Chunghwa Telecom laboratories
HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 2.13
Last update: 2026-08-13
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
1.3 Additional Information....................................................................................................... 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 7
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 7
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.6 Security Function Implementations................................................................................... 9
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................10
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................10
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................10
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................10
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................11
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................11
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................11
3.2 Trusted Channel Specification.........................................................................................11
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................11
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................12
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................12
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................12
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................15
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................15
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................16
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................16
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................16
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................16
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................16
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................16
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................16
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals..............................................................................................17
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7.5 EFP/EFT Information.......................................................................................................18
7.6 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges ..........................................................................18
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................18
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................19
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................19
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................19
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................20
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................20
9.5 Transitions.......................................................................................................................23
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................23
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................23
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................23
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................24
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................24
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................25
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................25
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................25
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................25
11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................25
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................25
Glossary and abbreviations.......................................................................................................25
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 7
Table 3: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 7
Table 4: Approved Algorithms.................................................................................................... 8
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ......................................................................................... 8
Table 6: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................10
Table 7: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................10
Table 8: Entropy Sources..........................................................................................................10
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................11
Table 10: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................12
Table 11: Roles.........................................................................................................................12
Table 12: Approved Services ....................................................................................................15
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................17
Table 14: EFP/EFT Information.................................................................................................18
Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures ...............................................................................18
Table 16: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................19
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................20
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................20
Table 19: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................21
Table 20: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................22
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................23
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................24
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................24
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................24
Table 25: Error States...............................................................................................................25
List of Figures
Figure 1: Front view of HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM.................................................................... 6
Figure 2: Rear view of HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM .................................................................... 7
Figure 3: Tamper-evidence seal................................................................................................17
Figure 4: Tamper-evident seals placement ...............................................................................18
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1 General
1.1 Overview
The Chunghwa Telecom Laboratories HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM is a hardware security
module used in a PKI system. The hardware security module (HSM) provides rapid
cryptographic functionality to the operators of the system. Crypto Officers (COs) and Users are
authenticated using a smart card and password. The smart card reader is located within the
boundary of the module. The boundary of the HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM is the physical
hardware box itself. All cryptographic module components are included inside this boundary.
1.2 Security Levels
The module meets the overall requirements for FIPS 140-3 Level 3.
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
This Security Policy describes how this module complies with the eleven sections of the
standard. For more information on the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program please refer
to the NIST website at https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program.
For more information about Chunghwa Telecom Co. Ltd. please visit http://www.chttl.com.tw.
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
This is a non-proprietary security policy developed for the Chunghwa Telecom Ltd. HiPKI
SafGuard 2000 HSM. It describes how the HiPKI SafGuard 2000 meets the requirements for a
FIPS 140-3 level 3 validation as specified in the FIPS 140-3 standard. This Security Policy is
part of the evidence documentation package to be submitted to the validation lab.
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Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The physical cryptographic boundary is defined as the module case, and the module runs on a
limited operating environment.
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) :
The hardware box determines the physical boundary of the cryptographic module. The HSM is
comprised of a cryptographic acceleration engine, peripheral management module, a power
source module, a tamper circuit, a smart card socket, a keypad, and an OLED display.
A photograph of the HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM which is approximately to scale, is included
below.
Figure 1: Front view of HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM
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Figure 2: Rear view of HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or Part Number Hardware Version Firmware Version Processors Features
HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM HSM-HW-10 HSM-FW-10 Marvell
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2.3 Excluded Components
None
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Types of
Services
Status Indicator
FIPS mode Only FIPS
mode
Approved Approved mode is indicated by the OLED screen displaying -
FIPS mode
Table 3: Modes List and Description
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The module operates only in a FIPS approved mode. Approved mode is indicated by the OLED
screen displaying “FIPS mode” when the module is powered on and passed the firmware
integrity checks and KAT tests.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC, AES-ECB A2892 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-KW, AES-KWP A2894 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38F
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4), ECDSA
KeyVer (FIPS186-4)
A2894 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4), ECDSA
SigVer (FIPS186-4)
A2894 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
FIPS 186-4
HMAC DRBG A2894 Mode - SHA2-256 SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A2892 Key Length - Key Length: 256-448
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KTS-IFC A2894 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) A2894 Key Generation Mode - B.3.3
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - Table C.2
Private Key Format - Standard
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4), RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A2894 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5, PKCSPSS
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
SHA2-256 A2892 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Symmetric:AES
Asymmetric:RSA, ECDSA
using output from DRBG SP 800-133Rev2 and IG D.I.
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
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N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Security function implementations are listed below which is associated to the approved
algorithms defined in Section 2.5 Algorithms.
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KeyWrap KTS-
Wrap
SP 800-38D and SP 800-38F.
KTS (key wrapping and
unwrapping) per IG D.G.
Key size:128, 192, and 256-
bit keys providing 128, 192,
or 256 bits of encryption
strength
AES-KW: (A2894)
Key size: 128,
192, 256
AES-KWP:
(A2894)
Key size: 128,
192, 256
KeyTransport KTS-
Encap
SP 800-56Brev2. KTS-IFC
(key encapsulation and un-
encapsulation) per IG D.G.
Key size:2048, 3072, 4096-
bit keys with 112-150-bit key
strength
KTS-IFC: (A2894)
Key size: 2048,
3072, 4096
GenAES CKG Generate AES Key Key size:128, 192, and 256-
bit keys providing 128, 192,
or 256 bits of encryption
strength
HMAC DRBG:
(A2894)
Key size: 128,
192, 256
GenRSA CKG Generate asymmetric keys
(RSA)
Key size:2048, 3072, 4096-
bit keys with 112-150-bit key
strength
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A2894)
Key size: 2048,
3072, 4096
GenECDSA CKG Generate asymmetric keys
(ECDSA)
Key size:P224, P256, P384,
P521 curves with 112-256-bit
key strength
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A2894)
Curve: P224,
P256, P384,
P521
MsgAuth MAC Verify audit log Key size:256-bit HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A2892)
Key size: 256-bit
GenRand DRBG Get random number HMAC DRBG:
(A2894)
ECDSASignVer DigSig-
SigGen
DigSig-
SigVer
Digital Signature generation
and verify
Key size:P224, P256, P384,
P521 curves with 112-256-bit
key strength
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A2894)
Curves : P224,
P256, P384,
P521
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A2894)
Curves: P224,
P256, P384,
P521
RSASignVer DigSig-
SigGen
DigSig-
SigVer
Digital signature generation
and verify
Key size:2048, 3072, 4096-
bit keys with 112-150-bit key
strength
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A2894)
Key size: 2048,
3072, 4096-bit
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A2894)
Key size: 2048,
3072, 4096-bit
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
None
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert Number Vendor Name
E8 Red Hat, Inc.
Table 7: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
SP800-90B
compliant ENT (NP)
Non-
Physical
Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 8 DRBG
256 bits 256 bits None
Table 8: Entropy Sources
A NIST approved deterministic random bit generator based on a hash function as specified in
SP800-90Arev1 is used. The Approved DRBG used for random number generation is a
HMAC_DRBG with prediction resistance. The random numbers used for key generation are all
generated by HMAC_DRBG. Per section 10.1.2.1 of SP800-90Arev1, the internal state of
HMAC_DRBG is the value V and Key.
The deterministic random bit generators are seeded by “reseed”. The reseed function is invoked
automatically in the module when the requests counter of random numbers is greater than or
equal to the reseed interval in order to adjust the internal state of HMAC_DRBG. The non-
physical entropy source outside the physical cryptographic boundary provides the random bits.
The output of entropy pool provides 256-bits of entropy to seed and reseed SP800-90B DRBG
during initialization (seed) and reseeding (reseed). No assurance of the minimum strength of
generated SSPs.
2.9 Key Generation
To generate RSA and ECDSA keys for application purpose, the module implements asymmetric
key generation services compliant with FIPS 186-4 and performs Cryptographic Key Generation
(CKG) for asymmetric keys as per section 5.1 of SP800-133rev2(vendor affirmed), in
accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H. To generate AES keys for application purpose, Session
key, Master key, Clone key and Audit key, the module implements symmetric key generation
services compliant with section 6.1 of SP800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed), in accordance with
FIPS 140-3 IG D.H. The random value used in both symmetric and asymmetric key generation
is obtained from the DRBG compliant with SP800-90Arev1.
2.10 Key Establishment
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The module provides RSA OAEP public-key encryption scheme compliant with SP800-56Brev2,
in accordance with scenario 1 of IG D.F; the module provides SP800-38F approved Key
Transport Scheme (KTS) according to IG D.G. The key transport method is provided using an
AES-KWP key wrapping algorithm.
According to SP800-57, RSA OAEP public-key encryption scheme provides 112 bits of
encryption strength and AES key wrapping provides 128 bits of encryption strength.
2.11 Industry Protocols
None
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
The table below describes the relationship between the interfaces.
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Ethernet, Smart Card Interface, and Front
Panel Keypad
Data Input plaintext data, ciphertext data, SSPs, smart
card PIN
Ethernet and Smart Card Interface Data Output plaintext data, ciphertext data, SSPs, status
Ethernet Control Input Command
Ethernet and OLED display Status Output Status
AC power source interfaces Power N/A
Power switch Control Input N/A
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
3.2 Trusted Channel Specification
RSA KTS-OAEP algorithm is applied to protect the session key which is used to implement a
trusted channel via the internet. RSA Client OAEP key pair is generated from the host and the
public key is transmitted to the module during the initialization process. When operator starts to
connect to the module in FIPS mode, the first step is to generate connection and the Host role
signs in to exchange the session key which is an AES 128 key wrapped with public key. The
trusted channel is established when the wrapped session key is obtained by the Host and
unwrapped with the private key. The role should be changed to CO/User to operation CO/User
services. Messages with SSP information are encrypted with AES-128-CBC (Cert. # A2892).
The module API always checks the encrypted messages in this connection without exception.
The session key is cleared after disconnection, and the trusted channel is closed. To prevent
any unauthorized tampering, the session key is re-generated every time when starting a new
connection.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
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The module supports CO role, User role and Host role. The HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM
implements two authentication methods, one is key transport scheme for trusted channel, and
the other is two-factor identity authentication. Two-factor identity–based authentication using a
combination of signature and passwords. Identity-based authentication occurs by two methods.
One is to enter a smart card and 8 digits PIN for each smart card and perform a signature with a
private key store on the card, the other is to do a signature from a software private key. Of at
least 2 COs and up to a maximum of 3 COs. Each CO, upon successful entry of a password,
transmits the signature in the HSM to authenticate to the role.
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
Two-factor
identity-based
authentication
(Smart Card)
Signature and 8
digits PIN and 12
printable
characters.
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
Probability of 1/(2^112
X 10^8) in a single
random attempt that
the PIN must be 8
digits long.
Probability of 3/(2^112 X
10^8) in multiple random
attempts in a minute since the
account is locked after 3 failed
login attempts
Two-factor
identity-based
authentication
(Software)
Signature and 12
printable
characters.
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
Probability of 1/(2^112
X 95^12) in a single
random attempt that
the password policy
requires 12 printable
characters
Probability of 3/(2^112 X
95^12) in multiple random
attempts in a minute since the
account is locked after 3 failed
login attempts
Key transport
authentication
RSA-OAEP
Encryption
Decryption
Probability of 1/2^112
in a single random
attempt.
Probability of
60,000,000/2^112 in multiple
random attempts in a minute.
Table 10: Authentication Methods
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
CO MultiFactorIdentity Crypto Officer Two-factor identity-based authentication (Smart Card)
Two-factor identity-based authentication (Software)
User MultiFactorIdentity User Two-factor identity-based authentication (Smart Card)
Two-factor identity-based authentication (Software)
Host Identity Host application Key transport authentication
Table 11: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
The approved services are described below:
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Verify audit
log
Verify audit log API returns
0
Audit log OK / Fail MsgAuth CO
- Audit log key:
E
Integrity test
on demand
Integrity test on
demand
API returns
0
N/A Success /
Error
RSASignVer CO
Self-test on
demand
Self-test on
demand
API returns
0
N/A Success /
Error
None CO
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Zeroize slot Delete all object
on slot
API returns
0
Slot ID OK / Fail None CO
- Client OAEP
key: Z
- Clone key: Z
- Session key: Z
- Application key
RSA: Z
- Application key
ECDSA: Z
- Application key
AES: Z
- Security
officer's public
key: Z
- User's public
key: Z
- P11 slot SO
password salt
hash: Z
- P11 slot User
password salt
hash: Z
- Entropy Input
String: Z
- DRBG Seed,
internal state: V
value and Key:
Z
Export
CloneWhole
HSM
Export whole HSM API returns
0
None Encryption
file
KeyWrap CO
- Clone key: R
Import
CloneWhole
HSM
Import whole HSM API returns
0
Encryption
file
OK / Fail KeyWrap CO
- Clone key: W
Export
CloneSlot
Clone and export a
slot
API returns
0
Slot ID Encryption
file
KeyWrap CO
- Clone key: R
Import
CloneSlot
Import a clone slot API returns
0
Encryption
file
OK / Fail KeyWrap CO
- Clone key: W
Switch to
Initialization
state &
Erase ALL
keys
Set module to
uninitialized state
API returns
0
N/A OK / Fail None CO
- Master key: Z
Generate
CO Quorum
Token
Generate CO
authentication
quorum token
API returns
0
CO ID CO
Quorum
Token
GenRand CO
Sign CO
Token (with
Smartcard)
CO send the
signature for the
CO Quorum Token
to the module
API returns
0
CO ID,
signature
OK / Fail ECDSASignVer
RSASignVer
CO
- Application key
RSA: R
- Application key
ECDSA: R
Generate
key
Generate a
cryptographic key
(AES, RSA,
ECDSA)
API returns
0
Slot ID,
key type,
key ID
OK / Fail GenAES
GenRSA
GenECDSA
User
- Client OAEP
key: W
- Session key:
W
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Wrap key Export an
Assigned key
using a
cryptographic key
(AES)
API returns
0
Slot ID,
key
type ,key
ID, KEK
key type ,
KEK key
ID,
encryption
key data
Wrapped
key data
KeyWrap User
- Session key: R
Unwrap key Import an
Assigned key from
a cryptographic
key (AES)
API returns
0
Slot ID,
key type,
key ID,
KEK key
type, KEK
key ID,
encryption
key data
OK / Fail KeyWrap User
- Session key: R
Encrypt Perform encrypt
operation on user
supplied data
object
API returns
0
Slot ID,
key type,
key ID,
plain data
Encrypted
data
None User
- Application key
AES: E
Decrypt Perform decrypt
operation on user
supplied data
object
API returns
0
Slot ID,
key type,
key ID,
encrypted
data
Plain data None User
- Application key
AES: E
Sign Generate
signature over
user supplied data
API returns
0
Slot ID,
key type,
key ID,
data
Signature ECDSASignVer
RSASignVer
User
- Application key
RSA: R
- Application key
ECDSA: R
Verify Validate signature
over user supplied
data
API returns
0
Slot ID,
key type,
key ID,
signature
OK / Fail ECDSASignVer
RSASignVer
User
- Application key
RSA: R
- Application key
ECDSA: R
Generate
Key
Quorum
Token
Generate a
quorum token if
cryptographic key
need quorum-
controlled
operation
API returns
0
Slot ID,
key type,
key ID
Key
Quorum
Token
GenRand User
Sign Key
Token (with
Smartcard)
User sends the
signature for the
key Quorum
Token to the
module
API returns
0
Slot ID,
key type,
key ID,
signature
OK / Fail ECDSASignVer
RSASignVer
User
- Application key
RSA: R
- Application key
ECDSA: R
View
Hardware
and
firmware
version
Show
hardware/firmware
version and status
of the module
API returns
0
None Hardware
/ firmware
version
and status
of the
module
None Unauthenticated
Zeroization Zeroize all
unprotected SSPs
OLED
displays
None None None CO
- Master key: Z
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
"Zeroization
+ time()"
Software
update
Load module
firmware
OLED
displays
"Delete all
keys +
Initial
Mode"
Update
image
OK / Fail RSASignVer CO
Get handle Generate trusted
channel
API returns
0
Server IP,
N, D, E
value of
the OAEP
Client key,
Name and
ID
Handle KeyTransport Host
Release
handle
Delete trusted
channel
API returns
0
Handle OK / Fail None Host
CO login CO login into the
system
API returns
0
CO ID,
signature,
and
password
OK / Fail RSASignVer CO
- P11 slot SO
password salt
hash: R
User login User login into the
system
API returns
0
User ID,
signature,
and
password
OK / Fail RSASignVer User
- P11 slot User
password salt
hash: R
Generate
Clone key
Generate Clone
key to encrypt the
whole HSM or a
slot information
API returns
0
N/A OK / Fail GenRand CO
- Clone key: W
Create user Add a user
account
API returns
0
User ID,
User
password,
User's
public key
OK / Fail RSASignVer CO
- P11 slot User
password salt
hash: W
Table 12: Approved Services
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
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The only firmware to be loaded to the module is HiPKI SafGuard 2000 service firmware. To
verify the firmware integrity, an RSA 2048 Manufacture key pair is generated outside the
boundary. Manufacture public key is imported to the module in advance before shipping from
the factory. The firmware file to be loaded is signed with Manufacture private key, the signed
data and the firmware version information are attached to the firmware file.
The module supports two COs authentication to operate HiPKI SafGuard 2000 service firmware
loaded (update) process. At first, the module imported the whole firmware file. After verifying the
signed data by Manufacture public key and checking the firmware version information is not
older than the previous version, the module updates the firmware version and store the firmware
file and the signed data. The newest version of the firmware will be loaded after re-staring up
the module. Then the module switch to Initialization state and the OLED will display “Initial
Mode.” The module enters the error state if any self-test fails.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
At start up, the HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM firmware executable code is verified by an RSA
2048 Manufacture public key and compared to a firmware signed data stored in the module.
The test fails if the calculated value does not equal the stored value.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The integrity test can be initiated by COs who invoke function to verify the integrity of the
firmware code.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
The HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM is defined as a multi-chip standalone module. The module
consists of production grade components, which include standard passivation techniques.
The HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM is being validated against FIPS 140-3 level 3. The module’s
enclosure is made of an aluminum alloy and is opaque to the visible spectrum. The HiPKI
SafGuard 2000 HSM has a mechanism for tamper detection and response, which zeroizes
Master key stored internally to the module in eMMC if an attempt is made to open the
enclosure. The tamper detection and response circuit are backed up by battery housed
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internally in the HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM in case of power failure to the module. If the top
casing is restored after an attempt is made to remove it, the OLED will continue to display
“detect tamper” and the module will return to the factory settings when the power is restarted.
The module’s operating temperature range is from 0˚C to 68˚C.
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Tamper
evident seals
Weekly The tamper-evident seals are installed only by the module manufacturer. After
delivering to the customer, a system administrator is required to check serial
number of each tamper-evident seal and inspect the tamper-evident seals if the
module has been interfered with. Upon viewing any signs of tampering, the
administrator is required to zeroize Master key and return the module to the
factory.
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals
Number: 3 tamper evident seals
Placement:
The case has a removable cover on the top. The cover is fixed to the case through eight
screws. Three screws locate on the left and the other three place on the right of the chassis,
respectively. The rest of the two screws place on the rear top of the chassis. The junctures
between the case and the cover are protected with three tamper-evidence seals. One seal is
located on the front top; another two seals cover the two screws placed on the rear top. The
photo of tamper-evidence seal is illustrated, there is a serial number on it which is uniquely
identifiable. The picture below shows the position of the seals on HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM.
Surface Preparation: None
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: None
Part Numbers: FS-4120
Figure 3: Tamper-evidence seal
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Figure 4: Tamper-evident seals placement
7.5 EFP/EFT Information
There is a temperature sensor module installed in the HiPKI SafGuard 2000. While the
operating temperature drops below specified limits (0˚C), the Master key stored internally to the
module in eMMC will be zeroized. When the temperature reaches 68˚C, the HiPKI SafGuard
2000 will shut down.
HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM system will shut down after the voltage signal being pulled HIGH to
264V or being pulled LOW to 90V.
The EFP information is listed below.
Temp/Voltage Type Temperature or Voltage EFP or EFT Result
LowTemperature 0°C EFP Zeroization
HighTemperature 68°C EFP Shutdown
LowVoltage 90V EFP Shutdown
HighVoltage 264V EFP Shutdown
Table 14: EFP/EFT Information
7.6 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
The hardness testing temperature ranges is displayed by the table below.
Temperature Type Temperature
LowTemperature -0.08°C
HighTemperature 68.9°C
Table 15: Hardness Testing Temperatures
8 Non-Invasive Security
The module claims no non-invasive security techniques.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
The following section indicates the key generation method, usage, and storage.
Master key stored in eMMC will be zeroized under the following circumstances:
1. if the tamper response switch is activated
2. if the CO returns the module to the “initialization” state as it is referred to by HiPKI
SafGuard 2000 Administrator Guidance
3. when the firmware loaded(update) process is executed
The HiPKI SafGuard 2000 HSM returns to the same state (initialization state) as it was when
shipped from the factory and must be reconfigured to continue operation. Two internal
independent actions, which means two CO authentication, are always required to output keys or
CSPs in cipher text. Keys are not output in plaintext.
The cryptographic module could distinguish between data, control information and power for
input, and data, control information and status information for output. All input commands and
control data (including function calls and manual controls such as switches and keypads) used
to control the operation of a cryptographic module shall only enter via the "control input"
interface. For each SSPs operations, the user authentication is needed.
9.1 Storage Areas
The SSP storage techniques are displayed in the following table.
Storage Area Name Description Persistence Type
eMMC None Static
Flash None Static
SDRAM None Dynamic
Table 16: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
The SSPs are entered and output in different methods, the following table lists the SSP input-
output methods.
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Master key split
Knowledge
(Import)
Smart card Cryptographic
boundary
Plaintext Manual Electronic AES-ECB
(A2892)
Master key split
Knowledge
(Export)
Cryptographic
boundary
Smart card Plaintext Automated Direct AES-ECB
(A2892)
Split Knowledge
(Import)
Smart card Cryptographic
boundary
Encrypted Automated Direct AES-ECB
(A2892)
Split Knowledge
(Export)
Cryptographic
boundary
Smart card Encrypted Automated Direct AES-ECB
(A2892)
Wrapping key
service
Cryptographic
boundary
Outside of the
boundary
Encrypted Automated Electronic KeyWrap
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Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Unwrapping key
service
Outside of the
boundary
Cryptographic
boundary
Encrypted Automated Electronic KeyWrap
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
MK_free SSPs are encrypted with Master
key and stored in
eMMC.Zeroization of Mater key
protects all other SSPs.
The Master key stored internally to the
module in eMMC will overwrite with
zeros within 1ms.
Triggered by
tamper detection
and response
circuit
Key_free Zeroization of Mater key can be
done by API called.
The Master key stored internally to the
module in eMMC will overwrite with
zeros within 1ms. The time is not
enough for the attacker to compromise
the Master Key.
Call the function
in application
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods
Since SSPs are encrypted with Master key and stored in eMMC in encrypted form, the Master
key stored internally to the module in eMMC will overwrite with zeros within 1ms when the
zeroization function is invoked. The time is not enough for the attacker to compromise the
Master Key. Unprotected SSPs including session key, intermediate keygen values, entropy
input string and DRBG seed, internal state: V value and Key are also zeroized when the
corresponding crypto services is finished.
9.4 SSPs
The following two tables summarize the module’s SSPs:
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
Master key Encrypt
Application key
256 - 256 Symmetric
key - CSP -
CSP
HMAC DRBG
(A2894)
CKG
AES-ECB
(A2892)
Client OAEP
key
Wraps Session
key
2048 - 112 Public key -
PSP - PSP
Generated by
host externally
KeyWrap AES-KW
(A2894)
AES-KWP
(A2894)
Audit log key Verification of
audit event log
256 - 256 Symmetric
key - CSP -
CSP
HMAC DRBG
(A2894)
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A2892)
Clone key Encrypt the
whole HSM or a
slot information
256 - 256 Symmetric
key - CSP -
CSP
HMAC DRBG
(A2894)
AES-ECB
(A2892)
Session key Wrapped by
Client OAEP key
to encrypt data
between host
and HSM
128 - 128 Symmetric
key - CSP -
CSP
HMAC DRBG
(A2894)
AES-ECB
(A2892)
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
Application
key RSA
Application
purpose
2048,
3072, 4096
- 112, 128,
>128
Private key -
CSP / Public
key - PSP -
CSP
RSA (internal),
the random value
used in RSA is
generated using
SP800-90Arev1
DRBG
RSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
Application
key ECDSA
Application
purpose
224, 256,
384, 521 -
112, 128,
192, 256
Public key -
PSP/ Private
key - CSP -
CSP
ECDSA
(internal), the
random value
used in ECDSA
is generated
using SP800-
90Arev1 DRBG
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
Application
key AES
Application
purpose
128, 192,
256 - 128,
192, 256
Symmetric
key - CSP -
CSP
HMAC DRBG
(A2894)
AES-CBC
(A2892)
AES-ECB
(A2892)
AES-KW
(A2894)
AES-KWP
(A2894)
Security
officer's
public key
Authenticate a
role
2048 - 112 Public key -
PSP - PSP
Generated by
Smart card or
host externally
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
User's public
key
Authenticate a
role
2048 - 112 Public key -
PSP - PSP
Generated by
Smart card or
host externally
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
P11 slot SO
password
salt hash
Hash password 128 - 128 Password -
CSP - CSP
Salt by HMAC
(internal)
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A2892)
P11 slot User
password
salt hash
Hash password 128 - 128 Password -
CSP - CSP
Salt by HMAC
(internal)
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A2892)
Entropy Input
String
Random number 256 - 256 Entropy
Input - CSP -
CSP
Obtained from
entropy source
HMAC
DRBG
(A2894)
DRBG Seed,
internal state:
V value and
Key
Random number 256 - 256 Internal state
- CSP - CSP
HMAC DRBG
(A2894)
CKG HMAC
DRBG
(A2894)
Table 19: SSP Table 1
Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Master key Master key split
Knowledge
(Import)
Master key split
Knowledge
(Export)
eMMC:Encrypted While in use MK_free
Client OAEP
key
Wrapping key
service
Flash:Encrypted While in use Key_free Session key:wraps
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Name Input - Output Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Unwrapping
key service
Audit log key Wrapping key
service
Unwrapping
key service
Flash:Encrypted While in use Key_free
Clone key Split
Knowledge
(Import)
Split
Knowledge
(Export)
eMMC:Encrypted While in use Key_free
Session key Wrapping key
service
Unwrapping
key service
SDRAM:Encrypted While in use Key_free
Application key
RSA
Wrapping key
service
Unwrapping
key service
eMMC:Encrypted While in use Key_free
Application key
ECDSA
Wrapping key
service
Unwrapping
key service
eMMC:Encrypted While in use Key_free
Application key
AES
Wrapping key
service
Unwrapping
key service
eMMC:Encrypted While in use Key_free
Security officer's
public key
Wrapping key
service
Unwrapping
key service
eMMC:Encrypted While in use Key_free
User's public
key
Wrapping key
service
Unwrapping
key service
eMMC:Encrypted While in use Key_free
P11 slot SO
password salt
hash
Wrapping key
service
Unwrapping
key service
eMMC:Encrypted While in use Key_free
P11 slot User
password salt
hash
Wrapping key
service
Unwrapping
key service
eMMC:Encrypted While in use Key_free
Entropy Input
String
eMMC:Encrypted From generation
until DRBG seed
is created
Key_free DRBG Seed,
internal state: V
value and
Key:Derives
DRBG Seed,
internal state: V
value and Key
eMMC:Encrypted Until cipher
handled is freed
or module
powered off
Key_free DRBG Seed,
internal state: V
value and
Key:Derived From
Table 20: SSP Table 2
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9.5 Transitions
In compliance with NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 2, the module supports algorithms and key lengths
that provide a minimum of 112 bits of security strength for applying cryptographic protection.
Starting January 1, 2031, the minimum security strength for applying cryptographic protection
will be 128 bits, and security strengths between 112 bits and 128 bits will be allowed for legacy
use only to process information that is already protected.
Please see the latest revision of SP 800-131A and CMVP Programmatic Transitions page for
transitions that may affect this module.
10 Self-Tests
The module performs pre-operational, conditional, and periodic self -tests to verify the integrity
and correctness of the cryptographic functionality. If the self-tests all pass, a status message,
“Self-tests OK” is displayed on the OLED. If any of self-tests fail, the module transitions to error
state and must be rebooted.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module implements the following pre-operational self-tests:
Algorithm or Test Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
RSA 2048 Verification SW/FW
Integrity
Return
code
Signature
Verification
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are running during operation of the module. The module performs the
following conditional self-tests:
Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-ECB (A2892)-
Encrypt
AES-128 KAT CAST Return
code
Encrypt First use
AES-ECB (A2892)-
Decrypt
AES-128 KAT CAST Return
code
Decrypt First use
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
P-256 KAT CAST Return
code
Sign First use
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
P-256 KAT CAST Return
code
Verify First use
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
P-224, P-256,
P-384, P-521
PCT PCT Return
code
Sign and verify Key pair
generation
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Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A2892)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Return
code
Message
Authentication
First use
HMAC DRBG
(A2894)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Return
code
Instantiate, reseed
and generate
First use
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
RSA-2048 KAT CAST Return
code
Sign First use
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
RSA-2048 KAT CAST Return
code
Verify First use
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A2894)
2048, 3072,
4096
PCT PCT Return
code
Sign and verify Key pair
generation
SHA2-256 (A2892) Data length=1 KAT CAST Return
code
Hash First use
AES-KW (A2894) AES-128 KAT CAST Return
code
Key Wrap First use
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A2894) Verification SW/FW Integrity 24 hours Automatically
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-ECB (A2892)-Encrypt KAT CAST 24 hours Automatically
AES-ECB (A2892)-Decrypt KAT CAST 24 hours Automatically
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A2894) KAT CAST 24 hours Automatically
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A2894) KAT CAST 24 hours Automatically
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A2894) PCT PCT 24 hours Automatically
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A2892) KAT CAST 24 hours Automatically
HMAC DRBG (A2894) KAT CAST 24 hours Automatically
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (A2894) KAT CAST 24 hours Automatically
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A2894) KAT CAST 24 hours Automatically
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A2894) PCT PCT 24 hours Automatically
SHA2-256 (A2892) KAT CAST 24 hours Automatically
AES-KW (A2894) KAT CAST 24 hours Automatically
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
The module enters the error state If any of self-tests fail, the error state list is shown below.
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Pre-Operational Self-
Tests Error
N/A Pre-Operational
tests failure
Restart the
module
OLED displays error message
Conditional Self-Tests
Error
N/A Conditional tests
failure
Restart the
module
OLED displays error message
and API returns error code
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Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Periodic Self-Tests
Error
N/A Periodic tests
failure
Restart the
module
OLED displays error message
Table 25: Error States
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
To initialize HiPKI SafGuard 2000, the administrator shall use a computer directly linked to the
module and executes HiPKI SafGuard 2000 Management Tool to set up the module from
initialization state to FIPS mode. See Administrator Guidance for more information about
initialization process.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
See Administrator Guidance for more information.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
See User Manual and Non-Administrator Guidance for more information.
11.4 Design and Rules
A Configuration Management and Security Delivery of Operation Document is provided by
Chunghwa Telecom which offers System Administrators with the secure destruction procedures
to ensure FIPS 140-3 Compliance of HiPKI SafGuard 2000.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not claim to mitigate any other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-3
requirements.
Glossary and abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CSP Critical Security Parameter
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DRBG Deterministic Random Bits Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook Book
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ENT (NP) Non-Physical Entropy Source
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HSM Hardware Security Module
KTS Key Transportation Schemes
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Public Key Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter