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16.04 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module
version 2.0
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 2.6
Last update: 2023-09-05
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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Table of Contents
1. Cryptographic Module Specification.......................................................................................................5
1.1. Module Overview...................................................................................................................................5
1.2. Modes of Operation ..............................................................................................................................8
2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................... 10
3. Roles, Services and Authentication...................................................................................................... 11
3.1. Roles ...................................................................................................................................................... 11
3.2. Services ................................................................................................................................................. 11
3.3. Algorithms............................................................................................................................................ 14
3.3.1. Ubuntu 16.04 LTS 64-bit Running on Intel® Xeon® E5 Processor .................................. 14
3.3.2. Allowed Algorithms ................................................................................................................... 19
3.3.3. Non-Approved Algorithms ....................................................................................................... 19
3.4. Operator Authentication................................................................................................................... 20
4. Physical Security ........................................................................................................................................ 21
5. Operational Environment........................................................................................................................ 22
5.1. Applicability.......................................................................................................................................... 22
5.2. Policy...................................................................................................................................................... 22
6. Cryptographic Key Management........................................................................................................... 23
6.1. Random Number Generation............................................................................................................ 25
6.2. Key Generation.................................................................................................................................... 25
6.3. Key Agreement / Key Transport / Key Derivation........................................................................ 26
6.4. Key Entry / Output.............................................................................................................................. 26
6.5. Key / CSP Storage................................................................................................................................ 26
6.6. Key / CSP Zeroization......................................................................................................................... 27
7. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)............................. 28
8. Self-Tests...................................................................................................................................................... 29
8.1. Power-Up Tests ................................................................................................................................... 29
8.1.1. Integrity Tests............................................................................................................................. 29
8.1.2. Cryptographic Algorithm Tests............................................................................................... 29
8.2. On-Demand Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................... 30
8.3. Conditional Tests ................................................................................................................................ 30
9. Guidance ....................................................................................................................................................... 32
9.1. Crypto Officer Guidance.................................................................................................................... 32
9.1.1. Operating Environment Configurations................................................................................ 32
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9.1.2. Module Installation.................................................................................................................... 33
9.2. User Guidance...................................................................................................................................... 33
9.2.1. TLS................................................................................................................................................. 33
9.2.2. AES GCM IV.................................................................................................................................. 33
9.2.3. AES XTS ........................................................................................................................................ 34
9.2.4. Triple-DES .................................................................................................................................... 34
9.2.5. Random Number Generator .................................................................................................... 34
9.2.6. API Functions .............................................................................................................................. 34
9.2.7. Use of ciphers.............................................................................................................................. 34
9.2.8. Environment Variables.............................................................................................................. 35
9.2.9. Handling FIPS Related Errors................................................................................................... 35
10. Mitigation of Other Attacks ................................................................................................................... 37
10.1. Blinding Against RSA Timing Attacks ......................................................................................... 37
10.2. Weak Triple-DES Keys Detection................................................................................................. 37
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Copyrights and Trademarks
Ubuntu and Canonical are registered trademarks of Canonical Ltd.
Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds.
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1. Cryptographic Module Specification
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for version 2.0 of the Ubuntu 16.04
OpenSSL Cryptographic Module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate
and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-2 (Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2) for a Security Level 1 software module.
The following sections describe the cryptographic module and how it conforms to the FIPS 140-2
specification in each of the required areas.
1.1. Module Overview
The Ubuntu 16.04 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a set of
software libraries implementing the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol v1.0, v1.1 and v1.2 and
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol v1.0 and v1.2, as well as general purpose
cryptographic algorithms. The module provides cryptographic services to applications running in the
user space of the underlying Ubuntu operating system through a C language Application Program
Interface (API). The module utilizes processor instructions to optimize and increase performance.
The module can act as a TLS server or client, and interacts with other entities via TLS/DTLS network
protocols.
For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the module is a software-only, multi-chip standalone
cryptographic module validated at overall security level 1. The table below shows the security level
claimed for each of the eleven sections that comprise the FIPS 140-2 standard.
FIPS 140-2 Section Security
Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Overall Level 1
Table 1 - Security Levels
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The cryptographic logical boundary consists of all shared libraries and the integrity check files used
for Integrity Tests. The following table enumerates the files that comprise the module.
Component Description
libssl.so.1.0.0 Shared library for TLS/DTLS network protocols.
libcrypto.so.1. 0.0 Shared library for cryptographic implementations.
.libssl.so.1.0.0.hmac Integrity check signature for libssl shared library.
.libcrypto.so.1.0.0.hmac Integrity check signature for libcrypto shared library.
Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Components
The software block diagram below shows the module, its interfaces with the operational
environment and the delimitation of its logical boundary, comprised of all the components within
the BLUE box.
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Figure 1 - Software Block Diagram
The module is aimed to run on a general purpose computer (GPC); the physical boundary of the
module is the tested platforms. Figure 2 shows the major components of a GPC.
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Figure 2 - Cryptographic Module Physical Boundary
The module has been tested on the test platforms shown below.
Test Platform Processor Test Configuration
Supermicro SYS-5018R-WR Intel® Xeon® E5 Ubuntu 16.04 LTS 64-bit with/without
AES-NI (PAA)
Table 3 - Tested Platforms
Note: Per FIPS 140-2 IG G.5, the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) makes no
statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys
when this module is ported and executed in an operational environment not listed on the validation
certificate.
1.2. Modes of Operation
The module supports two modes of operation:
• FIPS mode (the Approved mode of operation): only approved or allowed security functions
with sufficient security strength can be used.
• non-FIPS mode (the non-Approved mode of operation): only non-approved security
functions can be used.
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The module enters FIPS mode after power-up tests succeed. Once the module is operational, the
mode of operation is implicitly assumed depending on the security function invoked and the
security strength of the cryptographic keys.
Critical security parameters used or stored in FIPS mode are not used in non-FIPS mode, and vice
versa.
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2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the FIPS
140-2 validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware
platform on which it runs.
The logical interfaces are the API through which applications request services, and the TLS protocol
internal state and messages sent and received from the TCP/IP protocol. The following table
summarizes the four logical interfaces.
FIPS Interface Physical Port Logical Interface
Data Input Ethernet ports API input parameters, kernel I/O –
network or files on file system, TLS
protocol input messages.
Data Output Ethernet ports API output parameters, kernel I/O –
network or files on file system, TLS
protocol output messages.
Control Input Keyboard, Serial port, Ethernet
port, Network
API function calls, API input parameters
for control, TLS protocol internal state.
Status Output Serial port, Ethernet port,
Network
API return codes, TLS protocol internal
state.
Power Input PC Power Supply Port N/A
Table 4 - Ports and Interfaces
Note: The module is an implementation of the TLS protocol as defined in the RFC standards. The
TLS protocol provides confidentiality and data integrity between communicating applications. When
an application calls into the module’s API, the data passed will be securely passed to the peer.
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3. Roles, Services and Authentication
3.1. Roles
The module supports the following roles:
• User role: performs cryptographic services (in both FIPS mode and non-FIPS mode), TLS
network protocol, key zeroization, get status, and on-demand self-test.
• Crypto Officer role: performs module installation and initialization, and certificates
management.
The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing the module
services.
3.2. Services
The module provides services to users that assume one of the available roles. All services are shown
in Table 5 and Table 6, and described in detail in the user documentation (i.e., man pages)
referenced in section 9.1.
The table below shows the services available in FIPS mode. For each service, the associated
cryptographic algorithms, the roles to perform the service, and the cryptographic keys or Critical
Security Parameters and their access rights are listed. The following convention is used to specify
access rights to a CSP:
• Create: the calling application can create a new CSP.
• Read: the calling application can read the CSP.
• Update: the calling application can write a new value to the CSP.
• Zeroize: the calling application can zeroize the CSP.
• n/a: the calling application does not access any CSP or key during its operation.
If the services involve the use of the cryptographic algorithms, the corresponding Cryptographic
Algorithm Validation System (CAVS) certificate numbers of the cryptographic algorithms can be
found in Table 7 and Table 8 of this security policy. Notice that the algorithms mentioned in the
Network Protocol Services correspond to the same implementation of the algorithms described in
the Cryptographic Library Services.
Service Algorithms Role Access Keys/CSP
Cryptographic Library Services
Symmetric Encryption
and Decryption
AES User Read AES key
Triple-DES User Read Triple-DES key
RSA key generation RSA, DRBG User Create RSA public-private key
RSA digital signature
generation and
verification
RSA User Read RSA public-private key
DSA key generation DSA, DRBG User Create DSA public-private key
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Service Algorithms Role Access Keys/CSP
DSA domain
parameter generation
DSA User n/a n/a
DSA digital signature
generation and
verification
DSA User Read DSA public-private key
ECDSA key generation ECDSA, DRBG User Create ECDSA public-private key
ECDSA public key
validation
ECDSA User Read ECDSA public key
ECDSA signature
generation and
verification
ECDSA User Read ECDSA public and private
keys
Random number
generation
DRBG User Read,
Update
Entropy input string,
Internal state
Message digest SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512 (SHS)
User n/a n/a
Message
authentication code
(MAC)
HMAC User Read HMAC key
GMAC User Read AES key
CMAC with AES User Read AES key
CMAC with Triple-DES User Read Triple-DES key
Key wrapping AES User Read AES key
Key encapsulation RSA User Read RSA public and private
keys
Network Protocols Services
Transport Layer
Security (TLS) network
protocol v1.0, v1.1 and
v1.2 (RSA Key
Exchange)
See Appendix A for the
complete list of
supported cipher
suites.
TLS KDF
User Read AES or Triple-DES key, RSA,
DSA or ECDSA public-
private key, HMAC Key,
Pre-master secret, Master
secret
TLS extensions n/a User Read RSA, DSA or ECDSA public
and private keys
Certificates
management
n/a Crypto
Officer
Read RSA, DSA or ECDSA public
and private keys
Other FIPS-Related Services
Show status n/a User n/a None
Zeroization n/a User Zeroize All CSPs
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Service Algorithms Role Access Keys/CSP
Self-Tests AES, Triple-DES, SHS,
HMAC, DSA, RSA,
ECDSA, DRBG, TLS KDF
User n/a None
Module installation n/a Crypto
Officer
n/a None
Module initialization n/a Crypto
Officer
n/a None
Table 5 - Services in FIPS mode of operation
The table below lists the services only available in non-FIPS mode of operation.
Service Algorithms / Key sizes Role Access Keys
Cryptographic Library Services
Symmetric decryption 2-key Triple-DES listed in
Table 9
User Read 2-key Triple-DES key
Authenticated Encryption
cipher for encryption and
decryption
AES and SHA from multi-
buffer or stitch
implementation listed in
Table 9
User Read AES key, HMAC key
Asymmetric key generation
using keys disallowed by
[SP800-131A]
RSA, DSA listed in Table 9 User Create RSA, DSA or ECDSA
public and private
keys
Digital signature generation
using message digest or keys
disallowed by [SP800-131A].
RSA, DSA listed in Table 9 User Read RSA or DSA public and
private keys
Key establishment using keys
disallowed by [SP800-131A].
RSA listed in Table 9 User Read RSA public and
private keys
Shared Secret Computation Diffie-Hellman, EC Diffie-
Hellman
User Read,
Create
Diffie-Hellman and EC
Diffie-Hellman public
and private keys
Transport Layer Security
(TLS) network protocol v1.0,
v1.1 and v1.2 (DH/ECDH Key
Exchange)
User Read AES or Triple-DES key,
RSA, DSA or ECDSA
public-private key,
HMAC Key, Pre-
master secret, Master
secret, Diffie-Hellman
domain parameters or
EC Diffie-Hellman
public and private
keys
Message digest MD5 User n/a none
Message authentication code
(MAC) using keys disallowed
by [SP800-131A]
HMAC listed in Table 9,
CMAC with 2-key Triple-
DES
User Read HMAC key, 2-key
Triple-DES key
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Service Algorithms / Key sizes Role Access Keys
X9.31 RSA Key Generation ANSI X9.31 RSA Key
Generation
User Create RSA public and
private keys
Table 6 – Services in non-FIPS mode of operation
3.3. Algorithms
The algorithms implemented in the module are tested and validated by CAVP for the following
operating environment:
• Ubuntu 16.04 LTS 64-bit running on Intel® Xeon® E5 processor
The Ubuntu 16.04 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module is compiled to use the support from the
processor and assembly code for AES, SHA and GHASH operations to enhance the performance of
the module. Different implementations can be invoked by using a processor capability mask in the
operational environment. Please note that only one AES, SHA and/or GHASH implementation can be
executed in runtime.
Notice that for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, no parts of this protocol, other than the
key derivation function (KDF), have been tested by the CAVP.
3.3.1. Ubuntu 16.04 LTS 64-bit Running on Intel® Xeon® E5 Processor
The module supports the use of AES-NI, SSSE3 and strict assembler for AES implementation, the use
of AVX2, SSSE3 and strict assembler for SHA implementation (SSSE3 is only used for SHA-1, SHA-224
and SHA-256), and the use of CLMUL instruction set and strict assembler for GHASH that is used for
GCM mode. The module uses the most efficient implementation based on the processor’s capability;
this behavior can be also controlled through the use of the capability mask environment variable
OPENSSL_ia32cap.
The following table shows the CAVS certificates and their associated information of the
cryptographic implementation in FIPS mode.
CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode / Method Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli (in bits)
Use
AES from AESNI
#C1260
AES from strict
assembler
#C1265
AES using SSSE3
#C1267
AES [FIPS197],
[SP800-38A]
ECB, CBC, OFB,
CFB1, CFB8,
CFB128, CTR
128, 192, 256 Data Encryption
and Decryption
[SP800-38B] CMAC 128, 192, 256 MAC Generation
and Verification
[SP800-38C] CCM 128, 192, 256 Data Encryption
and Decryption
[SP800-38E] XTS 128, 256 Data Encryption
and Decryption
for Data Storage
AES from AESNI
and PCLMULQDQ
for GHASH
#C1258
AES [SP800-38D] GCM 128, 192, 256 Data Encryption
and Decryption
[SP800-38D] GMAC 128, 192, 256 Message
Authentication
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CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode / Method Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli (in bits)
Use
AES from AESNI
and assembler for
GHASH
#C1259
AES from strict
assembler and
PCLMULQDQ for
GHASH
#C1261
AES and GHASH
from strict
assembler
#C1264
AES using SSSE3
and PCLMULQDQ
for GHASH
#C1266
AES using SSSE3
and strict
assembler for
GHASH
#C1270
Code
AES from strict
assembler
#C1265
AES [SP800-38F] KW 128, 192, 256 Key Wrapping
and Unwrapping
AVX2 for SHA
#C1305
SHA from strict
assembler
#C1304
SSSE3 for SHA
#C12691
DRBG [SP800-90A] Hash_DRBG:
SHA 1, SHA
224, SHA 256,
SHA 384, SHA
512
without PR
n/a Deterministic
Random Bit
Generation
AVX2 for SHA
#C1305
SHA from strict
assembler
#C1304
SSSE3 for SHA
#C1269
HMAC_DRBG:
SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
without PR
1
SSSE3 for SHA implementation only covers SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 algorithms.
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CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode / Method Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli (in bits)
Use
AES from strict
assembler
#C1265
CTR_DRBG:
AES-128,
AES-192,
AES-256
with/without
DF, without PR
AVX2 for SHA
#C1305
SHA from strict
assembler
#C1304
SSSE3 for SHA
#C1269
DSA [FIPS186-4] L=2048, N=224;
L=2048, N=256;
L=3072, N=256
Key Pair
Generation
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
Domain
Parameter
Generation
Digital Signature
Generation
SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
L=1024, N=160,
L=2048, N=224;
L=2048, N=256;
L=3072, N=256
Domain
Parameter
Verification
Digital Signature
Verification
AVX2 for SHA
#C1305
SHA from strict
assembler
#C1304
SSSE3 for SHA
#C1269
ECDSA [FIPS186-4] P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
K-233, K-283,
K-409, K-571,
B-233, B-283,
B-409, B-571
Key Pair
Generation
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
Digital Signature
Generation
SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
P-192, P-224,
P-256, P-384,
P-521,
K-163, K-233,
K-283, K-409,
K-571,
B-163, B-233,
B-283, B-409,
B-571
Public Key
Verification
Digital Signature
Verification
AVX2 for SHA
#C1305
SHA from strict
assembler
#C1304
SSSE3 for SHA
#C1269
HMAC [FIPS198-1] SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
112 or greater Message
Authentication
Code
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CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode / Method Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli (in bits)
Use
AVX2 for SHA
#C1305
SHA from strict
assembler
#C1304
SSSE3 for SHA
#C1269
TLS v1.0,
v1.1 and
v1.2 KDF
[SP800-135] n/a n/a Key Derivation
AVX2 for SHA
#C1305
SHA from strict
assembler
#C1304
SSSE3 for SHA
#C1269
RSA [FIPS186-4] X9.31 2048, 3072 Key Pair
Generation
X9.31 with
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
2048, 3072 Digital Signature
Generation
X9.31 with
SHA-1,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
1024, 2048,
3072
Digital Signature
Verification
PKCS#1v1.5,
PSS with
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
2048, 3072 Digital Signature
Generation
PKCS#1v1.5,
PSS with
SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
1024, 2048,
3072
Digital Signature
Verification
AVX2 for SHA
#C1305
SHA from strict
assembler
#C1304
SSSE3 for SHA
#C1269
RSA [FIPS186-2] PKCS#1v1.5,
PSS with
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
4096 Digital Signature
Generation
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CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode / Method Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli (in bits)
Use
AVX2 for SHA
#C1305
SHA from strict
assembler
#C1304
SHS [FIPS180-4] SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
n/a Message Digest
SSSE3 for SHA
#C1269
SHS [FIPS180-4] SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256
n/a Message Digest
TDES from C
#C1257
Two-key
Triple-DES
[SP800-67],
[SP800-38A]
ECB, CBC,
CFB1, CFB8,
CFB64, OFB
192 Data Decryption
Three-key
Triple-DES
Data Encryption
and Decryption
[SP800-67],
[SP800-38B]
CMAC 192 MAC Generation
and Verification
AES-GCM:
#C1258, #C1259,
#C1261, #C1264,
#C1266, #C1270
(any GCM
implementation)
AES-CCM:
#C1260, #C1265,
#C1267 (any CCM
implementation)
AES-KW: #C1265
(any KW
implementation)
KTS2
(AES) [SP800-38C]
[SP800-38D]
[SP800-38F]
AES-GCM
AES-CCM
AES-KW
AES keys: 128,
192, 256 bits
Key wrapping
and unwrapping
AES-CBC and
HMAC:
AES-CBC:
#C1260, #C1265,
#C1267
HMAC: #C1269,
#C1304, #C1305
[FIPS180-4]
[FIPS 198-1]
[SP800-38A]
AES-
CBC+HMAC-
SHA1/224/256/
384/512
AES keys: 128,
256 bits
HMAC keys:
112 bits and
larger
2
Approved per IG D.9
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CAVP Cert Algorithm Standard Mode / Method Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli (in bits)
Use
Triple-DES and
HMAC:
Triple-DES:
#C1257
HMAC: #C1269,
#C1304, #C1305
[FIPS180-4]
[FIPS 198-1]
[SP800-67]
Triple-DES-
CBC+HMAC-
SHA1/224/256/
384/512
Triple-DES
keys: 192 bits
HMAC keys:
112 bits and
larger
Table 7 – Cryptographic Algorithms for Intel® Xeon® E5 Processor
3.3.2. Allowed Algorithms
The following table describes the non-Approved but allowed algorithms in FIPS mode:
Algorithm Caveat Use
RSA Key Encapsulation with key sizes
between 2048 and 15360 bits or more
Provides between 112
and 256 bits of
encryption strength
Key Establishment; allowed
per [FIPS140-2_IG] D.9 and
compliant to IG A.14
RSA Key Generation and Digital
Signature Verification with key size
greater than 3072 bits
n/a Digital Signature; allowed per
[SP800-131A] and compliant to
IG A.14
RSA Digital Signature Generation with
key size greater than 4096 bits
n/a Digital Signature; allowed per
[SP800-131A] and compliant to
IG A.14
MD53
n/a Pseudo-random function (PRF)
in TLS v1.0 and v1.1; allowed
per [SP800-52]
NDRNG n/a The module obtains the
entropy data from NDRNG to
seed the DRBG.
Table 8 – FIPS-Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms
3.3.3. Non-Approved Algorithms
The table below shows the non-Approved cryptographic algorithms implemented in the module
that are only available in non-FIPS mode.
Algorithm Use
3
According [SP800-52], MD5 is allowed to be used in TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1 as the hash function used in the
PRF, as defined in [RFC2246] and [RFC4346].
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Algorithm Use
RSA with key size smaller than 2048 bits Key Pair Generation, Digital Signature
Generation, Key Encapsulation
DSA with key size smaller than 2048 bits or
greater than 3072 bits
Key Pair Generation, Domain Parameters
Generation, Digital Signature Generation
DSA with key size smaller than 1024 bits or
greater than 3072 bits
Digital Signature Verification
ECDSA with curves P-192, K-163 or B-163 and
non-NIST curves.
Key Pair Generation, Domain Parameters
Generation, Digital Signature Generation
RSA, DSA and ECDSA signatures in TLS with
DH/ECDH key exchange method
Signature generation and verification used solely
in TLS with DH/ECDH key exchange method
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement; Shared Secret Computation
EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement; Shared Secret Computation
SHA-1 Message Digest in Digital Signature Generation
MD5 Message Digest
HMAC with key size less than 112 bits Message Authentication Code
AES in XTS mode with 192-bit key Data Encryption and Decryption
2-key Triple-DES Data Encryption
Multiblock ciphers using AES in CBC mode with
128 and 256 bit keys and HMAC SHA-1 and
SHA-256 (available only in Intel processors
with AES-NI capability).
Authenticated Data Encryption and Decryption
SSLeay Deterministic Random Number
Generator (PRNG)
Random Number Generation
Table 9 - Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
3.4. Operator Authentication
The module does not implement user authentication. The role of the user is implicitly assumed
based on the service requested.
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4. Physical Security
The module is comprised of software only and therefore this security policy does not make any
claims on physical security.
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5. Operational Environment
5.1. Applicability
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifications.
The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the
hardware specified in Table 3 - Tested Platforms.
5.2. Policy
The operating system is restricted to a single operator; concurrent operators are explicitly excluded.
The application that requests cryptographic services is the single user of the module.
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6. Cryptographic Key Management
The following table summarizes the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) that are used by the
cryptographic services implemented in the module:
Name CSP size /
mode
Generation Entry and Output Zeroization
AES keys 128, 192, 256
bits (ECB,
CBC, OFB,
CFB1, CFB8,
CFB128, CTR,
CCM, GCM,
GMAC, KW)
128, 256 bits
(XTS)
Not Applicable. The key
material is entered via
API parameter
The key is passed
into the module via
API input
parameters in
plaintext.
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup()
Triple-DES keys 192 bits (ECB,
CBC, CFB1,
CFB8, CFB64,
OFB, CMAC)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup()
HMAC keys 112 bits or
greater (SHA-
1, SHA2-
224/256/384/
512, SHA3-
224/256/384/
512)
HMAC_CTX_cleanup()
RSA private
keys (key
generation)
2048 bits or
greater
The public-private keys
are generated using
FIPS 186-4 Key
Generation method,
and the random value
used in the key
generation is
generated using
SP800-90A DRBG.
The key is passed
out of the module
via API output
parameters in
plaintext.
RSA_free()
RSA private
keys (signature
verification)
1024 bits of
greater
The key is passed
into the module via
API input
parameters in
plaintext.
RSA private
keys (signature
generation)
2048 bits or
greater
The key is passed
into the module via
API input
parameters in
plaintext.
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RSA private
keys (key
encapsulation)
2048 bits or
greater
The key is passed
into the module via
API input
parameters in
plaintext.
DSA private
keys (key
generation)
2048 or 3072
bits
The key is passed
out of the module
via API output
parameters in
plaintext.
DSA_free()
DSA private
keys (signature
generation/veri
fication)
The key is passed
into the module via
API input
parameters in
plaintext.
ECDSA private
keys (key
generation)
P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
The key is passed
out of the module
via API output
parameters in
plaintext.
EC_KEY_free()
ECDSA private
keys (signature
generation/veri
fication)
The key is passed
into the module via
API input
parameters in
plaintext.
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
According to
RFC2246
RFC4346
RFC5246
Generated by TLS client
as output from DRBG
when using RSA key
exchange.
Entry: if received
by module as TLS
server, wrapped
with server’s public
RSA key; otherwise
no entry.
Output: if
generated by
module as TLS
client, wrapped
with server’s public
RSA key;
otherwise, no
output.
SSL_free(), SSL_clear()
TLS Master
secret
According to
RFC2246
RFC4346
RFC5246
Derived from pre-
master secret.
None SSL_free(), SSL_clear()
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Entropy input
string
According to
SP800-90A
Obtained from the
NDRNG.
None FIPS_drbg_free()
DRBG internal
state (V, C)
According to
SP800-90A
(Hash)
During DRBG
initialization.
None FIPS_drbg_free()
DRBG internal
state (V, C, Key)
According to
SP800-90A
(HMAC, CTR)
Table 10 - Life cycle of Critical Security Parameters (CSP)
The following sections describe how CSPs, in particular cryptographic keys, are managed during its
life cycle.
6.1. Random Number Generation
The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90A] for the
creation of HMAC keys, key components of asymmetric keys, symmetric keys, server and client
random numbers for the TLS protocol, and internal CSPs. In addition, the module provides a Random
Number Generation service to calling applications.
The module supports all three DRBG mechanisms: Hash, HMAC and CTR. The DRBG is initialized
during module initialization; the module loads by default the DRBG using the CTR_DRBG mechanism
with AES-256 and derivation function without prediction resistance. A different DRBG mechanism
can be chosen through an API function call.
The module uses a Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator (NDRNG), getrandom() system
call, as the entropy source for seeding the DRBG. The NDRNG is provided by the operational
environment (i.e., Linux RNG), which is within the module’s physical boundary but outside of the
module’s logical boundary. The NDRNG provides at least 128 bits of entropy to the DRBG during
initialization (seed) and reseeding (reseed).
The Ubuntu Linux kernel performs conditional self-tests on the output of NDRNG to ensure that
consecutive random numbers do not repeat. The module performs the DRBG health tests as defined
in section 11.3 of [SP800-90A].
Note: According to Linux man pages [LMAN] random(4) and getrandom(2), the getrandom() system
call is prohibited until the Linux kernel has initialized its NDRNG during the kernel boot-up. This
blocking behavior is only observed during boot time. When defining systemd units using OpenSSL,
the Crypto Officer should ensure that these systemd units do not block the general systemd
operation as otherwise the entire boot process may be blocked based on the getrandom blocking
behavior.
CAVEAT: The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available
entropy.
6.2. Key Generation
The Module provides an SP800-90A-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) for
creation of key components of asymmetric keys, and random number generation.
The getrandom() system call from the Operational Environment is used as a source of random
numbers for DRBG seeds and entropy input string.
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The Key Generation methods implemented in the module for Approved services in FIPS mode is
compliant with [SP800-133].
For generating RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys the module implements asymmetric key generation
services compliant with [FIPS186-4]. A seed (i.e. the random value) used in asymmetric key
generation is directly obtained from the [SP800-90A] DRBG.
6.3. Key Agreement / Key Transport / Key Derivation
The module provides key wrapping using the AES with KW mode, and AES in CCM or GCM modes.
The module provides RSA key encapsulation using private key encryption and public key decryption
primitives. RSA key encapsulation is also used as part of the TLS protocol key exchange.
The module also provides key wrapping in the context of using the TLS protocol to send and receive
key material in the payload. The key wrapping methods are provided by the TLS record layer either
using an approved authenticated encryption mode (i.e. AES GCM), or a combination method
including symmetric encryption (i.e. AES or Triple-DES in CBC mode) and an approved authentication
method (i.e. HMAC with SHA); the method depends on the TLS cipher suite negotiated during the
TLS handshake. All methods provided by the TLS cipher suites included in Appendix A are approved
key transport methods according to IG D.9.
According to Table 2: Comparable strengths in [SP 800-57], the key sizes of AES, Triple-DES and RSA
provides the following security strength in FIPS mode of operation:
• RSA key wrapping4
provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
• AES KW, GCM and CCM key wrapping provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption
strength.
• Combination of AES encryption in CBC mode and HMAC (as part of the TLS protocol)
provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength).
• Combination of Triple-DES encryption in CBC mode and HMAC (as part of the TLS protocol)
provides 112 bits of encryption strength).
The module supports key derivation for the TLS protocol. The module implements the pseudo-
random functions (PRF) for TLSv1.0/1.1 and TLSv1.2.
Note: As the module supports RSA key sizes of 15360 bits or more, the encryption strength 256 bits
is claimed for RSA key encapsulations .
6.4. Key Entry / Output
The module does not support manual key entry or intermediate key generation key output. The
keys are provided to the module via API input parameters in plaintext form and output via API
output parameters in plaintext form. This is allowed by [FIPS140-2_IG] IG 7.7, according to the “CM
Software to/from App Software via GPC INT Path” entry on the Key Establishment Table.
6.5. Key / CSP Storage
Symmetric keys, HMAC keys, public and private keys are provided to the module by the calling
application via API input parameters, and are destroyed by the module when invoking the
appropriate API function calls.
4
“Key wrapping” is used instead of “key encapsulation” to show how the algorithm will appear in the certificate per IG G.13.
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The module does not perform persistent storage of keys. The keys and CSPs are stored as plaintext
in the RAM. The only exception is the HMAC key used for the Integrity Test, which is stored in the
module and relies on the operating system for protection.
6.6. Key / CSP Zeroization
The memory occupied by keys is allocated by regular memory allocation operating system calls. The
application is responsible for calling the appropriate zeroization functions provided in the module's
API listed in Table 10. Calling the SSL_free() and SSL_clear() will zeroize the keys and CSPs stored
in the TLS protocol internal state and also invoke the module’s API listed in Table 10 automatically
to zeroize the keys and CSPs. The zeroization functions overwrite the memory occupied by keys
with “zeros” and deallocate the memory with the regular memory deallocation operating system
call.
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7. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
(EMI/EMC)
The test platforms listed in Table 3 - Tested Platforms have been tested and found to conform to
the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, FCC PART 15, Subpart B,
Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (i.e., Business use). These devices are designed to
provide reasonable protection against harmful interference when the devices are operated in a
commercial environment. They shall be installed and used in accordance with the instruction
manual.
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8. Self-Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires that the module perform power-up tests to ensure the integrity of the module
and the correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, some functions
require continuous testing of the cryptographic functionality, such as the asymmetric key
generation. If any self-test fails, the module returns an error code and enters the error state. No
data output or cryptographic operations are allowed in error state.
See section 9.2.9 for descriptions of possible self-test errors and recovery procedures.
8.1. Power-Up Tests
The module performs power-up tests when the module is loaded into memory, without operator
intervention. Power-up tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic
algorithms work as expected.
While the module is executing the power-up tests, services are not available, and input and output
are inhibited. The module is not available for use by the calling application until the power-up tests
are completed successfully.
If any power-up test fails, the module returns the error code listed in Table 14 and displays the
specific error message associated with the returned error code, and then enters error state. The
subsequent calls to the module will also fail - thus no further cryptographic operations are possible.
If the power-up tests complete successfully, the module will return 1 in the return code and will
accept cryptographic operation service requests.
8.1.1. Integrity Tests
The integrity of the module is verified by comparing an HMAC-SHA-256 value calculated at run time
with the HMAC value stored in the .hmac file that was computed at build time for each software
component of the module. If the HMAC values do not match, the test fails and the module enters
the error state.
8.1.2. Cryptographic Algorithm Tests
The module performs self-tests on all FIPS-Approved cryptographic algorithms supported in the
Approved mode of operation, using the Known Answer Tests5
(KAT) and Pair-wise Consistency Tests
(PCT) shown in the following table:
Algorithm Power-Up Tests
AES • KAT AES ECB mode with 128-bit key, encryption
• KAT AES ECB mode with 128-bit key, decryption
Triple DES • KAT three-key Triple-DES ECB mode, encryption
• KAT three-key Triple-DES ECB mode, decryption
5
The module also implements Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman "Z" computation KAT. However these algorithms are non-approved.
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Algorithm Power-Up Tests
CMAC • KAT AES CMAC with 128, 192 and 256 bit keys, MAC generation
• KAT three-key Triple-DES, MAC generation
SHS • KAT SHA-1 and SHA-512
Note: SHA-224 and SHA-384 are not required per IG 9.4. SHA-256 is covered in the
Integrity Test which is allowed per IG 9.3)
HMAC Note: HMAC is covered in the Integrity Test which is allowed per IG 9.3 and 9.4
DSA • PCT DSA with L=2048, N=256 and SHA-256
ECDSA • PCT ECDSA with P-256 and SHA-256
• PCT ECDSA with K-233 and SHA-256
RSA • KAT RSA with 2048-bit key, PKCS#1 v1.5 scheme and SHA-256, signature
generation
• KAT RSA with 2048-bit key, PKCS#1 v1.5 scheme and SHA-256, signature
verification
DRBG • KAT CTR_DRBG with AES with 128, 192 and 256 bit keys, without PR, with DF
• KAT CTR_DRBG with AES with 128, 192 and 256 bit keys, without PR, without DF
• KAT Hash_DRBG without PR
• KAT HMAC_DRBG without PR
TLS KDF • KAT KDF for TLSv1.0 and v1.1
• KAT KDF for TLSv1.2
Table 11- Self-Tests
For the KAT, the module calculates the result and compares it with the known value. If the answer
does not match the known answer, the KAT is failed and the module enters the Error state.
For the PCT, if the signature generation or verification fails, the module enters the Error state. As
described in section 3.3, only one AES or SHA implementation is available at run-time.
8.2. On-Demand Self-Tests
On-Demand self-tests can be invoked by powering-off and reloading the module which cause the
module to run the power-up tests again. During the execution of the on-demand self-tests, services
are not available and no data output or input is possible.
8.3. Conditional Tests
The module performs conditional tests on the cryptographic algorithms, using the Pair-wise
Consistency Tests (PCT) and Continuous Random Number Generator Test (CRNGT), shown in the
following table:
Algorithm Conditional Test
DSA key generation • PCT using SHA-256, signature generation and verification.
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Algorithm Conditional Test
ECDSA key generation • PCT using SHA-256, signature generation and verification.
RSA key generation • PCT using SHA-256, signature generation and verification.
• PCT for encryption and decryption.
DRBG • CRNGT is not required per IG 9.8
Table 12 - Conditional Tests
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9. Guidance
9.1. Crypto Officer Guidance
The binaries of the module are contained in the Ubuntu packages for delivery. The Crypto Officer
shall follow this Security Policy to configure the operational environment and install the module to
be operated as a FIPS 140-2 validated module.
The following Ubuntu packages contain the FIPS validated module:
Processor
Architecture
Ubuntu packages
x86_64 libssl1.0.0_1.0.2g-1ubuntu4.fips.4.15.2_amd64.deb
libssl1.0.0-hmac_1.0.2g-1ubuntu4.fips.4.15.2_amd64.deb
Table 13 – Ubuntu packages
The libssl-doc_1.0.2g-1ubuntu4.fips.4.15.2_all.deb Ubuntu package contains the man pages for
the module.
Note: The prelink is not installed on Ubuntu, by default. For proper operation of the in-module
integrity verification, the prelink should be disabled.
9.1.1. Operating Environment Configurations
To configure the operating environment to support FIPS, the following shall be performed with the
root privilege:
(1) Install the linux-fips Ubuntu package.
(2) Install the fips-initramfs Ubuntu package.
(3) Create the file /etc/default/grub.d/99-fips.cfg with the content:
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT=”$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT fips=1”.
(4) If /boot resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter bootdev=UUID=<UUID of
partition> must also be appended in the aforementioned grub file. Please see the following
Note for more details.
(5) Execute update-grub to update the boot loader.
(6) Execute reboot to reboot the system with the new settings.
Now, the operating environment is configured to support FIPS operation. The Crypto Officer should
check the existence of the file, /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled, and that it contains “1”. If the file
does not exist or does not contain “1”, the operating environment is not configured to support FIPS
and the module will not operate as a FIPS validated module properly.
Note: If /boot resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter bootdev=UUID=<UUID of
partition> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command df /boot. For
example:
$ df /boot
Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on
/dev/sdb2 241965 127948 101525 56% /boot
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The UUID of the /boot partition can be found by using the command grep /boot /etc/fstab. For
example:
$ grep /boot /etc/fstab
# /boot was on /dev/sdb2 during installation
UUID=cec0abe7-14a6-4e72-83ba-b912468bbb38 /boot ext2 defaults 0 2
Then, the UUID shall be added in the /etc/default/grub.d/99-fips.cfg. For example:
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT fips=1 bootdev=UUID=Insert
boot UUID"
Optionally, the following packages may be also installed:
• The openssl Ubuntu package provides the command line interface.
• The libssl1.0-dev Ubuntu package provides include files that are necessary to build
applications using the module.
9.1.2. Module Installation
Once the operating environment configuration is finished, the Crypto Officer can install the Ubuntu
packages containing the module listed in Table 13 using normal packaging tool such as Advanced
Package Tool (APT). For example:
$ sudo apt-get install libssl1.0 libssl1.0-hmac libssl-doc
All the Ubuntu packages are associated with hashes for integrity check. The integrity of the Ubuntu
package is automatically verified by the packing tool during the installation of the module. The
Crypto Officer shall not install the package if the integrity fails.
To download the FIPS validated version of the module, please email "sales@canonical.com" or
contact a Canonical representative, https://www.ubuntu.com/contact-us.
9.2. User Guidance
In order to run in FIPS mode, the module must be operated using the FIPS Approved services, with
their corresponding FIPS Approved and FIPS allowed cryptographic algorithms provided in this
Security Policy (see section 3.2 Services). In addition, key sizes must comply with [SP800-131A].
9.2.1. TLS
The module implements TLS versions 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2. The TLS protocol implementation provides
both server and client sides. In order to operate in FIPS mode, digital certificates used for server and
client authentication shall comply with the restrictions of key size and message digest algorithms
imposed by [SP800-131A].
9.2.2. AES GCM IV
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or
decryption shall be redistributed.
The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with the [RFC5288] and shall only be used for the TLS
protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-2_IG] IG A.5, provision 1 (“TLS protocol IV
generation”). Moreover, the module is compliant with Section 3.3.1 of SP800-52 Rev2.
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9.2.3. AES XTS
The AES algorithm in XTS mode can be only used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage
devices, as specified in [SP800-38E]. The length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES shall
not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks that is 16MB of data. To meet the requirement in [FIPS140-2_IG] A.9, the
module implements a check to ensure that the two AES keys used in XTS-AES algorithm are not
identical.
Note: AES-XTS shall be used with 128 and 256-bit keys only. AES-XTS with 192-bit keys is not an
Approved service.
9.2.4. Triple-DES
[SP800-67] imposes a restriction on the number of 64-bit block encryptions performed under the
same three-key Triple-DES key.
When the three-key Triple-DES is generated as part of a recognized IETF protocol, the module is
limited to 220
64-bit data block encryptions. This scenario occurs in the following protocols:
• Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.1 and 1.2, conformant with [RFC5246]
• Secure Shell (SSH) protocol, conformant with [RFC4253]
• Internet Key Exchange (IKE) versions 1 and 2, conformant with [RFC7296]
In any other scenario, the module cannot perform more than 216
64-bit data block encryptions.
The user is responsible for ensuring the module’s compliance with this requirement.
9.2.5. Random Number Generator
The RAND_cleanup() API function must not be used. This call will clean up the internal DRBG state.
This call also replaces the DRBG instance with the non-FIPS Approved SSLeay Deterministic Random
Number Generator when using the RAND_* API calls.
9.2.6. API Functions
Passing “0” to the FIPS_mode_set() API function is prohibited.
Executing the CRYPTO_set_mem_functions() API function is prohibited as it performs like a null
operation in the module.
9.2.7. Use of ciphers
The following ciphers (usually obtained by calling the EVP_get_cipherbyname() function) use
multiblock implementations of the AES, HMAC and SHA algorithms that are not validated by the
CAVS; therefore, they cannot be used in FIPS mode of operation.
Cipher Name NID
AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1 NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1
AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1 NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1
AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256 NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256
AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256 NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256
Table 14 - Ciphers not allowed in FIPS mode of operation
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9.2.8. Environment Variables
OPENSSL_ENFORCE_MODULUS_BITS
As described in [SP800-131A], less than 2048 bits of DSA and RSA key sizes are disallowed by NIST.
Setting the environment variable OPENSSL_ENFORCE_MODULUS_BITS can restrict the module to only
generate the acceptable key sizes of RSA and DSA. If the environment variable is set, the module
can generate 2048 or 3072 bits of RSA key, and at least 2048 bits of DSA key.
OPENSSL_FIPS_NON_APPROVED_MD5_ALLOW
As described in [SP800-52], MD5 is allowed to be used in TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1 as the hash
function used in the PRF, as defined in [RFC2246] and [RFC4346]. By default, the module disables
the MD5 algorithm. Setting the environment variable OPENSSL_FIPS_NON_APPROVED_MD5_ALLOW can
enable the MD5 algorithm in the module. The MD5 algorithm shall not be used for other purposes
other than the PRF in TLS version 1.0 and 1.1.
9.2.9. Handling FIPS Related Errors
When the module fails any self-test, the module will return an error code to indicate the error and
enters error state that any further cryptographic operation is inhibited. Errors occurred during the
self-tests and conditional tests transition the module into an error state. Here is the list of error
codes when the module fails any self-test, in error state or not supported in FIPS mode:
Error Events Error Codes/Messages
When the Integrity Test fails at the
power-up
FIPS_R_FINGERPRINT_DOES_NOT_MATCH (111)
“fingerprint does not match”
When the AES, TDES, SHA-1, SHA-512 KAT
fails at the power-up
FIPS_R_SELFTEST_FAILED (134)
“selftest failed”
When the KAT for RSA fails, or the PCT for
ECDSA or DSA fails at the power-up
FIPS_R_TEST_FAILURE (137)
“test failure”
When the KAT of DRBG fails at the power-
up
FIPS_R_NOPR_TEST1_FAILURE (145)
“nopr test1 failure”
When the KAT of Diffie-Hellman or EC
Diffie-Hellman fails at the power-up6
0
When the new generated RSA, DSA or
ECDSA key pair fails the PCT
FIPS_R_PAIRWISE_TEST_FAILED (127)
“pairwise test failed”
When the CRNGT fails the output of the
NDRNG
FIPS_R_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STUCK (142)
“entropy source stuck”
When the SSLv2.0 or SSL v3.0 are called SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE (297)
“only tls allowed in fips mode”
When the module is in error state and any
cryptographic operation is called
FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED (115)
“fips selftest failed”
6
The module implements Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman "Z" computation KAT. However these algorithms are non-approved.
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FIPS_R_SELFTEST_FAILED (134)
“selftest failed”
When the AES key and tweak keys for
XTS-AES are the same
FIPS_R_AES_XTS_WEAK_KEY (201)
“identical keys are weak”
Table 15 – Error Events, Error Codes and Error Messages
These errors are reported through the regular ERR interface of the modules and can be queried by
functions such as ERR_get_error(). See the OpenSSL man pages for the function description.
When the module is in the error state and the application calls a crypto function of the module that
cannot return an error in normal circumstances (void return functions), the error message: “OpenSSL
internal error, assertion failed: FATAL FIPS SELFTEST FAILURE” is printed to stderr and the
application is terminated with the abort() call. The only way to recover from this error is to restart
the application. If the failure persists, the module must be reinstalled.
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10.Mitigation of Other Attacks
10.1. Blinding Against RSA Timing Attacks
RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a configuration where attackers can measure the time of RSA
decryption or signature operations, blinding must be used to protect the RSA operation from that
attack.
The module provides the API functions RSA_blinding_on() and RSA_blinding_off() to turn the
blinding on and off for RSA. When the blinding is on, the module generates a random value to form
a blinding factor in the RSA key before the RSA key is used in the RSA cryptographic operations.
Please note that the DRBG must be seeded prior to calling RSA_blinding_on() to prevent the RSA
Timing Attack.
10.2. Weak Triple-DES Keys Detection
The module implements the DES_set_key_checked() for checking the weak Triple-DES key and the
correctness of the parity bits when the Triple-DES key is going to be used in Triple-DES operations.
The checking of the weak Triple-DES key is implemented in the API function DES_is_weak_key() and
the checking of the parity bits is implemented in the API function DES_check_key_parity(). If the
Triple-DES key does not pass the check, the module will return -1 to indicate the parity check error
and -2 if the Triple-DES key matches to any value listed below:
static const DES_cblock weak_keys[NUM_WEAK_KEY] = {
/* weak keys */
{0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01},
{0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE},
{0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E},
{0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1},
/* semi-weak keys */
{0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE},
{0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01},
{0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1},
{0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E},
{0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1},
{0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01},
{0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE},
{0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E},
{0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E},
{0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01},
{0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE},
{0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1}
};
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Appendix A. TLS Cipher Suites
The module supports the following cipher suites for the TLS protocol. Each cipher suite defines the
key exchange algorithm, the bulk encryption algorithm (including the symmetric key size) and the
MAC algorithm.
Cipher Suite Reference
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA RFC2246
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA RFC3268
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RFC3268
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 RFC5246
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 RFC5246
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 RFC5288
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 RFC5288
RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM RFC5116
RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM RFC5116
RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 RFC6655
RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 RFC6655
TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA RFC4279
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA RFC4279
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RFC4279
RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA RFC4279
RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA RFC4279
RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RFC4279
PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 RFC5487
PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 RFC5487
RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 RFC5487
RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 RFC5487
PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 RFC5487
PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 RFC5487
RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 RFC5487
RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 RFC5487
PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM RFC6655
PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM RFC6655
PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 RFC6655
PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 RFC6655
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Appendix B. Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
API Application Program Interface
APT Advanced Package Tool
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CAVS Cryptographic Algorithm Validation System
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFB Cipher Feedback
CLMUL Carry-less Multiplication
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CPACF CP Assist for Cryptographic Function
CRNGT Continuous Random Number Generator Test
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Derivation Function
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EMI/EMC Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
GCM Galois Counter Mode
GPC General Purpose Computer
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IG Implementation Guidance
KAT Known Answer Test
KDF Key Derivation Function
KW Key Wrap
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LPAR Logical Partitions
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OFB Output Feedback
PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PAI Processor Algorithm Implementation
PCT Pair-wise Consistency Test
PR Prediction Resistance
PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SSSE3 Supplemental Streaming SIMD Extensions 3
TLS Transport Layer Security
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext Stealing
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Appendix C. References
FIPS140-2 FIPS PUB 140-2 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules
May 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf
FIPS140-2_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
October 23, 2019
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
March 2012
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
LMAN Linux Man Pages
http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1
February 2003
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
RFC2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1.0
January 1999
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt
RFC3268 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security
(TLS)
June 2002
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3268.txt
RFC4279 Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
December 2005
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4279.txt
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RFC4346 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1
April 2006
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt
RFC4492 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security
(TLS)
May 2006
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4492.txt
RFC5116 An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption
January 2008
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5116.txt
RFC5246 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
August 2008
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246.txt
RFC5288 AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS
August 2008
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5288.txt
RFC5487 Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter
Mode
March 2009
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5487.txt
RFC5489 ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
March 2009
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5489.txt
RFC6655 AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
July 2012
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6655.txt
RFC7251 AES-CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for TLS
June 2014
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7251.txt
SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
May 2005
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality
May 2004
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
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SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
November 2007
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices
January 2010
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf
SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
December 2012
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
SP800-52 NIST Special Publication 800-52 Revision 1 - Guidelines for the Selection,
Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations
April 2014
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-52r1.pdf
SP800-56B NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 1 - Recommendation for Pair-Wise
Key-Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography
September 2014
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Br1.pdf
SP800-57 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 4 - Recommendation for Key
Management Part 1: General
January 2016
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4.pdf
SP800-67 NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1 - Recommendation for the Triple
Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
January 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf
SP800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random
Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators
June 2015
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
SP800-131A NIST Special Publication 800-131A – Revision 2 - Transitioning the Use of
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
March 2019
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
SP800-135 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing
Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions
December 2011
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-135r1.pdf