FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 1 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT STMICROELECTRONICS Trusted Platform Module ST33TPHF2ESPI & ST33TPHF2EI2C ST33HTPH2E28AAF0 / ST33HTPH2E32AAF0 / ST33HTPH2E28AAF1 / ST33HTPH2E32AAF1 / ST33HTPH2E28AHB3 / ST33HTPH2E32AHB3 / ST33HTPH2E28AHB4 / ST33HTPH2E32AHB4 / ST33HTPH2E28AHB7 / ST33HTPH2E32AHB7 / ST33HTPH2E28AHB8 / ST33HTPH2E32AHB8 / ST33HTPH2E28AHC0 / ST33HTPH2E32AHC0 / ST33HTPH2E28AHC2 / ST33HTPH2E32AHC2 / ST33HTPH2E28AHD0 / ST33HTPH2E32AHD0 FIPS 140-2 Security Policy Level 1 Firmware revision: 49.40 / 49.41 HW version: ST33HTPH revision A Date: 2020/05/19 Document Version: 03-09 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 2 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Table of Contents 1 MODULE DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 DEFINITION..................................................................................................................................... 4 1.2 MODULE IDENTIFICATION ................................................................................................................. 4 1.2.1 AAF0/AAF1........................................................................................................................... 4 1.2.2 AHB3/AHB4.......................................................................................................................... 5 1.2.3 AHB7/AHB8.......................................................................................................................... 6 1.2.4 AHC0 .................................................................................................................................... 6 1.2.5 AHC2 .................................................................................................................................... 7 1.2.6 AHD0 .................................................................................................................................... 8 1.2.7 AHC2 V2............................................................................................................................... 8 1.3 PINOUT DESCRIPTION.................................................................................................................... 10 1.3.1 SPI configuration ................................................................................................................ 10 1.3.2 I2C configuration ................................................................................................................. 11 1.4 BLOCK DIAGRAMS ......................................................................................................................... 13 1.5 SECURITY LEVELS......................................................................................................................... 15 1.6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONS ........................................................................................................ 16 1.7 MODES OF OPERATION ................................................................................................................. 18 1.7.1 TPM1.2 approved mode ..................................................................................................... 18 1.7.2 TPM2.0 approved mode ..................................................................................................... 20 1.7.3 Limited and error modes..................................................................................................... 22 1.8 PORTS AND INTERFACES ............................................................................................................... 22 2 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY ...................................................................... 24 2.1 TPM1.2 ....................................................................................................................................... 24 2.1.1 Roles................................................................................................................................... 24 2.1.2 Authentication..................................................................................................................... 24 2.2 TPM2.0 ....................................................................................................................................... 25 2.2.1 Roles................................................................................................................................... 25 2.2.2 Authentication..................................................................................................................... 26 3 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY ........................................................................................................... 29 3.1 TPM1.2 ....................................................................................................................................... 29 3.1.1 List of Keys and CSPs........................................................................................................ 29 3.1.2 Services.............................................................................................................................. 32 3.1.3 Authorization....................................................................................................................... 37 3.1.4 Key management................................................................................................................ 37 3.2 TPM2.0 ....................................................................................................................................... 39 3.2.1 List of Keys and CSPs........................................................................................................ 39 3.2.2 Services.............................................................................................................................. 43 3.2.3 Authorization....................................................................................................................... 50 3.2.4 Key management................................................................................................................ 50 4 SELF-TESTS...................................................................................................................................... 53 4.1 TPM1.2 ....................................................................................................................................... 53 4.1.1 Power-up tests list .............................................................................................................. 53 4.1.2 Full self-tests list ................................................................................................................. 53 4.1.3 Conditional tests list............................................................................................................ 54 4.1.4 Verification.......................................................................................................................... 54 4.2 TPM2.0 ....................................................................................................................................... 54 4.2.1 Power-up tests list .............................................................................................................. 55 4.2.2 Full self-tests list ................................................................................................................. 56 4.2.3 Conditional tests list............................................................................................................ 56 4.2.4 Verification.......................................................................................................................... 57 5 PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY........................................................................................................ 58 6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT...................................................................................................... 59 7 MITIGATIONS OF OTHER ATTACKS .............................................................................................. 60 7.1 INTERNAL TAMPER DETECTION...................................................................................................... 60 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 3 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION....................................................................................................... 60 8 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................... 61 9 ACRONYMS....................................................................................................................................... 63 IMPORTANT NOTICE – PLEASE READ CAREFULLY........................................................................... 64 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 4 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 1 MODULE DESCRIPTION 1.1 Definition The ST33TPHF2ESPI & ST33TPHF2EI2C Trusted Platform Module is a fully integrated security module designed to be integrated into personal computers and other embedded systems. The security module is used primarily for cryptographic key generation, key storage and key management as well as generation and secure storage for digital certificates. The TPM is a single chip cryptographic HW module as defined in [FIPS 140-2]. The single silicon chip is encapsulated in a hard, opaque, production grade integrated circuit (IC) package. The cryptographic boundary is defined as the perimeter of the IC package. The security module supports SPI and I2 C interfaces compliant with the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specification for PC Client [PTP 1.03]. The HW and FW cryptographic boundaries are indicated in §1.4 of the current document. The security module implements both version 1.2 (revision 1.16) and 2.0 (revision 1.38) of the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specification for Trusted Platform Modules (TPM). 1.2 Module identification The hardware and firmware versions covered by the FIPS evaluation are identified as follow:  Hardware version: ST33HTPH revision A  Firmware version: 49.40 (SPI) & 49.41 (I2 C) FW version can be retrieved via response to the command TPM_GetCapability (TPM1.2) and TPM2_GetCapability (TPM2.0) with property set to TPM_PT_FIRMWARE_VERSION_1. The cryptographic services are provided by the cryptographic library “NesLib 5.1 for ST33”. The product is manufactured in two packages:  TSSOP28  TSSOP 28-pin  4.4 x 9.7 mm  VQFN32  Very thin pitch Quad pack no-lead 32-pin  5 x 5 mm The security module is available in the following configurations: 1.2.1 AAF0/AAF1 Table 1: Security module configurations Module configuration Product name / HW version ST33TPHF2ESPI/ ST33HTPH revision A Package TSSOP28 VQFN32 TSSOP28 VQFN32 Part number ST33HTPH2E28 AAF0 ST33HTPH2E32 AAF0 ST33HTPH2E28 AAF1 ST33HTPH2E32 AAF1 Default mode TPM1.2 TPM2.0 Marking P68HAAF0 P68HAAF1 FW version 49.00 / 49.401 1 The default FW version of this configuration is 49.00 (not part of this validation). To operate with FW version 49.40, module FW must be first field upgraded from 49.00 to 49.40. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 5 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Figure 1: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (TSSOP28) – Marking P68HAAF0 / P68HAAF1 Figure 2: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (VQFN32) – Marking P68HAAF0 / P68HAAF1 1.2.2 AHB3/AHB4 Table 2: Security module configurations Module configuration Product name / HW version ST33TPHF2ESPI/ ST33HTPH revision A Package TSSOP28 VQFN32 TSSOP28 VQFN32 Part number ST33HTPH2E28 AHB3 ST33HTPH2E32 AHB3 ST33HTPH2E28 AHB4 ST33HTPH2E32 AHB4 Default mode TPM1.2 TPM2.0 Marking P68HAHB3 P68HAHB4 FW version 49.04 / 49.401 Figure 3: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (TSSOP28) – Marking P68HAHB3 & P68HAHB4 Figure 4: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (VQFN32) – Marking P68HAHB3 & P68HAHB4 1 The default FW version of this configuration is 49.04 (not part of this validation). To operate with FW version 49.40, module FW must be first field upgraded from 49.04 to 49.40. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 6 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 1.2.3 AHB7/AHB8 Table 3: Security module configurations Module configuration Product name / HW version ST33TPHF2EI2C/ ST33HTPH revision A Package TSSOP28 VQFN32 TSSOP28 VQFN32 Part number ST33HTPH2E28 AHB7 ST33HTPH2E32 AHB7 ST33HTPH2E28 AHB8 ST33HTPH2E32 AHB8 Default mode TPM1.2 TPM2.0 Marking P68HAHB7 P68HAHB8 FW version 49.05 / 49.411 Figure 5: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (TSSOP28) – Marking P68HAHB7 & P68HAHB8 Figure 6: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (VQFN32) – Marking P68HAHB7 & P68HAHB8 1.2.4 AHC0 Table 4: Security module configurations Module configuration Product name / HW version ST33TPHF2ESPI/ ST33HTPH revision A Package TSSOP28 VQFN32 Part number ST33HTPH2E28AHC0 ST33HTPH2E32AHC0 Default mode TPM2.0 Marking PEAHC0 FW version 49.08 / 49.402 1 The default FW version of this configuration is 49.05 (not part of this validation). To operate with FW version 49.41, module FW must be first field upgraded from 49.05 to 49.41. 2 The default FW version of this configuration is 49.08 (not part of this validation). To operate with FW version 49.40, module FW must be first field upgraded from 49.08 to 49.40. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 7 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Figure 7: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (TSSOP28) – Marking PEAHC0 Figure 8: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (VQFN32) – Marking PEAHC0 1.2.5 AHC2 Table 5: Security module configurations Module configuration Product name / HW version ST33TPHF2EI2C/ ST33HTPH revision A Package TSSOP28 VQFN32 Part number ST33HTPH2E28AHC2 ST33HTPH2E32AHC2 Default mode TPM2.0 Marking PEAHC2 FW version 49.09 / 49.411 Figure 9: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (TSSOP28) – Marking PEAHC2 Figure 10: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (VQFN32) – Marking PEAHC2 1 The default FW version of this configuration is 49.09 (not part of this validation). To operate with FW version 49.41, module FW must be first field upgraded from 49.09 to 49.41. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 8 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 1.2.6 AHD0 Table 6: Security module configurations Module configuration Product name / HW version ST33TPHF2ESPI/ ST33HTPH revision A Package TSSOP28 VQFN32 Part number ST33HTPH2E28AHD0 ST33HTPH2E32AHD0 Default mode TPM2.0 Marking PEAHD0 FW version 49.40 Figure 11: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (TSSOP28) – Marking PEAHD0 Figure 12: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (VQFN32) – Marking PEAHD0 1.2.7 AHC2 V2 Table 7: Security module configurations Module configuration Product name / HW version ST33TPHF2EI2C/ ST33HTPH revision A Package TSSOP28 VQFN32 Part number ST33HTPH2E28AHC2 ST33HTPH2E32AHC2 Default mode TPM2.0 Marking PEAHC2 V2 FW version 49.41 Figure 13: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (TSSOP28) – Marking PEAHC2 V2 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 9 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Figure 14: Picture of the Cryptographic Module (VQFN32) – Marking PEAHC2 V2 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 10 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 1.3 Pinout description Pin layouts for ST33TPHF2ESPI are shown in Figure 15 and in Figure 16: VQFN32 Pinout Diagram. Pin layouts for ST33TPHF2EI2C are shown in Figure 17: TSSOP28 Pinout Diagram and in Figure 18: VQFN32 Pinout Diagram. 1.3.1 SPI configuration Figure 15: TSSOP28 Pinout Diagram Figure 16: VQFN32 Pinout Diagram FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 11 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Next table gives a description of the products pins. Table 8: ST33TPHF2E Pin definition (SPI configuration) Signal Type Description VPS Input Power supply. This pin must be connected to 1.8V or 3.3V DC power rail supplied by the motherboard. GND Input GND has to be connected to the main motherboard ground. SPI_RST Input SPI Reset used to re-initialize the device MISO Output SPI Master Input, Slave Output (output from slave) MOSI Input SPI Master Output, Slave Input (output from master) SPI_CLK Input SPI serial clock (output from master) SPI_CS Input SPI slave select (active low; output from master) SPI_PIRQ Output SPI IRQ used by TPM to generate an interrupt PP Input Physical presence, active high, internal pull-down. Used to indicate Physical Presence to the TPM. NiC - Not internally connected: not connected to the die. May be left unconnected but no impact on TPM if connected. NC - Not Connected: connected to the die but not usable. May be left unconnected. Internal pull-down. 1.3.2 I2C configuration Figure 17: TSSOP28 Pinout Diagram SDA 1 28 GPIO3 SCL 2 27 GPIO2 NiC 3 26 NiC NiC 4 25 NiC NiC 5 24 NiC NC 6 23 NiC PP 7 22 NiC NiC 8 21 NiC NiC 9 20 PIRQ VPS 10 19 NiC GND 11 18 NiC NiC 12 17 NiC NiC 13 16 RESET NiC 14 15 GPIO1 TSSOP28 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 12 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Figure 18: VQFN32 Pinout Diagram Next table gives a description of the products pins. Table 9: ST33TPHF2E Pin definition (I²C configuration) Signal Type Description VPS Input Power supply. This pin must be connected to 1.8V or 3.3V DC power rail supplied by the motherboard. GND Input GND has to be connected to the main motherboard ground. RESET Input Reset used to re-initialize the device SCL Input I²C serial clock (Open drain with no weak pull-up resistor) SDA Input/Output I²C serial data (Open drain with no weak pull-up resistor) PIRQ Output IRQ used by TPM to generate an interrupt GPIO1 Input/Output GPIO default to low (not used, reserved for future use) GPIO2 Input/Output GPIO default to low (not used, reserved for future use) GPIO3 Input/Output GPIO default to low (not used, reserved for future use) PP Input Physical presence, active high, internal pull-down. Used to indicate Physical Presence to the TPM. NiC - Not internally connected: not connected to the die. May be left unconnected but no impact on TPM if connected. NC - Not Connected: connected to the die but not usable. May be left unconnected. Internal pull-down. VQFN32 VPS 1 24 NiC NiC 2 23 NiC NiC 3 22 NiC PP 4 21 NiC NiC 5 20 NiC NC 6 19 NiC NiC 7 18 PIRQ NiC 8 17 RESET GND 9 32 NiC NiC 10 31 NiC NiC 11 30 SCL NiC 12 29 SDA GPIO1 13 28 GPIO3 NiC 14 27 GPIO2 NiC 15 26 NiC NiC 16 25 NiC FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 13 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 1.4 Block diagrams A block diagram of the hardware ST33HTPH (with its associated cryptographic boundary) is provided in Figure 19. TPM is composed of:  A SecurCore® SC300™ CPU core including a MPU (Memory Protection Unit)  Memories (RAMs, Flash and ROM)  HW accelerators for CRC (16 and 32-bits) and cryptographic operations (symmetric with EDES+ and AES and asymmetric with NESCRYPT)  A clock generator and three 16-bit timers  NDRNG (non-deterministic random bit generator)  SPI master/slave block  A security administration block dedicated to chip security configuration and alarms detection  FW and data stored in the memory areas Figure 19: ST33HTPH block diagram SecurCore® SC300™ CPU Core MPU I/D bus S bus RAM Flash memory ST ROM firewall ST ROM APB/AHB bridge APB AES HW accelerator EDES+ HW accelerator CRC HW accelerator Clock generator Timers NDRNG NESCRYPT HW accelerator with RAM Security Administrator SPI with RAM buffer Power mngt VCC GND SPI/I2C interface Cryptographic boundary GPIOs FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 14 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT A block diagram of the TPM FW is provided in Figure 20: TPM FW block diagram. Figure 20: TPM FW block diagram TPM FW is composed of:  Non-upgradable code blocks located in ROM & flash memories (depicted in orange)  Boot code  Cryptographic library  HW and memory low-level services  Upgradable code blocks via secure field upgrade mechanism (blue and green boxes)  Application flash loader (AFL) in charge of TPM field upgrade  TPM1.2 core  TPM1.2 commands code  TPM2.0 core  TPM2.0 commands code  Low-level services API (incl. cryptographic services, memory management, …) TPM2.0 core TPM2.0 commands AFL Boot Low-level services API Cryptographic library HW and memory services TPM1.2 core TPM1.2 commands FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 15 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 1.5 Security levels The cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 1 security of FIPS 140-2. Table 10: Module Security Level Specification Security Requirements Section Level Cryptographic Module Specification 1 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1 Roles, Services and Authentication 1 Finite State Model 1 Physical Security 3 Operational Environment N/A Cryptographic Key Management 1 EMI/EMC 1 Self-Tests 1 Design Assurance 1 Mitigation of Other Attacks 1 Overall 1 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 16 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 1.6 Cryptographic functions The security module supports the following cryptographic algorithms (both approved and non- approved). Algorithm certificate numbers for each approved algorithm are listed below. All algorithms, keys size or curve lengths listed below are part of services offered by the module. Table 11: Approved algorithms CAVP Cert # Algorithm Standard Mode / Method Key lengths, curves or moduli Use 2342 RSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-256, RSASSA- PKCS-v1.5 2048 Digital signature generation FIPS 186-4 SHA-11 , SHA-256, RSASSA-PKCS-v1.5, RSASSA-PSS 10242 , 2048 Digital signature verification FIPS 186-4 Appendix C3.1 2048 Key generation 1045 CVL RSADP SP800-56B RSA decryption primitive 2048 Key transport C1074 & C1075 ECDSA FIPS 186-4 SHA-256 P-224, P-256 Digital signature generation FIPS 186-4 SHA-1, SHA-256 P-224, P-256 Digital signature verification FIPS 186-4 - P-224, P-256 Key verification ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.4.2 P-224, P-256 Key generation C1074 & C1075 HMAC (single call) FIPS 198-1 SHA-1, SHA-256 160, 256 Message authentication C1067 & C1068 HMAC (sequence) FIPS 198-1 SHA-1, SHA-256 160, 256 Message authentication C1074 & C1075 KBKDF SP 800-108 CTR Key derivation C1074 & C1075 CVL TPM3 SP 800-135 HMAC SHA-1 Key derivation 1361 DRBG SP 800-90A HASH_based Deterministic random bit generation 4338 AES FIPS 197, SP 800-38A ECB, CFB, OFB, CBC, CTR 128, 192, 256 Data encryption/decryption 2345 Triple-DES SP 800-67, SP 800-38A TECB, TCBC, TCFB64, TOFB, CTR 192 Data encryption/decryption NA KTS (AES cert #4338 + HMAC cert #C1074) KTS (AES cert #4338 + HMAC cert #C1075) SP 800-38F CFB 128, 256 Key transport 3539 SHS FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-256 Message digest 1 Legacy use only 2 Legacy use only 3 TPM key establishment protocol that uses TPM KDF has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP (IG D.11) FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 17 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Vendor affirmation CKG SP800-133 (per IG D.12) Direct generation, Generation Key generation1 KTS RSA SP800-56B KTS-OAEP-basic 2048 Key transport KAS SSC SP 800-56A Rev3 ECC P-224, P-256 Key agreement scheme – shared secret computation KDA SP800-56C Rev 1 Key derivation Table 12: Allowed algorithms Algorithm Caveat Use NDRNG NA Seed or reseed DRBG 800-90A (with approximatively 345 bits of entropy). Generate random numbers not dedicated to be used as cryptographic material. Table 13: Non-approved algorithms Algorithm Use RSA (key length = 1024 bits) Key and digital signature generation SHA-1 Digital signature generation ECSchnorr Digital signature generation and verification ECDAA Digital signature generation MGF1 Encryption/decryption ECC derived keys Secret exchange or digital signature generation/verification 1 Symmetric keys and seeds used for generating the asymmetric keys are either generated by using KBKDF method (TPM2.0), DRBG (unmodified output for TPM2.0 & TPM1.2) or CVL TPM (TPM1.2). Methods are detailed per CSPs in tables Table 23: Keys and CSPs list and Table 27: Keys and CSPs list. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 18 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 1.7 Modes of Operation At a given time, TPM is configured to process commands according to TPM1.2 or TPM2.0 standard. To operate in FIPS approved mode, TPM shall follow the recommendations listed in the paragraphs below according to the current mode (TPM1.2 or TPM2.0). Switch between TPM1.2 and TPM2.0 (and vice versa) is possible via execution of TPM_SetMode (TPM1.2) or TPM2_SetMode (TPM2.0) command followed by a reset of the TPM. This security policy only applies to the security module when TPM operator follows the recommendations listed below to use the TPM in a FIPS approved mode of operation in TPM1.2 and TPM2.0 modes. 1.7.1 TPM1.2 approved mode TPM1.2 supports 2 sequential approved modes of operation. To operate in full FIPS approved mode in TPM1.2:  TPM_SelfTestFull command must be executed to switch from limited approved mode to full operational approved mode.  FIPS mode recommendations listed in §1.7.1.3 must be followed. 1.7.1.1 Limited approved mode This mode is the default mode when TPM starts. This mode is limited to a subset of TPM services. Table 14: TPM1.2 limited approved mode Properties Description Definition Transient mode of operation when TPM is power-up and before TPM_SelfTestFull execution Configuration No configuration required Services available List of available services is indicated in last column of Table 24: Command support table Algorithms used SHA-1 & SHA-256 CSPs used List of CSPs that might be accessed in this mode is indicated in Table 23: Keys and CSPs list Self-tests SHS / HW integrity / FW integrity / NDRNG 1.7.1.2 Full operational approved mode This mode is the full FIPS approved mode of operation. Table 15: TPM1.2 full operational approved mode Properties Description Definition Full approved mode of operation Configuration TPM_SelfTestFull execution Services available All services listed in Table 24: Command support table Algorithms used All supported algorithms (cf. §1.6) CSPs used All CSPs indicated in Table 23: Keys and CSPs list Self-tests SHS / HMAC / AES / DRBG / KDF / RSA / HW integrity / FW integrity / NDRNG FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 19 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 1.7.1.3 FIPS mode recommendations To use TPM in a full approved FIPS 140-2 mode (valid for both modes), TPM user shall:  Follow the procedure to switch from limited to full operational mode  Use the following commands with the indicated restrictions (Indicated parameters refer to [TPM1.2 Part3 r1.16]. Indicated values refer to [TPM1.2 Part2 r1.16].): o TPM_TakeOwnership: authDataUsage field of srkParams parameter must be different from TPM_AUTH_NEVER. o TPM_CreateWrapKey: size of key to be created must be strictly greater or equal to 2048 bits (keySize field of keyInfo parameter). authDataUsage field of keyInfo parameter must be different from TPM_AUTH_NEVER. o TPM_LoadKey / TPM_LoadKey2: size of key to be loaded must be strictly greater or equal to 2048 bits (keySize field of keyInfo parameter). authDataUsage field of keyInfo parameter must be different from TPM_AUTH_NEVER. o TPM_CMK_CreateKey: size of key to be created must be strictly greater or equal to 2048 bits (keySize field of keyInfo parameter). authDataUsage field of keyInfo parameter must be different from TPM_AUTH_NEVER. o TPM_MakeIdentity: authDataUsage field of idKeyParams parameter must be different from TPM_AUTH_NEVER. o TPM_EstablishTransport: If transAttributes field of transPublic parameter is equal to TPM_TRANSPORT_ENCRYPT, algId field must be different from TPM_ALG_MGF1.  Use TPM_OSAP for authentication sessions with TPM_ET_AES128_CTR ADIP encryption scheme for commands listed in Table 25: Encrypted methods for secret and private keys input and marked as using AES_CTR to input or output CSPs.  Use SHA-256 hash algorithm for digital signature generation. It concerns the following services: o TPM_Sign  Not use services that don’t meet FIPS 140-2 criteria: o TPM_DAA_Join (use of MGF1 as encryption scheme) o TPM_DAA_Sign (use of MGF1 as encryption scheme) o TPM_CertifyKey (signature generation using SHA1) o TPM_CertifyKey2 (signature generation using SHA1) o TPM_Quote (signature generation using SHA1) o TPM_Quote2 (signature generation using SHA1) o TPM_TickStampBlob (signature generation using SHA1) o TPM_ReleaseTransportSigned (signature generation using SHA1) If operator does not strictly follow the FIPS approved mode recommendations, TPM is considered as being in a FIPS non-approved mode of operation. To use the TPM in a FIPS approved mode if it was previously used in a FIPS non-approved mode, the operator shall:  Zeroize all data listed in Table 23: Keys and CSPs list that could potentially be reused as CSPs in FIPS approved mode To use the TPM in a FIPS non-approved mode if it was previously used in a FIPS approved mode, the operator shall:  Zeroize all CSPs listed in Table 23: Keys and CSPs list that could potentially be used by FIPS non-approved algorithms in FIPS approved mode FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 20 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 1.7.2 TPM2.0 approved mode TPM2.0 supports 2 sequential approved modes of operation. To operate in full FIPS approved mode in TPM2.0:  TPM2_SelfTest (full=YES) command must be executed to switch from limited approved mode to full operational approved mode.  FIPS mode recommendations listed in §1.7.2.3 must be followed. 1.7.2.1 Limited approved mode This mode is the default mode when TPM starts. This mode is limited to a subset of TPM services. Table 16: TPM2.0 limited approved mode Properties Description Definition Transient mode of operation when TPM is power-up and before TPM2_SelfTest(full=YES) execution Configuration No configuration required Services available List of available services is indicated in last column of Table 24: Command support table. Algorithms used SHA / HMAC / AES / DRBG / KDF / Triple-DES CSPs used List of CSPs that might be accessed in this mode is indicated in Table 27: Keys and CSPs list. Self-tests SHS / HMAC / AES / DRBG / KDF / Triple-DES / HW integrity / FW integrity / NDRNG 1.7.2.2 Full operational approved mode This mode is the full FIPS approved mode of operation. Table 17: TPM2.0 full operational approved mode Properties Description Definition Full approved mode of operation Configuration TPM2_SelfTest(full=YES) execution Services available All services Algorithms used All supported algorithms (cf. §1.6) CSPs used All CSPs Self-tests SHS / HMAC / AES / DRBG / KDF / Triple-DES / RSA / EC-DH / ECDSA / HW integrity / FW integrity / NDRNG 1.7.2.3 FIPS mode recommendations To use the TPM in a FIPS approved mode of operation (valid for both modes), the TPM operator shall:  Follow the procedure to switch from limited to full operational mode  Use an encryption session for the commands that inputs/outputs CSPs (List is indicated at §3.2.4.1). For commands without authorization, encryptedSalt used in TPM_StartAuthSession on encryption session creation must be different from the empty buffer.  Use an approved symmetric algorithm (AES) for encryption sessions FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 21 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT  Use authorization session based on HMAC or policy (no password allowed, cf. §2.2.2.1).  Duplicate only objects with encryptedDuplication attribute set.  Set the attribute noDA to 0 for objects to benefit from DAM protection (§2.2.2.3).  Not use FIPS 140-2 non-approved algorithms: o SHA-1 for RSA digital signature generation o EC Schnorr for ECC digital signature generation o ECDAA for ECC digital signature generation o Use ECC key derived from a parent key for ECC cryptographic operations For the following services: o TPM2_Sign, TPM2_Certify, TPM2_CertifyCreation, TPM2_Quote, TPM2_GetSessionAuditDigest, TPM2_GetCommandAuditDigest, TPM2_GetTime, TPM2_NV_Certify, TPM2_Commit  Use a policy including TPM2_PolicyAuthValue as a minimum in the policy sequence in case authorization is ensured by policy (authorization by policy must be at least as secure as authorization by HMAC).  Not use TPM2_LoadExternal service to load TDES keys into the TPM.  Limit number of encryptions with a same TDES key to a maximum of 216 encryptions.  Use TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth after first TPM init or after each TPM2_Clear to set the authorization value for the endorsement, platform, owner and lockout hierarchies.  Use TPM2_CreatePrimary command only for RSA and ECC key with default template. If operator does not strictly follow the FIPS approved mode recommendations (ex: use of XOR instead of AES in encryption session), TPM is considered as being in a FIPS non-approved mode of operation. To use the TPM in a FIPS approved mode if it was previously used in a FIPS non-approved mode, the operator shall:  Zeroize all data listed in Table 27: Keys and CSPs list that could potentially be reused as CSPs in FIPS approved mode To use the TPM in a FIPS non-approved mode if it was previously used in a FIPS approved mode, the operator shall:  Zeroize all CSPs listed in Table 27: Keys and CSPs list that could potentially be used by FIPS non-approved algorithms in FIPS approved mode FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 22 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 1.7.3 Limited and error modes TPM may reach specific states depending on sequence of operation that occurred. 1.7.3.1 Shutdown mode The shutdown mode is an infinite HW reset loop that may be exit only by a power-off/power- on sequence. This state is entered when TPM detects that a FW integrity check failed during the TPM boot sequence. 1.7.3.2 Failure mode Failure mode is a state of TPM that restricts the commands that can be executed to TPM_Startup / TPM_GetCapability / TPM_GetTestResult for TPM1.2 and TPM2_GetCapability / TPM2_GetTestResult for TPM2.0. TPM answers to all other commands with a specific error code: TPM_FAILEDSELFTEST (0x1C) for TPM1.2 and TPM_RC_FAILURE (0x101). This state is entered when one (except FW integrity test) of the self-tests fails. 1.7.3.3 Reduced mode The reduced mode is a specific state of the field upgrade mode (refer to §6) that can be reached if the on-going field upgrade procedure failed due to an error detected in the field upgrade commands received. In reduced mode, only a subset of commands might be executed: TPM_FieldUpgradeStart / TPM_FieldUpgradeData / TPM_GetCapability / TPM_GetTestResult / TPM_ContinueSelfTest for TPM1.2 and TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart / TPM2_VendorCmdFieldUpgradeStart / TPM2_FieldUpgradeData / TPM2_GetCapability / TPM2_GetTestResult / TPM2_SelfTest for TPM2.0. TPM answers to all other commands with the error TPM_RC_COMMAND_CODE (0x143). Reduced mode can be exited in case of the reception of a successful TPM_FieldUpgradeStart / TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart / TPM2_VendorCmdFieldUpgradeStart command that reloads the previous installed firmware or the new firmware that have not been completely uploaded. 1.8 Ports and interfaces The physical port of the security module is the SPI bus or I2C Bus. The logical interfaces and their mapping to physical ports of the module are described below: Table 18: Ports and interfaces Logical interface Description Physical port Control Input Interface Control Input commands issued to the security module SPI : SPI_CS / SPI_CLK / MOSI / SPI_RST / PP I2 C : SCL / SDA / RESET / PP Status Output Interface Status data output by the chip SPI : SPI_CS / SPI_CLK / MISO / SPI_PIRQ I2 C : SCL / SDA / PIRQ Data Input Interface Data provided to the chip as part of the data processing commands SPI : SPI_CS / SPI_CLK / MOSI I2 C : SCL / SDA Data Output Interface Data output by the chip as part of the data processing command SPI : SPI_CS / SPI_CLK / MISO I2 C : SCL / SDA Power interface Power interface of the chip VPS / GND Here are some details concerning the ports and interfaces of TPM: FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 23 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 1. The module does not include a maintenance interface. 2. Control and data inputs are multiplexed over the same physical interface. Control and data are distinguished by properly parsing input TPM command parameters according to input structures description, indicated for each TPM2.0 command in [TPM2.0 Part3 r1.38]1 and TPM1.2 command in [TPM1.2 Part3 r1.16]2. 3. Status and data output are multiplexed over the same physical interface. Status and data are distinguished by properly setting output TPM response parameters according to output structures description, indicated for each TPM2.0 command in [TPM2.0 Part3 r1.38] and TPM1.2 command in [TPM1.2 Part3 r1.16]. 4. The logical state machine and the command structure parsing of the module prevent from using input data externally from the “data input path” and prevent from outputting data externally from the “data output path”. 5. While performing key generation or key zeroization (no manual key entry on TPM), the output data path is logically disconnected while the output status path remains connected to report any possible failure during command processing. Generally, the output data path is only connected when TPM outputs response containing data. 6. In TPM1.2 mode, plaintext data might be output through usage of:  TPM_UnBind  TPM_Unseal To prevent inadvertent release of the plaintext data, both commands performs:  Check of command input structure  Check of command authorization (cf. §2.2.1 for details)  Decryption of the input blob with private part of specified key In TPM2.0 mode, plaintext data might be output through usage of:  TPM2_Unseal, TPM2_RSA_Decrypt, TPM2_EncryptDecrypt To prevent inadvertent release of the plaintext data, command performs:  Check of command input structure  Check of command authorization  Decryption of the input blob with private part of specified key However an encryption session might be used with these commands to avoid releasing plaintext data. 7. The logical state machine and command structure of the module guarantees the inhibition of all data output via the data output interface whenever an error state exists and while doing self-tests. 1 Some commands only deal with control input and status output parameters 2 Some commands only deal with control input and status output parameters FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 24 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 2 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY This chapter gives details about the roles managed by TPM for TPM1.2 and TPM2.0 modes. 2.1 TPM1.2 2.1.1 Roles Services (services are listed in §3.2.2) proposed by TPM are accessible under different roles. Next table defines the different roles supported by the TPM. Table 19: Roles Role Description Type of authentication Authentication data Crypto officer (CO) Equivalent to TPM owner (cf. [TPM1.2 Part1 r1.16] for role definition). Some TPM services are reserved to owner (initialization/configuration). Role based 160-bit secret data (Owner AuthData) User (U) Role requiring entity authorization, operator authorization. Role based 160-bit secret data (key usageAuth or operator AuthData) Physical presence (PP) HW assertion that proves that an operator is physically present (no remote access) HW based None No authentication (NA) Some TPM services do not require any authentication. None None The security module does NOT provide a Maintenance Role or Maintenance Interface. Cryptographic module does NOT support concurrent operators. 2.1.2 Authentication 2.1.2.1 Description Crypto officer and user authentication data knowledge must be proven to authorize some TPM services. TPM uses a two-step mechanism for authorization that consists in: 1. Opening a session of the following types: a. OIAP: Object-Independent Authorization Protocol b. OSAP: Object-Specific Authorization Protocol c. DSAP: Delegation-Specific Authorization Protocol Session is used to establish a sequence of nonce-data included in the authorization process (protection against replay attacks). OSAP and DSAP sessions also create a shared secret used as HMAC key for command authorization. For OIAP, the authorization data is directly used as HMAC key. 2. Using the command to be authorized by verifying if HMAC (based on authorization value) passed as parameter corresponds to the value computed by TPM. If they match, command execution is authorized. Secret authorization data is never exposed in plaintext (there is one exception for operatorAuth entered by TPM_SetOperatorAuth service and used by TPM_SetTempDeactivated). HMAC computation output based on the authorization data enables to prove knowledge of this secret. When power is removed from the module, all existing authentication sessions are destroyed. Therefore, the module must re-authenticate every role or identity after each power-on sequence. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 25 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 2.1.2.2 Authorization strength As authorization values are 160-bit random values (based on unbiased distribution of ‘0’ and ‘1’), the probability for an attacker to guess the authorization data is: 1 2160 = 6,84 ∗ 10−49 This value matches the requirement of 1*10-6 indicated in [FIPS 140-2]. The number of attempts per minute that an attacker can make is limited by the DAM (Dictionary Attack Mechanism). DAM consists in counting the number of failed authentication. When this counter reaches a pre-defined threshold, a lockout period is started. During this period, no authorized command execution is allowed and a specific error (TPM_DEFEND_LOCK_RUNNING) is returned in TPM response until period expires. Next table indicates the threshold values and the lockout durations: Table 20: DAM lockout durations Failed authentication counter <10 10 (DAM threshold) 11 12 13 … 23 >23 Lockout period (in seconds) 0 10 20 40 60 … 81920 86400 This table indicates that an attacker can do a maximum (during the first minute) of 12 trials per minute (if failed authorization counter reaches 12 it means total lockout period is equal to 10s + 20s + 40s = 70s). As a result the probability per minute that a random attempt will lead to a successful authorization matches FIPS requirements. Value is equal to: 12 ∗ 1 2160 = 8,21 ∗ 10−48 This value matches the requirement of 1*10-5 indicated in [FIPS 140-2]. NB: commands handling (reception, processing and response sending) is negligible compared to the lockout periods and not taken into account in the above computation. 2.2 TPM2.0 2.2.1 Roles Services (services are listed in §3.2.2) proposed by TPM are accessible under different roles. Next table defines the different roles supported by the TPM. Table 21: Roles Role Description Type of authentication Authentication data Crypto officer (CO) Role that requires knowledge of the authValue or authPolicy associated to one of the hierarchy (incl. lockout). Role based 256-bit secret data (authValue and/or authPolicy) User (U) Role that requires knowledge of the authValue or authPolicy associated to one object or NV index. Role based 160-bit or 256-bit secret data (authValue and/or authPolicy). Authorization depends on userWithAuth object attribute. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 26 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Admin (A) The object Administrator controls the certification of an object (TPM2_Certify and TPM2_ActivateCredential) and controls changing of the authValue of an object (TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth). Role based 160-bit or 256-bit secret data (authValue and/or authPolicy). Authorization depends on adminWithPolicy object attribute. DUP (D) This authorization role is only used for TPM2_Duplicate(). If duplication is allowed, authorization must always be provided by a policy session and the authPolicy equation of the object must contain a command that sets the policy command code to TPM_CC_Duplicate. Role based 160-bit or 256-bit secret data (authPolicy). Some commands can also be executed without any authorization role. Those commands are marked as NA in the service list table (Table 28: Command support table). The security module does NOT provide a Maintenance Role or Maintenance Interface and does NOT support concurrent operators. Roles are implicitly selected by TPM operator on command execution (cf. Table 28 for correspondence between service and supported role) by proving knowledge of the authorization value or knowledge of the policy sequence (nature of authorization session indicates the type of authorization) that are associated with the object the command is operating on. An operator might switch from one role to another by executing commands requiring different roles and proving knowledge of the authorization value or policy sequence of objects the role is associated to. 2.2.2 Authentication 2.2.2.1 Description In FIPS approved mode of operation, TPM uses a mechanism for authorization that consists in: 1. Opening an authorization session that may be of the following types: a. HMAC b. Policy 2. Executing the expected policy commands sequence in case of policy authorization session (defined policy must follow minimal recommendations listed in §1.7.2.3). 3. Do the comparison between reference value and computed value. If both match, command execution is authorized. More details on HMAC and policy sessions can be found in §19 of [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.38]. 2.2.2.2 Authorization strength As minimum value of authorization or policy values might be 160-bit random values (based on unbiased distribution of ‘0’ and ‘1’), the probability for an attacker to guess the authorization data is: 1 2160 = 6.84 ∗ 10−49 This value is then higher than the minimum of 1*10-6 required by [FIPS140-2]. The number of attempts per minute that an attacker can make is limited by the DAM (Dictionary Attack Mechanism) or by the PIN fail mechanism (they are concurrent mechanisms). 2.2.2.2.1 DAM FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 27 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT DAM consists in counting the number of failed authentication. When this counter reaches a pre-defined threshold, a lockout period is started. During this period, no authorized command execution is allowed and a specific error is returned in TPM response until period expires. Next table indicates the threshold values and the lockout durations: Table 22: DAM lockout durations Failed authentication counter >31 Lockout period (in seconds) 7200 This table indicates that an attacker can do a maximum (during the first minute) of 32 trials per minute before DAM being active. As a result the probability per minute that a random attempt will lead to a successful authorization matches FIPS requirements. Value is equal to: 32 ∗ 1 2160 = 2.19 ∗ 10−47 This value is then higher than the minimum of 1*10-5 required by [FIPS140-2]. NB: commands handling (reception, processing and response sending) is negligible compared to the lockout periods and not taken into account in the above computation. NB2: DAM parameters might be changed by using TPM2_DictionnaryAttackParameters command. However to operate in a FIPS approved mode, they shall not be changed in order not to decrease the authorization strength computed above. 2.2.2.2.2 PIN fail The PIN fail mechanism is based on the use of an NV index (named PIN index) that contains two 32-bits values: pinCount and pinLimit. Mechanism consists in proving, during a policy session (through use of TPM2_PolicySecret command), the knowledge of the authValue of this PIN index. If it fails, pinCount is incremented. If pinCount >= pinLimit, authorization is locked. The best case for an attacker is a pinCount and pinLimit set to the maximum possible value (232-1). So probability of successful authorization is equal to: (232 − 1) ∗ 1 2160 ≈ 2.94 ∗ 10−39 This value is then higher than the minimum of 1*10-5 required by [FIPS140-2]. NB: commands handling (reception, processing and response sending) is negligible compared to the lockout periods and not taken into account in the above computation. 2.2.2.2.3 Hierarchies authValue The ownerAuth, platformAuth and endorsementAuth associated to the three hierarchies are not subject to DAM or PIN fail protection. They are 256-bit random values (based on unbiased distribution of ‘0’ and ‘1’). Probability of guess per minute can be expressed as: 𝑛 ∗ 1 2256 Where n is the number of attempts per minute. If we consider a maximum of 232-1 trials per minute (value being much higher than what processing timings of any command permit), the probability of successful authorization per minute is equal to: (232 − 1) ∗ 1 2256 ≈ 3.71 ∗ 10−68 This value is then higher than the minimum of 1*10-5 required by [FIPS140-2]. Total number of trials to decrease the probability to 1*10-5 is equal to: 1. 10−5 ∗ 2256 ≈ 1.15 ∗ 1072 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 28 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT By still considering 232-1 trials per minute, this means that the total number of minutes necessary to decrease the probability of hierarchy authValue guess to 1*10-5 is equal to: (1.15 ∗ 1072 )/(232 − 1) ≈ 2.67 ∗ 1062 This value justifies not having DAM or PIN fail protection for hierarchies’ authValue. 2.2.2.3 Authorization protection By following recommendations to operate in FIPS mode of operation, authorization data associated to objects, NV indexes or hierarchies are never output from TPM in plaintext form and thus are protected from unauthorized disclosure. Authorization can be changed via the following services:  TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth  TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth  TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth As indicated in Table 28, roles that imply authentication are associated with these services meaning that authentication are protected against unauthorized modification and substitution. TPM authorization mechanism (HMAC or policy digest comparison) does not provide any information about authentication data or policy sequence. Authentication indicates pass (command executed) or fail (command not executed) and does not provide feedback that could weaken the strength of authentication. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 29 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 3 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY 3.1 TPM1.2 This chapter gives details about the services, keys and CSPs that the TPM manages in TPM1.2 mode. 3.1.1 List of Keys and CSPs Table 23: Keys and CSPs list Keys/CSPs Description Zeroization Index Name 1 Endorsement key (EK) – private part 2048-bits permanent RSA key unique per TPM stored in the form of two prime numbers. EK primes are generated externally by a HSM and inserted during TPM production phase. EK is used to:  Decrypt encOwnerAuth and encSrkAuth in TPM_TakeOwnership command  Decrypt blob in TPM_ActivateIdentity No zeroization (NIST waiver) 2 Storage root key (SRK) – private part & authorization value 2048-bits non-volatile RSA key. Root key of the key storage hierarchy. Key is generated and stored on TPM on TPM_TakeOwnership command according to the input parameters. SRK is used to:  Wrap and unwrap keys stored in the protected storage hierarchy Authorization data (non-volatile data) are 160-bits secret data used for SRK authorization. It is passed encrypted (RSA OAEP SHA1 algorithm with key = public part of EK) to TPM_TakeOwnership command. It is used as key for TPM KDF SP800-135 in session shared secret (CSP #8) generation for TPM_MakeIdentity and might be used for commands with U role in Table 28: Command support table that uses SRK as parent key. TPM_OwnerClear TPM_ForceClear 3 User RSA keys – private part & authorization value 2048-bits RSA keys generated with TPM_CreateWrapKey, TPM_MakeIdentity and TPM_CMK_CreateKey commands (output encrypted from TPM with parent key indicated in the command). Keys loaded on the TPM via TPM_ActivateIdentity, TPM_LoadKey or TPM_LoadKey2. Depending on key attributes (keyUsage field in TPM_KEY structure), key can be used as:  Signing key (TPM_KEY_SIGNING)  Storage key (TPM_KEY_STORAGE)  Identity key (TPM_KEY_IDENTITY)  Binding key (TPM_KEY_BIND)  Signing and binding key (TPM_KEY_LEGACY)  Migration key (TPM_KEY_MIGRATE) Key might be volatile or non-volatile (keyFlags parameter in TPM_KEY structure). TPM_OwnerClear TPM_ForceClear TPM_FlushSpecific TPM_EvictKey TPM_Init (for volatile keys only) FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 30 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Keys/CSPs Description Zeroization Index Name Authorization data (non-volatile data) are 160-bits secret data used for user RSA key authorization. It is passed encrypted (RSA OAEP SHA1 algorithm with key = public part of parent key) to key creation commands (TPM_CreateWrapKey, TPM_MakeIdentity and TPM_CMK_CreateKey). It is used as key for TPM KDF SP800-135 in session shared secret (CSP #8) generation for commands with U role in Table 28: Command support table that might use user RSA key as parent key. 4 Field upgrade verification key 2048-bits permanent RSA key unique per TPM product line. Only public part of the key is stored in the TPM (modulus, exponent). No (public key only) 5 contextKey / delegateKey 128-bits non-volatile AES key used to perform context saves/restores (TPM_SaveContext, TPM_LoadContext) and delegation blobs encryption/decryption (TPM_Delegate_CreateKeyDelegation, TPM_Delegate_CreateOwnerDelegation, TPM_Delegate_LoadOwnerDelegation). Key is generated by HDRBG on TPM_TakeOwnership command. TPM_OwnerClear TPM_ForceClear 6 HDRBG input seed 48-bytes value output from a NDRNG. Transient value 8 Session shared secret 160-bit volatile shared secret generated on TPM_OSAP or TPM_DSAP commands execution by derivation (TPM KDF SP800- 135) using entity authorization data as key. Session shared secret is used as:  AES CTR key (first 128-bits) in ADIP protocol to encrypt/decrypt authorization data (list of commands is indicated in Table 25: Encrypted methods for secret and private keys input).  HMAC SHA-1 key in HMAC computation in authorization protocols (concerned commands are indicated with CO or U role in Table 28: Command support table). TPM_FlushSpecific TPM_OwnerClear TPM_ForceClear 9 NV index – authorization value 160-bits (non-volatile data) used as secret authorization data for a specific NV index. Value is passed encrypted (AES CTR 128 with key = OSAP shared secret) to the TPM_NV_DefineSpace command. It is used as key for TPM KDF SP800-135 in session shared secret (CSP #8) generation for TPM_NV_WriteValueAuth and TPM_NV_ReadValueAuth commands. TPM_OwnerClear TPM_ForceClear 10 HDRBG state 222-bytes (volatile data) representing the HDRBG internal state (V and C secret values). HDRBG is seeded after each reset with NDRNG output. Internal state is updated after each HDRBG generate command execution or reseed. HDRBG is used in random number generation for cryptographic material. TPM_OwnerClear TPM_ForceClear TPM_SetMode TPM_Init 11 tpmProof 160-bits secret random number (non-volatile data) generated by HDRBG on TPM_TakeOwnership command execution. It is used as:  HMAC SHA-1 key in integrity computation of blobs generated or read in the following commands: TPM_OwnerClear TPM_ForceClear FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 31 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Keys/CSPs Description Zeroization Index Name TPM_CertifyKey2, TPM_Delegate_CreateKeyDelegation, TPM_Delegate_CreateOwnerDelegation, TPM_Delegate_UpdateVerification, TPM_CreateMigrationBlob, TPM_AuthorizeMigrationKey, TPM_CMKApproveMA, TPM_CMK_CreateKey, TPM_CMK_CreateTicket, TPM_CMK_CreateBlob, TPM_CMK_ConvertMigration, TPM_SaveContext, TPM_LoadContext, TPM_Seal 12 Owner – authorization value 160-bits secret authorization data (non-volatile data) for owner authorization. It is passed encrypted (RSA OAEP SHA1 algorithm with key = public part of EK) to TPM_TakeOwnership command. It can be changed on TPM_ChangeAuthOwner command processing. It is used as key for TPM KDF SP800-135 in session shared secret (CSP #8) generation for all commands listed in Table 28: Command support table and requesting CO role to be authorized. TPM_OwnerClear TPM_ForceClear 13 Monotonic counters – authorization value 160-bits secret authorization data (non-volatile data) for a specific monotonic counter (up to 4 monotonic counters can be created). Value is passed encrypted (AES CTR 128 with key = OSAP shared secret) to the TPM_CreateCounter command. It is used as key for TPM KDF SP800-135 in session shared secret (CSP #8) generation for TPM_IncrementCounter and TPM_ReleaseCounter commands. TPM_ReleaseCounter TPM_ReleaseCounter Owner TPM_OwnerClear TPM_ForceClear 14 Pre-computed RSA keys – private part 2048-bits RSA keys (exponent = 65537) pre-computed during TPM background processing (between commands handling) and forming a pool of keys used to speed up key creation commands. Keys are non-volatile data. TPM_OwnerClear TPM_ForceClear TPM_SetMode 15 Operator – authorization value 160-bits secret authorization data (non-volatile data) entered in plaintext on TPM_SetOperatorAuth. It is used as key for TPM KDF SP800-135 to be able to deactivate the TPM until the next boot of the platform via TPM_SetTempDeactivated command. TPM_OwnerClear TPM_ForceClear FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 32 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 3.1.2 Services Next table lists all services supported by the TPM in FIPS approved mode and indicates for each service, the role that can use this service and the keys/CSPs that can be accessed. Table 24: Command support table Services Role Keys and CSP access (R = read, W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize) Authorized limited approved mode Admin Start up and State 1 TPM_Init NA W: 1, 11 (first power-up only) Z: 3, 10 X 2 TPM_Startup NA - X 3 TPM_SaveState NA - X Admin Testing 4 TPM_SelfTestFull NA - X 5 TPM_ContinueSelfTest NA - X 6 TPM_GetTestResult NA - X Admin Opt-in 7 TPM_SetOwnerInstall PP - X 8 TPM_OwnerSetDisable CO R: 6, 8, 10 W: 6, 10 9 TPM_PhysicalEnable PP - X 10 TPM_PhysicalDisable PP - X 11 TPM_PhysicalSetDeactivated PP - X 12 TPM_SetTempDeactivated U, PP R: 6, 10, 15 W: 6, 10 13 TPM_SetOperatorAuth PP W: 15 Admin Ownership 14 TPM_TakeOwnership CO R: 1, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 W: 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12 15 TPM_OwnerClear CO R: 8, 10, 12 Z: 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 16 TPM_ForceClear PP Z: 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 X 17 TPM_DisableOwnerClear CO R: 8, 10, 12 18 TPM_DisableForceClear NA - X 19 TSC_PhysicalPresence NA - X 20 TSC_ResetEstablishmentBit NA - X Capability 21 TPM_GetCapability NA O: 4 (SHA-256 of public key) X 22 TPM_SetCapability CO R: 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 23 TPM_GetCapabilityOwner CO R: 6, 8, 10, 12 Administrative Functions & Management FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 33 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Services Role Keys and CSP access (R = read, W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize) Authorized limited approved mode 29 TPM_ResetLockValue CO R: 3, 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 Storage 30 TPM_Seal U R: 3, 6, 8, 10, 11 W: 6, 10 31 TPM_Unseal U R: 3, 6, 8, 10, 11 W: 6, 10 32 TPM_UnBind U R: 3, 6, 8, 10 W: 6, 10 33 TPM_CreateWrapKey U R: 3, 6, 8, 10, 14 W: 6, 10 O: 3 (private part is encrypted) 34 TPM_LoadKey2 U R: 6, 8, 10, 11 W: 3, 6, 10 35 TPM_GetPubKey U R: 3, 6, 8, 10 W: 6, 10 Migration 37 TPM_CreateMigrationBlob U R: 3, 6, 8, 10, 11 W: 6, 10 38 TPM_ConvertMigrationBlob U R: 3, 6, 8, 10 W: 6, 10 39 TPM_AuthorizeMigrationKey CO R: 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 W: 6, 10 40 TPM_MigrateKey U R: 3, 6, 8, 10 W: 6, 10 41 TPM_CMK_SetRestrictions CO R: 3, 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 42 TPM_CMK_ApproveMA CO R: 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 W: 6, 10 43 TPM_CMK_CreateKey U R: 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14 W: 3, 6, 10 O: 3 (private part is encrypted) 44 TPM_CMK_CreateTicket CO R: 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 45 TPM_CMK_CreateBlob U R: 3, 6, 8, 10, 11 W: 6, 10 46 TPM_CMK_ConvertMigration U R: 3, 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 Cryptographic Functions 52 TPM_SHA1Start NA - X 53 TPM_SHA1Update NA - X 54 TPM_SHA1Complete NA - X 55 TPM_SHA1CompleteExtend NA - X FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 34 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Services Role Keys and CSP access (R = read, W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize) Authorized limited approved mode 56 TPM_Sign U R: 3, 6, 8, 10 W: 6, 10 57 TPM_GetRandom NA R: 6, 10 W: 6, 10 58 TPM_StirRandom NA R: 6, 10 W: 6, 10 Endorsement Key Handling 64 TPM_ReadPubek NA - X 65 TPM_OwnerReadInternalPub CO R: 1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 Identity Creation and Activation 66 TPM_MakeIdentity CO R: 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14 W: 6, 10 O: 3 (identity key, private part is encrypted) 67 TPM_ActivateIdentity CO R: 1, 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 Integrity Collection and reporting 68 TPM_Extend NA - X 69 TPM_PCRRead NA - X 71 TPM_PCR_Reset NA - X Changing Auth Data 73 TPM_ChangeAuth U R: 6, 8, 10 W: 3, 6, 9, 10 74 TPM_ChangeAuthOwner CO R: 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 2, 6, 10, 12 Authorization sessions 75 TPM_OIAP NA R: 6, 10 W: 6, 8, 10 76 TPM_OSAP NA R: 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13 W: 6, 8, 10 77 TPM_DSAP NA R: 3, 6, 10, 11 W: 6, 8, 10 78 TPM_SetOwnerPointer NA - X Delegation 79 TPM_Delegate_Manage CO R: 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 8, 10 80 TPM_Delegate_CreateKeyDelegati on U R: 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 W: 6, 10 81 TPM_Delegate_CreateOwnerDeleg ation CO R: 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 W: 6, 10 82 TPM_Delegate_LoadOwnerDelegati on CO R: 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 W: 6, 10 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 35 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Services Role Keys and CSP access (R = read, W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize) Authorized limited approved mode 83 TPM_Delegate_ReadTable NA - X 84 TPM_Delegate_UpdateVerification CO R: 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 W: 6, 10 85 TPM_Delegate_VerifyDelegation NA R: 5, 6, 11 Non-Volatile Storage 86 TPM_NV_DefineSpace CO R: 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 9, 10 Z: 9 (if index previously defined and size = 0) 87 TPM_NV_WriteValue CO R: 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 88 TPM_NV_WriteValueAuth U R: 6, 8, 9, 10 W: 6, 10 89 TPM_NV_ReadValue CO R: 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 90 TPM_NV_ReadValueAuth U R: 6, 8, 9, 10 W: 6, 10 Session Management 91 TPM_KeyControlOwner CO R: 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 3, 10 92 TPM_SaveContext NA R: 3, 5, 9, 11 Z: 8 93 TPM_LoadContext NA R: 3, 5, 9, 11 Eviction 94 TPM_FlushSpecific NA Z: 3, 8 X Timing Ticks 95 TPM_GetTicks NA - X Transport Sessions 97 TPM_EstablishTransport U R: 3, 6, 8, 10 W: 6, 10 98 TPM_ExecuteTransport U R: 6, 8, 10 W: 6, 10 Monotonic Counter 100 TPM_CreateCounter CO R: 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10, 13 101 TPM_IncrementCounter U R: 6, 8, 10, 13 W: 6, 10 102 TPM_ReadCounter NA - X 103 TPM_ReleaseCounter U R: 6, 8, 10, 13 W: 6, 10 Z: 8, 13 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 36 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Services Role Keys and CSP access (R = read, W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize) Authorized limited approved mode 104 TPM_ReleaseCounterOwner CO R: 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 Z: 8, 13 Signal Commands 124 TPM_HASH_START NA - X 125 TPM_HASH_DATA NA - X 126 TPM_HASH_END NA - X Proprietary commands 127 TPM_FieldUpgradeStart CO, PP R: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 128 TPM_FieldUpgradeData NA - 129 TPM_SHA256Start NA - X 130 TPM_SHA256Update NA - X 131 TPM_SHA256Complete NA - X 133 TPM_SetMode CO R: 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 Z: 3, 14 134 TPM_SetCommandSet PP - X Deprecated commands 134 TPM_EvictKey NA Z: 3 X 135 TPM_Terminate_Handle NA - X 136 TPM_DirWriteAuth CO R: 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 W: 6, 9, 10 137 TPM_DirRead NA R: 9 X 138 TPM_ChangeAuthAsymStart U R: 3, 6, 8, 10 W: 6, 10 139 TPM_ChangeAuthAsymFinish U R: 6, 8, 10 W: 3, 6, 10 140 TPM_Reset NA Z: 8 X 141 TPM_OwnerReadPubek CO R: 1, 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 142 TPM_DisablePubekRead CO R: 6, 8, 10, 12 W: 6, 10 143 TPM_LoadKey U R: 3, 6, 8, 10, 11 W: 6, 10 Non FIPS service 144 Field upgrade de-obfuscation1 NA - 1 This service is not callable from TPM interface but is only used internally by TPM_FieldUpgradeData command. It consists of de-obfuscating data received by the TPM_FieldUpgradeData command with a non-FIPS approved algorithm. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 37 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 3.1.3 Authorization Some of the services listed above manipulate CSPs without requiring the operator to assume an authorized role:  Services using DRNG (read, state update without manipulation): TPM_GetRandom, TPM_StirRandom  Services used for authentication mechanism: TPM_OIAP, TPM_OSAP, TPM_DSAP,  Services using only public part of objects: TPM_GetCapability: SHA-256 of public key output.  Specific services that do not affect security of the module: TPM_Delegate_VerifyDelegation: use of CSPs to check blob integrity. TPM_SaveContext: use of CSPs to protect blob stored outside of TPM. TPM_LoadContext: use of CSPs to check blob integrity. TPM_FlushSpecific: flush of data (key, authorization or transport session) stored inside the TPM. TPM_FieldUpgradeData: this command can only be executed if TPM_FieldUpgradeStart previously executed (authorization requested). TPM_EvictKey: flush of data (key, authorization or transport session) stored inside the TPM. 3.1.4 Key management 3.1.4.1 Key entry and output Next table indicates the approved method used to encrypt all secret and private keys (indicated by S for secret value and P for private key in type column), entered into or output from the cryptographic module. Table 25: Encrypted methods for secret and private keys input Service Parameter name Type Input or output Encryption algorithm TPM_LoadKey inKey (private part) P Input RSA-OAEP SHA1 TPM_LoadKey2 inKey (private part) P Input RSA-OAEP SHA1 TPM_TakeOwnership encOwnerAuth encSrkAuth S S Input Input RSA-OAEP SHA1 RSA-OAEP SHA1 TPM_Seal encAuth S Input AES CTR 128 TPM_CreateWrapKey dataUsageAuth dataMigrationAuth wrappedKey S S P Input Input Output AES CTR 128 AES CTR 128 RSA-OAEP SHA1 TPM_CMK_CreateKey dataUsageAuth wrappedKey (private part) S P Input Output AES CTR 128 RSA-OAEP SHA1 TPM_EstablishTransport secret S Input RSA-OAEP SHA1 TPM_MakeIdentity identityAuth S Input AES CTR 128 TPM_Delegate_CreateKeyDelegation delAuth S Input AES CTR 128 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 38 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT TPM_Delegate_CreateOwnerDelegation delAuth S Input AES CTR 128 TPM_NV_DefineSpace encAuth S Input AES CTR 128 TPM_CreateCounter encAuth S Input AES CTR 128 TPM_SaveContext contextBlob P Output AES CTR 128 TPM_LoadContext contextBlob P Input AES CTR 128 TPM_CreateMigrationBlob outData P Output RSA-OAEP SHA1 TPM_ConvertMigrationBlob inData P Input RSA-OAEP SHA1 TPM_MigrateKey inData outData P P Input Output RSA-OAEP SHA1 RSA-OAEP SHA1 TPM_CMK_ConvertMigration outData P Output RSA-OAEP SHA1 TPM_ChangeAuth encData S Input AES CTR 128 3.1.4.2 Key transport As indicated in the above table, the TPM supports two different algorithms for key transport. Relative security strength of each cryptographic algorithm supported by the module is indicated in the table below: Table 26: Cryptographic Functions Algorithm Comparable number of bits of security RSA-2048 112 AES-1281 128 RSA-2048 and AES-128 are used to transport RSA-2048 keys (security strength of the transport method is then greater or equal than the security strength of the keys transported). AES-128 in CTR mode is also used in ADIP protocol to encrypt 160-bits authorization data. RSA is used with OAEP SHA-1 padding scheme method to encrypt (wrap) and decrypt (unwrap) secrets and private keys, as indicated in Table 25: Encrypted methods for secret and private keys input, with a parent key already loaded into the TPM. AES is used in CTR mode to encrypt/decrypt with shared secret from OSAP session as key for all commands listed in Table 25: Encrypted methods for secret and private keys input except for TPM_SaveContext and TPM_LoadContext that uses contextKey. 1 AES is used in conjunction with HMAC-SHA-1 approved authentication method (scheme is compliant with [SP800-38F]) FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 39 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 3.2 TPM2.0 This chapter gives details about the services, keys and CSPs that the TPM manages in TPM2.0 mode. 3.2.1 List of Keys and CSPs Table 27: Keys and CSPs list Keys/CSPs Description Zeroized Index Name Hierarchies 1 nullSeed 32 bytes primary seed values resp. for NULL, platform, endorsement and storage hierarchies. nullSeed is a random value generated by HDRBG at each TPM power-up. ppSeed / epSeed / spSeed are random values generated by HDRBG before its first use. They are used as seeds for:  DRBG to generate random used for sensitive part creation of primary keys (prime numbers for RSA and private key for ECC/KEYEDHASH/SYMCIPHER) and seedValue creation for all types of primary keys. TPM reset 2 ppSeed TPM2_Change PPS 3 epSeed TPM2_Change EPS 4 spSeed TPM2_Clear 5 nullProof 32 bytes secret values resp. for NULL, platform, endorsement and storage hierarchies. nullProof is a random value generated by HDRBG at each TPM power-up. phProof / ehProof / shProof are random values generated by HDRBG before its first use. They are used as keys for:  KDFa to generate context encryption key and IV (cf. [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.38] §30.3.1)  HMAC to compute context blob integrity (cf. [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.38] §30.3.2)  HMAC to compute/verify tickets shProof is used also as key (or part of key) for:  KDFa to generate obfuscation value used in attestation commands (cf. [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.38] §36.7)  KDFa to generate CSP #30. shProof is also used as source of entropy for:  DRBG reseed before generating seedValue (CSP #20) in the endorsement hierarchy (cf. [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.38] §27.7.4) TPM reset 6 phProof TPM2_Change PPS 7 ehProof TPM2_Clear / TPM2_Change EPS 8 shProof TPM2_Clear 9 platformAuth 32 bytes authorization data (authValue) used in authorization session based resp. on platform, endorsement, and storage or lockout hierarchy authorization. PlatformAuth is set to 0 at each TPM2_Startup (CLEAR). EndorsementAuth / ownerAuth / lockoutAuth are set to 0 at first TPM power-up. Primary auth values can be changed with command TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth. They are used as keys for:  HMAC authorization in case of unsalted and unbound session  KDFa to generate session key used in HMAC authorization in case of bound session They are used as part of keys for:  HMAC authorization in case of salted or bound session (key is concatenation of sessionKey and authValue)  KDFa to generate session key used in HMAC authorization in case of salted and bound session (key is concatenation of authValue and salt) TPM2_Startup 10 endorsementAuth TPM2_Clear / TPM2_Change EPS 11 ownerAuth TPM2_Clear 12 lockoutAuth TPM2_Clear FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 40 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT They are used as reference values for comparison in case of password authorization session. 13 platformPolicy 32 bytes authorization data (authPolicy) used in authorization session based resp. on platform, endorsement, storage or lockout hierarchy policy. platformPolicy is set to 0 at each TPM2_Startup (CLEAR). endorsementPolicy / ownerPolicy / lockoutPolicy are set to 0 at first TPM power- up. Primary policies can be changed with command TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy. They are used as reference values for a comparison in case of policy session. TPM2_Change PPS / TPM reset 14 endorsementPolicy TPM2_Clear / TPM2_Change EPS 15 ownerPolicy TPM2_Clear 16 lockoutPolicy TPM2_Clear Objects 17 authValue 0 to 32 bytes authorization data defined during object creation (TPM2_Create/TPM2_CreatePrimary/TPM2_CreateLoaded) used to authorize commands based on this object. Value can be changed with command TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth. It is used as:  HMAC and/or KDFa keys or part of keys in authorization session based on HMAC or password (usage is the same than for CSPs #9/10/11/12)  Secret value extended into policyDigest on TPM2_PolicySecret command TPM2_Clear (owner & endorsement) TPM2_Change PPS (platform) TPM2_Change EPS (endorsement) 18 authPolicy 0 to 32 bytes authorization data defined during object creation (TPM2_Create/TPM2_CreatePrimary/TPM2_CreateLoaded) used to authorize commands based on this object. It is used as reference value for a comparison in case of policy session TPM2_Clear (owner & endorsement) TPM2_Change PPS (platform) TPM2_Change EPS (endorsement) 20 seedValue 32 bytes generated from:  DRBG (cf. CSP #47) instantiated with CSP #1/2/3/4, a template hash, data and a string in case of primary object  TPM2.0 DRBG instance (cf. CSP #38) for ordinary objects  KDFa using parent’s seed in case of derived objects. It is used (when not set to 0) as:  Data in SHA computation to generate object’s unique value (HMAC and symmetric key creation)  Key in KDFa to generate a symmetric encryption key used in TPM2B_PRIVATE structure en/decryption.  Key in KDFa to generate HMAC key used in TPM2B_PRIVATE integrity protection generation or verification TPM2_Clear (owner & endorsement) TPM2_Change PPS (platform) TPM2_Change EPS (endorsement) 21 symKey 16 bytes generated from derivation of seedValue through KDFa usage. It is used as key for:  Symmetric en/decryption of TPM2B_PRIVATE structure Transient value only available during command processing 22 hmacKey 32 bytes generated from derivation of seedValue through KDFa usage. It is used as key for:  HMAC used in TPM2B_PRIVATE integrity protection generation or verification Transient value only available during command processing FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 41 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 23 sensitive Object sensitive part might be passed as encrypted parameter to TPM2_Create/TPM2_CreateLoaded commands or generated by:  DRBG (cf. CSP #47) instantiated with CSP #1/2/3/4, a template hash and a string in case of primary object  TPM2.0 DRBG instance (cf. CSP #38) for ordinary objects  KDFa using parent’s sensitive value in case of derived objects (type symcipher, keyedhash or ECC objects) . For RSA or ECC key, sensitive corresponds to the private key. Depending on object’s nature, sensitive is used as key for:  en/decryption (RSA, AES, TDES)  signature generation (RSA, ECDSA, HMAC)  secret value exchange (ECDH)  key for derivation through KDFa of derived objects Available key lengths correspond to the ones listed in Error! Reference source not found. (Key nature and length are selected by user thanks to the interface of the keys creation commands). TPM2_Clear (owner & endorsement) TPM2_Change PPS (platform) TPM2_Change EPS (endorsement) NV Indexes 24 authValue 0 to 32 bytes authorization data defined during NV index creation (TPM2_NV_DefineSpace) used to authorize commands based on this object. Value can be changed with command TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth. It is used as:  HMAC and/or KDFa keys or part of keys in authorization session based on HMAC or password.  Secret value extended into policyDigest on TPM2_PolicySecret command TPM2_NV_Und efineSpace / TPM2_NV_Und efineSpaceSpec ial 25 authPolicy 0 to 32 bytes authorization data defined during NV index creation (TPM2_NV_DefineSpace) used to authorize commands based on this object. It is used as reference value for a comparison in case of policy session TPM2_NV_Und efineSpace / TPM2_NV_Und efineSpaceSpec ial Sessions 26 salt Value passed encrypted (with a loaded decrypt key) to TPM2_StartAuthSession. It is used as:  Part of KDFa key to generate the sessionKey (cf. [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.38] §19.6) Transient value only available during TPM2_StartAut hSession processing 27 sessionKey Key generated by KDFa (cf. [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.38] §19.6) and whose value depends on salt and bind parameters of TPM2_StartAuthSession command (size depends on symmetric algorithm used). It is used as:  HMAC key used to generate and verify command authorization  Part of KDFa key used to generate encryption key and IV of encryption- based session TPM2_FlushCo ntext 28 encryption key and IV of encryption-based session Symmetric key and IV generated by KDFa (cf. [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.38] §21.3) from sessionKey and object’s authValue. It is used as key and IV for:  Symmetric en/decryption of first parameter of command/response if parameter structure is of type TPM2B_ TPM2_FlushCo ntext Context 29 contextKey 16 bytes randomly generated by HDRBG at each TPM reset. It is used as:  1st part of key used in KDFa to generate a symmetric encryption key and IV used in context blob en/decryption. TPM reset FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 42 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 30 symKey, IV 2*16 bytes derived from the concatenation of contextKey and one of the proof (CSP #5, 6, 7, 8). It is used as key and IV for:  Symmetric en/decryption of context blob Transient value only available during TPM2_ContextS ave / TPM2_ContextL oad processing Duplication 31 inner symKey Symmetric key passed as input to duplication commands or generated by HDRBG (size depends on symmetric algorithm used). It is used as:  Symmetric en/decryption key to protect TPM2B_PRIVATE output structure Transient value only available during command processing 32 seed 32 bytes value randomly generated by HDRBG if new parent is a RSA key or via KDFe if new parent is an ECC key. It is used as key for :  KDFa to generate a symmetric en/decryption key for outer protection  KDFa to generate a HMAC key for outer integrity protection 33 outer symKey Symmetric key generated via KDFa from seed. It is used as key for:  Symmetric en/decryption key for outer protection of TPM2B_PRIVATE output structure 34 outer hmacKey HMAC key generated via KDFa from seed. It is used as key for:  HMAC integrity key for outer protection of TPM2B_PRIVATE output structure Credential 35 seed 32 bytes value randomly generated by HDRBG if new parent is a RSA key or via KDFe if new parent is an ECC key. It is used as key for :  KDFa to generate a symmetric en/decryption key for outer protection  KDFa to generate a HMAC key for outer integrity protection Transient value only available during command processing 36 symKey Symmetric key generated via KDFa from seed. It is used as key for:  Symmetric en/decryption key for outer protection of credentialBlob 37 hmacKey HMAC key generated via KDFa from seed. It is used as key for:  HMAC integrity key for outer protection of credentialBlob DRBG 38 DRBG state Internal state (V and C secret values) of the HDRBG (based on SHA256) stored in RAM. This is the state of the main DRBG instance used to produce random numbers. TPM2_Clear ECC 39 commitNonce 32 bytes value randomly generated by HDRBG at each TPM2_Startup (CLEAR). It is used as key for :  KDFa to generate an ECC ephemeral private key used in TPM2_EC_Ephemeral command / TPM2_ZGen_2Phase Transient value only available during command processing 40 ephemeral key – derived from commitNonce ECC private key (size depends on curve selected) generated with KDFa from commitNonce. It is used as ephemeral private key in:  TPM2_Ephemeral command (scalar multiplication) to generate the associated ephemeral public key  TPM2_ZGen_2Phase (ECDH scheme) to generate outZ2 (output point) 41 ephemeral key ECC private key (size depends on curve selected) generated with DRBG. It is used as ephemeral private key in:  TPM2_ECDH_KeyGen command (ECDH scheme) to generate zPoint (output point) FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 43 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Static keys 42 Endorsement key - RSA primes 2 primes of 1024 bits used to construct EK if parameters in TPM2_CreatePrimary or TPM2_CreateLoaded (if not derivation parent and not a parent object) command match the default EK RSA template. Generated by a FIPS140-2 compliant HSM. TPM2_Change EPS 43 Endorsement key - ECC private key ECC 256 bits private key used to construct EK if in TPM2_CreatePrimary or TPM2_CreateLoaded (if not derivation parent and not a parent object) command match the default EK ECC template. Generated by a FIPS140-2 compliant HSM. TPM2_Change EPS Field upgrade keys 44 Field upgrade verification key 2048 bits permanent RSA key unique per TPM product line. Only public part of the key is stored in the TPM (modulus, exponent). No (public key) Transient DRBG 47 Transient DRBG state Internal state (V and C secret values) of a HDRBG instance (based on SHA256) stored in RAM. HDRBG is instantiated from primary seeds and used only in TPM2_CreatePrimary and TPM2_CreateLoaded (if not derivation parent and not a parent object) to generate prime numbers for primary RSA keys. Transient DRBG state cleared at the end of random numbers generation DRBG input seed 48 DRBG input seed 48-bytes value output from a NDRNG. Transient value 3.2.2 Services Next table lists all services supported by the TPM and indicates for each service, the role that can use this service and the keys/CSPs that can be accessed. Table 28: Command support table Services Role Keys and CSP access W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize C = used as key in cryptographic operation R = read (and not used as C) Authorized in limited approved mode Start-up 1 _TPM_Init NA W (first boot only) : 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 W : 29, 38, 48 X 2 TPM2_Startup NA W : 1, 5, 9, 13, 39 X 3 TPM2_Shutdown NA - X Testing 4 TPM2_SelfTest NA - X 5 TPM2_IncrementalSelfTest NA - X 6 TPM2_GetTestResult NA - X Session commands 7 TPM2_StartAuthSession NA W : 26, 27 C : 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 24, 26, 28 8 TPM2_PolicyRestart NA - Objects commands FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 44 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Services Role Keys and CSP access W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize C = used as key in cryptographic operation R = read (and not used as C) Authorized in limited approved mode 9 TPM2_Create U R : 18 W : 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 38, 48 C : 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 38, 48 O : 17, 18, 20, 23 10 TPM2_Load U R : 18 W : 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 38, 48 C : 17, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 38, 48 11 TPM2_LoadExternal NA W : 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 38, 48 C : 17, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 38, 48 X 12 TPM2_ReadPublic NA R : 23 W : 28 C : 28 X 13 TPM2_ActivateCredential A, U R : 18, 23, 35 W : 28, 36, 37 C : 27, 28, 35, 36, 37 14 TPM2_MakeCredential NA R : 23 W : 28, 35, 36, 37 C : 28, 36, 37 O : 35 15 TPM2_Unseal U R : 18, 23 W : 28 C : 27, 28 O : 23 16 TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth A R : 18 W : 17, 28, 38, 48 C : 27, 28, 38, 48 17 TPM2_CreateLoaded CO, U R : 18, 42, 43, 47 W : 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 38, 47, 48 C : 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 17, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 38, 47, 48 O : 20, 23 Duplication commands 18 TPM2_Duplicate D R : 18 W : 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 48 C : 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 48 O : 23, 31, 32 19 TPM2_Rewrap U R : 18, 32 W : 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 48 C : 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 48 O : 23, 31, 32 20 TPM2_Import U R : 18, 32 W : 28, 31, 33, 34, 38, 48 C : 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 48 O : 23 Asymmetric primitives 21 TPM2_RSA_Encrypt NA C: 28 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 45 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Services Role Keys and CSP access W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize C = used as key in cryptographic operation R = read (and not used as C) Authorized in limited approved mode 22 TPM2_RSA_Decrypt U R : 18 W : 28 C : 23, 27, 28 23 TPM2_ECDH_KeyGen NA W : 28, 41 C : 28, 41 24 TPM2_ECDH_ZGen U R : 18 W : 28 C : 23, 27, 28 25 TPM2_ECC_Parameters NA - X 26 TPM2_ZGen_2Phase U R : 18 W : 28, 38, 48 C : 23, 27, 28, 38, 40, 48 Symmetric primitives 27 TPM2_EncryptDecrypt U R : 18 W : 28 C : 23, 27, 28 28 TPM2_EncryptDecrypt2 U R : 18 W : 28 C : 23, 27, 28 29 TPM2_Hash NA W: 28 C: 5, 6, 7, 8, 28 30 TPM2_HMAC U R : 18 W : 28 C : 23, 27, 28 Random number generator 31 TPM2_GetRandom NA C : 28, 38, 48 X 32 TPM2_StirRandom NA W : 28, 38, 48 C: 28 X Hash/HMAC/Event sequences 33 TPM2_HMAC_Start U R : 18 W : 17, 28 C : 23, 27, 28 34 TPM2_HashSequenceStart NA W: 17, 28 C: 28 X 35 TPM2_SequenceUpdate U R : 18 W : 28 C : 23, 27, 28 36 TPM2_SequenceComplete U R : 18 W : 28 C : 5, 6, 7, 8, 23, 27, 28 37 TPM2_EventSequenceComplete U R : 18 W : 28 C : 23, 27, 28 Attestation commands FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 46 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Services Role Keys and CSP access W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize C = used as key in cryptographic operation R = read (and not used as C) Authorized in limited approved mode 38 TPM2_Certify A, U R : 18 W : 28, 38, 48 C : 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48 39 TPM2_CertifyCreation U R : 18 W : 28, 38, 48 C : 5, 6, 7, 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48 40 TPM2_Quote U R : 18 W : 28, 38, 48 C : 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48 41 TPM2_GetSessionAuditDigest CO R : 18 W : 28, 38, 48 C : 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48 42 TPM2_GetCommandAuditDigest CO R : 18 W : 28, 38, 48 C : 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48 43 TPM2_GetTime CO R : 18 W : 28, 38, 48 C : 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48 Ephemeral EC keys 44 TPM2_EC_Ephemeral NA W : 28, 40 C : 28, 39 Signing and signature verification 45 TPM2_VerifySignature NA R : 23 W : 28 C : 5, 6, 7, 8, 28 46 TPM2_Sign U R : 18 W : 28, 38, 48 C : 5, 6, 7, 8, 23, 27, 28, 38, 48 Command audit 47 TPM2_SetCommandCodeAuditStat us CO R : 13, 18 C : 9, 11, 15, 27 Integrity collection (PCR) 48 TPM2_PCR_Extend U R : 18 C : 27 49 TPM2_PCR_Event U R : 18 W : 28 C : 27, 28 50 TPM2_PCR_Read NA - X 51 TPM2_PCR_Allocate CO R : 13, 18 C : 9, 27 52 TPM2_PCR_Reset NA - 53 _TPM_Hash_Start NA - X 54 _TPM_Hash_Data NA - X FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 47 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Services Role Keys and CSP access W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize C = used as key in cryptographic operation R = read (and not used as C) Authorized in limited approved mode 55 _TPM_Hash_End NA - X Enhanced authorization commands 56 TPM2_PolicySigned NA C: 5, 6, 7, 8, 28 57 TPM2_PolicySecret U R : 18 W : 28, 38, 48 C : 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 24, 27, 28, 38, 48 58 TPM2_PolicyTicket NA W : 28 C: 5, 6, 7, 8, 28 59 TPM2_PolicyOR NA - 60 TPM2_PolicyPCR NA W : 28 C: 28 61 TPM2_PolicyLocality NA - 62 TPM2_PolicyNV U R : 18 W : 28 C : 27, 28 63 TPM2_PolicyCounterTimer NA W : 28 C: 28 64 TPM2_PolicyCommandCode NA - 65 TPM2_PolicyPhysicalPresence NA - 66 TPM2_PolicyCpHash NA W : 28 C: 28 67 TPM2_PolicyNameHash NA W : 28 C: 28 68 TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect NA W : 28 C: 28 69 TPM2_PolicyAuthorize NA W : 28 C: 5, 6, 7, 8, 28 70 TPM2_PolicyAuthValue NA - 71 TPM2_PolicyPassword NA - 72 TPM2_PolicyGetDigest NA W : 28 C: 28 73 TPM2_PolicyNvWritten NA - 74 TPM2_PolicyTemplate NA - 75 TPM2_PolicyAuthorizeNV U R : 25 C : 24 Hierarchy commands 76 TPM2_CreatePrimary CO R : 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 42, 43, 47 W : 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 38, 47, 48 C : 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 17, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 38, 42, 43, 47, 48 Z : 47 77 TPM2_HierarchyControl CO C : 9, 10, 11, 27 78 TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy CO W : 13, 14, 15, 16, 28 C : 9, 10, 11, 12, 27, 28 79 TPM2_ChangePPS CO Z : 2, 6, 13,14, 17, 18, 20, 23, 43 80 TPM2_ChangeEPS CO Z : 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 18, 20, 23, 42 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 48 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Services Role Keys and CSP access W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize C = used as key in cryptographic operation R = read (and not used as C) Authorized in limited approved mode 81 TPM2_Clear CO R : 13, 16 Z : 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25 C : 38 82 TPM2_ClearControl CO R : 13, 16 C : 9, 12 83 TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth CO R : 13, 16 W : 9, 10, 11, 12, 28, 38, 48 C : 9, 10, 11, 12, 28, 38, 48 Non-Volatile Storage 84 TPM2_DictionaryAttackLockReset CO R : 16 C : 12 85 TPM2_DictionaryAttackParameters CO R : 16 C : 12 Field Upgrade 86 TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart CO W : 28 C : 9, 13, 28, 44 87 TPM2_FieldUpgradeData NA - Context Management 88 TPM2_ContextSave NA W : 30 C : 5, 6, 7, 8, 29, 30 89 TPM2_ContextLoad NA W : 30 C : 5, 6, 7, 8, 29, 30 90 TPM2_FlushContext NA Z : 17, 18, 20, 23, 27, 28 X 91 TPM2_EvictControl CO R : 13, 15 C : 9, 11 Clock and Timers 92 TPM2_ReadClock NA - X 93 TPM2_ClockSet CO R : 13, 15 C : 9, 11 94 TPM2_ClockRateAdjust CO R : 13, 15 C : 9, 11 Capability Commands 95 TPM2_GetCapability NA - X 96 TPM2_TestParms NA - X Non-volatile storage 97 TPM2_NV_DefineSpace CO R : 13, 15, 18 W : 24, 25, 28 C : 9, 11, 27, 28 98 TPM2_NV_UndefineSpace CO R : 13, 15, 18 C : 9, 11, 27 Z : 24, 25 FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 49 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Services Role Keys and CSP access W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize C = used as key in cryptographic operation R = read (and not used as C) Authorized in limited approved mode 99 TPM2_NV_UndefineSpaceSpecial CO, A R : 9, 13, 17, 18 C : 9, 11, 27 Z : 24, 25 100 TPM2_NV_ReadPublic NA C: 28 X 101 TPM2_NV_Write U W : 28 R : 25 C : 24, 27, 28 102 TPM2_NV_Increment U R : 25 C : 24, 27 103 TPM2_NV_Extend U W : 28 R : 25 C : 24, 27, 28 104 TPM2_NV_SetBits U R : 25 C : 24, 27 105 TPM2_NV_WriteLock U R : 25 C : 24, 27 106 TPM2_NV_GlobalWriteLock CO C : 27 107 TPM2_NV_Read U W : 28 R : 25 C : 24, 27, 28 108 TPM2_NV_ReadLock U R : 25 C : 24, 27 109 TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth A W : 24, 28 C : 24, 27, 28 110 TPM2_NV_Certify U W : 28, 38, 48 R : 25 C : 24, 27, 28, 38, 48 Proprietary commands 111 TPM2_SetMode CO W : 28 C : 27, 28 112 TPM2_SetCommandSet CO W : 28 C : 27, 28 113 TPM2_RestoreEK CO Z : 3, 7, 10, 14, 17, 18, 20 R : 42, 43 W : 23, 28 C : 27, 28 114 TPM2_SetCommandSetLock CO W : 28 C : 27, 28 115 TPM2_VendorCmdFieldUpgradeSta rt CO W : 28 C : 9, 13, 28, 44 Misc. commands 116 TPM2_PP_Commands CO - Non FIPS services FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 50 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Services Role Keys and CSP access W = write, O = output, Z = zeroize C = used as key in cryptographic operation R = read (and not used as C) Authorized in limited approved mode 117 Field upgrade de-obfuscation1 NA - 3.2.3 Authorization Some of the services listed above manipulate CSPs without requiring the operator to assume an authorized role:  Services restricted to use of SHS: TPM2_Hash, TPM2_HashSequenceStart  Services using DRNG (read, state update without manipulation): TPM2_GetRandom, TPM2_StirRandom  Services used for authentication mechanism: TPM2_StartAuthSession, TPM2_PolicySigned, TPM2_PolicyTicket, TPM2_PolicyPCR, TPM2_PolicyCounterTimer TPM2_PolicyLocality, TPM2_PolicyCpHash, TPM2_PolicyNameHash, TPM2_PolicyAuthorize, TPM2_PolicyAuthorizeNV, TPM2_PolicyDuplicationSelect, TPM2_PolicyGetDigest  Services using (read, cryptographic operation) only public part of objects: TPM2_ReadPublic, TPM2_RSA_Encrypt, TPM2_NV_ReadPublic  Specific services that do not affect security of the module: TPM2_LoadExternal: loaded object not considered as protected object (specific attribute). TPM2_MakeCredential: convenience function that do not use TPM secrets. TPM2_ECDH_KeyGen: ephemeral ECC key generation TPM2_EC_Ephemeral: ephemeral ECC key generation TPM2_FieldUpgradeData: transport command for field upgrade. Can be used only if TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart or TPM2_VendorCmdFieldUpgradeStart command has been successfully executed (authorized command) TPM2_ContextSave: save objects under an encrypted and integrity protected format TPM2_ContextLoad: load encrypted and integrity protected objects into TPM TPM2_FlushContext: flush loaded object/session from TPM volatile memory 3.2.4 Key management 3.2.4.1 Key entry and output Next table indicates the approved method used to encrypt all secret, private keys and data (indicated by S for secret value, P for private key and D for user defined data in type column), entered into or output from the cryptographic module. Table 29: Encrypted methods for secret and private keys input Service Parameter name Type Input or output Encryption algorithm TPM2_ActivateCredential credentialBlob S Input AES CFB 1 This service is not callable from TPM interface but is only used internally by TPM2_FieldUpgradeData command. It consists of de-obfuscating data received by the TPM2_FieldUpgradeData command with a non-FIPS approved algorithm. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 51 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT secret S Input RSA OAEP or ECDH TPM2_ContextSave context D Output AES CFB TPM2_ContextLoad context D Input AES CFB TPM2_Create inSensitive P / S Input AES CFB (*) outPrivate P / S Output AES CFB TPM2_CreateLoaded inSensitive P / S Input AES CFB (*) outPrivate P / S Output AES CFB TPM2_CreatePrimary inSensitive P / S Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_Duplicate encryptionKey (if present) S Input AES CFB (*) encryptionKeyOut S Output AES CFB (*) duplicate S Output AES CFB outSymSeed S Output RSA OAEP or ECDH TPM2_EventSequenceComplete buffer D Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_GetRandom randomBytes D Output AES CFB (**) TPM2_Hash data D Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_HashSequenceStart auth S Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_HierarchyChangeAuth newAuth S Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_HMAC buffer D Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_HMACStart auth S Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_Import encryptionKey (if present) S Input AES CFB (*) duplicate S Input AES CFB inSymSeed S Input RSA OAEP or ECDH outPrivate S Output AES CFB TPM2_Load inPrivate P / S Input AES CFB TPM2_LoadExternal inPrivate P / S Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_MakeCredential credentialBlob S Output AES CFB secret S Output RSA OAEP or ECDH TPM2_NV_ChangeAuth newAuth S Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_NV_DefineSpace auth S Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_NV_Extend data D Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_NV_Read data D Output AES CFB (**) TPM2_NV_Write data D Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_ObjectChangeAuth newAuth S Input AES CFB (*) outPrivate S Output AES CFB TPM2_PCR_Event eventData D Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_Rewrap inDuplicate S Input AES CFB FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 52 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT inSymSeed S Input RSA OAEP or ECDH outDuplicate S Output AES CFB outSymSeed S Output RSA OAEP or ECDH TPM2_RSA_Decrypt message D Output AES CFB (**) TPM2_RSA_Encrypt message D Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_SequenceComplete buffer D Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_SequenceUpdate buffer D Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_SetPrimaryPolicy authPolicy S Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_StirRandom inData D Input AES CFB (*) TPM2_Unseal outData D Output AES CFB (**) TPM2_EncryptDecrypt outData D Output AES CFB (**) TPM2_EncryptDecrypt2 inData D Input AES CFB (*) outData D Output AES CFB (**) (*): Parameter decryption is ensured by use of a decryption session (attribute DECRYPT set) (**): Parameter encryption is ensured by use of an encryption session (attribute ENCRYPT set). This is mandatory for TPM_Unseal if output data might be used next used as a CSP. 3.2.4.2 Key transport Relative security strength has been calculated for each cryptographic algorithm supported by the module and used for key transport. Table 30: Cryptographic Functions Algorithm Comparable number of bits of security RSA OAEP (2048 bits) 112 ECDH (P-224 curve) 112 ECDH (P-256 curve) 128 AES CFB (128 bits)1 128 AES CFB (256 bits)2 256 1 AES is used in conjunction with HMAC approved authentication method ([SP800-38F] compliant) 2 AES is used in conjunction with HMAC approved authentication method ([SP800-38F] compliant) FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 53 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 4 SELF-TESTS 4.1 TPM1.2 Self-tests run by the cryptographic module are split in three categories:  Power-up self-tests  Full self-tests  Conditional self-tests The power-on self-tests do not require operator intervention in order to run. Power-on self- tests execution completes all tests listed in Table 14: TPM1.2 limited approved mode. Completion of power-on self-tests allows the TPM to be in a limited approved mode allowing to process only a subset of TPM commands (see §1.7.1.1). To switch from limited approved mode to full approved mode, operator shall execute TPM_SelfTestFull command. This command requests the module to switch mode by executing all self-tests listed in Table 36: Asymmetric cryptography self-tests list (power-up self-tests plus the remaining self-tests, that mainly concern asymmetric cryptography). The security module outputs an “error” Return Code via the status interface when the error state is entered due to a failed self-test. While in error state, security module does not perform any cryptographic functions and all data output via the data output interface are inhibited. If power-on self-tests have passed successfully, no status is indicated but commands that require self-tests to be completed can be successfully executed. 4.1.1 Power-up tests list Table 31: Cryptographic algorithm KATs Algorithm tested Test description SHA1 SHA1 computation on known data (16 bytes) and comparison of output to the expected digest (20 bytes) SHA256 SHA256 computation on known data (16 bytes) and comparison of output to the expected digest (32 bytes) NDRNG TPM performs AIS31 statistical test verification on NDRNG output. If test fails, status is set to FAIL and error is returned. Table 32: TPM integrity tests Algorithm tested Test description FW integrity FW integrity is verified by computing an EDC (CRC-16 ISO 13239) and comparing it to reference values. FW integrity is verified during boot sequence before execution of one of the code block (CML, AFL and TPM) and during full self-tests execution. If failure is detected during boot sequence, TPM enters an infinite reset loop that can be exit only by power-off/power-on sequence. In failure is detected during self-tests, status is set to FAIL and error is returned. HW integrity HW integrity is guaranteed via check of HW sensors. If failure is detected during boot sequence, status is set to FAIL and error is returned. 4.1.2 Full self-tests list Next table list of the tests performed in addition to the tests from Table 32: TPM integrity tests and Table 33: Cryptographic algorithm KATs on a TPM_SelfTestFull command execution. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 54 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Table 33: Cryptographic algorithm KATs Algorithm tested Test description HMAC SHA1 HMAC-SHA1 computation on known data (16 bytes) / known key (16 bytes, same value as data) and comparison of output to the expected MAC (20 bytes) KDF SP800-108 KDF (based on SHA1) computation on known data (16 bytes) / known label (“TEST”) and comparison of output to the expected value (32 bytes). Hash DRBG Instantiate, Generate and Reseed API are tested in a single test sequence in accordance with §11.3 of [SP800-90A]. Output of HDRBG (55 bytes) is compared to a reference value. AES AES CFB encryption is done on known data (32 bytes) / known key (16 bytes) and known IV (16 bytes, same value as key). The 32 bytes output data are compared to the expected reference data. If comparison succeeds, AES CFB decryption is done on encrypted data with same key & same IV as encryption. 32 bytes output are compared to the initial plaintext data. RSA A known key is loaded (2048 bits length). Signature RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is generated on known data (20 bytes). Output of signature is compared to a reference signature. If comparison is success, signature verification is performed. Failure state is entered if one of the step (generation or verification) fails. 4.1.3 Conditional tests list Table 34: TPM conditional tests Algorithm tested Test description Hash-DRBG Each 32 bytes of generated data are compared to the previous generated data. If data are equal, status is set to FAIL and error is returned. NDRNG TPM performs AIS31 statistical test verification on NDRNG output. If test fails, status is set to FAIL and error is returned. Continuous self-tests are performed on the output of NDRNG (HW check). FW load During field upgrade procedure, several checks are performed before authorizing the FW to be upgraded: - Verification of signature (RSASSA-PSS) on the first data blob to ensure authentication of the FW - Verification of digest (SHA256) on each subsequent blob to guarantee integrity of the full FW. RSA key generation A new RSA key is generated or retrieved from pre-computed keys (done in BKG). Depending on the key purpose (signing or encrypting) indicated in TPM_KEY_USAGE structure, en/decryption or signing/verification is done on known data (16 bytes). 4.1.4 Verification Successful completion of self-tests can be verified through use of TPM_GetTestResult command. If the first 4 bytes of response are equal to 0, self-tests completed successfully. 4.2 TPM2.0 Self-tests run by the cryptographic module are split in three categories:  Power-up self-tests  Full self-tests FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 55 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT  Conditional self-tests The power-on self-tests do not require operator intervention in order to run. Power-on self- tests execution completes all tests except KATs on asymmetric algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, ECDH). Completion of power-on self-tests allows the TPM to be in a limited approved mode allowing to process commands that do not use asymmetric cryptography (see 1.7.2.1). To switch from limited approved mode to full approved mode, operator shall execute TPM2_SelfTest(full = YES) command that will execute again the list of power-up self-tests plus the asymmetric cryptography self-tests listed in Table 36: Asymmetric cryptography self- tests list). The security module outputs an “error” Return Code via the status interface when the error state is entered due to a failed self-test. While in error state, security module does not perform any cryptographic functions and all data output via the data output interface are inhibited. If power-on self-tests have passed successfully, no status is indicated but commands that require self-tests to be completed can be successfully executed. 4.2.1 Power-up tests list Table 35: Power-up self-tests list Algorithm tested Test description SHA1 SHA1 computation on known data (16 bytes) and comparison of output to the expected digest (20 bytes) SHA256 SHA256 computation on known data (16 bytes) and comparison of output to the expected digest (32 bytes) HMAC SHA256 HMAC-SHA256 computation on known data (16 bytes) / known key (16 bytes, same value as data) and comparison of output to the expected MAC (32 bytes). Self-test allows validating the secure SHA algorithm also used in standalone (out of HMAC context). KDF SP800- 108 KDFa (based on SHA1) computation on known data (16 bytes) / known label (“TEST”) and comparison of output to the expected value (32 bytes). Hash- DRBG Instantiate, Generate and Reseed API are tested in a single test sequence in accordance with §11.3 of [SP800-90A]. Output of HDRBG (55 bytes) is compared to a reference value. AES AES CFB encryption is done on known data (32 bytes) / known key (16 bytes) and known IV (16 bytes, same value as key). The 32 bytes output data are compared to the expected reference data. If comparison succeeds, AES CFB decryption is done on encrypted data with same key & same IV as encryption. 32 bytes output are compared to the initial plaintext data. Triple-DES Triple-DES CFB encryption is done on known data (32 bytes) / known key (24 bytes) and known IV (8 bytes). The 32 bytes output data are compared to the expected reference data. If comparison succeeds, Triple-DES CFB decryption is done on encrypted data with same key & same IV as encryption. 32 bytes output are compared to the initial plaintext data. FW integrity FW integrity is verified by computing an EDC (CRC-16 ISO 13239) and comparing it to reference values. FW integrity is verified during boot sequence before execution of one of the code block (CML, AFL and TPM) and during full self-tests execution. If failure is detected during boot sequence, TPM enters an infinite reset loop that can be exit only by power-off/power-on sequence. In failure is detected during self-tests, status is set to FAIL and error is returned. HW integrity HW integrity is guaranteed via check of HW sensors. If failure is detected during boot sequence, status is set to FAIL and error is returned. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 56 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 4.2.2 Full self-tests list Next table list of the tests performed in addition to the tests from Table 34: TPM conditional tests and Table 35: Power-up self-tests list on a TPM2_SelfTest(full=YES) command execution. Table 36: Asymmetric cryptography self-tests list Algorithm tested Test description RSA A known key is loaded (2048 bits length). Signature RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is generated on known data (20 bytes). Output of signature is compared to a reference signature. Signature verification is performed on the generated signature. ECDH Primitive “Z” Computation KAT is implemented: a known private key d (32 bytes length) is used with a known point P of NIST P-256 curve to compute P = dQ. Q is compare to known reference point. ECDSA A known private key (256 bits) is used to generate ECDSA signature based on NIST P- 256 curve. Output of signature is compared to a reference signature. Signature verification is performed on the generated signature. 4.2.3 Conditional tests list Table 37: TPM conditional tests Algorithm tested Test description FW integrity FW integrity is verified by computing an EDC (CRC-16 ISO 13239) and comparing it to reference values. Hash-DRBG Each 32 bytes of generated data are compared to the previous generated data. If data are equal, status is set to FAIL and error is returned. NDRNG HW performs continuous tests on TRNG output. If test fails, bit TRNG_ERR is raised on SEC_STAT register and TPM enters failure mode. FW load During field upgrade procedure, several checks are performed before authorizing the FW to be upgraded: - Verification of signature (RSASSA-PSS) on the first data blob to ensure authentication of the FW - Verification of digest (SHA256) on each subsequent blob to guarantee integrity of the full FW. RSA key generation A new RSA key is generated or retrieved from pre-computed keys (done in BKG). Depending on the key purpose (signing or encrypting) indicated in sign attribute of the key, en/decryption or signing/verification is done on known data (16 bytes). ECC key generation On each ECC key generation, an ECDSA signature is generated and verified on curve NIST P-256. TDES key generation TDES key generation process consists in generating a pseudo-random value from KDFa and checking that this value passes the following conditional tests to be considered and next used as a functional TDES key. Conditional tests are: 1. Check that the 3 TDES cryptographic keys are different: Key1 != Key2, Key2 != Key3, Key1 != Key3 (Keying option 1 from §3.2 of [SP800-67]) 2. Key is not one of the weak key listed in §3.4.2 of [SP800-67] In case of failure, new pseudo-random values are generated until a valid TDES key is found. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 57 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 4.2.4 Verification Successful completion of self-tests can be verified through use of TPM2_GetTestResult command. The first 4 bytes of response indicate self-tests status. If they are equal to 0, self- tests completed successfully. If not, the subsequent 4 bytes indicate the list of algorithms not fully self-tested. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 58 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 5 PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY The security module meets Physical Security protection requirements for FIPS level 3. CSPs are physically protected from unexpected disclosure and modification. Security module is tamper evident, encapsulated in a hard opaque package to prevent direct observation of internal security components. Regular visual inspection must be conducted by user to check that HW integrity of the chip has not been damaged. Physical security protection mechanisms that assure that CSPs remain protected from unauthorized disclosure, usage, modification or deletion, are described in “Mitigations of other attacks” section. Nominal operating conditions for the security module are:  Voltage: 1.8V or 3.3V (±10%).  Frequency: System clock is created by an internal oscillator. Hardness testing was only performed at ambient temperature. No assurance is provided for Level 3 hardness conformance at any other temperature. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 59 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Module operational environment is “limited modifiable” because TPM FW can only be modified through field upgrade service (use of TPM_FieldUpgradeStart and TPM_FieldUpgradeData commands when TPM is executing in TPM1.2 mode and TPM2_FieldUpgradeStart or TPM2_VendorCmdFieldUpgradeStart and TPM2_FieldUpgradeData commands when TPM is executing in TPM2.0 mode). The Non-upgradable code blocks are non-modifiable. FIPS 140-2 level 1 & 2 operational environment requirements of [FIPS 140-2] section 4.6.1 are then not applicable to the security module. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 60 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 7 MITIGATIONS OF OTHER ATTACKS The security module meets Physical Security protection requirements for FIPS level 3. 7.1 Internal Tamper Detection The security module contains an active metal shield that covers the internal TPM circuitry and memory components. Cutting, removing or modifying the shield layer will cause the TPM to Reset and enter a SHUTDOWN mode. 7.2 Environmental protection The security module contains circuitry which will detect environmental conditions outside the range described in the product datasheet. Power supply voltage is continuously monitored. If conditions exist outside the range determined by the TPM tamper detection circuitry, the chip will reset and will enter a FAILURE mode. The chip will remain Reset and in FAIL mode as long as the environmental condition causing the tamper event persists. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 61 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 8 REFERENCES Reference Document [ST33TPHF2ESPI DS] ST33TPHF2ESPI Datasheet, STMicroelectronics, December 2015 [ST33TPHF2EI2C DS] ST33TPHF2EI2C Datasheet, STMicroelectronics, May 2017 [TPM1.2 Part1 r1.16] TPM Main, Part 1, Design principles, Version 1.2 Level 2, rev 116, TCG [TPM1.2 Part2 r1.16] TPM Main, Part 2, TPM Structures, Version 1.2 Level 2, revision 116, TCG [TPM1.2 Part3 r1.16] TPM Main, Part 3, Commands, Version 1.2 Level 2, revision 116, TCG [TIS 1.30] TCG PC Client Specific TPM Interface Specification (TIS) – Version 1.3 [TPM2.0 Part1 r1.38] TPM2.0 Main, Part 1, Architecture, rev 1. 38, TCG [TPM2.0 Part2 r1. 38] TPM2.0 Main, Part 2, Structures, rev 1. 38, TCG [TPM2.0 Part3 r1. 38] TPM2.0 Main, Part 3, Commands, rev 1. 38, TCG [TPM2.0 Part4 r1. 38] TPM2.0 Main, Part 4, Supporting routines, rev 1. 38, TCG [PTP 1.03] TCG PC Client Platform TPM Profile (PTP) Specification, rev. 1.03 [FIPS 140-2] FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules / National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), CHANGE NOTICES (12-03-2002) [FIPS DTR] National Institute of Standards and Technology and Communications Security, Derived Test Requirements(DTR) for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules [FIPS IG] National Institute of Standards and Technology and Communications Security, Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program [FIPS 180-4] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, March 2012 [FIPS 186-4] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013 [FIPS 197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 2001 [SP800-135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Existing Application- Specific Key Derivation Function Validation System, September 2015. [SP800-108] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions, October 2009. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 62 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT Reference Document [SP800-131Ar2] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, March 2019. [FIPS 198-1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, NIST Computer Security Division Page 3 07/26/2011, (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008 [SP800-90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, January 2012. [SP800-38F] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, December 2012. [SP800-56A] Rev 3 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, March 2007April 2018. [SP800-56B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography, August 2009 [SP800-56C] Rev 1 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment Schemes, April 2018 [SP800-67] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, January 2012. FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 63 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT 9 ACRONYMS Term Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard CO Crypto Officer DES Data Encryption Standard DSAP Delegate Specific Authorization Protocol EK Endorsement Key FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard FUM Field Upgrade Mode GPIO General Purpose I/O HMAC Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NV Non-volatile (memory) OIAP Object-Independent Authorization Protocol OSAP Object Specific Authorization Protocol PCR Platform Configuration Register RSA Rivest Shamir Adelman RTM Root of Trust for Measurement RTR Root of Trust for Reporting SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SPI Serial Peripheral Interface SRK Storage Root Key TCG Trusted Computed Group TPM Trusted Platform Module TSS TPM Software Stack FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY Page 64 of 64 NON-PROPRIETARY DOCUMENT IMPORTANT NOTICE – PLEASE READ CAREFULLY STMicroelectronics NV and its subsidiaries (“ST”) reserve the right to make changes, corrections, enhancements, modifications, and improvements to ST products and/or to this document at any time without notice. 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