Microsoft Corporation
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.1
Last Update: 2026-08-10
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
4516 Seton Center Pkwy, Suite 250
Austin, TX 78759
https://www.atsec.com
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
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Table of Contents
1 General.......................................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Levels....................................................................................................................................................5
1.3 Additional Information......................................................................................................................................5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................................................6
2.1 Description .........................................................................................................................................................6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ..................................................................7
2.3 Excluded Components .......................................................................................................................................7
2.4 Modes of Operation............................................................................................................................................7
2.5 Algorithms..........................................................................................................................................................8
2.6 Security Function Implementations................................................................................................................29
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ......................................................................................................................35
2.8 RBG and Entropy .............................................................................................................................................37
2.9 Key Generation ................................................................................................................................................37
2.10 Key Establishment..........................................................................................................................................38
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................................................38
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces...........................................................................................................................39
3.1 Ports and Interfaces..........................................................................................................................................39
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication .......................................................................................................................40
4.1 Authentication Methods..................................................................................................................................40
4.2 Roles..................................................................................................................................................................42
4.3 Approved Services............................................................................................................................................42
4.4 Non-Approved Services ...................................................................................................................................54
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded...............................................................................................................54
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................................................55
5.1 Integrity Techniques........................................................................................................................................55
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................................................55
6 Operational Environment .......................................................................................................................................56
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements .......................................................................................56
7 Physical Security .....................................................................................................................................................57
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required.................................................................................................................57
7.2 EFP/EFT Information.......................................................................................................................................57
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7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges...........................................................................................................57
8 Non-Invasive Security.............................................................................................................................................58
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ..........................................................................................................59
9.1 Storage Areas....................................................................................................................................................59
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods .............................................................................................................................59
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods.................................................................................................................................60
9.4 SSPs...................................................................................................................................................................60
9.5 Transitions........................................................................................................................................................67
10 Self-Tests................................................................................................................................................................68
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................68
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................................................68
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ......................................................................................................................73
10.4 Error States .....................................................................................................................................................76
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.............................................................................................................................................78
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures......................................................................................78
11.2 Administrator Guidance ................................................................................................................................78
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance........................................................................................................................78
11.4 End of Life ......................................................................................................................................................78
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks..................................................................................................................................79
A Glossary and Abbreviations....................................................................................................................................80
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels................................................................................................................................................5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware....................................................................................................7
Table 3: Modes List and Description ...........................................................................................................................8
Table 4: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................................................28
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms......................................................................................................................29
Table 6: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms...................................................................................................29
Table 7: Security Function Implementations............................................................................................................35
Table 8: Entropy Certificates .....................................................................................................................................37
Table 9: Entropy Sources............................................................................................................................................37
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................................................39
Table 11: Authentication Methods ............................................................................................................................41
Table 12: Roles............................................................................................................................................................42
Table 13: Approved Services......................................................................................................................................54
Table 14: Non-Approved Services .............................................................................................................................54
Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................................................57
Table 16: EFP/EFT Information.................................................................................................................................57
Table 17: Hardness Testing Temperatures ................................................................................................................57
Table 18: Storage Areas ..............................................................................................................................................59
Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods .......................................................................................................................60
Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods...........................................................................................................................60
Table 21: SSP Table 1 .................................................................................................................................................63
Table 22: SSP Table 2 .................................................................................................................................................67
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests ................................................................................................................................72
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information .............................................................................................................76
Table 25: Error States .................................................................................................................................................77
List of Figures
Figure 1: Module’s block diagram................................................................................................................................6
Figure 2: Module top level view and physical perimeter ...........................................................................................7
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the Microsoft HSM Cryptographic
Module. It describes the security rules under which the module must operate and how the module meets the
requirements of FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) at overall
Security Level 3.
This Non-Proprietary Security Policy may be reproduced and distributed, provided it is kept whole and intact
and includes this notice. All other documentation remains proprietary to its respective authors.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
The laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation into a consolidated Security Policy document
without altering any technical statements. The Security Policy was then refined iteratively throughout
conformance testing. The vendor reviewed both intermediate and final versions and approved all content.
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use: The Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is a single
chip hardware module that provides cryptographic services. It consists of two layers: the HSM layer and the
HSP layer, which are accessed through different interfaces as specified in Section 3.1 of this Security Policy.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Single Chip
Module Characteristics:
Cryptographic Boundary: The cryptographic boundary is the entire chip. Figure 1 displays a block diagram of
the module.
Figure 1: Module’s block diagram
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Figure 2: Module top level view and physical perimeter
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model
and/or Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware Version Processors Features
M1244265-
004 B0
M1244265-
004 B0
Version of the ROM FW image
executed by the HSP processor:
M1244265-004 B0; version of the
two RAM FW images executed by
the HSP processor: 3.4.2.3-
50917001fips (boot-time
firmware) and 3.3.6.4-
60108004fips (run-time firmware);
version of the two RAM FW
images executed by the HSM PCI
PHY controllers: 3.3.6.4-
60108004fips; version of the three
RAM FW images executed by the
HSM Fast-path processors: 3.3.6.4-
60108004fips; version of the RAM
FW image executed by the HSM
Control processors: 3.3.6.4-
60108004fips
1x SiFive E21 RISC-V processor
(HSP processor); 2x Microsoft
ARM Cortex-M7 processors
(called HSM Control
processors); 3x Microsoft ARM
Cortex-M7 processors (called
HSM Fast-path processors); 2x
R8051XC2 microcontrollers
version 2.24 (called the HSM
PCI PHY controller)
N/A
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2.3 Excluded Components
The module does not claim any excluded components.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
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Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
Automatically entered whenever an
approved service is requested
Approved Equivalent to the indicator of
the requested service
Non-Approved
mode
Automatically entered whenever a non-
approved service is requested
Non-
Approved
Equivalent to the indicator of
the requested service
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The module automatically transitions to approved mode after passing all pre-operational and CASTs performed
at power-on. No operator intervention is required to reach this point.
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The module automatically switches between the approved and non-approved modes depending on the services
requested by the operator. The status indicator of the mode of operation is equivalent to the indicator of the
service that was requested.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A7763 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A4199 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A6565 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A7927 Direction - Decrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A7984 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External, Internal
Key Length - 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128-4096
Increment 128
AAD Length - AAD Length: 0
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
SP 800-38D
AES-KWP A7927 Direction - Decrypt
Cipher - Cipher
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 8-4096
Increment 8
SP 800-38F
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-KWP A7980 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher - Cipher
Key Length - 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 8-4096
Increment 8
SP 800-38F
AES-XTS Testing Revision
2.0
A7760 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128-65536
Increment 128
Tweak Mode - Hex
Data Unit Length Matches Payload Length - Yes
SP 800-38E
AES-XTS Testing Revision
2.0
A7761 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128-65536
Increment 128
Tweak Mode - Hex
Data Unit Length Matches Payload Length - Yes
SP 800-38E
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7764 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7765 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7766 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7767 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7768 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7769 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7770 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7771 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7772 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7773 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7774 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7775 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7776 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7777 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7778 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7779 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7977 Curve - P-384
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7764 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7765 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7766 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7767 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7768 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7769 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7770 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
512
Component - Yes
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7771 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7772 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7773 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7774 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7775 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7776 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7777 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7778 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7779 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Component - Yes
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7977 Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-
5)
A7978 Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
Component - No
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5)
A7976 Component - No
Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5)
A7977 Component - No
Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-
5)
A7978 Component - No
Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
FIPS 186-5
HMAC DRBG A6566 Prediction Resistance - No
Supports Reseed - Yes
Mode - SHA2-512
Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 1024
Nonce - Nonce: 0
Personalization String Length - Personalization
String Length: 0
Additional Input - Additional Input: 0
Returned Bits - 512
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A4199 MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 256
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A7928 MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 256
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A7983 MAC - MAC: 256
Key Length - Key Length: 112-4096 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A4199 MAC - MAC: 384
Key Length - Key Length: 384
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A7928 MAC - MAC: 384
Key Length - Key Length: 384
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A7983 MAC - MAC: 384
Key Length - Key Length: 112-4096 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A6566 MAC - MAC: 512
Key Length - Key Length: 512
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A7928 MAC - MAC: 512
Key Length - Key Length: 512
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A7983 MAC - MAC: 512
Key Length - Key Length: 112-4096 Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7764 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7765 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7766 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7767 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7768 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7769 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7770 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7771 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7772 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7773 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7774 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7775 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7776 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7777 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7778 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7779 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256,
P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3
A7981 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-384
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2 A7928 Fixed Info Pattern - uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo
Fixed Info Encoding - concatenation
Derived Key Length - 128, 192, 256
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 256,
384, 528
HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Perform Multiple Expansion Tests - No
Uses Hybrid Shared Secret - No
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2 A7982 Fixed Info Pattern - uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo
Fixed Info Encoding - concatenation
Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-
8192 Increment 8
HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-
512
Perform Multiple Expansion Tests - No
Uses Hybrid Shared Secret - No
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDF SP800-108 A4199 KDF Mode - Counter
MAC Mode - HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-
384
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 256,
Supported Lengths: 384
Fixed Data Order - Before Fixed Data
Counter Length - 32
Supports Empty IV - No
Custom Key In Length - 0
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
KDF SP800-108 A7928 KDF Mode - Counter
MAC Mode - HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256,
HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512
Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 128, 192,
256
Fixed Data Order - Before Fixed Data
Counter Length - 32
Supports Empty IV - No
Custom Key In Length - 256, 384, 528
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
KTS-IFC A7929 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 16 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
KTS-IFC A7930 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A7931 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 17 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
KTS-IFC A7932 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A7933 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A7934 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 18 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
KTS-IFC A7935 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A7936 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A7937 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 19 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
KTS-IFC A7938 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A7939 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A7940 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 20 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
KTS-IFC A7941 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A7942 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 21 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
KTS-IFC A7943 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
KTS-IFC A7961 Function - keyPairGen
IUT ID - 0123456789abcdef
Modulo - 2048
Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic, rsakpg1-
prime-factor
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Scheme -
KTS-OAEP-basic -
KAS Role - responder
Key Transport Method -
Hash Algorithms - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Supports Null Associated Data - Yes
Associated Data Pattern - literal[]
Associated Data Encoding - concatenation
Key Length - 128
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7929 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7930 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 22 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7931 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7932 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7933 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7934 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7935 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7936 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7937 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7938 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7939 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7940 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 23 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7941 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7942 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7943 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7944 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7945 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7946 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7947 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7948 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7949 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7950 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 24 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7951 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7952 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7953 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7954 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7955 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7956 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7957 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7958 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7959 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A7961 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Key Format - Standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 25 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) A7984 Key Generation Mode - probable
Modulo - 2048
p mod 8 - 0
Primality Tests - 2pow100
q mod 8 - 0
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Info Generated By Server - Yes
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
FIPS 186-5
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7929 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7930 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7931 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7932 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7933 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7934 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7935 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7936 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 26 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7937 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7938 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7939 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7940 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7941 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7942 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7943 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7944 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7945 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7946 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 27 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7947 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7948 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7949 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7950 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7951 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7952 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7953 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7954 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7955 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7956 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
Microsoft HSM Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2026 Microsoft Corporation, atsec information security.
This document can be reproduced and distributed only whole and intact, including this copyright notice.
Page 28 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7957 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7958 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7959 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A7961 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Private Key Format - standard
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
FIPS 186-4
SHA2-256 A7762 Message Length - Message Length: 8-8192
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A7781 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A7979 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A7762 Message Length - Message Length: 8-8192
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A7781 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A7979 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A6566 Message Length - Message Length: 8-65528
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A7762 Message Length - Message Length: 8-8192
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A7979 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
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Name Properties Implementation Reference
Symmetric and Asymmetric
Cryptographic Key Generation
(CKG)
Key type:Symmetric
and Asymmetric
N/A SP800-133r2 section 4, IG D.H
additional comment 2, Direct
DRBG output
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
Name Use and Function
HSM AES-GCM with
external IV
Encryption/decryption (non-approved due to not being CAVP tested and due to
the use of an externally generated IV)
Table 6: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
RSA KeyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
RSA key pair
generation
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7984)
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG):
()
Key type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
HSM RSA key
decapsulation
(KTS)
KTS-Decap RSA key
decapsulation
Standard:SP 800-
56Br2
IG D.G:approved or
allowed method
from IG D.G
Key
confirmation:no
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 112 bits of
security strength
KTS-IFC: (A7929,
A7930, A7931,
A7932, A7933,
A7934, A7935,
A7936, A7937,
A7938, A7939,
A7940, A7941,
A7942, A7943,
A7961)
SHA2-256: (A7762)
SHA2-384: (A7762)
SHA2-512: (A7762)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
HSM random
number generation
DRBG Random number
generation
HMAC DRBG:
(A6566)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A6566)
SHA2-512: (A6566)
HSP random
number generation
DRBG Random number
generation
HMAC DRBG:
(A6566)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A6566)
SHA2-512: (A6566)
HSP Entropy
Source
ENT-ESV Entropy source
HSM Entropy
Source
ENT-ESV Entropy source
HSM AES-KWP
unwrapping (KTS)
KTS-Unwrap AES-KWP
unwrapping
Standard:SP 800-
38F
IG D.G:approved or
allowed method
from IG D.G
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
security strength
AES-KWP:
(A7927)
AES-ECB: (A7927)
HSP AES-KWP
wrapping (KTS)
KTS-Wrap AES-KWP
wrapping
Standard:SP 800-
38F
IG D.G:approved or
allowed method
from IG D.G
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 256 bits of
security strength
AES-KWP:
(A7980)
AES-ECB: (A4199)
HSP AES-KWP
unwrapping (KTS)
KTS-Unwrap AES-KWP
unwrapping
Standard:SP 800-
38F
IG D.G:approved or
allowed method
from IG D.G
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
AES-KWP:
(A7980)
AES-ECB: (A4199)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
provides 256 bits of
security strength
HSP AES-GCM
encryption
BC-AuthEncrypt Symmetric
encryption
AES-GCM:
(A7984)
AES-ECB: (A4199)
HSP AES-GCM
decryption
BC-AuthDecrypt Symmetric
decryption
AES-GCM:
(A7984)
AES-ECB: (A4199)
HSM ECDSA
KeyGen
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
Key pair generation ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7764, A7765,
A7766, A7767,
A7768, A7769,
A7770, A7771,
A7772, A7773,
A7774, A7775,
A7776, A7777,
A7778, A7779)
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG):
()
Key type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
HSP ECDH
KeyGen
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
Key pair generation ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7977)
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG):
()
Key type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
HSM ECDSA
SigGen component
DigSig-SigGen Signature
generation
component
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7764, A7765,
A7766, A7767,
A7768, A7769,
A7770, A7771,
A7772, A7773,
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
A7774, A7775,
A7776, A7777,
A7778, A7779)
HSP ECDSA
SigGen for DICE
attestation
DigSig-SigGen Signature
generation
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5):
(A7977, A7978)
SHA2-384: (A7781)
HSP ECDSA
SigVer
DigSig-SigVer Signature
verification
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A7976, A7977,
A7978)
SHA2-384: (A7781)
HSM ECDH shared
secret computation
KAS-SSC ECDH shared
secret computation
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7764, A7765,
A7766, A7767,
A7768, A7769,
A7770, A7771,
A7772, A7773,
A7774, A7775,
A7776, A7777,
A7778, A7779)
HSP ECDH shared
secret computation
KAS-SSC ECDH shared
secret computation
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A7981)
HSM RSA
signature
generation
component
DigSig-SigGen Signature
generation
RSA Signature
Primitive: (A7929,
A7930, A7931,
A7932, A7933,
A7934, A7935,
A7936, A7937,
A7938, A7939,
A7940, A7941,
A7942, A7943,
A7944, A7945,
A7946, A7947,
A7948, A7949,
A7950, A7951,
A7952, A7953,
A7954, A7955,
A7956, A7957,
A7958, A7959,
A7961)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
HSM RSA
decryption
component
KTS-Unwrap RSA decryption
component
RSA Decryption
Primitive Sp800-
56Br2: (A7929,
A7930, A7931,
A7932, A7933,
A7934, A7935,
A7936, A7937,
A7938, A7939,
A7940, A7941,
A7942, A7943,
A7944, A7945,
A7946, A7947,
A7948, A7949,
A7950, A7951,
A7952, A7953,
A7954, A7955,
A7956, A7957,
A7958, A7959,
A7961)
HSM HKDF KAS-56CKDF HMAC-based key
derivation function
SHA2-256: (A7762)
SHA2-384: (A7762)
SHA2-512: (A7762)
KDA HKDF SP800-
56Cr2: (A7928)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A7928)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A7928)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A7928)
HSP HKDF KAS-56CKDF HMAC-based key
derivation function
KDA HKDF SP800-
56Cr2: (A7982)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A7983)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A7983)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A7983)
SHA2-256: (A7979)
SHA2-384: (A7979)
SHA2-512: (A7979)
HSM KBKDF KBKDF Key-based key
derivation function
SHA2-256: (A7762)
SHA2-384: (A7762)
SHA2-512: (A7762)
KDF SP800-108:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A7928)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A7928)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A7928)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A7928)
HSP KBKDF KBKDF Key-based key
derivation function
KDF SP800-108:
(A4199)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A4199)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A4199)
SHA2-256: (A7781)
SHA2-384: (A7781)
HSM SHA SHA Hash function SHA2-256: (A7762)
SHA2-384: (A7762)
SHA2-512: (A7762)
HSM HMAC MAC Message
authentication
code
SHA2-256: (A7762)
SHA2-384: (A7762)
SHA2-512: (A7762)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A7928)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A7928)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A7928)
HSM AES-XTS
decryption
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
Symmetric
decryption
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0:
(A7760, A7761)
AES-ECB: (A6565)
HSM AES-XTS
encryption
BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
Symmetric
encryption
AES-XTS Testing
Revision 2.0:
(A7760, A7761)
AES-ECB: (A6565)
HSM AES-CBC
encryption
BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
Symmetric
encryption
AES-CBC: (A7763)
HSM AES-CBC
decryption
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
Symmetric
decryption
AES-CBC: (A7763)
HSM AES-CBC
decryption + HSM
HMAC
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
MAC
Symmetric
decryption, HMAC
AES-CBC: (A7763)
SHA2-256: (A7762)
SHA2-384: (A7762)
SHA2-512: (A7762)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A7928)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A7928)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A7928)
HSP DICE key
derivation
KBKDF Asymmetric key
derivation
KDF SP800-108:
(A4199)
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A4199)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A4199)
SHA2-256: (A7781)
SHA2-384: (A7781)
HSM AES Key
Generation
CKG Symmetric key
generation
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
Cryptographic Key
Generation (CKG):
()
HMAC DRBG:
(A6566)
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A6566)
SHA2-512: (A6566)
Table 7: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
AES XTS:
AES-XTS is only approved for and shall only be used for storage purposes. Per IG C.I, AES-XTS Key_1 and/or
Key_2, when entered into the module by the operator, shall be generated and/or established independently of
each other according to the rules for component symmetric keys from NIST SP 800-133rev2, Sec. 6.3 for an
approved use of AES-XTS.
The module implements a check that ensures the length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES does
not exceed 2²⁰ AES blocks, that is, 16MB of data.
The module implements a check that ensures, before performing any cryptographic operation, the two AES
keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical.
AES-GCM IV (related to the HSP AES-GCM encryption and HSP AES-GCM decryption security functions):
The module generates GCM IV in compliance with scenario 5 of IG C.H. The IV length is 96 bits (32-bit fixed
field and 64-bit invocation field), and the IV value is deterministic in compliance with the SPDM protocol
version 1.3.0. The design of the SPDM protocol implicitly ensures that the counter (the SPDM sequence
number of the IV) does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given SPDM session key. In
case of power loss, the IV and key are freshly generated from derived session keys and random nonces, through
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a new SPDM session establishment. The use of AES-GCM within this protocol is defined in the specification
DSP0274. The module's GCM implementation with an IV generated outside the GCM implementation used as
part of an approved mechanism is limited to the discussed SPDM protocol.
RSA Signature Generation Component:
The module’s RSA signature generation component implementations were CAVP tested with moduli sizes
2048, 3072, and 4096 bits. The module only supports these moduli sizes. The RSA SigGen (CVL) shall only be
used within the context of a FIPS 186-5 signature generation.
RSA Decryption Component:
The module’s RSA decryption component implementations were CAVP tested with moduli sizes 2048, 3072,
and 4096 bits. The module only supports these moduli sizes. The RSA Decryption Primitive (CVL) shall only be
used within the context of a SP 800-56Brev2 KTS.
RSA Key Generation:
The module’s RSA key generation implementation was CAVP tested with moduli size 2048 bits. This modulus
size is allowed by FIPS 140-3 IG C.F. The number of Miller-Rabin tests is compliant with Table B.1 of FIPS 186-
5.
SP 800-56B Rev.2 Assurances:
The module offers KTS-OAEP compliant with SP 800-56BRev2 and IG D.G. The module only uses internally
generated RSA keys for KTS-OAEP, which meet the assurances required by the key pair owner defined in
section 6.4.1 of SP 800-56BRev2.
The module does not accept public keys from outside entities. Therefore, the assurances defined in section 6.4.2
of SP 800-56BRev2 are not applicable.
ECDSA Signature Generation Component:
The ECDSA SigGen (CVL) shall only be used within the context of a FIPS 186-5 signature generation.
SP 800-56ARev3 Assurances:
The module offers ECDH shared secret computation (of the Diffie-Hellman variety, not the MQV variety)
compliant with SP 800-56ARev3 and meeting IG D.F scenario 2 path (1). To meet the required assurances listed
in section 5.6 of SP 800-56Arev3, the following steps shall be performed.
1. The entity using the module must use the module's service for generating ECDH ephemeral keys. This meets
the assurances required by the key pair owner defined in section 5.6.2.1 of SP 800-56ARev3.
2. As part of the module's shared secret computation implementation, the module internally performs the
public key validation on the peer's public key passed in as input to the function. This meets the public key
validity assurance required by section 5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56ARev3.
3. The module does not support static keys; therefore, the "assurance of peer's possession of private key" is not
applicable.
Curves used in KAS-ECC-SSC:
The module supports KAS-ECC-SSC with P-256, P-384, and P-521. The bit lengths “N” of the private key and
the maximum security strength “s” supported by these curves are:
• For P-256, N is 256 bits and s is 128 bits
• For P-384, N is 384 bits and s is 192 bits
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• For P-521, N is 521 bits and s is 256 bits
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E166 Microsoft Corporation
Table 8: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational Environment Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
M1244265-004 B0
Entropy Source
Physical Microsoft M1244265-004 B0 (TRNG
HSM); Microsoft M1244265-004 B0
(TRNG HSP)
1 bit 0.5 bits None
Table 9: Entropy Sources
The module implements two SP 800-90ARev1-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generators (DRBGs),
specifically HMAC DRBG using HMAC-SHA2-512 which provides 256 bits of security strength. The two
DRBG implementations are identical. The DRBGs do not support prediction resistance.
The module includes two instances of the M1244265-004 B0 Entropy Source (ESV certificate E166). Each
entropy source instance seeds one HMAC_DRBG instance and provides an entropy rate of 0.5 bit/bit.
During instantiation and reseeding, each DRBG performs one GetEntropy() call to receive 1,024 bits of entropy
input containing 512 bits of entropy.
The following is the link to the Public Use Document of the entropy source:
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/documents/entropy/E166_PublicUse.pdf
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG, vendor affirmed), compliant with SP 800-133r2.
When random values are required, they are obtained from the SP 800-90Ar1 approved DRBG of type
HMAC_DRBG, compliant with section 4 of SP 800-133r2. This method does not use the value V as described in
Additional Comment 2 of FIPS 140-3 IG D.H.
The following methods are implemented:
• Symmetric key generation for AES,
• RSA key pair generation,
• ECC key pair generation
Intermediate key generation values are not output from the module and are explicitly zeroized before the
completion of the algorithm.
Additionally, the module implements the following key derivation methods, per SP 800-133r2, section 6.2:
• KBKDF,
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• HKDF
All the CAVP certificates for these algorithms can be found in the Approved Algorithms table in Section 2.5 of
this Security Policy.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module implements key establishment methods as listed in the Security Function Implementations table in
Section 2.6 of this Security Policy.
The module implements KAS-ECC-SSC with curves P-256, P-384, and P-521.
The module implements KTS-IFC (RSA-OAEP) with a 2048-bit modulus, which was also the modulus size used
during testing. RSA keys are generated using the rsakpg1-basic method. The module performs only un-
encapsulation and does not perform key confirmation as part of key transport. Required assurances are
performed by the module in accordance with section 6.4 of SP 800-56Br2.
The module supports a hybrid key transport scheme as specified in section 9.3 of SP 800-56BRev2. In this
scheme, KTS-IFC is used to un-encapsulate an AES-KWP key, which in turn unwraps a second key used to
perform HSM services.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module uses AES-GCM in the context of the SPDM protocol. No part of the SPDM protocol, other than the
AES-GCM, has been tested by the CAVP or CMVP.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
PCIe Gen 5 Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
HSM input data, output data, control input, status output through
logical FW APIs
I2C Data Input
Data Output
Control
Input
Status
Output
HSP input data, output data, control input, status output through logical
FW APIs
Quad SPI Data Input
Data Output
HSP input data, output data through logical FW APIs
UART Status
Output
Status output in registers
Physical power
rails
Power N/A
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces
The module does not implement a control output interface.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
ID and PIN Identity Based
Authentication
used to assume
the DDI role
128 bit ID and
PIN based
authentication
The probability of
successfully
guessing the
correct PIN in
one random
attempt is 1 in
2^128.
Due to delays enforced by the
module after failed authentication
attempts, the maximum number
of wrong PIN attempts in a
minute is 1000. This means there
is a probability of 1000/(2^128) of
randomly guessing the correct
PIN in a minute, which is
approximately 1 in 2^118.
Challenge-
response
Protocol
Identity Based
Authentication
used to assume
the Crypto
Officer role
HSP ECDSA
SigVer
Since the ECC
curve used in this
mechanism is P-
384, the
probability of
successfully and
randomly
guessing a
signature is 1 in
2^192.
The maximum bandwidth of the
interface used to physically
transmit the signature is 3.2 Mbps
or 192 * 10^6 bits per minute. The
size of the signature (r,s) is 384*2 =
768 bits. Conservatively
accounting for only the size of the
signature, that corresponds to 192
* 10^6 / 768 = 250000 signatures
that can be transmitted in a
minute. Conservatively assuming
the signature verification in the
module is instantaneous, the
maximum probability of randomly
guessing a correct signature in a
minute is the maximum number
of signature verifications in a
minute divided by the strength of
the signature algorithm, or
250000/(2^192) which is
approximately 1 in 2^174.
Signed
token
Identity Based
Authentication
used to assume
the Crypto
Officer role
HSP ECDSA
SigVer
Since the ECC
curve used in this
mechanism is P-
384, the
probability of
successfully and
randomly
guessing a
signature is 1 in
2^192.
The maximum bandwidth of the
interface used to physically
transmit the signature is 3.2 Mbps
or 192 * 10^6 bits per minute. The
size of the signature (r,s) is 384*2 =
768 bits. Conservatively
accounting for only the size of the
signature, that corresponds to 192
* 10^6 / 768 = 250000 signatures
that can be transmitted in a
minute. Conservatively assuming
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Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
the signature verification in the
module is instantaneous, the
maximum probability of randomly
guessing a correct signature in a
minute is the maximum number
of signature verifications in a
minute divided by the strength of
the signature algorithm, or
250000/(2^192) which is
approximately 1 in 2^174.
Table 11: Authentication Methods
ID and PIN:
To assume the DDI role (described in the next section), the operator must first establish an ID and PIN through
a two-stage process.
First stage: The module and operator exchange ECC public keys, and the module sends a nonce to the operator.
Both parties then perform ECDH and derive AES and HMAC keys using HKDF, incorporating the nonce. The
operator selects an ID and PIN and encrypts each separately with AES-CBC using an operator-chosen IV,
producing two ciphertexts. The operator then computes an HMAC over the concatenation of the encrypted ID,
encrypted PIN, AES-CBC IV, and nonce. The operator sends all four values along with the HMAC tag to the
module. The module verifies the HMAC tag and, if verification succeeds, decrypts and stores the ID and PIN.
This ID identifies the operator.
Second stage: The module and operator again exchange ECC public keys — though the module uses a different
public key this time — and the module sends a new nonce. Both parties again perform ECDH and derive AES
and HMAC keys using HKDF with the new nonce. The operator re-encrypts the same ID and PIN separately
with AES-CBC using a new operator-chosen IV, then computes an HMAC over the concatenation of the
encrypted ID, encrypted PIN, AES-CBC IV, and nonce. The operator sends all four values along with the
HMAC tag to the module. The module verifies the HMAC tag and, if verification succeeds, decrypts the ID and
PIN and checks them against the values stored during the first pass.
If both values match, the module issues a session ID to the operator. This session ID must accompany every
subsequent operator request for services allocated to the DDI role.
Challenge-response:
The module issues a random challenge value to the operator, who signs it and returns the signature alongside
the requested service call. The module verifies the signature against a public key that identifies the operator.
This challenge-response exchange is required each time the operator invokes a service that uses this
authentication mechanism.
Signed token:
The operator submits a signed token to the module along with the requested service call. The module verifies
the token's signature against a public key that identifies the operator. This verification is required each time the
operator invokes a service that uses this authentication mechanism.
Upon power-off, all previous authentications are cleared and the operator must re-authenticate.
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4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Identity CO Challenge-response Protocol
Signed token
DDI Role Identity User ID and PIN
User Role Role User None
Table 12: Roles
The module concurrently supports one operator connected to the I2C interface (who can be in the Crypto
Officer role or User role) and up to 64 operators in the DDI role. Alternatively, the module concurrently
supports one operator connected to the I2C interface (who can be in the Crypto Officer role or User role) and
up to 64 operators in the User role connected through the PCIe Gen 5 interface.
The services of the Crypto Officer role are accessible only via the I2C interface; the services of the DDI role are
accessible only via the PCIe Gen 5 interface. In this way, two concurrent operators in the CO and DDI roles
will be unable to access the services of the other operator due to them connecting to the module through these
different physical interfaces. This also means that role changes between the DDI role and Crypto Officer role
are not possible.
An unauthenticated operator cannot access services of the DDI role or Crypto Officer role, because the module
always requires authentication data to access these services for each service invocation.
An operator who has assumed the unauthenticated User role may change roles to the DDI role only by
performing the necessary authentication as described in Section 4.1 of this Security Policy. Similarly, an
operator who has assumed the unauthenticated User role may change roles to the Crypto Officer role only by
performing the necessary authentication as described in Section 4.1 of this Security Policy.
An operator who has assumed the DDI role may change roles to the unauthenticated User role by invoking the
“Close session (HSM)” service. This clears the DDI role authentication.
4.3 Approved Services
All approved services implemented by the module are listed in the table below. The following convention is
used to specify access rights to SSPs:
Generate (G): The module generates or derives the SSP.
Read (R): The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
Write (W): The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
Execute (E): The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Zeroize (Z): The module zeroizes the SSP.
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Get API
revision
(HSM)
Provides DDI
API version
information
None None Minimum and
maximum
revision of the
API supported
None User Role
DDI Role
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
by the DDI
interface
Get device
info (HSM)
Provides
device
information
None None Device kind
(whether the
module is a
chip or not),
number of key
tables
available to
HSM services
None User Role
DDI Role
Delete key
(HSM)
Delete a key
from key
storage
fips_approve
d is 1
Key ID None None DDI Role
Open key
(HSM)
Get the ID of a
key from its
name
fips_approve
d is 1
Key name Key ID, key
type, public
key (if
available)
None DDI Role
- HSM ECC
public key:
R
- HSM RSA
public key:
R
Attest key
(HSM)
Generate
attestation
report for key
fips_approve
d is 1
Key ID,
report data
to be
included in
the report
Attestation
report
HSM
ECDSA
SigGen
component
HSM SHA
DDI Role
- HSP
ECDSA
private key
(DICE): E
Get
collateral
(HSM)
Provides
certificates
used internally
by the module
fips_approve
d is 1
Collateral
type,
certificate
Id
Certificates None DDI Role
Import
RSA-
encapsulate
d key (HSM)
Unencapsulate
a key using
RSA-OAEP
and AES-KWP
fips_approve
d is 1
Unwrappin
g key ID,
wrapped
key
Key ID, public
key
HSM RSA
key
decapsulatio
n (KTS)
HSM AES-
KWP
unwrapping
(KTS)
DDI Role
- RSA
Unwrappin
g key: E
- HSM AES
Key: W,E
Get RSA
unwrapping
key ID
(HSM)
Provides ID for
RSA
unwrapping
key, and the
corresponding
fips_approve
d is 1
None Key ID,
corresponding
wrapping key
RSA
KeyGen
HSP AES-
KWP
DDI Role
- RSA
Wrapping
key: G,R
- RSA
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
RSA wrapping
key
unwrapping
(KTS)
Unwrappin
g key: G
- HSP AES
Key: E
RSA
signature
generation
(HSM)
Perform an
RSA signature
generation
component
operation
fips_approve
d is 1
RSA key
ID, data
Signature HSM RSA
signature
generation
component
DDI Role
- HSM RSA
private key:
E
RSA
decryption
component
(HSM)
Perform an
RSA
decryption
component
operation
fips_approve
d is 1
RSA key
ID,
ciphertext
Plaintext HSM RSA
decryption
component
DDI Role
- HSM RSA
private key:
E
ECC
KeyGen
(HSM)
Generate an
ECC key pair
fips_approve
d is 1
Curve Key ID for
private key;
public key
HSM
ECDSA
KeyGen
DDI Role
- HSM ECC
public key:
G,R
- HSM ECC
private key:
G
ECDSA
SigGen
(HSM)
Perform an
ECDSA
signature
generation
component
operation
fips_approve
d is 1
Key ID for
private key,
data
Signature HSM
ECDSA
SigGen
component
DDI Role
- HSM ECC
private key:
E
ECDH SSC
(HSM)
ECDH shared
secret
computation
fips_approve
d is 1
Key ID for
private key;
public key
Key ID for
ECDH secret
HSM ECDH
shared
secret
computation
DDI Role
- HSM ECC
public key:
W,E
- HSM ECC
private key:
E
- HSM
ECDH
Secret: G
Generate
AES key
(HSM)
Symmetric key
generation
fips_approve
d is 1
Key length Key ID HSM AES
Key
Generation
DDI Role
- HSM AES
Key: G
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
AES-CBC
encryption
(HSM)
AES-CBC
encryption
fips_approve
d is 1
Key ID,
plaintext,
IV
Ciphertext HSM AES-
CBC
encryption
DDI Role
- HSM AES
Key: E
AES-CBC
decryption
(HSM)
AES-CBC
decryption
fips_approve
d is 1
Key ID,
ciphertext,
IV
Plaintext HSM AES-
CBC
decryption
DDI Role
- HSM AES
Key: E
AES-XTS
encryption
(HSM)
AES-XTS
encryption
fips_approve
d is 1
Key ID,
plaintext,
tweak
Ciphertext HSM AES-
XTS
encryption
DDI Role
- HSM AES
Key: E
AES-XTS
decryption
(HSM)
AES-XTS
decryption
fips_approve
d is 1
Key ID,
ciphertext,
tweak
Plaintext HSM AES-
XTS
decryption
DDI Role
- HSM AES
Key: E
HKDF
(HSM)
Derive a key
via HKDF
fips_approve
d is 1
Key ID of
ECDH
shared
secret, salt,
info,
derived key
length
Key ID of
derived key
HSM HKDF DDI Role
- HSM AES
Key: G
- HSM
ECDH
Secret: E
- HSM
HMAC key:
G
HKDF +
KBKDF
(HSM)
Derive a key
from a shared
secret using
HKDF, and
then perform
KBKDF on the
derived
symmetric key
fips_approve
d is 1
Key ID of
shared
secret,
other info
Key ID of
derived key
HSM HKDF
HSM
KBKDF
DDI Role
- HSM AES
Key: G
- HSM
HMAC key:
G
- HSM key
derivation
key: G,E
- HSM
ECDH
Secret: E
HMAC
(HSM)
Message
authentication
code
fips_approve
d is 1
Key ID,
message
MAC tag HSM
HMAC
DDI Role
- HSM
HMAC key:
E
Get ECC
public key
for
establishing
PIN (HSM)
Provides ECC
public key -
this is needed
as part of the
fips_approve
d is 1
None ECC public
key
HSM
random
number
generation
HSM
User Role
- HSM ECC
public key:
R
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
authentication
mechanism
Entropy
Source
HSM
ECDSA
KeyGen
Establish
PIN (HSM)
Establishes a
PIN
fips_approve
d is 1
Encrypted
PIN, ECC
public key
None HSM ECDH
shared
secret
computation
HSM HKDF
HSM AES-
CBC
decryption +
HSM
HMAC
User Role
- HSM
Operator
PIN: W
- HSM AES
Key: G,E
- HSM
HMAC key:
G,E
- HSM ECC
public key:
W,E
- HSM
ECDH
Secret: G,E
- HSM ECC
private key:
E
Get ECC
public key
for opening
session
(HSM)
Provides ECC
public key -
this is needed
as part of the
authentication
mechanism
fips_approve
d is 1
None ECC public
key
HSM
random
number
generation
HSM
Entropy
Source
HSM
ECDSA
KeyGen
User Role
- HSM ECC
public key:
R
Open
session
(HSM)
Opens user
session - part
of the
authentication
mechanism
fips_approve
d is 1
Encrypted
ID,
Encrypted
PIN, IV,
nonce,
HMAC tag,
DER
encoded
public key
Success/failure HSM ECDH
shared
secret
computation
HSM HKDF
HSM AES-
CBC
decryption +
HSM
HMAC
User Role
- HSM
Operator
PIN: W
- HSM AES
Key: G,E
- HSM
HMAC key:
G,E
- HSM ECC
public key:
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
W,E
- HSM
ECDH
Secret: G,E
- HSM ECC
private key:
E
Change PIN
(HSM)
Changes the
PIN
fips_approve
d is 1
Encrypted
PIN, ECC
public key
None HSM ECDH
shared
secret
computation
HSM HKDF
HSM AES-
CBC
decryption +
HSM
HMAC
DDI Role
- HSM
Operator
PIN: W
- HSM AES
Key: G,E
- HSM
HMAC key:
G,E
- HSM ECC
public key:
W,E
- HSM
ECDH
Secret: G,E
- HSM ECC
private key:
E
Close
session
(HSM)
Closes user
session (change
roles from DDI
role to the
unauthenticate
d User role)
fips_approve
d is 1
None None None DDI Role
Fuse
zeroization
(HSP)
Zeroize fuse
secrets by
transitioning
the module to
the RETEST
state
None None None None Crypto
Officer
- Fuse
secrets: Z
User Role
- Fuse
secrets: Z
Firmware
update
(HSP)
Perform a
firmware
update
HSP
indicator
returns
"FIPS"
Firmware
image
Pass/fail HSP ECDSA
SigVer
Crypto
Officer
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Reset device
configuratio
n without
SPDM
(HSP)
Reset device
configuration
without using
an SPDM
session to
encrypt data in
transit
HSP
indicator
returns
"FIPS"
None Pass/fail None Crypto
Officer
Reset device
configuratio
n with
SPDM
(HSP)
Reset device
configuration
by using SPDM
session to
encrypt data in
transit
HSP
indicator
returns
"FIPS"
ECC public
key
ECC public
key, Pass/fail
HSP AES-
GCM
encryption
HSP AES-
GCM
decryption
HSP ECDH
KeyGen
HSP ECDH
shared
secret
computation
HSP HKDF
Crypto
Officer
- HSP
ECDH
public key:
G,R,W,E
- HSP
ECDH
private key:
G,E
- HSP AES
Key: G,E
- HSP
ECDH
Secret: G,E
Device
attestation
(HSP)
Prove the
identity of the
module to the
operator by
signing a
nonce
HSP
indicator
returns
"FIPS"
Nonce Signature,
device status
HSP ECDSA
SigGen for
DICE
attestation
HSP DICE
key
derivation
HSP KBKDF
User Role
- HSP
ECDSA
private key
(DICE): G,E
- Fuse
secrets: E
- HSP key
derivation
key: G,E
Crypto
Officer
- HSP
ECDSA
private key
(DICE): G,E
- Fuse
secrets: E
- HSP key
derivation
key: G,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Access error
log (HSP)
Get self-test
failures
None N/A Error log
containing
self-test
failures
None User Role
Crypto
Officer
Show status Get returned
status code
from every
service
None None Status
(success/failur
e)
None Crypto
Officer
DDI Role
User Role
Get device
state (UART
status)
Get
information on
the device state
None None Device state None Crypto
Officer
User Role
Show
module
name and
version
(HSP)
Return the
module name
and version
information
None N/A Module name
and version
None User Role
Crypto
Officer
On-demand
self-tests
Perform pre-
operational
and power-on
conditional
algorithm self-
tests
None N/A Pass/fail HSM RSA
key
decapsulatio
n (KTS)
HSM
random
number
generation
HSP random
number
generation
HSP
Entropy
Source
HSM
Entropy
Source
HSM AES-
KWP
unwrapping
(KTS)
HSP AES-
KWP
wrapping
(KTS)
HSP AES-
KWP
User Role
Crypto
Officer
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
unwrapping
(KTS)
HSP AES-
GCM
encryption
HSP AES-
GCM
decryption
HSM
ECDSA
SigGen
component
HSP ECDSA
SigGen for
DICE
attestation
HSP ECDSA
SigVer
HSM ECDH
shared
secret
computation
HSP ECDH
shared
secret
computation
HSM RSA
signature
generation
component
HSM HKDF
HSP HKDF
HSM
KBKDF
HSP KBKDF
HSM AES-
XTS
decryption
HSM AES-
XTS
encryption
HSM AES-
CBC
encryption
HSM AES-
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
CBC
decryption
Power-on
reset
zeroization
Zeroize SSPs
via power-on
reset
None None None None User Role
- RSA
Wrapping
key: Z
- RSA
Unwrappin
g key: Z
- HSM AES
Key: Z
- HSP AES
Key: Z
- HSM
Entropy
Input: Z
- HSM
DRBG Seed:
Z
- HSM
DRBG
Internal
State: Z
- HSM ECC
public key:
Z
- HSM ECC
private key:
Z
- HSP
ECDH
private key:
Z
- HSP
ECDH
public key:
Z
- HSM
ECDH
Secret: Z
- HSP
ECDH
Secret: Z
- HSM RSA
public key:
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Z
- HSM RSA
private key:
Z
- HSM
Operator
PIN: Z
-
Intermediat
e key
generation
value: Z
- HSM
HMAC key:
Z
- HSM key
derivation
key: Z
- HSP key
derivation
key: Z
- HSP
Entropy
Input: Z
- HSP
DRBG Seed:
Z
- HSP
DRBG
Internal
State: Z
Crypto
Officer
- RSA
Wrapping
key: Z
- RSA
Unwrappin
g key: Z
- HSM AES
Key: Z
- HSP AES
Key: Z
- HSM
Entropy
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Input: Z
- HSM
DRBG Seed:
Z
- HSM
DRBG
Internal
State: Z
- HSM ECC
public key:
Z
- HSM ECC
private key:
Z
- HSP
ECDH
private key:
Z
- HSP
ECDH
public key:
Z
- HSM
ECDH
Secret: Z
- HSP
ECDH
Secret: Z
- HSM RSA
public key:
Z
- HSM RSA
private key:
Z
- HSM
Operator
PIN: Z
-
Intermediat
e key
generation
value: Z
- HSM
HMAC key:
Z
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- HSM key
derivation
key: Z
- HSP key
derivation
key: Z
- HSP
Entropy
Input: Z
- HSP
DRBG Seed:
Z
- HSP
DRBG
Internal
State: Z
Table 13: Approved Services
Every service output contains status information on the success/failure of the requested service.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
Name Description Algorithms Role
AES-GCM (HSM) Encryption and decryption HSM AES-GCM with external IV DDI Role
Table 14: Non-Approved Services
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module performs the loading of external firmware in two scenarios:
1. Every time the module starts up, firmware stored outside the module boundary is transferred into the
module, as explained in FIPS 140-3 IG 10.3.F additional comment 3 part a. This is the introduction of
additional firmware components, not the updating of existing firmware components.
2. The module offers a firmware update service which is invocable by the Crypto Officer operator. This
service updates existing firmware components, but does not introduce additional firmware components.
In either case, the module verifies the external firmware using ECDSA P-384 with SHA-384 before the external
firmware is executed. All the non-ROM firmware is loaded externally on start-up. The firmware update service
allows for updates to the non-ROM firmware. All data output through the data output interface is inhibited
while the firmware load test is being performed and until it is completed.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module does not perform an integrity test (a firmware load test is performed).
The integrity test is not applied for ROM firmware as the vendor claims the memory technology will not
degrade for 10 years after the date of manufacture, in compliance with FIPS 140-3 IG 5.A. The end-of-life
procedures described in Section 11.4 of this Security Policy shall be followed before 10 years have elapsed from
the date of manufacture.
The module does not provide any services via the HMI, SFMI, HFMI, or HSMI interface that allow the operator
to examine the executable code.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
This section is not applicable, as the module does not perform an integrity test.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
The module operates in a limited modifiable operational environment. The module claims physical security at
level 3. Therefore, this section is not applicable.
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7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance
Opaque sealing
coat
No actions are required to maintain the
physical security of the module
No actions are required to maintain the
physical security of the module
Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 EFP/EFT Information
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature or
Voltage
EFP
or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature -35°C +/- 5°C EFP Module stops all operations and shuts down
HighTemperature 125°C +/- 5°C EFP Module stops all operations and shuts down
LowVoltage 734mV +/- 50mV EFP Module stops all operations and shuts down
HighVoltage 923mV +/- 50mV EFP Module stops all operations and shuts down
Table 16: EFP/EFT Information
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
Temperature
Type
Temperature
LowTemperature -40°C
HighTemperature 125°C
Table 17: Hardness Testing Temperatures
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8 Non-Invasive Security
This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanism and therefore this section is not
applicable.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area Name Description Persistence
Type
HSM GSRAM The global SRAM stores keys for use by the HSM Dynamic
HSM Fast-path
Key Vault
The HSM fast-path key vault stores 256 bit keys exclusively for the HSM
AES-GCM and AES-XTS (fast-path)
Dynamic
HSM UPKA SRAM Internal SRAM for HSM UPKA Dynamic
HSM RNG
Registers
Internal registers used by HSM DRBG Dynamic
HSP KSU The key storage unit contains memory that stores keys for use by the
HSP
Dynamic
HSP SRAM The HSP SRAM stores keys for use by the HSP Dynamic
HSP PKA SRAM Internal SRAM for HSP PKA Dynamic
HSP RNG Registers Internal registers used by HSP DRBG Dynamic
Fuses HSP fuse storage Static
Table 18: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or Algorithm
DDI Import of
Non-fast Path
Keys
Outside
entity
HSM
GSRAM
Encrypted Automated Electronic HSM AES-KWP
unwrapping (KTS)
DDI Import of
Fast Path Keys
Outside
entity
HSM Fast-
path Key
Vault
Encrypted Automated Electronic HSM AES-KWP
unwrapping (KTS)
DDI Public
Key Export
HSM
GSRAM
Outside
entity
Plaintext Automated Electronic
DDI Import of
AES-KWP
Keys
Outside
entity
HSM
GSRAM
Encrypted Automated Electronic HSM RSA key
decapsulation (KTS)
DDI Import of
PIN
Outside
entity
HSM
GSRAM
Encrypted Automated Electronic HSM AES-CBC
decryption + HSM
HMAC
Import of
Public Key
into HSP KSU
Outside
entity
HSP KSU Plaintext Automated Electronic
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Table 19: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Power-on
reset
Zeroizes SSPs The module performs a power-on reset which
overwrites SSPs with zeroes or with random
data. The availability of the module and
responsiveness to operator requests indicates
that zeroization was completed.
Power-cycling
Automatic Automatically
zeroized by the
module when no
longer needed
The module overwrites SSPs with zeroes or
with random data. The successful completion
of the cryptographic service which generates
and zeroizes the SSP indicates that zeroization
was completed.
N/A
Fuse
zeroization
Zeroizes fuse secrets The module overwrites fuse secrets with ones.
The destruction of the module indicates that
zeroization was completed.
Transitioning the
module to the
RETEST state
Table 20: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
RSA
Wrapping
key
Sent to the
operator who
will encrypt
SSPs outside
the module
before
importing them
into the
module
2048 -
112
Public key -
PSP
RSA KeyGen
RSA
Unwrapping
key
Used in RSA-
OAEP key un-
encapsulation
2048 -
112
Private key -
CSP
RSA KeyGen HSM RSA key
decapsulation
(KTS)
HSM AES
Key
Used for
symmetric
encryption and
decryption
128, 192,
256 -
128, 192,
256
Symmetric key
- CSP
HSM
random
number
generation
HSM HKDF
HSM
KBKDF
HSM AES-
KWP
unwrapping
(KTS)
HSM AES-
XTS
decryption
HSM AES-
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
XTS
encryption
HSM AES-
CBC
encryption
HSM AES-
CBC
decryption
HSM AES-
CBC
decryption +
HSM HMAC
HSP AES
Key
Used for
symmetric
encryption and
decryption
128, 192,
256 -
128, 192,
256
Symmetric key
- CSP
HSP random
number
generation
HSP HKDF
HSP AES-
KWP
wrapping
(KTS)
HSP AES-
KWP
unwrapping
(KTS)
HSP AES-
GCM
encryption
HSP AES-
GCM
decryption
HSM
Entropy
Input
Used to form
DRBG seed
1024 -
512
Entropy - CSP HSM
Entropy
Source
HSM random
number
generation
HSM DRBG
Seed
Used to
instantiate
DRBG
888 - 256 DRBG seed -
CSP
HSM
random
number
generation
HSM random
number
generation
HSM DRBG
Internal
State
Used to
generate
random
numbers
V = 512
bits, Key
= 512
bits - 256
DRBG internal
state - CSP
HSM
random
number
generation
HSM random
number
generation
HSP Entropy
Input
Used to form
DRBG seed
1024 -
512
Entropy - CSP HSP Entropy
Source
HSP random
number
generation
HSP DRBG
Seed
Used to
instantiate
DRBG
888 - 256 DRBG seed -
CSP
HSP random
number
generation
HSP random
number
generation
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
HSP DRBG
Internal
State
Used to
generate
random
numbers
V = 512
bits, Key
= 512
bits - 256
DRBG internal
state - CSP
HSP random
number
generation
HSP random
number
generation
HSM ECC
public key
ECC public key P-256, P-
384, P-
521 -
128, 192,
256
Public key -
PSP
HSM ECDSA
KeyGen
HSM ECDH
shared secret
computation
HSM ECC
private key
ECC private
key
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 -
128, 192,
256
Private key -
CSP
HSM ECDSA
KeyGen
HSM ECDSA
SigGen
component
HSP ECDH
private key
ECC private
key
P-384 -
192
Private key -
CSP
HSP ECDH
KeyGen
HSP ECDH
shared secret
computation
HSP ECDH
public key
ECC public key P-384 -
192
Public key -
PSP
HSP ECDH
KeyGen
HSP ECDH
shared secret
computation
HSM ECDH
Secret
ECDH shared
secret
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 -
128, 192,
256
Shared secret -
CSP
HSM ECDH
shared secret
computation
HSM HKDF
HSP ECDH
Secret
ECDH shared
secret
P-384 -
192
Shared secret -
CSP
HSP ECDH
shared secret
computation
HSP HKDF
HSM RSA
public key
RSA public key 2048,
3072,
4096-bit
modulus
- 112,
128, 149
Public key -
PSP
HSM RSA
signature
generation
component
HSM RSA
decryption
component
HSM RSA
private key
RSA private
key
2048,
3072,
4096-bit
modulus
- 112,
128, 149
Private key -
CSP
HSM RSA
signature
generation
component
HSM RSA
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
decryption
component
HSM
Operator
PIN
Used for
operator
authenticaton
128 - 128 Authentication
PIN - CSP
Intermediate
key
generation
value
Intermediate
value generated
during key pair
generation
256-2048
- 128-
256
Intermediate
key generation
value - CSP
HSM HMAC
key
Key used for
HMAC
256, 384,
512 -
128-256
Symmetric key
- CSP
HSM HKDF
HSM
KBKDF
HSM HMAC
HSM key
derivation
key
Symmetric key
derivation key
used in KBKDF
256, 384,
528 - 256
Symmetric key
- CSP
HSM HKDF HSM KBKDF
Fuse secrets Used by
KBKDF
32 - N/A Key derivation
key - CSP
HSP KBKDF
HSP key
derivation
key
Used by
KBKDF
256, 384
- 256
Symmetric key
- CSP
HSP KBKDF HSP KBKDF
HSP ECDSA
private key
(DICE)
Used by
ECDSA SigGen
P-384 -
192
Private key -
CSP
HSP DICE
key
derivation
HSP ECDSA
SigGen for
DICE
attestation
Table 21: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
RSA
Wrapping key
DDI
Public
Key
Export
HSP
SRAM:Plaintext
HSM
GSRAM:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
Intermediate key
generation
value:Generated
from
RSA
Unwrapping
key
HSP
SRAM:Plaintext
HSM
GSRAM:Plaintext
HSM UPKA
SRAM:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
Intermediate key
generation
value:Generated
from
HSM AES
Key
DDI
Import
HSM
GSRAM:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
of Non-
fast Path
Keys
DDI
Import
of Fast
Path
Keys
DDI
Import
of AES-
KWP
Keys
HSM Fast-path Key
Vault:Plaintext
HSP AES Key HSP KSU:Plaintext Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSM Entropy
Input
HSM RNG
Registers:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSM DRBG
Seed:Used to
generate
HSM DRBG
Seed
HSM RNG
Registers:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSM Entropy
Input:Generated
from
HSM DRBG
Internal
State:Used to
generate
HSM DRBG
Internal State
HSM RNG
Registers:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSM DRBG
Seed:Generated
from
HSP Entropy
Input
HSP RNG
Registers:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSP DRBG
Seed:Used to
generate
HSP DRBG
Seed
HSP RNG
Registers:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSP Entropy
Input:Generated
from
HSP Internal
State:Used to
generate
HSP DRBG
Internal State
HSP RNG
Registers:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSP DRBG
Seed:Generated
from
HSM ECC
public key
DDI
Import
HSM
GSRAM:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSM ECC private
key:Paired With
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
of Non-
fast Path
Keys
DDI
Public
Key
Export
HSM UPKA
SRAM:Plaintext
HSM ECDH
Secret:Used to
derive
Intermediate key
generation
value:Generated
from
HSM ECC
private key
DDI
Import
of Non-
fast Path
Keys
HSM
GSRAM:Plaintext
HSM UPKA
SRAM:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSM ECC public
key:Paired With
HSM ECDH
Secret:Used to
derive
Intermediate key
generation
value:Generated
from
HSP ECDH
private key
HSP PKA
SRAM:Plaintext
HSP KSU:Plaintext
Copy in HSP PKA
SRAM: Until key
generation is
completed. Copy in
HSP KSU: Until the
module is reset
Power-on
reset
Automatic
HSP ECDH public
key:Paired With
HSP ECDH
Secret:Used to
derive
Intermediate key
generation
value:Generated
from
HSP ECDH
public key
Import
of Public
Key into
HSP
KSU
HSP PKA
SRAM:Plaintext
HSP KSU:Plaintext
Copy in HSP PKA
SRAM: Until key
generation is
completed. Copy in
HSP KSU: Until the
module is reset
Power-on
reset
Automatic
HSP ECDH
private key:Paired
With
HSP ECDH
Secret:Used to
derive
Intermediate key
generation
value:Generated
from
HSM ECDH
Secret
HSM
GSRAM:Plaintext
HSM UPKA
SRAM:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSM ECC public
key:Derived From
HSM ECC private
key:Derived From
HSP ECDH
Secret
HSP PKA
SRAM:Plaintext
HSP KSU:Plaintext
Copy in HSP PKA
SRAM: Until key
generation is
completed. Copy in
Power-on
reset
Automatic
HSP ECDH
private
key:Derived From
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
HSP KSU: Until the
module is reset
HSP ECDH public
key:Derived From
HSM RSA
public key
DDI
Import
of Non-
fast Path
Keys
DDI
Public
Key
Export
HSM
GSRAM:Plaintext
HSM UPKA
SRAM:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSM RSA private
key:Paired With
HSM RSA
private key
DDI
Import
of Non-
fast Path
Keys
HSM
GSRAM:Plaintext
HSM UPKA
SRAM:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSM RSA public
key:Paired With
HSM
Operator PIN
DDI
Import
of PIN
HSM
GSRAM:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
Intermediate
key
generation
value
HSM UPKA
SRAM:Plaintext
HSP PKA
SRAM:Plaintext
HSP
SRAM:Plaintext
Copy in HSM UPKA
SRAM: Until key
generation is
completed. Copy in
HSP PKA SRAM:
Until key generation
is completed. Copy in
HSP KSU: Until the
module is reset
Power-on
reset
Automatic
RSA Wrapping
key:Used to
generate
RSA Unwrapping
key:Used to
generate
HSM ECC public
key:Used to
generate
HSM ECC private
key:Used to
generate
HSP ECDH
private key:Used
to generate
HSP ECDH public
key:Used to
generate
HSM HMAC
key
HSM
GSRAM:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSM key
derivation
key
HSM
GSRAM:Plaintext
Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSM AES
Key:Used to
generate
HSM HMAC
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
key:Used to
generate
Fuse secrets Fuses:Plaintext Until fuse zeroization
is performed
Fuse
zeroization
HSP key
derivation
key:Used to derive
HSP key
derivation
key
HSP KSU:Plaintext Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
Fuse
secrets:Derived
From
HSP ECDSA
private key
(DICE):Used to
derive
HSP ECDSA
private key
(DICE)
HSP KSU:Plaintext Until the module is
reset
Power-on
reset
HSP key
derivation
key:Derived From
Table 22: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
Beginning in 2031, keys providing 112 bits of security strength shall no longer be used to apply cryptographic
protection and are limited to legacy use for processing, as specified in Table 4 of NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5.
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10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
N/A for this module.
The module does not perform any pre-operational test.
The integrity test is not applied for ROM firmware as the vendor claims the memory technology will not
degrade for 10 years after the date of manufacture, in compliance with FIPS 140-3 IG 5.A. The end-of-life
procedures described in Section 11.4 of this Security Policy shall be followed before 10 years have elapsed from
the date of manufacture.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or Test Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
HSP AES-GCM
(encryption)
256-bit key KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Encryption Power-up
HSP AES-GCM
(decryption)
256-bit key KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Decryption Power-up
RSA KeyGen 2048 bits PCT PCT Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Encryption &
decryption
After every
RSA key
generation
HSP KBKDF HMAC-
SHA2-384;
384-bit key
KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Key based key
derivation
function
Power-up
HSP
HMAC_DRBG
512-bit
entropy input
for
instantiation;
512-bit
entropy input
for reseeding
KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Deterministic
Random Bit
Generator;
instantiate,
generate and
reseed health
test per section
11.3 of the SP
800-90Ar1
Power-up
HSP HKDF HMAC-SHA-
256; 176-bit
input key;
104-bit salt;
KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
HMAC based
key derivation
function
Power-up
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
592-bit
output key
HSP AES-KWP
(wrapping)
256-bit key KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Key wrapping Power-up
HSP AES-KWP
(unwrapping)
256-bit key KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Key
unwrapping
Power-up
HSP ECDH SSC P-384 KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Shared secret
computation
Power-up
HSP ECDH
KeyGen
N/A PCT PCT Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Re-calculation
of public key
After every
HSP ECDH
key
generation
HSP ECDSA
SigVer (ROM)
P-384 with
SHA-384
KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Signature
verification
Before the
integrity/load
test is
performed
HSM AES-ECB 256-bit KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Decryption Power-up
HSM AES-KWP 256-bit KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Key
unwrapping
Power-up
HSM KBKDF HMAC-SHA-
512; 512-bit
input key;
320-bit
output key
KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Key-based key
derivation
function
Power-up
HSM HKDF HMAC-SHA-
256; 256-bit
input key;
256-bit
output key
KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
HMAC-based
key derivation
function
Power-up
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
HSM AES-CBC
(encryption)
256-bit key KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Encryption Power-up
HSM AES-CBC
(decryption)
256-bit key KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Decryption Power-up
HSM AES-XTS
(encryption)
256-bit key KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Encryption Power-up
HSM AES-XTS
(decryption)
256-bit key KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Decryption Power-up
HSM
HMAC_DRBG
1024-bit
entropy input
for
instantiation;
512-bit
entropy input
for reseeding
KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Deterministic
Random Bit
Generator
Power-up
16 Self-tests of the
16 HSM RSA-
OAEP Un-
encapsulation
Implementations
(one self-test on
each of the 16
UPKA instances)
2048 bit
modulus;
SHA-256
KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Un-
encapsulation
Power-up
16 Self-tests of the
16 HSM RSA
Signature
Generation
Component (with
internal RSA
acceleration)
Implementations
(one self-test on
each of the 16
UPKA instances)
2048 bit
modulus
KAT CAST Implied by
successful
signature
generation
Signature
Generation
Power-up
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
16 Self-tests of the
16 HSM ECDSA
Signature
Generation
Component
Implementations
(one self-test on
each of the 16
UPKA instances)
P-384 KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Signature
generation
component
Power-up
16 Self-tests of the
16 HSM ECDH
Implementations
(one self-test on
each of the 16
UPKA instances)
P-384 KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Shared secret
computation
Power-up
HSM ECDSA
KeyGen
SHA-256 for
P-256; SHA-
384 for P-384;
SHA-512 for
P-512
PCT PCT Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Sign & verify After every
HSM ECDSA
key
generation
operation
HSM ECDH
KeyGen
N/A PCT PCT Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Shared secret
computation
After every
HSM ECDH
key
generation
operation
Start-up APT for
HSM entropy
source
APT cutoff:
802; 1024
samples
APT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
SP 800-90B
health tests
Power-up
Start-up RCT for
HSM entropy
source
RCT cutoff:
51; 1024
samples
RCT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
SP 800-90B
health tests
Power-up
Continuous APT
for HSM entropy
source
APT cutoff:
802; 1024
samples
APT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
SP 800-90B
health tests
Power-up
Continuous RCT
for HSM entropy
source
RCT cutoff:
51
RCT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
SP 800-90B
health tests
Power-up
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Algorithm or Test Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Start-up APT for
HSP entropy
source
APT cutoff:
802; 1024
samples
APT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
SP 800-90B
health tests
Power-up
Start-up RCT for
HSP entropy
source
RCT cutoff:
51; 1024
samples
RCT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
SP 800-90B
health tests
Power-up
Continuous APT
for HSP entropy
source
APT cutoff:
802; 1024
samples
APT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
SP 800-90B
health tests
Power-up
Continuous RCT
for HSP entropy
source
RCT cutoff:
51
RCT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
SP 800-90B
health tests
Power-up
HSP SHA-512 N/A KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Hash function Power-up
HSP ECDSA
SigVer (run-time
implementation)
P-384 with
SHA-384
KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Signature
verification
Power-up
HSP ECDSA
SigGen for DICE
attestation (run-
time
implementation)
P-384 with
SHA-384
KAT CAST Implied by
successful
operation of
the module
Signature
generation
Power-up
HSP ECDSA
SigVer Load Test
(executed by ROM
FW)
P-384 with
SHA-384
FW
load
test
SW/FW
Load
Implied by
successful
operation of
the module;
implied by
successful
completion
of the
firmware
update
service
Signature
verification
On power-up;
when the
firmware
update service
is requested
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests
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10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
N/A for this module.
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
HSP AES-GCM
(encryption)
KAT CAST Once every 15
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSP AES-GCM
(decryption)
KAT CAST Once every 15
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
RSA KeyGen PCT PCT N/A N/A
HSP KBKDF KAT CAST Once every 15
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSP
HMAC_DRBG
KAT CAST Once every 15
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSP HKDF KAT CAST Once every 15
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSP AES-KWP
(wrapping)
KAT CAST Once every 15
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSP AES-KWP
(unwrapping)
KAT CAST Once every 15
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSP ECDH SSC KAT CAST Once every 15
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSP ECDH
KeyGen
PCT PCT N/A N/A
HSP ECDSA
SigVer (ROM)
KAT CAST Once every 15
seconds
Automatically by
the module
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
without external
input or control
HSM AES-ECB KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSM AES-KWP KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSM KBKDF KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSM HKDF KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSM AES-CBC
(encryption)
KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSM AES-CBC
(decryption)
KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSM AES-XTS
(encryption)
KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSM AES-XTS
(decryption)
KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSM
HMAC_DRBG
KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
16 Self-tests of the
16 HSM RSA-
OAEP Un-
encapsulation
KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Implementations
(one self-test on
each of the 16
UPKA instances)
16 Self-tests of the
16 HSM RSA
Signature
Generation
Component (with
internal RSA
acceleration)
Implementations
(one self-test on
each of the 16
UPKA instances)
KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
16 Self-tests of the
16 HSM ECDSA
Signature
Generation
Component
Implementations
(one self-test on
each of the 16
UPKA instances)
KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
16 Self-tests of the
16 HSM ECDH
Implementations
(one self-test on
each of the 16
UPKA instances)
KAT CAST Once every 60
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSM ECDSA
KeyGen
PCT PCT N/A N/A
HSM ECDH
KeyGen
PCT PCT N/A N/A
Start-up APT for
HSM entropy
source
APT CAST On-demand By requesting the
self-test service
Start-up RCT for
HSM entropy
source
RCT CAST On-demand By requesting the
self-test service
Continuous APT
for HSM entropy
source
APT CAST Continuously Continuously as
the noise source
generates data
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Continuous RCT
for HSM entropy
source
RCT CAST Continuously Continuously as
the noise source
generates data
Start-up APT for
HSP entropy
source
APT CAST On-demand By requesting the
self-test service
Start-up RCT for
HSP entropy
source
RCT CAST On-demand By requesting the
self-test service
Continuous APT
for HSP entropy
source
APT CAST Continuously Continuously as
the noise source
generates data
Continuous RCT
for HSP entropy
source
RCT CAST Continuously Continuously as
the noise source
generates data
HSP SHA-512 KAT CAST Once every 15
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSP ECDSA
SigVer (run-time
implementation)
KAT CAST Once every 15
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSP ECDSA
SigGen for DICE
attestation (run-
time
implementation)
KAT CAST Once every 15
seconds
Automatically by
the module
without external
input or control
HSP ECDSA
SigVer Load Test
(executed by ROM
FW)
FW load test SW/FW Load N/A N/A
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Normal
Crash
The module
crashes.
Failure of any
self-test except
for the start-up
HSP APT/RCT,
The module
automatically
detects that it
Implicit indicator: for around 1
second, the module becomes
unresponsive to any input and all data
output and cryptographic operations
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Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
and continuous
HSM APT/RCT
crashed and
resets itself.
are blocked; after around 1 second,
the module automatically recovers
from the error state by resetting itself
(which triggers the pre-operational
self-tests and power-on CASTs)
Hard
Crash
The module
crashes and must
be power cycled
to recover from
this hard crash.
Failure of the
start-up HSP
APT/RCT or
continuous HSM
APT/RCT
Power cycle of
the module
Implicit indicator: the module
becomes unresponsive to any input
and all data output and cryptographic
operations are blocked; the module
does not automatically recover from
the error state - the operator must
power cycle the module to clear the
error state.
Table 25: Error States
All data output through the data output interface and all cryptographic operations are inhibited in every error
state.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The module does not require any user installation or configuration after delivery from the silicon
manufacturing facility.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The module must be inspected physically for tamper evidence before use.
The operator must invoke the module name service and verify that it returns “Microsoft HSM Cryptographic
Module”.
The operator must invoke the module version service and verify that it returns “3.4.2.3-50917001fips” for the
boot-time firmware, “3.3.6.4-60108004fips” for the run-time firmware, and “M1244265-004 B0” for the HW
and ROM FW version.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
There is no non-administrator guidance.
11.4 End of Life
When the module needs to be securely sanitized, the operator must perform the zeroization method “Power-on
reset” and then perform the zeroization method “Fuse zeroization” as described in Section 9.3 of this Security
Policy.
When the module needs to be securely destroyed, it must be transitioned to the RETEST state.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This module does not implement security mechanisms to mitigate other attacks. Therefore, this section is not
applicable.
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A Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
API Application Programming Interface
CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
EFP/EFT Environmental Failure Protection/Environmental Failure Testing
ESV Entropy Source Validation
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IG Implementation Guidance
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
KSU Key Storage Unit
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PCT Pair-wise Consistency Test
PSP Public Security Parameter
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with Cipher Text Stealing