### Persistent Systems, LLC Wave Relay® Kernel Space Crypto Module ### FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy ### Document Version: 1.5 Date: January 14, 2026 Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 1 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### Table of Contents | 1 - General | ................................................................................................................................ 5 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1.1 Overview | .......................................................................................................................... 5 | | 1.2 Security Levels | ................................................................................................................. 5 | | 2 - Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................................... | 6 | | 2.1 Description | ....................................................................................................................... 6 | | 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification | ........................................ 8 | | 2.3 Excluded Components | ...................................................................................................... 9 | | 2.4 Modes of Operation | .......................................................................................................... 9 | | 2.5 Algorithms | .......................................................................................................................10 | | 2.6 Security Function Implementations ..................................................................................14 | | | 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information | .........................................................................................17 | | 2.8 RBG and Entropy | ............................................................................................................17 | | 2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................18 | | | 2.10 Key Establishment | .........................................................................................................18 | | 2.11 Industry Protocols | ..........................................................................................................18 | | 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................19 | | | 3.1 Ports and Interfaces | ........................................................................................................19 | | 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication .......................................................................................20 | | | 4.1 Authentication Methods | ...................................................................................................20 | | 4.2 Roles | ...............................................................................................................................20 | | 4.3 Approved Services | ..........................................................................................................20 | | 4.4 Non-Approved Services | ...................................................................................................23 | | 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded | ................................................................................24 | | 5 Software/Firmware Security | ...................................................................................................25 | | 5.1 Integrity Techniques | ........................................................................................................25 | | 5.2 Initiate on Demand | ..........................................................................................................25 | | 6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................26 | | | 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements | ..........................................................26 | | 6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions | ...........................................................................26 | | 7 Physical Security | ....................................................................................................................27 | | 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................27 | | | 8 Non-Invasive Security | ............................................................................................................28 | | 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ..........................................................................29 | | | 9.1 Storage Areas | .................................................................................................................29 | | 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods | ..............................................................................................29 | | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version | 1.3 Page 2 of 44 | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ................................................................................................29 9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................30 10 Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................32 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................32 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ....................................................................................................32 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ........................................................................................36 10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................40 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .....................................................................................40 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................40 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..........................................................40 11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................40 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ..........................................................................................41 11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................41 Rules of Operation .............................................................................................................41 11.6 End of Life .....................................................................................................................41 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................41 References and Definitions .......................................................................................................43 Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 3 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). #### List of Tables | Table 1: Security Levels ............................................................................................................. | 5 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) | .... 8 | | Table 3: Tested Module Identification - Hybrid Disjoint Hardware .............................................. | 9 | | Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid | .................................. 9 | | Table 5: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................10 | | | Table 6: Approved Algorithms | ...................................................................................................12 | | Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms .......................................................................13 | | | Table 8: Security Function Implementations ..............................................................................16 | | | Table 9: Entropy Certificates | .....................................................................................................17 | | Table 10: Entropy Sources ........................................................................................................17 | | | Table 11: Ports and Interfaces | ..................................................................................................19 | | Table 12: Authentication Methods | .............................................................................................20 | | Table 13: Roles | .........................................................................................................................20 | | Table 14: Approved Services | ....................................................................................................23 | | Table 15: Non-Approved Services.............................................................................................24 | | | Table 16: Storage Areas | ...........................................................................................................29 | | Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods ........................................................................................29 | | | Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods | ..........................................................................................29 | | Table 19: SSP Table 1 | ..............................................................................................................31 | | Table 20: SSP Table 2 | ..............................................................................................................31 | | Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests | ........................................................................................32 | | Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests | ...............................................................................................36 | | Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .........................................................................36 | | | Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information ................................................................................39 | | | Table 25: Error States | ...............................................................................................................40 | | Table 26 - References ..................................................................................................................43 | | | Table 27 - Acronyms and Definitions | .............................................................................................44 | | List of Figures | | | Figure 1- Cryptographic Boundary ............................................................................................. | 7 | | Figure 2 - Physical Perimeter | ..................................................................................................... 8 | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 4 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### 1 -General ## 1.1 Overview This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 1.1 of the Persistent Systems LLC Wave Relay® Kernel Space Crypto Module. It contains the security rules under which the Module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 2 module. ## 1.2 Security Levels The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows from Table 1: | Section | Title | Security Level | |-----------|-----------------------------------------|------------------| | 1 | General | 2 | | 2 | Cryptographic module specification | 2 | | 3 | Cryptographic module interfaces | 2 | | 4 | Roles, services, and authentication | 2 | | 5 | Software/Firmware security | 2 | | 6 | Operational environment | 2 | | 7 | Physical security | 2 | | 8 | Non-invasive security | N/A | | 9 | Sensitive security parameter management | 2 | | 10 | Self-tests | 2 | | 11 | Life-cycle assurance | 2 | | 12 | Mitigation of other attacks | N/A | | | Overall Level | 2 | Table 1: Security Levels Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 5 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### 2 -Cryptographic Module Specification FIPS validated connectivity drives mission success. This Persistent Systems LLC Wave Relay® Kernel Space Crypto Module, hereafter denoted as the 'module', is a Software -Hybrid cryptographic module operating on a single-chip device that provides FIPS validated cryptographic algorithms which are used by kernel space system services & protocols (e.g. Wave Relay, IPsec, etc.) The Wave Relay® System is a peer-to-peer wireless MANET networking solution in which there is no master node. If any device fails, the rest of the devices continue to communicate using any remaining connectivity. By eliminating master nodes, gateways, access points, and central coordinators from the design, Wave Relay® delivers high levels of fault tolerance regardless of which nodes might fail. ## 2.1 Description ###### Purpose and Use: The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated cryptography. The module is intended to be used in various products within the vendor's portfolio of solutions. Built to create powerful, secure networks anywhere, the Module is used to unite all critical data sources in real time giving you and your team the confidence to make difficult decisions in the heart of the moment. Module Type : Software-hybrid Module Embodiment : SingleChip ####### Cryptographic Boundary: The Module is a single-chip embodiment. Figure 1 below shows a block diagram of the cryptographic boundary. The cryptographic boundary is outlined in red and defined as a combination of the software kernel library (FIPS140.ko) and the hardware crypto IP core within the NXP i.MX 6 Series SoC (System on a Chip). The disjoint hardware component is the hardware-only cryptographic algorithms and entropy source depicted on the left side of Figure 1 under 'Crypto Accelerator and Assurance Module (CAAM)'. The software component is the 'FIPS Kernel Module' on the right s ide of Figure 1, which includes the SW Crypto Functions (which may utilize PAA), as well as the FIPS Self-Test implementations and CAAM Driver. The Module supports both hardware (Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module (CAAM)) and software based cryptographic operation. The flow of information between the components and the relation between data and the M odule's interfaces are depicted through arrows. Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP): Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material - Version 1.3 Page 6 of 44 May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). The TOEPP of the Module is depicted in Figure 2 below.The TOEPP is the NXP i.MX6 SOC. Figure 1- Cryptographic Boundary Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 7 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). There are four physical variants of the chip as shown in Figure 2 below. Figure 2 - Physical Perimeter ## 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ####### Tested Module Identification -Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets): The cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environments: Table 2: Tested Module Identification -Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) | Package or File Name | Software/ Firmware Version | Features | Integrity Test | |------------------------|------------------------------|------------|------------------| | Wave Relay | 1.1 | | HMAC-SHA2-256 | ####### Tested Module Identification -Hybrid Disjoint Hardware: The cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environments: | Model and/or Part Number | Hardware Version | Firmware Version | Processors | Features | |----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------|------------| | MCIMX6Q6AVT10AE | MCIMX6Q6AVT10AE | | | | | MCIMX6Q6AVT10AD | MCIMX6Q6AVT10AD | | | | | MSCMMX6QZCK08AB | MSCMMX6QZCK08AB | | | | | MCIMX6Q7CZK08AE | MCIMX6Q7CZK08AE | | | | Version 1.3 Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Page 8 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table 3: Tested Module Identification -Hybrid Disjoint Hardware ####### Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid: Wave Relay® Kernel Space Crypto Module cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environments. Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid | Operating System | Hardware Platform | Processors | PAA/PAI | Hypervisor or Host OS | Version(s) | |--------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------------|--------------| | Wave Relay® OS 2.2 | MPU (5th Generation) | MCIMX6Q6AVT10AE | Yes | | 1.1 | | Wave Relay® OS 2.2 | MPU (5th Generation) | MCIMX6Q6AVT10AD | Yes | | 1.1 | | Wave Relay® OS 2.2 | Embedded Module | MCIMX6Q7CZK08AE | Yes | | 1.1 | | Wave Relay® OS 2.2 | Embedded Module lite | MCIMX6Q7CZK08AE | Yes | | 1.1 | | Wave Relay® OS 2.2 | Embedded Module | MSCMMX6QZCK08AB | Yes | | 1.1 | | Wave Relay® OS 2.2 | Embedded Module lite | MSCMMX6QZCK08AB | Yes | | 1.1 | | Wave Relay® OS 2.2 | GVR5 | MCIMX6Q7CZK08AE | Yes | | 1.1 | | Wave Relay® OS 2.2 | Integrated Antenna Series | MCIMX6Q7CZK08AE | Yes | | 1.1 | ## 2.3 Excluded Components No components were excluded from the cryptographic boundary. ## 2.4 Modes of Operation Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 9 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ####### Modes List and Description: The Module supports an Approved mode and Non-Approved mode of operation. The Module does not support a degraded mode. Table 5: Modes List and Description | Mode Name | Description | Type | Status Indicator | |---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------| | Approved | The module supports Approved services in the Approved mode of operation. Non-Approved services are not supported in this mode. | Approved | fips140_service_indicator = 1 | | Non- Approved | The module is capable of non- approved services in the non-approved mode of operation only. | Non- Approved | fips140_service_indicator = 0 | ####### Mode Change Instructions and Status: The module provides a service level indicator. All Approved services will indicate they are Approved services and all non-Approved services will indicate they are non-Approved. No additional configuration or initialization is required. ## 2.5 Algorithms ####### Approved Algorithms: The Module implements cryptographic algorithms in the following providers: - Wave Relay® Kernel Space Crypto Module (HW) version 1.0 (Cert. #A4588) - Wave Relay® Kernel Space Crypto Module (SW) version 1.0 (Cert. #A4589) Validation certificates for each Approved security function are listed in the table below. | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-------------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | AES-CBC | A4588 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CBC | A4589 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CBC-CS3 | A4589 | Direction - decrypt, encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CCM | A4589 | Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38C | | AES-CMAC | A4589 | Direction - Generation, Verification Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38B | | AES-CTR | A4588 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 10 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |------------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | AES-CTR | A4589 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-ECB | A4588 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-ECB | A4589 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-GCM | A4589 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External, Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38D | | AES-GMAC | A4589 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External, Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38D | | AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 | A4589 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256 | SP 800-38E | | Counter DRBG | A4589 | Prediction Resistance - No, Yes Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | | Hash DRBG | A4589 | Prediction Resistance - No, Yes Mode - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-512 | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | | HMAC DRBG | A4589 | Prediction Resistance - No, Yes Mode - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-512 | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | | HMAC-SHA-1 | A4588 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524280 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA-1 | A4589 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524280 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-224 | A4588 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524280 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-224 | A4589 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524280 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-256 | A4588 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524280 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-256 | A4589 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524280 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-384 | A4589 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524280 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-512 | A4589 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524280 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA3-224 | A4589 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524280 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA3-256 | A4589 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524280 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 11 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | HMAC-SHA3-384 | A4589 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524280 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA3-512 | A4589 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524280 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A4589 | Signature Type - PKCS 1.5 Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 | FIPS 186-4 | | SHA-1 | A4588 | Message Length - Message Length: 160, 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA-1 | A4589 | Message Length - Message Length: 160, 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-224 | A4588 | Message Length - Message Length: 224, 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-224 | A4589 | Message Length - Message Length: 224, 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-256 | A4588 | Message Length - Message Length: 256, 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-256 | A4589 | Message Length - Message Length: 256, 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-384 | A4589 | Message Length - Message Length: 384, 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A4589 | Message Length - Message Length: 512, 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA3-224 | A4589 | Message Length - Message Length: 0- 65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 202 | | SHA3-256 | A4589 | Message Length - Message Length: 0- 65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 202 | | SHA3-384 | A4589 | Message Length - Message Length: 0- 65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 202 | | SHA3-512 | A4589 | Message Length - Message Length: 0- 65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 202 | Table 6: Approved Algorithms ####### Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms: The Module does not support any vendor affirmed cryptographic algorithms. N/A for this module. ###### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms: The module does not implement any Non-Approved, but Allowed Algorithms in the Approved Mode of Operation. Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 12 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). N/A for this module. ###### Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed: The module does not implement any Non-Approved, Algorithms Allowed with No Security Claimed in the Approved Mode of Operation. N/A for this module. ####### Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms: The Module implements the Non-Approved, Not Allowed cryptographic algorithms listed in the table below. Table 7: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms | Name | Use and Function | |--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | AES (GCM) - Ext IV | GCM with Externally Generated IVs | | AES (GCM) - Hybrid | Hybrid Authenticated Symmetric Encryption/Decryption using internally generated IV HW: Encrypt, Decrypt SW: Message Authentication | | ghash | Message Authentication used independently from AES(GCM) | | AES (CCM) - Hybrid | Hybrid Authenticated Symmetric Encryption/Decryption HW: Encrypt, Decrypt SW: Message Authentication | | AES (cbcmac) | Message Authentication used independently from AES(CCM) | | AES (CTS) | Cipher Text Stealing | | AES (XTS) - Hybrid | Hybrid Disk Encryption HW: First encryption SW: Second encryption | | ENT (SW) | Software Entropy Source (Jitterentropy) for DRBG Seeding | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 13 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ## 2.6 Security Function Implementations The table below shows the Security Function Implementations that the module implements: | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |--------|-----------|-------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | SF1 | BC-Auth | Symmetric Key Data Encryption | Publication:FIPS 197 | AES-CBC: (A4588, A4589) Size: 128, 192, 256 AES-CTR: (A4588, A4589) Size: 128, 192, 256 AES-ECB: (A4588, A4589) Size: 128, 192, 256 AES-CBC-CS3: (A4589) Size: 128, 192, 256 AES-CCM: (A4589) Size: 128, 192, 256 AES-GCM: (A4589) Size: 128, 192, 256 AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0: (A4589) Size: 128, 256 | | SF2 | BC-UnAuth | Symmetric Key Data Decryption | Publication:197 | AES-CBC: (A4588, A4589) Size: 128, 192, 256 AES-CTR: (A4588, A4589) Size: 128, 192, 256 AES-ECB: (A4588, A4589) Size: 128, 192, 256 | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 14 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |--------|--------|------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | SF3 | MAC | Message Authentication Generation/Verification | Publication:FIPS 198, SP800-38B, SP800-38D | Size: 128, 256 AES-CMAC: (A4589) AES-GMAC: (A4589) HMAC-SHA-1: (A4588, A4589) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A4588, A4589) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A4588, A4589) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A4589) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A4589) HMAC-SHA3-224: (A4589) HMAC-SHA3-256: (A4589) HMAC-SHA3-384: (A4589) HMAC-SHA3-512: (A4589) | | SF4 | SHA | Message Digest | Publication:FIPS 180-4, FIPS 202 | SHA-1: (A4588, A4589) | Page 15 of 44 Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table 8: Security Function Implementations | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |--------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | SHA2-224: (A4588, A4589) SHA2-256: (A4588, A4589) SHA2-384: (A4589) SHA2-512: (A4589) SHA3-224: (A4589) SHA3-256: (A4589) SHA3-384: (A4589) SHA3-512: (A4589) | | SF5 | DRBG | Random Number Generation | Publication:SP800-90A | Hash DRBG: (A4589) HMAC DRBG: (A4589) Counter DRBG: (A4589) | | SF6 | DigSig-SigVer | Signature Verification | Publication:186-4 | RSA SigVer (FIPS186- 4): (A4589) Size: 2048, 3072, 4096 | | SF7 | ENT-ESV | Entropy Generation | Publication:SP800-90B | Hash DRBG: (A4589) HMAC DRBG: (A4589) Counter DRBG: (A4589) | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 16 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ## 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information Below are the documentation requirements for specific algorithms and conditions, as mandated by Implementation Guidance. ###### AES GCM IV Uniqueness FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option 2 The IV is generated internally at its entirety randomly. The generation uses an Approved DRBG (Cert. #A4589 ) that is internal to the module's boundary. The IV length is fixed at 96 bits (per SP 800-38D). ###### FIPS140-3 IG C.I The XTS algorithm implementation includes a check prior to use to ensure Key_1 ≠ Key_2 . ###### SHA-1 The use of SHA-1 by the 'Hash' service is only approved for integrity checks and is not approved for use as part of a digital signature. ## 2.8 RBG and Entropy Table 9: Entropy Certificates | Cert Number | Vendor Name | |---------------|--------------------| | E82 | persistent systems | The Module uses the following entropy sources: Table 10: Entropy Sources | Name | Type | Operational Environment | Sample Size | Entropy per Sample | Conditioning Component | |------------------------------------|----------|---------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------------| | Wave Relay Physical Entropy Source | Physical | NXP i.MX 6 | 384 bits | 316 bits | | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 17 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Persistent Systems is using a physical free running ring oscillator to generate entropy input for instantiation and reseed of SP 800-90A compliant DRBGs. The entropy source is the True Random Number Generator (TRNG) sub-component of an NXP i.MX 6 SoC chip. The entropy source performs all required health tests of SP 800-90B, which includes continuous, start-up and on-demand health tests. There are no configurations needed by the operator to use the entropy source in accordance with the Public Use Document for ESV Cert. #E82. Whenever a failure is detected during the health testing, entropy data is not returned to the caller; instead, a failure code is returned to enable the caller to determine the reason for the failure. The entropy source then halts and will refuse new requests for entropy. Upon return of the failure, the operator shall reset or reboot the entropy source. The entropy source will continue to operate after being reset and passing all start-up and continuous health tests. The default Approved DRBG used for random number generation is the HMAC_DRBG (Cert A4589) using SHA2-512. In addition, the module also provides HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG and HASH_DRBG using different mechanisms and key sizes. The DRBGs are all internally seeded by using the entropy source (ESV Cert. #E82). The security strength of the DRBG is determined by the internal mechanism selected (i.e., 256-bits security strength for a CTR_DRBG using AES-256). The operator shall select the appropriate DRBG mechanism for the security strength required when using the 'Random Bit Generation' service . ## 2.9 Key Generation The module does not support Key Generation Functions. ## 2.10 Key Establishment ####### Key Agreement Information The module does not support Key Agreement Functions. ####### Key Transport Information The module does not support Key Transport Functions. ## 2.11 Industry Protocols The module does not implement any Industry Protocols. Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 18 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ## 3.1 Ports and Interfaces The Module's ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed below. | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |-----------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | N/A | Control Input | o API input arguments that are used to initialize and control the operation of the module o API Commands invoking cryptographic services | | N/A | Data Input | o API input arguments that provide input data for processing o Data to be encrypted, decrypted, verified, or hashed o Keys to be used in cryptographic services | | N/A | Data Output | o API output arguments that return generated or processed data back to the caller o Data that has been encrypted, decrypted or verified o Hashes o Random Values generated by the module's DRBG o Random seed material for other module DRBGs | | N/A | Status Output | o API call return values o Status information regarding the module | | N/A | Power | N/A | Table 11: Ports and Interfaces Note: The module does not support Control Output. Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 19 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### 4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ## 4.1 Authentication Methods Table 12: Authentication Methods | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |---------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Role Based Authentication | Signature Verification | SF6 | RSA 3072-bit has a security strength of 128 bits. The probability of successfully guessing the private key is 1/(2^128). | Each authentication attempt takes approximately 8.4 seconds, which results in a maximum of seven authentication attempts per minute. The probably of a brute force attack being successful within a given minute is 7/(2^128). | ## 4.2 Roles The Module supports one distinct operator role, Crypto Officer (CO). One authentication is allowed per Module reset. The Module does not support concurrent operators. The Cryptographic Officer's authentication public key is protected by the physical and logical design of the Module; it is stored as part of the Module binary itself. The Roles Table below lists all operator roles supported by the Module. Table 13: Roles | Name | Type | Operator Type | Authentication Methods | |-----------------------|--------|-----------------|---------------------------| | Cryptographic Officer | Role | CO | Role Based Authentication | ## 4.3 Approved Services All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below: The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as: - G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP. - R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output). - W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module (SSP is input). - E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. - Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 20 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Descript ion | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Securi ty Funct ions | SSP Access | |----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------| | Module Self- Test | Perform module initializat ion, pre- operation al, and condition al cryptogra phic algorith m self- tests. | fips_get_tests_pass ed() | Power | Pass/Fail Status | None | Cryptogra phic Officer - Software Integrity Key: E | | Login | Authenti cate to the module. | fips140_get_error() | Authenti cation Signature | Authenti cation Status | SF6 | Cryptogra phic Officer - CO Authentic ation Key: E | | Module Status | Shows module's status | fips140_get_error() | None | Status | None | Cryptogra phic Officer | | Hash | Compute a Message Digest | fips140_service_in dicator()=1 | Message | Hash Value | SF4 | Cryptogra phic Officer | | Show Module Info | Shows module's versionin g informati on | fips140_module_v ersion() | None | Module Base Name + Module Version Number | None | Cryptogra phic Officer | | Symmetric Encryption/De cryption | Encrypti on and decryptio n of data. | fips140_service_in dicator()=1 | AES Key, Plaintext or Cipherte xt | Plaintext or Cipherte xt | SF1 SF2 | Cryptogra phic Officer - AES Key: W,E | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 21 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Descript ion | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Securi ty Funct ions | SSP Access | |----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Keyed MAC | Compute a Message Authenti cation code | fips140_service_in dicator()=1 | Message, HMAC or AES Key | Message Authenti cation Code | SF3 | Cryptogra phic Officer - AES Key: W,E - HMAC Key: W,E | | Random Bit Generation | Generate s random values. Operator must select the appropria te DRBG mechanis m for the security- strength desired. | fips140_service_in dicator()=1 | DRBG Selection | Random Values | SF5 | Cryptogra phic Officer - CTR_DR BG-State: W,E - HMAC_D RBG- State: W,E - HASH_D RBG- State: W,E | | RSA Signature Verification | Signature Verificati on | fips140_service_in dicator()=1 | RSA Public Key, Signature Message | Boolean indicatin g validity of signature | SF6 | Cryptogra phic Officer - RSA Public Key: R,E | | Entropy Generation | Generate entropy for internal or external DRBGs | fips140_service_in dicator()=1 | N/A | Entropy | SF7 | Cryptogra phic Officer - DRBG- EI: G,R | | Zeroisation | Destroys all security | fips140_get_error() =1 | N/A | N/A | None | Cryptogra phic Officer - DRBG- | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 22 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table 14: Approved Services | Name | Descript ion | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Securi ty Funct ions | SSP Access | |--------|----------------|-------------|----------|-----------|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | paramete rs | | | | | EI: Z - CTR_DR BG-State: Z - AES Key: Z - HMAC Key: Z - RSA Public Key: Z - HMAC_D RBG- State: Z - HASH_D RBG- State: Z | ## 4.4 Non-Approved Services All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below: | Name | Description | Algorithms | Role | |------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------| | Authenticated Symmetric Encryption/Decryption | GCM using externally generated IVs | AES (GCM) - Ext IV | CO | | Hybrid Authenticated Symmetric Encryption/Decryption | GCM or CCM encryption/decryption using a hybrid implementation in Hardware and Software | AES (GCM) - Hybrid AES (CCM) - Hybrid | CO | | Hybrid Symmetric Encryption/Decryption | encryption/decryption using a hybrid implementation in Hardware and Software | AES (XTS) - Hybrid | CO | | Authentication Codes | Message Authentication used independent of CCM or GCM | ghash AES (cbcmac) | CO | | Entropy (SW) | Software entropy source | ENT (SW) | CO | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 23 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Table 15: Non-Approved Services | Name | Description | Algorithms | Role | |---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------| | Ciphertext Stealing | AES encryption/decryption using ciphertext/stealing | AES (CTS) | CO | ## 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The module does not support an External Software/Firmware Load capability. Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 24 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### 5 Software/Firmware Security ## 5.1 Integrity Techniques The Module is composed of the following component(s): - Component 1: software cryptographic kernel library - binary - Component 2: hardware-implemented cryptographic algorithms The software component is protected with the authentication technique, HMAC-SHA2-256, as described in Table 16. ## 5.2 Initiate on Demand The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by power cycling the hardware. Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 25 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### 6 Operational Environment ## 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ####### Type of Operational Environment : Modifiable The Module has a modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. The tested operational environments are listed in Section 2.1. The Operating Environment is modifiable and allows the operator to load and execute software. ####### How Requirements are Satisfied : The Module supports a modifiable operational environment. The operator may load and execute software that was not included in the original evaluation as the underlying Wave Relay OS 2.2 operational environment is modifiable. Each instance of a cryptographic module controls its own SSPs and are not owned or controlled by external processes/operators. This requirement is not enforced by administrative documentation and procedures but by the cryptographic module itself. The operational environment provides the capability to separate individual application processes from each other in order to prevent uncontrolled access to CSPs and uncontrolled modification of SSPs ## 6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions All cryptographic software, SPPs and control/status information is under the control of an operating system that implements mandatory access control. The Operating system protects against unauthorized execution, unauthorized modification and unauthorized reading of SSPs and status data. Processes that are spawned by the cryptographic module are owned by the module and are not owned by external processes/operators. The Operating System provides an audit mechanism with the date and time of each audited event. Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 26 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### 7 Physical Security The design and physical security characteristics of the Wave Relay Kernel Space Crypto module meet the intent of the FIPS 140-3 Level 2 Physical Security Requirements, based on the test results described in the physical security test report. The embodiment of the Module is a single chip, which is opaque and also provides tamper evidence. The module has been subjected to FIPS140-3 Level 2 physical security analysis. ## 7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required ###### The module has: - o Production grade components with standard passivation (conformal coating/sealing coating) for environmental protection - o The Module has tamper-evident coating - o Susceptible to evidence of tampering on the external boundary when attempts to gain physical access - o External boundary shall be opaque to prevent knowledge of the critical areas of the module N/A for this module. Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 27 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### 8 Non-Invasive Security The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack. Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 28 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### 9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ## 9.1 Storage Areas | Storage Area Name | Description | Persistence Type | |---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| | System Memory (S1) | Stored in plaintext in volatile memory (RAM). | Dynamic | | Binary (S2) | Stored in plaintext as part of the module binary itself. | Static | Table 16: Storage Areas ## 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distribution Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorithm | |---------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------------| | Input in plaintext (IO1) | Application Software (outside) | System Memory (S1) | Plaintext | Manual | Electronic | | | Output in plaintext (IO2) | System Memory (S1) | Application Software (outside) | Plaintext | Manual | Electronic | | ## 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------| | Z1 | Zeroisation service | Active overwriting of SSP values with 0s in volatile memory | Zeroisation service | | Z2 | Zeroisation upon use | Active overwriting of SSP values with 0s immediately after SSP is no longer needed. | N/A | Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 29 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). 9.4 SSPs All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in Section 4.3 | Name | Description | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Use d By | |------------------|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------| | DRBG-EI | Entropy Input | 387-771 - 128 to 256 | ENT - CSP | SF7 | | SF5 | | CTR_DRBG- State | CTR_DRBG internal state (V and Key) | V is 128, Key is 128 to 256 - 128 to 256 | DRBG - CSP | SF5 | | SF5 | | HMAC_DRB G-State | HMAC_DRBG internal state (V and Key) | V is 160 to 512, Key is 160 to 512 - 128 to 256 | DRBG - CSP | SF5 | | SF5 | | HASH_DRBG -State | HASH_DRBG internal state (V and C) | V is 440 to 888, C is 440 to 888 - 128 to 256 | DRBG - CSP | SF5 | | SF5 | | HMAC Key | Used for Message Authentication | 128 to 512 - 128 to 256 | MAC - CSP | | | SF3 | | AES Key | Used for encryption/decrypti on operations | 128, 192, 256 - 128, 192, 256 | Symmetric - CSP | | | SF1 SF2 | | RSA Public Key | Used for signature verification | 2048, 3072, 4096 - 112, | Asymmetri c - PSP | | | SF6 | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 30 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Name | Description | Size - Strengt h | Type - Category | Generate d By | Establishe d By | Use d By | |------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------|------------| | | | 128, 150 | | | | SF6 | | CO Authentication Key | Used for authenticating the CO | 3072 - 128 | Asymmetri c - PSP | | | SF3 | | Software Integrity Key | Used for module integrity | 256 - 256 | Self-Test - Neither | | | | Table 19: SSP Table 1 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------------------| | DRBG-EI | Output in plaintext (IO2) | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | Until use completes | Z1 Z2 | DRBG- State:Used to derive | | CTR_DRBG- State | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | Until use completes | Z1 Z2 | DRBG- EI:Derived From | | HMAC_DRBG- State | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | Until use completes | Z1 Z2 | DRBG- EI:Derived From | | HASH_DRBG- State | | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | Until use completes | Z1 Z2 | DRBG- EI:Derived From | | HMAC Key | Input in plaintext (IO1) | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | Until use completes | Z1 Z2 | | | AES Key | Input in plaintext (IO1) | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | Until use completes | Z1 Z2 | | | RSA Public Key | Input in plaintext (IO1) | System Memory (S1):Plaintext | Until use completes | Z1 Z2 | | | CO Authentication Key | | Binary (S2):Plaintext | Until use completes | N/A | | | Software Integrity Key | | Binary (S2):Plaintext | Until use completes | N/A | | Table 20: SSP Table 2 Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 31 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### 10 Self-Tests ## 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests The Module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the Module. Per FIPS 140-3 these are categorized as either preoperational self-tests or conditional self-tests. Pre-operational self -tests are available on demand by power cycling the Module. The operator may invoke periodic self-tests by power cycling the module. It is recommended that periodic self-testing be performed weekly. Please note that HMAC-SHA2-256 is self-tested prior to execution of the Software Integrity Test. The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests in table below Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |-------------------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------| | Software Integrity Test | HMAC SHA2- 256 | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | fips_get_tests_passed() | Executed on the kernel module. | ## 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests The Module performs the following conditional self-tests in the table below: | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |-------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------------------|-----------|--------------| | AES-CBC- Encrypt (4588) | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Encrypt | Power-On | | AES-CBC- Decrypt (4588) | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Decrypt | Power-On | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 32 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------------------|-----------|--------------| | AES-CTR Encrypt (4588) | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Encrypt | Power-On | | AES-CTR Decrypt (4588) | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Decrypt | Power-On | | AES-ECB Encrypt (4588) | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Encrypt | Power-On | | AES-ECB Decrypt (4588) | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Decrypt | Power-On | | AES-CBC Encrypt (4589) | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Encrypt | Power-On | | AES-CBC Decrypt (4589) | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Decrypt | Power-On | | AES-CBC-CS3 Encrypt | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Encrypt | Power-On | | AES-CBC-CS3 Decrypt | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Decrypt | Power-On | | AES-CCM Encrypt | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Encrypt | Power-On | | AES-CCM Decrypt | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Decrypt | Power-On | | AES-CMAC (A4589) | Key sizes: 128, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | | AES-CTR Encrypt (4589) | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Encrypt | Power-On | | AES-CTR Decrypt (4589) | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Decrypt | Power-On | | AES-ECB Encrypt (4589) | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Encrypt | Power-On | | AES-ECB Decrypt (4589) | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Decrypt | Power-On | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 33 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| | AES-GCM Encrypt | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Encrypt | Power-On | | AES-GCM Decrypt | Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Decrypt | Power-On | | AES-XTS Encrypt | Key sizes: 128, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Encrypt | Power-On | | AES-XTS Decryt | Key sizes: 128, 256 bits | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Decrypt | Power-On | | Counter DRBG (A4589) | Key size: 128, 192, 256 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | instantiation, generate, and reseed KATs | Power-On | | Hash DRBG (A4589) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | instantiation, generate, and reseed KATs | Power-On | | HMAC DRBG (A4589) | SHA2-256, SHA2-512 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | instantiation, generate, and reseed KATs | Power-On | | Entropy | SP800-90B Health Tests | RCT, APT | CAST | fips140_get_error() | Startup and Continuous RCT and APT per [90B] Section 4.2 and 4.4 | Entropy Generation | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A4588) | SHA-1 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | | HMAC-SHA2- 224 (A4588) | SHA2-224 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 (A4588) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A4589) | SHA-1 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | | HMAC-SHA2- 224 (A4589) | SHA2-224 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 (A4589) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 34 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |--------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------------------|------------------------|--------------| | HMAC-SHA2- 384 (A4589) | SHA2-384 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | | HMAC-SHA2- 512 (A4589) | SHA2-512 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | | HMAC-SHA3- 224 (A4589) | SHA3-224 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | | HMAC-SHA3- 256 (A4589) | SHA3-256 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | | HMAC-SHA3- 384 (A4589) | SHA3-384 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | | HMAC-SHA3- 512 (A4589) | SHA3-512 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Generate | Power-On | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A4589) | Key Size: 3072- bit with SHA2- 384 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Signature Verification | Power-On | | SHA-1 (A4588) | SHA-1 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Message Digest | Power-On | | SHA2-224 (A4588) | SHA2-224 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Message Digest | Power-On | | SHA2-256 (A4588) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Message Digest | Power-On | | SHA-1 (A4589) | SHA-1 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Message Digest | Power-On | | SHA2-224 (A4589) | SHA2-224 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Message Digest | Power-On | | SHA2-256 (A4589) | SHA2-256 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Message Digest | Power-On | | SHA2-384 (A4589) | SHA2-384 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Message Digest | Power-On | | SHA2-512 (A4589) | SHA2-512 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Message Digest | Power-On | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 35 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |---------------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------------------|----------------|--------------| | SHA3-224 (A4589) | SHA3-224 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Message Digest | Power-On | | SHA3-256 (A4589) | SHA3-256 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Message Digest | Power-On | | SHA3-384 (A4589) | SHA3-384 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Message Digest | Power-On | | SHA3-512 (A4589) | SHA3-512 | KAT | CAST | fips_get_tests_passed() | Message Digest | Power-On | Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests ## 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------|-------------------| | Software Integrity Test | KAT | SW/FW Integrity | On Demand | Manually | Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |------------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | AES-CBC-Encrypt (4588) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-CBC-Decrypt (4588) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-CTR Encrypt (4588) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-CTR Decrypt (4588) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 36 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |------------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | AES-ECB Encrypt (4588) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-ECB Decrypt (4588) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-CBC Encrypt (4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-CBC Decrypt (4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-CBC-CS3 Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-CBC-CS3 Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-CCM Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-CCM Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-CMAC (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-CTR Encrypt (4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-CTR Decrypt (4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-ECB Encrypt (4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-ECB Decrypt (4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-GCM Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-GCM Decrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-XTS Encrypt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | AES-XTS Decryt | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | Counter DRBG (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | Hash DRBG (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | HMAC DRBG (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | Entropy | RCT, APT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A4588) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 37 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |---------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | HMAC-SHA2-224 (A4588) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA2-256 (A4588) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA2-224 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA2-256 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA2-384 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA2-512 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA3-224 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA3-256 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA3-384 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | HMAC-SHA3-512 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186- 4) (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA-1 (A4588) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA2-224 (A4588) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA2-256 (A4588) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA-1 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA2-224 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA2-256 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA2-384 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA2-512 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Page 38 of 44 | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |---------------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | SHA3-224 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA3-256 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA3-384 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | | SHA3-512 (A4589) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manually | Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information The operator may invoke periodic self-tests by power cycling the module. It is recommended that periodic self-testing be performed weekly. Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 39 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ## 10.4 Error States Table 25: Error States | Name | Description | Conditions | Recovery Method | Indicator | |--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------| | ES1 | The module fails pre- operational self-tests, conditional self- tests, or authentication. | The Module enters the FIPS_error state | Power cycle the module | fips140_get_error() | ## 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests Self-tests may be initiated on demand by power cycling the module. ### 11 Life-Cycle Assurance ## 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures No end user action is required to startup the module in an approved mode for operation. The module is built into the Wave Relay® OS and delivered in Persistent Systems' Wave Relay® Solutions. There is no standalone delivery of the module as a software hybrid module. Persistent Systems' internal development process guarantees that the correct version of the module is installed within its intended device OS version. ####### Installation and Initialization: The module is pre-installed within the Persistent Systems Solutions, which include the MPU5, Embedded Module, Embedded Module lite, GVR5, or Integrated Antenna Series. No further initialization of the module is required. Upon powering on the hardware platform, the module will automatically perform pre-operational and conditional self-tests in accordance with FIPS 140-3 requirements. ####### Delivery: The module is pre-installed within the Persistent Systems product offerings. The Persistent Systems products are distributed using a trusted courier and packaging must be inspected upon delivery. ## 11.2 Administrator Guidance Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 40 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). There are no specific management activities required of the Crypto Officer Role to ensure that the module runs securely. However, if any irregular activity is noticed or the module is consistently reporting errors, then Persistent Systems Support should be contacted. ## 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance There are no specific management activities required of the Crypto Officer Role to ensure that the module runs securely. However, if any irregular activity is noticed or the module is consistently reporting errors, then Persistent Systems Support should be contacted. ## 11.4 Design and Rules ###### Rules of Operation 1. The Module provides one distinct operator roles: Cryptographic Officer. 2. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle. 3. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role. 4. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling the Module. 5. All self-tests do not require any operator action. 6. Data output is inhibited during self-tests, zeroisation, and error states. 7. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the Module. 8. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroised by the zeroisation service. 9. The Module does not support concurrent operators. 10. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role. 11. The Module does not support manual SSP establishment method. 12. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data. 13. The Module does not store any plaintext CSPs 14. The Module does not output intermediate key values. 15. The Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces. ## 11.6 End of Life The module must be zeroised and returned to the manufacturer. ### 12 Mitigation of Other Attacks The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks. Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 41 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 42 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). ### References and Definitions The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy. Table 26 -References | Abbreviation | Full Specification Name | |----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | [FIPS140-3] | Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules , March 22, 2019 | | [ISO19790] | International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology - Security techniques - Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017 | | [ISO24759] | International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology - Security techniques - Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15 December 2015 | | [IG] | Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, | | [131A] | Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, Revision 2, March 2019 | | [197] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001 | | [198] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008 | | [180] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015 | | [202] | FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, FIPS PUB 202, August 2015 | | [38A] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001 | | [38B] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005 | | [38C] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, Special Publication 800- 38C, May 2004 | | [38D] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007 | | [38E] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, Special Publication 800-38E, January 2010 | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 43 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision). | Abbreviation | Full Specification Name | |----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | [90A] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, Revision 1, June 2015. | | [90B] | National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018. | Table 27 -Acronyms and Definitions | Acronym | Definition | |-----------|------------------------------| | APT | Adaptative Proportion Test | | KAT | Know Answer Test | | RCT | Repetition Count Test | | SSP | Sensitive Security Parameter | Copyright Persistent Systems, LLC 2025 Version 1.3 Page 44 of 44 Persistent Systems, LLC Public Material -May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).