Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Version 1.3 Last update: 2017-12-15 Prepared by: atsec information security corporation 9130 Jollyville Road, Suite 260 Austin, TX 78759 www.atsec.com ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 1 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Table of contents 1 Introduction............................................................................................................................3 2 Cryptographic Module Specifcation.......................................................................................4 2.1 Module Overview..........................................................................................................4 2.2 FIPS 140-2 Validation....................................................................................................5 2.3 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................6 3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces............................................................................7 4 Roles, Services and Authentication........................................................................................8 4.1 Roles.............................................................................................................................8 4.2 Services........................................................................................................................8 4.3 Authentication............................................................................................................10 5 Physical Security..................................................................................................................11 6 Operational Environment.....................................................................................................12 7 Cryptographic Key Management..........................................................................................13 7.1 Random Number Generation......................................................................................13 7.2 Key / CSP Storage.......................................................................................................14 7.3 Key / CSP Zeroization..................................................................................................14 8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)..............................15 9 Self Tests..............................................................................................................................16 9.1 Power-Up Tests............................................................................................................16 9.1.1 Integrity Tests....................................................................................................16 9.1.2 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests...........................................................................16 10 Guidance............................................................................................................................17 10.1 Crypto Ofcer Guidance............................................................................................17 10.1.1 Confguration Changes and FIPS Approved Mode............................................18 10.2 User Guidance..........................................................................................................18 10.3 Handling Self-Test Errors...........................................................................................18 Appendix A Glossary and Abbreviations..................................................................................19 Appendix B References...........................................................................................................20 ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 2 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 1 Introduction This document is the non-proprietary Security Policy for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module version 5.0. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specifed in FIPS PUB 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2) for a Security Level 1 module. ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 3 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 2 Cryptographic Module Specifcation 2.1 Module Overview The Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a daemon implementing the cryptographic algorithms. The module provides cryptographic services to other network entities implementing the IKEv1 and IKEv2 protocols. Note: This security policy only covers the IKE protocol, which is a part from the IPsec protocol family. The logical module boundary is depicted in the software block diagram below. The module is aimed to run on a general purpose computer; the physical boundary is the surface of the case of the target platform, as shown in the diagram below: ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 4 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Figure 1: Software Block Diagram Figure 2: Hardware Block Diagram Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy This cryptographic module combines a vertical stack of Linux components, and the module intends to limit implementations, which are proved by each separate component, to the external interface. The components within the cryptographic boundary comprising the module are listed as follows: • Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module with the version of the Libreswan RPM fle 3.20-3.el7. This consists of Pluto IKE Daemon application found at /usr/libexec/ipsec/. • Fipscheck RPM package (version 1.4.1-6.el7), that includes fpscheck library and application. Fipscheck performs the integrity validation of the IKE Daemon (pluto binary) The following components which act as bound modules need to be installed for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module to operate: • The bound module Red Hat Enterprise Linux NSS Cryptographic Module with FIPS 140- 2 Certifcate #3070 (hereafter referred to as the “NSS module”) provides cryptographic algorithms used by the IKE Daemon. The IKE Daemon uses the NSS module in accordance with the Security Rules stated in the NSS Cryptographic Module Security Policy. • The bound module Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Cryptographic Module with FIPS 140-2 Certifcate #3016 (hereafter referred to as the “OpenSSL module”) provides HMAC SHA-256 algorithm required by fpscheck application and library for integrity check. 2.2 FIPS 140-2 Validation For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the module is a software-only, multi-chip standalone cryptographic module validated at security level 1. The table below shows the security level claimed for each of the eleven sections that comprise the FIPS 140-2 standard: FIPS 140-2 Section Security Level 1 Cryptographic Module Specifcation 1 2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1 3 Roles, Services and Authentication 1 4 Finite State Model 1 5 Physical Security N/A 6 Operational Environment 1 7 Cryptographic Key Management 1 8 EMI/EMC 1 9 Self Tests 1 10 Design Assurance 1 11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A Table 1: Security Levels The module has been tested on the following platforms: Hardware Platform Processor Operating System Dell PowerEdge R630 Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-2640 v3 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.4 Table 2: Tested Platforms ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 5 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy The physical boundary is the surface of the case of the target platform. The logical boundary is depicted in Figure 1: software block diagram. The module also includes algorithm implementations using Processor Algorithm Acceleration (PAA) functions provided by the diferent processors supported, as shown in the following table: Processor Processor Algorithm Acceleration (PAA) function Cryptographic Module implementation Intel x86 AES-NI AES Table 3: PAA function implementations 2.3 Modes of Operation The module only supports the FIPS approved mode, and it turns to FIPS approved mode after initialization and power-on self-tests succeed. The module verifes its integrity using a HMAC-SHA-256 digest operation and compares the value with the build time pre-computed value. If the digests match, the power-up self-tests are successful. The services available in FIPS mode can be found in section 4.2, Table 5. ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 6 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the hardware platform on which it runs. The logical interfaces through which applications request services are summarized in following table: Logical interface Description Data input IKE Network Port/Protocol, NSS Key Database fle stored in /etc/ipsec.d/, whack socket input Data output IKE Network Port/Protocol, Linux Kernel (netlink/XFRM Interface) Control input IKE Network Port/Protocol, Confguration Files (/etc/ipsec.conf, /etc/ipsec.d/, /etc/ipsec.secrets), Linux Kernel (netlink/XFRM Interface), command line Status output Log File, IKE Network Port/Protocol Table 4: Logical Interfaces ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 7 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 4 Roles, Services and Authentication 4.1 Roles The module supports the following roles: ⚫ User role: performs key derivation and negotiates IKE to establish security association. ⚫ Crypto Ofcer role: performs module installation and confguration, manages Pluto IKE Daemon, self tests and show status. The module is a Security Level 1 software-only cryptographic module and does not implement authentication. The User and Crypto Ofcer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing the module services. The User role is assumed by the underlying server application that makes calls to the module on behalf of one or more external clients. 4.2 Services The module supports services available to users in the available roles. All services are described in detail in the user documentation. The following table shows the available services, the roles allowed (“CO” stands for Crypto Ofcer and “U” stands for User), the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) involved and how they are accessed in the FIPS mode. “R” stands for Read permission, “W” stands for Write permission, and “Z” stands for Zeroization of the module. The Libreswan and the bound NSS module together provide the Dife-Hellman and EC Dife- Hellman key agreement. The Libreswan module only implements the KDF portion of the key agreement and the bound NSS module provides the shared secret computation. • Dife-Hellman (Certs. #1378 and #1379 with CVL Cert. #1410, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 bits and 256 bits of encryption strength); • EC Dife-Hellman (Certs. #1378 and #1379 with CVL Cert. #1410, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength); Service Algo(s). CAVS Cert(s). Role CSPs Access Provided by libreswan: Install and Confgure the module N/A N/A CO RSA private keys, pre-shared keys R, W, Z Manage Pluto IKE Daemon start, stop, etc. Commands N/A CO Zeroize of CSPs, Keys R, Z Negotiate IKE to establish security associations (SAs) SP 800-135 Key Derivation Function (KDF) in IKEv1 and IKEv2 CVL Cert. #1410 U RSA private keys, shared secret IKE SA encryption keys and integrity keys, IPsec SA encryption keys and integrity keys R W Self tests N/A N/A CO HMAC SHA-256 keys for integrity check R ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 8 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Service Algo(s). CAVS Cert(s). Role CSPs Access Show Status N/A N/A CO None R Provided by OpenSSL: HMAC integrity check HMAC-SHA256 Certs. #3076, #3088, #3090, #3091, #3107, #3108, #3109, #3110, #3111, #3112 CO N/A R, W Provided by the NSS module: IKE protocol cryptographic algorithms AES Certs. #4739, #4740, #4741, #4742 U AES 128, 192 and 256 bits keys R, W Triple-DES Certs. #2520, #2521 U Three-key Triple-DES 168 bits keys R, W ECDSA Certs. #1181, #1182 U ECDSA keys based on P- 256, P-384 and P-521 curves R, W RSA Certs. #2588, #2589 U For certifcate based RSA: 2048 and 3072 bits keys For raw RSA keys: 3072 keys R, W SHS Certs. #3884, #3885 U N/A R, W HMAC Certs. #3156, #3157 U At least 112 bits HMAC keys R, W DRBG Certs. #1625, #1626 U Entropy input string, seed, V and C values R, W Table 5: Services available in FIPS mode Non-Approved but allowed algorithms Keys/CSPs Note Dife-Hellman Dife-Hellman public and private components with size between 2048 bits and 15360 bits CVL Certs. #1378, #1379 Not validated by CAVP, but allowed in FIPS mode according ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 9 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy to IG D.8 EC Dife-Hellman EC Dife-Hellman public and private components based on P-256, P-384 and P-521 curves CVL Certs. #1378, #1379 Not validated by CAVP, but allowed in FIPS mode according to IG D.8 RSA (key wrapping) RSA keys with size equal to or larger than 2048 bits Certs. #2588, #2589 Not compliant with NIST SP 800-56B, but allowed in FIPS mode through December 31st 2017 according to IG D.9 NDRNG Seed from entropy noise sources N/A Table 6: Non-approved but allowed algorithms available in FIPS mode (provided by the bound NSS module) Usage Non-Approved algorithm Signature generation and verifcation DSA signature generation with key size not equal to 2048 or 3072 bits; DSA signature verifcation with key size not equal to 1024, 2048 or 3072 bits RSA signature generation with key size not equal to 2048 or 3072 bits; RSA signature verifcation with key size not equal to 1024, 2048 or 3072 bits Message digest MD5 Key management DSA domain parameter generation (not validated by CAVP); DSA domain parameter verifcation with key size not equal to 1024, 2048 or 3072 bits; DSA key pair generation with key size not equal to 2048 and 3072 bits Dife-Hellman key agreement with key size less than 2048 bit RSA key wrapping (encrypt, decrypt) with key size less than 2048 bits Table 7: Non-approved algorithms (provided by the bound NSS module) Note: Only the SP 800-135 Key Derivation Function has been validated by CAVP. 4.3 Authentication The module is a Security Level 1 software-only cryptographic module and does not implement authentication. The role is implicitly assumed based on the service requested. ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 10 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 5 Physical Security The module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security. ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 11 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 6 Operational Environment This module operates in a modifable operational environment per the FIPS 140-2 defnition. 6.1 Applicability The module operates in a modifable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifcations. The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the hardware specifed in section 2.2. The Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system is used as the basis of other products which include but are not limited to: • Red Hat Enterprise Linux Atomic Host • Red Hat Virtualization (RHV) • Red Hat OpenStack Platform • OpenShift Container Platform • Red Hat Gluster Storage • Red Hat Ceph Storage • Red Hat CloudForms • Red Hat Satellite. Compliance is maintained for these products whenever the binary is found unchanged. The module operates in a modifable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifcations. The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the hardware specifed in section 1.1. 6.2 Policy The operating system is restricted to a single operator (concurrent operators are explicitly excluded). The application that request cryptographic services is the single user of the module, even when the application is serving multiple clients. In FIPS Approved mode, the ptrace(2) system call, the debugger (gdb(1)), and strace(1) shall be not used. ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 12 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 7 Cryptographic Key Management The application that uses the module is responsible for appropriate destruction and zeroization of the key material. The library provides functions for key allocation and destruction, which overwrites the memory that is occupied by the key information with “zeros” before it is deallocated. 7.1 Random Number Generation and CSPs management The module does not implement any random number generator nor provides key generation. The module only provides key derivation through the implementation of the SP 800-135 KDF. The table below lists the CSPs/keys used by the module: Keys/CSPs Type Key Generation Key Storage Key Entry/Outp ut Key Zeroization RSA 2048 and 3072 bits private keys RSA keys used for authentication N/A Ephemeral N/A N/A Pre-shared keys AES/Triple- DES/HMAC keys N/A External to the module Loaded on startup Zeroized and freed on shutdown Shared secret according to the IKE protocol Shared secret established by Dife-Hellman key agreement N/A Ephemeral IKE Network Port/Protocol Close of IKE SA or termination of Pluto IKE Daemon zeroizes the CSP IKE SA Tunnel Encryption Keys AES 128, 192, and 256 bits or Triple- DES 168 bits keys N/A (derived from shared secret by using KDF) Ephemeral N/A Close of IKE SA or termination of Pluto IKE Daemon zeroizes the CSP IKE SA Tunnel Integrity Keys HMAC keys with at least 112 bits N/A (derived from shared secret by using KDF) Ephemeral N/A Close of IKE SA or termination of Pluto IKE Daemon zeroizes the CSP IPsec SA Tunnel Encryption Keys AES 128, 192, and 256 bits or Triple- DES 168 bits keys N/A (derived from shared secret by using KDF) Ephemeral N/A Close of IKE SA or overwritten by re-negotiated IPsec SA or termination of Pluto IKE Daemon zeroizes the CSP IPsec SA Tunnel Integrity Keys HMAC keys with at least 112 bits N/A (derived from shared secret by using KDF) Ephemeral N/A Close of IKE SA or overwritten by re-negotiated IPsec SA or termination of Pluto IKE Daemon zeroizes the CSP Table 8: Keys/CSPs Notes: The RSA private keys are encrypted by the NSS module. When an operation requires a private key, the frst pointer or handle to the private key is obtained using the public key and CKA_ID ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 13 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy (key ID). Only during the operation, private keys are decrypted and the operation is performed. After the operation, the memory pointing to the private key is zeroized by the NSS module. 7.2 Key / CSP Storage Public and private keys are provided to the module by the calling process, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate IKE Network Port/Protocol. The module does not perform persistent storage of keys. 7.3 Key / CSP Zeroization For volatile memory, memset is included in deallocation operations. There are no restrictions when zeroizing any cryptographic keys and CSPs. ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 14 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) MARKETING NAME.......................... PowerEdge R630 REGULATORY MODEL..................... E26S REGULATORY TYPE......................... E26S001 EFFECTIVE DATE............................. September 03, 2014 EMC EMISSIONS CLASS.................. Class A ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 15 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 9 Self Tests 9.1 Power-Up Tests The module performs power-up tests at module initialization which includes the software integrity test to ensure that the module is not corrupted. The self-tests are triggered automatically without any user intervention. While the module is performing the power-up tests, services are not available and input or output is not possible: the module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling application until the self-tests are completed successfully. 9.1.1 Integrity Tests The integrity check is performed by the fpscheck application using the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm implemented by the OpenSSL module. The OpenSSL module computes an HMAC SHA-256 value for the fpscheck utility, as well as the /usr/libexec/ipsec/pluto binary implementing the IKE protocol. The integrity verifcation is performed as follows: The Libreswan application links with the library libfpscheck.so which is intended to execute fpscheck application to verify the integrity of the libreswan application fle using the HMAC- SHA-256. Upon calling the FIPSCHECK_verify() function provided with libfpscheck.so, the fpscheck application is loaded and executed, and the following steps are performed: 1. fpscheck loads the OpenSSL module, which performs its own integrity check using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm 2. fpscheck performs the integrity check of its own application fle using the HMAC SHA- 256 algorithm provided by the OpenSSL module 3. fpscheck automatically verifes the integrity of libfpscheck.so library before processing requests of calling applications 4. The fpscheck application performs the integrity check of the /usr/libexec/ipsec/pluto binary fle as follows: the fpscheck application computes the HMAC SHA-256 checksum of the fle from the command line and compares the computed value to the value stored inside the /usr/lib64/fpscheck/pluto.hmac checksum fle. The fpscheck application returns the appropriate exit value based on the comparison result: zero if the checksum is OK, which is enforced by the libfpscheck.so library. Otherwise, an error code will be shown, which puts the module into the error state. 5. libreswan also performs additionnal opwer-on self-tests that are not relevant to tis FIPS validation, which we document here for completeness: Libreswan performs a few more algorithm checks during power-on. These tests mostly come from RFC test vectors and from NIST test vectors. For example, AES-CBC and AES-GCM are tested during power-on with a KAT. Note that the NSS bound module already performs these tests when it powers-on, so these tests are redundant for the purpose of this FIPS validation. If any of the above steps fails, an error code (a non-zero value) will be returned and the module enters the error state. In Error state, all output is inhibited and no cryptographic operation is allowed. The Module needs to be reinitialized in order to recover from the Error state. The power-up self tests can be performed on demand by reinitializing the Module. 9.1.2 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests The power-up self tests for the SP 800-135 KDF are covered by the CAVP certifcate received for this algorithm documented in Table 5: Services available in FIPS mode. ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 16 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy All other cryptographic algorithm self-tests are implemented in the NSS bound module. If any of the self-tests fail, libreswan enters the Error state. In the Error state, all outputs are inhibited and no cryptographic operation is allowed. ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 17 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy 10 Guidance The following guidance items are to be used for assistance in maintaining the module's validated status while in use. 10.1 Crypto Ofcer Guidance NOTE: All cryptographic functions for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module will be provided by a copy of a FIPS 140-2 validated version of the NSS module. The OpenSSL module is used to perform integrity verifcation. • Confgure Pluto as specifed in ipsec.conf(5), and ipsec.secrets(5) man pages, as well as the fle README.nss provided by the RPM package: libreswan-3.20-3.el7. • To start and stop the module, use the (service ipsec) command. • ikelifetime should not be larger than 1 hour. • salifetime should not be larger than 1 hour. • Galois Counter Mode (GCM) and Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CCM) should be used with their full tag lengths. • Aggressive mode should not be used. • Stopping the module will zeroize the ephemeral CSPs and keys. • To check FIPS 140-2 module status, use: # ipsec status | grep fips 000 fips mode=disabled; Note: do not use # ipsec barf for checking the FIPS status of the module • The version of the RPM containing the validated module is stated in section 2.1 above. The integrity of the RPM is automatically verifed during the installation and the Crypto ofcer shall not install the RPM fle if the RPM tool indicates an integrity error. • When zeroizing the module, the crypto ofcer is responsible for using a FIPS140-2 approved mechanism to clear the keys written on disk. • The database for the cryptographic keys used by the Pluto Daemon must be initialized after it has been created as documented in the README.nss documentation with the following command, assuming that the database is stored in the directory /etc/ipsec.d/ ◦ modutil -fips true -dbdir /etc/ipsec.d NOTE: Encryption and decryption of data is done implicitly when the Pluto is asked to set up a new Security Association. For proper operation of the in-module integrity verifcation, the prelink has to be disabled. For this purpore, libreswan installs a libreswan-prelink.conf fle in % {_sysconfdir}/prelink.conf.d/ that instructs prelink to skip /usr/libexec/ipsec. To bring the module into FIPS mode, perform the following: 1. Install the dracut-fps package: # yum install dracut-fips 2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image (note: this step only regenerates the initrd fle for the currently running kernel): # dracut -f After regenerating the initrd, the crypto ofcer must check and append, if necessary, the following string to the kernel command line by changing the setting in the boot loader: fips=1 ©2017 Red Hat®, Inc. / atsec information security corporation Page 18 of 22 This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice. Red Hat Enterprise Linux Libreswan Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy If /boot or /boot/ef resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=