
**IBM System Storage TS1130 Tape Drive –
Machine Type 3592, Model E06**

Security Policy

Document Version 7 Revision 3

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1 Document History

Date	Author	Change
02/25/2009	Christine Knibloe	V0.0 Initial Creation
10/05/2009	Said Ahmad	V1.0 Updated Figure 1 and Table 3 removing references to misc. port
10/20/2009	Said Ahmad	V2.0 Updated cryptographic boundary from the canister to drive brick
10/21/2009	Said Ahmad	V3.0 Updated Figure 1 with duplicate Ethernet port
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6/8/2010	Said Ahmad	V7.1 Updated per CMVP comments
7/16/2010	Said Ahmad	V7.2 Updated per CMVP Comments

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2 Introduction

This non-proprietary security policy describes the IBM System Storage TS1130 Tape Drive - Machine Type 3592, Model E06 cryptographic module and the approved mode of operation for FIPS 140-2, meeting the security level 1 requirements for each section of the requirements. This policy was prepared as part of FIPS 140-2 validation of the TS1130. The IBM System Storage TS1130 Tape Drive - Machine Type 3592, Model E06 is referred to in this document as the “TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive,” the “TS1130,” and the encrypting tapedrive.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2—*Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST web site at:

<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/>

The security policy document is organized in the following sections:

- Introduction
- References
- Document Organization

TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive Cryptographic Module Description

- Cryptographic Module Overview
- Secure Configuration
- Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
- Roles and Services
- Physical Security
- Cryptographic Key Management
- Self-Tests
- Design Assurance
- Mitigation of Other Attacks

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2.1 References

This document describes only the cryptographic operations and capabilities of the TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive. More information is available on the general function of the TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive at the IBM web site:

<http://www.ibm.com/storage/tape/>

The tape drive meets the T10 SCSI-3 Stream Commands (SSC) standard for the behavior of sequential access devices. In addition, the tape drive primary host interfaces are physical fibre channel ports. The physical and protocol behavior of these ports conforms to Fibre Channel Protocol (FCP) specification. These specifications are available at the INCITS T10 standards web site:

<http://www.T10.org/>

A Redbook describing tape encryption and user configuration of the drive in various environments can be found at:

<http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/abstracts/sg247320.html?Open>

The TS1130 drive format on the tape media is designed to conform to the IEEE P1619.1 committee draft proposal for recommendations for protecting data at rest on tape media. Details on P1619.1 may be found at:

<http://ieee-p1619.wetpaint.com/>

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3 TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive Cryptographic Module Description

3.1 Overview

The TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive is a set of hardware, firmware, and interfaces allowing the optional storage and retrieval of encrypted data to magnetic tape cartridges. The TS1130 tape drive is FIPS validated as a multi-chip, embedded cryptographic module (Hardware Version: 45E8855 EC Level L31095 and Firmware Version: 46X1651 EC Level L31096). In customer operation the “brick” unit is embedded in a canister package for operation in a library. Some components of the TS1130 tape drive, such as mechanical components used for tape loading/unloading and actuating the tape cartridge, labels, cables, connectors, terminals and sensor components, do not have an effect on the security of the cryptographic module.

A block diagram of the TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive is shown below:

Cryptographic Module Block Diagram




Figure 1: TS1130 Block Diagram

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The TS1130 Encrypting Tape Drive has two major cryptographic functions:

- **Data Block Cipher Facility:** The tape drive provides functions which provide the ability for standard tape data blocks as received during SCSI-type write commands to be encrypted before being recorded to media using AES-GCM block cipher using a provided key, and decrypted during reads from tape using a provided key.
 - Note the AES-GCM block cipher operation is performed after compression of the host data therefore not impacting capacity and data rate performance of the compression function
 - The TS1130 drive automatically performs a complete and separate decryption and decompression check of host data blocks after the compression/encryption process to validate there were no errors in the encoding process
- **Secure Key Interface Facility:** The tape drive provides functions which allow authentication of the tape drive to an external IBM key manager, such as the IBM Encryption Key Manager (EKM) or the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM), and allow transfer of protected key material between the key manager and the tape drive.

3.2 Secure Configuration

This section describes the approved mode of operation for the TS1130 drive to maintain the FIPS 140-2 validation.

There are two configurations for the TS1130 in the approved mode of operation. They are:

- System-Managed Encryption (SME)
- Library-Managed Encryption (LME)

In order to be in an approved mode of operation, the values of the fields Key Path (manager Type) (from VPD), In-band Key Path (Manager Type) Override, Indirect Key Mode Default, Key Scope, and Encryption Method must be set according to the table below. More details can be found in the TS1130 SCSI Reference.

Table 1: Settings for Approved Configurations

Required Fields	System-Managed Encryption (SME)	Library-Managed Encryption (LME)
Key Path (Manager Type) (from VPD) Mode Page X'25', byte 21, bits 7-5	X'1'	X'6'
In-band Key Path (Manager Type) Override Mode Page X'25', byte 21, bits 4-2	X'0' or X'1'	X'0'
Indirect Key Mode Default Mode Page X'25', byte 22, bit 4	B'0'	B'0'
Key Scope Mode Page X'25', byte 23, bits 2-0	X'0' or X'1'	X'0' or X'1'
Encryption Method Mode Page X'25', byte 27	X'10' or X'1F'	X'60'

A user can determine if the TS1130 is in the approved mode of operation by issuing a SCSI Mode Sense command to Mode Page X'25' and evaluating the values returned.

Certain commands are prohibited while in the approved mode of operation. The commands vary based on which configuration is used in the approved mode. In the LME configuration, all Mode Select commands to subpages of Mode Page X'25' are prohibited. In the SME configuration, Mode Select commands to the following subpages of Mode Page X'25' are prohibited.

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Table 2: Mode Select Eligibility of Mode Page X'25' Subpages

Mode Page X'25' Subpages	System-Managed Encryption (SME)	Library-Managed Encryption (LME)
X'C0' – Control/Status	Allowed	Prohibited
X'D0' – Generate dAK/dAK' Pair	Prohibited	Prohibited
X'D1' – Query dAK	Prohibited	Prohibited
X'D2' – Update dAK/dAK' Pair	Prohibited	Prohibited
X'D3' – Remove dAK/dAK' Pair	Prohibited	Prohibited
X'D5' – Drive Challenge/Response	Allowed	Prohibited
X'D6' – Query Drive Certificate	Allowed	Prohibited
X'D7' – Query/Setup HMAC	Prohibited	Prohibited
X'D8' – Install eAK	Prohibited	Prohibited
X'D9' – Query eAK	Prohibited	Prohibited
X'DA' – Update eAK	Prohibited	Prohibited
X'DB' – Remove eAK	Prohibited	Prohibited
X'DF' – Query dSK	Allowed	Prohibited
X'E0' – Setup SEDK/EEDK(s)	Allowed	Prohibited
X'E1' – Alter EEDK(s)	Allowed	Prohibited
X'E2' – Query EEDKs (Active)	Allowed	Prohibited
X'E3' – Query EEDKs (Needed)	Allowed	Prohibited
X'E4' – Query EEDKs (Entire)	Allowed	Prohibited
X'E5' – Query EEDKs (Pending)	Allowed	Prohibited
X'EE' – Request EEDKs (Translate)	Allowed	Prohibited
X'EF' – Request EEDKs (Generate)	Allowed	Prohibited
X'FE' – Drive Error Notify	Allowed	Prohibited

Loading a FIPS 140-2 validated drive microcode level and configuring the drive for SME or LME operation initializes the TS1130 into the approved mode of operation. The FIPS 140-2 validated drive microcode level should be loaded twice to ensure the firmware occupies both the main and reserved firmware locations.

The TS1130 supports multi-initiator environments, but only one initiator may access cryptographic functions at any given time. Therefore the TS1130 does not support multiple concurrent operators.

The TS1130 implements a non-modifiable operational environment which consists of a firmware image stored in FLASH. The firmware image is copied to, and executed from, RAM. The firmware image can only be updated via FIPS-approved methods that verify the validity of the image.

The TS1130 drive operates as a stand-alone tape drive and has no direct dependency on any specific operating system or platform for FIPS approved operating mode, but does have requirements for:

- Key Manager/Key Store attachment
- Drive Configuration

The following criteria apply to the usage environment:

- Key Manager and Key Store Attachment
 - In both SME and LME modes of operation, an IBM key manager, such as the Encryption Key Manager (EKM) or the Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager (TKLM), and a supported key store must be used in a manner which supports secure import and export of keys with the TS1130 drive :
 - Keys must be securely passed into the TS1130 drive. The key manager must support encryption of the Data Key to form an Session Encrypted Data Key (SEDK) for transfer to the TS1130 drive using the TS1130 drive public Session Key and a 2048-bit RSA encryption method.

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- The key manager/key store must be able to use the EEDK it supplies the drive to determine the Data Key.
- Drive Configuration requirements
 - The TS1130 drive must be configured in SME or LME encryption mode.
 - The TS1130 drive must have the FIPS 140-2 validated drive firmware level loaded and operational.
 - Drive must be configured in the approved mode of operation.
 - In LME mode, the TS1130 drive must be operated in an automation device which operates to the LDI or ADI interface specifications provided.

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3.3 Ports and Interfaces

The cryptographic boundary of the TS1130 drive cryptographic module is the drive brick. Tape data blocks to be encrypted (write operations) or decrypted data blocks to be returned to the host (read operation) are transferred on the host interface ports using SCSI commands, while protected key material may be received on the host interface ports or the library port.

The physical ports are separated into FIPS-140-2 logical ports as described below.

Table 3: Ports and Interfaces of the TS1130

TS1130 Drive Physical Ports	FIPS-140-2 Logical Interface	Crypto Services	Interface Functionality
Fibre Channel Port 0	Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inputs data ▪ <u>Crypto</u>: Inputs protected keys from the key manager in SME mode. ▪ Outputs data ▪ Outputs encrypted key components ▪ Inputs SSC-3 SCSI protocol commands ▪ Outputs SSC-3 SCSI protocol status
Fibre Channel Port 1			
RS-422 Port	Data Input Data Output Control Input Status Output	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Crypto</u>: Inputs protected keys from the key manager in LME mode. ▪ Outputs data ▪ Outputs encrypted key components ▪ Inputs LDI and LMI protocol commands. ▪ Outputs LDI and LMI protocol status.
RS-232 Port	Disabled	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Disabled in the FIPS validated firmware
Ethernet Port	Control Input Status Output Data Input	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inputs controls and image for firmware load ▪ Outputs status
ACF Interface	Control Input Status Output	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inputs controls from automatic cartridge facility ▪ Outputs status
I2C Interface	Data Input Data Output	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inputs VPD data ▪ Outputs VPD data
Service Panel Interface	Control Input Status Output	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inputs controls from service panel ▪ <u>Crypto</u>: Inputs controls for key zeroization ▪ <u>Crypto</u>: Inputs controls for VPD configuration ▪ Outputs status ▪ <u>Crypto</u>: Outputs indicator for the encrypting state
Front Panel Interface - 8 Character Display - Unload Button - Reset Button	Control Input Status Output	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inputs unload button selection ▪ Inputs reset button selection ▪ Outputs status on 8 character display ▪ <u>Crypto</u>: Outputs indicator for the encrypting state
Input Power Port	Power	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inputs power to the TS1130 drive
Write Protect Switch	Control Input	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inputs write protect state of the cartridge
Cartridge Memory RFID Port	Data Input Data Output	Yes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inputs parameters. ▪ <u>Crypto</u>: Inputs external key structures ▪ Outputs parameters. ▪ <u>Crypto</u>: Outputs external key structures
Read/Write Head	Data Input Data Output Control Input	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inputs data from tape cartridges (decrypted reads) ▪ Outputs data to tape cartridges (encrypted writes) ▪ Inputs command to load firmware from special FMR cartridges

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3.4 Roles and Services

The TS1130 drive supports both a Crypto Officer role and a User role, and uses basic cryptographic functions to provide higher level services. For example, the TS1130 drive uses the cryptographic functions as part of its data reading and writing operations in order to perform the encryption/decryption of data stored on a tape.

The Crypto Officer role is implicitly assumed when an operator performs key zeroization. The User role is implicitly assumed for all other services. Both operators have access to the Power-up Self-Tests service.

The two main services the TS1130 drive provides are:

- Encryption or decryption of tape data blocks using the Data Block Cipher Facility.
- Establishment and use of a secure key channel for key material passing by the Secure Key Interface Facility.

It is important to note that the Secure Key Interface Facility may be an automatically invoked service when a user issues Write or Read commands with encryption enabled that require key acquisition by the TS1130 drive. Under these circumstances the TS1130 drive automatically establishes a secure communication channel with a key manager and performs secure key transfer before the underlying write or read command may be processed.

3.4.1 User Guidance

The services table describes what services are available to the User and Crypto Officer roles.

- There is no authentication required for accessing the User Role
- There is no authentication required for accessing the Crypto Officer Role

Single Operator requirements:

- The TS1130 drive enforces a requirement that only one host interface initiator may have access to cryptographic services at any given time.

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3.4.2 Provided Services

Available services are also documented in the specified references. All of the services summarized here are allowed in the FIPS mode of operation:

Table 4: Provided Services

Service	Interface(s)	Description	Inputs	Outputs	Role
General SCSI commands	- Host	As documented in the TS1130 SCSI Reference	Formatted Operational Codes and Messages	Formatted Operational Codes and Messages	User
General Library Interface commands	- Library	As documented in the Drive Library LDI and LMI Interface Specifications	Formatted Operational Codes and Messages	Formatted Operational Codes and Messages	User
Service Panel Configuration	- Service Panel	Set selected aspects of drive configuration manually, per the 3592 E06 Maintenance Information Manual	Button selections	Service Panel	User
Service Panel Diagnostics	- Service Panel	Invoke diagnostics manually, per the 3592 E06 Maintenance Information Manual	Button selections	Service Panel, 8 Character Display	User
Service Panel Status Display	- Service Panel	Displays status, per the 3592 E06 Maintenance Information Manual	From TS1130 drive operating system	Service Panel	User
Front Panel Interface Status	- Front Panel Interface (8 Character Display)	Displays status, per the 3592 E06 Maintenance Information Manual	From TS1130 drive operating system	8 Character Display	User
Front Panel Interface Unload	- Front Panel Interface (Unload Button)	Unload via unload button	Button selection	8 Character Display	User
Front Panel Interface Reset	- Front Panel Interface (Reset Button)	Reset via the reset button	Button selection	Reboot occurs	User

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Service	Interface(s)	Description	Inputs	Outputs	Role
Encrypting Write-type Command	- Host	The Secure Key Interface Facility automatically requests a key, provides authentication data, securely transfers and verifies the key material. The Data Block Cipher Facility encrypts the data block with the received Data Key using AES-GCM block cipher for recording to media. A received EEDK is automatically written to media using the Cartridge memory and the RW Head Interface. The decryption-on-the-fly check performs AES-GCM decryption of the encrypted data block and verifies the correctness of the encryption process	- Plaintext data - SEDK - EEDK	- Encrypted data on tape - EEDK on tape	User
Decrypting Read-type Command	- Host	The Secure Key Interface Facility automatically requests a key, provides authentication data and EEDK information if available, securely transfers and verifies the key material. The received Data Key is used by the Data Block Cipher Facility to decrypt the data block with using AES-GCM decryption and returning plaintext data blocks to the host; Optionally in Raw mode the encrypted data block may be returned to the host in encrypted form (not supported in approved configuration)	SEDK	- Plaintext data to host	User
Set Encryption Control Parameters (including Bypass Mode)	- Host - Library	Performed via Mode Select to Mode Page x'25' and Encryption Subpage X'C0'	Requested Mode Page and Subpage	None	User
Query Encryption Control Parameters (including Bypass Mode) "Show Status"	- Host - Library	Performed via Mode Sense to Mode Page x'25' and Encryption Subpage X'C0'	Requested Mode Page and Subpage	Mode Data	User

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Service	Interface(s)	Description	Inputs	Outputs	Role
Drive Challenge/Response	- Host - Library	Allows programming challenge data and reading an optionally encrypted, signed response; not used in default configuration. Performed via mode select and mode sense to Mode Page x'25' and Encryption Subpage x'D5'; not used in default configuration	Requested Mode Page and Subpage	Mode Data	User
Query Drive Certificate	- Host - Library	Allows reading of the Drive Certificate public key. Performed via mode sense to Mode Page x'25' and Encryption Subpage x'D6'; the provided certificate is signed by the IBM Tape Root CA.	Requested Mode Page and Subpage	Mode Data	User
Query dSK	- Host - Library	Allows reading of the Drive Session (Public) Key Performed via mode sense to Mode Page x'25' and Encryption Subpage X'DF'.	Requested Mode Page and Subpage	Mode Data	User
Setup an SEDK and EEDK structure (a protected key structure)	- Host - Library	This is the means to import an encrypted private key to the TS1130 for use in writing and encrypted tape or in order to read a previously encrypted tape. Performed via mode select to Mode Page x'25' and Encryption Subpage x'E0'. In this service, the module generates a drive session key pair. The module then sends the dSK to the key manager where it is used to create an SEDK. At this time, the key manager also uses its own RSA key to generate the EEDK. Then, the key manager sends both the SEDK and the EEDK back to the module.	Requested Mode Page and Subpage	Mode Data	User

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Service	Interface(s)	Description	Inputs	Outputs	Role
Query EEDK(s) – active, needed, pending , entire (all)	- Host - Library	Allows the reading from the drive of EEDK structures in different categories for the medium currently mounted. Performed by Mode Select commands to Mode Page x25' and various subpages.	Requested Mode Page and Subpage	Mode Data	User
Request EEDK(s) Translate	- Host - Library	This status command is used when the drive has already notified the Key Manager that it has read EEDKs from a mounted, encrypted tape and needs them translated to an SEDK and returned for the drive to read the tape. The key manager issues this command to read EEDK(s) structures which the drive requires to be translated by the Key Manager and subsequently returned to the drive as an SEDK structure to enable reading of the currently active encrypted area of tape. Performed via mode sense to Mode Page x'25' and Encryption Subpage x'EE' .	Requested Mode Page and Subpage	Mode Data	User
Request EEDK(s) Generate	- Host - Library	This status command is used when the drive has already notified the Key Manager that it requires new SEDK and EEDK(s) to process a request to write an encrypted tape. This page provides information about the type of key the drive is requesting. Performed via mode sense to Mode Page x'25' and Encryption Subpage x'EF' .	Requested Mode Page and Subpage	Mode Data	User

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Service	Interface(s)	Description	Inputs	Outputs	Role
Alter EEDK(s)	- Host - Library	This command is used to modify the EEDK structures stored to tape and cartridge memory. The TS1130 will write the modified structures out to the tape and cartridge memory as directed. Performed via mode sense to Mode Page x'25' and Encryption Subpage x'E1'.	Requested Mode Page and Subpage	Mode Data	User
Drive Error Notify and Drive Error Notify Query	- Host - Library	These status responses are the means used by the drive to notify the Key Manager that an action is required, such as a Key generation or Translate, to proceed with an encrypted write or read operation. These status responses are read via Mode Sense commands to Mode Page x'25' subpage 'EF' and 'FF'.	Requested Mode Page and Subpage	Mode Data	User
Power-Up Self-Tests	- Power - Host - Library	Performs integrity and cryptographic algorithm self-tests, firmware image signature verification	None required	Failure status, if applicable	User, Crypto Officer
Configure Drive Vital Product Data (VPD) settings	- Host - Library	Allows controlling of default encryption mode and other operating parameters	From TS1130 drive operating system	Vital Product Data (VPD)	User
Firmware Load	- Host	Allows loading of validated firmware images	Firmware image	None	Crypto Officer
Key Path Check diagnostic	- Host	As documented in the TS1130 SCSI Reference	Diagnostic command specifying the Key Path diagnostic	Diagnostic command status	User
Key Zeroization	- Service Panel	Zeroes all private plaintext keys in the TS1130 drive via the Service Panel	Service panel buttons	Diagnostic command status	Crypto Officer

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3.5 Physical Security

The TS1130 drive “brick” unit is embedded in a factory supplied canister assembly. The brick assembly is the cryptographic boundary of the TS1130. All of the drive’s components are production grade.

Both the drive brick unit and the canister assembly have industrial grade covers. These covers are not removed in the field in the approved configuration. The TS1130 requires no preventative maintenance, and field repair is not performed for the unit. All failing units must be sent intact to the factory for repair.




Figure 2 TS1130 Drive Brick




Figure 3 TS1130 Drive Canister

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3.6 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Management

3.6.1 Cryptographic Algorithms

The TS1130 drive supports the following basic cryptographic functions. These functions are used by the Secure Key Interface Facility or the Data Block Cipher Facility to provide higher level user services.

Table 5: Basic Cryptographic Functions

Algorithm	Type /Usage	Specification	Approved?	Used by	Algorithm Certificate
AES-GCM mode encryption / decryption (256-bit keys)	Symmetric Cipher Encrypts data blocks while performing decrypt-on-the-fly verification Decrypts data blocks	AES: FIPS-197 GCM: SP800-38D	Yes	ASIC	#918, #919 and #1273
RNG	IV generation for AES-GCM, Drive Session Key generation	FIPS 186-2 using SHA-1	Yes	Firmware	#711
SHA-1	Hashing Algorithm Multiple uses	FIPS 180-3	Yes	Firmware	#1173
SHA-256	Hashing Algorithm Digest verifies key manager messages, digest appended on messages to key manager	FIPS 180-3	Yes	Firmware	#1173
PKCS #1 :RSA Sign/Verify	Digital signature generation and verification to sign the session key and to verify firmware image signature on firmware load	FIPS 186-2 and PKCS#1	Yes	Firmware	#611
PKCS #1 :RSA Key Generation (1024 and 2048-bit keys)	Key Generation Session key generation	-	No, but allowed in FIPS mode ¹	Firmware	N/A
PKCS #1 RSA Key Transport (1024 and 2048-bit keys)	Unwrapping of transported key material SEDK	-	No, but allowed in FIPS mode	Firmware	N/A
TRNG (Custom)	Seeding RNG	-	No ²	ASIC	N/A

¹ Allowed for generation of keys used by the RSA Key Transport mechanism

² Allowed in FIPS mode for seeding approved RNG

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3.6.2 Security Parameters

The following table provides a summary of both critical security parameters (CSPs) and non-critical security parameters used by the TS1130 drive.

Table 6: Security Parameters

Security Parameter	CSP	Key Type	Input into Module	Output from Module	Generation Method	Storage Location	Storage Form	Zeroized
Drive Certificate Public Key (dCert)	No	RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1	Yes - at time of manufacture	Yes	N/A	Drive Vital Product Data (VPD)	Non-volatile Plaintext	N/A
Drive Certificate Private Key (dCert')	Yes	RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1	Yes - at time of manufacture	No	N/A	Drive VPD	Non-volatile X.509 certificate signed with the IBM Tape root CA	Yes
Drive Session Public Key (dSK)	No	RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1	No – Generated by module	Yes	Non-approved, allowed in FIPS mode	Drive RAM	Ephemeral Plaintext	N/A
Drive Session Private Key (dSK')	Yes	RSA 2048-bit PKCS#1	No – Generated by module	No	Non-approved, allowed in FIPS mode	Drive RAM	Ephemeral Plaintext	Yes
Session Encrypted Data Key (SEDK)	No	RSA-2048 encrypted with the dSK	Yes	No	N/A	Drive RAM	Ephemeral Encrypted	Yes
Data Key (DK)	Yes	AES 256-bit symmetric key	Yes – (Received in encrypted form, encapsulated in the SEDK)	No	N/A	Before Use: Drive RAM When in use: Stored In ASIC; (unreadable register)	Ephemeral Plaintext Ephemeral Encrypted form as SEDK	Yes
186-2 RNG Seed Key	Yes	Seed	No – Generated by module	No	TRNG	Drive RAM	Ephemeral Plaintext	Yes
186-2 RNG Seed	Yes	Seed (20 bytes)	No – Generated by module	No	TRNG	Drive RAM	Ephemeral Plaintext	Yes

Additional notes on key management:

- Secret and private keys are never output from the TS1130 drive in plaintext form.
- Secret keys may only be imported to the TS1130 drive in encrypted form.
- Zeroization behavior outlined in Table 7

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Table 7: CSP Access Table

	Drive Certificate Public Key (dCert)	Drive Certificate Private Key (dCert')	Drive Session Public Key (dSK)	Drive Session Private Key (dSK')	Session Encrypted Data Key (SEDK)	Data Key (DK)	186-2 RNG Seed Key	186-2 RNG Seed
General SCSI commands								
General Library Interface commands	R		R		W			
Service Panel Configuration , Diagnostic and Status services					X	X	X	X
Service Panel Configuration								
Service Panel Diagnostics					X	X	X	X
Service Panel Status Display Front Panel Interface Status								
Front Panel Interface Unload			Z	Z	Z	Z		
Front Panel Interface Reset			Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
Encrypting Write-type Command						X		
Decrypting Read-type Command						X		
Set Encryption Control Parameters (including Bypass Mode)								
Query Encryption Control Parameters (including Bypass Mode)								
“Show Status”								
Drive Challenge/Response	X	X	X	X				
Query Drive Certificate	R							
Query dSK		X	R					
Setup an SEDK and EEDK structure (a protected key structure)				X	W	W		
Query EEDK(s) – active, needed, pending , entire (all)								
Request EEDK(s) Translate					R			
Request EEDK(s) Generate					W			
Alter EEDK(s)				X	RW			
Drive Error Notify and Drive Error Notify Query								
Power-Up Self-Tests					X	X	X	X
Configure Drive Vital Product Data (VPD) settings	W	W						
Firmware Load Test								
Key Path Check diagnostic	X	X	RX	X	R			
Key Zeroization	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z		

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3.6.3 Self-Test

The TS1130 drive performs both Power On Self Tests and Conditional Self tests as follows. The operator shall power cycle the device to invoke the Power On Self tests.

Table 8: Self-Tests

Function Tested	Self-Test Type	Implementation	Failure Behavior
AES-GCM (256-bit keys)	Power-Up	KAT performed for Encrypt and Decrypt (256-bit)	FSC ³ D12D posted
RNG	Power-Up	KAT performed	FSC D12D posted
SHA-1	Power-Up	KAT performed	FSC D12D posted
SHA-256	Power-Up	KAT performed	FSC D12D posted
RSA PKCS #1 Sign/Verify	Power-Up	KAT performed	FSC D12D posted
Firmware Integrity Check	Power-Up	RSA PKCS #1 digital signature verification of application firmware; CRC check of SH vital product data (VPD); CRC check of FPGA image.	Drive reboot
RNG	Conditional: When a random number is generated	Ensure the newly generated random number does not match the previously generated random number. Also ensure the first number generated after start up is unused and stored for comparison	FSC D133 posted
TRNG (Custom)	Conditional: When a random number is generated	Ensure the newly generated random number does not match the previously generated random number. Also ensure the first number generated after start up is unused and stored for comparison	FSC D133 posted
Firmware Load Check	Conditional: When new firmware is loaded	RSA PKCS #1 signature verification of new firmware image before new image may be loaded	Code load is rejected
Exclusive Bypass Test	Conditional: When switching between encryption and bypass modes	Ensure correct data output after switching modes Check to ensure the key is properly loaded (Note: The same implementation serves as the Alternating Bypass Test.)	FSC D189 posted
Alternating Bypass Test	Conditional: When switching between encryption and bypass modes	Ensure correct data output after switching modes Check to ensure the key is properly loaded (Note: The same implementation serves as the Exclusive Bypass Test.)	FSC D188 posted
Key Path test	Conditional: When the Send Diagnostic command specifying this diagnostic number is received from the host fibre or library port; the drive must be unloaded and idle or the command is rejected	The drive will initiate a key request and key transfer operation with an attached Key Manager; random protected key material is imported into the device and checked for validity; status is reported back to the Key Manager and the invoking Host	FSC D132 posted

³ Fault Symptom Code

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3.6.4 Bypass States

The TS1130 supports the following bypass states:

Table 9: Bypass States

Bypass State	To enter the Bypass State	To verify the Bypass State
Static Bypass Mode 1: Encryption disabled	Issue a Mode Select command to mode page X'25' and set the "Encryption Disabled" bit	Issue a Mode Sense command to verify the mode is accurately reflected on mode page X'25'
Static Bypass Mode 2: Zero key usage for all records	Issue a Mode Select command to mode page X'25' and set bit 0 of Encryption Control 3 to 1	
Alternating Bypass Mode 1: Zero Key usage all labels	Issue a Mode Select command to mode page X'25' and set bit 2 of Encryption Control 3 to 1	
Alternating Bypass Mode 2: Zero Key usage on Volume Labels	Issue a Mode Select command to mode page X'25' and set bit 1 of Encryption Control 3 to 1	

Bypass entry, exit, and status features are provided to meet approved methods for use of bypass states.

3.7 Design Assurance

TS1130 drive release parts are maintained under the IBM Engineering Control (EC) system. All components are assigned a part number and EC level and may not be changed without re-release of a new part number or EC level.

The following table shows the validated configuration for each host interfaces of the TS1130 encrypting tape drive:

Table 10: Validated Configuration

Hardware EC Level	45E8855 EC Level L31095
Firmware EC Level	46X1651 EC Level L31096

3.8 Mitigation of other attacks

The TS1130 drive does not claim to mitigate other attacks.

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