical ports according to Tab 5.
Logical interfaces Physical interfaces
Power
VCC
GND
Data Input IN/OUT 0
Data Output IN/OUT 0
Control Input
RST
CLK
IN/OUT 0
Status Output IN/OUT 0
Tab 5: Physical to logical interface mapping
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 15/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
3.2.2 USB logical interface
Communications are based on the USB transmission protocol, ICCD class, as defined in
[USB], [CCID] and [ICCD]. The ICCD class of the USB protocol allows interacting as with a
card reader interface: the host sees the module as a smart card inserted in a card reader.
The cryptographic module and the host communicate by exchanging APDU commands and
APDU responses, defined in [ISO 7816-4] specifications.
Tab 6 describes the logical ports of the cryptographic module for the USB interface and their
mapping to the physical ports.
Logical interfaces Physical interface
Power
VCC
GND
Data Input
USB D+
USB D-
Data Output
USB D+
USB D-
Control Input
USB D+
USB D-
USB-Xin
IN/OUT 0
Status Output
USB D+
USB D-
USB-Xout
IN/OUT 0
Tab 6: Functional specification of the USB interface
The YpsID module also implements the USB protocol, HID class, as defined in [USB] and
[HID]. This class is not used by the YpsID platform itself, but is available for the future
applets aimed to be loaded on the YpsID platform. Please see Appendix A.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 16/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
4 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
4.1 ROLES
Tab 7 presents the two roles supported by the YpsID module.
Role Description
CO
The CO has access to the ISD. He is in charge of ISD management, applet code
loading, applet instantiation, SSD creation and SSD personalization. He can
associate any created applet instance to a SSD or let this instance be linked to
the ISD.
User
A User has access to a given SSD. He is in charge of the management of this
SSD.
Tab 7: Role description
4.2 AUTHENTICATION
4.2.1 Role authentication mechanisms
The YpsID module supports identity-based authentication according to Level 3 requirements
for the roles, services and authentication area of [FIPS 140-2]. Tab 8 presents the
authentication mechanisms associated to the corresponding roles.
Role Type of Authentication Authentication data
CO Mutual authentication ISD CO key set (ISD_KENC, ISD_KMAC)
User Mutual authentication SSD User key set (SSD_KENC, SSD_KMAC)
Tab 8: Roles and required authentication
The mutual authentication is performed with the authentication data through the INIT
service. Therefore an operator proves the knowledge of his authentication data by
successfully completing the INIT service.
The identity-based feature is achieved through the mutual-authenticate functionality:
 The CO is uniquely identified by the identification number of the ISD and the
identification number of his ISD CO key set.
 A User is uniquely identified by the identification number of the selected SSD and
the identification number of his SSD User key set.
The ability to change from one role to another is strictly enforced by the YpsID design:
 All previous authentication records are cleared when a new authentication takes
place.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 17/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
 All authentication-related records are also cleared from memory when the module
power is removed. Prior authentication information is no longer available.
Therefore, it is not possible to have more than one authenticated operator on the YpsID
module at the same time.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 18/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
4.2.2 Role authentication strength
The following table presents the strength of the authentication role mechanism.
Authenticatio
n mechanism
Description
Probability that a
random
authentication
attempt succeeds
Probability that multiple
random authentication
attempts within a one
minute period succeed
CO
authentication
Mutual
authentication
(symmetric
scheme)
Less than 1/106
Less than 1/105
User
authentication
Tab 9: Strength of the FIPS Approved role authentication mechanisms
4.3 SERVICES
4.3.1 Services description
Tab 10 describes the services of the YpsID module and the security functions used at the
invocation of each service.
Services Description Security functions
SELECT
Selection of the ISD, a SSD or an applet
instance.
GET_DATA
Retrieving general information (including ATR
value) from the ISD or from an SSD.
INIT
CO or User authentication and opening of a
secured channel.
TDES, TDES MAC
GET_STATUS
Retrieving the life cycle data of Executable Load
Files, Executable Modules, ISD, SSDs or
applications, according to a given match/search
criteria.
SET_STATUS
Modification of the life cycle state of the module
(ISD state) and locking or unlocking of SSDs
and applets.
INST_INST
Creation of an applet instance or a SSD, with its
AID and its capability to be selected by default.
INST_EXTR
Association of an ISD applet instance to a given
SSD.
LOAD Loading of applet firmware
STORE_DATA
Storage of a set of information in the ISD or in a
SSD.
TDES
PUT_DES_KEY
Modification of a TDES key (ISD CO key set, ISD
Key Encryption key, SSD User key set or SSD
Key Encryption key).
TDES
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 19/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Services Description Security functions
PUT_RSA_KEY Set a RSA public key (SSD DAP key). TDES
DELETE
Deletion of an applet instance or of code or of
an Executable Load File.
SELF_TESTS Execution of power up self-tests.
TDES, SHA-1, SHA-
256, RSA, P-RNG
TERMINATE Zeroization of the whole E²PROM.
Tab 10: YpsID services overview
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 20/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
4.3.2 Services Access Control
The crypto module uses identity-based control to access the services of the YpsID module.
Tab 11 presents the authorized roles for each service.
The term ‘No role’ is used to identify services for which authentication is not required.
Indeed, initiating the act of authentication, by nature, does not require an authenticated
state for this module.
Services CO User No role
SELECT X X X
GET_DATA X X X
INIT X
GET_STATUS X
SET_STATUS X
INST_INST X
INST_EXTR X
LOAD X
STORE_DATA X X
PUT_DES_KEY X X
PUT_RSA_KEY X
DELETE X
SELF_TESTS X X X
TERMINATE X
Tab 11: Service access control
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 21/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
4.4 CSPS
4.4.1 CSPs description
Tab 12 presents the CSPs of the YpsID module.
CSPs Description
ISD CO key set
(ISD_KENC, ISD_KMAC)
Two static double TDES keys, that are used to derive the ISD
CO Session key set as part of the CO authentication. There is
one ISD CO key set per module.
ISD Key Encryption key
(ISD_KKEK)
A static double TDES key used to cipher CSPs entering the
module. There is one ISD Key Encryption key per module.
ISD CO Session key set
(ISD_SKENC, ISD_SKMAC)
Two double TDES keys, derived from the ISD CO key set using
the SCP.01 protocol, used to authenticate the CO.
SSD User key set
(SSD_KENC, SSD_KMAC)
Two double TDES keys used to derive a SSD User Session key
set as part of a User authentication. There is one SSD User key
set per SSD.
SSD Key Encryption key
(SSD_KKEK)
A static double TDES key used to cipher CSPs entering the
module. There is one SSD Key Encryption key per SSD.
SSD User Session key
set
(SSD_SKENC, SSD_SKMAC)
Two double TDES keys, derived from a SSD User key set using
the SCP.01 protocol, used to authenticate a User.
E²PROM Protection key
A double TDES key used to cipher the E²PROM key storage
location.
P-RNG Seed key
A double key generated by the non-deterministic hardware
random number generator and used to seed the Approved
[ANSI X9.31] P-RNG function.
P-RNG Seed
64 bits generated by the non-deterministic hardware random
number generator and used to seed the Approved [ANSI
X9.31] P-RNG function.
Tab 12: YpsID CSPs overview
Additionally, the YpsID module may contain RSA public key: the SSD DAP Public keys
(SSD_KDAP). SSD DAP keys are RSA public keys dedicated to a specific SSD and used to
verify the signature of the loaded firmware. There is at most one SSD DAP key per SSD.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 22/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
4.4.2 CSPs Access control
Tab 13 presents the services access rights to CSPs and keys stored in the YpsID module.
CSPs Services Operations Role
ISD CO key set
(ISD_KENC, ISD_KMAC)
INIT Execution CO
PUT_DES_KEY Modification CO
STORE_DATA Modification CO
TERMINATE Zeroization CO
ISD Key Encryption key
(ISD_KKEK)
PUT_DES_KEY Modification/Execution CO
STORE_DATA Modification/Execution CO
TERMINATE Zeroization CO
ISD CO Session key set
(ISD_SKENC, ISD_SKMAC)
INIT Derivation/Execution CO
SSD User key set(s)
(SSD_KENC, SSD_KMAC)
INIT Execution User
PUT_DES_KEY Modification User
STORE_DATA Modification User
TERMINATE Zeroization CO
SSD Key Encryption
key(s)
(SSD_KKEK)
PUT_DES_KEY Modification/Execution User
STORE_DATA Modification/Execution User
TERMINATE Zeroization CO
SSD User Session key
set(s)
(SSD_SKENC, SSD_SKMAC)
INIT Derivation/Execution User
SSD DAP key(s)
(SSD_KDAP)
PUT_RSA_KEY Modification User
STORE_DATA Modification User
TERMINATE Zeroization User
E²PROM Protection key
PUT_DES_KEY Execution CO/User
PUT_RSA_KEY Execution User
TERMINATE Zeroization CO
Tab 13: CSPs & keys access rights within services
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 23/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
5 PHYSICAL SECURITY
5.1 [FIPS 140-2] LEVEL 4 REQUIREMENTS
The YpsID module is designed and manufactured to fulfill the requirements of [FIPS 140-2]
Level 4 physical security:
 Opacity
 Tamper resistance and tamper evidence
 Physical penetration testing
 Chemical testing
 EFP for temperature and voltage (note: clock frequency protections are also in place).
All the hardware, firmware and data components of the module are physically protected. The
module does not contain any door, ventilation hole or removable cover. No maintenance
access interface, as defined in [FIPS 140-2], is available.
5.2 SECURITY MECHANISMS
The module implementation is a production grade, commercially available single-chip device
(ATMEL AT90SC 256 72 RCT-USB), which contains the following hardware security features:
 Voltage monitor
 Frequency monitor
 Light protection
 Temperature monitor.
For values of voltage, clock input frequency, UV light or temperature which go outside
acceptable bounds, the module prevents further operation by entering an error state and
remaining mute until the module is reset. Therefore the security of the module is not
compromised by unusual environmental conditions outside of the module’s normal operating
range.
5.3 MODULE ENCAPSULATION
The physical encapsulation of the chip is a metallic layer, which covers sensitive circuitry and
thus prevents all the sensitive components from being visible. It provides advanced
protection against physical attacks and fulfills the physical tampering and probing
requirements. Therefore, if an attacker tries to remove metallic layer of the module, the
owner of the YpsID module will notice the attempt just by looking at the module.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 24/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Only [FIPS 140-2] validated applets may be downloaded on the YpsID cryptographic module.
This module performs the firmware load test on all new code, and as such the YpsID
cryptographic module is defined as possessing a limited operational environment.
The Operational Environment requirements of [FIPS 140-2] Area 6, therefore, do not apply to
the YpsID cryptographic module.
It is noted that loading any applet will result in the current module being invalidated. The
loading of validated applets will result in a different FIPS module (combination of platform and
applet(s)) referenced by a separate FIPS 140 certificate.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 25/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT
7.1 KEY OVERVIEW
Tab 14 gives an overview of all the cryptographic keys used in the YpsID module.
Cryptographic keys Key size (bits)
Approved
algorithms
ISD CO key set
Encryption key: ISD_KENC: 112 TDES
Mac key: ISD_KMAC: 112 TDES MAC
ISD Key Encryption key ISD_KKEK: 112 TDES
ISD CO Session key set
Encryption key: ISD_SKENC: 112 TDES
Mac key: ISD_SKMAC: 112 TDES MAC
SSD User key set
Encryption key: SSD_KENC: 112 TDES
Mac Key: SSD_KMAC: 112 TDES MAC
SSD Key Encryption key SSD_KKEK: 112 TDES
SSD User Session key set
Encryption key: SSD_SKENC: 112 TDES
Mac Key: SSD_SKMAC: 112 TDES MAC
E²PROM Protection key Encryption key: 112 TDES
SSD DAP key SSD_KDAP: 1024 to 2048 RSA
P-RNG Seed key Seed key: 112 P-RNG
Tab 14: Cryptographic key overview
7.2 KEY GENERATION
No cryptographic key is generated on board.
7.3 ENTRY/OUTPUT
All static cryptographic keys are always input in the module ciphered with a CSP encryption
key (the ISD Key Encryption key or a SSD Key Encryption key).
Cryptographic keys are never output from the cryptographic module.
7.4 STORAGE
Static cryptographic keys are stored in E²PROM and are prevented from disclosure,
modification and substitution by:
- An API which does not allow those operations.
- An integrity check for each key.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 26/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
- A dedicated key (the E²PROM Protection key) which encrypts the E²PROM area
where cryptographic keys are stored.
7.5 ZEROIZATION
There is a zeroization mechanism to actively overwrite all static cryptographic keys and other
CSPs stored in the E²PROM, which is implemented via the Destroyed service. This is
achieved by erasing the whole E²PROM (erasing the whole E²PROM will also terminate the
module).
In addition, session keys (ISD CO Session key set and SSD CO Session key set) are erased
at the end of each session.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 27/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
8 EMI/EMC
The YpsID cryptographic module has been tested to meet the EMI/EMC FCC Part 15 Class B
requirements.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 28/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
9 SELF-TESTS
The YpsID cryptographic module performs a set of self-tests to ensure that it is working
properly, as required by [FIPS 140-2].
9.1 POWER UP SELF-TESTS
The YpsID module performs the following self-tests at power up:
 E²PROM firmware integrity check CRC16 test.
 [ANSI X9.31] Pseudo random number generation known answer test.
 TDES 2 key CBC ciphering/deciphering known answer test.
 RSA CRT signature & SHA-1 known answer test.
 RSA signature verification known answer test.
 SHA-256 known answer test.
9.2 CONDITIONAL SELF-TESTS
The YpsID module performs the following conditional self-tests:
 Hardware random number generation continuous test.
 [ANSI X9.31] pseudo random number generation continuous test.
 TDES MAC Firmware Load Test (Note: new applet code is applicable only to future
validated cryptographic modules based on this product).
 CRC integrity check for CSPs.
9.3 SELF-TESTS ON DEMAND
The suite of cryptographic power up self-tests may be performed at any time by repowering
the module.
9.4 SELF-TESTS FAILURE
If any self-test fails, the cryptographic module outputs a specific status, enters an error state
and remains mute until the module is reset.
Moreover, in case the self-test failing is the E²PROM firmware integrity check, then the
YpsID module outputs a specific status related to this particular error and enters a terminate
state. The module then will not boot any more after repowering.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 29/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
10 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS
The YpsID module implements countermeasures to protect against the attacks listed in Tab 15:
Attacks Countermeasures
SPA/SEMA Countermeasures against SPA/SEMA attacks
Timing Countermeasures against Timing attacks
DPA/DEMA Countermeasures against DPA/DEMA attacks
CPA/CEMA Countermeasures against CPA/CEMA attacks
DFA Countermeasures against DFA attacks
Tab 15: Mitigation of other attacks
Note: As an expanded security feature of [FIPS 140-2] single-chip requirements; when the
chip detects that its shield (metallic layer) is broken or damaged, it triggers a security
mechanism that, by erasing the E²PROM, will definitively render the YpsID module unusable.
Therefore, if an attacker tries to remove the shield of the module, he will not be able to access
any sensitive information.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 30/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
11 SECURITY RULES
The following represents the security rules established for and supported by the YpsID
cryptographic module.
11.1 SECURE OPERATION SECURITY RULES
 The YpsID module does not allow itself to return to the personalization lifecycle state
once personalization has been performed: personalization can therefore only be
performed once.
 Operators of the YpsID module should verify at power up of the module the value of the
byte in the ATR which indicates that the card is [FIPS 140-2] Level 3 compliant.
 Operators of the YpsID module shall have at any time the capability to check whether
the module is [FIPS 140-2] Level 3 compliant or not.
 Operators of the YpsID module shall have the capability at any time to retrieve its
identification number.
 All the applets loaded on the YpsID module shall be [FIPS 140-2] validated; otherwise
the module shall lose its validation.
 The YpsID platform shall execute a TDES MAC verification of the code of the applets
loaded on the platform. Additionally, a signature verification with a SSD DAP key may be
performed.
 CO and Users shall have the capability to check that the module is working properly. This
can be done by requesting the serial number data of the module. If the command
answers, then the module is working correctly. If the command does not answer, then
the module is either in error state, powered off or terminated. The module shall be
distinctive in indicating which of these states it occupies.
 The YpsID module shall not allow data output during self-tests, zeroization and error
states.
11.2 AUTHENTICATION SECURITY RULES
 CO and Users shall not share or disclose their secret authentication data to unauthorized
operators.
 After reception of the YpsID module, the User shall update his authentication data.
 No authentication record shall be kept after power down of the module.
 The strength of each authentication mechanism shall be better than 1/106
for a one-time
guess and 1/105
for multiple attempts in a 1-minute period.
 Only one authenticated operator shall be accepted on the YpsID module at a time.
11.3 KEY MANAGEMENT SECURITY RULES
 The module shall contain a zeroization service for all CSPs stored in E²PROM.
 The YpsID module shall rely on CSP encryption keys for the protection of all CSPs
entering the cryptographic boundary.
 The P-RNG seed key shall not have the same value as the P-RNG seed.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 31/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
11.4 PHYSICAL SECURITY RULES
 The YpsID module shall be inspected periodically for evidence of tampering.
 Access to the module shall be limited prior to initialization based on the physical security
protections and the lack of available interfaces prior to and during initialization.
 For values of voltage, clock input frequency, UV light, or temperature which go outside
acceptable bounds, the module shall remain mute until it is reset.
 An E²PROM integrity check failure shall lead to terminate the YpsID module.
11.5 SELF-TESTS SECURITY RULES
 The YpsID module shall perform power up self-tests automatically, without operator
intervention.
 The operator of the module shall be able to perform power up self-tests at any time, on
demand.
 When a self-test fails, the module shall output a specific status and enter an error state.
 Moreover, if the self-test failing is the E²PROM firmware integrity check, then the YpsID
module shall not be able to boot any more.
 No data shall be output before power up self-tests are completed.
 No data shall be output when conditional self-tests are performed.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 32/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
APPENDIX A: FUTURE MODULE FUNCTIONALITY
The YpsID module also implements the following functionalities that will be available for the
future applets aimed to be loaded on the platform:
 On board key generation (up to a 2048-bit modulus RSA).
 File system.
 MOC mechanism for fingerprint verification.
AUTHENTICATIONS:
Fingerprint verification
A MOC mechanism is available for the use of the future validated applets which will be
loaded. It is not actually used by the YpsID itself to authenticate a role.
This feature performs a 1:1 comparison between the fingerprint template coming from a
biometric sensor and the biometric reference stored in the module. The module can be
configured so that one or two fingerprints comparison is needed for the authentication to
succeed.
The strength of this authentication mechanism (whether with one or two fingerprints) is
better than 1/106
for a one-time guess and 1/105
for multiple attempts in a 1-minute period.
PIN verification
Future validated applets loaded on the YpsID platform may use the Global PIN for file access
control or applet role authentication. It is not used by the YpsID platform itself to
authenticate a role.
This password authentication mechanism can provide a strength better than 1/106
for a one-
time guess and 1/105
for multiple attempts in a 1-minute period.
KEY GENERATION:
A FIPS Approved RSA CRT key pair generation function, compliant with [PKCS#1 v2.1], is
available to the future applets loaded on the YpsID module. This function relies on a FIPS
Approved pseudo random number generation algorithm compliant with [ANSI X9.31].
CONDITIONAL SELF TESTS:
RSA key pair wise consistency check after each RSA key pair generation. No cryptographic
key is actually generated on board by the YpsID platform itself. But a FIPS Approved RSA
CRT key pair generation function is available to the future applets loaded on the YpsID
platform. Therefore the corresponding self-test is also available for the use of the future
applets.
PIN verification
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 33/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Future validated applets loaded on the YpsID platform may use the Global PIN for file access
control or applet role authentication. It is not used by the YpsID platform itself to
authenticate a role.
This password authentication mechanism can provide a strength better than 1/106
for a one-
time guess and 1/105
for multiple attempts in a 1-minute period.
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 34/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY
AID Application IDentifier
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Protocol Interface
ATR Answer To Reset
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCID Circuit Card Interface Devices
CEMA Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis
CO Crypto Officer
CPA Correlation Power Analysis
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DEMA Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
DPA Differential Power Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book
E²PROM Electrically Erasable and Programmable Read Only Memory
EFP Environmental Failure Protection
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GP Global Platform
HID Human Interface Devices
ISD Issuer Security Domain
ISO International Organization for Standardization
MAC Message Authentication Code
MOC Match On Card
PKCS Public Key Cryptographic Standards
RAM Random Access Memory
P-RNG Pseudo Random Number Generation
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SEMA Simple Electromagnetic Analysis
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA Simple Power Analysis
SSD Supplementary Security Domain
TDES Triple DES
YpsID
Non Proprietary Security Policy
Ref.: 0000067307-06
Page: 35/35
June 2011 – Morpho document – 0000067307-06
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
APPENDIX C: REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
[ANSI X9.31] American Bankers Association, Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), ANSI X9.31-1998,
Washington, D.C., 1998
[ANSI X9.52] American Bankers Association, Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of
Operation
ANSI X9.52 – 1998
[CCID] Universal Serial Bus - Device Class: Smart Card CCID - Specification for
Integrated Circuit(s) Cards Interface Devices
Revision 1.1 - April 22nd
, 2005
[CERT E2] “Certificate No. 1459 – YpsID by Sagem Orga – FIPS 140-2 Level 3”
Evaluated by Infogard and certified by the NIST
[CO GUIDE] Morpho, YpsID Crypto Officer guidance, SSE-0000067309
[FIPS 140-2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 140-2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules
May 25, 2001
[FIPS 180-2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard,
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 with Change
Notice 1
February 25, 2004
[ICCD] Universal Serial Bus - Device Class: Smart Card ICCD - Specification for USB
Integrated Circuit(s) Card Devices
Revision 1.0 - April 22nd
2005
[GP] Global Platform Card Specification – Configuration 3
Version 2.1.1 - May 2003
[HID] Universal Serial Bus - Device Class Definition for Human Interface Devices
(HID) -Firmware Specification - 6/27/01 - Version 1.11
[ISO/IEC 3309] Information technology -- Telecommunications and information exchange
between systems -- High-level data link control (HDLC) procedures -- Frame
structure
[ISO 7816-2] Identification Cards – Integrated Circuit(s) Cards with Contacts
Part 2: Dimensions and location of the contacts
[ISO 7816-3] Identification Cards – Integrated Circuit(s) Cards with Contacts
Part 3: Electronic signals and transmission protocols
[ISO 7816-4] Identification Cards – Integrated Circuit(s) Cards with Contacts
Part 4: Inter-industry commands for interchange
[ISO 9797] Information technology – Security techniques – Data integrity mechanism
using a cryptographic check function employing a block cipher algorithm
[JCS] Java Card ™ 2.2.1 Card Specification, Sun Microsystems
[PKCS#1 v2.1] RSA Laboratories, PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard
June 14, 2002
[USB] Universal Serial Bus Specification
Revision 2.0 April 27, 2000