Nvidia Corporation H100 Tensor Core GPU Hardware Models: H100 FIPS-1; H100 FIPS-2 Firmware Version: 570.36 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy FIPS Security Level: 2 Document Version: 0.12 Prepared for: Prepared by: Nvidia Corporation Corsec Security, Inc. 2788 San Tomas Expressway 12600 Fair Lakes Circle, Suite 210 Santa Clara, CA 95051 Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America United States of America Phone: +1 408 486-2000 Phone: +1 703 267 6050 www.nvidia.com www.corsec.com FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 2 of 47 References This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-3 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources: • The Nvidia website www.nvidia.com contains information on the full line of services and solutions from Nvidia. • The search page on the CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation- program/Validated-Modules/Search) can be used to locate and obtain vendor contact information for technical or sales-related questions about the module. Document Organization ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B uses the same section naming convention as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7 - Security requirements. For example, Annex B section B.2.1 is named “General” and B.2.2 is named “Cryptographic module specification,” which is the same as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7.1 and section 7.2, respectively. Therefore, the format of this Security Policy is presented in the same order as indicated in Annex B, starting with “General” and ending with “Mitigation of other attacks.” If sections are not applicable, they have been marked as such in this document. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 3 of 47 Table of Contents 1. General..................................................................................................................................................6 1.1 Overview.................................................................................................................................................6 1.2 Security Levels.........................................................................................................................................6 2. Cryptographic Module Specification .......................................................................................................7 2.1 Description..............................................................................................................................................7 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ..........................................................9 2.3 Excluded Components ......................................................................................................................... 10 2.4 Modes of Operation............................................................................................................................. 11 2.5 Algorithms............................................................................................................................................ 11 2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................................... 14 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information............................................................................................................ 16 2.8 RBG and Entropy.................................................................................................................................. 17 2.9 Key Generation .................................................................................................................................... 17 2.10 Key Establishment................................................................................................................................ 17 2.11 Industry Protocols................................................................................................................................ 18 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces .........................................................................................................19 3.1 Ports and Interfaces............................................................................................................................. 19 4. Roles, Services, and Authentication......................................................................................................20 4.1 Authentication Methods...................................................................................................................... 20 4.2 Roles..................................................................................................................................................... 20 4.3 Approved Services ............................................................................................................................... 20 4.4 Non-Approved Services ....................................................................................................................... 24 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................................... 25 5. Software/Firmware Security ................................................................................................................26 5.1 Integrity Techniques ............................................................................................................................ 26 5.2 Initiate on Demand .............................................................................................................................. 26 6. Operational Environment.....................................................................................................................27 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements............................................................................. 27 6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions .............................................................................................. 27 7. Physical Security ..................................................................................................................................28 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required ..................................................................................................... 28 8. Non-Invasive Security ..........................................................................................................................29 9. Sensitive Security Parameters Management.........................................................................................30 9.1 Storage Areas....................................................................................................................................... 30 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods.................................................................................................................. 30 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods..................................................................................................................... 30 9.4 SSPs...................................................................................................................................................... 31 10. Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................................37 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests................................................................................................................... 37 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 4 of 47 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests .......................................................................................................................... 37 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information............................................................................................................. 40 10.4 Error States .......................................................................................................................................... 41 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .......................................................................................................... 41 11. Life-Cycle Assurance.............................................................................................................................42 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ............................................................................. 42 11.2 Administrator Guidance....................................................................................................................... 42 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance............................................................................................................... 43 11.4 End of Life ............................................................................................................................................ 43 12. Mitigation of Other Attacks..................................................................................................................44 Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations ....................................................................................................45 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 5 of 47 List of Tables Table 1: Security Levels ..............................................................................................................................................6 Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware....................................................................................................9 Table 3: Modes List and Description ....................................................................................................................... 11 Table 4: Approved Algorithms - Copy Engine.......................................................................................................... 12 Table 5: Approved Algorithms - GPU Service Processor ......................................................................................... 12 Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Security Controller ............................................................................................... 12 Table 7: Approved Algorithms - Root of Trust for Storage...................................................................................... 13 Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ..................................................................................................................... 13 Table 9: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed................................................................ 14 Table 10: Security Function Implementations......................................................................................................... 16 Table 11: Entropy Certificates ................................................................................................................................. 17 Table 12: Entropy Sources....................................................................................................................................... 17 Table 13: Ports and Interfaces................................................................................................................................. 19 Table 14: Authentication Methods.......................................................................................................................... 20 Table 15: Roles ........................................................................................................................................................ 20 Table 16: Approved Services ................................................................................................................................... 24 Table 17: Mechanisms and Actions Required ......................................................................................................... 28 Table 18: Storage Areas........................................................................................................................................... 30 Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods...................................................................................................................... 30 Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods......................................................................................................................... 31 Table 21: SSP Table 1............................................................................................................................................... 33 Table 22: SSP Table 2............................................................................................................................................... 36 Table 23: Pre-Operational Self-Tests....................................................................................................................... 37 Table 24: Conditional Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................. 40 Table 25: Pre-Operational Periodic Information..................................................................................................... 40 Table 26: Conditional Periodic Information ............................................................................................................ 41 Table 27: Error States.............................................................................................................................................. 41 Table 28: Acronyms and Abbreviations................................................................................................................... 45 List of Figures Figure 1: Module Block Diagram (with Cryptographic Boundary) .............................................................................8 Figure 2: Nvidia H100 Tensor Core GPU (Top View) ..................................................................................................9 Figure 3: Nvidia H100 Tensor Core GPU (Bottom View) ............................................................................................9 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 6 of 47 1. General 1.1 Overview This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the H100 Tensor Core GPU (version: 570.36) from Nvidia Corporation (Nvidia). This Security Policy describes how the H100 Tensor Core GPU meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-3, which details the U.S. and Canadian government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp. This document also describes how to run the module in a secure Approved mode of operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-3 validation of the module. The H100 Tensor Core GPU is referred to in this document as H100 or the module. 1.2 Security Levels The H100 Tensor Core GPU is validated at the FIPS 140-3 section levels shown in the table below. Section Title Security Level 1 General 2 2 Cryptographic module specification 2 3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2 4 Roles, services, and authentication 2 5 Software/Firmware security 2 6 Operational environment N/A 7 Physical security 2 8 Non-invasive security N/A 9 Sensitive security parameter management 2 10 Self-tests 2 11 Life-cycle assurance 2 12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A Overall Level 2 Table 1: Security Levels The module has an overall security level of 2. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 7 of 47 2. Cryptographic Module Specification 2.1 Description 2.1.1 Purpose and Use H100 is part of the complete NVIDIA data center solution that incorporates building blocks across hardware, networking, software, libraries, and optimized AI models and applications from the NVIDIA NGC™ catalog. The second-generation Multi-Instance GPU (MIG), built-in NVIDIA confidential computing, and NVIDIA NVLink Switch System allows the H100 to securely accelerate workloads. 2.1.2 Module Type The H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 is a Hardware module. 2.1.3 Module Embodiment The H100 Tensor Core GPU is a Single Chip embodiment. 2.1.4 Module Characteristics The module does not have any additional characteristics. 2.1.5 Cryptographic Boundary The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined by the external edge of the chip casing. Figure 1 illustrates a block diagram of the H100 GPU. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 8 of 47 RTS PCIe endpoint Tensor Cores DRAM/HBM Plaintext Data Encrypted Data Control Input Status Output Power Cryptographic Boundary GSP JTAG NVLINK I2C C2C GPIO TESTOUT STRAPS POWER SPI KEY: GPU – Graphical Processing Unit DRAM – Dynamic Random-Access Memory GSP – Security Processor SEC2 – Security Processor FSP – Foundation Security Processor PCIe – Peripheral Component Interconnect Express C2C/NVLINK – High Speed Data interface. GPIO – General Purpose Input Output PMU – Power Management Unit SPI – Serial Peripheral Interface RTS – RoT for Storage MINION – Microcontroller in IOctrl for NVLINK FSP NVDEC MINION Excluded: FUSE Keyslot TCM FIFO SEC2 Keyslot TCM FIFO Network on Chip Memory Management Unit PMU Excluded: Figure 1: Module Block Diagram (with Cryptographic Boundary) Figure 2 and Figure 3 below display the top and bottom views of the module, respectively. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 9 of 47 Figure 2: Nvidia H100 Tensor Core GPU (Top View) Figure 3: Nvidia H100 Tensor Core GPU (Bottom View) 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification 2.2.1 Tested Module Identification – Hardware The table below displays the tested operational environment of the hardware module. Model and/or Part Number Hardware Version Firmware Version Processors Features H100 FIPS-1 H100 FIPS-1 570.36 Nvidia H100 HBM2E H100 FIPS-2 H100 FIPS-2 570.36 Nvidia H100 HBM3 Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 10 of 47 2.2.2 Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) This section is only applicable to software, firmware, and hybrid modules. N/A for this module. 2.2.3 Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware This section is only applicable to hybrid modules. N/A for this module. 2.2.4 Tested Operational Environments – Software, Firmware, Hybrid This section is only applicable to software, firmware, and hybrid modules. N/A for this module. 2.2.5 Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments – Software, Firmware, Hybrid The vendor does not affirm any operational environments. N/A for this module. 2.3 Excluded Components The bulleted list below specifies the hardware components of the cryptographic module that are excluded from the security requirements, as well as the rationale for exclusion. • Excluded Hardware Components o NVDEC: NVDEC is an independent ucoded block which is used for video decode acceleration. It has cryptographic functionality to handle DRM content. However, all cryptographic blocks are dedicated and located within this block. It does not provide any functionality or support to the GSP/SEC2 components and has an independent path for access to resources in the chip. The cryptographic functionality is not used in the module’s services or to fulfill any of the module’s security objectives. o Minion: This is an independent ucoded block to manage the NVLINK PHY programming. It has cryptographic functionality to authenticate and decrypt the firmware that is running on it. However, it provides no service or support to the GSP/SEC2 components and has an independent path to access FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 11 of 47 chip resources for its own functioning. The cryptographic functionality is not used in the module’s services or to fulfill any of the module’s security objectives. o PMU: This is an independent ucoded block to manage the chip power management functions. It has cryptographic functionality to authenticate and decrypt the firmware that is running on it. However, it provides no service or support to GSP/SEC2 components and has an independent path to access chip resources for its own functioning. The cryptographic functionality is not used in the module’s services or to fulfill any of the module’s security objectives. o FSP: FSP is an independent ucoded block that does not provide services to GSP/SEC2 and has dedicated crypto blocks located within the block. The cryptographic functionality is not used in the module’s services or to fulfill any of the module’s security objectives. o Front Capacitors: The module includes package-level capacitors located along the package edges, used solely for decoupling and signal conditioning between internal die power/IO nets and the package pins. These components do not store or process SSPs, user data, or security-relevant control/status information. These hardware components cannot be used to cause a compromise. Further, the module’s physical security is maintained in the absence of these components. Thus, these hardware components have been excluded from the module validation. 2.4 Modes of Operation 2.4.1 Modes List and Description The table below lists the mode of operation supported by the module. Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator Approved The only supported mode of operation of the module. Approved FIPS Mode ON; Devtools Mode ON Table 3: Modes List and Description 2.5 Algorithms 2.5.1 Approved Algorithms The module employs cryptographic algorithm implementations from the following sources: • Copy Engine (Cert. A2733) • GPU Service Processor (Cert. A2732, A4422) • Security Controller (Cert. A2730, A4423) • Root of Trust Storage for Storage (Cert. A4414) The module implements the Approved algorithms listed in the table below. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 12 of 47 Copy Engine Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference AES-ECB A2733 Direction - Encrypt Key Length - 256 SP 800-38A AES-GCM A2733 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 256 SP 800-38D Table 4: Approved Algorithms - Copy Engine GPU Service Processor Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference AES-ECB A4422 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 256 SP 800-38A AES-GCM A4422 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 256 SP 800-38D Counter DRBG A4422 Prediction Resistance - No Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - No SP 800-90A Rev. 1 ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) A4422 Curve - P-384 Secret Generation Mode - extra bits FIPS 186-5 ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5) A4422 Curve - P-384 FIPS 186-5 ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) A2732 Curve - P-384 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384 FIPS 186-5 HMAC-SHA2-384 A4422 Key Length - Key Length: 128, 192, 256 FIPS 198-1 KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 A4422 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-384 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - responder SP 800-56A Rev. 3 KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2 A4422 Derived Key Length - 256 Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 256 HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-384 SP 800-56C Rev. 2 RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A2732 Modulo - 3072 Signature Type - pss FIPS 186-5 SHA2-384 A4422 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 Table 5: Approved Algorithms - GPU Service Processor Security Controller Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference AES-ECB A4423 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 SP 800-38A AES-GCM A4423 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 256 SP 800-38D Conditioning Component AES-CBC-MAC SP800-90B A4423 Key Length - 128 SP 800-90B RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) A2730 Modulo - 3072 Signature Type - pss FIPS 186-5 SHA2-384 A4423 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4 Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Security Controller Root of Trust for Storage Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference SHA2-384 A4414 Message Length - Message Length: 800 FIPS 180-4 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 13 of 47 Table 7: Approved Algorithms - Root of Trust for Storage Only the algorithms specified in the tables above are approved algorithms supported by the module in approved mode of operation 2.5.2 Vendor Affirmed Algorithms The vendor affirms the following cryptographic security methods: Name Properties Implementation Reference CKG Section 6.1 Symmetric Key type:Symmetric N/A SP 800-133 Rev. 2 Section 6.1 CKG Section 4 Example 1 Asymmetric Key type:Asymmetric N/A SP 800-133 Rev. 2 Section 4 Example 1 CKG Section 4 Example 2 Asymmetric Key Type:Asymmetric N/A SP 800-133 Rev. 2 Section 4 Example 2 Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms 2.5.3 Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms The module does not offer any non-approved, allowed algorithms. N/A for this module. 2.5.4 Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed The table below lists the non-approved, allowed algorithms with no security claimed. Name Caveat Use and Function AES ECB (No Security Claimed) No Security Claimed; AES-ECB is only used as a pre-requisite for the AES- GCM which is only used within an encrypted tunnel. (IG 2.4.A Scenario 2c) Pre-requisite AES mode for the AES GCM implemented operating within an encrypted tunnel. AES-GCM (No Security Claimed) No Security Claimed; AES-GCM is used within an encrypted tunnel. (IG 2.4.A Scenario 2c) AES-GCM for data transfer within an encrypted AES-GCM tunnel. ECDSA KeyGen (No Security Claimed) No Security Claimed; ECDSA KeyGen is used for key generation of key pairs used for the attestation report. (IG 2.4.A Scenario 2) Generation of the ECDSA Key Pairs for the Attestation Report Service ECDSA SigGen (No Security Claimed) No Security Claimed; ECDSA SigGen is used for signature generation used for the attestation report. (IG 2.4.A Scenario 2) Generation of the ECDSA signatures for the Attestation Report Service HMAC-SHA2-256 (No Security Claimed) No Security Claimed; SHA2-256 is only used as a pre-requisite for the KBKDF which is used as a conditioning component for the GSP_UDS_KDK and GSP_UDS1, and key derivation of AK_Seed_NonCA and GSP_UDS1. (IG 2.4.A Scenario 2) Conditioning Component KBKDF (SP800- 108) (No Security Claimed) No Security Claimed; KBKDF is used as a conditioning component for the GSP_UDS_KDK and GSP_UDS1, and key derivation of AK_Seed_NonCA and GSP_UDS1. (IG 2.4.A Scenario 2) Conditioning Component SHA2-256 (No Security Claimed) No Security Claimed; SHA2-256 is only used as a pre-requisite for the KBKDF which is used as a conditioning component for the GSP_UDS_KDK and GSP_UDS1, and key derivation of AK_Seed_NonCA and GSP_UDS1. (IG 2.4.A Scenario 2) Conditioning Component FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 14 of 47 Name Caveat Use and Function SHA2-384 (No Security Claimed) No Security Claimed; SHA2-384 is only used as a pre-requisite for the ECDSA SigGen which is used for signature generation used for the attestation report. (IG 2.4.A Scenario 2) Pre-requisite hash algorithm for the ECDSA SigGen which is used for signature generation SPDM KDF (No Security Claimed) No Security Claimed; The SPDM KDF is used within an encrypted tunnel. (IG 2.4.A Scenario 2c) SPDM KDF for use in SPDM protocol. Note that the SPDM protocol operates within an encrypted AES-GCM tunnel. Table 9: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed 2.5.5 Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms The module does not offer any non-approved, not allowed algorithms. N/A for this module. 2.6 Security Function Implementations The table below lists the security function implementations for this module. Name Type Description Properties Algorithms AES-GCM for DMA BC-Auth 256-bit AES-GCM used by the GPU -> CPU DMA Key and CPU -> GPU DMA Key for data transfer. Publication:SP 800-38D AES-ECB: (A4422) Key Length: 256 bits AES-GCM: (A4422) Key Length: 256 bits AES-GCM for KMD BC-Auth 256-bit AES-GCM used by the GPU -> CPU KMD Key and CPU -> GPU KMD Key for data transfer. Publication:SP 800-38D AES-ECB: (A2733, A4423) Key Length: 256 bits AES-GCM: (A2733, A4423) Key Length: 256 bits AES-GCM for RPC BC-Auth 256-bit AES-GCM used by the GPU -> CPU RPC Key and CPU -> GPU RPC Key for data transfer. Publication:SP 800-38D AES-ECB: (A4422) Key Length: 256 bits AES-GCM: (A4422) Key Length: 256 bits AES-GCM for Secure Session Establishment BC-Auth AES-GCM used for obfuscating the SPDM operations. Publication:SP 800-38D AES-ECB: (A4422) Key Length: 256 bits AES-GCM: (A4422) Key Length: 256 bits AES-GCM for SPDM BC-Auth AES-GCM used for obfuscating the SPDM operations. AES ECB (No Security Claimed): () Key Length: 256 bits AES-GCM (No Security Claimed): () Key Length: 256 bits AES-GCM for UMD BC-Auth 256-bit AES-GCM used by the GPU -> CPU UMD Key and CPU -> GPU UMD Key for data transfer. Publication:SP 800-38D AES-ECB: (A2733, A4423) Key Length: 256 bits AES-GCM: (A2733, A4423) Key Length: 256 bits FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 15 of 47 Name Type Description Properties Algorithms CKG (GPU Service Processor) CKG Symmetric cryptographic key generation (GPU Service Processor). Publication:SP 800-133 Rev. 2 CKG Section 6.1 Symmetric: () Counter DRBG: (A4422) AES-ECB: (A4422) ECDSA KeyGen for AK_Pvt/Pub_NonCA AsymKeyPair-KeyGen ECDSA key generation for the AK_Pvt_NonCA and the AK_Pub_NonCA, which are used for signing and verifying the attestation report, respectively. Publication:FIPS 186-5 ECDSA KeyGen (No Security Claimed): () Counter DRBG: (A4422) CKG Section 4 Example 2 Asymmetric: () AES-ECB: (A4422) ECDSA KeyGen for ECDH AsymKeyPair-KeyGen ECDSA key generation for the Ephemeral ECDH key pair, which is used for shared secret computation. Publication:FIPS 186-5 ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A4422) Counter DRBG: (A4422) CKG Section 4 Example 1 Asymmetric: () AES-ECB: (A4422) ECDSA SigGen for AK_Pvt_NonCA DigSig-SigGen ECDSA signature generation for the AK_Pvt_NonCA, which is used to sign the attestation report. Publication:FIPS 186-5 ECDSA SigGen (No Security Claimed): () Counter DRBG: (A4422) SHA2-384 (No Security Claimed): () AES-ECB: (A4422) ECDSA SigGen for the device attestation certificate DigSig-SigGen ECDSA digital signature generation to sign "key exchange" messages. Publication:FIPS 186-5 ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186- 5): (A2732) Counter DRBG: (A4422) SHA2-384: (A4414) AES-ECB: (A4422) Entropy Source ENT-ESV Entropy source with conditioning component. Publication:SP 800-90B Conditioning Component AES-CBC- MAC SP800-90B: (A4423) AES-ECB: (A4423) HKDF for Secure Session Establishment KAS-56CKDF HKDF for Secure Session Establishment (SPDM). Publication:SP 800-56C Rev. 2 KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2: (A4422) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4422) SHA2-384: (A4422) HMAC for Data Transfer MAC HMAC for message authentication during data transfer. Publication:FIPS 198-1 HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4422) SHA2-384: (A4422) KAS-ECC-SSC KAS-SSC KAS-ECC-SSC used for ECDH, which is needed for the Secure Session Establishment service. Publication:SP 800-56A Rev. 3 KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A4422) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A4422) SHA2-384: (A4422) Counter DRBG: (A4422) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186- 5): (A4422) AES-ECB: (A4422) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 16 of 47 Name Type Description Properties Algorithms KBKDF for AK_Seed_NonCA KBKDF Key-based key derivation of the AK_Seed_NonCA. Publication:SP 800-108 Rev. 1 KBKDF (SP800-108) (No Security Claimed): () HMAC-SHA2-256 (No Security Claimed): () SHA2-256 (No Security Claimed): () Counter DRBG: (A4422) AES ECB (No Security Claimed): () KBKDF for GSP_UDS1 KBKDF Key-based key derivation of the GSP_UDS1. Publication:SP 800-108 Rev. 1 KBKDF (SP800-108) (No Security Claimed): () HMAC-SHA2-256 (No Security Claimed): () SHA2-256 (No Security Claimed): () Counter DRBG: (A4422) AES ECB (No Security Claimed): () RSA SigVer for Authentication DigSig-SigVer Used for certificate- based authentication. Publication:FIPS 186-5 RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A2732) SHA2-384: (A4423) RSA SigVer for Firmware Integrity DigSig-SigVer Signature Verification for the firmware integrity tests. Publication:FIPS 186-5 RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A2732, A2730) SHA2-384: (A4422, A4423) SHA for Conditioning Component UNK KBKDF is used as a vetted conditioning component for the GSP_UDS_KDK and GSP_UDS1 keys. Publication:SP 800-108 KBKDF (SP800-108) (No Security Claimed): () SHA2-256 (No Security Claimed): () HMAC-SHA2-256 (No Security Claimed): () Table 10: Security Function Implementations 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information The information below provides algorithm information of references to specifications. 2.7.1 AES GCM IV All AES GCM IVs are 96 bits in size and constructed deterministically. This applies for each of the algorithm implementations: • AES GCM IV Generation (GPU Service Processor) • AES GCM IV Generation (Security Controller) • AES GCM IV Generation (Copy Engine) As per I.G. C.H Key/IV Pair Uniqueness Requirements from SP 800-38D, AES GCM IV implements scenario 4. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 17 of 47 2.8 RBG and Entropy The table below specifies the module’s entropy certificates. Please note that SECHUB and SEC2 refer to the Security Processor. Cert Number Vendor Name E201 NVIDIA Table 11: Entropy Certificates The table below specifies the module’s entropy sources. Name Type Operational Environment Sample Size Entropy per Sample Conditioning Component Nvidia Random Number Generator (NVRNG) Physical H100(SECHUB) 128 bits 128 bits Conditioning Component AES-CBC-MAC SP800-90B (A4423) Table 12: Entropy Sources The DRBG requests 384 bits from the entropy source, resulting in 256 bits of entropy strength. 2.9 Key Generation The module uses the following methods for key generation: • CKG • ECDSA KeyGen As per IG D.H and SP 800-133rev2, the module uses an Approved Counter DRBG to generate random values and seeds that are used for asymmetric and symmetric key generation. The generated seed is an unmodified output from the Counter DRBG. 2.10 Key Establishment 2.10.1 Key Agreement Information The module supports the following key agreement methods: • KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman) and KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2: Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance D.F, this key agreement method claims Scenario 2 path (2). 2.10.2 Key Transport Information The module does not support any key transport methods. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 18 of 47 2.11 Industry Protocols The module supports the following industry protocol: • SPDM The SPDM protocol is implemented within an AES-GCM encrypted tunnel. No parts of the SPDM protocol have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 19 of 47 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces 3.1 Ports and Interfaces The H100 Tensor Core GPU is a single-chip processor embedded in a general-purpose computer or server. It connects to the host device via a PCIe connector. The design of this connector supports information flows in four logically distinct and isolated categories: • Data Input • Data Output • Control Input • Status Output A mapping of the FIPS-defined interfaces, the host device’s physical interfaces, and the module’s logical interfaces can be found in the table below. Physical Port Logical Interface(s) Data That Passes C2C pins Data Input Data Output User Mode Application Data GPIO pins Control Input GPIO are General Purpose Input/Output ports that allow the system to control H100. Things like Voltage Regulators, Fans, and LEDs are connected to GPIOs. No user data goes over the GPIOs. I2C pins Control Input Status Output I2C is a low bandwidth control path H100. It allows the system BMC (Baseboard Management Controller) to perform system maintenance tasks like querying H100 temperature and other telemetry. No User Mode Application Data flows across I2C. NVLINK pins Data Input Data Output Control Input NVLINK allows for fast transfer of User Mode Application Data between multiple H100s. PCIe pins Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output PCIe endpoint is the primary control port for the H100. All host interactions go through the PCIe endpoint, including User Mode Application data, Kernel Mode Data, and Host configuration commands. Power pins Power N/A SPI pins Control Input Used to read in firmware. Straps pins Control Input Straps are board level settings that configure physical properties of the GPU. These are not dynamically modifiable. Table 13: Ports and Interfaces The module also includes two ports that are disabled during normal module operation: • JTAG – JTAG is the port that is used for silicon debug and manufacturing. • TESTOUT – This port is used to read out device status during manufacturing. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 20 of 47 4. Roles, Services, and Authentication 4.1 Authentication Methods The module supports role-based authentication; operators explicitly assume an authorized role based on the authentication credentials used. Module operators authenticate to the module using a certificate. The strength calculations for each of the authentication mechanisms are provided in the table below. Method Name Description Security Mechanism Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute Certificate-based authentication The mechanism provides mutual authentication between the requester (CPU which can assume the CO or User role) and responder (GPU which is the module). RSA SigVer for Authentication 1/2^128 2/2^128 Table 14: Authentication Methods 4.2 Roles The module Crypto Officer (CO) that authorized operators can assume. The CO role performs cryptographic initialization or management functions and general security services. The module also supports the following role(s): • User – The User role performs general security services, including cryptographic operations and other approved security functions. The table below lists additional information about the supported roles. Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods Crypto Officer Role CO Certificate-based authentication User Role User Certificate-based authentication Table 15: Roles 4.3 Approved Services Descriptions of the services available are provided in the table below. The keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation: • G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. • R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). • W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. • E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 21 of 47 • Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP. Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Attestation Report Generate and retrieve attestation report. Global FIPS Indicator: "FIPS Mode ON" Host runs verified tool On Success: Report Error Code: SPDM Payload embedded error code. ECDSA KeyGen for AK_Pvt/Pub_NonCA ECDSA SigGen for the device attestation certificate ECDSA SigGen for AK_Pvt_NonCA Entropy Source KBKDF for AK_Seed_NonCA KBKDF for GSP_UDS1 SHA for Conditioning Component User - AK_Pub_NonCA: G,R,E - AK_Pvt_NonCA: G,E - AK_Seed_NonCA: G,E - DRBG 'Key' Value: G,E - DRBG 'V' Value: G,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,E - DRBG Seed: G,E - GSP_UDS1: G,E - GSP_UDS_KDK: E - IK_Pvt: E Data Transfer Transfer data to and from module. Global FIPS Indicator: "FIPS Mode ON" SecureCE application invoked. Error Code: Based on error type (e.g. Encryption/Decryption errors, HMAC errors etc.) AES-GCM for RPC AES-GCM for DMA AES-GCM for KMD AES-GCM for UMD HMAC for Data Transfer User - AES GCM IV: E - CPU -> GPU DMA Key: E - CPU -> GPU KMD Key: E - CPU -> GPU RPC Key: E - CPU -> GPU UMD Key: E - Data Transfer Key: E - GPU -> CPU DMA Key: E - GPU -> CPU KMD Key: E - GPU -> CPU RPC Key: E - GPU -> CPU UMD Key: E FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 22 of 47 Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Perform Self- tests On- demand Performs pre- operational self-tests. Global FIPS Indicator: "FIPS Mode ON" Power cycle Module operational on pass RSA SigVer for Firmware Integrity Unauthenticated - AES GCM IV: Z - AK_Pub_NonCA: Z - AK_Pvt_NonCA: Z - AK_Seed_NonCA: Z - CPU -> GPU DMA Key: Z - CPU -> GPU KMD Key: Z - CPU -> GPU RPC Key: Z - CPU -> GPU UMD Key: Z - DRBG 'Key' Value: Z - DRBG 'V' Value: Z - DRBG Entropy Input: Z - DRBG Seed: Z - Ephemeral ECDH Private Component: Z - Ephemeral ECDH Public Component: Z - Export Master Key: Z - Firmware Integrity Key: E,Z - GPU -> CPU DMA Key: Z - GPU -> CPU KMD Key: Z - GPU -> CPU RPC Key: Z - GPU -> CPU UMD Key: Z - SPDM Key Wrapping Key: Z FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 23 of 47 Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Secure Session Establishment Establish a secure session. Global FIPS Indicator: "FIPS Mode ON" Secure establishment request On Success: FINISH_RSP message is sent. Error Code: RPC Error Code AES-GCM for SPDM AES-GCM for Secure Session Establishment CKG (GPU Service Processor) ECDSA KeyGen for ECDH Entropy Source HKDF for Secure Session Establishment KAS-ECC-SSC RSA SigVer for Authentication Unauthenticated User - AES GCM IV: G,E - CPU -> GPU DMA Key: G - CPU -> GPU KMD Key: G - CPU -> GPU RPC Key: G - CPU -> GPU UMD Key: G - Data Transfer Key: G - DRBG 'Key' Value: G,E - DRBG 'V' Value: G,E - DRBG Entropy Input: G,E - DRBG Seed: G,E - ECDHE Secret: G,E,Z - Ephemeral ECDH Private Component: G,E - Ephemeral ECDH Public Component: G,R,W,E - Export Master Key: G,E - GH100 Key: W,E,Z - GPU -> CPU DMA Key: G - GPU -> CPU KMD Key: G - GPU -> CPU RPC Key: G - GPU -> CPU UMD Key: G - SPDM Key Wrapping Key: G,E Show Status Returns approved mode status. Global FIPS Indicator: "FIPS Mode ON" nvidia-smi conf_compute -q Current state of operation None Crypto Officer Show Versioning Information Return module versioning information. Global FIPS Indicator: "FIPS Mode ON" nvidia-smi Version details None Crypto Officer User FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 24 of 47 Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security Functions SSP Access Zeroize Zeroizes and de-allocates memory containing sensitive data by resetting GSP or SECHUB. Global FIPS Indicator: "FIPS Mode ON" SPDM session de- initialization Zeroize all SSPs None Crypto Officer - AES GCM IV: Z - AK_Pub_NonCA: Z - AK_Pvt_NonCA: Z - AK_Seed_NonCA: Z - CPU -> GPU DMA Key: Z - CPU -> GPU RPC Key: Z - CPU -> GPU UMD Key: Z - DRBG 'Key' Value: Z - DRBG 'V' Value: Z - DRBG Entropy Input: Z - DRBG Seed: Z - Ephemeral ECDH Private Component: Z - Ephemeral ECDH Public Component: Z - Export Master Key: Z - GPU -> CPU DMA Key: Z - GPU -> CPU KMD Key: Z - GPU -> CPU RPC Key: Z - GPU -> CPU UMD Key: Z - GSP_UDS1: Z - GSP_UDS_KDK: Z - SPDM Key Wrapping Key: Z Table 16: Approved Services 4.4 Non-Approved Services The module does not offer any non-Approved services. N/A for this module. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 25 of 47 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded Module firmware is loaded from an external source at power on. The module does not allow the operator to load firmware from an external source for upgrading the module firmware version. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 26 of 47 5. Software/Firmware Security 5.1 Integrity Techniques All FIPS firmware components within the cryptographic boundary are verified using an approved integrity technique implemented within the cryptographic module itself. The module implements a 3072-bit RSA digital signature verification with SHA2-384 for the firmware integrity tests of GSP and SEC2. The RSA implementations used for the firmware integrity check on the GSP firmware have been awarded CAVP certificate A2732 and for the SEC2 firmware A2730. The SHA implementations used to support the RSA implementations have also been awarded CAVP certificates for the GSP and SEC2 firmware, respectively: A4422 and A4423. The module’s executable code is in the form of two compiled firmware images loaded onto the module, one for GSP and one for SEC2. The file name of the binary is NV_GPU_VBIOS_G520_0202_885. A firmware load test is to be considered inherently performed by the firmware integrity test after firmware is loaded into the module. Failure of the integrity check will cause the module to enter a critical error state. 5.2 Initiate on Demand The CO can initiate the pre-operational tests on demand by rebooting/power-cycling the module. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 27 of 47 6. Operational Environment 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements The H100 Tensor Core GPU comprises a firmware driver that executes in a Non-Modifiable operational environment. 6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions The operating system offers no mechanism whereby the operator can modify firmware components, nor can the operator load and execute software or firmware that was not included as part of the validation of the module. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 28 of 47 7. Physical Security 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required The H100 is implemented as a single-chip embodiment with seven dies in a single package. It is manufactured using standard integrated circuit manufacturing technologies, producing a device that meets all commercial-grade power, temperature, reliability, shock, and vibration specifications, and all integrated circuits are coated with commercial standard passivation. The H100 physical package provides hardness, opacity, and tamper-evidence protection conforming to FIPS 140- 3 Physical Security Level 2. The H100 achieves this level of protection by implementing a chip enclosure (IC package) that is both hard and opaque (refer to Figure 2 above). This type of IC package ensures that any physical tampering will always result in scratches, chipping, or other visible damage on the enclosure. The module implements the following physical security mechanisms in the table below. Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance Enclosure (IC package) 6 months Verify chip package not compromised or tampered. Table 17: Mechanisms and Actions Required FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 29 of 47 8. Non-Invasive Security This section is not applicable. There are currently no approved non-invasive mitigation techniques references in Annex F of ISO/IEC 19790. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 30 of 47 9. Sensitive Security Parameters Management 9.1 Storage Areas The table below lists sensitive security parameters (SSPs) storage areas for this module. Storage Area Name Description Persistence Type DRAM/HBM DRAM/RAM stores SPDM Key Wrapping Key, Export Master Key, and ECDHE SSPs. Dynamic FIFO FIFO stores DRBG SSPs. Dynamic Fuses Fuses store GSP_UDS_KDK, IK_Pvt, and Firmware Integrity Key. Static Keyslot Keyslot contains keys used for secure communication between the GPU and the CPU. Dynamic TCM TCM stores ephemeral SSPs and non-SSPs. Dynamic Table 18: Storage Areas 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods The module does not have any SSP input or output methods. Name From To Format Type Distribution Type Entry Type SFI or Algorithm Key Establishment export DRAM/HBM External Plaintext Automated Electronic Key Establishment import External DRAM/HBM Plaintext Automated Electronic Public key export TCM External Plaintext Automated Electronic Public key import External TCM Plaintext Automated Electronic Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods The table below lists SSP zeroization methods for this module. Zeroization Method Description Rationale Operator Initiation Reset Upon SECHUB or GSP reset commands, the SSPs are zeroized. Resetting the SECHUB and GSP overwrites the SSPs with zeroes, yielding them irretrievable. Operator resets SECHUB and GSP using the following zeroization commands: /sys/bus/pci/drivers/nvidia/unbind sudo rmmod nvidia_uvm sudo rmmod nvidia Session Termination Upon session termination, the memory will be cleared. Session termination overwrites the SSPs with zeroes, yielding them irretrievable. Operator terminates session. Zeroization after use (FIFO) After use, SSPs stored in FIFO will be zeroized. When done using the SSP, the SSP stored in FIFO is overwritten with zeroes, yielding it irretrievable. Operator calls service and the SSPs used by this service are zeroized after use. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 31 of 47 Zeroization Method Description Rationale Operator Initiation Zeroization after use (TCM) After use, SSPs stored in the TCM will be zeroized. When done using the SSP, the SSP stored in the TCM is overwritten with zeroes, yielding it irretrievable. Operator calls service and the SSPs used by this service are zeroized after use. Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods 9.4 SSPs The module supports the keys and other SSPs listed in the table below. Please note the SSPs tables include entries that are not considered SSPs but are otherwise included for completeness everywhere they are referenced. Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generated By Established By Used By AES GCM IV Used as the initialization vector for symmetric keys that use AES- GCM. 96 bits - 96 bits Initialization Vector - PSP Other (IG C.H Scenario 4) AES-GCM for DMA AES-GCM for SPDM AES-GCM for KMD AES-GCM for RPC AES-GCM for Secure Session Establishment AES-GCM for UMD AK_Pub_NonCA Used for the attestation report. 384 bits - N/A Public - Neither ECDSA KeyGen for AK_Pvt/Pub_NonCA ECDSA SigGen for the device attestation certificate AK_Pvt_NonCA Used for the attestation report. 384 bits - N/A Private - Neither ECDSA KeyGen for AK_Pvt/Pub_NonCA ECDSA SigGen for the device attestation certificate AK_Seed_NonCA Used as the DRBG seed when generating the AK_Pvt_NonCA and AK_Pub_NonCA 384 bits - N/A Seed - Neither KBKDF for AK_Seed_NonCA SHA for Conditioning Component ECDSA KeyGen for AK_Pvt/Pub_NonCA CPU -> GPU DMA Key Used for secure communication between the CPU and GPU. DMAs initiated at both end points CPU- GPU. 256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP HKDF for Secure Session Establishment AES-GCM for DMA CPU -> GPU KMD Key Used for secure communication between the CPU and GPU. 256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP HKDF for Secure Session Establishment AES-GCM for KMD CPU -> GPU RPC Key Used for secure communication between the CPU and GPU. 256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP HKDF for Secure Session Establishment AES-GCM for RPC FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 32 of 47 Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generated By Established By Used By CPU -> GPU UMD Key Used for secure communication between the CPU and GPU. 256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP HKDF for Secure Session Establishment AES-GCM for UMD Data Transfer Key Data transfer. Secure work launch HMAC key. 256 bits - 256 bits Authentication - CSP HKDF for Secure Session Establishment HMAC for Data Transfer DRBG 'Key' Value DRBG state value 256 bits - 256 bits State value - CSP CKG (GPU Service Processor) CKG (GPU Service Processor) DRBG 'V' Value DRBG state value 128 bits - 128 bits State value - CSP CKG (GPU Service Processor) CKG (GPU Service Processor) DRBG Entropy Input DRBG entropy input 384 bits - 384 bits Entropy Input - CSP Entropy Source CKG (GPU Service Processor) DRBG Seed DRBG seed value 384 bits - 256 bits Seed - CSP CKG (GPU Service Processor) CKG (GPU Service Processor) ECDHE Secret Secure session establishment. Expanded with HKDF to derive SPDM ephemeral keys. 384 bits - 192 bits Shared Secret - CSP KAS-ECC-SSC HKDF for Secure Session Establishment Ephemeral ECDH Private Component Secure session establishment. Used for shared secret computation. 384 bits - 192 bits Private - CSP ECDSA KeyGen for ECDH KAS-ECC-SSC Ephemeral ECDH Public Component Secure session establishment. Used for shared secret computation. 384 bits - 192 bits Public - PSP ECDSA KeyGen for ECDH KAS-ECC-SSC Export Master Key Secure session establishment. For deriving additional keys. 256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP HKDF for Secure Session Establishment AES-GCM for Secure Session Establishment Firmware Integrity Key Used in firmware integrity check 3072 bits - 128 bits Public Key - PSP Pre-Loaded RSA SigVer for Firmware Integrity GH100 Key Used for certificate-based authentication. 3072 bits - 128 bits Public - PSP RSA SigVer for Authentication GPU -> CPU DMA Key Used for secure communication between the CPU and GPU. DMAs initiated at both end points CPU- GPU. 256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP HKDF for Secure Session Establishment AES-GCM for DMA GPU -> CPU KMD Key Used for secure communication between the CPU and GPU. 256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP HKDF for Secure Session Establishment AES-GCM for KMD FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 33 of 47 Name Description Size - Strength Type - Category Generated By Established By Used By GPU -> CPU RPC Key Used for secure communication between the CPU and GPU. 256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP HKDF for Secure Session Establishment AES-GCM for RPC GPU -> CPU UMD Key Used for secure communication between the CPU and GPU. 256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP HKDF for Secure Session Establishment AES-GCM for UMD GSP_UDS1 Used as input to conditioning component, output is AK_Seed_NonCA. 256 bits - N/A Symmetric Key - Neither KBKDF for GSP_UDS1 SHA for Conditioning Component KBKDF for AK_Seed_NonCA SHA for Conditioning Component GSP_UDS_KDK Used as input to conditioning component, output is GSP_UDS1. 256 bits - N/A Symmetric Key - Neither Pre-Loaded KBKDF for GSP_UDS1 IK_Pvt Used to sign AK_Cert_NonCA. 384 bits - N/A Private - Neither Pre-Loaded ECDSA SigGen for the device attestation certificate SPDM Key Wrapping Key Secure session establishment. Used to wrap (encrypt) any SPDM secrets. 256 bits - 256 bits Symmetric Key - CSP CKG (GPU Service Processor) AES-GCM for SPDM Table 21: SSP Table 1 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs AES GCM IV TCM:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination SPDM Key Wrapping Key:Used With Export Master Key:Used With GPU -> CPU RPC Key:Used With CPU -> GPU RPC Key:Used With GPU -> CPU UMD Key:Used With CPU -> GPU UMD Key:Used With GPU -> CPU KMD Key:Used With CPU -> GPU KMD Key:Used With GPU -> CPU DMA Key:Used With CPU -> GPU DMA Key:Used With AK_Pub_NonCA Public key export TCM:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination AK_Seed_NonCA:Derived From AK_Pvt_NonCA:Paired With FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 34 of 47 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs AK_Pvt_NonCA Keyslot:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination AK_Seed_NonCA:Derived From AK_Pub_NonCA:Paired With AK_Seed_NonCA TCM:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Zeroization after use (TCM) GSP_UDS1:Derived From CPU -> GPU DMA Key Keyslot:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination ECDHE Secret:Derived From AES GCM IV:Used With CPU -> GPU KMD Key Keyslot:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination ECDHE Secret:Derived From AES GCM IV:Used With CPU -> GPU RPC Key Keyslot:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination ECDHE Secret:Derived From AES GCM IV:Used With CPU -> GPU UMD Key Keyslot:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination ECDHE Secret:Derived From AES GCM IV:Used With Data Transfer Key Keyslot:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination ECDHE Secret:Derived From AES GCM IV:Used With DRBG 'Key' Value TCM:Plaintext Stored in TCM until done being used or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Zeroization after use (TCM) DRBG 'V' Value TCM:Plaintext Stored in TCM until done being used or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Zeroization after use (TCM) DRBG Entropy Input FIFO:Plaintext Stored in FIFO until SSP is done being used or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Zeroization after use (FIFO) DRBG Seed FIFO:Plaintext Until SSP is done being used. Reset Zeroization after use (FIFO) FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 35 of 47 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs ECDHE Secret DRAM/HBM:Obfuscated Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination Ephemeral ECDH Private Component:Derived From Ephemeral ECDH Public Component:Derived From SPDM Key Wrapping Key:Wrapped By Ephemeral ECDH Private Component DRAM/HBM:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination Ephemeral ECDH Public Component:Paired With Ephemeral ECDH Public Component Key Establishment import Key Establishment export DRAM/HBM:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination Ephemeral ECDH Private Component:Paired With Export Master Key DRAM/HBM:Obfuscated Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination SPDM Key Wrapping Key:Wrapped by ECDHE Secret:Derived From AES GCM IV:Used With Firmware Integrity Key Fuses:Plaintext N/A GH100 Key Public key import TCM:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination GPU -> CPU DMA Key Keyslot:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination ECDHE Secret:Derived From AES GCM IV:Used With GPU -> CPU KMD Key Keyslot:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination ECDHE Secret:Derived From AES GCM IV:Used With GPU -> CPU RPC Key Keyslot:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination ECDHE Secret:Derived From AES GCM IV:Used With GPU -> CPU UMD Key Keyslot:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination ECDHE Secret:Derived From AES GCM IV:Used With GSP_UDS1 TCM:Plaintext Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination GSP_UDS_KDK:Derived From FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 36 of 47 Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs GSP_UDS_KDK TCM:Plaintext Fuses:Obfuscated Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Zeroization after use (TCM) IK_Pvt TCM:Plaintext Fuses:Obfuscated Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Zeroization after use (TCM) SPDM Key Wrapping Key DRAM/HBM:Obfuscated Stored in TCM until session termination or until GSP or SECHUB is reset. Reset Session Termination ECDHE Secret:Wraps Export Master Key:Wraps AES GCM IV:Used With Table 22: SSP Table 2 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 37 of 47 10. Self-Tests The module performs pre-operational self-tests and conditional self-tests. Pre-operational tests are performed between the time the cryptographic module is instantiated and before the module transitions to the operational state. Conditional self-tests are performed by the module during module operation when certain conditions exist. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status, and the error resolutions. 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module performs the following pre-operational self-tests: Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A2730) 3072-bit with SHA2-384 (A4423) Firmware Integrity SW/FW Integrity On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Firmware integrity test on SEC2 firmware RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A2732) 3072-bit with SHA2-384 (A4422) Firmware Integrity SW/FW Integrity On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Firmware integrity test on GSM firmware Table 23: Pre-Operational Self-Tests Please note that algorithms must pass their own CASTs before being used for the pre-operational firmware integrity tests. 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests The module performs the following conditional self-tests: Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions AES-GCM Decrypt (A2733) 256-bit Comparison Test CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Decrypt Boot up AES-GCM Decrypt (A4422) 256-bit KAT CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Decrypt Boot up AES-GCM Decrypt (A4423) 256-bit KAT CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Decrypt Boot up FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 38 of 47 Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions AES-GCM Encrypt (A2733) 256-bit Comparison Test CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Encrypt Boot up AES-GCM Encrypt (A4422) 256-bit KAT CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Encrypt Boot up AES-GCM Encrypt (A4423) 256-bit KAT CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Encrypt Boot up Continuous health Test - Adaptive Proportion Test N/A Fault Detection CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Continuous health Test - Adaptive Proportion Test on entropy source Boot up Continuous health Test - Repetitive Count Test N/A Fault Detection CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Continuous health Test - Repetitive count test on entropy source Boot up Counter DRBG (A4422) AES, 256-bit without derivation function KAT CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. DRBG KAT Boot up DRBG Health Tests AES, 256-bit without derivation function Generate/Instantiate/Reseed CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. DRBG Health Tests Boot up ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A2732) P-384 PCT PCT On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Sign/Verify Boot up ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A4422) P-384 PCT PCT On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Sign/Verify Boot up FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 39 of 47 Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A2732) P-384 KAT CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Sign Boot up KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A4422) P-384 KAT CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Shared Secret "Z" Computation Boot up KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2 (A4422) HMAC-SHA2- 384 KAT CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Derive Boot up RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A2730) 3072-bit; SHA2-384 KAT CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Verify Boot up RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A2732) 3072-bit; SHA2-384 KAT CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Verify Boot up SHA2-384 (A4414) SHA2-384 Comparison Test CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Hash Boot up SHA2-384 (A4422) SHA2-384 KAT CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Hash Boot up, before the pre- operational self-test. SHA2-384 (A4423) SHA2-384 KAT CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Verify Boot up Start-up health Test - Adaptive Proportion Test N/A Fault Detection CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Start-up health Test - Adaptive Proportion Test and Repetitive count test on entropy source Boot up FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 40 of 47 Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test Method Test Type Indicator Details Conditions Start-up health Test - Repetitive Count test N/A Fault Detection CAST On success module will proceed into normal operation, on fail module will halt. Start-up health Test - Repetitive count test on entropy source Boot up Table 24: Conditional Self-Tests 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information The module does not perform periodic self-tests automatically, but the operator may conduct self-tests on demand via the methods listed in Section 10.5 below. The tables below provide information regarding the pre- operational self-tests and conditional self-tests, respectively, that the operator can perform on demand: Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A2730) Firmware Integrity SW/FW Integrity On Demand Manually RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A2732) Firmware Integrity SW/FW Integrity On Demand Manually Table 25: Pre-Operational Periodic Information Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method AES-GCM Decrypt (A2733) Comparison Test CAST On Demand and Continuous Manually AES-GCM Decrypt (A4422) KAT CAST On Demand Manually AES-GCM Decrypt (A4423) KAT CAST On Demand Manually AES-GCM Encrypt (A2733) Comparison Test CAST On Demand and Continuous Manually AES-GCM Encrypt (A4422) KAT CAST On Demand Manually AES-GCM Encrypt (A4423) KAT CAST On Demand Manually Continuous health Test - Adaptive Proportion Test Fault Detection CAST On Demand Manually Continuous health Test - Repetitive Count Test Fault Detection CAST On Demand Manually Counter DRBG (A4422) KAT CAST On Demand Manually DRBG Health Tests Generate/Instantiate/Reseed CAST On Demand Manually ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A2732) PCT PCT On Demand Manually ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A4422) PCT PCT On Demand Manually ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A2732) KAT CAST On Demand Manually KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A4422) KAT CAST On Demand Manually KDA HKDF SP800- 56Cr2 (A4422) KAT CAST On Demand Manually FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 41 of 47 Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A2730) KAT CAST On Demand Manually RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A2732) KAT CAST On Demand Manually SHA2-384 (A4414) Comparison Test CAST On Demand and Continuous Manually SHA2-384 (A4422) KAT CAST On Demand Manually SHA2-384 (A4423) KAT CAST On Demand Manually Start-up health Test - Adaptive Proportion Test Fault Detection CAST On Demand Manually Start-up health Test - Repetitive Count test Fault Detection CAST On Demand Manually Table 26: Conditional Periodic Information 10.4 Error States The table below describes the error states of the module. Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator Critical Error The module will no longer perform cryptographic services or output data over data output interfaces. The module fails any self-test. The operator fails to authenticate to the module. The module must be re-initialized by reboot/power-cycle of the host platform. If the module continues to experience self- test failures, contact Nvidia Corporation for assistance. Bits set in a status register. Error logs are viewable after power cycling the module. Table 27: Error States 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests The operator may initiate self-tests on demand by rebooting or power-cycling the module. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 42 of 47 11. Life-Cycle Assurance The sections below describe how to ensure the module is operating in its validated configuration, including the following: • Procedures for secure installation, initialization, startup, and operation of the module • Maintenance requirements • Administrator and non-Administrator guidance The sections below describe how to ensure the module is operating in its validated configuration. Operating the module without following the guidance herein (including the use of undocumented services) will result in non-compliant behavior and is outside the scope of this Security Policy) 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures 11.1.1 Secure Installation The module is delivered to the operator pre-installed on a compatible circuit board. The Crypto Officer shall inspect the module to ensure that the IC package has not been compromised or tampered with. If the module has been compromised or tampered, the Crypto Officer shall not install the module and should contact Nvidia Custom Support for assistance. No further installation action is required by the operator. 11.1.2 Configuration There are no specific configuration steps the operator needs to perform. 11.1.3 Initialization This module is designed to support vendor applications, and these applications are the sole consumers of the cryptographic services provided by the module. No end-user action is required to initialize the module for operation; the calling application performs any actions required to initialize the module before the end user can use the module. 11.2 Administrator Guidance There are no specific management activities required of the CO role to ensure that the module runs securely. However, if any irregular activity is noticed or the module is consistently reporting errors, then Nvidia Customer Support should be contacted. The following list provides additional guidance for the CO: FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 43 of 47 • The CO can initiate the pre-operational self-tests (as well as the conditional and critical functions self-tests that are performed pre-operationally) on demand for periodic testing of the module by rebooting-power- cycling the host platform. • To determine the module’s operational status, the Crypto Officer can invoke the module’s Show Status service. • To zeroize the module’s SSPs, the Crypto Officer can invoke the module’s Zeroize service. • To review the module’s versioning information, the Crypto Officer can invoke the module’s Show Versioning Information service. • The module firmware supports a debug mode that is disabled by default. Enabling the debug mode results in a non-compliant state. 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance If any irregular activity is noticed or the module is consistently reporting errors, then Nvidia Customer Support should be contacted. The following list provides additional policies for the User role: • Maintenance, including protection and zeroization, of any keys and CSPs that exist outside the module’s cryptographic boundary are the responsibility of the end-user. For the zeroization of keys in volatile memory, module operators can reboot/power-cycle the host device. • In the event that power to the module is lost and subsequently restored, a new key for use with the AES- GCM encryption/decryption shall be established by the User by invoking the “Secure Session Establishment” and “Data Transfer” services. 11.4 End of Life All ephemeral or temporary keys can be sanitized via power cycle. The operator must ensure the power-off state has been transitioned to at module end of life, which is a maximum of 10 years. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 44 of 47 12. Mitigation of Other Attacks The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-3 Level 2 requirements for this validation. Therefore, per ISO/IEC 19790:2012 section 7.12, requirements for this section are not applicable. FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 45 of 47 Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations Table 28 provides definitions for the acronyms and abbreviations used in this document. Table 28: Acronyms and Abbreviations Acronym Definition AES Advanced Encryption Standard AK Attestation Key API Application Programming Interface BROM Boot Read-only Memory C2C Client to Client CBC Cipher Block Chaining CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program CO Cryptographic Officer CPU Central Processing Unit CSP Critical Security Parameter CTR Counter CVL Component Validation List DEP Default Entry Point DES Data Encryption Standard DH Diffie-Hellman DMA Direct Memory Access DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator ECB Electronic Code Book ECC CDH Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm EMI/EMC Electromagnetic Interference /Electromagnetic Compatibility FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard GCM Galois/Counter Mode GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code GPIO General Purpose Input/Output GPU Graphical Processor Unit GSP GPU Service Processor HMAC (keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.12 January 20, 2026 H100 Tensor Core GPU 570.36 ©2026 Nvidia Corporation This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 46 of 47 Acronym Definition I2C Inter-Integrated Circuit IV Initialization Vector KAS Key Agreement Scheme KAT Known Answer Test KMD Kernel-mode Driver KTS Key Transport Scheme KW Key Wrap KWP Key Wrap with Padding NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology OS Operating System PCIe Peripheral Component Interconnect Express PCT Pairwise Consistency Test PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standard PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme RAM Random Access Memory RM Remote Machine RNG Random Number Generator RPC Remote Procedure Call RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman SEC2/SECHUB Security Processor SHA Secure Hash Algorithm SHS Secure Hash Standard SP Special Publication SPDM Security Protocol and Data Model SPI Serial Peripheral Interface TCM Tightly Coupled Memory UMD User-mode Driver Prepared by: Corsec Security, Inc. 12600 Fair Lakes Circle, Suite 210 Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America Phone: +1 703 267 6050 Email: info@corsec.com http://www.corsec.com