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TITLE: LunaRA Security Policies
ABSTRACT: This document describes the security policies
implemented by the LunaRA PC Card (LunaRA
token) and how the design of its firmware
enforces these policies.
DOCUMENT NUMBER: CR-0729
ORIGINATOR: Bob Woodard
DEPARTMENT: Systems Engineering
LOCATION OF ISSUE: Ottawa
DATE ORIGINATED: February 12, 2001
CHANGE LEVEL: 7
CHANGE DATE: September 7, 2001
SECURITY LEVEL: None
SUPERSESSION DATA: CR-0729, 6
Document Approvals
Name Position Date Signature
Robert Woodard Manager, PKI Solutions Software
Development
Mike Haines Director, Software Development
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© Copyright 1997-2001 Chrysalis-ITS, Inc.
All rights reserved. Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) are granted the right to copy and distribute this document provided such reproduction is in its
entirety.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................................................4
1.1. PURPOSE..................................................................................................................................................................4
1.2. SCOPE ......................................................................................................................................................................4
1.3. INTENDED AUDIENCE...............................................................................................................................................4
1.4. HISTORY OF REVISION .............................................................................................................................................4
1.5. REFERENCES............................................................................................................................................................4
1.6. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS / ABBREVIATIONS ..........................................................................................................4
2. LUNARA OVERVIEW................................................................................................................................................5
3. SECURITY POLICY TOOLS.....................................................................................................................................5
3.1. FIXED POLICY VECTOR (FPV) .................................................................................................................................5
3.1.1. Number of SO Login Fails Allowed ................................................................................................................6
3.1.2. Secret Key Policy ............................................................................................................................................6
3.1.3. Private Key Policy ..........................................................................................................................................6
3.1.4. Token Security Policy......................................................................................................................................7
3.2. TOKEN POLICY VECTOR (TPV) ...............................................................................................................................8
3.2.1. Number of User Login Fails Allowed .............................................................................................................8
3.2.2. Minimum/Maximum PIN Length.....................................................................................................................8
3.2.3. Local Policies..................................................................................................................................................8
4. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (I&A)............................................................................................9
5. DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC)...................................................................................................10
6. OBJECT REUSE ........................................................................................................................................................10
APPENDIX A. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS SUPPORT...........................................................................11
APPENDIX B. POLICY VECTOR SETTINGS.........................................................................................................13
APPENDIX C. SESSION AND LOGIN STATES REQUIRED FOR LUNA COMMANDS.................................14
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Purpose
This document describes the security policies implemented by the LunaRA PC Card (LunaRA token) and how
the design of its firmware and hardware enforces these policies.
1.2. Scope
This document addresses the LunaRA token’s security policies.
1.3. Intended Audience
The intended audience for this document is the LunaRA Engineering and Product Management Team, external
agencies for validation or endorsement of the LunaRA token; selected industry partners; and potential users of
LunaRA tokens who want to understand the security policies of the product for FIPS-compliant operations.
The reader of this document should be familiar with the PKCS#11 standard defined by RSA Laboratories.
1.4. History of Revision
Revision Date Description
Draft February 12, 2001 Creation of document.
1 March 6, 2001 Formatting changes.
2 March 16, 2001 Incorporation of review comments from T. Casar.
3 March 27, 2001 Change of Security Level to “None” and new proprietary
statement.
4 April 11, 2001 Incorporation of B. Woodard’s comments for FPV_USE_CAV.
5 July 17, 2001 Corrected FPV/TPV force RSA blinding information (resolves
Razor Issue #484).
6 July 20, 2001 Revision required for CorpDocs system.
7 September 7, 2001 Updated Appendix A
1.5. References
Document
Number
Revision
Author Title
PKCS#11 v2.10 RSA Laboratories PKCS#11: Cryptographic Token Interface
Standard, December 1999
1.6. Glossary of Acronyms / Abbreviations
Shortforms Longform Explanation
CAV Cryptographic Algorithm Vector
CCM Custom Command Module
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
DAC Discretionary Access Control
FPV Fixed Policy Vector
I&A Identification and Authentication
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
PIN Personal Identification Number
SO Security Officer
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Shortforms Longform Explanation
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
TPV Token Policy Vector
UAV User Authorization Vector
2. LUNARA OVERVIEW
The LunaRA token securely stores data and keying material inside its cryptographic boundary. The LunaRA
token also performs cryptographic operations on data provided by external applications using the keying material
stored in the token. These abilities are defined as key management, object management, and cryptographic
capability.
Before a LunaRA token can be used to perform any cryptographic or key/object management functions, the
token must receive a valid operator identity (also known as a user number), as well as a valid authentication
code (a PIN). These two inputs are processed by the token during a "LOGIN" command. When this command
has completed successfully, the token allows the user to perform operations based on the policy settings defined
for that token.
The token has the ability to distinguish two categories of users: super-users and normal users. The super-user
category is referred to as the Security Officer (SO) and the normal user category is referred to as the user. A
token can have only one SO. The SO is allowed to perform all of the cryptographic, key and object management
functions provided by the token, as well as a set of functions called the SO functions. These SO functions are
available only to the SO, and allow the SO to manage the token users and security policies.
For a LunaRA token, there is no limit on the number of users that can be created by the SO. All users are
subjected to the same policy settings as those established by the SO. However, each user has his or her own
authentication code (or PIN) initially assigned under control of the SO, which is used internally to protect the data
the user owns.
The LunaRA token meets and is validated against FIPS 140-1 level 2 security requirements. For example, one
aspect of FIPS 140-1 level 2 physical security is through tamper evidence provided by the case: an attacker
cannot get into the LunaRA token and access plain-text keys in an operational state without leaving evidence of
tampering. Contact Chrysalis-ITS for more details of the physical security used to protect the LunaRA token.
The LunaRA is a special Luna token variant that was developed for use in a Registration Authorization
environment. As such, the capability of being able to extract RSA private keys generated on the token is a
requirement of LunaRA. In addition, non-private keys may be cloned between LunaRAs within the same cloning
domain. In most other respects, the LunaRA resembles the Luna2 token.
3. SECURITY POLICY TOOLS
The LunaRA token provides two levels of security policy enforcement. A vector that is loaded on the token
during manufacturing dictates the first level of security. This vector, called the Fixed Policy Vector (FPV),
establishes security policies that cannot be modified after manufacturing.
The second level of security is provided by a policy vector that can be modified by the token's SO. This vector is
called the Token Policy Vector (TPV), and consists of a series of policy settings that can be established and
modified by the token’s legitimate SO.
3.1. Fixed Policy Vector (FPV)
The FPV contains the settings necessary to enforce policy rules that apply across a wide range of token users.
For example, one bit in the FPV defines whether the token can be exported. In an exportable version, the token
provides a reduced set of algorithms and imposes limitations on maximum key lengths as required by export
regulations.
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The FPV cannot be modified by the SO or any of the users. The FPV is put on the token during manufacturing
and remains in place until the token is destroyed or the firmware is erased. The integrity of the FPV is
maintained through the same mechanism used to protect the executable code from being modified – a 32-bit
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) computation.
The format of the FPV is a 32-bit vector that is divided into four fields of eight bits. These fields, and their
contents, are defined in the following sections.
3.1.1. Number of SO Login Fails Allowed
This field defines the number of consecutive failed login attempts that can be made by the SO before the token
erases the flash memory to prevent illegal access to its contents.
This security measure prevents an impostor from cracking the SO’s password on the token.
3.1.2. Secret Key Policy
The following table defines the flags that identify the security policies that are followed for secret key objects.
Name Description
FPV_SECRET_KEY_SENSITIVE This bit determines whether a secret key object must always be made
sensitive or if it can be determined by the high-level application using the
token. When this bit is set, all secret keys stored on the token are sensitive.
The keys are encrypted when in the flash memory and they can be
extracted only outside of the token in encrypted form using the
GESC_WRAP_KEY function.
This bit must be set for FIPS-compliant tokens using automated key
establishment.
FPV_SECRET_KEY_NO_CREATE This bit determines whether a secret key object can be created by an
external application using the token, instead of being generated by the
token. When this bit is set, an external application cannot create a secret
key on the token; it is not possible to enter a secret key in plain text form on
the token.
This bit must be set for FIPS-compliant tokens using automated key
establishment.
3.1.3. Private Key Policy
The following table defines the flags that identify the security policies that are followed for private key objects.
Name Description
FPV_PRIVATE_KEY_SENSITIVE This bit determines whether a private key object must always be made
sensitive or if it can be determined by the high-level application using the
token through PKCS#11. When this bit is set, all private keys stored on the
token must be flagged as sensitive whether or not the high-level application
requested this flag when the keys were created. When this bit is set, all
private keys are encrypted while stored in flash memory.
Note: After a private key is sensitive, it cannot be extracted from the token
even in encrypted format.
This bit must be set for FIPS-compliant tokens using automated key
establishment.
FPV_PRIVATE_KEY_NO_CREATE This bit determines whether a private key object can be created by an
external application using the GESC_CREATE_OBJ call, instead of being
generated by the token. When this bit is set, an external application cannot
create a private key on the token; it is not possible to enter a private key in
plain text form on the token.
This bit must be set for FIPS-compliant tokens using automated key
establishment.
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3.1.4. Token Security Policy
The following table defines the flags that identify the security policies that dictate the behavior of the token in
general.
Name Description
FPV_XPPLUS_TOKEN This bit indicates that the token is built upon XPplus-style hardware.
XPplus hardware has: asymmetric math accelerators; extra RAM; non-
volatile RAM; tamper detection mechanisms which trigger interrupts and
wipe non-volatile RAM. This bit is not set on the LunaRA token.
FPV_XP_TOKEN This bit determines if the token is used in an XP style functionality, thus
allowing the KCV to be set indirectly (allows XP tokens to get a CA3
's
domain vector). This allows the token to be initialized as either a FIPS
Level 2 or 3 device at InitToken time; all keys must be volatile. This bit is
not set on the LunaRA token.
FPV_RA_TOKEN This bit determines if the token has the RA functionality. In addition to the
cloning restriction of private key objects (see FPV_ENABLE_CLONING),
special component key wrapping is associated with the
LUNA_MECH_3DES_ECB mechanism. This bit is set on the LunaRA.
FPV_DOMESTIC_FLAG This bit determines whether the token can be exported. When this bit is set,
the token is configured for the domestic market and cannot be exported.
This bit is verified internally every time a cryptographic function implying an
encryption or a decryption is performed. If the bit is set, no restrictions exist
on key sizes. If the bit is not set, a limitation of 56 bits is applied to any
symmetric keys used for encryption or decryption, and a 512-bit limitation
on asymmetric keys used for wrapping and unwrapping operations.
Signature and verification operations are not restricted in terms of key
lengths. This bit is set on the LunaRA token.
FPV_ENABLE_CLONING This bit determines whether sensitive objects on the token can be "cloned"
to another similarly enabled token. When this bit is set, cloning is enabled.
For a LunaRA token, this bit is set, however this bit is tested in conjunction
with the FPV_RA_TOKEN bit to restrict the cloning of objects with the
private key attribute set (i.e., CKO_PRIVATE_KEY).
FPV_USE_CAV This bit is used by the firmware to determine if the CAV should be checked
to validate the desired algorithm. Normally, this bit is zero, which assumes
all algorithms are valid.
FPV_WRAPPING_TOKEN This bit determines whether RSA private keys can be wrapped. When this
bit is set, an RSA private key can be wrapped. Although not normally set
on most Luna token variants, this bit is set on the LunaRA.
FPV_USE_M_OF_N This bit defines whether the token can perform M of N activation. When this
bit is set, the token can be configured to perform M of N activation. M of N
activation is not a feature ordinarily enabled on a LunaRA token.
FPV_USE_RAW_RSA This bit determines whether RAW RSA operations can be performed on the
token. When this bit is set, RAW RSA operations are allowed. RAW RSA
provides access to RSA to perform encrypt and decrypt operations on data
without any padding. This bit is set on the LunaRA token.
FPV_SPECIAL_CLONING This bit determines whether the token allows the factory-default Chrysalis-
ITS key cloning certificate to be modified. When this bit is set, customers
can create their own key cloning certificate. Key cloning is a feature
enabled on a LunaRA token, and this bit is set.
FPV_ENABLE_CCM This bit determines whether a Custom Command Module (CCM) can be
loaded onto the token. When this bit is set, a CCM can be loaded onto the
token.
This bit must be cleared (i.e., zero) for FIPS-compliant tokens.
FPV_CCM_PRESENT_FWUPDATE This bit determines whether a CCM must be present before a firmware
update operation is allowed to proceed. When this bit is set, a CCM must
be loaded on the token to perform a firmware update. Additionally, the
CCM must implement the PreModuleUpdate function.
This bit is for an OEM version of LunaRA and does not apply to the
Chrysalis-ITS labeled product.
FPV_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING This bit determines whether the token must perform blinding to introduce a
random element to the time needed to complete an RSA operation.
Blinding defeats timing attacks on an RSA operation.
The token firmware performs blinding regardless of this setting.
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Name Description
FPV_PIN_MUST_USE_SP This bit determines if the serial communication port must be used to enter
an authentication code. When this bit is set, an authentication code can
only be entered through the serial communication port. When this bit is
cleared, authentication codes are entered via the host computer. Use of
the serial communication port is NOT a feature of a LunaRA token; this bit
is clear on a LunaRA token.
FPV_MOFN_MUST_USE_SP This bit determines if the serial communication port must be used to enter
the M of N secret. When this bit is set, the M of N secret can only be
entered through the serial communication port. When this bit is cleared,
the M of N secret is entered via the host computer. Use of the serial
communication port is NOT a feature of a LunaRA token; this bit is clear on
a LunaRA token.
FPV_KCV_MUST_USE_SP This bit determines if the serial communication port must be used to enter
the key cloning domain identifier. When this bit is set, the key cloning
domain identifier can only be entered through the serial communication
port. When this bit is cleared, the key cloning domain identifier is entered
via the host computer. Use of the serial communication port is NOT a
feature of a LunaRA token; this bit is clear on a LunaRA token.
3.2. Token Policy Vector (TPV)
The TPV contains the settings necessary to enforce policy rules locally in an organization. For example, one bit
in the TPV defines whether the token can perform a signature operation using a signing key generated by an
outside process or if it must use an internally generated key for this function. The TPV can be modified by the
token’s SO. The TPV contents are used by the internal code to validate the operations performed by the token’s
USER.
The format of the TPV is a 32-bit vector that is divided into four fields of eight bits. These fields and their
contents are defined in the following sections.
3.2.1. Number of User Login Fails Allowed
This field defines the number of consecutive failed login attempts that can be made by a USER before the USER
gets locked out or the USER’s data is erased. This security feature prevents illegal access to the USER’s data
and keys: it prevents an impostor from cracking the USER’s password on the token. Whether the user is locked
out or the data is erased depends upon the "USER zeroize" bit. If the USER zeroize bit is disabled, too many
failed login attempts results in the USER getting locked out. In this case, the USER’s identity and private data
(including key material) are erased from the token. The SO must create a new user in order to continue. The
new user will have no association with the previous (deleted) user.
3.2.2. Minimum/Maximum PIN Length
These two fields define the minimum and maximum length restrictions for a USER's PIN.
3.2.3. Local Policies
The following table defines the flags that identify the security policies that dictate the behavior of the users on the
token.
Name Description
TPV_USER_ZEROIZE This bit determines whether the token can be zeroized by a normal user or if only
the token's SO can zeroize the token.
When this bit is set, it indicates that a valid token user can zeroize the token. This bit
enables using the token in an environment where the SO is not commonly used.
When this bit is set, the SO cannot change a user password, and a user is zeroized
after too many unsuccessful login attempts.
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Name Description
TPV_USER_FW_UPDATE This bit determines whether the firmware can be updated by a normal user or if only
the token’s SO can update the firmware. When this bit is set, a normal user can
perform the firmware update.
TPV_M_OF_N_ACTIVATION This bit determines whether M of N activation is required for a user to gain access to
the token. When this bit and the FPV_SECURITY_POLICY_USE_M_OF_N bit in
the FPV are set, the token is not activated until the required number of parts to a
split secret has been entered. Ordinarily, this bit is not set for LunaRA tokens.
TPV_KEY_ATTRIB_LOCK This bit determines whether the flag attributes of a key can be modified once the key
is a valid object on the token. When this bit is set, it indicates that the flag attributes
of a key cannot be modified after they have been established. For example, if this bit
is set and a DES key is created for encryption and decryption, these attributes
cannot be changed to wrap and unwrap once the key exists on the token.
TPV_KEY_SINGLE_FUNCTION This bit determines whether a key can be used to perform multiple types of
operations (i.e., use a key for encrypting, signing, and wrapping). When this bit is
set, it indicates that keys can be used only to perform single functions. For
symmetric keys, a single function is considered to be a pair of related functions such
as encryption/decryption, wrapping/unwrapping, or sign/verify. With the validated
release of LunaRA, multiple use of a key is allowed regardless of the value of
TPV_KEY_SINGLE_FUNCTION.
TPV_SIGNING_KEY_LOCAL When performing a signing operation, the private key used may have been
generated locally or provided by an external source. In most environments, it is
preferable to have the signing/verifying key pair generated by the token and never
extracted from it. However, in certain cases the signing keys are generated
externally and loaded on the token for subsequent signature operations. When this
bit is set, it indicates that externally generated keys cannot be used for signing
operations performed by the token.
TPV_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING This bit determines whether the token must perform blinding, which introduces a
random element to the time needed to complete an RSA operation. Blinding defeats
timing attacks on an RSA operation. If this bit is set, the token will always use RSA
blinding (the TPV_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING bit will have no effect).
TPV_DISABLE_CLONING_BY_USER This bit determines whether a user or both a user and the token's SO are permitted
to clone sensitive objects when the FPV_SECURITY_POLICY_ENABLE_CLONING
bit is set. If the FPV_SECURITY_POLICY_ENABLE_CLONING bit is clear, no
cloning is permitted and the TPV_DISABLE_CLONING_BY_USER bit has no effect
regardless of its value. When TPV_DISABLE_CLONING_BY_USER is clear, both a
user and the token's SO are permitted to clone sensitive objects. When the bit is
set, only the token's SO is permitted to clone sensitive objects.
TPV_XP_MUST_USE_SP This bit determines whether the token implements XP-type functionality. When this
bit is set: all objects are stored in volatile memory; token KCV may be cloned from a
different token; the token is dual mode (i.e., whether the SP is required is defined at
token initialization time); and, object headers are always modifiable, even in non-
modifiable objects.
4. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (I&A)
The LunaRA token enforces an identity-based user authentication policy. For normal users, the user number and
a valid PIN must be provided to the token before access to private data and token services can be granted. For
the SO, only a PIN is required.
Note: Normal users also have a text-based name associated with them. The name corresponding to a
particular user number can be queried from the token.
The PINs for the SO and users can be changed at any time by their respective owners. The SO can also
reinstate users with lost PINs. Reinstating users does not affect the cryptographic material and data owned by
the user and protected under the old PIN.
The LunaRA token implements policy that limits the number of login attempts. This feature prevents an
exhaustive search approach for finding the PIN of the SO or user. The implementation of this feature differs from
that of an SO PIN search and that of a user PIN search.
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For a user PIN search:
• If “n” consecutive user logon attempts fail, the token flags the event in the User’s Authorization
Vector (UAV). This erases the user’s profile and private data from the token. The SO must
create a new user; the new user will have no association with the deleted user. (The value of "n"
is defined by the SO in the TPV.)
For an SO PIN search:
• If “n” consecutive SO logon attempts fail, the token is zeroized and its operational state goes to
ZEROIZED. (The value of "n" is defined in the FPV, which is defined when a LunaRA token is
manufactured and cannot be modified without invalidating the CRC value of the software load.)
5. DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL (DAC)
Every data object on the token can be public or private. Private data objects are labeled with a number that
corresponds to the owner and can be accessed only by the legitimate owner. A user cannot create a key or
certificate object as a public object. Only data objects can be public or private.
The token does not allow for any granularity of ownership other than that of individual or public (i.e., a data object
cannot be owned by two users and restricted from other users). Also, the ownership of an object implies
read/write/modify/execute access to the object, which means full access rights to the object.
6. OBJECT REUSE
The token enforces an object reuse policy in that every object is allocated a portion of memory (flash or SRAM).
The policy also ensures that no other objects are placed in the same memory location unless all previous
memory content is initialized and purged. When cryptographic functions are performed, a cryptographic context
is created to hold data required by the function (e.g., a DES key schedule for a DES function or an MD5 chaining
vector). The cryptographic context only exists in SRAM memory and is not assigned to any functions except
those defined by its owner. The memory assigned to a cryptographic context is always purged of its content
before being handed over to a function.
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APPENDIX A. Cryptographic Algorithms Support
Encrypt/Decrypt:
• DES-ECB
• DES-CBC
• 3-DES-ECB
• 3-DES-CBC
• RC2-ECB
• RC2-CBC
• RC4
• RC5-ECB
• RC5-CBC
• CAST-ECB
• CAST-CBC
• CAST3-ECB
• CAST3-CBC
• CAST5-ECB
• CAST5-CBC
• RSA X-509
Digest:
• MD2
• MD5
• SHA-1
Sign/Verify:
• RSA-1024
• RSA-2048
• RSA-4096
• DSA
• DES-MAC
• 3-DES-MAC
• RC2-MAC
• RC5-MAC
• CAST-MAC
• CAST3-MAC
• CAST5-MAC
• SSL3-MD5-MAC
• SSL3-SHA1-MAC
• HMAC-SHA1
• HMAC-MD5
Generate Key:
• DES
• double length DES
• triple length DES
• RC2
• RC4
• RC5
• CAST
• CAST3
• CAST5
• PBE-MD2-DES
• PBE-MD5-DES
• PBE-MD5-CAST
• PBE-MD5-CAST3
• PBE-SHA-1-CAST5
• GENERIC-SECRET
• SSL PRE-MASTER
Generate Key Pair:
• RSA-1024
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• RSA-2048
• RSA-4096
• DSA-1024
• DH-1024
• DH-2048
Wrap Symmetric Key Using Symmetric Algorithm:
• DES-ECB
• 3-DES-ECB
• RC2-ECB
• CAST-ECB
• CAST3-ECB
• CAST5-ECB
Wrap Symmetric Key Using Asymmetric Algorithm:
• RSA-1024
• RSA-2048
• RSA-4096
Wrap Asymmetric Key Using Symmetric Algorithm:
• 3-DES-ECB (LunaRA only)
• 3-DES-CBC1
Unwrap Symmetric Key With Symmetric Algorithm:
• DES-ECB
• 3-DES-ECB
• RC2-ECB
• CAST-ECB
• CAST3-ECB
• CAST5-ECB
Unwrap Symmetric Key With Asymmetric Algorithm:
• RSA-1024
• RSA-2048
• RSA-4096
Unwrap Asymmetric Key With Symmetric Algorithm:
• DES-CBC
• 3-DES-CBC
• CAST-CBC
• CAST3-CBC
• CAST5-CBC
Derive Key Value:
• DH-1024
• DH-2048
• concatenate Base & Key
• concatenate Base & Data
• concatenate Data & Base
• XOR Base and Data
• Extract Key from Key
• MD2 Derivation
• MD5 Derivation
• SHA-1 Derivation
• SSL3-Master
• SSL3-Key & MAC
• 3DES-ECB (LunaRA only)
• 2DES Derivation (LunaRA only)
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APPENDIX B. Policy Vector Settings
Standard
LunaRA
Domestic
Standard
LunaRA
Export
Token Policy Vector Settings
TPV_USER_ZEROIZE 1 1
TPV_USER_FW_UPDATE 0 0
TPV_M_OF_N_ACTIVATION 0 0
TPV_KEY_ATTRIB_LOCK 1 1
TPV_KEY_SINGLE_FUNCTION 0 0
TPV_SIGNING_KEY_LOCAL 0 0
TPV_MAX_PIN_LEN 48 48
TPV_MIN_PIN_LEN 4 4
TPV_LOGIN_FAILS_ALLOWED 10 10
TPV_DISABLE_CLONING_BY_USER 0 0
Fixed Policy Vector Settings
FPV_SECURITY_POLICY_DOMESTIC 1 0
FPV_SECURITY_POLICY_ENABLE_CLONING 1 1
FPV_SECURITY_POLICY_USE_CAV 0 0
FPV_SECURITY_POLICY_WRAPPING_TOKEN 1 1
FPV_SECURITY_POLICY_USE_M_OF_N 0 0
FPV_SECURITY_POLICY_USE_RAW_RSA 1 1
FPV_SECURITY_POLICY_SPECIAL_CLONING 1 1
FPV_ENABLE_CCM 0 0
FPV_SEC_KEY_POLICY_SENSITIVE 1 1
FPV_SEC_KEY_POLICY_NO_CREATE 1 1
FPV_PRI_KEY_POLICY_SENSITIVE 1 1
FPV_PRI_KEY_POLICY_NO_CREATE 1 1
FPV_SO_LOGIN_FAILS_ALLOWED 3 3
FPV_PIN_MUST_USE_SP 0 0
FPV_MOFN_MUST_USE_SP 0 0
FPV_KCV_MUST_USE_SP 0 0
FPV_XP_TOKEN 0 0
FPV_XPPLUS_TOKEN 0 0
FPV_RA_TOKEN 1 1
Document Number
CR-0729
Change Level
7
Security Level
None
Page Number
Page 14 of 15
APPENDIX C. Session And Login States Required For Luna Commands
Command
To
Module
No
Session
Open
Session
Open, No
Login
SO
Logged
On
User
Logged
On
Token Main Module Commands
LUNA_ZEROIZE √
LUNA_INIT_TOKEN √
LUNA_GET √
LUNA_GET_USV √
LUNA_SET_TPV √
LUNA_FW_UPDATE √
LUNA_CONFIGURE_SP √
Session Manager Commands
LUNA_OPEN_ACCESS √
LUNA_CLEAN_ACCESS √
LUNA_CLOSE_ACCESS √
LUNA_GET_ALL_ACCESSES √
LUNA_OPEN_SESSION √
LUNA_CLOSE_SESSION √
LUNA_CLOSE_ALL_SESSIONS √
LUNA_GET_SESSION_INFO √
LUNA_EXTRACT_CONTEXTS √
LUNA_INSERT_CONTEXTS √
User Module Commands
LUNA_GET_USER_LIST √
LUNA_GET_USER_NAME √
LUNA_LOGIN √
LUNA_LOGOUT √
LUNA_SET_PIN √
LUNA_INIT_PIN √
LUNA_CREATE_USER √
LUNA_DELETE_USER √
Object Management Module
LUNA_CREATE_OBJECT √
LUNA_COPY_OBJECT √
LUNA_DESTROY_OBJECT √
LUNA_GET_OBJECT_SIZE √
LUNA_GET_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE √
LUNA_GET_ATTRIBUTE_SIZE √
LUNA_MODIFY_OBJECT √
LUNA_FIND_OBJECTS √
Random Number Generator Module
LUNA_GET_RANDOM √
LUNA_SEED_RANDOM √
Key Management Module
LUNA_GENERATE_KEY √
LUNA_GENERATE_KEY_W_VALUE √
LUNA_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR √
LUNA_WRAP_KEY √
LUNA_UNWRAP_KEY √
LUNA_UNWRAP_KEY_W_VALUE √
LUNA_DERIVE_KEY √
LUNA_DERIVE_KEY_W_VALUE √
LUNA_MFG_LOAD √
Cryptographic Algorithm Module
LUNA_ENCRYPT_INIT √
LUNA_ENCRYPT_INIT_W_VALUE √
LUNA_ENCRYPT_INIT √
Document Number
CR-0729
Change Level
7
Security Level
None
Page Number
Page 15 of 15
Command
To
Module
No
Session
Open
Session
Open, No
Login
SO
Logged
On
User
Logged
On
LUNA_ENCRYPT_INIT_W_VALUE √
LUNA_ENCRYPT √
LUNA_ENCRYPT_FIFO √
LUNA_ENCRYPT_END √
LUNA_DECRYPT_INIT √
LUNA_DECRYPT_INIT_W_VALUE √
LUNA_DECRYPT √
LUNA_DECRYPT_FIFO √
LUNA_DECRYPT_END √
LUNA_DECRYPT_RAW_RSA √
LUNA_DIGEST_INIT √
LUNA_DIGEST √
LUNA_DIGEST_FIFO √
LUNA_DIGEST_KEY √
LUNA_DIGEST_KEY_VALUE √
LUNA_DIGEST_END √
LUNA_SIGN_INIT √
LUNA_SIGN_INIT_W_VALUE √
LUNA_SIGN √
LUNA_SIGN_FIFO √
LUNA_SIGN_END √
LUNA_SIGN_SINGLEPART √
LUNA_SIGN_UPDATE_KEY √
LUNA_SIGN_FINAL_DERIVE_KEY √
LUNA_VERIFY_INIT √
LUNA_VERIFY_INIT_W_VALUE √
LUNA_VERIFY √
LUNA_VERIFY_FIFO √
LUNA_VERIFY_END √
LUNA_VERIFY_SINGLEPART √
LUNA_GET_MECH_LIST √
LUNA_GET_MECH_INFO √
LUNA_SELF_TEST √
LUNA_SET_UP_MASKING_KEY √
LUNA_CLONE_AS_SOURCE √
LUNA_CLONE_AS_TARGET_INIT √
LUNA_CLONE_AS_TARGET √
LUNA_GEN_TKN_KEYS √
LUNA_LOAD_CERT √
LUNA_GEN_KCV √
LUNA_LOAD_CUSTOMER_VERIFICATION_KEY √
LUNA_M_OF_N_GENERATE √
LUNA_M_OF_N_ACTIVATE √
LUNA_M_OF_N_MODIFY √
Special Packet Processing Commands
LUNA_IPSEC_INIT_NO_USER √
LUNA_IPSEC_PROCESS_PACKET √
LUNA_IPSEC_END √
LUNA_GEN_CRC32 √
LUNA_SCP_TEST √