Cisco Firepower 2100 Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Version 0.6
July 20, 2018
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................. 3
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 3
1.3 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 3
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 4
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 4
2 CISCO FIREPOWER 2100 SERIES OVERVIEW............................................................ 5
2.1 CISCO FX-OS WITH FX-OS CRYPTO LIBRARY................................................................... 5
2.2 CISCO ASA WITH ASA CRYPTO LIBRARY.......................................................................... 6
2.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE CHARACTERISTICS ................................................................... 6
2.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY............................................................................................. 6
2.5 MODULE INTERFACES......................................................................................................... 6
2.6 FRONT AND REAR PANELS.................................................................................................. 7
2110 and 2120 Front............................................................................................................................................................ 7
2110 and 2120 Rear............................................................................................................................................................. 8
2130 and 2140 Front............................................................................................................................................................ 8
2130 and 2140 Rear............................................................................................................................................................. 9
2.7 ROLES AND SERVICES......................................................................................................... 9
2.8 USER SERVICES ................................................................................................................ 10
2.9 CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES.............................................................................................. 10
2.10 NON-FIPS MODE SERVICES .............................................................................................. 11
2.11 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES ......................................................................................... 12
2.12 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY/CSP MANAGEMENT...................................................................... 12
2.13 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................ 17
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ................................................................................................................................ 17
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode ................................................................................................. 18
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 18
2.14 PHYSICAL SECURITY......................................................................................................... 20
Opacity Shield Security..................................................................................................................................................... 20
Opacity Shield installation................................................................................................................................................. 20
Tamper Evidence Label (TEL) placement......................................................................................................................... 20
3 SECURE OPERATION ...................................................................................................... 23
3.1 CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE - SYSTEM INITIALIZATION .................................................. 23
3.2 CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE - SYSTEM CONFIGURATION................................................. 27
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is the non-proprietary Security Policy for the Cisco Firepower 2100 Cryptographic Module
running firmware 9.8. This security policy describes how this module containing two
cryptographic libraries meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2 and how to run
this module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation. This Security Policy may be freely distributed.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program
is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html.
1.2 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 2
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 2
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 2
Table 1 Module Validation Level
1.3 References
This document deals with the specification of the security rules listed in Table 1 above, under
which the Cisco Firepower 2100 Cryptographic Module will operate, including the rules derived
from the requirements of FIPS 140-2, FIPS 140-2 IG and additional rules imposed by Cisco
Systems, Inc. More information is available on the module from the following sources:
The Cisco Systems website contains information on the full line of Cisco Systems security.
Please refer to the following website:
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/index.html
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/security/firepower-2100-series/tsd-products-support-
series-home.html
For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco
Systems website at www.cisco.com.
The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html)
contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 4
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1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco Firepower 2100 Cryptographic Module identified running two
cryptographic libraries is referred to as Cisco Firepower 2100 Cryptographic Module, Cisco
Firepower 2100 CM, FX-OS Crypto Library, ASA Crypto Library, CM, Module or the System.
1.5 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the Cisco Firepower 2100 Cryptographic Module
identified above and explains the secure layout, configuration and operation of the module. This
introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the general features and functionality
of the module. Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of
operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation
Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 5
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2 Cisco Firepower 2100 Series Overview
The Cisco Firepower 2100 Series NGFW appliances can be deployed either as a Next-
Generation Firewall (NGFW) or as a Next-Generation IPS (NGIPS). They are perfect for the
Internet edge and all the way in to the data center. There are four identical externally looking,
new models: Firepower 2110 and 2120 models offer 1.9 and 3 Gbps of firewall throughput while
Firepower 2130 and 2140 models provide 5 and 8.5 Gbps respectively of firewall throughput.
When deployed as next-generation firewall (NGFW) appliances, it uses the Cisco Firepower
2100 Cryptographic Module
Cisco Firepower 2100 Series
 Firepower 2110
 Firepower 2120
 Firepower 2130
 Firepower 2140
Firepower 2100 Series
2.1 Cisco FX-OS with FX-OS Crypto Library
The Cisco Firepower eXtensible Operating System (FX-OS) running on the 2100 Series is a
next-generation network and content security solutions which provides a web interface that
makes it easy to configure platform settings and interfaces, provision devices, and monitor
system status. The FX-OS is part of the Cisco Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) Security
Solution and provides an agile, open, built for scalability, consistent control, and simplified
management. The FX-OS provides the following features:
 Modular chassis-based security system—provides high performance, flexible
input/output configurations, and scalability.
 Firepower Chassis Manager—graphical user interface provides streamlined, visual
representation of current chassis status and simplified configuration of chassis features.
 FX-OS CLI—provides command-based interface for configuring features, monitoring
chassis status, and accessing advanced troubleshooting features.
 FX-OS REST API—allows users to programmatically configure and manage their
chassis.
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2.2 Cisco ASA with ASA Crypto Library
The Cisco ASA delivers enterprise-class firewall for businesses, improving security at
the Internet edge, high performance and throughput for demanding enterprise data centers. It is
available in a blade form factor that can be integrated into the Cisco Firepower 2100 Series.
The ASA solution offers a combination of the industry's most deployed stateful firewall along
with a comprehensive range of next-generation network security services, intrusion prevention
system (IPS), content security, secure unified communications, SSHv2, SNMPv3,
HTTPS/TLSv1.2 and StrongSwan (IPSec/IKEv2).
2.3 Cryptographic Module Characteristics
The Cisco Firepower 2100 Cryptographic Module contains FX-OS Cryptographic Library
running on the Intel 64-bit Xeon and the ASA Cryptographic Library executing on the Cavium
Octeon processor, providing the cryptographic services required for their perspective hosts
within the module.
2.4 Cryptographic Boundary
The module is a hardware, multi-chip standalone crypto module. The cryptographic boundary is
defined as the 2100 series chassis unit encompassing the "top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and
"bottom" surfaces of the case representing the module’s physical perimeter. Diagram 1 below is
the block diagram showing two independent crypto libraries running on the same hardware
platform (the rectangle area).
Diagram 1 Block Diagram
2.5 Module Interfaces
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The module provided
Ca
vi
u
Xeon
Mgmt SSH Console
Port
SFP Ethernet Port
Switch
FX-OS
ASA
Octeon
CN73XX
Ca
vi
u
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no power to external devices and takes in its power through normal power input/cord. The
logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following table:
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface 2100 Physical Interfaces
Data Input MGMT Port
Console port
SFP/SFP+ Ethernet and/or RJ-45 Gigabit Ethernet Ports
Data Output MGMT Port
Console port
SFP/SFP+ Ethernet and/or RJ-45 Gigabit Ethernet Ports
Control Input MGMT Port
Console port
SFP/SFP+ Ethernet and/or RJ-45 Gigabit Ethernet Ports
Status Output MGMT Port
Console port
SFP/SFP+ Ethernet and/or RJ-45 Gigabit Ethernet Ports
LEDs
Table 2 Hardware/Physical Boundary Interfaces
Note: Each module has a Type A USB 2.0 port, but it is considered to be disabled once the
Crypto-Officer has applied the Opacity Shield.
2.6 Front and Rear Panels
2110 and 2120 Front
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2110 and 2120 Rear
2130 and 2140 Front
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2130 and 2140 Rear
2.7 Roles and Services
The module can be accessed in one of the following ways:
 SSHv2
 HTTPS/TLSv1.2
 IPSec/IKEv2
 SNMPv3
Authentication is identity-based. As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles that operators
may assume: a Crypto Officer role and User role. The module also supports RADIUS and
TACACS+ as another means of authentication, allowing the storage of usernames and passwords
on an external server as opposed to using the module’s internal database for storage. If not using
TACACS+, then the module automatically assigns the authenticated identity to the user role (and
the operator can escalate their privileges by issuing the “enable” command and providing the
enable password). When using the TACACS+, the CO can configure the module to behave in
the same was as when using a local user database, or the CO can configure the TACACS+ server
to respond with the identity’s privilege level (in addition to whether or not they should be
granted access) and the module will automatically place the operator into the highest role
supported by their privilege level.
The User and Crypto Officer passwords (used for console, SSH, HTTPS/TLS and SNMP) and all
shared secrets must each be at a minimum eight (8) characters long. There must be at least one
special character and at least one number character (enforced procedurally) along with six
additional characters taken from the 26 upper case, 26 lower case, 10 numbers and 32 special
characters. See the Secure Operation section for more information. If six (6)
special/alpha/number characters, one (1) special character and one (1) number are used without
repetition for an eight (8) digit value, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence
is one (1) in 187,595,543,116,800. This is calculated by performing 94 x 93 x 92 x 91 x 90 x 89
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 10
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x 32 x 10. In order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to
make over 3,126,592,385,280 guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities
of the module.
Additionally, when using RSA based authentication, the RSA key pair used for authentication
must have a modulus size of 2048 bits, thus providing 112 bits of strength. Thus an attacker
would have a 1 in 2112
chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the
one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a
successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of
approximately 8.65x1031
attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of
the module to support.
2.8 User Services
A User accesses the system through a console port, SSHv2, SNMPv3 or HTTPS/TLSv1.2 to one
of the data input interfaces listed in Table 2. The module prompts the User for username and
password. If the password is correct, the User is allowed entry to the module management
functionality. The other means of accessing the console is via telnet tunneled within an IPSec
session. This session is authenticated either using a shared secret or an RSA digital signature
authentication mechanism. The services available to the User role accessing the CSPs, the type
of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are
listed below:
Services Description Keys and CSPs Access
Status Functions View the module configuration, routing tables, active
sessions health, and view physical interface status.
Operator password (r, w, d)
Terminal Functions Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal, adjust
flow control).
Operator password (r, w, d)
Directory Services Display directory of files kept in flash memory. Operator password (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand. N/A
IPSec VPN Negotiation and encrypted data transport via IPSec VPN. Operator password, skeyid, skeyid_d,
SKEYSEED, IKE session encrypt key, IKE
session authentication key, ISAKMP preshared,
IKE authentication private Key, IKE
authentication public key, ECDSA private key,
ECDSA public key, IPSec encryption key, IPSec
authentication key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG
seed, DRBG V and DRBG key (r, w, d)
SSHv2 Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSHv2. Operator password, SSHv2 RSA private key,
SSHv2 RSA public key and SSHv2 session key,
DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V and
DRBG key (r, w, d)
HTTPS Functions
(TLSv1.2)
Negotiation and encrypted data transport via
HTTPS/TLSv1.2.
Operator password, DRBG entropy input, DRBG
Seed, DRBG V, DRBG Key, ECDSA private
key, ECDSA public key, TLS RSA private key,
TLS RSA public key, TLS pre-master secret,
TLS master secret, TLS encryption keys and TLS
integrity key (r, w, d)
Table 3 User Services
2.9 Crypto Officer Services
A Crypto Officer enters the system by accessing the console port with a terminal program or
SSHv2, SNMPv3 or HTTPS/TLSv1.2session to one of the data input interfaces listed in Table 2.
The Crypto Officer authenticates in the same manner as a User. A Crypto Officer may assign
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permission to access the Crypto Officer role to additional accounts, thereby creating additional
Crypto Officers.
The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration of the module. The services available
to the Crypto Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and
zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:
Services Description Keys and CSPs Access
Configure the Security Define network interfaces and settings, create command
aliases, set the protocols the appliance will support,
enable interfaces and network services, set system date
and time, and load authentication information.
ISAKMP preshared, Operator password, Enable password,
Enable secret, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session
authentication key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE
authentication public key, IPSec encryption key, IPSec
authentication key (r, w, d)
Firmware Installation Install the firmware during the System Initialization. Integrity test key
Configure External
Authentication Server
Configure Client/Server authentication. RADIUS secret, TACACS+ secret
Define Rules and Filters Create packet Filters that are applied to User data streams
on each interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules,
which define a set of packets to permit or deny based on
characteristics such as protocol ID, addresses, ports, TCP
connection establishment, or packet direction.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
View Status Functions View the appliance configuration, routing tables, active
sessions health, temperature, memory status, voltage,
packet statistics, review accounting logs, and view
physical interface status.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
HTTPS/TLS (TLSv1.2) Configure HTTPS/TLS parameters, provide entry and
output of CSPs.
DRBG entropy input, DRBG Seed, DRBG V, DRBG Key,
ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, TLS RSA private
key, TLS RSA public key, TLS pre-master secret, TLS master
secret, TLS encryption keys and TLS integrity key (r, w, d)
IPSec VPN Functions Configure IPSec VPN parameters, provide entry and
output of CSPs.
ISAKMP preshared, skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE
session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, IKE
authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key,
ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, DRBG entropy
input, DRBG Seed, DRBG V, DRBG Key, IPSec encryption
key, IPSec authentication key (r, w, d)
SSHv2 Functions Configure SSH v2 parameter, provide entry and output of
CSPs.
Diffie-Hellman private key, Diffie-Hellman public key, Diffie-
Hellman Shared Secret, EC Diffie-Hellman private key, EC
Diffie-Hellman public key, EC Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret,
SSHv2 Private Key, SSHv2 Public Key and SSHv2 session
key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V and DRBG
key (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand. N/A
User services The Crypto Officer has access to all User services. Operator password (r, w, d)
SNMPv3 Configure SNMPv3 MIB and monitor status. SNMPv3 Password, SNMPv3 session key (r, w, d)
Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys/CSPs by running the
zeroization methods classified in table 6, Zeroization
column.
All CSPs (d)
Table 4 Crypto Officer Services
2.10 Non-FIPS mode Services
The cryptographic module in addition to the above listed FIPS mode of operation can operate in
a non-FIPS mode of operation. This is not a recommended operational mode but because the
associated RFC’s for the following protocols allow for non-approved algorithms and non-
approved key sizes, a non-approved mode of operation exist. So those services listed above with
their FIPS approved algorithms in addition to the following services with their non-approved
algorithms and non-approved keys sizes are available to the User and the Crypto Officer. Prior
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 12
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to using any of the Non-Approved services in Section 2.10, the Crypto Officer must zeroize all
CSPs which places the module into the non-FIPS mode of operation.
Services 1
Non-Approved Algorithms
SSH
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
IPSec
Hashing: MD5
MACing: MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: RSA (key transport), Diffie-Hellman
TLS Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
Table 5 Non-approved algorithms in the Non-FIPS mode services
Neither the User nor the Crypto Officer are allowed to operate any of these services while in
FIPS mode of operation.
All services available can be found at
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/60/configuration/guide/fpmc-config-
guide-v60.pdf. This site lists all configuration guides.
2.11 Unauthenticated Services
The services for someone without an authorized role are to view the status output from the
module’s LED pins and to cycle power.
2.12 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The module administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as
passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-protection of the Crypto Officer
role login, and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of overwriting the
memory that stored the key or refreshing the volatile memory. Keys are both manually and
electronically distributed but entered electronically. Persistent keys with manual distribution are
used for pre-shared secret whereas protocols such as IKE, TLS and SSH are used for electronic
distribution.
All pre-shared keys are associated with the CO role that created the keys, and the CO role is
protected by a password. Therefore, the CO password is associated with all the pre-shared keys.
The Crypto Officer needs to be authenticated to store keys. Only an authenticated Crypto Officer
can view the keys. All Diffie-Hellman (DH)/ECDH keys agreed upon for individual tunnels are
directly associated with that specific tunnel only via the IKE protocol. RSA Public keys are
entered into the module using digital certificates which contain relevant data such as the name of
the public key's owner, which associates the key with the correct entity. All other keys are
associated with the user/role that entered them.
1
These approved services become non-approved when using any non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or
curve sizes. When using approved algorithms and key sizes these services are approved.
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The entropy comes from a process of extracting bits from dev/urandom and is fed into the DRBG.
The module provides approximately 274 bits entropy to instantiate the DRBG.
Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
DRBG entropy
input
SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
384-bits This is the entropy for SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG. It is used to construct
the DRBG seed.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG Seed SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
384-bits Input to the DRBG that determines
the internal state of the DRBG.
Generated using DRBG derivation
function that includes the entropy
input.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG V SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
128-bits The DRBG V is one of the critical
values of the internal state upon
which the security of this DRBG
mechanism depends. Generated first
during DRBG instantiation and then
subsequently updated using the
DRBG update function.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG Key SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
256-bits Internal critical value used as part of
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG.
Established per SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
DH 2048–4096 bits The shared secret used in Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
exchange.
Established per the Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
private key
DH 224–384 bits The private key used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. This key
is generated by calling SP800-90A
DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
public key
DH 2048-4096 bits The public key used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange. This key
is derived per the Diffie-Hellman
key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie-
Hellman Shared
Secret
ECDH P-256, P-384,
P-521 Curves
The shared secret used in Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
exchange.
Established per the Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
EC Diffie
Hellman private
key
ECDH P-256, P-384,
P-521 Curves
Used in establishing the session key
for an IPSec session. The private
key used in Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) exchange. This
key is generated by calling SP800-
90A DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie
Hellman public
key
ECDH P-256, P-384,
P-521 Curves
Used in establishing the session key
for an IPSec session. The public key
used in Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) exchange. This
key is established per the EC Diffie-
Hellman key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
skeyid Keying material 160 bits A shared secret known only to IKE
peers. It was established via key
derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF and it will be used
for deriving other keys in IKE
protocol implementation.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
skeyid_d Keying material 160 bits A shared secret known only to IKE
peers. It was derived via key
derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it will
be used for deriving IKE session
authentication key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
SKEYSEED Keying material 160 bits A shared secret known only to IKE
peers. It was derived via key
derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it will
be used for deriving IKE session
authentication key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IKE session
encrypt key
Triple-DES/AES Triple-DES 192
bits or AES
128/192/256 bits
The IKE session (IKE Phase I)
encrypt key. This key is derived via
key derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when IPSec
session is
terminated
IKE session
authentication
key
HMAC-SHA-
1/256/384/512
160-512 bits The IKE session (IKE Phase I)
authentication key. This key is
derived via key derivation function
defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when IPSec
session is
terminated
ISAKMP
preshared
Pre-shared secret Variable 8 plus
characters
The secret used to derive IKE
skeyid when using preshared secret
authentication. This CSP is entered
by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 15
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
IKE
authentication
private Key
RSA/ECDSA RSA (2048 bits)
or ECDSA
(Curves:
P-256, P-384,
P-521)
RSA/ECDSA private key used in
IKE authentication. This key is
generated by calling SP800-90A
DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA/ECDSA
keypair deletion
command
IKE
authentication
public key
RSA/ECDSA RSA (2048 bits)
or ECDSA
(Curves:
P-256, P-384,
P-521)
RSA/ECDSA public key used in
IKE authentication. The key is
derived in compliance with FIPS
186-4 RSA/ECDSA key pair
generation method in the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA/ECDSA
keypair deletion
command
IPSec encryption
key
Triple-
DES/AES/AES-
GCM
192 bits Triple-
DES or
128/192/256 bits
AES
The IPSec (IKE phase II) encryption
key. This key is derived via a key
derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2). IPSec
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when IPSec
session is
terminated
IPSec
authentication
key
HMAC-SHA-
1/256/384/512
160-512 bits The IPSec (IKE Phase II)
authentication key. This key is
derived via a key derivation
function defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2). IPSec
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when IPSec
session is
terminated
Operator
password
Password 8 plus characters The password of the User role. This
CSP is entered by the User.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
Enable password Password 8 plus characters The password of the CO role. This
CSP is entered by the Crypto
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
RADIUS secret Shared Secret 16 characters The RADIUS shared secret. Used
for RADIUS Client/Server
authentication. This CSP is entered
by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret
TACACS+
secret
Shared Secret 16 characters The TACACS+ shared secret. Used
for TACACS+ Client/Server
authentication. This CSP is entered
by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret
SSHv2 Private
Key
RSA 2048 bits
modulus
The RSA private key used in SSHv2
connection. This key is generated by
calling SP 800-90A DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
SSHv2 Public
Key
RSA 2048 bits
modulus
The RSA public key used in SSHv2
connection. The key is derived in
compliance with FIPS 186-4 RSA
key pair generation method in the
module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 16
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
SSHv2 Session
Key
Triple-DES/AES Triple-DES 192
bits or AES
128/192/256 bits
This is the SSHv2 session key. It is
used to encrypt all SSHv2 data
traffics traversing between the
SSHv2 Client and SSHv2 Server.
This key is derived via key
derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (SSH).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SSH
session is
terminated
ECDSA private
key
ECDSA Curves:
P-256, 384, 521
Signature generation used in
IPSec/IKE and TLS. This key is
generated by calling SP 800-90A
DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
ECDSA keypair
deletion
command
ECDSA public
key
ECDSA Curves:
P-256, 384, 521
Signature verification used in
IPSec/IKE and TLS. This key is
derived in compliance with FIPS
186-4 ECDSA key pair generation
method in the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
ECDSA keypair
deletion
command
Enable secret Shared Secret At least eight
characters
The obfuscated password of the CO
role. However, the algorithm used to
obfuscate this password is not FIPS
approved. Therefore, this password
is considered plaintext for FIPS
purposes. This password is zeroized
by overwriting it with a new
password. The Crypto Officer
configures the module to obfuscate
the Enable password. This CSP is
entered by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
TLS RSA
private key
RSA 2048 bits Identity certificates for the security
appliance itself and also used in
TLS session negotiations. This key
is generated by calling SP 800-90A
DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
TLS RSA public
key
RSA 2048 bits Identity certificates for the security
appliance itself and also used in
TLS session negotiations. This key
is derived in compliance with FIPS
186-4 RSA key pair generation
method in the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
TLS pre-master
secret
Shared Secret At least eight
characters
Shared secret created/derived using
asymmetric cryptography from
which new HTTPS/TLS session
keys can be created. This key
entered into the module in cipher
text form, encrypted by RSA public
key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 17
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
TLS master
secret
keying material 48 Bytes Keying material used to derive other
HTTPS/TLS keys. This key was
derived from TLS pre-master secret
during the TLS session
establishment
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
TLS encryption
keys
Triple-
DES/AES/AES-
GCM
Triple-DES 192
bits or AES
128/192/256 bits
Used in HTTPS/TLS connections to
protect the session traffic. This key
was derived in the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
TLS integrity
key
HMAC-SHA-
256/384
256-384 bits Used for TLS integrity to assure the
traffic integrity. This key was
derived in the module.
DRAM Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
SNMPv3
password
Shared Secret 256 bits The password is used to setup
SNMPv3 connection. This key is
entered by Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
SNMPv3
session key
AES 128 bits Encryption key used to protect
SNMP traffic. This key is derived
via key derivation function defined
in SP800-135 KDF (SNMPv3).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Integrity test key RSA-2048 Public
key
2048 bits A hard coded key used for firmware
power-up integrity verification.
Hard coded
for firmware
integrity
testing
Zeroized by
commands
‘install platform
platform-vers’
and ‘scope auto-
install’
Table 6 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
2.13 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Algorithm FX-OS Crypto
Library
ASA Crypto
Library
AES (128/192/256 CBC, GCM) 4905 4234
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key) 2559 2293
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512) 4012 3471
HMAC (SHA-1/256/384) 3272 2772
ECDSA (KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; P-256, P-384, P-521) N/A 1254
RSA (PKCS1_V1_5; KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; 2048 bits) 2678 2286
CTR_DRBG (AES-256) 1735 1317
CVL Component (IKEv2, TLSv1.2, SSHv2, SNMPv3) 1521 983
CKG (vendor affirmed) N/A N/A
Table 7 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Number
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 18
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Notes:
 There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not used by the module. Only the
algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in this table.
 The module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC
5288 for TLS and RFC 7296 for IPSec/IKEv2. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2 and
provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1, Section 3.3.1.
The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When
the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first
party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new
encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with
the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established. The module uses RFC 7296
compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM
encryption keys are derived. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values
for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger
a handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then
restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
 Each of TLS, SSH and IPSec protocols governs the generation of the respective Triple-DES
keys. Refer to RFC 5246 (TLS), RFC 4253 (SSH) and RFC 6071 (IPSec) for details relevant
to the generation of the individual Triple-DES encryption keys. The user is responsible for
ensuring the module limits the number of encryptions with the same key to 220
.
 No parts of the SSH, TLS, SNMP and IPSec protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested
by the CAVP and CMVP.
 In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic
Key Generation as per scenario 1 of section 5 in SP800-133. The resulting generated
symmetric key and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the unmodified output
from SP800-90A DRBG.
Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in
the FIPS approved mode:
 Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #983 and #1521, key agreement; key establishment
methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
 EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #983 and #1521, key agreement; key establishment
methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
 NDRNG (entropy source)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength)
Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used
in FIPS mode of operation:
 DES
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of
encryption strength; non-compliant)
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 19
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 HMAC MD5
 HMAC-SHA1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits
 MD5
 RC4
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of encryption
strength; non-compliant)
Self-tests performed
 FX-OS Crypto Library POSTs
o AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
o AES-GCM KAT
o DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A Section 11.3 are
performed)
o Firmware Integrity Test (using RSA 2048 with SHA-512)
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
o RSA KATs (separate KAT for signing; separate KAT for verification)
o SHA-1 KAT
o Triple-DES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
 FX-OS Crypto Library Conditional tests
o RSA pairwise consistency test
o Continuous Random Number Generator test for SP800-90A DRBG
o Continuous Random Number Generator test for NDRNG
 ASA Crypto Library POSTs
o AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
o AES-GCM KAT
o DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A Section 11.3 are
performed)
o ECDSA (Sign and Verify) Power on Self-Test
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
o RSA KATs (separate KAT for signing; separate KAT for verification)
o SHA-1 KAT
o SHA-256 KAT
o SHA–384 KAT
o SHA-512 KAT
o Triple-DES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
 ASA Crypto Library Conditional tests
o RSA pairwise consistency test
o ECDSA pairwise consistency test
o Conditional IPSec Bypass test
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 20
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o Continuous Random Number Generator test for SP800-90A DRBG
o Continuous Random Number Generator test for NDRNG
The security module performs all power-on self-tests automatically when the power is applied.
All power-on self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The
power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the
initialization of the LAN’s interfaces; this prevents the security module from passing any data
during a power-on self-test failure. In the unlikely event that a power-on self-test fails, an error
message is displayed on the console followed by a security appliance reboot.
2.14 Physical Security
The FIPS 140-2 level 2 physical security requirements for the modules are met by the use of
opacity shields covering the front panels of modules to provide the required opacity and tamper
evident seals to provide the required tamper evidence.
Opacity Shield Security
The following table shows the tamper labels and opacity shields that shall be installed on the
modules to operate in a FIPS approved mode of operation. The CO is responsible for using,
securing and having control at all times of any unused tamper evident labels. Actions to be taken
when any evidence of tampering should be addressed within site security program.
Models Number
Tamper
labels
Tamper Evident
Labels
Number
Opacity
Shields
Opacity Shields
FP 2110, 2120, 2130, 2140 7 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 1 69-100250-01
Opacity Shield installation
2100 Series
Inspection of the opacity shields should be incorporated into facility security procedures to
include how often to inspect and any recording of the inspection. It is recommended inspection
occur at least every 30 days but this is the facilities Security Manager decision.
Tamper Evidence Label (TEL) placement
The tamper evident seals (hereinafter referred to as tamper evident labels (TEL)) shall be
installed on the security devices containing the module prior to operating in FIPS mode. TELs
shall be applied as depicted in the figures below. Any unused TELs must be securely stored,
accounted for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location.
Should the CO have to remove, change or replace TELs (tamper-evidence labels) for any reason,
the CO must examine the location from which the TEL was removed and ensure that no residual
debris is still remaining on the chassis or card. If residual debris remains, the CO must remove
the debris using a damp cloth.
Any deviation of the TELs placement by unauthorized operators such as tearing,
misconfiguration, removal, change, replacement or any other change in the TELs from its
original configuration as depicted below shall mean the module is no longer in FIPS mode of
operation. Returning the system back to FIPS mode of operation requires the replacement of the
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 21
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TELs as depicted below and any additional requirement per the site security policy which are out
of scope of this Security Policy.
To seal the system, apply tamper-evidence labels as depicted in the figures below.
Front
Left side
Right side
Top
TEL 1
TEL 2
TEL 2
TEL 1
TEL 3
TEL 4
TEL 5
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 22
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Bottom
Rear
Appling Tamper Evidence Labels
Step 1: Turn off and unplug the system before cleaning the chassis and applying labels.
Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels.
Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose.
Step 3: Apply a label to cover the security appliance as shown in figures above and allow the
label to cure for a minimum of 12 hours.
The tamper evident labels are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive
backing. Any attempt to open the device will damage the tamper evident seals or the material of
the security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident labels have non-repeated serial
numbers, they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to
verify that the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident labels can also be
inspected for signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices.
The word “FIPS” or “OPEN” may appear if the label was peeled back.
Inspection of the tamper seals should be incorporated into facility security to include how often
to inspect and any recording of the inspection. It is recommended 30 days but this is the
facilities Security Manager decision.
TEL 6
TEL 7
TEL 3
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 23
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3 Secure Operation
The module meets all the Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped only to
authorized operators by the vendor, and the modules are shipped in Cisco boxes with Cisco
adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Follow the setting instructions provided
below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining
the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Initialization
The single firmware image (File name: cisco-asa-fp2k.9.8.2.28.SPA; firmware version: 9.8)
running in Cisco Firepower 2100 Cryptographic Module contains both FX-OS and ASA crypto
libraries. This is the only allowable image for this current FIPS-approved mode of operation.
The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following security steps for Tamper labels
and opacity shield:
Step 1: The Crypto Officer must install opacity shields as described in Section 2.14 of this
document.
Step 2: The Crypto Officer must apply tamper evidence labels as described in Section 2.14 of
this document.
Now the Crypto Officer must install and configure the FX-OS and ASA as below.
Step 1: firepower login:
At this prompt type username and press enter.
Then password
Step 2: remove your configuration and erase your application image). All configuration and
bootable images will be lost
firepower # connect local
firepower(local-mgmt)#
firepower(local-mgmt)# format everything
Do you still want to format? (yes/no):yes
100+0 records in …
A BOOT STATUS MESSAGES WILL BE DISPLAYED
A 10 second countdown timer will start. Press the esc before it gets to 0
Use BREAK or ESC to interrupt boot. (PRESS THE ESC KEY TO GET TO ROMMON)
Use SPACE to begin boot immediately.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 24
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Step 3: Boot interrupted. Type set, enter in appropriate information
rommon 1 > set
ADDRESS=1.1.1.1 <—mgmt port ip address
NETMASK=255.255.255.0
GATEWAY=1.1.1.2
SERVER=2.1.1.1
IMAGE=pathtoimage/cisco-asa-fp2k.9.8.2.28.SPA (image path)
CONFIG=
PS1="rommon! > "
Step 4: TYPE tftp –b to boot the FX-OS operating system
rommon 2 > tftp -b (THIS ONLY LOADS FXOS)
Enable boot bundle: tftp_reqsize = 268435456
ADDRESS: 1.1.1.1
NETMASK: 255.255.255.0
GATEWAY: 1.1.1.2
SERVER: 2.1.1.1
IMAGE: pathtoimage/cisco-asa-fp2k.9.8.2.28.SPA
MACADDR: 0c:75:bd:08:c9:80
VERBOSITY: Progress
RETRY: 40
PKTTIMEOUT: 7200
BLKSIZE: 1460
CHECKSUM: Yes
PORT: GbE/1
PHYMODE: Auto Detect
link up
Receiving pathtoimage/cisco-asa-fp2k.9.8.2.28.SPA from 1.1.1.1
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
File reception completed.
BOOT UP STATUS INFORMATION
Step 5: Login in when prompted.
firepower login:
Password:
Successful login attempts for user 'admin': 1
Cisco Firepower Extensible Operating System (FX-OS) Software
TAC support: http://www.cisco.com/tac
Copyright (c) 2009-2015, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 25
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this Copyright Notice.
Configure network information for the physical management port. Type the commands below at
the firepower prompt.
firepower #scope system
firepower/system # scope services
firepower/system/services# create ip-block 0.0.0.0 0 ssh
firepower/system/services/ip-block # exit
firepower/system/services# create ip-block 0.0.0.0 0 snmp
firepower/system/services/ip-block # exit
firepower/system/services# create ip-block 0.0.0.0 0 https
firepower/system/services/ip-block # # exit
firepower/system/services# create ipv6-block :: 0 ssh
firepower/system/services/ip-block # exit
firepower/system/services# create ipv6-block :: 0 snmp
firepower/system/services/ip-block # exit
firepower/system/services# create ipv6-block :: 0 https
firepower/system/services/ip-block # exit
firepower/system/services # commit-buffer
firepower/system/services # top
firepower # scope fabric a
firepower /fabric-interconnect # set out-of-band static ip 1.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw
1.1.1.2 (substitute your ip info. This will set your physical mgmt. port information)
Warning: When committed, this change may disconnect the current CLI session.
Use commit-buffer command to commit the changes.
firepower /fabric-interconnect* # commit
firepower /fabric-interconnect # top
firepower # scope firmware
firepower /firmware # download image scp://username@1.1.1.1/tftp/cisco-asa-
fp2k.9.8.2.28.SPA (insert your server ip address and file path)
Password:yourpassword here for the scp server
Please use the command 'show download-task' or 'show download-task detail' to check download
progress.
firepower /firmware # show down cisco-asa-fp2k.9.8.2.28.SPA
firepower /firmware # show package
Name Package-Vers
--------------------------------------------- ------------
cisco-asa-fp2k.9.8.2.28.SPA 9.8.2.28
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 26
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firepower /firmware # scope auto
firepower /firmware/auto-install # install security-pack version 9.8.2.28
During the upgrade, the system will be reboot
Do you want to proceed? (yes/no): yes
This operation upgrades firmware and software on Security Platform Components
Here is the checklist of things that are recommended before starting Auto-Install
(1) Review current critical/major faults
(2) Initiate a configuration backup
Do you want to proceed? (yes/no): yes
Install started. This will take several minutes.
BOOT STATUS MESSAGES THIS MESSAGE WILL BE DISPLAYED
Cisco ASA starting ...
Registering to process manager ...
Cisco ASA started successfully.
WAIT ABOUT 5 MINUTES AFTER THIS MESSAGE AND YOU SHOULD SEE
DISPLAYED THE ASA PROMPT
ciscoasa>
Step 6: WHEN YOU HIT ENTER YOU WILL RETURN TO THE FXOS PROMPT.
Login to FXOS
At the FXOS prompt type connect asa to get to the ASA prompt.
ciscoasa> press enter
firepower /ssa # connect asa
ciscoasa> en
Password:
ciscoasa# configure terminal
Enter in configure information for ASA. Once completed ping cisco.com If you can not ping
out then you have not set the ASA up completely. Once you are able to ping then setup the ASA
license.
ciscoasa# license smart register idtoken [enter in token]
ciscoasa# configure terminal
ciscoasa(conf)#sho configure
 read over the setting in the ASA configure. Make additions and/or deletions to the configure file.
 run ping tests both internal and external (cisco.com).
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 27
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ciscoasa(config)#license smart
ciscoasa(config)# sh lic all
Smart Licensing Status
======================
Smart Licensing is ENABLED
License Usage
ciscoasa(config)#fips enable
3.2 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Configuration
To operate in FIPS mode, the Crypto Officer must perform the following steps:
Step 1: Assign users a Privilege Level of 1.
Step 2: Define RADIUS and TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long and
secure traffic between the security module and the RADIUS/TACACS+ server via IPSec tunnel.
Note: Perform this step only if RADIUS/TACAS+ is configured, otherwise proceed.
Step 3: Configure the security module such that any remote connections via Telnet are secured
through IPSec.
Step 4: Configure the security module such that only FIPS-approved algorithms are used for
IPSec tunnels.
Step 5: Configure the security module such that error messages can only be viewed by Crypto
Officer.
Step 6: Disable the TFTP server.
Step 7: Disable HTTP for performing system management in FIPS mode of operation. HTTPS
with TLS should always be used for Web-based management.
Step 8: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using FIPS approved algorithms.