Page 1
Micron S650DC® SAS TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Module Security Policy
REV 0.9
Micron S650DC®
SAS TCG Enterprise SSC Self-
Encrypting Drive
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Module Security
Policy
Security Level 2
Rev 0.9 – March, 2018
Micron Technology, LLC
Page 2
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
Table of Contents
1 Introduction................................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Scope..................................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.2 Security Levels ..................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.3 References............................................................................................................................................................. 3
1.4 Acronyms.............................................................................................................................................................. 4
2 Cryptographic Module Description .............................................................................................................................. 5
2.1 Overview............................................................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Logical to Physical Port Mapping......................................................................................................................... 5
2.3 Product Versions................................................................................................................................................... 5
2.4 FIPS Approved Algorithms .................................................................................................................................. 6
2.5 Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................................................. 7
2.6 FIPS 140-2 Approved Mode of Operation............................................................................................................ 8
2.6.1 TCG Security Mode...................................................................................................................................... 8
2.6.2 Entering FIPS Approved Mode of Operation ............................................................................................... 8
2.7 User Data Cryptographic Erase Methods.............................................................................................................. 8
2.8 Revert-SP Method................................................................................................................................................. 8
2.9 Show Status........................................................................................................................................................... 8
3 Identification and Authentication (I&A) Policy ........................................................................................................... 9
3.1 Operator Roles...................................................................................................................................................... 9
3.1.1 Crypto Officer Roles..................................................................................................................................... 9
3.1.2 User Roles..................................................................................................................................................... 9
3.1.3 Unauthenticated Role.................................................................................................................................... 9
3.2 Authentication....................................................................................................................................................... 9
3.2.1 Authentication Types.................................................................................................................................... 9
3.2.2 Authentication in TCG Security Mode ......................................................................................................... 9
3.2.3 Authentication Mechanism, Data and Strength........................................................................................... 10
3.2.4 Personalizing Authentication Data.............................................................................................................. 10
4 Access Control Policy................................................................................................................................................. 11
4.1 Services............................................................................................................................................................... 11
4.2 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs............................................................................................................................ 13
5 Physical Security ........................................................................................................................................................ 15
5.1 Mechanisms ........................................................................................................................................................ 15
5.2 Operator Requirements ....................................................................................................................................... 16
6 Operational Environment............................................................................................................................................ 17
7 Security Rules............................................................................................................................................................. 17
7.1 Secure Initialization ............................................................................................................................................ 17
7.2 Ongoing Policy Restrictions ............................................................................................................................... 17
8 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy............................................................................................................................. 17
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Top view of tamper-evidence label on sides of drive.......................................................................................... 15
Figure 2: Left-side view of tamper-evidence label on left side of drive ............................................................................. 15
Figure 3: Right-side view of tamper-evidence label on right side of drive......................................................................... 15
Page 3
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
1 Introduction
1.1 Scope
This security policy applies to the FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module (CM) embedded in Micron S650DC®
SAS SSD TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive products.
This document meets the requirements of the FIPS 140-2 standard (Appendix C) and Implementation
Guidance (section 14.1). It does not provide interface details needed to develop a compliant application.
This document is non-proprietary and may be reproduced in its original entirety.
1.2 Security Levels
FIPS 140-2 Requirement Area Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
Electromagnetic Interface / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI / EMC) 3
Self – tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
The overall security level pursued for the cryptographic modules is Security Level 2.
1.3 References
1. FIPS PUB 140-2
2. Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2
3. Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
4. TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise, Specification Version 1.0, Revision 3.00, January
10, 2011
5. TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Specification Version 1.0, Revision 0.9, May 24, 2007
6. TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification, Specification Version 1.0,
7. SCSI Primary Commands-4 Rev 15 (SPC-4)
8. SCSI Block Commands Rev15 (SBC-3)
9. Serial Attached SCSI-2 Rev 13 (SAS-2)
Page 4
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
1.4 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard (FIPS 197)
CBC Cipher Block Chaining, an operational mode of AES
CM Cryptographic Module
CO Crypto-officer
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CSPSK Critical Security Parameter Sanitization Key
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
MEK Media Encryption Key
HDD Hard Disk Drive
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IV Initialization Vector for encryption operation
LBA Logical Block Address
LED Light Emitting Device
MSID Manufactured SID, public drive-unique value that is used as default PIN, TCG term
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
POR Power-on Reset (power cycle)
POST Power on Self-Test
PSID Physical SID, public drive-unique value
RNG Random Number Generator
SED Self-Encrypting Drive, Micron SSD products that provide HW data encryption.
SID Secure ID, PIN for Drive Owner CO role, TCG term
SoC System-on-a-Chip
SP Security Provider or Security Partition (TCG), also Security Policy (FIPS 140-2)
SSD Solid State Drives
XTS The XTS-AES algorithm is a mode of operation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Page 5
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
2 Cryptographic Module Description
2.1 Overview
The Micron S650DC® TCG Enterprise SSC Self-Encrypting Drive, FIPS, 140-2 Module is embodied in
Micron S650DC SAS SED model solid state drive. These products meet the performance requirements of
the most demanding Enterprise applications. The cryptographic module (CM) provides a wide range of
cryptographic services using FIPS approved algorithms. Services include hardware-based data encryption
(AES-XTS), instantaneous user data disposal with cryptographic erase, independently controlled and
protected user data LBA bands and authenticated FW download. The services are provided through industry-
standard TCG Enterprise SSC, SCSI protocols.
The CM, whose cryptographic boundary is the full drive enclosure, has a multiple-chip embedded physical
embodiment. The physical interface to the CM is a SAS connector. The logical interfaces are the industry-
standard SCSI (refer to Section1.3, items 7 & 8), TCG SWG (refer to Section1.3, item 5), and Enterprise
(refer to Section1.3, item 4) protocols, carried on the SAS (refer to Section1.3, item 9) transport interface.
The primary function of the module is to provide data encryption, access control and cryptographic erase of
the data stored on the flash drive media. The human operator of the drive product interfaces with the CM
through a “host” application on a host system.
2.2 Logical to Physical Port Mapping
FIPS 140-2 Interface Module Ports
Data Input SAS Connector
Data Output SAS Connector
Control Input SAS Connector
Status Output SAS Connector, LED
Power Input Power Connector
2.3 Product Versions
The following models and hardware versions (PNs) are validated with the following FW versions:
 SSD, 2.5-Inch, SAS Interface, 400 GB
o 400 GB: MTFDJAK400MBS-2AN16FCYY
o FW Versions: MB13, MB17, MB18 and MB19
 SSD, 2.5-Inch, SAS Interface, 800 GB
o 800 GB: MTFDJAK800MBS-2AN16FCYY
o FW Versions: MB13, MB17, MB18 and MB19
 SSD, 2.5-Inch, SAS Interface, 1600 GB
o 1600 GB: MTFDJAL1T6MBS-2AN16FCYY
o FW Versions: MB13, MB17, MB18 and MB19
 SSD, 2.5-Inch, SAS Interface, 3200 GB
o 3200 GB: MTFDJAL3T2MBS-2AN16FCYY
o FW Versions: MB13, MB17, MB18 and MB19
Page 6
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
2.4 FIPS Approved Algorithms
SP800-132, Section 5.4 Option 2a is used and password length is a minimum of 4 bytes. The Master Key is
256 bits and decryption algorithm is AES-GCM. The keys derived from passwords are used in storage
applications.
There are algorithms, modes and keys that have been CAVS tested but not utilized by the module. Only the
algorithms, modes and keys shown in this table are utilized by the module.
Algorithm Certificate Number Modes/Key Sizes/Etc used
Hardware AES # 3441 256-bit XTS and CBC
Hardware RSA #1762
FIPS 186-4 Signature verification
w/ 2048-bit modulus
Hardware SHA #2841 256-bit
Hardware HMAC #2190 256-bit
Firmware AES #1343 256-bit CBC
Firmware AES-GCM #2841 256-bit
Firmware SHA #1225 256-bit
Firmware RSA #1021
FIPS 186-2 Signature verification
w/ 2048-bit modulus
Firmware 800-90A DRBG #62 Hash based DRBG
Firmware HMAC #1597 256-bit
Firmware 800-38F Key Wrap #2947 256-bit
Firmware 800-132 PBKDF Vendor Affirmation Option 2a
Hardware NDRNG Non approved but allowed
Page 7
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
2.5 Self-Tests
Function Tested Self-Test Type Implementation Failure Behavior
Hardware AES Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT
performed.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Firmware AES Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT
performed.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Firmware AES –
GCM ( 800-38D )
Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT
performed.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Hardware RSA Power-On Verify KAT performed. Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Hardware SHA-256 Power-On Digest KAT performed. Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Firmware 800-90A
DRBG
Power-On DRBG KAT performed. Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Firmware 800-38F
Key Wrap
Power-On Encrypt and Decrypt KAT
performed.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Firmware 800-132
PBKDF
Power-On KAT performed. Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Firmware HMAC Power-On Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code constructed from SHA-256.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Hardware HMAC Power-On Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code constructed from SHA-256.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Firmware Integrity
Check
Power-On Signature Verification. Enters FW Integrity Error State.
Firmware Load
Check
Conditional:
When new
firmware is
downloaded
RSA PKCS#1 signature verification
of new firmware image is done
before it can be loaded.
Incoming firmware package is
not loaded and is discarded.
Firmware 800-90A
DRBG
Conditional:
When a random
number is
generated
Newly generated random number is
compared to the previously generated
random number. Test fails if they are
equal.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Firmware Entropy
DRBG 800-90B
Health Tests
Conditional:
When a seed for
DRBG is
requested
Repetition Count and Adaptive
Proportion tests are performed.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Non-Approved
NDRNG
Conditional:
When a seed for
DRBG is
requested
Newly generated random number is
compared to the previously generated
random number. Test fails if they are
equal.
Enters FIPS Self Test Error
State.
Page 8
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
2.6 FIPS 140-2 Approved Mode of Operation
Before the operator performs Secure Initialization steps detailed in Section 7.1, the drive will operate in a
non-FIPS compliant mode.
There is 1 approved mode of operation, “TCG Security”.
The module’s FIPS mode of operation is enforced through configuration and policy. Violating these ongoing
policy restrictions (detailed in Section 7.2) would mean that one is no longer using the drive in a FIPS
compliant mode of operation. The operator can determine if the CM is operating in a FIPS approved mode
by invoking the Show Status service (refer to Section 4.1).
2.6.1 TCG Security Mode
This mode has the capability to have multiple Users with independent access control to read/write/crypto
erase independent data areas (LBA ranges). Note that by default there is a single “Global Range” that
encompasses the whole user data area which is the starting point from which multiple Users request their
independent data areas.
In addition to the Drive Owner and User(s) roles, this mode implements a CO role (EraseMaster) to administer
the above capability.
2.6.2 Entering FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
After the module is installed and configured per the Security Rules of this policy in Section 7.1, the drive is
always in the Approved mode of operation except when a critical failure has been detected, causing a
transition to a “Failed” state.
In some of these “Failed” state scenarios (e.g. repeated POST failure), the drive cannot be restored to FIPS
approved mode and does not provide any FIPS services.
2.7 User Data Cryptographic Erase Methods
Since all user data is encrypted / decrypted by the CM for storage on / retrieval from the drive media, the data
can be erased using cryptographic methods. The data is erased by zeroizing the Media Encryption Key
(MEK).
Other FIPS services can be used to erase all the other private keys and CSPs (see Section 2.8).
2.8 Revert-SP Method
The TCG Revert-SP method may be invoked to transition the CM back to the as-manufactured state
(uninitialized). This corresponds to exiting the FIPS approved mode of operation and is akin to a “restore to
factory defaults” operation. This operation also provides a means to zeroize keys and CSPs. Subsequently,
the CM has to be re-initialized before it can return to a FIPS compliant mode of operation. This Revert-SP
method is invoked as an unauthenticated service by virtue of the use of a public credential (PSID).
2.9 Show Status
Show status service can be used to determine if the drive is operational under the security constraints of FIPS.
For this purpose TCG Level 0 Discovery mechanism is utilized. TCG Level 0 Discovery mechanism maybe
invoked by the operator to know if drive is in “use” or security “fail” state. If the Drive Security Life Cycle
State is 0x80 then drive is in Use State i.e. security is operational. If the Drive Security Life Cycle State is
0xFF the drive is in security Fail State i.e. drive is not operational in terms of FIPS services.
The LED indicates the drive is powered on. Drive activity is indicated by blinking of the LED. No other
status is indicated through LED.
Page 9
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
3 Identification andAuthentication (I&A) Policy
3.1 Operator Roles
Note: The following identifies the CO and User roles with a general description of the purposes. For further
details of the services performed by each role in each FIPS mode, see section 4.1.
3.1.1 Crypto Officer Roles
3.1.1.1 Drive Owner
This CO role corresponds to the SID (Secure ID) Authority on the Admin SP as defined in Enterprise SSC
[4]. This role is used to download a new FW image. Note: only a FIPS validated firmware version can be
loaded to the module. Otherwise, the module is not operating in FIPS mode.
3.1.1.2 EraseMaster (TCG Security Mode)
This CO role corresponds to the same named role as defined in Enterprise SSC [refer to Section1.3, item 4].
This role is used to enable/disable User roles, and erase the user data region (LBA band). An operator is
authenticated to this role with role-based authentication.
3.1.2 User Roles
3.1.2.1 BandMasters (0-15) (TCG Security Mode)
This user role corresponds to the same named role as defined in Enterprise SSC [refer to Section1.3, item 4].
This role is used to lock/unlock and configure a user data band (“LBA band”) for read/write access.
A CM can be configured to support up to 16 user data bands, which are controlled by their respective
BandMaster credentials. By default 2 user bands are enabled. BandMasters are enabled/disabled using the
EraseMaster role. An operator is authenticated to the BandMaster role with identity-based authentication. If
a user data band is erased (EraseMaster service) then the BandMaster PIN is reset to MSID.
3.1.3 Unauthenticated Role
This role can perform the Show Status service.
If the operator has physical access to the drive, this role can also reset the module with a power cycle
(which results in POSTs). This role can also use the public PSID value to exit the FIPS approved mode of
operation. See section 4.1 for details.
3.2 Authentication
3.2.1 Authentication Types
Some operator roles have role-based authentication and others have identity-based authentication. For
example, the Drive Owner role uses role-based authentication as there is only one ID and one PIN. In TCG
Security Mode, the CM has up to 16 User operators. Each of these operators is assigned a unique ID to which
a PIN is associated, thus this provides identity-based authentication.
For some services the authentication is performed in a separate associated service; e.g. the Read Unlock
service is the authentication for subsequent User Data Read service. If the User Data Read service is attempted
without prior authentication then the command will fail.
3.2.2 Authentication in TCG Security Mode
Operator authentication is provided within a TCG session. The host application can have only a single session
open at a time. Authentication of an operator, using the TCG interface, uses the Authenticate method to
authenticate to a role after a session has been started. Authentications will persist until the session is closed.
During a session the application can invoke services for which the authenticated operator has access control.
Note that a security rule of the CM is that the host must not authenticate to more than one operator (TCG
authority) in a session.
For the Show Status the host application will authenticate to the “Anybody” authority which does not have
a private credential. Therefore this operation is effectively an unauthenticated service.
Page 10
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
3.2.3 Authentication Mechanism, Data and Strength
Operator authentication with PINs is implemented by hashing the operator input value and comparing it to
the stored hash of the assigned PIN. The PINs have a retry attribute (“TryLimit”) that controls the number of
unsuccessful attempts before the authentication is blocked. The “TryLimit” has an unmodifiable value of
1024. The PINs have a maximum length of 32 bytes.
Per the policy security rules, the minimum PIN length is 4 bytes (Rule 2 in Section 7.1). This gives a
probability of 1/232
of guessing the PIN in a single random attempt. This easily meets the FIPS 140-2
authentication strength requirements of less than 1/1,000,000.
In TCG interface, each failed authentication attempt takes a minimum of 15ms to complete. Thus a theoretical
maximum of {(60*1000)/15} attempts can be processed in one minute. Thus the probability of multiple
random attempts to succeed in one minute is 4000/232
. This is significantly lower than the FIPS requirement
of 1/100,000. In addition, since the “TryLimit” is unmodifiable, only 1024 attempts can be processed in one
minute before the authorities are locked out.
3.2.4 Personalizing Authentication Data
The initial value for SID and various other PINs is a manufactured value (MSID). This is a device-unique,
32-byte, public value. The Security Rules (Section 7) for the CM requires that the PIN values must be
“personalized” to private values using the “Set PIN” service.
Page 11
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
4 Access Control Policy
4.1 Services
The following tables represent the FIPS 140-2 services for each FIPS Approved Mode in terms of the
Approved Security Functions and operator access control. Note the following:
 Use of the services described below is only compliant if the module is in the noted Approved
mode.
 Underlying security functions used by higher level algorithms are not represented (e.g. hashing as
part of asymmetric key)
 Operator authentication is not represented in this table.
 Some security functions listed are used solely to protect / encrypt keys and CSPs.
 Service input and output details are defined by the TCG and SCSI standards.
 Unauthenticated services (e.g. Show Status) do not provide access to private keys or CSPs.
 Some services have indirect access control provided through enable / disable or lock / unlock
services used by an authenticated operator; e.g. User data read / write.
Page 12
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
Table 1.1 - FIPS 140-2 Authenticated Services
(TCG Security Mode)
Service Name Description Operator Access
Control
Security Function Command(s)/Event(s)
Set PIN Change operator
authentication data.
EraseMaster,
BandMasters, Drive
Owner
Firmware SHA256,
Firmware DRBG,
Firmware PBKDF,
Firmware HMAC,
Firmware AES_GCM
TCG Set Method
Firmware
Download
Enable / Disable FW
Download and load
complete firmware image. If
the self-test of the code load
passes then the device will
run with the new code.
Drive Owner** Hardware RSA,
Hardware SHA
TCG Set Method, SCSI
Write Buffer
Enable / Disable
BandMasters
Enable / Disable a User
Authority.
EraseMaster None TCG Set Method
Set Range
Attributes
Set the location, size, and
locking attributes of the
LBA range.
BandMasters None TCG Set Method
Lock / Unlock
User Data Range
for Read and/or
Write
Block or allow read
(decrypt) / write (encrypt) of
user data in a range.
BandMasters Firmware AES-GCM,
Firmware AES,
Firmware Key Wrap
TCG Set Method
User Data Read /
Write
Encryption / decryption of
user data to/from a LBA
range.
Access control to this
service is provided through
Lock / Unlock User Data
Range.
None* Hardware AES SCSI Read, Write
Commands
Cryptographic
Erase
Erase user data in an LBA
range by cryptographic
means: changing the Media
encryption key (MEK).
BandMaster PIN is also
reset.
EraseMaster, Firmware DRBG,
Hardware SHA,
Firmware PBKDF,
Firmware HMAC,
Firmware
AES_GCM,Hardware
HMAC, Firmware Key
Wrap
TCG Erase Method
*Security has to be Unlocked
**FW Download Port has to be Unlocked
Page 13
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
Table 1.2 - FIPS 140-2 Unauthenticated Services
(TCG Security Mode)
Service Name Description Operator
Access
Control
Security
Function
Command(s)/Event(s)
Show Status Reports if the CM is operational in terms
of FIPS services and approved mode of
operation value.
None None TCG Level 0 Discovery, TCG
Get Method
Drive Security Life Cycle
State =0x80(Use State)
and, Approved mode of
operation value =0x02.
Reset Module Runs POSTs and zeroizes key & CSP in
RAM.
None All
cryptographic
algorithms
POR
DRBG Generate
Bytes
Returns an SP 800-90A DRBG Random
Number of 256 bytes
None Firmware
DRBG,
Firmware
SHA256
TCG Random()
Exit FIPS
Approved Mode
of Operation1
Transition the CM back to the as-
manufactured state (uninitialized)
None (using
PSID)
None TCG AdminSP.RevertSP()
FIPS 140
Compliance
Descriptor
Reports FIPS 140 Revision, Overall
Security Level, Hardware and Firmware
revisions and Module name
None None SCSI SECURITY
PROTOCOL IN – Protocol 0
4.2 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
The following table defines the keys / CSPs and the operators / services which use them. Note the
following:
 The use of PIN CSPs for authentication is implied by the operator access control.
 The Set PIN service is represented in this table even though generally it is only used at module
setup.
 All non-volatile storage of keys and CSPs is in the system area of the drive media to which there is
no logical or physical access from outside of the module.
 The module uses SP 800-90A DRBG and adopts Hash DRBG mechanism.
 The module generates a minimum 256 bits of entropy for use with key generation.
 Read access of private values are internal only to the CM and are thus not represented in this table.
 There is no security-relevant audit feature.
1
CM will enter non-compliant state, which is outside the scope of this validation
Page 14
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
Table 3 – “Key Management”
Name Description
Type (Pub / Priv,
key / CSP (e.g.
PIN)), size
Operator Role Services Used In Access **(W, X)
SID (Secure ID), aka
Drive Owner PIN
Auth. Data
Private, PIN, 256
bits
Drive Owner Set PIN W
EraseMaster EraseMaster Auth Data
Private, PIN, 256
bits
EraseMaster
SetPIN W
Cryptographic Erase X
BandMaster 0-15
Passwords
Users Auth. Data
Private, PIN, 256
bits
BandMasters
Set PIN W
Lock/Unlock User Data X
LBA Range MEKs MEK (per LBA band)
Private, AES Key,
256 bits
Users Lock/Unlock User Data X
Entropy Input String
*Input to a DRBG mechanism of a
string of bits that contains entropy
Private, 256 bits None
Services which use the
DRBG (cryptographic erase)
X
Seed
*String of bits that is used as input
to a DRBG mechanism
Private, Hash seed,
448 bits
None
Services which use the
DRBG (cryptographic erase,
SetPIN)
X
Internal State
*Collection of stored information
about DRBG instantiation
Private, V and C
440 bits
None
Services which uses the
DRBG (cryptographic erase,
SetPIN)
X
ORG 0-0 - ORG 0-3
Firmware Load Test Signature
Verify Key
Public, RSA Key,
2048 bits
Drive Owner
(enable FW
download)
FW Download X
MEKEK This key is used to wrap the MEK
Private, AES Key,
256 bits
BandMasters,
EraseMaster
Lock/Unlock User Data,
Cryptographic Erase, Set PIN
W,X
Master Key
This key is used to protect the
MEKEK
Private, AES Key, 32
bytes
Drive Owner,
BandMasters,
EraseMaster
Unlock User Data,
Cryptographic Erase, Set PIN
W,X
CSPSKs
Critical Security Parameter
Sanitization Keys, used within
PBKDF
Private, AES Key,
256 bits
Drive Owner,
BandMasters,
EraseMaster
Lock/Unlock User Data,
Cryptographic Erase, SetPIN
W, X
* Source: Section 4 Terms and Definitions of NIST Special Publication 800-90A
** W- Write access is allowed, X – Execute access is allowed
Page 15
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
5 Physical Security
5.1 Mechanisms
The CM has the following physical security:
 Production-grade components with standard passivation
 Two tamper-evident security labels applied by Micron manufacturing prevent top and bottom
cover removal for access or visibility to the media
 Exterior of the drive is opaque
 The tamper-evident labels cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without tamper-evidence
 The tamper-evident labels cannot be easily replicated with a low attack time
 Security label on sides of drive provide tamper-evidence of top and bottom cover removal
Figure 1: Top view of tamper-evidence label on sides of drive
Figure 2: Left-side view of tamper-evidence label on left side of drive
Figure 3: Right-side view of tamper-evidence label on right side of drive
Page 16
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
5.2 Operator Requirements
The operator is required to inspect the CM periodically for one or more of the following tamper evidence:
 Checkerboard pattern on security label
 Security label cutouts do not match original
Upon discovery of tamper evidence, the module should be removed from service.
7mm drives
15 mm drives
Checkerbox Pattern
Tamper
Evidence
Page 17
MICRON S650DC® SAS TCG ENTERPRISE SSC SELF-ENCRYPTING DRIVE
NON-PROPRIETARY FIPS 140-2 MODULE SECURITY POLICY
REV 0.9
6 Operational Environment
The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the CM operates
in a “non-modifiable operational environment”. That is, while the module is in operation the operational
environment cannot be modified and no code can be added or deleted. FW can be upgraded (replaced) with
a signed FW download operation. If the code download is successfully authenticated then the module will
begin operating with the new code image.
7 Security Rules
7.1 Secure Initialization
The following are the security rules for initialization and operation of the CM in a FIPS 140-2 compliant
manner. Reference the appropriate sections of this document for details.
1. Users: At installation and periodically examine the physical security mechanisms for tamper
evidence.
2. COs and Users: At installation, set all operator PINs applicable for the FIPS mode to private values
of at least 4 bytes length:
 TCG Security: Drive Owner, EraseMaster and BandMasters
3. Drive Owner: At installation, disable the “Makers” authority1
4. At installation, the value of LockOnReset1
for FW Download must be set to “Power Cycle” and it
must not be modified.
5. At installation, the value of PortLocked1
for FW Download must be set to “TRUE”.
7.2 Ongoing Policy Restrictions
1. Prior to assuming a new role, close the current Session and start a new Session, or do a power cycle, so
that the previous authentication is cleared.
2. User Data Read/Writes shall be an authenticated service2
. Therefore, set ReadLockEnabled1
and
WriteLockEnabled1
to “True” (the default value is “False”). If a band is configured with a value of
“False” then the band is to be considered excluded from the module boundary.
8 Mitigation of OtherAttacks Policy
The CM does not make claims to mitigate against other attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2.
1
Refer Section 1.3, Item 5
2
Refer to Section 4.1, Table 1.1