1
FIPS 140-2 Level 3
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family
Document number: CNN35xx-NFBE-SPD-L3
Document Version: Version 2.06.17
Revision Date: 6/21/2023
© Copyright 2023 Marvell
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
This document may be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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Revision History
Revision Date Author Description of Change
2.06.02 11/12/2019 Phanikumar Kancharla FW 2.06 build 03 CMVP Submission
2.06.03 6/4/2020 Phanikumar Kancharla FW 2.06 build 05 with backward compatibility and
input sanity bug fixes
2.06.04 9/17/2020 Phanikumar Kancharla Updated Section 3, Table 4, and Table 5 in response
to CMVP Comments
2.06.05 10/23/2020 Phanikumar Kancharla FW 2.06 build 6 to address bug fixes; Table 4
updated to add CVL Cert. #C839
2.06.06 1/6/2021 Phanikumar Kancharla FW 2.06 build 7 to address bug fixes
2.06.07 1/28/2021 Ruchitha Uppuluri Updated Table 2 with new HW part numbers; minor
reformatting
2.06.14 11/4/2021 Rajendar Kalwa FW 2.06 build 14 to incorporate transition algorithm
certs and bug fixes
2.06.15 3/21/2022 Rajendar Kalwa Updated KAS certificate description in Table 4
2.06.15a 4/14/2022 Rajendar Kalwa FW 2.06 build 15 for input sanity bug fixes
2.06.15b 5/3/2022 Rajendar Kalwa Corrected HW versions in Table 2
2.06.16 10/7/2022 Rajendar Kalwa Enhanced error handling and corresponding cleanup.
2.06-17 6/21/2023 Rajendar Kalwa FW 2.06 build 17 for CVE fix and input sanity bug fix
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Table of Contents
1 Module Overview................................................................................................................................. 6
2 Security Level ..................................................................................................................................... 10
3 Modes of Operation........................................................................................................................... 11
3.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation................................................................................................................11
3.2 Non-FIPS Mode of Operation.........................................................................................................................11
3.3 Partitions.......................................................................................................................................................11
3.3.1 HSM Master Partition ..........................................................................................................................11
3.3.2 HSM Partition.......................................................................................................................................12
4 Encrypted Communication Channels.................................................................................................13
5 Supported Cryptographic Algorithms ................................................................................................14
5.1 Approved and Allowed Algorithms................................................................................................................14
5.2 Non-Approved, Non-Allowed Algorithms ......................................................................................................19
5.3 LED Error Pattern for FIPS Failure..................................................................................................................19
5.4 TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 Cipher Suites.........................................................................................................................21
6 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................................... 22
7 Identification and Authentication Policy............................................................................................23
7.1 Assumption of Roles, Master Partition..........................................................................................................23
7.1.1 Manufacturer (MFG)............................................................................................................................23
7.1.2 Master Crypto Officer (MCO)...............................................................................................................23
7.2 Assumption of Roles, Non-Master Partition Roles.........................................................................................23
7.2.1 Pre-Crypto Officer (Pre-CO) .................................................................................................................23
7.2.2 Partition Crypto Officer (PCO) .............................................................................................................24
7.2.3 Partition Crypto User (PCU).................................................................................................................24
7.2.4 Appliance User (AU).............................................................................................................................24
7.3 Authentication...............................................................................................................................................24
7.4 Roles, Services, and CSP Access .....................................................................................................................25
8 Keys and Certificates.......................................................................................................................... 33
8.1 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)...........................................................................................33
8.2 Definition of Public Keys................................................................................................................................35
8.3 Definition of Session Keys..............................................................................................................................36
9 Operational Environment...................................................................................................................36
10 Security Rules..................................................................................................................................... 37
11 Physical Security Policy ...................................................................................................................... 38
11.1 Physical Security Mechanisms ..................................................................................................................38
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy .....................................................................................................39
13 References.......................................................................................................................................... 40
14 Definitions and Acronyms ..................................................................................................................40
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List of Tables
Table 1 – LED Description ............................................................................................................................. 6
Table 2 – Hardware Part Numbers................................................................................................................ 7
Table 3 – Module Security Level Specification............................................................................................10
Table 4 – FIPS Approved Algorithms Used in the Module..........................................................................14
Table 5 – FIPS Allowed Algorithms Used in the Module.............................................................................18
Table 6 – Non-Approved, Non-Allowed Algorithms Used in the Module...................................................19
Table 7 – LED Flash Pattern for Errors ........................................................................................................19
Table 8 – Cavium HSM Ports and Interfaces...............................................................................................22
Table 9 – Roles and Required Identification and Authentication...............................................................24
Table 10 – Strength of Authentication Mechanism....................................................................................25
Table 11– Roles, Services and CSPs.............................................................................................................25
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List of Figures
Figure 1 – Top View of Cryptographic Module............................................................................................6
Figure 2 – Cryptographic Module Showing Tamper Evidence..................................................................39
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1 Module Overview
The NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family module (hereafter referred to as the module or HSM) by
Marvell (formerly Cavium Inc.) is a high-performance purpose-built security solution for crypto
acceleration. The module provides a FIPS 140-2 overall Level 3 security solution. The module is deployed
in a PCIe slot to provide crypto and TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 acceleration in a secure manner to the system host. It
is typically deployed in a server or an appliance to provide crypto offload. The module’s functions are
accessed over the PCIe interface via an API defined by the module.
The module is a hardware/firmware multi-chip embedded cryptographic module. The module provides
cryptographic primitives to accelerate approved and allowed algorithms for TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 and SSH. The
cryptographic functionality includes modular exponentiation, random number generation, and hash
processing, along with protocol specific complex instructions to support TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 security protocols
using the embedded NITROXIII chip. The module implements password based single factor authentication
at FIPS 140-2 Level 3 security. The physical boundary of the module is the outer perimeter of the card
itself.
Figure 1 – Top View of Cryptographic Module
Table 1 – LED Description
LED Location LED Description
D6 – Red Power Fail indication
D6 – Green Power OK – All voltages rails are at nominal
D13 – Red See Table 7
D13 – Green See Table 7
D10 –Multicolor See Table 7
D12 – Multicolor See Table 7
D14 – Multicolor See Table 7
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The configuration of hardware and firmware for this validation is:
Table 2 – Hardware Part Numbers
Part Number HW
Version
LiquidSecurity
Appliance
Cores Enabled Key Store
Size
Max
Partitions
CNL3560P-NFBE-G HW-1.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560-NFBE-G HW-1.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3530-NFBE-G HW-1.0 Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3510-NFBE-G HW-1.0 Yes 24 25K 24
CNL3510P-NFBE-G HW-1.0 Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3560P-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3530-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3510-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 Yes 24 25K 24
CNL3510P-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3560PB-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560B-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3530B-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3510B-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 Yes 24 25K 24
CNL3510PB-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3560P-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560B-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560A‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560C‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560D‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560E‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3560F‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNL3530-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530B-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530A‐NFBE‐3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530C‐NFBE‐3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530D‐NFBE‐3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530E‐NFBE‐3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3530F‐NFBE‐3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3510-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 24 25K 24
CNL3510P-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510A‐NFBE‐3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510C‐NFBE‐3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510D‐NFBE‐3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510E‐NFBE‐3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510F‐NFBE‐3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 50K 32
CNL3510I-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 24 25K 16
CNL3530I-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 32 25K 32
CNL3560I-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 Yes 64 100K 32
CNN3560P-NFBE-G HW-1.0 No 64 100K 64
CNN3560-NFBE-G HW-1.0 No 64 100K 32
CNN3530-NFBE-G HW-1.0 No 32 25K 32
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CNN3510-NFBE-G HW-1.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LP-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPB-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3560P-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 No 64 100K 64
CNN3560P-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 No 64 100K 64
CNN3560-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 No 64 100K 32
CNN3560-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 No 64 100K 32
CNN3560A‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 64 100K 32
CNN3560C‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 64 100K 32
CNN3560D‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 64 100K 32
CNN3560E‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 64 100K 32
CNN3560F‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 64 100K 32
CNN3530-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 No 32 25K 32
CNN3530-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 No 32 25K 32
CNN3530A‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 32 25K 32
CNN3530C‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 32 25K 32
CNN3530D‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 32 25K 32
CNN3530E‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 32 25K 32
CNN3530F‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 32 25K 32
CNN3510-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510A‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510C‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510D‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510E‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510F‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LP-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPB-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPA‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPC‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPD‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPE‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3510LPF‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 24 25K 24
CNN3505LP-NFBE-2.0-G HW-2.0 No 16 10K 16
CNN3505LP-NFBE-3.0-G HW-3.0 No 16 10K 16
CNN3505LPA‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 16 10K 16
CNN3505LPC‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 16 10K 16
CNN3505LPD‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 16 10K 16
CNN3505LPE‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 16 10K 16
CNN3505LPF‐NFBE‐3.0‐G HW-3.0 No 16 10K 16
LP is low-frequency part, where N3 chip runs at 500MHz, otherwise it runs at 600MHz.
CNN35XX-NFBE-G Firmware:
CNN35XX-NFBE-FW-2.06 build 17.
The module supports different performance options as listed above in the hardware identifier. The
physical hardware and firmware are identical across all options. The underlying hardware has multiple
identical cryptographic engines which are enabled or disabled using an option parameter set at
manufacturing time. Also, the manufacturer can configure the HSM adapter to work only with Cavium’s
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LiquidSecurity HSM appliances, these parts are identified with CNL prefix. CNN cards can work with non-
Cavium appliances. CNL and CNN part numbers employ the same hardware and firmware with the only
difference being in vendor configuration where CNL parts require certificates in cloning service, which is
optional in CNN.
The major blocks of the module are: General purpose MIPS based control processor, crypto processors,
RAM memory, NOR and eMMC flash for persistent storage, USB interfaces, and PCIe gen-2 x8 interfaces.
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2 Security Level
The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 3 security of FIPS 140-2.
Table 3 – Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Module Ports and Interfaces 3
Roles, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 3
Physical Security 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
EMI/EMC 3
Power on Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 3
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3 Modes of Operation
The module supports the following modes of operation:
1) Non-FIPS mode of operation
2) FIPS Approved Level 3 mode of operation
The module is initialized into one of the modes specified above during the module initialization period.
The value of the parameter fipsState passed into the call specifies the mode. The following are the allowed
values for fipsState parameters:
0 - Non-FIPS mode
2 - FIPS Approved mode with single factor authentication mechanism
3 - FIPS Approved mode with certificate based dual factor authentication mechanism
The indicator of Approved mode is obtained by using the Get Status service. The fipsState field of Get
Status service indicates the mode. CSPs are not shared between the Approved and non-Approved modes
of operation.
3.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
The module provides a FIPS Approved mode of operation, comprising all services described in Section 7.3
below. In this mode, the module allows only FIPS Approved or allowed algorithms. Request for any non-
Approved/allowed algorithm is rejected.
3.2 Non-FIPS Mode of Operation
The Module supports a Non-FIPS mode implementing the non-FIPS Approved algorithms listed in Table
6. All services are available in both the Approved and non-Approved modes of operation; however, the
PCU Key Management and PCU Crypto Offload services are capable of employing non-FIPS Approved
algorithms in the non-Approved mode.
3.3 Partitions
N3FIPS adapter is a sr-iov enabled intelligent PCIe adapter with 1 physical function and 128 virtual
functions. In addition to the crypto offloads, this adapter can provide secure key storage with up to 64
partitions, including master partition. Each partition will have its own users to manage the partition and
own configuration policies and hence each partition can be treated as a virtual HSM. HSM always has one
default partition called HSM Master partition and this contains configuration of the complete HSM and
default configuration of any additional partitions that are created. Only one HSM partition can be assigned
to one SR-IOV virtual function of HSM adapter and vice-versa. Keys belonging to one partition are not
accessible from other partition. This is achieved through a secure binding between partition and the PCIe
virtual function.
3.3.1 HSM Master Partition
This is the default partition with only one user, called the Master Crypto Officer (MCO). This partition
represents the operating state of the whole HSM adapter. i.e., initialization of HSM is nothing but
initializing this partition with required configuration and MCO credentials. Zeroizing this partition will
erase all HSM partitions in the adapter. The HSM has to be initialized and the MCO should already be
logged in to create more partitions on the adapter. The MCO can backup and restore complete partition
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including user data, partition configuration and user keys. All the backup data is encrypted with Backup
keys.
3.3.2 HSM Partition
Each partition will have a different set of users to manage it and a dedicated key storage and crypto
resources associated. A partition will have a default configuration supplied by the master partition and
can be changed (within limits) during the partition initialization. When a partition is created by the MCO,
it will be in a zeroized state and has to be initialized to do any keystore management or crypto function
offloads. Partition initialization will create the Partition Crypto Officer (PCO). The PCO can later create up
to 1024 users (PCO or PCU) on demand. Each user will have a unique user name to identify themselves.
The User has to login to the partition/vHSM to issue any authorized commands. Users are authenticated
using passwords submitted during the user creation.
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4 Encrypted Communication Channels
The End to End encryption feature in the module allows an application to initiate an TLS connection with
the firmware to ensure the confidentiality of the data communicated over PCIe path.
The connection is based on TLS v1.2 with the cipher-suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
(known to OpenSSL as AES128-GCM-SHA256). The module will act as server, and host application will act
as client. The server private key will be the partition private key PAK which is generated for each pHSM
when the pHSM/partition is created. The server certificate used for the SSL connection is the partition
certificate PAC. The complete chain will be validated by the host application (CavClient) before
establishing the TLS connection.
The End to End encryption feature is enabled using the initialization configuration parameters. Once this
feature is enabled, all commands except the initialize and open session are encrypted.
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5 Supported Cryptographic Algorithms
This section provides the list of supported cryptographic algorithms segregated based on the operating
mode.
5.1 Approved and Allowed Algorithms
The cryptographic module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms.
Table 4 – FIPS Approved Algorithms Used in the Module
FIPS Approved Algorithm Usage Certificate
AES:
− ECB mode: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
− CBC mode: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
− CTR mode: 128, 192 and 256-bit
− XTS mode: 128 and 256-bit (Tested, but not used)
Data encryption and decryption C839 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII-GC)
AES
− CCM Mode: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
Authenticated encryption and
decryption
C839 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII-GC)
AES
− CMAC Mode: MAC generate and verify; 128, 192 and
256-bit
Message authentication code
generation and verification
C839 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII-GC)
AES:
− GCM: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
− 96-bit random IV; TLS record encryption
− GMAC is supported
− IG A.5 Notes:
− TLS 1.2 or other applications can offload GCM
operations.
− For TLS-1.2 protocol, IV constructed as described in RFC
5288.
− IV is generated internally to the cryptographic module.
− IV is not generated internally to the GCM algorithm
boundary.
− SP 800-38D §8.2.2 is used for GCM IV construction.
− IVs are generated randomly, and IG A.5 Requirement #2
applies.
− IV’s free field is a 4-byte counter.
− IV’s random field is a 96-bit random number.
− IV’s random field is incremented by 1. IV’s random field
wouldn’t overflow 96-bits in the lifetime of the module.
− Internal Approved RNG: SP 800-90A DRBG, AES_CTR
256-bit or SHA-512.
− Internal NDRNG used to seed the Approved RNG:
Octeon HW random number generator
Data encryption, decryption,
key-wrap and key-unwrap
C839 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII-GC)
AES:
− ECB mode: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
− CBC mode: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
Data encryption/decryption. C819 (N3FIPS-
OpenSSL-1.1.1-
AES)
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FIPS Approved Algorithm Usage Certificate
AES:
− KW and KWP mode: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-
bit
Key encryption/decryption. C1263
(LiquidSecurity
Keywrap)
CKG
− IG D.12
− SP 800-133 Section 6.1 Asymmetric signature key
generation using unmodified DRBG output
− SP 800-133 Section 6.2 Asymmetric key establishment
key generation using unmodified DRBG output
− SP 800-133 Section 7.1 Direct symmetric key generation
using unmodified DRBG output
− SP 800-133 Section 7.3 Derivation of symmetric keys
from a key agreement shared secret.
− SP 800-133 Section 7.4 Derivation of symmetric keys
from a pre-shared key
Key generation N/A: Vendor
Affirmed
CVL:
SP 800-56A ECC CDH: P‐224, P‐256, P‐384 and P‐521
ECDH key derivation and SSL
suite B key exchange
C829 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII-ECC)
CVL:
FIPS 186-4 ECDSA SP: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-
283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, and B-571
ECDSA Signature generation on
pre-hashed input messages
C825 (N3FIPS-
OpenSSL-1.1.1-
ECC)
CVL:
− TLS-KDF (v1.0/1.1, v1.2)
TLS handshake C840 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII-TLS-
KDF)
CVL:
- SP 800-56B RSADP
- FIPS 186-4 RSASP1
RSA Decryption and Key Unwrap
RSA Signature Primitive
C839 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII-GC)
CVL:
− SP 800-56B RSADP
RSA Decryption Primitive A1954
(OpenSSL)
DRBG:
SP 800-90A DRBG: AES-CTR 256-bit
IV and nonce generation 680
DRBG:
− SP 800-90A DRBG: AES-CTR 256-bit
Key generation C821 (N3FIPS-
OpenSSL-1.1.1-
DRBG-CTR)
DRBG:
− SP 800-90A DRBG: SHA512
Random number generation
and key generation
C830 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII-
DRBG-SHA)
DSA:
− Key Gen: 2048 and 3072-bit
− PQG Gen: 2048 and 3072-bit
− PQG Ver: 1024-bit*, 2048 and 3072-bit
− Sig Gen: 2048 and 3072-bit (SHA-224, -256, -384, -512)
− Sig Ver: 1024*, 2048 and 3072-bit (SHA-1, 224, -256, -
384, -512)
* Legacy use only
Key generation, Sign and Verify C823 (N3FIPS-
OpenSSL-1.1.1-
DSA)
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FIPS Approved Algorithm Usage Certificate
ECDSA:
− Key Gen: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-
409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, and B-571
− Key Ver: All P, K and B curves
− Sig Gen and Sig Gen Component: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-
521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409,
and B-571 (SHA-224, -256, -384, -512)
− SigVer: All P, K and B curves (SHA-1, 224, -256, -384, -
512)
Key generation, Sign and Verify C825 (N3FIPS-
OpenSSL-1.1.1-
ECC)
ECDSA:
− Sig Gen Component: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 (SHA-
224, -256, -384, -512)
− SigVer: P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 (SHA-1, 224, -
256, -384, -512)
Signature generation and
verification
C829 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII-ECC)
HMAC:
HMAC-SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512
MAC generation and KAS C822 (N3FIPS-
OpenSSL-1.1.1-
HMAC)
HMAC:
− HMAC-SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512
MAC generation C839 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII-GC)
KAS:
− SP 800-56A rev3 KAS-ECC Ephemeral Unified with P-521
− One Step KDF
− No key confirmation
Key Agreement for Cloning A1952 (N3FIPS-
KAS-ECC)
KAS-RSA:
− SP 800-56B rev2 RSA/IFC based KAS using 2048-bit key
size
− 3072 and 4096-bit key sizes tested, but not used.
− One Step KDF
Key Agreement A1953
(OpenSSL)
KBKDF:
− SP 800-108 HMAC-SHA-1, -224, -256, -384, -512 KDF
− Counter mode
Key derivation C826 (N3FIPS-
OpenSSL-1.1.1-
HMAC-KDF)
KBKDF:
− SP 800-108 HMAC-SHA-256, 384, 512 KDF
− SP 800-108 AES-CMAC 128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit
− Counter mode
Key derivation C839 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII-GC)
KDF:
− ANSI X9.63 (SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512)
(Tested, but not used)
Key derivation C825 (N3FIPS-
OpenSSL-1.1.1-
ECC)
KTS
− AES GCM provides between 128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
Key Transport C839 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII-GC)
KTS
− SP 800-38F AES KW and KWP, 128, 192 and 256-bit
− SP 800-38F (AES) provides between 128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
Key Transport, Key wrap,
unwrap, backup/restore
C1263
(LiquidSecurity
Keywrap)
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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FIPS Approved Algorithm Usage Certificate
KTS
− SP 800-38F (Triple-DES) provides 112-bits of encryption
strength (limited to 2^16 encryption operations)
Key Transport C1263
(LiquidSecurity
Keywrap)
KTS-RSA
− SP 800-56B rev2 RSA/IFC based KTS-OAEP using 2048,
3072, or 4096-bit key sizes. Provides between 112 and
150 bits of encryption strength.
− SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
Key wrap, unwrap A1955 (N3FIPS-
NITROXIII)
KTS-RSA
− SP 800-56B rev2 RSA/IFC based KTS-OAEP using 2048,
3072, or 4096-bit key sizes. Provides between 112 and
150 bits of encryption strength.
− SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
Key wrap, unwrap A1953
(OpenSSL)
RSA:
− KeyGen: 2048, 3072-bit
− FIPS 186-2 PKCS #1 1.5 and PSS SigGen: 4096-bit (SHA-
224, -256, -384, -512)
− FIPS 186-4 PKCS #1 1.5 and PSS SigGen: 2048 and 3072-
bit (SHA-224, -256, -384, -512)
− FIPS 186-4 PKCS #1 1.5 and PSS SigVer: 1024, 2048 and
3072-bit (SHA-1, 224, -256, -384, -512)
Key generation, Sign and Verify C824 (N3FIPS-
OpenSSL-1.1.1-
RSA)
RSA:
− KeyGen: 4096-bit
− FIPS 186-4 PKCS #1 1.5 and PSS SigGen: 4096-bit (SHA-
224, -256, -384, -512)
− FIPS 186-4 PKCS #1 1.5 and PSS SigVer: 4096-bit (SHA-1,
224, -256, -384, -512)
Key generation, Sign and Verify A1954
(OpenSSL)
SHS:
SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512
Data hashing 1780
SHS:
− SHA-1, 224, 256, 384 and 512
Signature generation,
verification, HMAC. SHA-1 used
for verify only.
C820 (N3FIPS-
OpenSSL-1.1.1-
SHA)
Triple-DES (limited to 2^16 encryption operations):
− TECB mode: 3-key Encrypt/Decrypt
− TCBC mode: 3-key Encrypt/Decrypt
Data encryption and decryption 1311
Triple-DES (limited to 2^16 encryption operations):
− TECB mode: 3-key Encrypt/Decrypt
− TCBC mode: 3-key Encrypt/Decrypt
Data encryption and decryption
Module limits Triple-DES
encryptions to 2^16 64-bit
blocks per IG A.13.
C1169 (N3FIPS-
OpenSSL-1.1.1-
TDES)
Triple-DES:
− KW mode: 3-key Encrypt/Decrypt
Key encryption/decryption. C1263
(LiquidSecurity
Keywrap)
The cryptographic module supports the following non-FIPS Approved algorithms which are allowed for
use in FIPS mode.
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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Table 5 – FIPS Allowed Algorithms Used in the Module
Algorithm Usage
[IG D.9] AES: #C819 (N3FIPS-OpenSSL-1.1.1-AES)
− ECB mode: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
− CBC mode: Encrypt/Decrypt; 128, 192 and 256-bit
Key unwrap only
[IG A.2] ECDSA Cert. #C829 and #C825, Secp256K1 (128 bits), X25519 (128 bits)
(SHA-1*, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)
*Legacy verification only
EC Key generation, Sign,
Verify and ECDH.
[IG 7.15] Hardware RNG (NDRNG) Seed, seed key generation
[IG D.9] RSA PKCS#1 of modulus size 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits (CVL Cert. #A1954,
key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits
of encryption strength).
CSP Encrypt/Decrypt
[IG D.9] RSA PKCS#1 of modulus size 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits (CVL Cert. #C839,
key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits
of encryption strength).
CSP Encrypt/Decrypt
[SP 800-135] MD5 Hashing within TLS
The support of TLS 1.0/1.1, v1.2 protocol by the module is restricted to the TLS Key Derivation Function
and the crypto operation. This functionality of the module is used by the user of the module as part of TLS
protocol negotiation. The TLS protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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5.2 Non-Approved, Non-Allowed Algorithms
The cryptographic module supports the following non-Approved algorithms available only in non-FIPS
mode.
Table 6 – Non-Approved, Non-Allowed Algorithms Used in the Module
Algorithm Usage Keys/CSPs
PBE Key generation Password
ECDSA P192, EdCurve25519
(SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512)
Key generation, sign, and ECDH EC Public and Private Key.
5.3 LED Error Pattern for FIPS Failure
On successful completion of the FIPS tests, the D10 Green LED remains in the “ON” state. Blinking indicates
failures on the HSM. If the LED remains in the permanent glow, the card’s state is fine. All blinks are 200ms
ON and 200ms OFF. Blink delay time gap is 1000ms.
Table 7 – LED Flash Pattern for Errors
FIPS Test LED Pattern
LED No. Color Red Green Blue Blinks
N3 AES-CBC Encrypt/Decrypt D12 Red Y N N 1
N3 AES-GCM Encrypt D12 Red Y N N 2
N3 AES-GCM Decrypt D12 Red Y N N 3
N3 AES-CCM Encrypt D12 Red Y N N 4
N3 AES-CCM Decrypt D12 Red Y N N 5
N3 AES-CMAC Sign D12 Red Y N N 6
N3 AES-CMAC Verify D12 Red Y N N 7
N3 AES-CMAC KDF D12 Red Y N N 8
N3 HMAC KDF D12 Red Y N N 9
N3 TLS KDF D12 Red Y N N 10
N3 Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt/Decrypt D12 Red Y N N 11
N3 RSASP1 D12 Red Y N N 12
N3 ECC CDH D12 Green N Y N 2
N3 ECDSA Sig Verify D12 Green N Y N 3
N3 DRBG SHA D12 Green N Y N 4
N3 RSA Enc and Dec D12 Green N Y N 5
OpenSSL AESCBC Encrypt/Decrypt D12 Blue N N Y 1
OpenSSL DSA Sign/Verify D12 Blue N N Y 2
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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FIPS Test LED Pattern
LED No. Color Red Green Blue Blinks
OpenSSL DRBG CTR D12 Blue N N Y 3
OpenSSL ECDSA PKV D12 Blue N N Y 4
OpenSSL ECDSA Sign/Verify D12 Blue N N Y 5
OpenSSL RSA Sign/Verify D12 Blue N N Y 6
OpenSSL RSA Encrypt/Decrypt D12 Blue N N Y 7
OpenSSL HMAC KDF D12 Blue N N Y 8
OpenSSL X963 KDF D12 Blue N N Y 9
AES KeyWrap D12 Blue N N Y 10
AES KeyUnwrap D12 Blue N N Y 11
TDES KeyWrap D12 Blue N N Y 12
SP 800-56A KAS D12 Blue N N Y 13
ECDSA pair wise consistency test D12 Blue N N Y 4
RSA pair wise consistency test D12 Blue N N Y 5
DSA pair wise consistency test D12 Green N Y N 1
Firmware Power-on Tests
Nitrox device file creation D14 Red Y N N 1
Nitrox driver load fails D14 Red Y N N 2
Nitrox micro code load fails D14 Red Y N N 3
Nitrox pot test failures D14 Red Y N N 4
Database creation fails D14 Red Y N N 5
Mgmt daemon has not started
successfully
D14 Red Y N N 6
HW RNG for firmware D12 Blue N N Y 3
Other Firmware States
HSM Boot stage 1 D10 Red Y N N No blink
FW integrity Failure state D10/D12/D1
4
Red R N N 30 sec on and
reboot
HSM Boot stage 2 D10 Red Y N N Blink (definite)
HSM Boot stage 3(SE-APP initialized
Linux handshake not done)
D10 Violet Y N Y No blink
HSM Linux handshake done, host
driver handshake not done
D10 Violet Y N Y Infinite
HSM PF driver handshake complete D10 Green N Y N No blink
HSM admin driver handshake done D10 Blue N N Y No blink
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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5.4 TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 Cipher Suites
The module supports the algorithms for following cipher suites using FIPS Approved and allowed
algorithms and key sizes:
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC3_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA
• TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
For cipher suites using GCM, the IV is generated per RFC 5288. The module supports GCM cipher suites
compatible with SP 800-52.
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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6 Ports and Interfaces
The module ports and interfaces are described in the below table.
Table 8 – Cavium HSM Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Ports/Interfaces
Pins Used FIPS 140-2
Designation
Name and Description
USB Interface (J2) USB Interface
USB0_DP, USB0_DM
Power
No functionality
in FIPS mode
USB Interface
Not used in FIPS mode
Serial Interface (J3) 3 Pin serial interface - GND, Tx, Rx N/A
No functionality
in FIPS mode
Disabled at the hardware level
during the firmware load
process.
PCIe Interface (P1) PCIE x8 Interface
Lane 0
Transmit Side B (14, 15)
Receive Side A (16, 17)
Lane 1
Transmit Side B (19, 20)
Receive Side A (21, 22)
Lane 2
Transmit Side B (23, 24)
Receive Side A (25, 26)
Lane 3
Transmit Side B (27, 28)
Receive Side A (29, 30)
Lane 4
Transmit Side B (33, 34)
Receive Side A (35, 36)
Lane 5
Transmit Side B (37, 38)
Receive Side A (39, 40)
Lane 6
Transmit Side B (41, 42)
Receive Side A (43, 44)
Lane 7
Transmit Side B (45, 46)
Receive Side A (47, 48)
Data Input
Control Input
Data Output
Status Output
Power
PCIe Interface
- Primary interface to
communicate with the
module
- Provides APIs for the
software on the host to
communicate with the
module
LED LED interface (7 LEDs, 13 pins) Status output Visual status indicator
Tamper PIN Tamper pin GPIO Control Input Tamper pin is used to zeroize the
card by zeroizing the master key
stored in EEPROM
Power Connector 6 PIN power connector Power In External power connector.
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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7 Identification and Authentication Policy
7.1 Assumption of Roles, Master Partition
The module supports the following roles. One identity is allowed for each role, per partition.
7.1.1 Manufacturer (MFG)
During the manufacturing stage, each HSM goes through the following process:
• An RSA key pair called the HSM FIPS Master Authentication Key (FMAK) is generated on HSM. CSR
is requested out of HSM and signed by the Manufacturer Authentication Root Certificate (MARC).
The generated certificate is called the HSM FIPS Master Authentication Certificate (FMAC).
• A 256-bit MKBK encrypted with the FMAK public key is loaded into the HSM.
• Program Performance settings and capabilities Appliance Compatibility mode, run random
operations, Encrypted channels
• Program Serial Number and Max Operating Temperature
The same above steps are followed by the manufacturer once the HSM is moved to manufacturer reset
after manufacturer zeroize.
7.1.2 Master Crypto Officer (MCO)
The master partition supports only the Master Crypto Officer role (MCO). This role is used to configure
non-master partitions (create, provision, resize, delete) but cannot access their resources (e.g., cannot
manage or use non-master partition keys).
This role is authenticated with username and password (one-factor) and optionally with signature as well
(two-factor). Refer to Section 7.3 for details.
7.2 Assumption of Roles, Non-Master Partition Roles
Each Non-Master Partition supports four (4) distinct operator roles as described below. The module
enforces the separation of roles using identity-based authentication. Re-authentication is required to
change roles.
Except for Pre-CO, concurrent operators are allowed; however, only one operator is allowed per login
session.
7.2.1 Pre-Crypto Officer (Pre-CO)
During partition initialization, default credentials are used to create a Pre-CO or a PCO. The Pre-CO is a
restricted role primarily for configuring certificates and setting up a PCO. Once a PCO is set up for a
partition, the Pre-CO role is no longer accessible.
Because the Pre-CO is essentially a restricted PCO, it does not have its own column in Table 11. Instead,
PCO capabilities in Table 11 are marked with an asterisk (*) to indicate Pre-CO can run these services.
This role is authenticated with username and password (one-factor) only.
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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7.2.2 Partition Crypto Officer (PCO)
This role has access to administrative services of the partition and can configure PCU and AU identities.
This role is authenticated with username and password (one-factor) and optionally with signature as
well (two-factor).
7.2.3 Partition Crypto User (PCU)
This role has access to all cryptographic services offered by the partition; its purpose is operational use
of the module.
This role is authenticated with username and password (one-factor) and optionally with signature as
well (two-factor).
7.2.4 Appliance User (AU)
This role has access to partition audit logs and can create end-to-end encrypted channels. It is to set up
and synchronize clusters.
This role is authenticated with username and password (one-factor) only.
7.3 Authentication
The module enforces identity-based authentication. A role is explicitly selected at authentication; the
MCO role is associated with the Master Partition and the PCO and PCU roles are associated with user
partitions (see Section 7.1 for details). The module allows one identity per role, per partition.
Table 9 – Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Description Authentication Type Authentication Data
MFG This role sets the identity,
serial number, performance
settings and max operating
temperature
Manufacturer License
certificate-based
authentication
RSA signature
MCO This role has access to
administrative services
offered by the module or HSM
Identity-based operator
authentication
Username and password;
optional RSA signature (2FA)
Pre-CO This role is an optional role
with limited functionality,
eventually transition into PCO
Identity-based operator
authentication
Username and password
PCO This role has access to
administrative services of the
partition
Identity-based operator
authentication
Username and password;
optional RSA signature (2FA)
PCU This role has access to all
crypto services offered by the
partition
Identity-based operator
authentication
Username and password;
optional RSA signature (2FA)
AU This role has access to
partition audit logs and
Appliance secure channel key
Identity-based operator
authentication
Username and password
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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Table 10 – Strength of Authentication Mechanism
Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism
Username and password The password is a minimum of 7 characters, case-sensitive alpha-numeric. As
such there are (26*2+10)^7 = 62^7 possible minimum-length passwords, and
the false acceptance rate is 1 in 62^7 which is less than 1 in 1,000,000.
A maximum of 20 password attempts are possible before permanent lockout.
Therefore, the probability of false authentication over any timeframe is 20 in
62^7, which is less than 1 in 100,000. (The number of allowed login attempts
prior to lockout is configured during module initialization but cannot exceed
20.)
Lockout of MCO automatically zeroizes the module. In all other cases, lockout
can be unset by destroying the partition.
RSA Signature Authentication is performed using SHA-256 based RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1-v1.5
signatures (provides 112 bits of strength). Corresponding public key is
associated with the identity (for Manufacturing role, it is part of FW image).
The probability that a random attempt will succeed, or a false acceptance will
occur, is approximately 1 in 2^112, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000. For each
failed signature verification, the module will block for 2 seconds. Based on this
maximum rate, the probability that a random attempt will succeed in a one
minute period is approximately 30 in 2^112, which is less than 1 in 100,000.
7.4 Roles, Services, and CSP Access
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP.
O = Output: The module reads the CSP out of the module.
I = Input: The module writes the CSP. The write access is typically performed after a CSP is
imported into the module, or the module generates a CSP, or the module overwrites an existing
CSP.
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
E = Execute: The module executes or uses the CSP.
Table 11– Roles, Services and CSPs
MCO
PCO
PCU
MFG
AU
Un-auth
Service Description Commands Cryptographic Keys/CSPs
X X X MP Zeroize Zeroize the master partition. Can be
configured to be allowed by CO only.
CN_ZEROIZE Z: All keys in Set 1 of Table 12
X MP Factory Reset Factory-reset the master partition CN_ZEROIZE Z: All keys in Sets 1,2 of Table
12
X MP Vendor Zeroize Zeroize all data CN_VENDOR_ZEROIZE Z: All keys in Set 1,2,3 of Table
12
X X X X Partition Zeroize Zeroize a given partition. Can be
configured to be allowed by CO only
CN_ZEROIZE Z: All keys in Set 4 of Table 12
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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MCO
PCO
PCU
MFG
AU
Un-auth
Service Description Commands Cryptographic Keys/CSPs
X Partition Factory Reset Factory-reset a given partition CN_ZEROIZE Z: All keys in Set 4,5 of Table 12
X Partition Delete Delete a partition & all associated
keys
CN_DELETE_PARTITION Z: All keys in Set 4,5,6 of Table
12
X X X X X X Session Management Management services for open,
status of sessions.
CN_APP_INITIALIZE
CN_APP_FINALIZE
CN_OPEN_SESSION
CN_CLOSE_SESSION
CN_GET_SESSION_
INFO
Z: Session Keys Stored in RAM
X X X X X X Session Management –
Close
Management services for closing all
sessions.
CN_CLOSE_ALL_
SESSIONS
Z: Session Keys Stored in RAM
X X Partition Application
Session Close (All)
Close sessions of all Applications tied
to a Partition.
CN_CLOSE_
PARTITION_
SESSIONS
Z: Session Keys Stored in RAM
X X X X X X Basic HSM Info Obtain basic information of the
HSM.
CN_TOKEN_INFO
CN_PARTITION_INFO
CN_GET_HSM_LABEL
CN_ALL_PARTITION_
INFO
CN_GET_POLICY_SET
CN_GET_M_VALUE
X X X X X X Read Firmware Version
String
Obtain firmware version. CN_GET_VERSION
X X X X X X Read or delete
coredump file
Read-out or delete coredump if it
exists
CN_GET_CORE_DUMP
CN_DELETE_CORE_DUMP
X Enables encrypted
communication channel
Create E2E session. CN_ENCRYPT_SESSION
CN_AUTHORIZE_SESSION
G: E2E TLS Session Symmetric
Key Set, E2E TLS Session
HMAC Key Set
E: PAC
X X X X X X Login to a Session Allows login to a session. Public key
is used to verify user signatures,
optionally in 2-factor authentication.
CN_LOGIN E: PEK, Two-Factor
Authentication Public Key
(In case of 2FA only)
I: Password
X X X X Logout of a Session Allows logout of a session. CN_LOGOUT
X X
*
X X Change User Password Requires user to be logged in.
Updates Passwords and Public key
for 2-factor authentication.
CN_CHANGE_PSWD E: PEK
I: new password, new public
key
Z: Old password
X X Manufacturer Settings Manufacturer Controlled Settings
run by manufacturer for the first
time and MCO can do it later.
CN_MASTER_CONFIG
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_CERT_REQ
CN_CERT_AUTH_
STORE_CERT
CN_STORE_VENDOR_PRE_S
HARED_
KEY
(CN_STORE_KBK_SHAR
E)
CN_SET_KBK_PRIMARY
G: FMAK, MFDEK
E: Manufacturer License
Validation Key
I: MARC, FMAC, MFKBK
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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MCO
PCO
PCU
MFG
AU
Un-auth
Service Description Commands Cryptographic Keys/CSPs
X Initialize HSM Commands and services to initialize
the module.
CN_INIT_TOKEN
CN_GEN_PSWD_
ENC_KEY
CN_CREATE_CO
CN_INIT_DONE
CN_CERT_AUTH_
STORE_CERT
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_CERT_REQ
CN_CERT_AUTH_
STORE_CERT
CN_STORE_USER_
PRE_SHARED_
KEY
(CN_STORE_KBK_SHAR
E)
CN_SET_KBK_PRIMARY
G: PEK, MMEK
E: PEK, MFDEK
O: CSR for FMAKI: Host
PswdEncKeyPublic Key,
AOAC, Password, Two-
Factor Authentication
Public key, AOTAC
X Secure Boot Commands to identify the hosts are
of Cavium.
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_CERT
CN_CERT_AUTH_
RECV_PEER_CERT
CN_CERT_AUTH_
SECURE_BOOT
E: MARC to validate HOST_ID
cert, HOST_ID cert to
validate signature on
challenge
SecureBootAuth Public
Key, FMAC
X Firmware Update Updates adapter with Cavium signed
firmware images. Adapter has to be
rebooted to use the new firmware.
CN_FW_UPDATE_
BEGIN
CN_FW_UPDATE
CN_FW_UPDATE_
END
E: Manufacturer Firmware
Validation Key
I: Manufacturer Firmware
Validation Key,
Manufacturer License
Validation Key
Z: Optionally Zeroize the HSM
keys.
X Other MCO Operations Misc. MCO Operations. CN_SLAVE_CONFIG
CN_INVOKE_FIPS
CN_GET_RSA_CACHE_SIZE
CN_GET_HSM_DIAG_INFO
CN_PARTN_STORAGE_GET
CN_PARTN_STORAGE_UPD
ATE
CN_PARTN_STORAGE_DELE
TE
X Partition Management Commands and services to manage
partitions.
CN_CREATE_
PARTITION
CN_DELETE_
PARTITION
CN_RESIZE_
PARTITION
CN_GET_PARTITION_
COUNT
CN_ALL_PARTITION_
INFO
G: PAK key pair, PMEK
E: FMAK, MFDEK
W: PAC
Z: All partition keys
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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MCO
PCO
PCU
MFG
AU
Un-auth
Service Description Commands Cryptographic Keys/CSPs
X MCO Backup and
Restore
Allows MCO to take back up using
KBK derived from pre-loaded MKBK,
OKBK. MCO uses find key in to get
the key handles in a partition.
CN_BACKUP_BEGIN
CN_BACKUP_CONFIG
CN_BACKUP_USERS
CN_BACKUP_KEY
CN_BACKUP_END
CN_RESTORE_BEGIN
CN_RESTORE_CONFIG
CN_RESTORE_USERS
CN_RESTORE_KEY
CN_RESTORE_END
CN_BACKUP_OBJECT
G: KBK, Backup session key
E: MFKBK, OKBK, Optionally
POKBK, KBK
O: POTAC, All keys NIST AES
wrapped with KBK
I: User passwords and Two-
Factor Authentication
Public Keys, All keys NIST
AES wrapped with KBK,
new POTAC verify the
owner ship
Z: Backup session key
X PCO Backup and
Restore
PCO uses find key in to get the key
handles in a partition.
CN_BACKUP_BEGIN
CN_CREATE_OBJECT
CN_WRAP_KBK (Modes:
KBK_WRAP_WITH_KEK
,
KBK_WRAP_WITH_CER
T_AUTH_DERIVED_KEY,
KBK_WRAP_WITH_RSA
,
KBK_USING_PRE_SHAR
ED_KEYS)
CN_BACKUP_CONFIG
CN_BACKUP_USERS
CN_BACKUP_KEY
CN_BACKUP_END
CN_RESTORE_BEGIN
CN_GENERATE_KEY_
PAIR
CN_UNWRAP_KBK (Modes:
KBK_WRAP_WITH_KEK
,
KBK_WRAP_WITH_CER
T_AUTH_DERIVED_KEY,
KBK_WRAP_WITH_RSA
)
CN_RESTORE_CONFIG
CN_RESTORE_USERS
CN_RESTORE_KEY
CN_RESTORE_OBJECT
CN_RESTORE_END
G: KBK Wrapping RSA key pair,
POKBK, KBK
E: KLK or KBK Wrap RSA public
key or SAZ,
MFKBK, OKBK, POKBK,
KBK, POKBK,
O: wrapped Partition KBK, User
passwords and Two-Factor
Authentication Public
Keys, All user keys,
I: KBK wrap public key, All keys
NIST AES wrapped with
KBK, User passwords and
Two-Factor Authentication
Public Keys, All user keys,
Z: SAZ
X MCO Partition Data
Management
Commands to manage Unclassified
data storage mainly used to
maintain network IP addresses.
CN_PARTN_
STORAGE_
UPDATE
CN_PARTN_
STORAGE_GET
CN_PARTN_
STORAGE_
DELETE
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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MCO
PCO
PCU
MFG
AU
Un-auth
Service Description Commands Cryptographic Keys/CSPs
X
*
Partition Initialization Commands to initialize the partition
and claim ownership of the
partition, reset resources.
CN_INIT_TOKEN
CN_GEN_PSWD_
ENC_KEY
CN_CREATE_CO
CN_INIT_DONE
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_CERT_REQ
CN_CERT_AUTH_
STORE_CERT
CN_STORE_USER_
PRE_SHARED_
KEY
CN_ACC_DEV_RESET
(CN_STORE_KBK_SHARE)
CN_SET_M_VALUE
CN_SET_NODEID
CN_SET_KBK_PRIMARY
G: PEK, Partition’s Masking Key
E: PEK, FMAK
O: CSR for PAK
I: Host PswdEncKeyPublicKey,
Password, Two-Factor
Authentication Public key,
POAC, POTAC, POKBK
X PCO UserManagement Commands to manage users in the
partition.
CN_CREATE_USER
CN_DELETE_USER
CN_LIST_USERS
CN_GET_LOGIN_
FAILURE_CNT
CN_CREATE_PRE_OFFICER
CN_CREATE_APPLIANCE_U
SER
E: PEK to decrypt and store,
PMEK to encrypt the
password and store it in
database
I: password and new Public key
Z: all session keys
X X SecureAuth based on
Certificates
Commands used for mutual
authentication and key agreement
between two partitions/entities of
same Partition owner on Cavium
HSM.
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_CERT
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_SOURCE_
RANDOM
CN_CERT_AUTH_
VALIDATE_PEER_
CERTS
CN_CERT_AUTH_
GET_CERT
CN_CERT_AUTH_
VALIDATE_PEER_
CERTS
CN_CERT_AUTH_
SOURCE_KEY_
EXCHANGE
G: SAZ
E: POTAC to verify peer POAC,
MARC to verify peer PAC
and FMAC, peer PAC to
verify peer signature, local
PAK to sign responder's
challenge, local PAK to
sign initiator's challenge
O: FMAC, PAC, POAC,
I: Peers FMAC, PAC, POAC,
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MCO
PCO
PCU
MFG
AU
Un-auth
Service Description Commands Cryptographic Keys/CSPs
X X Cloning Protocol Cloning: Clone Masking of a Partition
to a different Partition of the same
owner.
CN_CLONE_SOURCE_
INIT
CN_CLONE_SOURCE_
STAGE1
CN_CLONE_TARGET_
INIT
CN_CLONE_TARGET_
STAGE1
G: KAS key pair, CSSZ and KAS,
Partition’s Cloning Private
Key, KAS keying material
(Partition’s Cloning
Session Key, Partition’s
Cloning Session MAC Key)
E: KAS keying material for
masking key encryption
and mac tag generation
and peer mac tag
verification, KAS keying
material for presumed
data encryption and mac
tag generation, KAS keying
material to decrypt the
masking key, validate MAC
tag.
Partition Cloning
Initiator Public Key,
Partition Cloning
Responder Public Key,
Partition’s Masking Key,
SAZ, Partition Cloning ECC
Domain Parameter Set
O: Partition Cloning Initiator
Public Key, Partition
Cloning Responder Public
Key, Partition’s Masking
Key
I: Partition Cloning Initiator
Public Key, Partition
Cloning Responder Public
Key, Partition’s Masking
Key
Z: CSSZ, SAZ, and KAS keying
material (Partition’s
Cloning Session Key,
Partition’s Cloning Session
MAC Key)
X
*
Key Transportation A SP 800-56 A/B protocol to
generate a shared KLK on host and
Partition.
CN_GEN_KEY_ENC_
KEY
G: Partition’s KeyLoading
private/public RSA/ECC
key pair, KLSZ, KLK,
I: Host RSA/ECC KeyLoading
Public Key
Z: KLSZ, Partition KeyLoading
private/public key pair
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MCO
PCO
PCU
MFG
AU
Un-auth
Service Description Commands Cryptographic Keys/CSPs
X X X PCU Key Management
Key can be shared with multiple
users to use it for crypto operations.
Tombstone feature is added to
support key deletions in cluster
modes. Note: clusters are fully
maintained out of HSM and this is
just to enable the feature.
CN_EXTRACT_
MASKED_OBJECT
CN_INSERT_
MASKED_OBJECT
CN_DESTROY_OBJECT
CN_GET_ATTRIBUTE_
VALUE
CN_GET_ATTRIBUTE_
SIZE
CN_GET_ALL_ATTRIBUTES_
SIZE
CN_GET_ALL_ATTRIBUTES_
VALUE
CN_MODIFY_OBJECT
CN_FIND_OBJECTS
CN_FIND_OBJECTS_
FROM_INDEX
CN_GENERATE_KEY
CN_GENERATE_KEY_
PAIR
CN_GENERATE_PBE_
KEY
CN_EXPORT_PUB_
KEY
CN_SHARE_OBJECT
CN_GET_OBJECT_
INFO
CN_TOMBSTONE_OBJECT
CN_DELETE_TOMBSTONED
_OBJECT
CN_UNWRAP_KEY
CN_WRAP_KEY
CN_DERIVE_KEY
CN_FIND_OBJECTS_USING_
COUNT
CN_MODIFY_KEY_OWNER
G: All General Purpose User
CSPs, General Purpose
User Public Keys
E: Partition’s Masking Key, KLK
or user provided wrapping
Key, PEK specified user
key, All General Purpose
User CSPs,
O: General Purpose User CSPs
in wrapped form General
Purpose User Public Keys
I: Imported keys in wrapped
form
Z: General Purpose User CSPs,
General Purpose User
Public
X X X X Find Key handles Users can find key handles based on
search criteria like key type or label.
MCO/PCO use it as part of backup
service. Hash of key handles in order
to check if clusters are in sync.
CN_FIND_OBJECTS
CN_FIND_OBJECTS_
FROM_INDEX
CN_FIND_OBJECTS_USING_
COUNT
CN_FIND_ALL_OBJECTS_US
ING_COUNT
CN_ADMIN_GET_PARTN_K
EYHANDLES_HASH
X PCU Key Management –
Special
Unwrap only RSA Key
CN_UNWRAP_KEY
CN_FIND_OBJECT
CN_DELETE_OBJECT
E: KLK
O: Asymmetric Public Key (RSA
only)
I: Asymmetric Private Key (RSA
only)
Z: Asymmetric Private Key (RSA
only)
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MCO
PCO
PCU
MFG
AU
Un-auth
Service Description Commands Cryptographic Keys/CSPs
X X PCU Crypto Offload CN_ME_PKCS and
CN_ME_PKCS_LARGE are RSA 2K
and 3K operations.
Appliance user is allowed to use the
imported RSA key.
CN_SIGN
CN_VERIFY
CN_ECC_DH
CN_NIST_AES_WRAP
CN_ALLOC_SSL_CTX
CN_FREE_SSL_CTX
CN_GEN_PMK
CN_FIPS_RAND
CN_ME_PKCS_LARGE
CN_ME_PKCS
CN_FECC
CN_HASH
CN_HMAC
CN_ENCRYPT_DECRYPT
E: specified user key
X X Audit Logs – PCO /
Appliance
CN_PARTN_GET_
AUDIT_DETAILS
CN_PARTN_GET_
AUDIT_LOGS
CN_PARTN_GET_
AUDIT_SIGN
CN_PARTN_ACK_
AUDIT_SIGN
CN_PARTN_ACK_AUDIT_SI
GN
CN_PARTN_GET_AUDIT_LO
GS
CN_PARTN_GET_AUDIT_DE
TAILS
E: PAK, FMAK
X Audit Logs – MCO CN_FINALIZE_LOGS
X X HSM policies – MCO
Partition policies – PCO
MCO: Enable audit logs for partition
(Sticky policy)
PCO: Enable/Disable of
crypto/mgmt. logs
CN_SET_POLICY
X SSL Protocol Packet
Processing
These API can understand the
SSL/TLS protocol semantics and
optimized to do multiple sequential
crypto operations on the given input
data. For example: Encrypt/decrypt
record will do HMAC comparison in
addition to the symmetric crypto
operation.
MAJOR_OP_RSASERVER_LA
RGE
MAJOR_OP_RSASERVER
MAJOR_OP_HANDSHAKE
MAJOR_OP_OTHER
MAJOR_OP_FINISHED
MAJOR_OP_RESUME
MAJOR_OP_ENCRYPT_DEC
RYPT_RECORD
MAJOR_OP_ECDH
E: TLS Session Symmetric Key
Set and TLS Session HMAC
key part of SSL Context
X X MofN authentication To execute a service or use key ‘m’
users of ‘n’ allowed users should
approve.
CN_GET_TOKEN
CN_APPROVE_TOKEN
CN_LIST_TOKENS
CN_TOKEN_TIMEOUT
CN_DELETE_TOKEN
X Load KBK Load Manufacturer / AO / PO KBK CN_LOAD_KBK I: MFKBK, OKBK, POKBK
PCO capabilities in Table 11 are marked with an asterisk (*) to indicate Pre-CO can run these services.
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8 Keys and Certificates
8.1 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The Manufacturer FIPS Data Encryption Key (MFDEK) and HSM Master Partition Master Encryption Key
are stored in plaintext form in the EEPROM. The Partition Master Encryption Key (PMEK) is stored
encrypted under the HSM Master Partition Master Encryption Key. All other keys and CSPs stored in the
persistent memory are encrypted by the MFDEK, HSM Master Partition Master Encryption Key, or PMEK.
All general-purpose user CSPs are generated/created by the PCU and these CSPs can be shared between
multiple PCUs.
Note: All the DRBGs are supplied with 6 blocks of size of 48-bytes. This will provide an unmodified,
combined nonce and seed of 256 bits of security.
D: Manually Deleted
E: Erased right after used
S: Deleted on session close.
Column “Set” categorize CSPs as set 1 to 6 and links with Table-11 to identify the CSPs zeroized in each service.
Table 12 – Private Keys and CSPs
Name Description and Usage Set
HSM CSPs
DRBG Entropy The entropy material for the FIPS Approved DRBG. Each version of the DRBG
has its own DRBG Entropy CSP.
1, E
CTR_DRBG Internal State
#C821
The internal state for the FIPS Approved DRBG. 1, E
CTR_DRBG Internal State
#680
The internal state for the FIPS Approved DRBG. 1, E
HASH_DRBG Internal State The internal state for the FIPS Approved SHA DRBG. 1, E
Manufacturer FIPS Data
Encryption Key (MFDEK)
AES 256-bit key used to encrypt manufacturer keys stored in persistent
storage of the HSM.
3
HSM Master Partition
Master Encryption Key
(MMEK)
AES 256-bit key used to encrypt Master Partition CSPs and authentication
data stored in persistent storage of the HSM.
1
Partition Master
Encryption Key (PMEK)
AES 256-bit key used to encrypt partition CSPs and authentication data
stored in persistent storage of the HSM.
1
HSM FIPS Master
Authentication Key
(FMAK)
A unique 2048-bit RSA private key. Used to identify the HSM when in the
FIPS operating mode.
3
Partition Authentication
Key (PAK)
A unique 2048-bit RSA private key used to identify the HSM Partition. 1, 6
SecureAuth Shared Secret
(SAZ)
Shared secret Z for SP 800-56B KAS2, using PAK and POAC 1, 4, E, S
Authentication CSPs
PswdEncKeyRSAPrivate
Key
2048-bit RSA Private Key, used in SP 800-56B KAS to generate PswdEncKey. 1, 4, E
PswdEncKey (PEK) AES-256 key, for encrypting User passwords during user creation and
authentication.
1, 4
Login Passwords String of 7 to 32 alphanumeric characters. 1, 4
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Name Description and Usage Set
Key Loading CSPs
Partition’s KeyLoading
Private Key
ECC 521-bit or RSA 2048-bit key used in SP 800-56A C (2,0, ECC DH) or SP
800-56B KAS2 to agree on Z during key loading.
1, 4, E
Partition’s KeyLoading
Shared Secret (KLSZ)
Shared secret Z for SP 800-56A C (2,0, ECC DH) or SP 800-56B KAS2. 1, 4, E
Partition’s Key Loading Key
(KLK)
A 256-bit AES key derived from Z, used to decrypt the imported CSPs. 1, 4
Backup and Restore Keys
Manufacturer FIPS Key
Backup Key (MFKBK)
AES 256-bit key used to derive KBK. 3
HSM Owner KBK (OKBK) AES 256-bit key used to derive KBK. 2
Partition Owner KBK
(POKBK)
AES 256-bit key used to derive KBK. 1, 5
HSM Key Backup Key (KBK) Key used to encrypt/decrypt the Backup Session Key. 1, 4
Backup Session Key Key used to backup and restore partition data. 1, 4, E
Cloning Keys
Partition’s Cloning Private
Key
ECC 521-bit or RSA 2048-bit ephemeral Private Key used in SP 800-56A C
(2,0, ECC DH) or SP 800 -56B KAS2 -bilateral -confirmation key agreement to
generate shared secret Z. At HSM Partition level, used to establish secure
channel for cloning process (to export Partition’s Masking Key).
1, 4, E
Partition’s Cloning Shared
Secret (CSSZ)
Shared secret Z for SP 800-56A C (2,0, ECC DH) or SP 800-56B KAS2 -bilateral
-confirmation scheme.
1, 4, E
Partition’s Cloning Session
Key
AES 256 key for encryption and decryption of Partition’s Masking Key. 1, 4, E
Partition’s Cloning Session
MAC Key
HMAC SHA256 key used for key confirmation during SP 800-56A key
agreement.
1, 4, E
Partition’s Masking Key AES-256 key, for key wrapping. Used to import/export CSPs and masked
objects.
1, 4
General Purpose User CSPs
Asymmetric Private Keys RSA/DSA/ECDSA/ECDH general purpose keys. 1, 4, D
Asymmetric Private
Session Keys
RSA/DSA/ECDSA/ECDH general purpose session keys. 1, 4, D, S
Symmetric Keys Triple-DES or AES general purpose keys. 1, 4, D
Symmetric Session Keys Triple-DES or AES general purpose session keys. 1, 4, D, S
HMAC Keys HMAC general purpose keys (minimum key size of 160 bits). 1, 4, D
HMAC Session Keys HMAC session general purpose keys (minimum key size of 160 bits). 1, 4, D, S
TLS Session ECDH Key Used for key agreement as part of TLS-1.0/1.1/1.2 handshake protocol. 1, 4, D
TLS Session Symmetric Key
Set
AES 128, 192, 256 or Triple-DES keys used for encrypting TLS sessions. 1, 4, D, S
TLS Session HMAC key HMAC key used in SSL session (minimum key size of 160 bits). 1, 4, D, S
E2E Session Keys
E2E TLS Session Symmetric
Key Set
AES 128 Key used for encrypting/decrypting E2E session data. 1, 4, D, S
E2E TLS Session HMAC keys HMAC keys used in E2E session. 1, 4, D, S
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8.2 Definition of Public Keys
The module contains the following public keys:
Table 13 – Public Keys
Name Description and Usage Sets
HSM Keys
Manufacturer Firmware
Integrity Check Keys
RSA 2048-bit public keys used to check the integrity of the SW images
booted. The SW image is signed by the manufacturer using a RSA private key.
Manufacturer Firmware
Update Validation Key
RSA 2048-bit public key used to authenticate new SW images uploaded into
the module. The SW image is signed by the manufacturer using an RSA
private key and the signature is verified before upgrading to the new image
using the public key.
Manufacturer Debug
Firmware Update
Validation Key
RSA 2048-bit public key used to authenticate debug enabled new SW images
loaded into the module. The SW image is signed by the manufacturer using a
RSA private key and the signature is verified before upgrading to the new
image using this public key. On successful upgrade HSM is zeroized before
booting into debug image.
Manufacturer License
Validation Key
RSA 2048-bit public key used to authenticate the manufacturer role. 3
Manufacturer
Authentication Root Cert.
(MARC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate, used to issue FMAC certificates. 3
HSM FIPS Master
Authentication Certificate
(FMAC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate of FMAK. Used to identify the HSM FIPS
operating mode.
3
SecureBootAuth Public
Key
RSA 2048-bit public key used to verify authenticity of the host system. 2
Administrative Keys
HSM/Adapter Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(AOTAC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate used as trust anchor of MCO. 2
HSM/Adapter Owner
Authentication Certificate
(AOAC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate of FMAK. Used to identify the HSM owner. 2
Partition Authentication
Certificate (PAC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate of PAK. Used to identify the Partition. 1, 6
Partition Owner Trust
Anchor Certificate
(POTAC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate used as trust anchor of PCO. 1, 5
Partition Owner
Authentication Certificate
(POAC)
RSA 2048-bit public key certificate of PAK. Used to identify the Partition
owner.
1, 5
NITROXIII CNN35XX-NFBE HSM Family Version 2.06.17 Security Policy
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Name Description and Usage Sets
Key Backup/Cloning Keys
Partition Cloning Initiator
Public Key
ECC 521-bit ephemeral public key used in SP 800-56A C (2,0, ECC DH) key
agreement or RSA 2048-bit ephemeral public key used in SP 800-56B KAS2 -
bilateral -confirmation key agreement to generate shared secret Z.
1, 4, E
Partition Cloning
Responder Public Key
ECC 521-bit ephemeral public key used in SP 800-56A C (2, 0, ECC DH) key
agreement or RSA 2048-bit ephemeral public key used in SP 800-56B KAS2 -
bilateral -confirmation key agreement to generate shared secret Z.
1, 4, E
Partition Cloning ECC
Domain Parameter Set
Set EE per SP 800-56A Table 2. 1, 4, E
Authentication Keys
Partition
PswdEncKeyPublicKey
RSA 2048-bit public key generated by the partition to be used in SP 800-56B
key agreement to generate PswdEncKey.
1, 4, E
Host
PswdEncKeyPublicKey
RSA 2048-bit public key loaded by the host to be used SP 800-56B key
agreement to generate PswdEncKey.
1, 4, E
Two-Factor Authentication
Public Key or MofN
Authentication Key
RSA 2048-bit public key used to verify signature on encrypted passwords
during user creation and login and/or to verify signatures on MofN
authentication tokens.
1, 4
General Purpose Keys
User Public Keys RSA/DSA/ECDSA/ECDH public keys. 1, 4
User Public Session Keys RSA/DSA/ECDSA/ECDH public session keys. 1, 4
8.3 Definition of Session Keys
The cryptographic module supports the generation/import/export of user keys which are bound to a
session and are termed as session keys. Following points apply to the session keys:
• Session keys are stored in RAM and are lost across reboots.
• Session key access is restricted to an application in which it is created. PCU can share the session
keys with other users, so that other sessions can use it.
• Every session in an application will have access to the keys created by every other session in the
same application.
• When a session is closed, the session keys created by that session get destroyed. If the key is
shared, then it will be deleted only after closing all the sessions sharing this key.
9 Operational Environment
The module implements a limited operational environment. FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment
requirements do not apply to the module in this validation.
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10 Security Rules
This section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement the
security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level-3 module.
1. The cryptographic module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to any
cryptographic services.
3. The cryptographic module shall perform the following power up, continuous and conditional self-
tests:
A. Power-Up Self Tests (KAT)
a. Firmware Integrity Tests (RSA 2048-bit SHA-256 signature verification and a 32-bit CRC).
b. Nitrox Library
- AES 128-bit CBC Encrypt & Decrypt (#C839)
- AES 128-bit GCM Encrypt & Decrypt (#C839)
- AES 128-bit CCM Encrypt & Decrypt (#C839)
- AES 128-bit CMAC Sign and Verify (#C839)
- SP 800-108 128-bit CMAC KDF in Counter (#C839)
- SP 800-108 HMAC SHA256 KDF in Counter (#C839)
- TLS KDF (#C840)
- Triple-DES CBC Encrypt & Decrypt (Triple DES #1131)
- RSASP 2048-bit (#C839)
- ECC CDH P256 and P384 (#C829)
- ECDSA P256 Verify using SHA-1, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 (#C829, and SHS #1780)
- SP 800-90A SHA512 HASH_DRBG (#C830)
- RSA 2048-bit Encrypt and Decrypt (#C839 and #A1955)
c. OpenSSL Library
- AES 128-bit CBC Encrypt & Decrypt (#C819)
- SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG (#C821)
- SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG (DRBG #680)
- DSA 2048-bit SHA-256 Sig Gen and Sig Ver (#C823)
- ECDSA PKV, Sig Gen and Sig Ver using P256 with SHA-1, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 (#C825
and SHS #C820)
- RSA 2048-bit Sig Gen, Sig Ver (#C824, #A1953 and #A1954)
- RSA 2048-bit Encrypt and Decrypt (#A1953 and #A1954)
- SP 800-108 HMAC SHA256 KDF (#C826 and #C822)
d. Others
- SP 800-56A KAS using P521 and HMAC SHA512 (#A1952)
- SP 800-38F AES Key Wrap and Unwrap (Cert. #1263, LiquidSecurity Keywrap)
- SP 800-38F Triple-DES Key Wrap and Unwrap (Cert. #1263, LiquidSecurity Keywrap, and
TDES CBC #C1169)
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B. Conditional Self-Tests
- ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test (#C829 and #C825)
- RSA Pairwise Consistency Test (#C824, #A1954, and #A1955)
- DSA Pairwise Consistency Test (#C823)
- DRBG, SP800-90A health tests (#680, #C821, and #C830)
- HW RNG Continuous Number Test
- Firmware load test (RSA Signature Verification) – RSA 2048-SHA512
4. Critical Functions Tests: The module runs the following Critical Functions Tests which are required
to ensure the correct functioning of the device.
a. Power On Memory Test
b. EEPROM Test
c. NOR Flash Test
d. Nitrox Chips Tests
5. The operator shall be capable of commanding the module to perform the power up self-test by
cycling power or resetting the module.
6. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output shall be inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
11. The module does not support bypass capabilities.
12. The module does not support manual key entry.
13. The module has no CSP feedback to operators.
14. The module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
15. The module does not output intermediate key values.
16. The module shall be configured for FIPS operation by following the first-time initialization
procedure described in User Manual and C-API Specification (CNN35XX-NFBE-SDK-UserGuide).
11 Physical Security Policy
11.1 Physical Security Mechanisms
The module’s cryptographic boundary is defined to be the outer perimeter of the hard epoxy enclosure
containing the hardware and firmware components. The module is opaque and completely conceals the
internal components of the cryptographic module. The epoxy enclosure of the module prevents physical
access to any of the internal components without having to destroy the module. There are no operator
required actions.
Note: The module’s hardness testing was only performed at ambient temperature (23°C); no assurance is
provided for Level 3 hardness conformance at any other temperature.
11.2 Tamper Evidence
The module is coated in hard epoxy, such that any physical breach attempt leaves behind evidence of
tamper. This is shown in the figure below.
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Figure 2 – Cryptographic Module Showing Tamper Evidence
Top: Minor tamper to the epoxy only
Bottom: Major tamper, damaging circuitry
While the module is designed to prevent successful tampering (any physical breach to module circuitry is
likely to destroy the module, as per FIPS 140-2 Level 3 Physical Security requirements), the module should
still be checked periodically for attempts. Guidelines are provided in the table below.
Table 14 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Epoxy Coating 12 Months Examine surface of module for
scratched or damaged epoxy,
especially if circuitry shows.
If the module is found to be meaningfully damaged or tampered with (e.g., circuitry is showing, or other
significant damage has occurred), it should be removed from usage and destroyed.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
No mitigation of other attacks is implemented by the module.
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13 References
1. NIST Key Wrap Specification, SP 800-38F, December 2012.
2. NIST Special Publication 800-38D November 2007.
3. NIST Special Publication 800-56A, March 2007.
4. NIST Special Publication 800-56B, August 2009.
5. NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part-1, May 2006.
6. FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013.
7. FIPS PUB 140-2, FIPS Publication 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.
8. NIST Special Publication 800-90A, January 2012
9. Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
10. NIST Special Publication 800-131Ar2, March 2019.
11. FIPS PUB 186-2 Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Jan 2000.
12. NIST Special Publication 800-133 Revision 1, July 2019
13. NIST Special Publication 800-108, October 2009
14. NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1, December 2011
14 Definitions and Acronyms
MCO – Master Crypto Officer
PCO – Partition Crypto Officer
PCU – Partition Crypto User
HSM – Hardware Security Module
KBK – Key Backup Key
KLK – Key Loading Key
KAT – Known Answer Test
KAS – Key Agreement Scheme
SR-IOV – Single Root I/O Virtualization
2FA – 2 Factor Authentication