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IBM 4770-001 Enterprise PKCS#11 HSM
Cryptographic Coprocessor Security Module
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version 1.3
Last update: 2023-07-18
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 Cryptographic Module Specification .....................................................................4
1.1 Module Overview................................................................................................................4
1.2 Modes of Operation ..........................................................................................................11
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces ........................................................ 13
3 Roles, services, and authentication.................................................................... 14
3.1 Roles and their authentication .........................................................................................14
3.2 Services............................................................................................................................16
3.3 Authentication..................................................................................................................27
4 Physical Security............................................................................................... 28
5 Operational Environment................................................................................... 31
6 Key Management .............................................................................................. 32
6.1 Random Number Generation............................................................................................35
6.2 Key Generation.................................................................................................................35
6.3 Key Establishment............................................................................................................35
6.4 Key Entry/Output..............................................................................................................36
6.5 Key Zeroization ................................................................................................................36
6.6 Key Storage......................................................................................................................36
7 EMI/EMC ........................................................................................................... 38
8 Self-Tests ......................................................................................................... 39
8.1 Power-On Self-Tests .........................................................................................................39
8.1.1 Integrity Tests...........................................................................................................39
8.1.2 Known-Answer Self-Tests..........................................................................................40
8.1.3 Conditional Tests ......................................................................................................42
9 Design assurance .............................................................................................. 43
9.1 Delivery and Operation ....................................................................................................43
9.2 Crypto Officer Guidance ...................................................................................................43
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9.2.1 Coprocessor Physical Installation..............................................................................43
9.2.2 Firmware Installation and Entering Operational/FIPS Mode ......................................44
9.3 User Guidance..................................................................................................................44
9.3.1 Handling Self-Test Errors ..........................................................................................44
9.3.2 DSA signature service usage ....................................................................................46
9.4 Supplemental IBM Security Policy and Guidance..............................................................46
10 Mitigation of other attacks ................................................................................ 47
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1 Cryptographic Module Specification
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy of the IBM 4770-001 Enterprise
PKCS#11 HSM Cryptographic Coprocessor Security Module. It describes the design and features of
this cryptographic module and the rules under which the module operates. It also describes how
the module meets the requirements of FIPS 140-2 for all applicable areas at security level 4.
1.1 Module Overview
The IBM 4770-001 Enterprise PKCS#11 HSM Cryptographic Coprocessor Security Module
cryptographic module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a Multi-Chip Embedded Hardware
cryptographic module in the form of a PCIe card. This module with components Miniboot (MB)
hardware and EP11 firmware, provides crypto officers and users the security policy governing
access to those services specified in section 3.2. EP11 provides an interface similar to the industry
standard PKCS#11 API. The EP11 firmware provides a stateless backend, relying mainly on host-
resident, encrypted datastores to maintain sensitive state, while presenting services as a regular
HSM-based PKCS#11 implementation.
The Module is a cryptographic coprocessor, a general-purpose computing platform with
cryptographic accelerator engines, executing firmware and retaining secrets, despite foreseeable
physical or logical attacks. The overall security rating of the module is 4. The Module is intended
for use by US Federal agencies and other markets that require FIPS 140-2 validated Level 4
modules. End users can base high-assurance applications, such as digital signature generation or
financial transaction processing, on this platform. Table 1 lists the security levels supported by the
cryptographic module according to each section of FIPS 140-2.
FIPS 140-2 Section Title Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 4
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 4
Roles, Services, and Authentication 4
Finite State Model 4
Physical Security 4
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 4
EMI/EMC 4
Self-Tests 4
Design Assurance 4
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 4
Table 1 - Security Levels
For the purposes of this FIPS 140–2 validation, this policy describes fixed module configurations,
and does not allow firmware updates. Therefore, this policy is applicable only when the
appropriate configurations are loaded to suitable hardware. Components are identified through the
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most significant eight bits (i.e. the first byte) of their content hashes, which is reported by host
drivers in a platform-specific way. The configurations covered by this policy are the following:
Model Hardware
[Part Number and Version]
Configuration
4770-001 PN 03JJ471-H07163 POST0
v9398
MB0 v9005 (Standard Power)
Segment 0 Information
The hardware part numbers imply Segment 0 configuration
Segment 1 Information
Name: 8.0.37z P3592 M3592 P4630 F0D0B
Hash data:
D5B3 3BE0 F565 9086 411F 58E7 30E3 3566 53FF C592
BA8F 8E55 2FBD 9BF3 C169 12A1 2097 C258 32DA C623
F570 C325 16ED 1492 B9A5 5584 EA2A 9D3F 330D BE44
385D 5F26
Segment 2 Information
short ID: 5E8E 728A (the first bits of the hash value of
segment firmware)
Hash data:
5E8E 728A 67C5 1EAC FD88 6F93 E1EE C599 0885 4393
EDFD 171E DBE3 3377 20E6 09B5 EF97 C549 05B3 2D30
5926 D75B 8267 DC99 3043 5421 36EC 1FAA EC86 A15D
B740 82BC
Segment 3 Information
short ID: 77FA 9138
Hash data:
77FA 9138 D034 9969 6369 709A F780 5126 4ED2 8165
5677 9BAF 5D07 BE4C CDAF E5A0 F2D5 2C4C 40A3 146C
1452 E44B 8963 90D1 9102 0D37 DEE7 B469 59B5 B1F2
EBBA 620F
4770-001 PN 03JJ467-H07163 POST0
v9398
MB0 v9005 (Low Power)
Segment 0 Information
The hardware part numbers imply Segment 0 configuration
Segment 1 Information
Name: 8.0.37z P3592 M3592 P4630 F0D0B
Hash data:
D5B3 3BE0 F565 9086 411F 58E7 30E3 3566 53FF C592
BA8F 8E55 2FBD 9BF3 C169 12A1 2097 C258 32DA C623
F570 C325 16ED 1492 B9A5 5584 EA2A 9D3F 330D BE44
385D 5F26
Segment 2 Information
short ID: 5E8E 728A (the first bits of the hash value of
segment firmware)
Hash data:
5E8E 728A 67C5 1EAC FD88 6F93 E1EE C599 0885 4393
EDFD 171E DBE3 3377 20E6 09B5 EF97 C549 05B3 2D30
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5926 D75B 8267 DC99 3043 5421 36EC 1FAA EC86 A15D
B740 82BC
Segment 3 Information
short ID: 77FA 9138
Hash data:
77FA 9138 D034 9969 6369 709A F780 5126 4ED2 8165
5677 9BAF 5D07 BE4C CDAF E5A0 F2D5 2C4C 40A3 146C
1452 E44B 8963 90D1 9102 0D37 DEE7 B469 59B5 B1F2
EBBA 620F
4770-001 PN 03JJ829-N38324 POST0
v8840
MB0 v3606 (Standard Power)
Segment 0 Information
The hardware part numbers imply Segment 0 configuration
Segment 1 Information
Name: 8.0.37z P3592 M3592 P4630 F0D0B
Hash data:
D5B3 3BE0 F565 9086 411F 58E7 30E3 3566 53FF C592
BA8F 8E55 2FBD 9BF3 C169 12A1 2097 C258 32DA C623
F570 C325 16ED 1492 B9A5 5584 EA2A 9D3F 330D BE44
385D 5F26
Segment 2 Information
short ID: 5E8E 728A (the first bits of the hash value of
segment firmware)
Hash data:
5E8E 728A 67C5 1EAC FD88 6F93 E1EE C599 0885 4393
EDFD 171E DBE3 3377 20E6 09B5 EF97 C549 05B3 2D30
5926 D75B 8267 DC99 3043 5421 36EC 1FAA EC86 A15D
B740 82BC
Segment 3 Information
short ID: 77FA 9138
Hash data:
77FA 9138 D034 9969 6369 709A F780 5126 4ED2 8165
5677 9BAF 5D07 BE4C CDAF E5A0 F2D5 2C4C 40A3 146C
1452 E44B 8963 90D1 9102 0D37 DEE7 B469 59B5 B1F2
EBBA 620F
4770-001 PN 03JJ825-N38324 POST0
v8840
MB0 v3606 (Low Power)
Segment 0 Information
The hardware part numbers imply Segment 0 configuration
Segment 1 Information
Name: 8.0.37z P3592 M3592 P4630 F0D0B
Hash data:
D5B3 3BE0 F565 9086 411F 58E7 30E3 3566 53FF C592
BA8F 8E55 2FBD 9BF3 C169 12A1 2097 C258 32DA C623
F570 C325 16ED 1492 B9A5 5584 EA2A 9D3F 330D BE44
385D 5F26
Segment 2 Information
short ID: 5E8E 728A (the first bits of the hash value of
segment firmware)
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Hash data:
5E8E 728A 67C5 1EAC FD88 6F93 E1EE C599 0885 4393
EDFD 171E DBE3 3377 20E6 09B5 EF97 C549 05B3 2D30
5926 D75B 8267 DC99 3043 5421 36EC 1FAA EC86 A15D
B740 82BC
Segment 3 Information
short ID: 77FA 9138
Hash data:
77FA 9138 D034 9969 6369 709A F780 5126 4ED2 8165
5677 9BAF 5D07 BE4C CDAF E5A0 F2D5 2C4C 40A3 146C
1452 E44B 8963 90D1 9102 0D37 DEE7 B469 59B5 B1F2
EBBA 620F
4770-001 PN 03KY267-H07190 POST0
v8840
MB0 v3606 (Standard Power)
Segment 0 Information
The hardware part numbers imply Segment 0 configuration
Segment 1 Information
Name: 8.0.37z P3592 M3592 P4630 F0D0B
Hash data:
D5B3 3BE0 F565 9086 411F 58E7 30E3 3566 53FF C592
BA8F 8E55 2FBD 9BF3 C169 12A1 2097 C258 32DA C623
F570 C325 16ED 1492 B9A5 5584 EA2A 9D3F 330D BE44
385D 5F26
Segment 2 Information
short ID: 5E8E 728A (the first bits of the hash value of
segment firmware)
Hash data:
5E8E 728A 67C5 1EAC FD88 6F93 E1EE C599 0885 4393
EDFD 171E DBE3 3377 20E6 09B5 EF97 C549 05B3 2D30
5926 D75B 8267 DC99 3043 5421 36EC 1FAA EC86 A15D
B740 82BC
Segment 3 Information
short ID: 77FA 9138
Hash data:
77FA 9138 D034 9969 6369 709A F780 5126 4ED2 8165
5677 9BAF 5D07 BE4C CDAF E5A0 F2D5 2C4C 40A3 146C
1452 E44B 8963 90D1 9102 0D37 DEE7 B469 59B5 B1F2
EBBA 620F
4770-001 PN 03KY263-H07190 POST0
v8840
MB0 v3606 (Low Power)
Segment 0 Information
The hardware part numbers imply Segment 0 configuration
Segment 1 Information
Name: 8.0.37z P3592 M3592 P4630 F0D0B
Hash data:
D5B3 3BE0 F565 9086 411F 58E7 30E3 3566 53FF C592
BA8F 8E55 2FBD 9BF3 C169 12A1 2097 C258 32DA C623
F570 C325 16ED 1492 B9A5 5584 EA2A 9D3F 330D BE44
385D 5F26
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Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Components
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show representations that apply to all part numbers listed in Table 2.
Although the part numbers in the table are different, the module functionality and the structure
are the same. The physical form of the 4770-001 PCIe module is depicted in Figure 1. The red
outline in the picture depicts the physical cryptographic boundary. The module is comprised of two
(2) electrical component cards with one used as a battery holder and the second one being the
main functional component of the Module. The module relies on a host system that supplies a PCIe
interface for input/output communication.
Segment 2 Information
short ID: 5E8E 728A (the first bits of the hash value of
segment firmware)
Hash data:
5E8E 728A 67C5 1EAC FD88 6F93 E1EE C599 0885 4393
EDFD 171E DBE3 3377 20E6 09B5 EF97 C549 05B3 2D30
5926 D75B 8267 DC99 3043 5421 36EC 1FAA EC86 A15D
B740 82BC
Segment 3 Information
short ID: 77FA 9138
Hash data:
77FA 9138 D034 9969 6369 709A F780 5126 4ED2 8165
5677 9BAF 5D07 BE4C CDAF E5A0 F2D5 2C4C 40A3 146C
1452 E44B 8963 90D1 9102 0D37 DEE7 B469 59B5 B1F2
EBBA 620F
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Figure 1 – Module
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Figure 2 – 4770-001 Block Diagram
The module is divided into four layers, which are further referred to as segments, as illustrated in
Figure 3. The items on the left side of the segments in Figure 3 are not part of the module. The
base two segments, and a stub in the third segment control security and configuration of the
module:
• Segment 0: Permanent POST 0 (Power-on Self-Test) and Miniboot 0 (security bootstrap).
This code is in Secure Flash, bootstrapping the entire module, effectively non-modifiable.
• Segment 1: Rewritable POST 1 and Miniboot 1, responsible for most of user-visible
infrastructure functionality.
POST 2, while executed by the module CPU, is logically controlled and is considered as part
of Segment 1. Specifically, POST 2 gets control immediately after module CPU reset and
before any OS or higher-level applications. POST 2 does not get access to secrets, and it
must be approved by the Segment 1 crypto officer to load (being part of Segment 1
firmware updates).
POST routines perform initial and higher-level testing of the module’s infrastructural
functionality. If both POST 0 and POST 1 pass successfully, and POST 2 reports success of
the module CPU tests, the PCIe card’s hardware is guaranteed to be functional for basic
services. In addition to POSTs, both Miniboot 0 and Miniboot 1 perform detailed, targeted
tests of card hardware—cryptographic, code integrity, other infrastructure—before relying
on their services.
• Segment 2: Special-purpose Linux operating system.
• Segment 3: EP11, application code, including user space drivers.
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Figure 3 - Module Architecture
The module has been tested on the operational environments listed in Table 3.
Operating System Hardware P/N Processors
Linux based on kernel
v 3.1
PN 03JJ467-H07163POST0 v9398 MB0
v9005(Low Power)
Capri ASIC Low Power with
Power PC 405 x1
Power PC 470 x2
PN 03JJ825-N38324POST0 v8840 MB0
v3606(Low Power)
PN 03KY263-H07190POST0 v8840 MB0
v3606 (Low Power)
PN 03JJ471-H07163POST0 v9398 MB0
v9005(Standard Power)
Capri ASIC Standard Power with
Power PC 405 x1
Power PC 470 x2
PN 03JJ829-N38324POST0 v8840 MB0
v3606(Standard Power)
PN 03KY267-H07190POST0 v8840 MB0
v3606 (Standard Power)
Table 3: Tested Operational Environments
1.2 Modes of Operation
The module supports two modes of operation:
• FIPS mode (the Approved mode of operation): only approved or allowed security functions
listed in Table 10can be used.
• Non-FIPS mode (the non-Approved mode of operation): all security functions (approved
services listed in Table 7 and Table 8 or non-approved services and algorithms listed in
Table 9) can be used. In order to switch from FIPS mode to non-FIPS mode or from non-FIPS
mode to FIPS mode, it requires reinitialization of the module that zeroizes or and/or re-
creates the CSPs stored in volatile and non-volatile storage of the module such that there is
no sharing of keys or CSPs between the two modes.
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The Segment 3 of the module can consist of multiple domains, also called EP11 domains. They
domains are the partitions that maintain their own administrative settings, key material as well as
their own operational mode (FIPS or non-FIPS) and the mode is reported via compliance settings
using control point setups. The control points are administratively controlled sets of restrictions
that enable or disable specific functionalities. When the compliance settings show that
XCP_ADMS_FIPS2021 and XCP_ADMS_ADM_FIPS2021 are enabled it is identified that a domain is in
FIPS mode. This mode prohibits use of any non-approved algorithm, mode key or key size. The key
objects contain the expected mode of operation. Therefore, objects containing a non-expected
mode of operation are not usable within the running mode.
To enable FIPS mode, the administrative setting XCP_ADMM_STR_112BIT (or a higher key strength
mode i.e., XCP_ADMM_STR_128) must be enabled, and the following control points must be
disabled:
XCP_CPB_KEYSZ_BELOW80BIT
XCP_CPB_KEYSZ_80BIT
XCP_CPB_ALG_RAW_RSA
XCP_CPB_SKIP_KEYTESTS
XCP_CPB_ALG_NFIPS2011
XCP_CPB_KEYSZ_HMAC_ANY
XCP_CPB_KEYSZ_RSA65536
XCP_CPB_ALG_NFIPS2021
XCP_CPB_ECDSA_OTHER
XCP_CPB_ALG_EC_25519
XCP_CPB_ALG_PQC
XCP_CPB_BTC
XCP_CPB_ALLOW_NONSESSION
XCP_CPB_ALG_EC_SECGCRV
XCP_CPB_ALG_EC_BPOOLCRV
XCP_CPB_COMPAT_LEGACY_SHA3
XCP_CPB_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN
XCP_CPB_WRAP_ASYMM
XCP_CPB_UNWRAP_ASYMM
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2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
Table 4 describes all the cryptographic module’s ports and interfaces. The physical ports listed in
the table below maps to the physical ports shown in Figure 2. All input data of the cryptographic
module uses data input interfaces, and all output data of the cryptographic module uses data
output interfaces. Data output is inhibited during power-on self-tests and error state.
Physical port Logical Interface Data that passes over port/interface
PCIe data/addresses
Data input
Data output
PCIe Express signals
PCIe control
Control input
Status output
PCIe Express signals
Serial ports (RS232) Status output Auxiliary signals
USB port
N/A (the current firmware does
not use USB port)
The USB port is not used by the module.
PCIe power Power Auxiliary signals
Battery power (USB) Power Auxiliary signals
External warning
(Sensor connected to
the Tamper
Controller)
Control input (from sensor)
Status output (to host)
Auxiliary signals
N/A
EP11 Data input/
EP11 Data output
API input parameters for data/ API output
parameters for data
EP11 Control input API function calls
EP11 Status output API return code
Table 4 - Ports and Interfaces
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3 Roles, services, and authentication
3.1 Roles and their authentication
Table 5 describes the roles supported by the cryptographic module. The module supports the
Cryptographic Officer roles and User role. The module does not support concurrent operators, and
it does not support a Maintenance role.
Role Description
CO1
Cryptographic Officer 1
Owns Segment 1 and established by IBM as the base authority.
CO2
Cryptographic Officer 2
Owns Segment 2 and established by CO1.
CO3
Cryptographic Officer 3
Owns Segment 3 and established by CO2.
CO (EP11
Module
Administrator)
Performs EP11 administrative services that are opaque to the User role. Module
administrators are the most privileged EP11 identities. They are authorized to submit
state-changing commands at the module level.
CO (EP11
Domain
Administrator)
Performs EP11 administrative services that are opaque to the User role. Domain
administrators are authorized to submit state-changing commands to its own domain, but
not the entire module or other domains.
User Uses EP11 Domain services.
Table 5 - Roles Description
Table 6 lists the roles and their respective authentication methods and strengths.
Role Authentication
Method
Authentication Strength
CO1 Identity-based ECC P-521 using SHA-512 is used for the signing and verification of
digital signatures.
The probability that a random attempt will succeed, or a false
acceptance will occur is 1/2^256, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Even considering the rate of one (1) signature verification per 1μs,
the probability of successfully authenticating to the Module within
one minute through random attempts is 60,000,000/2^256, which is
less than 1/100,000.
CO2 Identity-based ECC P-521 using SHA-512 is used for the signing and verification of
digital signatures.
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The probability that a random attempt will succeed, or a false
acceptance will occur is 1/2^256, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Even considering the rate of one (1) signature verification per 1μs,
the probability of successfully authenticating to the Module within
one minute through random attempts is 60,000,000/2^256, which is
less than 1/100,000.
CO3 Identity-based ECC P-521 using SHA-512 is used for the signing and verification of
digital signatures.
The probability that a random attempt will succeed, or a false
acceptance will occur is 1/2^256, which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Even considering the rate of one (1) signature verification per 1μs,
the probability of successfully authenticating to the Module within
one minute through random attempts is 60,000,000/2^256, which is
less than 1/100,000.
CO (EP11
Module
Administrator)
Identity-based ECDSA with curves P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 and RSA with
approved keys 2048, 3072, 4096 with SHA-256 is used for the
signing and verification of digital signatures.
Considering lowest key size, the probability that a random attempt
will succeed, or a false acceptance will occur is 1/2^112, which is
less than 1/1,000,000.
Even considering the rate of one (1) signature verification per 1μs,
the probability of successfully authenticating to the Module within
one minute through random attempts is 60,000,000/2^256, which is
less than 1/100,000.
CO (EP11
Domain
Administrator)
Identity-based ECDSA with curves P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 and RSA with
approved keys 2048, 3072, 4096 with SHA-256 is used for the
signing and verification of digital signatures.
Considering lowest key size, the probability that a random attempt
will succeed, or a false acceptance will occur is 1/2^112, which is
less than 1/1,000,000.
Even considering the rate of one (1) signature verification per 1μs,
the probability of successfully authenticating to the Module within
one minute through random attempts is 60,000,000/2^256, which is
less than 1/100,000.
User Identity-based The user authentication is performed by verifying a PIN blob
protected under authenticated-encryption that uses AES Key
Wrapping under a 256-bit shared key derived from the SP800-56Ar3
compliance shared secret computation. The authentication strength
is 2^256 , which is the security strength of the AES Key Wrapping
with a 256-bit key.
Even considering the rate of one (1) AES Key Unwrapping per 1μs,
the probability of successfully authenticating to the Module within
one minute through random attempts is 60,000,000/2^256, which is
less than 1/100,000.
Table 6 - Roles and Authentication
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3.2 Services
• G = Generates keys
• I = Input keys from outside of the Module
• O = Output Key
• K = Used to Encrypt/Decrypt
• U = Use Key
• W = Write/Store Key
• Z = Zeroize
• R = Read
• D = Delete
• V= Verify Signature
• S = Generate Signature
Table 7 lists the authenticated services supported by the cryptographic module.
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
CSPs/Public Keys Roles Access
rights to
CSPs/
Public
Keys
Miniboot
Establish Officer (CO) 2 Register new
Officer 2
ECDSA ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer1 public key)
CO1 V
ECDSA ECDSA Key
(Device keypair (DKP1)
private key)
S
Establish Officer (CO) 3 Register new
Officer 3
ECDSA ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer2 public key)
CO2 V
ECDSA ECDSA Keys
(Device keypair (DKP1)
private key)
S
Surrender Officer (CO) 2 Clear Segment 2
and 3 parameters
and persistent
data, and officer 2
and officer 3 public
keys
ECDSA ECDSA Keys
(Device keypair (DKP1)
private key)
S
ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer2 public key)
V, W
ECDSA ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer3 public key)
W
Surrender Officer (CO) 3 Clear Segment 3
parameters and
persistent data
and officer 3 public
key
ECDSA ECDSA Keys
(Device keypair (DKP1)
private key)
CO3 S
ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer3 public key)
V, W
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
CSPs/Public Keys Roles Access
rights to
CSPs/
Public
Keys
Ordinary Burn 1 Load Segment 1
firmware and
officer 1 public
key; optionally
clear Segment 2
and/or 3
parameters and
persistent data
and officer public
key, as defined by
Segment 2/3
persistent object
definitions
ECDSA
Dilithium is used
in conjunction
with ECDSA but
has no security
claimed per IG
1.23 bullet 2 as a
redundant
algorithm.
ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer1 public key1)
CO1 V, I, W
Dilithium Key2 1312 to 2592
bytes
ECDSA Keys
(Device keypair (DKP1)
public key)
G, W
ECDSA Keys
(Device keypair (DKP1)
private key)
G, W, S
Key Encrypting Key
(DKP1_KEK)
G, W, D, K
Ordinary Burn 2 Load (replace)
Segment 2
firmware;
optionally clear
Segment 3
parameters,
persistent data,
and officer public
key, as defined by
Segment 3
persistent object
definitions
ECDSA ECDSA Keys
(Device keypair (DKP1)
private key)
CO2 S
ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer2 public key)
V
Emergency Burn 2 Clear Segment 2
and 3 parameters
and persistent
data and officer 2
and officer 3 public
keys; Load
segment 2
firmware and
officer 2 public key
ECDSA ECDSA Keys
(Device keypair (DKP1)
private key)
CO1 S
ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer1 public key)
V
ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer2 public key)
I, W, V
Ordinary Burn 3 Load (replace)
segment 3
firmware
ECDSA ECDSA Keys
(Device keypair (DKP1)
private key)
CO3 S
1 For Ordinary Burn 1 there are two instances of the Officer1 public key – one that is already
present in the Module and one that is supplied in the command. The “old” key is used to verify a
signature on the command, at which point the “new” key is imported and written (replacing the
“old” key).
2 Dilithium is a non-approved but allowed algorithm in FIPS mode with no security claimed per IG
1.23. Therefore, the Dilithium key is not a CSP and is not listed in Table 16.
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
CSPs/Public Keys Roles Access
rights to
CSPs/
Public
Keys
ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer3 public key)
V
Emergency Burn 3 Clear Segment 3
parameters and
persistent data
and officer 3 public
key; Load
Segment 3
firmware and
officer 3 public key
ECDSA ECDSA Keys
(Device keypair (DKP1)
private key)
CO2 S
ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer2 public key)
V
ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer3 public key)
I, W, V
Software-Induced Tamper Render a PCIe HSM
card (i.e. the
module)
inoperable by
evoking the
module’s tamper
response
mechanism.
Evocation of this
service destroys
all CSPs residing
on the PCIe HSM
card.
Note: this
command is not
expected to be
used during the
lifetime of a typical
deployment since
it decommissions
the module and
renders it useless.
ECDSA ECDSA Key
(Device keypair (DKP1)
private key), DRBG seed,
DRBG state
CO1 Z
ECDSA
(Crypto Officer1 public key)
V
EP11 Domain
EC Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret Computation
Shared secret
computation with
EC Diffie Hellman
KAS-ECC-SSC EC Key Pair, EP11 User R
Shared Secret W
Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret Computation
Shared secret
computation with
Diffie Hellman
KAS-FCC-SSC DH Key Pair R
Shared Secret W
Key Wrapping/Unwrapping Key wrapping AES-KW/KWP AES Key wrapping key,
wrapped key
R
Symmetric
Encryption/Decryption
Symmetric
encryption/decrypt
ion
AES, Triple-DES AES, Triple-DES Keys R
Key Generation Key generation DSA, ECDSA, RSA DSA, ECDSA, RSA Keys W
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
CSPs/Public Keys Roles Access
rights to
CSPs/
Public
Keys
Key Verification Key verification ECDSA ECDSA public key R
Signature
Generation/Verification
Signature
generation/verifica
tion
DSA, ECDSA, RSA DSA, ECDSA, RSA Keys R
Random Number Generation Random number
generation
DRBG Entropy Input R
Seed, Internal State W
Message Digest Message digest SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512,
SHA3-224, SHA3-
256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
N/A N/A
Message Authentication
Code (MAC)
Message
Authentication
Code (MAC)
AES-CMAC,
Triple-DES-CMAC
AES, Triple-DES Keys R
HMAC-SHA-224,
HMAC-SHA-256,
HMAC-SHA-384,
HMAC-SHA-512,
HMAC-SHA-
512/224, HMAC-
SHA-512/256,
HMAC-SHA3-224,
HMAC-SHA3-256,
HMAC-SHA3-384,
HMAC-SHA3-512
HMAC Keys R
Manage module
administrator (public keys)
Replace, add or
remove
administrator
public keys
RSA, ECDSA RSA, ECDSA Keys, (EP11
Module Administrator Keys)
CO (EP11
Module
Administra
tor)
V, R, W, Z,
D
Export module state Export module
state by
encrypting its
sensitive part
(wrapping keys)
using AES KW
AES, RSA RSA, ECDSA Keys
(EP11 Module Administrator
Keys)
V, R
AES Key
(EP11 Domain Wrapping
Keys)
R
Import module state Import module
state that contains
sensitive
(wrapping keys)
and non-sensitive
data. Sensitive
data is encrypted
AES, RSA RSA, ECDSA Keys
(EP11 Module Administrator
Keys)
V, R
AES Keys
(EP11 Domain Wrapping
Keys)
W
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
CSPs/Public Keys Roles Access
rights to
CSPs/
Public
Keys
Zeroize Module seg 3 Zeroize all objects
in segment 3
including anything
within domains
N/A RSA, ECDSA Keys
(EP11 Domain Administrator
Keys)
D, Z
AES Keys
(EP11 Domain Wrapping
Keys)
D, Z
RSA, ECDSA Keys
(EP11 Module Administrator
Keys)
V, R
Manage domain
administrator (public keys)
Import
administrative
keys with their
certificates
RSA, ECDSA RSA, ECDSA Keys
(EP11 Domain Administrator
Keys)
CO (EP11
Domain
Administra
tor)
R, W
Generate importer key Generate the
importer key for
importing sensitive
data
RSA, ECDSA Keys (Importer
Keys)
R, W
RSA, ECDSA Keys
(EP11 Module Administrator
Keys)
V, R
Set domain attributes Set the domain
attributes
RSA, ECDSA Keys
(EP11 Domain Administrator
Keys)
V, R
Manage (set, add, remove)
control points
Manage the
control points to
adjust the
functionality of the
module
RSA, ECDSA Keys
(EP11 Domain Administrator
Keys)
V, R
Export Wrapping Key Export a wrapping
key in encrypted
form using key
transport with AES
KW
AES, RSA AES Key
(EP11 Domain Wrapping
Keys)
R
RSA, ECDSA Key
(EP11 Domain Administrator
Key)
V
Import Wrapping Key Generate or import
a key by
generating an
importer key and
providing it for
encryption of the
wrapping key that
is to be imported
AES, RSA, ECDSA AES Key
(EP11 Domain Wrapping
Keys)
W
RSA, ECDSA Key
(EP11 Domain Administrator
Key)
V
Generate Wrapping Key RSA, ECDSA AES Key
(EP11 Domain Wrapping
Keys)
W
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Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
CSPs/Public Keys Roles Access
rights to
CSPs/
Public
Keys
RSA, ECDSA Keys
(EP11 Domain Administrator
Keys)
V, D, Z
Zeroize Domain Zeroizes the
domain
N/A AES Keys
(EP11 Domain Wrapping
Keys)
D, Z
RSA, ECDSA Keys
(EP11 Domain Administrator
Keys)
D, Z
Table 7 - Authenticated Services
Table 8 lists the unauthenticated services supported by the cryptographic module.
Service Description
Cold Boot Reboots the Module and performs power-on self-tests
Query Status Read infrastructure status, including segment owners. Reset the Module CPU
(MCPU) (OS/application).
Query Status/Noreset Read module status, including segment owners. Do not reset Module CPU.
Query Signed Health (“Get Health”) Read module status, including owner identities and officer public keys; Reset
Module CPU conditionally (only if Segment 2 or Segment 3 has been updated
since the MCPU was last reset [in practice this is only possible for Segment 3])
Query Signed Health/No reset
(“Query Firmware”)
Read module status, including owner identities and officer public keys. Do not
reset Module CPU.
Query Certificate Returns the entire Segment 1 certificate list, one certificate at a time (repeated
calls to Miniboot 1).
Query Segment 0 Hash Returns the computed SHA-512 hash of Segment 0 (Miniboot 0 concatenated
with POST0).
Algorithm Test
(SHA-256 test)
Compute SHA-256 hash of host-supplied data as an interactive
communications/infrastructure self-test; Does not access CSPs
Continue to Segment 1 Advance from Segment 0 into Segment 1 if status permits
Continue to Segment 2 Start Segment 2 firmware if status permits
PKCS#11 Queries Includes environment and key queries
Non-Administrative Extended Queries Queries unique to EP11, beyond PKCS#11.
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Service Description
Administrative Queries General information about the module
Self-Test On-demand self-test
Show Status Show the status of the module
Login The service used to login to the module that performs user role authentication
Logout The service used to logout from the module
Table 8 - Unauthenticated Services
Table 9 lists all the non-approved services used by the module.
Service Algorithm Key type Role
EP11
Key Establishment ECDH Brainpool/Montgomery curves EP11 User
Key Generation RSA 1024 bits
DSA L=1024, N=160
ECDSA BP192r1/t1, BP224r1/t1, BP256r1/t1, BP320r1/t1,
BP384r1/t1, BP512r1/t1, secp256k1, Edwards/Montgomery
curves
Domain Parameter
Generation
DSA L=1024, N=160;
L=2048, N=256;
L=3072, N=256
NOTE: DSA Domain Parameter Generation for approved
key sizes has not been ACVP-tested therefore listed as
non-approved.
Key Derivation BIP32 secp256k1
SLIP10 secp256k1, ed25519, nist256
Signature
Generation/Verification
DSA L=1024, N=160
EdDSA ED25591, ED448
ECDSA Brainpool, secp256k1 curves
Signature
Generation/Verification
Dilithium 1312 to 2592 bytes
Table 9: Non-Approved Services
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Table 10 lists all security functions of the module, including specific key strengths employed for
approved services, and implemented modes of operation.
CAVP Cert Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
Miniboot
#A2431 DRBG [NIST SP800-
90A Rev 1]
SHA-512 N/A Random number generation
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4] Testing candidates P-521 Key generation
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4] SHA-512 P-521 signature generation,
signature generation
component, signature
verification
N/A CKG [SP800-133
Rev 2]
Vendor Affirmed ECDSA: P-521 Key generation
EP11 Domain
#A2495 AES [FIPS 197, SP
800-38A]
CBC, ECB 128, 192, 256 bits Encryption/decryption
KW, KWP 256 bits Key wrapping/unwrapping
AES-CMAC [FIPS
197, SP 800-38B]
CMAC 128, 192, 256 bits Encryption/decryption
Triple-DES [SP 800-
67, SP 800-38A]
CBC, ECB 168 bits (without
parity)
Decryption
Triple-DES [SP 800-
67, SP 800-38B
CMAC MAC generation/verification
HMAC [FIPS 198-1] SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384,
SHA-512, SHA-
512/224, SHA-
512/256, SHA3-
224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-
512
112 bits or greater Message authentication
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CAVP Cert Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
SHS [FIPS 180-4] SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512,
SHA-512/224,
SHA-512/256
N/A Message digest
#A2471 SHA-512 N/A
N/A CKG [SP800-133
Rev 2]
Vendor Affirmed DSA: L=2048,
N=256; L=3072,
N=256
ECDSA: P-224, P-
256, P-384, P-521
RSA: 2048, 3072,
4096 bits
Key generation
#A2495 SHA-3 [FIPS 202] SHA3-224, SHA3-
256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
N/A Message digest
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4] SHA2-224, SHA2-
256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA2-
512/224, SHA2-
512/256, SHA3-
224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-
512
P-224, P-256, P-
384, P-521
Signature generation,
Signature generation
component, signature
verification
ECDSA [FIPS 186-4] B.2.1 Extra
random bits
P-224, P-256, P-
384, P-521
Key generation
KAS-ECC-SSC
[Sp800-56Ar3]
ephemralUnified P-256, P-521 Shared Secret computation
KTS [FIPS197]
[SP800-38F] [FIPS
198-1]
AES-KW, KWP 256 Key wrapping/unwrapping
AES-CBC and
HMAC-SHA-224/
HMAC-SHA-256/
HMAC-SHA-384/
HMAC-SHA-512
AES 256 HMAC
with keys equal to
or greater than
112 bits
RSA
Encrypt/Decrypt
(CVL)
N/A
NOTE: This is
tested but not
used.
2048, 3072, 4096 Encryption/decryption
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CAVP Cert Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
RSA [FIPS 186-4] B.3.3 Random
Primes that are
Probably Prime
2048, 3072, 4096
bits
Key generation
PSS with SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512
2048, 3072, 4096
bits
Signature generation
PSS with SHA-1
SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
Signature verification
PKCS1v1.5 with
SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512
#A2471 DSA [FIPS 186-4] N/A {L=2048, N=256},
{L=3072 N=256}
Key generation
SHA-256 {L=2048, N=256},
{L=3072 N=256}
Signature generation
SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512,
SHA-512/224,
SHA-512/256
{L=2048 N=256},
{L=3072 N=256}
Signature verification
KAS-FFC-SSC [SP
800-56Ar3]
dhEphem 2048, 3072 Shared Secret computation
#A2495 KDA-KDF [SP800-
56Cr2]
OneStep
HMAC-SHA2-256
N/A Key derivation
KBKDF [SP800-108] Counter
HMAC-SHA2-256
#A2427,
#A2471,
#A2495
Hash DRBG [SP
800-90A]
SHA-512 Random number generation
#A2427 ECDSA [FIPS 186-4] Testing candidate P-521 Key generation/verification
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CAVP Cert Algorithm and
Standard
Mode / Method Description / Key
Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
SHA-512 Signature generation
component, signature
verification
N/A ENT (P) SP800-90B N/A N/A Random number generation
Table 10 - Approved Algorithms
Table 11 lists the algorithms that are non-approved but allowed in the approved mode of
operation.
Algorithm Key Type Use/Function
Miniboot
Dilithium 1312 to 2592 bytes
Signature
Generation/Verification (no
security claimed per IG 1.23)
Table 11: Non-Approved but Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
Table 12 lists the algorithms that are non-approved and not allowed in the approved mode of
operation.
Algorithm Key Type Use/Function
ECDH Brainpool/Montgomery curves Key Establishment
DSA L=1024, N=160 Key Generation
RSA 1024 bit
DSA L=1024, N=160 Signature Generation/Verification
ECDSA BP192r1/t1, BP224r1/t1,
BP256r1/t1, BP320r1/t1,
BP384r1/t1, BP512r1/t1,
secp256k1,
Edwards/Montgomery curves
DSA L=1024, N=160;
L=2048, N=256;
L=3072, N=256
Domain Parameter Generation
NOTE: DSA Domain Parameter
Generation for approved key
sizes has not been ACVP-tested
therefore listed as non-approved
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BIP32 secp256k1 Key Derivation
SLIP10 secp256k1, ed25519, nist256
EdDSA ED25591, ED448 Signature Generation/Verification
ECDSA Brainpool, secp256k1 curves
Dilithium (Implemented in
EP11)
1312 to 2592 bytes
Table 12: Non-Approved Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
3.3 Authentication
The cryptographic module supports identity-based authentication.
Interacting Miniboot, Crypto officers are authenticated via signed service request. Crypto officers
prove their identities via signatures using the keys that corresponds to their identities. Therefore,
their requests are signed by them using ECDSA with administrative keys and authenticated by the
module.
Crypto Officers (EP11 Administrators) are added during initialization. During initialization, the
module accepts Crypto Officers (administrators); therefore, the first administrator’s certificates will
be accepted without authentication as part of the initialization and ownership establishment. As
soon as enough administrators are present, and a special request is submitted, the module leaves
initialization. All the subsequent requests are authenticated. Administrator commands are
authenticated through public-key cryptography, while some module’s state-changing commands
require signatures of multiple administrators. An administrator’s identity is proven through the
possession of a signing key that corresponds to its public key. Administrator’s public keys are
supplied during administrator login using X.509 certificates.
The user’s role authenticates through a token-based authentication mechanism, where the
authentication token is derived from user provided PIN and session related information.
The EP11 authenticated services listed in Table 7, requires the user to present the authentication
token. Upon a successful verification on the provided authentication token, the requested service
is granted. The EP11 services that do not disclose, modify, substitute keys or key pairs do not
require authentication. These services are listed in Table 8.
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4 Physical Security
Module physical security mechanisms are mainly automatic. Intrusions, which destroy card secrets
through an internal, independent action, are host-observable as system administration events. A
picture of the Module security cover is presented in Figure 1.
COs may notice tamper detection through unusual Module startup, such as a card failing to
initialize. It is recommended to investigate the tamper event type reported by the Module, possibly
cross-checking the tamper event with other logs.
Physical Security Mechanism
Recommended Frequency
of Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance
Details
Hard Tamper N/A (Automatic) N/A
Soft Tamper N/A (Automatic) N/A
External Warning Module Restart Application Discretion
Low Battery As frequent as possible Replace as soon as possible
Table 13 - Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical security is constantly monitored through a tamper detection/ response envelope with
tamper response and zeroization circuitry. No external physical monitoring is required.
Environmental failure protection (EFP) is included.
A hard tamper event is caused by very high overvoltage, temperature or its rate of change out of
reasonable operational range, or physical tamper (penetration of the tamper-detection matrix).
Module memory-type devices (e.g., Battery Backed RAM (BBRAM), communication FIFOs) are
actively zeroized. Module secrets are immediately destroyed: High Speed Erasable BBRAM (HSEB)
is actively cleared at microelectronic speeds (sub-milliseconds). The Module becomes permanently
inoperative: Miniboot startup does not successfully complete without secrets in HSEB.
A soft tamper event is caused by moderate overvoltage or temperature moderately out of
operational range. Reaction is instantaneous. The Module is held under reset while the soft tamper
conditions persist. Secrets are not destroyed.
Hard and soft temper events’ specifics are listed in Table 14.
Temperature or
voltage
measurement
Specify EFP or EFT Specify if this condition
results in shutdown or
zeroisation
Hard tamper event
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Low Temperature Shipping/Storage
temperature below
-38°C ±3°C
EFP Module memory-type devices
(e.g., BBRAM, communication
FIFOs) are actively zeroized.
Module secrets are
immediately destroyed: HSEB
is actively cleared at
microelectronic speeds (sub-
milliseconds). The Module
becomes permanently
inoperative: Miniboot startup
does not successfully
terminate without secrets in
HSEB.
High Temperature Shipping/Storage
temperature above
+90°C ± 2°C
EFP
Low Voltage Dead Battery tamper
threshold < 2.4V ±
0.1V on Battery
Voltage
EFP
High Voltage High Voltage tamper
threshold > 4.2V ±
0.2V on +3.3V Power
supply and battery
High Voltage tamper
threshold > 6.28V ±
0.01V on +5V Power
supply
EFP
Low tamper event
Low Temperature Crypto operating
temperature below
0°C ± 2°C
EFP Reaction is instantaneous. The
Module is held under reset
while the soft tamper
conditions persist. Secrets are
not destroyed.
High Temperature Crypto operating
temperature above
83°C ± 2°C
EFP
Low Voltage Under voltage soft
tamper threshold
4.76V ± 0.01V on
+5.0V Power supply
EFP
High Voltage Over voltage soft
tamper threshold
5.89V ± 0.05V on
+5.0V Power Supply
EFP
Table 14 - EFP/EFT
Table 15 lists the module's intended temperature range of operation. The module is tested at the
low and the high temperatures of operation to pass the hardness requirement for a level 4
module.
Hardness tested temperature measurement
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Low Temperature -42 °C
High Temperature 93 °C
Table 15 - Hardness testing temperature ranges
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5 Operational Environment
The Module is designated as a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions.
The Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions
within the scope of this validation must be validated by the CMVP against FIPS 140-2 or its
successor. Any firmware other than the one listed in Table 2 loaded into this Module is out of the
scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
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6 Key Management
Table 16 describes the usage CSPs by the cryptographic services of the module. An approved SP
800-90A compliant DRBG is used for key generation; the entropy source is contained within the
module scope. The module does not output intermediate keys.
In Table 16 HSEB and Secure Flash are non-volatile memory, and DRAM is volatile memory.
CSPs/ keys Name
/Type
Generation Entry
/Output
Storage Zeroization
Miniboot
ECDSA Key
(Device keypair
(DKP1) private key)
FIPS 186-4
B.4.2 compliant
key pair
generation
using
unmodified
DRBG output.
No entry/no
output
Flash (encrypted) Overwritten by new
values
ECDSA Key
(Device keypair
(DKP1) public key)
FIPS 186-4
B.4.2 compliant
key pair
generation
using
unmodified
DRBG output.
No entry
Output to the
host.
Flash N/A
Entropy Input Obtained from
SP 800-90B
compliant
entropy source
No entry/no
output
DRAM xcDRNGUninstantiate
DRBG seed and
internal state
Derived from
entropy input
as defined in
SP800-90A
No entry/no
output
DRAM xcDRNGUninstantiate
AES Key
(File System
Encryption Key)
Unmodified
DRBG output
No entry/no
output
HSEB On hard tamper
ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer1
public key)
N/A (not
generated by
the module)
Entered through
a signed service
request
command
Output to the
host.
Flash N/A
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ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer2
public key)
Entered through
a signed service
request
command
Output to the
host.
Flash N/A
ECDSA Key
(Crypto Officer3
public key)
Entered through
a signed service
request
command
Output to the
host.
Flash N/A
ECDSA Key
(IBM Class Root
public key)
Not generated
by the module
Entered during
the manufacture
process
Output to the
host.
Flash N/A
Key Encrypting Key
(DKP1_KEK)
Unmodified
DRBG output
No entry/no
output
HSEB On hard tamper
EP11
AES Key Unmodified
DRBG output
No entry/output
to the host in
encrypted form
DRAM/HSEB memclr()
Triple-DES Unmodified
DRBG output
No entry/output
to the host in
encrypted form
DRAM/HSEB memclr()
RSA key pair FIPS 186-4
compliant key
pair generation
using
unmodified
DRBG output
No entry/output
to the host in
encrypted form
DRAM/HSEB memclr()
DSA key pair FIPS 186-4
compliant key
pair generation
using
unmodified
DRBG output.
No entry/output
to the host in
encrypted form
DRAM/HSEB memclr()
Entropy input Obtained from
SP 800-90B
compliant
entropy source
No entry/no
output
DRAM memclr()
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DRBG seed and
internal state
Derived from
entropy input
as defined in
SP800-90A
No entry/no
output
DRAM memclr()
ECDSA key pair FIPS 186-4
B.4.1 compliant
key pair
generation
using
unmodified
DRBG output
No entry/output
to the host in
encrypted form
DRAM/HSEB memclr()
DH key pair SP 800-
56ARev3
compliant key
pair generation
using
unmodified
DRBG output
No entry/output
to the host in
encrypted form
DRAM/HSEB memclr()
ECDH key pair SP 800-
56ARev3
compliant key
pair generation
using
unmodified
DRBG output
No entry/output
to the host in
encrypted form
DRAM/HSEB memclr()
HMAC key Unmodified
DRBG output
No entry/output
to the host in
encrypted form
DRAM/HSEB memclr()
Shared Secret Generated
during the
Diffie-Hellman
or EC Diffie-
Hellman
shared secret
computation.
No entry/output DRAM memclr()
ECDSA/RSA Keys
(EP 11 Module
Administrator Public
Key)
N/A Entered with
certificates/no
output
Flash/DRAM N/A
ECDSA/RSA Keys
(EP11 Domain
Administrator Public
Key)
N/A Entered with
certificates/no
output
Flash/DRAM N/A
AES Key Unmodified
DRBG output
Can be imported
and exported by
HSEB/DRAM memclr()
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Table 16 – Keys and CSPs
6.1 Random Number Generation
The module provides an [SP800-90A]-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) for
creation of symmetric keys, asymmetric keys, and random number generation. The DRBG is based
on SHA-512 hash function. The module performs the DRBG health tests as defined in section 11.3
of [SP800-90A]. The module uses ring oscillators (ROs) as a noise source. The entropy source is
compliant with [SP800-90B] and marked as ENT (P) on the certificate. The entropy source provides
full 512-bits of entropy as the input to the Hash_DRBG which uses SHA-512.
6.2 Key Generation
The Key Generation methods implemented in the module for approved services in FIPS mode are
compliant with Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) standard [SP800-133] (vendor affirmed) .
The module implements symmetric key generation service for AES, Triple-DES and HMAC and
asymmetric key generation services for RSA, DSA and ECDSA which are compliant with [FIPS 186-
4]. The random numbers used in asymmetric and symmetric key generation are directly obtained
from the [SP800-90A] Hash_DRBG.
The public and private keys used in the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement schemes are generated
internally by the module using the ECDSA key generation method compliant with [FIPS186-4] and
[SP800-56Ar3]. The Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme is also compliant with [SP800-56Ar3]
and generates keys using safe primes defined in RFC7919 and RFC3526.
6.3 Key Establishment
According to Table 10 Comparable strengths in [SP800-57], the key sizes of AES, Diffie-Hellman,
and EC Diffie-Hellman provide the following security strengths in FIPS mode of operation.
• Diffie-Hellman provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength.
(EP11 Domain
Wrapping Key)
domain
administrators in
encrypted form
EC/RSA Importer Key FIPS 186-4
compliant key
pair generation
using
unmodified
DRBG output
No entry/no
output for
private key
May output
public key
DRAM memclr()
ECDSA Keys
(Operating System
Keypair private key)
FIPS 186-4
compliant key
pair generation
using
unmodified
DRBG output
No entry/no
output for
private key
May output
public key
Flash
(private key
encrypted)
Key encryption key
used to encrypt the
ECDSA private key is
zeroized on hard
tamper
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• EC Diffie-Hellman provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength.
• AES key wrapping with AES KW and KWP key establishment methodology provides 256 bits of
encryption strength.
• AES key wrapping with CBC and HMAC provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption
strength.
The module implements SP800-56ARev3 compliant DH and ECDH shared secret computation that
maps to IG D.8 scenario X1(1). The module also implements key agreement scheme consisting of
shared secret computation followed by SP 800-56C KDF mapping to IG D.8 scenario X1(2).
However, this key agreement operation is performed internally as part of user authentication
process and is not available as a service from the module.
6.4 Key Entry/Output
The module supports cryptographic AES-256 key entry and output using split knowledge based on
Shamir’s Secret Sharing algorithm. The module splits the key into at least two components, which
must be used to reconstruct the original key. Knowledge of any k-1 or fewer components provide
no information about the original key.
CSPs that are entered, and output are encrypted with approved algorithms such as AES-CBC with
HMAC or AES KW/KWP. When wrapping keys (WKs) or their parts are transported, they are
encrypted with key encryption keys using the specified approved algorithms.
The module associates entered or output cryptographic keys with entities to which the keys are
assigned. The association of keys with their corresponding entities is performed through
authentication which described in section 3. The specification of keys that are entered into or
output from the module is included in Table 16.
6.5 Key Zeroization
The module provides two types of zeroization mechanisms: zeroization to respond administrative
services and zeroization to respond tamper events. The former is called firmware-induced
zeroization, and the latter is called Tamper-induced zeroization.
EP11 firmware-induced zeroization can be triggered by by Crypto Officer (EP11 Module
Administrator) “Zeroize module seg 3” service and the Crypto Officer (EP11 Domain Administrator)
“Zeroize domain” service on the need-basis. The functions for zeroization are specified in Table
16, where memclr() function is the central key clearing function.
The module also implements Tamper-induced zeroization, which can only be triggered by the
module hardware in response to tamper attempts. The EP11 firmware is not involved in the
Tamper-induced zeroization mechanism. In the event of tamper, keys and CSPs in the non-volatile
memory HSEB and DRAM are all zeroized. All the public keys are protected from the modification
and substitution by the digital signatures on the public key certificates.
6.6 Key Storage
The module stores CSPs used by the cryptographic module, which are listed in Table 16, including
keys that are used for validity of the module’s current configuration (operating system ECDSA
private key) and proof of authenticity of the module (DKP1 key private key). These keys are stored
in flash memory encrypted with an AES key that is stored in HSEB, as specified in Table 16. The
module’s internal key storage is verified by Miniboot Error Correction Code to prevent corruption
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caused by accidental bit flips. The tamper subsystem monitors a set of parameters to determine if
a hard tamper event has occurred. In case if a tamper event has occurred, the tamper controller
erases the internal key storage by overwriting it with zeroes or random values.
The keys used in user services including symmetric and asymmetric keys are stored in non-
persistent form. In some cases, copies of keys, not including public keys, are stored in HSEB. The
storage methods for all the keys used by the module are listed in Table 16.
Additionally, the module exports user keys for storage outside its cryptographic boundary in
encrypted form with authenticated encryption using the approved algorithm AES with HMAC using
keys listed in section 3.2. The module does not release CSPs in non-protected form.
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7 EMI/EMC
The module meets the requirements of 47 CFR FCC PART 15, Subpart B, Class B (Home use).
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8 Self-Tests
Each time the Module is powered on, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate
correctly, and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-on self–tests are available on
demand by power cycling the Module.
On power on or reset, the Module performs the self-tests described in the Power-On Self-tests
table below. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by
the Module. If one of the KATs fails, the Module halts and a POST error code is generated. In
addition to startup tests, the Module executes conditional data tests.
8.1 Power-On Self-Tests
8.1.1 Integrity Tests
Configuration integrity test verifies firmware flash memory component and code integrity.
Non-modifiable Security Service Processor code, POST 0 and Miniboot 0, are checked for integrity,
initially through an embedded non-cryptographic checksum. In case of checksum mismatch, the
code halts itself (POST 0) or is not even permitted to execute (Miniboot 0, inhibited by POST 0).
This code is executed only at startup, verifying that the Miniboot 0 image is not corrupted.
Once Miniboot 0 takes control, it uses the Persistent Memory Manger (PMM) to determine which
copy of POST1 should be run. The PMM maintains a truncated SHA-512 hash of the contents of
each segment and verifies that the hash of the chosen copy of POST1 matches the stored hash.
When POST1 runs, it performs a full PMM initialization. The PMM checks the hash on both copies of
all segments and (if possible) corrects any errors detected. Uncorrectable errors cause the
module to halt.
During regular operations, the crypto ASIC covers all traffic through combinations of redundant
implementations, CRCs, and parity checks, in engine-specific ways. Failures are reported as
specific hardware errors.
The Firmware Integrity tests are listed and described in Table 17.
Algorithm Test
Firmware Integrity Test
POST0
32-bit Checksum
The POST0 firmware image incorporates a 32-bit checksum computed so that when
the POST0 image is treated as an array of four-byte numbers the sum of the entries is
zero. POST0 copies itself from flash to RAM and then verifies the checksum on the
RAM copy.
POST1
32-bit Checksum
SHA-512
(truncated)
The POST1 firmware image incorporates a 32-bit checksum computed so that when
the POST1 image is treated as an array of four-byte numbers the sum of the entries is
zero. When POST1 runs, it verifies the checksum on the RAM copy of itself.
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Algorithm Test
POST1 is covered by the Persistent Memory Manager (PMM). MB0 directs the PMM to
decide which copy of POST1 should be loaded and run. The PMM verifies the hash of
POST1 at this time.
POST2
32-bit Checksum
SHA-512
(truncated)
The POST2 firmware image incorporates a 32-bit checksum computed so that when
the POST2 image is treated as an array of four-byte numbers, the sum of the entries
is zero. POST2 copies itself from flash to RAM and then verifies the checksum on the
RAM copy.
POST2 is covered by the Persistent Memory Manager (PMM). The PMM verifies the
hash of POST2 when POST1 directs the PMM to initialize itself.
MB0
32-bit Checksum
The MB0 firmware image incorporates a 32-bit checksum computed so that when the
MB0 image is treated as an array of four-byte numbers, the sum of the entries is
zero. POST0 verifies the checksum on the copy of MB0 in flash before transferring
control to MB0. While MB0 copies itself from flash to RAM, it computes the checksum
and verifies that the result is zero at the end.
MB1
SHA-512
(truncated)
MB1 is covered by the Persistent Memory Manager (PMM). The PMM verifies the hash
of MB1 when POST1 directs the PMM to initialize itself.
Table 17: Integrity Tests
8.1.2 Known-Answer Self-Tests
Table 18 lists the Known-Answer Self-Tests performed by the module.
Algorithm Test
Miniboot
HASH DRBG Modes: SHA-512
ECDSA Sign, Verify
Modes: SHA-512
Keys: P-521
EP11
AES Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB, CBC
Keys: 128, 192, 256
Message Authentication
Modes: CMAC
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Algorithm Test
Keys: 128, 192, 256
DH DH Shared Secret Computation (Primitive Z Computation KAT)
Hash: SHA-256
Keys: 2048
ECDH ECDH Shared Secret Computation (Primitive Z Computation KAT)
Keys: P-256, P-521
DSA Sign/Verify using 2048 bit key
SP 800-56Cr2
KDF (KDA)
Modes: One Step with HMAC-SHA-256
SP 800-108 KDF Modes: Counter with HMAC-SHA-256
ECDSA Sign Verify
Modes: SHA-256
Keys: P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
HASH DRBG Modes: SHA-512
HMAC SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
RSA Modes: PKCS and PSS with SHA-256
Sign, Verify
Keys: 2048
SHS SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512
Triple-DES Encryption, Decryption
Modes: ECB/CBC
Keys: 168
Message Authentication
Modes: CMAC
Keys: 168
Table 18 – Known-Answer Self-Tests
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8.1.3 Conditional Tests
Table 19 lists all the pairwise consistency tests performed by the module.
Algorithm Test
Miniboot
ECDSA
Key Generation
Signature Generation and Verification
Hash: SHA-256
EP11
RSA
Key Generation
Signature Generation and Verification
Hash: SHA-256
DSA
Key Generation
Signature Generation and Verification
Hash: SHA-256
ECDSA
Key Generation
Signature Generation and Verification,
Hash: SHA-256
SP800-90B Health Tests: RCT and APT
Table 19 - Conditional Tests
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9 Design assurance
9.1 Delivery and Operation
The module is initialized at the factory. Internal controls guarantee that each one may be
initialized only once, therefore there are no field initialization requirements, other than platform-
specific ones for installation of PCIe cards. Once a module has been delivered, its configuration
should be logged, to verify that it is fully operational and loaded by an approved code level.
Application-specific details of this verification are available outside this policy.
1. The Module will provide six (6) distinct operator roles: Cryptographic Officer 1,
Cryptographic Officer 2, and Cryptographic Officer 3, Crypto Officer (EP11 Domain
Administrator), Crypto Officer (EP11 Module Administrator), EP11 User.
2. The Module will provide identity-based authentication.
3. When the Module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator will not have access to
any cryptographic services.
4. The operator will be capable of commanding the Module to perform the power on self-tests
by cycling power or resetting the Module.
5. Power on self-tests do not require any operator action.
6. Data output will be inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
7. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the Module.
8. Please refer to section 6 for the respective zeroization methods for each CSP. Specifically,
to zeroize the persistent keys the operator will have to initiate the hard tamper on the device.
However, note that this will make the module inoperable.
9. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
10. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
11. The Module does not support manual key entry.
12. The Module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
13. The Module does not enter or output plaintext CSPs.
14. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
9.2 Crypto Officer Guidance
9.2.1 Coprocessor Physical Installation
Note that on a Microsoft Windows operating system, it is necessary to install the Common
Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) support software before installing a coprocessor. Other
supported operating systems do not require this, but it is recommended.
To install the coprocessor into the host computer, follow these steps:
1. Locate your computer’s instructions for installing expansion cards. Throughout this
procedure, follow the safety instructions in that manual.
2. Turn OFF the computer and all attached devices.
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3. Disconnect all cables, including the power cable. Refer to “Danger Notice D005” in
Appendix B.
4. Choose a PCIe expansion slot able to accommodate a standard short-type adapter card.
5. If the expansion slot has an individual cover, remove any bracket-holding screw and the
cover.
Attention: Electrostatic discharge (ESD) can damage the card and its components. Wear
an ESD wrist-strap while handling and installing the card, or take the following precautions:
• Limit your movements; this helps prevent static electricity from building up around you.
• Prevent others from touching the card or other components.
• Before removing the card from the electrostatic discharge (ESD) barrier bag, touch the
bag to an unpainted metal surface on your computer and hold it there for at least two
seconds.
• Handle the card by its edges only. Do not touch exposed circuitry and components.
6. Remove the cryptographic coprocessor from its ESD barrier bag. Do not discard the bag. It
can be used again whenever the coprocessor is removed from the server.
7. Insert the coprocessor into the slot; be sure that the card is fully seated.
8. If possible, install a bracket-holding screw. Some server models have a row of screws
available inside the machine for this purpose.
9. Replace the host computer’s cover.
10. Reconnect the power cable and any other cables that you disconnected.
11. Turn the computer ON. The cryptographic coprocessor runs it power-on self-test (POST).
9.2.2 Firmware Installation and Entering Operational/FIPS Mode
1. Surrender and establish seg3 HSM card ownership
2. Load firmware image with Coprocessor Load Utility (CLU) tool
3. Run CLU Status command
4. Run EP11Info command to show card is being initialized
5. Use Trusted Key Entry (TKE) script to bring domain out of initialization
6. Run EP11Info to show card has transitioned out of initialization
7. Run EP11Info to show domain has transitioned out of initialization
8. Use TKE to disable control points for entering FIPS mode as mentioned in section 1.2
9. Run EP11Info to show domain / card is in FIPS mode.
9.3 User Guidance
9.3.1 Handling Self-Test Errors
When the cryptographic module is in error state it is inactive, and all the data output and services
are inhibited. Errors occurred during the self-tests and conditional tests transition the module into
an error state. To recover from the error state the cryptographic module must be reset.
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Error State Cause of Error Error Indicator
Miniboot
ERROR STATE DRBG KATs failure Code 8003*
ECDSA KATs failure
ECDSA PCT failure
POST0 checksum failure de00a900:000000a0
MB0 checksum failure 8003a1b0:xxxxxxxx
POST1 checksum failure de00a200:00001000
MB1 checksum failure de00a200:02001100
EP11
ERROR STATE SHA* KATs failure Hash KAT HW/SW disagree on digest /
KAT: SHA* failed /
KAT: hash selftests failed /
KAT: selftests failed
HMAC-SHA-* KATs failure KAT: HMAC/SHA* f /
KAT: HMAC selftests failed
KAT: selftests failed
AES KATs failure KAT: AES/* failed /
KAT: symmetric selftests failed /
KAT: selftests failed /
KAT: symmetric encrypt result
mismatched /
AES CMAC KATs failure KAT: AES*-CMAC failed /
KAT: CMAC selftests failed /
KAT: selftests failed /
Triple-DES KATs failure KAT: 3DES/* failed /
KAT: symmetric selftests failed /
KAT: selftests failed /
KAT: symmetric encrypt result
mismatched
RSA KATs failure KAT: RSA/PSS/sign mismatched /
KAT: RSA/sign-verify failed /
KAT: RSA selftests failed /
KAT: selftests failed /
KAT: RSA selftests failed
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Error State Cause of Error Error Indicator
ECDSA KATs failure KAT: EC/sign+verify failed /
KAT: EC/sign-verify failed /
KAT: EC selftests failed /
KAT: selftests failed /
KAT: EC/sign KAT compare failed
DH KATs failure KAT: DH exchange disagrees /
DH: 1+2 mismatched /
KAT: DH key agreement selftest failed /
KAT: selftests failed
SP800-108 KDF KAT failure KAT: selftests failed /
KAT: KDF data invalid /
KAT: KDF f
SP800-56Cr2 KDF KAT failure
DSA KAT failure Inject Fault
DRBG KAT failure KAT: HW-DRNG/1 failed
KAT: SW-DRNG/1 failed
ECDSA PCT failure CSP: signature does not verify /
could not verify signing key /
PK: key/gen verify failed
DSA PCT failure
RSA PCT failure
ECDH KATs failure KAT: ECDH f /
KAT: EC selftests failed
ENT RCT and APT Health-tests failure Code 8003*/Code 80010101
Table 20 - Error States
9.3.2 DSA signature service usage
In the approved mode, the module does not provide DSA domain parameter generation service.
For DSA, the only approved services available in the approved mode are DSA key generation,
signature generation and signature verification. During the DSA signature operation, the module
performs the validation of parameter "g" as required per section 4.1 of SP 800-89. the module
cannot perform similar validation on parameters "p" and "q" due to unavailability of
domain_parameter_seed. The module's User requesting the DSA signature service shall confirm
the assurance on the validity of "p" and "q" as required per section 4.1 or 4.2 of SP 800-89.
9.4 Supplemental IBM Security Policy and Guidance
Supplemental security policy that contains additional information regarding the cryptographic
module is available here.
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10 Mitigation of other attacks
The module does not implement security mechanisms to mitigate other attacks.
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Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APT Adaptive Proportion Test
BBRAM Battery Backed RAM
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCA Common Cryptographic Architecture
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EFP Environmental Failure Protection
EFT Environmental Failure Testing
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
HSEB High Speed Erasable BBRAM
KAT Known Answer Test
KEK Key Encrypting Key
MAC Message Authentication Code
MB Miniboot
MCPU Module CPU
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
PCT Pair-Wise Consistency Test
PCIe PCI Express Interface
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
POST Power-On Self-Test
RCT Repetitive Count Test
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SKM Session Key Modifier
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SP Special Publication
SSC Shared Secret Computation
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
TKE Trusted Key Entry
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Appendix A. References
FIPS140-2 FIPS PUB 140-2 - Security Requirements For Cryptographic Modules
May 2001
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-2
FIPS140-2_IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module
Validation Program
May 2021
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
August 2015
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
FIPS202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
August 2015
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1
February 2003
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm
September 2002
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt
RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm
August 2009
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt
SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38a.pdf
SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
May 2005
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38b.pdf
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SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality
May 2004
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices
January 2010
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38e.pdf
SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
December 2012
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
SP800-38G NIST Special Publication 800-38G - Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Format - Preserving Encryption
March 2016
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38G.pdf
SP800-56Ar3 NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3 - Recommendation for Pair Wise
Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
April 2018
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
SP800-56Cr2 NIST Special Publication 800-56C – Revision 1 - Recommendation for Key
Derivation through Extraction-then-Expansion
August 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf
SP800-57 NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 4 - Recommendation for Key
Management Part 1: General
May 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf
SP800-67r2 NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 2 - Recommendation for the Triple
Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
November 2017
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-67r2.pdf
SP800-90Ar1 NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Revision 1 - Recommendation for Random
Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators
June 2015
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
SP800-90B (Second DRAFT) NIST Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the
Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation
January 2018
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf
SP800-108 NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions (Revised)
October 2009
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-108.pdf
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SP800-131Ar1 NIST Special Publication 800-131A Revision 2- Transitions: Recommendation for
Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
March 2019
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132 - Recommendation for Password-Based Key
Derivation - Part 1: Storage Applications
December 2010
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-132.pdf
SP800-133 NIST Special Publication 800-133 Revision 2 - Recommendation for
Cryptographic
Key Generation
June 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf
SP800-135 NIST Special Publication 800-135 Revision 1 - Recommendation for Existing
Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions
December 2011
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-135r1.pdf
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Appendix B. Danger Notice D005
DANGER: When working on or around the system, observe the following precautions:
Electrical voltage and current from power, telephone, and communication cables are hazardous.
To avoid a shock hazard:
• If IBM supplied a power cord(s), connect power to this unit only with the IBM provided
power cord. Do not use the IBM provided power cord for any other product.
• Do not open or service any power supply assembly.
• Do not connect or disconnect any cables or perform installation, maintenance, or
reconfiguration of this product during an electrical storm.
• The product might be equipped with multiple power cords. To remove all hazardous
voltages, disconnect all power cords.
• Connect all power cords to a properly wired and grounded electrical outlet. Ensure that the
outlet supplies proper voltage and phase rotation according to the system rating plate.
• Connect any equipment that will be attached to this product to properly wired outlets.
• When possible, use one hand only to connect or disconnect signal cables.
• Never turn on any equipment when there is evidence of fire, water, or structural damage.
• Do not attempt to switch on power to the machine until all possible unsafe conditions are
corrected.
• Assume that an electrical safety hazard is present. Perform all continuity, grounding, and
power checks specified during the subsystem installation procedures to ensure that the
machine meets safety requirements.
• Do not continue with the inspection if any unsafe conditions are present.
• Disconnect the attached power cords, telecommunications systems, networks, and
modems before you open the device covers, unless instructed otherwise in the installation
and configuration procedures.
• Connect and disconnect cables as described in the following procedures when installing,
moving, or opening covers on this product or attached devices.
To disconnect:
1. Turn off everything (unless instructed otherwise).
2. Remove the power cords from the outlets.
3. Remove the signal cables from the connectors.
4. Remove all cables from the devices.
To connect:
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1. Turn off everything (unless instructed otherwise).
2. Attach all cables to the devices.
3. Attach the signal cables to the connectors.
4. Attach the power cords to the outlets.
5. Turn on the devices.
• Sharp edges, corners and joints may be present in and around the system. Use care when
handling equipment to avoid cuts, scrapes, and pinching. (D005)