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Motorola Solutions, Inc.
Motorola Solutions Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) HSM - Security Level 2
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: R01.00.00
Date: August 10, 2026
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 8
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 9
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................13
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................17
2.7.1 AES GCM IV Generation...........................................................................................17
2.7.2 Protocol Information..................................................................................................18
2.7.3 Key Agreement Scheme ...........................................................................................18
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................18
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................19
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................19
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................20
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................20
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................21
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................21
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................22
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................22
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................32
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................32
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................32
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................32
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................33
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................33
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................33
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................34
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required..................................................................................34
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................35
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................36
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................36
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9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................36
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................37
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................39
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................50
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................50
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................50
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................55
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................58
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................59
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................59
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................59
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................59
11.4 Design and Rules ..........................................................................................................59
Rules of Operation.............................................................................................................59
11.5 Maintenance Requirements...........................................................................................60
11.6 End of Life .....................................................................................................................60
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................61
References and Definitions .......................................................................................................62
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..................................................................... 7
Table 3 – Approved Mode Drop-in Algorithms............................................................................ 7
Table 4: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 8
Table 5: Approved Algorithms...................................................................................................12
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................13
Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed.....................................13
Table 8: Security Function Implementations..............................................................................17
Table 9: Entropy Certificates.....................................................................................................18
Table 10: Entropy Sources........................................................................................................19
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................20
Table 12: Authentication Methods.............................................................................................22
Table 13: Roles.........................................................................................................................22
Table 14: Approved Services ....................................................................................................32
Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required ...........................................................................34
Table 16: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................36
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................37
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................38
Table 19: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................43
Table 20: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................49
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................50
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................54
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................55
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................57
Table 25: Error States...............................................................................................................58
Table 26 References.................................................................................................................62
Table 27 Acronyms and Definitions...........................................................................................63
List of Figures
Figure 1 – MACE HSM IC (Top)................................................................................................. 6
Figure 2 – MACE HSM IC (Interfaces) ....................................................................................... 6
Figure 3 – Cryptographic Boundary for the MACE HSM............................................................. 7
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version R05.01.07 of the Motorola
Solutions Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) HSM – Security Level 2 (Also referred to as MACE HSM). It
contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets
the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
140-3) for an overall Security Level 2 module.
1.2 Security Levels
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows from Table 1:
Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
This Motorola Solutions MACE HSM module, hereafter denoted as the Module. The Module is
implemented as a single-chip cryptographic module to meet FIPS 140-3 Level 2 physical security
requirements as defined by FIPS 140-3. The MACE HSM provides all key storage and generation and
performs all crypto processing for the Motorola Solutions ASTRO HSM product.
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3
validated overall security level 2, the Module is intended to be used in ASTRO HSM unit.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Single Chip
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Cryptographic Boundary:
The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The Module is a single-chip
embodiment. The cryptographic boundary is shown in Figure 3 below.
Figure 1 – MACE HSM IC (Top)
Figure 2 – MACE HSM IC (Interfaces)
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Figure 3 – Cryptographic Boundary for the MACE HSM
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
The MACE HSM cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment.
Model
and/or Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware Version Processors Features
5185912T05 5185912 R05.01.07 with [AES256 R01.00.07
and/or AES128 R01.00.05]
5185912
family
N/A
5185912Y03 5185912 R05.01.07 with [AES256 R01.00.07
and/or AES128 R01.00.05]
5185912
family
N/A
5185912Y05 5185912 R05.01.07 with [AES256 R01.00.07
and/or AES128 R01.00.05]
5185912
family
N/A
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
The MACE HSM cryptographic module supports the following approved algorithms which may be
installed separately from the MACE base firmware using the program update service. While the
installation of AES may be done separately, for the purposes of this validation the MACE includes this
firmware.
Table 3 – Approved Mode Drop-in Algorithms
Algorithm* Algorithm FW Version Base FW Version Cert. #
AES128 R01.00.05 R05.01.07 A5274
AES256 R01.00.07 R05.01.07 A5275
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Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
The module does not exclude any components from the cryptographic boundary.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved Operating in approved mode Approved FIPS Status : 0x02
Table 4: Modes List and Description
The MACE HSM is originally non-compliant and must be configured to operate in an approved mode of
operation. The MACE must be installed, initialized and configured, including a required change of the
factory-default password, in order to be in an approved mode. Documented below are the additional
configuration settings that are required for the MACE to be used in an Approved Mode of operation at
overall Security Level 2.
The approved mode is indicated by using the “Module Info” service. The result from this service will
return:
FIPS Status: 0x02
Which indicates that the module is operating in Level 2 Approved Mode.
When the module is in the approved operating mode, the “Module Info” service can be used to verify
the firmware version matches an approved version listed on NIST’s website:
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/validated-modules
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
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The module can be configured to operate in a FIPS 140-3 Approved mode of operation at overall
Security Level 2. To configure the module to operate in the Approved mode, the operator must log in as
the CO using the default password and:
1. Change the default password for CO and User
2. Disable Clear Key Import
3. Disable Clear Key Export
4. Disable Key Loss Key (KLK)
5. Configure one of the options below
a. Configure Key Load Mode to Black Only & Disable FIPS Level 3 Compliant Key Transport
b. Configure Key Load Mode to Red
6. Disable KVL Role
7. Enable FIPS Algorithms Only
Additionally, the Module supports “drop-in algorithms” via the Program Update service. Drop-in
algorithms may be added or removed from the Module independent of the base FW. In order to remain
in the Approved Mode, only Approved algorithms may be loaded into the Module; in particular AES-128
(Cert. #A5274) and/or AES-256 (Cert. # A5275). The loading and unloading of any firmware within the
validated cryptographic module invalidate the Module’s validation and zeroizes all SSPs except those
entered at manufacturing. The Module is then in a non-compliant state.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
The Module implements the Approved cryptographic algorithms listed the table below.
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A5273 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CBC A5274 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128
SP 800-38A
AES-CBC A5275 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB8 A5273 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A5274 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128
Payload Length - Payload Length: 8-128
Increment 8
Supports Counter larger than maximum value
- No
Incremental Counter - Yes
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A5275 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 8-128
SP 800-38A
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Increment 8
Supports Counter larger than maximum value
- No
Incremental Counter - Yes
Counter Tests Performed - Yes
AES-ECB A5273 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A5274 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128
SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A5275 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A5273 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2
Key Length - 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 256-512
Increment 128
AAD Length - AAD Length: 256-512
Increment 128
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A5274 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2
Key Length - 128
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 256-512
Increment 128
AAD Length - AAD Length: 256-512
Increment 128
SP 800-38D
AES-GCM A5275 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2
Key Length - 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
Payload Length - Payload Length: 256-512
Increment 128
AAD Length - AAD Length: 256-512
Increment 128
SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC A5273 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2
Key Length - 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
SP 800-38D
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AAD Length - AAD Length: 256-512
Increment 128
AES-GMAC A5274 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2
Key Length - 128
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
AAD Length - AAD Length: 256-512
Increment 128
SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC A5275 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2
Key Length - 256
Tag Length - 128
IV Length - IV Length: 96
AAD Length - AAD Length: 256-512
Increment 128
SP 800-38D
AES-KW A2527 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Cipher - Cipher
Key Length - 128, 256
Payload Length - Payload Length: 128-256
Increment 64
SP 800-38F
AES-OFB A5273 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-OFB A5274 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128
SP 800-38A
AES-OFB A5275 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
Counter DRBG A6380 Prediction Resistance - No
Supports Reseed - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
Additional Input - Additional Input: 0
Entropy Input - Entropy Input: 256-1024
Increment 128
Nonce - Nonce: 128-512 Increment 128
Personalization String Length -
Personalization String Length: 0
Returned Bits - 128
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A2532 Curve - P-384
Secret Generation Mode - Extra Bits
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A2532 Component - No
Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A2532 Component - No
Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
FIPS 186-4
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA2-
384
A6378 MAC - MAC: 384
Key Length - Key Length: 256
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC
Sp800-56Ar3
A2533 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-
384
Function - Key Pair Generation, Partial
Validation
iutId - A1B2C3D4E5
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - Initiator, Responder
KDF Methods -
oneStepKdf -
Auxiliary Function Methods -
Auxiliary Function Name - SHA2-384
Fixed Info Pattern -
algorithmId||l||uPartyInfo||vPartyInfo
Fixed Info Encoding - Concatenation
Key Length - 384
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF SRTP (CVL) A2534 AES Key Length - 128, 256
Supports Empty KDR - Yes
KDR Exponents - 1
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A5253 Hash Pair -
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256
Modulo - 2048
Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5
Fixed Public Exponent - 010001
Public Exponent Mode - fixed
FIPS 186-5
SHA2-256 A6379 Message Length - Message Length: 256, 8-
2048 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 SHS 817 Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200
Increment 8
Supports Bit-Oriented Messages - No
Supports Empty Message - Yes
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A6379 Message Length - Message Length: 384, 8-
2048 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.3 KDF
(CVL)
A2535 HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-384
KDF Running Modes - DHE, PSK, PSK-DHE
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 5: Approved Algorithms
NOTE: Only the algorithms specified in this section are supported by the module in approved
mode of operation.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The Module implements the FIPS Vendor Affirmed cryptographic algorithms listed.
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Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG1 Key Type:Asymmetric and
Symmetric
N/A SP800-133rev2 Section 4
example #1 and IG D.H
CKG -
IDK
Key Type: Symmetric N/A SP800-133rev2 Sections 6.3 #2
and IG D.H
Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
The Module implements the non-approved, but Allowed cryptographic algorithms listed.
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
The Module implements theNon-Approved, Allowed cryptographic Algorithms with No Security Claimed.
Name Caveat Use and Function
AES
MAC
No Security Claimed. AES
MAC is used as part of
OTAR but is considered
obfuscation.
[IG 2.4.A] P25 AES OTAR. AES MAC is applied
directly to the plaintext OTAR key components and
then KTS encryption is performed on the OTAR key
components and decrypted within the module using
AES KW Cert #5438
Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not implement any Non-Approved Algorithms, Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of
Operation.
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
The following table shows the Security Function Implementations that the module implements:
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
A5273
Authenticated
Decrypt
BC-AuthDecrypt Authenticated
Decrypt,
Message
Authentication
AES-GCM:
(A5273)
AES-GMAC:
(A5273)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
A5273
Authenticated
Encrypt
BC-AuthEncrypt Authenticated
Encrypt,
Message
Authentication
AES-GCM:
(A5273)
AES-GMAC:
(A5273)
A5273
Decryption
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
Block Cipher AES-CBC:
(A5273)
AES-CFB8:
(A5273)
AES-ECB:
(A5273)
AES-OFB:
(A5273)
A5273
Encryption
BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
Block Cipher AES-CBC:
(A5273)
AES-CFB8:
(A5273)
AES-ECB:
(A5273)
AES-OFB:
(A5273)
A5274
Authenticated
Decrypt
BC-AuthDecrypt Authenticated
Decrypt,
Message
Authentication
AES-GCM:
(A5274)
AES-GMAC:
(A5274)
A5274
Authenticated
Encrypt
BC-AuthEncrypt Authenticated
Encrypt,
Message
Authentication
AES-GMAC:
(A5274)
AES-GCM:
(A5274)
A5274
Decryption
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
Block Cipher AES-CBC:
(A5274)
AES-CTR:
(A5274)
AES-ECB:
(A5274)
AES-OFB:
(A5274)
A5274
Encryption
BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
Block Cipher AES-CBC:
(A5274)
AES-CTR:
(A5274)
AES-ECB:
(A5274)
AES-OFB:
(A5274)
A5275
Authenticated
Decrypt
BC-AuthDecrypt Authenticated
Decrypt,
Message
Authentication
AES-GCM:
(A5275)
AES-GMAC:
(A5275)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
A5275
Authenticated
Encrypt
BC-AuthEncrypt Authenticated
Encrypt,
Message
Authentication
AES-GCM:
(A5275)
AES-GMAC:
(A5275)
A5275
Decryption
BC-
UnAuthDecrypt
Block Cipher AES-CBC:
(A5275)
AES-CTR:
(A5275)
AES-ECB:
(A5275)
AES-OFB:
(A5275)
A5275
Encryption
BC-
UnAuthEncrypt
Block Cipher AES-CBC:
(A5275)
AES-CTR:
(A5275)
AES-ECB:
(A5275)
AES-OFB:
(A5275)
Common-SHA2 SHA Secure Hash
Standard
SHA2-256:
(A6379)
SHA2-384:
(A6379)
Entropy ENT-ESV Entropy Source
HMAC MAC Message
Authentication
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A6378)
IDK-Gen CKG Symmetric Key
Generation
CKG - IDK: ()
AES 256:
Symmetric
KAS KAS-Full ECC Ephemeral
Unified ,
(Initiator,
Responder),
KPG, Partial,
oneStepKdf
(SP800-56Cr1)
IG D.F Scenario
2 path 2
SHA2-384:
(A6379)
KAS-ECC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A2533)
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A2532)
KDF SRTP:
(A2534)
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A2535)
KDF KAS-135KDF Key Derivation
function
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A2535)
KDF SRTP:
(A2534)
KeyGen1 CKG Symmetric Key
Generation
AES-CBC:
(A5273, A5274,
A5275)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
AES-CFB8:
(A5273)
AES-CTR:
(A5274, A5275)
AES-ECB:
(A5273, A5274,
A5275)
AES-GCM:
(A5273, A5274,
A5275)
AES-GMAC:
(A5273, A5274,
A5275)
AES-KW:
(A2527)
AES-OFB:
(A5273, A5274,
A5275)
KDF SRTP:
(A2534)
Counter DRBG:
(A6380)
CKG1: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric and
Symmetric
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A2535)
KeyGen2 AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
Asymmetric Key
Pair Generation
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A2532)
KAS-ECC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A2533)
CKG1: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric and
Symmetric
KTS1 KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
Key Transport -
Wrapping
Key
establishment
methodology:
provides 128 or
256 bits strength
IG
D.G:Approved
method in KW
mode
AES-KW:
(A2527)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
RNG DRBG AES-256 CTR
Deterministic
RBG
Counter DRBG:
(A6380)
SHA SHA Secure Hash
Standard
SHA2-256:
(SHS 817)
SigGen1 DigSig-SigGen Digital Signature
Verification
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A2532)
SHA2-256:
(SHS 817)
SigVer1 DigSig-SigVer Digital Signature
Verification
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A2532)
SHA2-256:
(SHS 817)
SigVer2 DigSig-SigVer Digital Signature
Verification
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5):
(A5253)
SHA2-256:
(SHS 817)
Table 8: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
2.7.1 AES GCM IV Generation
2.7.1.1 Deterministic Construction
The Module generates GCM IVs deterministically as specified in SP800-38D Section 8.2.1 using the
following protocols:
●TLS 1.3: Adherence to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Key/IV Pair Uniqueness requirements from SP 800-38D is met
through C.H Option 5. TLS1.3 is following RFC 8446 Section 5.3 & Section 8.1 for 96-bit IV Generation
and with Section B.4 for AES-GCM usage. The IV is used only within the TLS1.3 context and uses an
approved DBRG for generation. It is generated by XORing the lower 64-bit of 96-bit TLS 1.3 HKDF derived
data (internal/static IV) and 64-bit SSL sequence numbers. Also, the (key, IV) pair collision probability
does not exceed 2-32
.
o During operational testing, the Module was tested against an independent version of TLS1.3 and
found to behave correctly.
●SRTP: The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with RFC 7714, Section 8.1 IV construction and shall
only be used for the SRTP protocol to be compliant with FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option 5. The fixed field
consists of a 32-bit Synchronization Source identifier and 16-bits of zeroes, and the invocation field
consists of a 16-bit Sequence Number and 32-bit Rollover Counter. Both the fixed field and invocation
field are passed into the Module as input parameters and XORed with a 96-bit random salt imported or
generated internally. Note that the XOR operation does not have an impact on SP 800-38D requirements
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 18 of 65
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because the salt is not regenerated until a key is re-established and therefore acts as a constant within
an individual key’s lifecycle.
o During operational testing, the Module was tested against an independent version of SRTP and
found to behave correctly.
●SRTCP: The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with RFC 7714, Section 9.1 IV construction and
shall only be used for the SRTCP protocol to be compliant with FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option 5. The fixed
field consists of 16 bits of zeroes, a 32-bit Synchronization Source, 17 bits of zeroes, and the invocation
field which consists of a 31-bit SRTCP Index. Both the fixed field and invocation field are passed into the
Module as input parameters and XORed with a 96-bit random salt imported or generated internally.
Note that the XOR operation does not have an impact on SP 800-38D requirements because the salt is
not regenerated until a key is re-established and therefore acts as a constant within an individual key’s
lifecycle.
o During operational testing, the Module was tested against an independent version of SRTP and
found to behave correctly.
If the Module's power is lost and restored for any of the protocols listed above, a new GCM key will be
established. The invocation field is incremented externally and input to the Module; if the new
invocation field is not greater than the last value then the Module will transition to an error state.
Following an overflow of the invocation field, the Module will transition to an error state.
2.7.1.2 DRBG-based Construction
The Module generates GCM IVs randomly as specified in SP800-38D section 8.2.2 using approved DRBG
(Cert #A2529) and is to be compliant with FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option 2 and the IV length is 96 bits.
2.7.2 Protocol Information
Note for TLS 1.3 and SRTP, no parts of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the
CAVP and CMVP.
2.7.3 Key Agreement Scheme
KAS [56Ar3] - Per [IG] D.F Scenario 2 path (2), compliant key agreement scheme where testing is
performed end-to-end for the shared secret computation and a KDF compliant with onestep KDF.
without key confirmation.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E132 Motorola Solutions
Table 9: Entropy Certificates
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Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Motorola Solutions
Advanced Crypto Engine
(MACE) Entropy Source
Physical Atmel
5186912
1 bit 0.138262 N/A
Table 10: Entropy Sources
2.9 Key Generation
For Key Generation methods, see Section 2.6 Security Function Implementations above.
2.10 Key Establishment
The appropriate public key validation assurance is implemented. The module checks the validity of the
ECC P-384 ephemeral public key as defined in SP 800-56Arev3 Section #5.6.2.3.4 ECC Partial Public-Key
Validation Routine. The module rejects the public key and returns an error. There are no actions needed
by the operator.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
The Module’s ports and associated defined logical interface categories are listed below.
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
External Bus
Interface (EBI)
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
The main physical port provided by the Module. It
provides access to the majority of the supported
interfaces.
Status Indicator Status
Output
This interface provides status output to indicate all power-
up self-tests complete successfully.
Power Power This interface powers all circuitry.
Key Loading Port
(KYLD)
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
Provides an interface to the Key Variable Loader.
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Metho
d
Name
Description Security
Mechanis
m
Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute
AM1 Identity-
based.
Crypto-Officer
Password: an
8-32 ASCII
(printable)
characters
password is
authenticated
to gain access
to Crypto-
Officer
services. It
should be
noted that
after
authenticating
, this
password
may be
changed at
any time
through the
EBI Port.
SHA The password requires a
minimum of 1 Upper
case, 1 Lower case, 1
Numerical and 1 special
character. Since the
minimum password
length is 8 ASCII
printable characters and
there are 95 ASCII
printable characters, the
probability of a
successful random
attempt is 1 in
{(10)x(26^2)x(32)x(95^4)
} which is 1 in
17,619,399,200,00.
After the CO password
has been incorrectly
entered 10 consecutive
times, the Module will
erase all CSPs, reset the
CO password back to
the default and must be
reinitialized. The
strength per minute is 15
in
{(10)x(26^2)x(32)x(95^4)
}
AM2 Identity
based. User
Password: an
8-32 ASCII
(printable)
characters
password is
authenticated
to gain access
to User
services. It
should be
noted that
after
authenticating
, this
password
may be
SHA The password requires a
minimum of 1 Upper
case, 1 Lower case, 1
Numerical and 1 special
character. Since the
minimum password
length is 8 ASCII
printable characters and
there are 95 ASCII
printable characters, the
probability of a
successful random
attempt is 1 in
{(10)x(26^2)x(32)x(95^4)
} which is 1 in
17,619,399,200,00.
After the User password
has been incorrectly
entered 10 consecutive
times, the Module will
erase all CSPs, reset the
User password back to
the default and must be
reinitialized. The
strength per minute is 15
in
{(10)x(26^2)x(32)x(95^4)
}
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Metho
d
Name
Description Security
Mechanis
m
Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute
changed at
any time
through the
EBI Port.
Table 12: Authentication Methods
4.2 Roles
The Module supports two distinct operator roles, the Cryptographic Officer (CO) and the User. In
addition, the Module supports services which do not require authentication (UA).
The Roles Table below lists all operator roles supported by the Module.
The Module does support concurrent operators, on the EBI port, by utilizing logical channels to provide
operator separation.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Identity CO AM1
User Identity User AM2
Table 13: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below:
The SSPs modes of access shown in the table below are defined as:
• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module (SSP is input).
• E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP
Note: The Program Update service requires the Crypto Officer to enable this service for the User.
Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Algorithm
List Query
Provides a
list of drop-
in
Approv
ed
mode
Command
In
List of drop-
in
algorithms.
None User
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
algorithms
available in
the Module
using AM2.
Success/fail
ure status.
Change
CO
Password
(AM1)
Modify the
current
password
used to
identify and
authenticat
e the CO
role using
AM1.
Approv
ed
mode
indicato
r and
service
status
output
Password Updated the
CO
password.
Success/fail
ure status.
A5273
Encryption
A5273
Decryption
Common-
SHA2
Crypto
Officer
- CO PWD
(AM1): G,E,Z
- PEK: E
- PWD Hash:
G,E,Z
Change
User
Password
(AM2)
Modify the
current
password
used to
identify and
authenticat
e the User
role using
AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Password Updated the
User
password.
Success/fail
ure status.
A5273
Encryption
A5273
Decryption
Common-
SHA2
User
- PEK: E
- PWD Hash:
G,E,Z
- User PWD
(AM2): G,E,Z
Decrypt Decrypt
data using
AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Ciphertext Plaintext.
Success/fail
ure status.
A5275
Decryption
A5275
Authenticat
ed Decrypt
A5274
Decryption
A5274
Authenticat
ed Decrypt
A5273
Decryption
A5273
Authenticat
ed Decrypt
KeyGen1
User
- KDF-DK: E
- KEK: E
- KPK: E
- TEK: E
Delete Key Mark key
for deletion
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
In
Key is
marked for
deletion.
Success/fail
ure status.
None User
Encrypt Encrypt
data using
AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Plaintext Ciphertext.
Success/fail
ure status.
A5275
Encryption
A5275
Authenticat
ed Encrypt
User
- DRBG-
EI/Seed: E
- DRBG-
State: E
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
A5274
Encryption
A5274
Authenticat
ed Encrypt
A5273
Encryption
A5273
Authenticat
ed Encrypt
RNG
- KDF-DK: E
- KEK: E
- KPK: E
- TEK: E
Export Key Transfer
keys out of
the Module
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
In
Ciphertext.
Success/fail
ure status.
A5273
Encryption
KTS1
User
- BKWK: E
- KDF-DK: R
- KEK: E
- MEK: E
- SRTP-MK:
R
- SRTP-MS:
R
- TEK: R,E
- TLS-MS: R
Export
MEK
Transfer
MEK out of
the Module
using AM1
& AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
In
Ciphertext.
Success/fail
ure status.
KTS1 Crypto
Officer
- DH-SS: E
- MEK: R
User
- DH-SS: E
- MEK: R
Extract
Action
Logs
Exports the
history of
actions
performed
by the
operators
Approv
ed
mode
Command
In
Error logs
out.
Success/Fail
ure status.
None Crypto
Officer
Extract
Error Logs
Provide the
history of
error
events.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
In
Error logs
out.
Success/Fail
ure status.
None Crypto
Officer
User
Generate
Entropy
Generate
Entropy for
use inside
the MACE
HSM
Approv
ed
mode
Power On DRBG Seed Entropy
RNG
Unauthentica
ted
- DRBG-
EI/Seed: G
- DRBG-
nonce: G
- DRBG-
State: G
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Generate
Hash
Generate a
hash of a
block of
data using
AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Data In. Hash.
Success/fail
ure status
Common-
SHA2
User
Generate
Key
Generate
symmetric
[135] keys
within the
Module
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
in
Key Stored
inside
Module.
Success/fail
ure status.
KeyGen1
IDK-Gen
KDF
User
- DRBG-
nonce: E
- DRBG-
State: E
- IDK: G,Z
- IDK Block:
E,Z
- IDK ROM:
E,Z
- KDF-DK: G
- KPK: G,Z
- SRTP-MK:
G,E
- SRTP-MS:
G,E
- TLS-MS: E
Generate
MAC
Generate a
Message
Authenticati
on Code
over a
block of
data using
AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Data to
generate
MAC
Generated
MAC.
Success/fail
ure status
HMAC User
- KDF-DK: E
- KEK: E
- TEK: E
Generate
MEK
Generate
MEK within
the Module
using AM1
& AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
in
MEK Stored
inside
Module.
Success/fail
ure status.
KeyGen1 Crypto
Officer
- DRBG-
EI/Seed: E
- DRBG-
State: E
- MEK: G
User
- DRBG-
EI/Seed: E
- DRBG-
State: E
- MEK: G
Generate
Random
Number
Generate a
Random
Number
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
in.
Generated
Random
Number.
Success/fail
ure status.
RNG User
- DRBG-
EI/Seed: E
- DRBG-
State: E
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Generate
Signature
Generate a
signature
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
In.
Signature,
Success/fail
ure status.
SigGen1
RNG
User
- DRBG-
EI/Seed: E
- DRBG-
State: E
- ECDSA-
PRIV: G,E
- ECDSA-
PUB: G,R
Import Key Imports
keys into
the Module
encrypted
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Ciphertext Key Stored
inside the
Module.
Success/fail
ure status.
A5273
Decryption
KTS1
User
- BKWK: E
- KDF-DK: R
- KEK: W,E
- MEK: W,E
- SRTP-MK:
R
- SRTP-MS:
R
- TEK: W,E
- TLS-MS: R
Import
MEK
Import
MEK into
the Module
encrypted
using AM1
& AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Ciphertext MEK Stored
inside the
Module.
Success/fail
ure status.
KTS1 Crypto
Officer
- DH-SS: E
- MEK: W
User
- DH-SS: E
- MEK: W
Key Query Retrieve
the
metadata
for a given
key present
in the
Module,
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
in.
Key
metadata.
Success/fail
ure status.
None User
KVL
Check Key
Obtain
status
information
about a
specific
key/keyset
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
in
Status
information
on keys
Success/Fail
ure
Indication..
None User
KVL
Configurati
on
Display and
Modify
OTAR/OTE
K
Configurati
on
Approv
ed
mode
Command
in
Configuratio
n settings.
Success/Fail
ure
Indication
None User
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Parameters
using AM2.
KVL
Delete Key
Delete
Key(s) in
the Module
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
in
Success/Fail
ure
Indication.
None User
- KEK: Z
- MEK: Z
- TEK: Z
KVL Key
Transfer
Key
Import or
Modify
Keys in the
Module
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Ciphertext Store Keys
internal to
the Module.
Success/Fail
ure
Indication.
None User
- KEK: W,E,Z
- KPK: E
- TEK: W,E,Z
KVL
Version
Info
Return
Module
specific
version
information
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
in
Version
Information.
Success/Fail
ure
Indication
None Unauthentica
ted
Logout CO
(AM1)
Logs out
CO role
using AM1.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
In
Logout CO None Crypto
Officer
Logout
User
(AM2)
User
Logout
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
In
Logout User None User
Module
Configurati
on
Set
configuratio
n
parameters
used to
specify
module
behavior
using
AM1..
Approv
ed
mode
Configurati
on
parameter
s
Updated
module
configuration
.
Success/fail
ure status.
None Crypto
Officer
- CO PWD
(AM1): Z
- DH-Priv: Z
- DH-Pub: Z
- DH-SS: Z
- ECDSA-
PRIV: Z
- ECDSA-
PUB: Z
- KDF-DK: Z
- KEK: Z
- KPK: Z
- MEK: Z
- PWD Hash:
Z
- SRTP-MK:
Z
- SRTP-MS:
Z
- TEK: Z
- TLS-MS: Z
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- User PWD
(AM2): Z
Module
Info
Return
Module
specific
information
using UA.
Module HW
version,
version
information,
and FIPS
status.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
in.
Module HW
version,
Firmware
version, and
FIPS status
None Unauthentica
ted
Module
Reset
Reset the
Module
Approv
ed
mode
Command
in.
Module
Reset
None Crypto
Officer
User
OTAR/OT
EK Delete
Key
Delete
Key(s) in
the Module
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
In
Delete Keys
stored in the
Module.
Success/Fail
ure
Indication
None User
- KEK: Z
- MEK: Z
- TEK: Z
OTAR/OT
EK
Transfer
Key
Import or
Modify
Keys in the
Module
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Ciphertext Store Keys
internal to
the Module.
Success/Fail
ure
Indication.
KTS1 User
- KEK: W,E
- KPK: E
- TEK: W,E
Perform
Key
Agreement
Process
Perform a
key
agreement
process
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
in.
Generate
Keys stored
in the
Module.
Success/fail
ure status
KeyGen2
KAS
User
- DH-CLI-
Pub: W,E
- DH-Priv:
G,E
- DH-Pub:
G,R
- DH-SS: G,E
- DRBG-
EI/Seed: E
- DRBG-
State: G,E
- KDF-DK:
G,E
- KEK: W
- SRTP-MK:
W
- SRTP-MS:
W
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- TEK: W
- TLS-MS: W
Program
Update
Update the
MACE
HSM
firmware.
Firmware
upgrades
are
authenticat
ed using a
digital
signature.
The
Program
Update
Public
Signature
Key is used
to validate
the
signature of
the
firmware
image
being
loaded
before it is
allowed to
be
executed.
Approv
ed
mode
Firmware
image
The MACE
HSM is
upgraded to
new
firmware.
A5273
Decryption
SigVer2
Crypto
Officer
- BKWK: Z
- CO PWD
(AM1): Z
- DH-CLI-
Pub: Z
- DH-Priv: Z
- DH-Pub: Z
- DH-SS: Z
- ECDSA-
PRIV: Z
- ECDSA-
PUB: Z
- FW-LD-
Pub: E,Z
- IDK: E,Z
- IDK Block:
E,Z
- IDK ROM:
E
- KEK: Z
- KPK: Z
- MEK: Z
- PEK: Z
- PWD Hash:
Z
- SRTP-MK:
Z
- SRTP-MS:
Z
- TEK: Z
- TLS-MS: Z
- User PWD
(AM2): Z
User
- BKWK: Z
- CO PWD
(AM1): Z
- DH-CLI-
Pub: Z
- DH-Priv: Z
- DH-Pub: Z
- DH-SS: Z
- ECDSA-
PRIV: Z
- ECDSA-
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
PUB: Z
- IDK: E,Z
- IDK Block:
E,Z
- IDK ROM:
E
- KDF-DK: Z
- KEK: Z
- KPK: Z
- MEK: Z
- PEK: Z
- PWD Hash:
Z
- SRTP-MK:
Z
- SRTP-MS:
Z
- TEK: Z
- TLS-MS: Z
- User PWD
(AM2): Z
Self-Tests Perform
module
self-tests
comprised
of
cryptograp
hic
algorithm
tests and
firmware
integrity
test.
Initiated by
module
reset or
transition
from power
off state to
power on
state using
UA.
Approv
ed
mode
indicato
r and
service
status
output
Power
on/Comma
nd In
Success/Res
et.
A5275
Encryption
A5275
Decryption
A5275
Authenticat
ed Encrypt
A5275
Authenticat
ed Decrypt
A5274
Encryption
A5274
Decryption
A5274
Authenticat
ed Encrypt
A5274
Authenticat
ed Decrypt
A5273
Encryption
A5273
Decryption
A5273
Authenticat
ed Encrypt
A5273
Unauthentica
ted
- FW-LD-
Pub: E
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Authenticat
ed Decrypt
IDK-Gen
SigGen1
SigVer1
SigVer2
Entropy
RNG
KAS
SHA
Common-
SHA2
HMAC
Validate
CO
Password
(AM1)
Validate
the current
password
used to
identify and
authenticat
e the CO
role using
AM1.
Approv
ed
mode
Password Successful
authenticatio
n will allow
access to
the services
allowed for
CO role.
A5273
Encryption
A5273
Decryption
Common-
SHA2
Crypto
Officer
- CO PWD
(AM1): Z
- DH-Priv: Z
- DH-Pub: Z
- DH-SS: Z
- ECDSA-
PRIV: Z
- ECDSA-
PUB: Z
- KDF-DK: Z
- KEK: Z
- KPK: G,E,Z
- MEK: Z
- PEK: E
- PWD Hash:
W,Z
- SRTP-MK:
Z
- SRTP-MS:
Z
- TEK: Z
- TLS-MS: Z
Validate
User
Password
(AM2)
Validate
the current
password
used to
identify and
authenticat
e the User
role using
AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Password Successful
authenticatio
n will allow
access to
the services
allowed for
User role.
A5273
Encryption
A5273
Decryption
Common-
SHA2
User
- DH-Priv: Z
- DH-Pub: Z
- DH-SS: Z
- ECDSA-
PRIV: Z
- ECDSA-
PUB: Z
- KDF-DK: Z
- KEK: Z
- KPK: G,E,Z
- MEK: Z
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 32 of 65
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicat
or
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- PEK: E
- PWD Hash:
W,Z
- SRTP-MK:
Z
- SRTP-MS:
Z
- TEK: Z
- TLS-MS: Z
- User PWD
(AM2): Z
Verify
Signature
Verify a
signature
using AM2.
Approv
ed
mode
Command
In.
Success/fail
ure status.
SigVer1 User
- ECDSA-
PUB: E
Table 14: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
There are no Non-Approved services available while the module is in the approved mode.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
This module supports loading of external firmware via the Program Update service. Execution of the
successfully loaded firmware is only effective after the next reset of the security module. Any firmware
loaded into the module other than that listed in section 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version
and Identification, is outside the scope of this Security Policy and requires a separate FIPS 140-3
validation.
The module validates the integrity of the externally loaded firmware via procedures described in section
5.1 Integrity Techniques.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The Module has a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. The Module is
composed of the following firmware components:
• Component 1: Executable - binary
• Component 2: Drop in Algorithms - binary
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 33 of 65
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The firmware components are protected with the FW-LD-Pub key described in section 9.4 SSPs. The FW-
LD-Pub key is loaded into the module at manufacturing
The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by power cycling the Module.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by power cycling the Module.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
The MACE HSM has a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions with a Physical
Security at Level 2. Therefore, per the FIPS 140-3 Management Manual Section 7.5 Partial validations
and non-applicable areas this section in not applicable.
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 34 of 65
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7 Physical Security
The MACE HSM is a production grade, single-chip cryptographic module with standard passivation over
the modules circuitry as defined by FIPS 140-3 and is designed to meet level 2 physical security
requirements. The information below is applicable to cryptographic module hardware kit numbers
5185912Y03, 5185912Y05, and 5185912T05, which have identical physical security characteristics.
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
The MACE HSM is covered with a hard-opaque epoxy coating that provides evidence of attempts to
tamper with the MACE HSM. The security provided from the hardness of the MACE HSM’s epoxy
encapsulate is claimed at the temperature range of -40 to 85 degrees Celsius. No assurance of the epoxy
hardness is claimed for this physical security mechanism outside of this range. The MACE HSM does not
contain any doors, removable covers, or ventilation holes or slits. No maintenance access interface is
available. No special procedures are required to maintain physical security of the MACE HSM while
delivering to operators.
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Covered with a hard-opaque epoxy coating
that provides evidence of attempts to tamper
with the MACE HSM.
Periodically Look for signs of tampering.
Remove from service if
tampering found.
Table 15: Mechanisms and Actions Required
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 35 of 65
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8 Non-Invasive Security
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack.
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 36 of 65
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area Name Description Persistence
Type
Flash Memory (S2) Stored in the flash in plaintext, associated by
memory location (pointer).
Static
Flash Memory -
Encrypted (S3)
Stored in the flash in encrypted, associated by
memory location (pointer).
Static
System Memory (S1) Stored in the volatile memory (RAM). Dynamic
Table 16: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Input
encrypted
on
ephemeral
key
generated
via KAS (I8)
Application
Software
(outside)
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
Encrypted Manual Electronic KTS1
Input
encrypted
on KEK (I5)
OTAR
(outside)
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
Encrypted Manual Electronic KTS1
Input
encrypted
on TEK or
MEK (I7)
Application
Software
(outside)
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
Encrypted Manual Electronic KTS1
Input
encrypted
on the
BKWK (I3)
Application
Software
(outside)
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
Encrypted Manual Electronic A5273
Decryption
Input
encrypted
on the IDK
(I1)
Application
Software
(outside)
Flash
Memory
(S2)
Encrypted Manual Electronic A5273
Decryption
Input
encrypted
on the PEK
(I2)
Application
Software
(outside)
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
Encrypted Manual Electronic A5273
Decryption
Input in
plaintext as
part of
protocol (I4)
Application
Software
(outside)
Flash
Memory
(S2)
Plaintext Manual Electronic
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 37 of 65
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Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Input in
plaintext
through the
KVL (I6)
KVL Flash
Memory
(S2)
Plaintext Manual Electronic A5273
Decryption
Output
encrypted
on
ephemeral
key
generated
via KAS
(O5)
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
Application
Software
(outside)
Encrypted Manual Electronic KTS1
Output
encrypted
on KEK
(O3)
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
OTAR
(outside)
Encrypted Manual Electronic KTS1
Output
encrypted
on the
BKWK (O1)
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
Application
Software
(outside)
Encrypted Manual Electronic A5273
Encryption
Output
encrypted
on the TEK
or MEK (O4)
Flash
Memory -
Encrypted
(S3)
Application
Software
(outside)
Encrypted Manual Electronic KTS1
Output in
plaintext
public key
(O2)
Flash
Memory
(S2)
Application
Software
(outside)
Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Z1 Zeroized by the "Program Update"
service.*
SSPs zeroized upon
loading of new firmware.
Yes
Z2 Zeroized by module power cycle or
hard reset.*
SSPs in volatile memory
zeroized.
Yes
Z3 Zeroized by the "Configure Module"
service by overwriting with a fixed
pattern of 0s.
CO zeroize module when
configuring into an
Approved mode.
Yes
Z4 Zeroized by the "Change CO
Password (AM1)" service by
overwriting with a fixed pattern of 0s.
Old CO password
zeroized as new CO
password set
Yes
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 38 of 65
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Z5 Zeroized by the "Validate CO
Password (AM1)" service by
overwriting with a fixed pattern of 0s.
CO password zeroized
after too many failed login
attempts
Yes
Z6 Zeroized by the "Change User
Password (AM2)" service by
overwriting with a fixed pattern of 0s.
Old User password
zeroized as new CO
password set
Yes
Z7 Zeroized by the "Validate User
Password (AM2)" service by
overwriting with a fixed pattern of 0s.
User password zeroized
after too many failed login
attempts
Yes
Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods
Note: For zeroization methods with an asterisk, once zeroization is complete the Module will reboot,
indicating successful zeroization. The output status of all other methods of success of zeroization are
implicit and any attempt to use previous keys/CSPs will trigger an error.
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 39 of 65
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9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
BKWK A 256-bit AES
OFB (A5273)
key used to
transfer keys
with the Host
256 -
256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Pre-
loaded
A5273
Encryption
A5273
Decryption
CO
PWD
(AM1)
8-32 ASCII
characters
CO password.
N/A -
N/A
Authenticatio
n - CSP
A5273
Encryption
A5273
Decryption
DH-
CLI-
Pub
The Elliptic
Curve (EC)
Diffie-Hellman
(DH) public
key for the
other party,
used for
establishing a
shared secret
over an
insecure
channel.
768 -
192
Asymmetric
Public Key -
PSP
KAS
DH-Priv The Elliptic
Curve Diffie-
Hellman (DH)
private key
used for
establishing a
shared secret
over an
insecure
channel.
384 -
192
Asymmetric
Private Key -
CSP
KeyGen2 KAS
DH-Pub The Elliptic
Curve (EC)
Diffie-Hellman
(DH) public
key, used for
establishing a
shared secret
over an
insecure
channel.
768 -
192
Asymmetric
Public Key -
PSP
KeyGen2 KAS
DH-SS The Elliptic
Diffie-Hellman
384 -
192
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KAS KAS
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
(DH) Shared
Secret (SS) is
established
as a part of
DH key
agreement
scheme.
DRBG-
EI/Seed
Internally
generated by
the HWRNG
1856 -
N/A
N/A - CSP Entropy KeyGen1
KeyGen2
SigGen1
RNG
DRBG-
nonce
Internally
generated by
the HWRNG
960 -
N/A
N/A - CSP Entropy RNG
DRBG-
State
CTR_DRBG
(A2529)
internal state:
V (128 bits)
and Key (AES
256)
256 -
256
N/A - CSP RNG KeyGen1
KeyGen2
SigGen1
RNG
ECDSA
-PRIV
384-bit
ECDSA
Private Key
used to
generate the
signature of
the input data
from the
Generate
Signature
service
request.
384 -
192
Asymmetric
Private Key -
CSP
KeyGen2 SigGen1
ECDSA
-PUB
ECDSA
Public key
used to
validate the
signature of
the input data
from a service
request.
768 -
192
Asymmetric
Public Key -
PSP
KeyGen2 SigVer1
FW-LD-
Pub
2048-bit RSA
key used to
validate the
signature of
the firmware
image during
FW integrity
2048 -
112
Asymmetric
Public Key -
PSP
Pre-
Loaded
SigVer2
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 41 of 65
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
and FW
Loading
before it is
allowed to be
executed.
IDK A 256-bit AES
CBC (A5273)
key used to
decrypt
downloaded
firmware
images.
256 -
256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
IDK-Gen A5273
Decryption
IDK
Block
A 256-bit AES
CBC key
used in the
re-
construction
of IDK per
SP800-133r2
(Section 6.3
#2) via XOR
using IDK
ROM
256 -
256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Pre-
Loaded
IDK-Gen
IDK
ROM
A 256-bit AES
CBC key
used in the
re-
construction
of IDK per
SP800-133r2
(Section 6.3
#2) via XOR
using IDK
Block
256 -
256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Pre-
loaded
IDK-Gen
KDF-
DK
KDF Derived
Key. Keys
derived using
TLS or SRTP
KDFs.
128,
256 -
128,
256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KeyGen1 A5275
Authenticate
d Encrypt
A5275
Authenticate
d Decrypt
A5274
Authenticate
d Encrypt
A5274
Authenticate
d Decrypt
A5273
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 42 of 65
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
Authenticate
d Encrypt
A5273
Authenticate
d Decrypt
KDF
KEK 128, 256-bit
AES-KW
(A2527) keys
used for
encryption of
keys in key
transport
operation
128,
256 -
128,
258
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KTS1
KPK 256 bit AES
CFB-8
(A5273) key
used to
encrypt all
TEKs and
KEKs stored
in the flash.
256 -
256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KeyGen1 A5273
Encryption
A5273
Decryption
MEK 256-bit AES
key-KW
(A2527) used
for encryption
of keys in key
transport
operation
256 -
256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KeyGen1 KTS1
PEK 256-bit AES-
CFB8
(A5273) key
used for
decrypting
passwords
during
password
validation
256 -
256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
Pre-
loaded
A5273
Decryption
PWD
Hash
256-bit
password
hash stored in
the non-
volatile
memory.
256 -
128
Authenticatio
n - CSP
Common-
SHA2
SRTP-
MK
SRTP/SRTCP
Master Key.
128 or 256 bit
128,
256 -
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KeyGen1 KDF
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 43 of 65
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
key used in
SRTP KDF.
128,
256
SRTP-
MS
SRTP/SRTCP
Master Salt.
112-bit key
used in SRTP
KDF, or 96-bit
key to
generate IV
internally for
AES GCM
encryption
operation.
96, 112
- 96,
112
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KeyGen1 KDF
TEK 128, 256-bit
AES-KW
(A2527) keys
used for
enabling
secure
communicatio
n with target
devices.
128,
256 -
128,
256
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KTS1
TLS-
MS
TLS KDF
Master
Secret. 384
bit secret key
material.
384 -
384
Symmetric
Key - CSP
KeyGen1 KDF
User
PWD
(AM2)
8-32 ASCII
characters
User
password.
N/A -
N/A
Authenticatio
n - CSP
A5273
Encryption
A5273
Decryption
Table 19: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
BKWK Input
encrypted
on the
IDK (I1)
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
(S2):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
-Encrypted
(S3):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
KPK:Encrypted by
KEK:Wraps
TEK:Wraps
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 44 of 65
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
CO
PWD
(AM1)
Input
encrypted
on the
PEK (I2)
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
-Encrypted
(S3):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
PEK:Decrypted by
PWD Hash:Hashed by
DH-CLI-
Pub
Input in
plaintext
as part of
protocol
(I4)
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
DH-Priv System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
DH-Pub:Paired With
DH-SS:Derives
DH-Pub Output in
plaintext
public key
(O2)
System
Memory
(S1):Plaintext
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
DH-Priv:Paired With
DH-SS:Derives
DH-SS System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
DH-Priv:Derived From
DH-Pub:Derived From
DRBG-
EI/Seed
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z2 DRBG-nonce:Used With
DRBG-State:Generates
DRBG-
nonce
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z2 DRBG-EI/Seed:Used With
DRBG-State:Generates
DRBG-
State
System
Memory
When
module
is reset
Z2 DRBG-EI/Seed:Derived
From
DRBG-nonce:Derived From
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 45 of 65
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
(S1):Encrypte
d
ECDSA
-PRIV
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
ECDSA-PUB:Paired With
ECDSA
-PUB
Output in
plaintext
public key
(O2)
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
ECDSA-PRIV:Paired With
FW-LD-
Pub
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
(S2):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
IDK System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z2 IDK ROM:Derived From
IDK Block:Derived From
IDK
Block
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
(S2):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
IDK ROM:Used With
IDK:Generates
IDK
ROM
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
(S2):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
IDK Block:Used With
IDK:Generates
KDF-DK Input
encrypted
on TEK or
MEK (I7)
Output
encrypted
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
SRTP-MK:Used With
SRTP-MS:Used With
TLS-MS:Used With
BKWK:Encrypted by
MEK:Encrypted/Decrypted
by
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
on the
BKWK
(O1)
Output
encrypted
on the
TEK or
MEK (O4)
Z6
Z7
KEK Input
encrypted
on the
BKWK
(I3)
Input
encrypted
on KEK
(I5)
Input in
plaintext
through
the KVL
(I6)
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
-Encrypted
(S3):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
KPK:Encrypted by
BKWK:Decrypted by
TEK:Decrypted by
KPK System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
(S2):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
DRBG-State:Derived From
KEK:encrypts in the flash.
TEK:encrypts in the flash.
MEK Input
encrypted
on
ephemera
l key
generated
via KAS
(I8)
Output
encrypted
on
ephemera
l key
generated
via KAS
(O5)
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
-Encrypted
(S3):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
KPK:Encrypted by
DH-SS:Encrypted by
DH-SS:Decrypted by
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 47 of 65
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
PEK System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
(S2):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
CO PWD (AM1):Decrypts
User PWD (AM2):Decrypts
PWD
Hash
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
-Encrypted
(S3):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
CO PWD (AM1):Hash of
User PWD (AM2):Hash of
SRTP-
MK
Input
encrypted
on the
BKWK
(I3)
Input
encrypted
on TEK or
MEK (I7)
Output
encrypted
on the
BKWK
(O1)
Output
encrypted
on KEK
(O3)
Output
encrypted
on the
TEK or
MEK (O4)
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
-Encrypted
(S3):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
KDF-DK:Used With
SRTP-MS:Used With
BKWK:Encrypted/Decrypte
d by
MEK:Encrypted/Decrypted
by
SRTP-
MS
Input
encrypted
on the
BKWK
(I3)
Input
encrypted
on TEK or
MEK (I7)
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
-Encrypted
(S3):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
KDF-DK:Used With
SRTP-MK:Used With
SRTP-MS:Used With
BKWK:Encrypted/Decrypte
d by
MEK:Encrypted/Decrypted
by
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
Output
encrypted
on the
BKWK
(O1)
Output
encrypted
on KEK
(O3)
Output
encrypted
on the
TEK or
MEK (O4)
TEK Input
encrypted
on the
BKWK
(I3)
Input
encrypted
on KEK
(I5)
Input in
plaintext
through
the KVL
(I6)
Input
encrypted
on TEK or
MEK (I7)
Output
encrypted
on the
TEK or
MEK (O4)
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
-Encrypted
(S3):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
KPK:Encrypted by
BKWK:Decrypted by
KEK:Decrypted by
MEK:Decrypted by
MEK:Encrypted by
TLS-MS Input
encrypted
on the
BKWK
(I3)
Input
encrypted
on TEK or
MEK (I7)
Output
encrypted
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
-Encrypted
(S3):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
KDF-DK:Used With
BKWK:Encrypted/Decrypte
d by
MEK:Encrypted/Decrypted
by
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
on the
BKWK
(O1)
Output
encrypted
on the
TEK or
MEK (O4)
User
PWD
(AM2)
Input
encrypted
on the
PEK (I2)
System
Memory
(S1):Encrypte
d
Flash Memory
-Encrypted
(S3):Encrypte
d
When
module
is reset
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z4
Z5
Z6
Z7
PEK:Decrypted by
PWD Hash:Hashed by
Table 20: SSP Table 2
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10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The MACE HSM performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation. Per FIPS 140-3 these are categorized
as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests.
Pre-operational self–tests are available on demand by power cycling the MACE HSM. In addition, pre-
operational self–tests are periodically performed by the MACE HSM as configured by the operator
during the module configuration as shown in Section 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup
Procedures.The MACE HSM will not accept any commands when a periodic self-test is required; the
commands still in the I/O buffer will be processed by the MACE HSM after periodic self-test ends and
will execute when the I/O buffer is emptied. The MACE HSM logs the most recent self-test errors to the
internal flash; the operator (CO) can extract the error logs using Extract Error Log service.
The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests in table below
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
Firmware
integrity
SHA2-256
(Cert. #817),
RSA-2048
(Cert. #A5253)
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Success or
ES2 on
failure
When the MACE HSM is
powered up, the digital
signature is verified. If the
digital signature matches
then the test passes
otherwise it fails.
Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
(A5274)
Decryption
AES-128 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-CBC
Decryption
Bootup
AES-CBC
(A5274)
Encryption
AES-128 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-CBC
Encryption
Bootup
AES-CBC
(A5275)
Decryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-CBC
256
Decryption
Bootup
AES-CBC
(A5275)
Encryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-CBC
256
Encryption
Bootup
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Algorithm
or Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-
CFB8
(A5273)
Decryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-CFB8
256
Decryption
Bootup
AES-
CFB8
(A5273)
Encryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-CFB8
256
Encryption
Bootup
AES-CTR
(A5274)
Decryption
AES-128 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-CTR
Decryption
Bootup
AES-CTR
(A5274)
Encryption
AES-128 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-CTR
Encryption
Bootup
AES-CTR
(A5275)
Decryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-CTR
256
Decryption
Bootup
AES-CTR
(A5275)
Encryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-CTR
256
Encryption
Bootup
AES-ECB
(A5274)
Decryption
AES-128 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-ECB
Decryption
Bootup
AES-ECB
(A5274)
Encryption
AES-128 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-ECB
Encryption
Bootup
AES-ECB
(A5275)
Decryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-ECB
256
Decryption
Bootup
AES-ECB
(A5275)
Encryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-ECB
256
Encryption
Bootup
AES-GCM
(A5273)
Decryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
256-bit AES-
GCM and
GMAC
Authenticated
Decryption
Bootup
AES-GCM
(A5273)
Encryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
256-bit AES-
GCM and
GMAC
Authenticated
Encryption
Bootup
AES-GCM
(A5274)
Decryption
AES-128 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
128-bit AES-
GCM and
GMAC
Authenticated
Decryption
Bootup
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Algorithm
or Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-GCM
(A5274)
Encryption
AES-128 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
128-bit AES-
GCM and
GMAC
Authenticated
Encryption
Bootup
AES-GCM
(A5275)
Decryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
256-bit AES-
GCM and
GMAC
Authenticated
Decryption
Bootup
AES-GCM
(A5275)
Encryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
256-bit AES-
GCM and
GMAC
Authenticated
Encryption
Bootup
AES-KW
(A2527)
Decryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
Message
Decryption
Bootup
AES-KW
(A2527)
Encryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
Message
Encryption
Bootup
AES-OFB
(A5273)
Decryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-OFB
256
Decryption
Bootup
AES-OFB
(A5273)
Encryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-OFB
256
Encryption
Bootup
AES-OFB
(A5274)
Decryption
AES-128 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-OFB
Decryption
Bootup
AES-OFB
(A5274)
Encryption
AES-128 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-OFB
Encryption
Bootup
AES-OFB
(A5275)
Decryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-OFB
256
Decryption
Bootup
AES-OFB
(A5275)
Encryption
AES-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-OFB
256
Encryption
Bootup
Counter
DRBG
(A6380)
AES-256 CTR KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
AES-256
CTR_DRBG
instantiation
and generate
KATs
performed
before the
first random
Bootup
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Algorithm
or Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
data
generation.
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4) (A2532)
ECDSA KeyGen PWCT PCT Success
or ES3
on failure
ECDSA P-
384 Pair-wise
Consistency
Test
Bootup
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
4) (A2532)
ECDSA P-384
SigGen
KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
ECDSA P-
384 SigGen
Bootup
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4) (A2532)
ECDSA P-384
SigVer
KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
ECDSA P-
384 SigVer
Bootup
Entropy
90B Start-
up
Adaptive
Proportion
Test
(APT)
Adaptive
Proportion Test
APT CAST ES4 on
failure
Designed to
detect a large
loss of
entropy that
might occur
as a result of
some
physical
failure or
environment
al change
affecting the
noise source
Bootup
Entropy
90B Start-
up
Repetition
Count
Test
(RCT)
Repetition Count
Test
RCT CAST ES4 on
failure
Designed to
quickly detect
catastrophic
failures that
cause the
noise source
to become
"stuck" on a
single output
value for a
long period of
time
Bootup
Firmware
Load
2048-bit RSA
Signature
Verification/SHA2-
256
KAT SW/FW
Load
Success
or ES2
on failure
A digital
signature is
generated
over the code
when it is
built using
SHA-256 and
RSA-2048.
The digital
loading a
new
firmware
image
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 54 of 65
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Algorithm
or Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
signature is
verified upon
download into
the MACE
HSM.
HMAC-
SHA2-384
(A6378)
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT CAST Success
or ES2
on failure
HMAC-
SHA2-384
Bootup
KAS-ECC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A2533)
KAS-ECC SP800-
56Ar3
KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
Per IG D.F,
separately
tested KAS
Shared
Secret
generation
with P-384
and SP800-
56Cr2 one-
step KDA.
Bootup
KDF
SRTP
(A2534)
SRTP KDF KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
SRTP KDF
[135]
Bootup
KDF TLS
(A2535)
TLS 1.3 KDF KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
TLS 1.3 KDF
[135]
Bootup
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
5) (A5253)
RSA-2048 SigVer KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
2048-bit RSA
PKCSv1.5
Signature
Verification,
performed
before Pre-
Operational
FW integrity
tests.
Bootup
SHA2-256
(A6379)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES1
on failure
SHA2-256 Bootup
SHA2-256
(SHS 817)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Success
or ES2
on failure
SHA2, -256,
KAT
performed
before Pre-
Operational
FW integrity
tests.
Bootup
Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests
The Module performs the following conditional self-tests in the table below
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 55 of 65
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10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Firmware
integrity
KAT SW/FW Integrity On Demand Manually
Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Method
Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-CBC
(A5274)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-CBC
(A5274)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-CBC
(A5275)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-CBC
(A5275)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-CFB8
(A5273)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-CFB8
(A5273)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-CTR
(A5274)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-CTR
(A5274)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-CTR
(A5275)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-CTR
(A5275)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-ECB
(A5274)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-ECB
(A5274)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-ECB
(A5275)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Method
Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-ECB
(A5275)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-GCM
(A5273)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-GCM
(A5273)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-GCM
(A5274)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-GCM
(A5274)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-GCM
(A5275)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-GCM
(A5275)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-KW
(A2527)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-KW
(A2527)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-OFB
(A5273)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-OFB
(A5273)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-OFB
(A5274)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-OFB
(A5274)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-OFB
(A5275)
Decryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
AES-OFB
(A5275)
Encryption
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
Counter
DRBG
(A6380)
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Method
Test Type Period Periodic Method
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A2532)
PWCT PCT On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A2532)
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A2532)
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
Entropy 90B
Start-up
Adaptive
Proportion
Test (APT)
APT CAST On Demand Manually
Entropy 90B
Start-up
Repetition
Count Test
(RCT)
RCT CAST On Demand Manually
Firmware
Load
KAT SW/FW
Load
N/A N/A
HMAC-
SHA2-384
(A6378)
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
KAS-ECC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A2533)
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
KDF SRTP
(A2534)
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
KDF TLS
(A2535)
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A5253)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually
SHA2-256
(A6379)
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
SHA2-256
(SHS 817)
KAT CAST On
Demand/Periodically
Manually/programmatically
Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information
Conditional self–tests are periodically performed by the MACE HSM every X minutes, where X is
configured by the operator during module configuration (1 minutes to 720 minutes). The MACE HSM will
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 58 of 65
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not accept any commands when a periodic self-test is required; the commands still in the I/O buffer will
be processed by the MACE HSM end the periodic self-test executed when the I/O buffer is emptied. The
MACE HSM logs the most recent self-test errors to the internal flash; the operator CO) can extract the
error logs using Extract Error Log service.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
ES1 The MACE HSM
fails a conditional
KAT.
The MACE HSM
enters the critical error
state. In this state, the
MACE HSM stores the
status into the internal
flash memory and then
halts all further
operation by entering
an infinite loop.
Reboot/Power
cycle the module.
Device will not
respond to
authentication
requests.
ES2 The MACE HSM
fails a firmware
loading during
program upgrade
and/or firmware
integrity pre-
operational self-
test.
The MACE HSM
enters the firmware
signature validation
failure state. In this
state, the MACE HSM
halts all further
operations by entering
the flash programming
mode.
Reboot/Power
cycle the module
or re-flashing a
new image.
Device will not
respond to
authentication
requests.
ES3 The MACE HSM
fails an ECDSA
PCT.
The MACE HSM
enters a temporary
error state. The
generated key is
discarded.
The error state is
automatically
cleared and the
module resumes
normal operation.
The MACE HSM
will return an error
code (0x01) to the
operator.
ES4 The MACE HSM
fails to acquire
Entropy.
The MACE HSM
enters the Fatal Error
state.
Automatic The MACE HSM
stores the status
into the internal
flash memory and
resets to attempt
recovery.
Table 25: Error States
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The Module is originally a non-compliant module and must be initialized to be in approved mode. There
is no non-approved mode. During initialization the operator shall configure the Module from the
instructions below:
1. Upon first access, the operator will use the default passwords for the specified product found on
https://support.motorolasolutions.com/.
2. The operator will then change the default passwords based on the requirements in the roles and
Authentication Table.
3. The operator will then complete Module configuration using the Module Configuration and
Configure OTEK services.
4. Finally, the operator will set the Module to the Approved mode using the Module Configuration
Service.
Delivery:
The Module is used in multiple Motorola Solutions, Inc. products. Motorola uses commercially available
courier systems such as UPS, FedEx, and DHL with a tracking number and requires a signature at the end
by an authorized client.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Use vendor provided product specific user guide for secure operations.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
Use vendor provided product specific user guide for secure operations.
11.4 Design and Rules
Rules of Operation
1. The Module provides two distinct operator roles: Cryptographic Officer and User.
2. The Module provides identity-based authentication.
3. The Module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting
the Module.
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6. All self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the Module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
10. The Module does support concurrent operators, on the EBI Port, with the following restrictions
a. The User can only authenticate on Logical Channel 0.
b. The Crypto Officer can only authenticate on Logical Channel 1.
c. MEK generation, importing and exporting services require the use of concurrent operators. If
only one operator is authenticated then these services will be blocked.
11. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
12. The Module does not support manual SSP establishment method.
13. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of
data.
14. The Module does not output plaintext CSPs.
15. The Module does store some CSPs in plaintext.
16. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
17. The Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.
11.5 Maintenance Requirements
N/A
11.6 End of Life
After the end-of-life, the operator should zeroize all SSPs using “Erase Crypto Module“ service followed
by shredding the MACE HSM chip.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks.
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References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 26 References
Abbreviation * Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-3] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, March 22, 2019
[ISO19790] International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology — Security techniques —
Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017
[ISO24759] International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology — Security techniques —
Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15
December 2015
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, October 23, 2024.
[131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and
Key Lengths, Revision 2, March 2019
[133] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation,
Revision 2, June 2020
[135] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing
Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1,
December 2011.
[186-4] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-, July 19, 2013.
[186-5] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-, February 3, 2023.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December
2001
[38D] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-
38D, November 2007
Copyright Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2026 Version 1.00.00 Page 63 of 65
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Abbreviation * Full Specification Name
[38F] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher
Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F, December
2012
[56Ar3] NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, April 2018
[56Cr2] NIST Special Publication 800-56C Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, August 2020
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A,
Revision 1, June 2015.
[90B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy
Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018.
[OTAR] Project 25 – Digital Radio Over-The-Air-Rekeying (OTAR) Messages and Procedures [TIA-
102.AACA-A], September 2014
[RFC3686] Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP), January 2004
[RFC3711] The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP), March 2004
[RFC5288] AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS, August 2008
[RFC5869] HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF), May 2010
[RFC5246] The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, August 2008
[RFC6188] The Use of AES-192 and AES-256 in Secure RTP, March 2011
[RFC7714] AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption in the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP),
December 2015
[RFC8446] The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3, August 2018
Table 27 Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym * Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BKWK Black Key Wrap Key
CAST Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CFB Cipher Feedback
CKG Cryptographic Key Generation
CO Crypto-Officer
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Acronym * Definition
CO PWD Crypto-Officer Password
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DH-CLI-Pub Diffie-Hellman Client Public Key
DH-Priv Diffie-Hellman Private Key
DH-Pub Diffie-Hellman Public Key
DH-SS Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DRBG-
EI/Seed
DRNG Entropy Input
DSEK DRBG Seed Encryption Key
EBI External Bus Interface
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
ECDSA-
PUB
ECDSA Public Key
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FW Firmware
FW-LD-Pub Firmware Load Public Key
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
HSM Hardware Security Module
IDK Image Decryption Key
IV Initialization Vector
KAT Known Answer Test
KDA Key Derivation Algorithm
KDF Key Derivation Function
KDF-DK KDF Derived Key
KEK Key Encryption Key
KPK Key Protection Key
KYLD Keyload
KVL Key Variable Loader
MAC Message Authentication Code
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Acronym * Definition
MACE Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine
MEK Multi-HSM Exchange Key
OFB Output Feedback
OTAR Over The Air Rekeying
PWD Hash Password Hash
PEK Password Encryption Key
PWCT Pair-Wise Consistency Test
ECDSA-
PRIV
ECDSA Private Key
SRTP Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
SRTP-MK SRTP/SRTCP Master Key
SRTP-MS SRTP/SRTCP Master Salt
RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
TEK Traffic Encryption Key
TLS Transport Layer Security
TLS-MS TLS Pre-Shared Master Secret
UA Unauthenticated Service
User PWD User Password