## Ribbon Communications, Inc. SBC SWe Session Border Controller Version: 10.01.06 ##### Prepared for: ##### Ribbon Communications, Inc. 4 Technology Park Drive Westford, MA 01886 United States of America Phone: +1 855 467 6687 www.ribboncommunications.com ##### Prepared by: Corsec Security, Inc. 12600 Fair Lakes Circle, Suite 210 Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America Phone: +1 703 267 6050 www.corsec.com FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## Table of Contents | General..................................................................................................................................................6 | General..................................................................................................................................................6 | General..................................................................................................................................................6 | |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1.1 | Overview .................................................................................................................................................6 | | | 1.2 | Security Levels.........................................................................................................................................6 | | | 2. | Cryptographic Module Specification .......................................................................................................8 | | | 2.1 | Description ..............................................................................................................................................8 | | | 2.2 | Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ....................................................... | 12 | | 2.3 | Excluded Components ......................................................................................................................... | 14 | | 2.4 | Modes of Operation ............................................................................................................................. | 14 | | 2.5 | Algorithms ............................................................................................................................................ | 14 | | 2.6 | Security Function Implementations ..................................................................................................... | 18 | | 2.7 | Algorithm Specific Information ............................................................................................................ | 23 | | 2.8 | RNG and Entropy ................................................................................................................................. | 24 | | 2.9 | Key Generation .................................................................................................................................... | 24 | | 2.10 | Key Establishment ................................................................................................................................ | 25 | | 2.11 | Industry Protocols ................................................................................................................................ | 25 | | 3. | Cryptographic Module Interfaces ......................................................................................................... | 26 | | 3.1 | Ports and Interfaces ............................................................................................................................. | 26 | | 4. | Roles, Services, and Authentication ...................................................................................................... | 27 | | 4.1 | Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................................... | 27 | | 4.2 | | | | | Roles ..................................................................................................................................................... | 28 | | 4.3 | Approved Services ............................................................................................................................... | 29 | | 4.4 | Non-Approved Services ....................................................................................................................... | 39 | | 4.5 | External Software/Firmware Loaded ................................................................................................... | 39 | | 5. | Software/Firmware Security ................................................................................................................ | 41 | | 5.1 | Integrity Techniques ............................................................................................................................ | 41 | | 5.2 | Initiate on Demand .............................................................................................................................. | 41 | | 6. | Operational Environment ..................................................................................................................... | 42 | | 6.1 | Operational Environment Type and Requirements ............................................................................. | 42 | | 7. | Physical Security .................................................................................................................................. | 43 | | 8. | Non-Invasive Security .......................................................................................................................... | 44 | | 9. | Sensitive Security Parameters Management ......................................................................................... | 45 | | 9.1 9.2 | Storage Areas ....................................................................................................................................... SSP Input-Output Methods .................................................................................................................. | 45 45 | | 9.3 | SSP Zeroization Methods ..................................................................................................................... | 46 | | 9.4 | SSPs ...................................................................................................................................................... | 46 | | 9.5 | Transitions ............................................................................................................................................ | 52 | | 10. | Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................................. | 53 | | 10.1 | Pre-Operational Self-Tests ................................................................................................................... | 53 | | 10.2 | Conditional Self-Tests .......................................................................................................................... | 53 | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 2 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | | 10.3 | Periodic Self-Test Information ............................................................................................................. 55 | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | 10.4 | Error States .......................................................................................................................................... 57 | | | 10.5 | Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .......................................................................................................... 57 | | 11. | Life-Cycle Assurance ............................................................................................................................. 58 | Life-Cycle Assurance ............................................................................................................................. 58 | | | 11.1 | Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ............................................................................. 58 | | | 11.2 | Administrator Guidance ....................................................................................................................... 61 | | | 11.3 | Non-Administrator Guidance ............................................................................................................... 63 | | | 11.4 | Design and Rules .................................................................................................................................. 63 | | | 11.5 | End of Life ............................................................................................................................................ 63 | | 12. | Mitigation of Other Attacks .................................................................................................................. 64 | Mitigation of Other Attacks .................................................................................................................. 64 | | Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................................................... 65 | Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................................................... 65 | Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................................................... 65 | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 3 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## List of Tables | Table 1: Security Levels ..............................................................................................................................................6 | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| | Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) .............................. | 13 | | Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid ............................................................. | 13 | | Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid ............................................. | 14 | | Table 5: Modes List and Description ....................................................................................................................... | 14 | | Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon Cryptographic Library............................................................................... | 16 | | Table 7: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon SRTP KDF Library (IPP) .............................................................................. | 16 | | Table 8: Approved Algorithms - ............................................................................................................................... | 16 | | Table 9: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon IKE KDF Library ......................................................................................... | 17 | | Table 10: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon IKE KDF Library ....................................................................................... | 17 | | Table 11: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon SSH KDF Library ...................................................................................... | 17 | | Table 12: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon TLS KDF Library ....................................................................................... | 17 | | Table 13: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon Entropy Library ....................................................................................... | 17 | | Table 14: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ................................................................................................................... | 17 | | Table 15: Security Function Implementations......................................................................................................... | 23 | | Table 16: Entropy Certificates ................................................................................................................................. | 24 | | Table 17: Entropy Sources ....................................................................................................................................... | 24 | | Table 18: Ports and Interfaces ................................................................................................................................. | 26 | | Table 19: Authentication Methods.......................................................................................................................... | 27 | | Table 20: Roles ........................................................................................................................................................ | 29 | | Table 21: Approved Services ................................................................................................................................... | 39 | | Table 22: Storage Areas ........................................................................................................................................... | 45 | | Table 23: SSP Input-Output Methods ...................................................................................................................... | 45 | | Table 24: SSP Zeroization Methods ......................................................................................................................... | 46 | | Table 25: SSP Table 1 ............................................................................................................................................... | 49 | | Table 26: SSP Table 2 ............................................................................................................................................... | 52 | | Table 27: Pre-Operational Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................... | 53 | | Table 28: Conditional Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................. | 55 | | Table 29: Pre-Operational Periodic Information ..................................................................................................... | 56 | | Table 30: Conditional Periodic Information ............................................................................................................ | 56 | | Table 31: Error States .............................................................................................................................................. | 57 | | Table 32. Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... | 65 | ## List of Figures | Figure 1. Typical Deployment of SBC SWe in a Network ............................................................................................9 | | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| | Figure 2. Module Block Diagram (with Cryptographic Boundary) ........................................................................... | 11 | | Figure 3. Block Diagram of a GPC ............................................................................................................................ | 12 | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 4 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 5 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## 1. General ### 1.1 Overview #### 1.1.1 References This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-3 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources: - The Ribbon website (www.ribboncommunications.com) contains information on the full line of services and solutions from Ribbon. - The search page on the CMVP website (https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validationprogram/Validated-Modules/Search) can be used to locate and obtain vendor contact information for technical or sales-related questions about the module. #### 1.1.2 Document Organization ISO/IEC 19790 Annex B uses the same section naming convention as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7 - Security requirements. For example, Annex B section B.2.1 is named 'General' and B.2.2 is named 'Cryptographic module specification,' which is the same as ISO/IEC 19790 section 7.1 and section 7.2, respectively. Therefore, the format of this Security Policy is presented in the same order as indicated in Annex B, starting with 'General' and ending with 'Mitigation of other attacks.' If sections are not applicable, they have been marked as such in this document. ### 1.2 Security Levels The SBC SWe Session Border Controller is validated at the FIPS 140-3 section levels shown in the table below. Table 1: Security Levels | Section | Title | Security Level | |-----------|-----------------------------------------|------------------| | 1 | General | 1 | | 2 | Cryptographic module specification | 1 | | 3 | Cryptographic module interfaces | 1 | | 4 | Roles, services, and authentication | 3 | | 5 | Software/Firmware security | 1 | | 6 | Operational environment | 1 | | 7 | Physical security | N/A | | 8 | Non-invasive security | N/A | | 9 | Sensitive security parameter management | 1 | | 10 | Self-tests | 1 | | 11 | Life-cycle assurance | 1 | | 12 | Mitigation of other attacks | N/A | | | Overall Level | 1 | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 6 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ##### The module has an overall security level of 1. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 7 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## 2. Cryptographic Module Specification ### 2.1 Description #### 2.1.1 Purpose and Use Ribbon Communications, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Ribbon) is a leader in IP 1 networking with proven expertise in delivering secure, reliable and scalable next-generation infrastructure and subscriber solutions. The Ribbon line of Session Border Controller (SBC) solutions help mid-sized and large enterprises take advantage of cost-saving SIP 2 trunking services by securing their network from IP-based attacks, unifying SIP-based communications and controlling traffic in the network. The Ribbon SBC SWe Session Border Controller (SBC SWe) is a software-based, cloud-optimized SBC architected to enable and secure real-time communications in the cloud. Starting at 25 sessions and scaling to tens of thousands per instance, the unique architecture of the SBC SWe allows customers to define where on the performance curve their network needs to reside. The SBC SWe uses a 'microservices' architecture designed to separate signaling, media, and transcoding to optimize virtual network resources. It also supports on-demand auto-scaling, with a feedback loop using Key Performance Indicators and the Ribbon Virtual Network Function (VNF) Manager. The SBC SWe features the same code base, resiliency, media transcoding, and security technology found in Ribbon's hardware-based SBC 5000 Series and SBC 7000 Session Border Controllers. However, as a software solution, customers can deploy the SBC SWe as a VNF on industry-standard servers in a data center environment using a hypervisor, as a VNF in an OpenStack cloud infrastructure, or as a VNF on public cloud or hosted services. Some of the network and security features provided by the SBC SWe are: - Built-in media transcoding capability - Industry-leading user interface for ease of management and ongoing operations - Common service orchestration with Ribbon's centralized call routing and policy management for networkwide intelligence and control - Enhanced security/encryption services to protect privacy and ensure compliance - Load-balancing of Real Time Communications (RTC) traffic across the cloud for network efficiency - Integrated analytics of network traffic to drive orchestration of SBC VNFs - TLS 3 , IPsec (IKEv1 4 ) for signaling encryption - Secure RTP/RTCP 5 for media encryption 1 IP - Internet Protocol 2 SIP - Session Initiation Protocol 3 TLS - Transport Layer Security 4 IKEv1 - Internet Key Exchange version 1 5 RTCP - RTP Control Protocol SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 8 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 - Support for large number of protocols including IPv4, IPv6, IPv4/IPv6 interworking, SSH 6 , SFTP 7 , SNMP 8 , HTTPS 9 , RTP/RTCP, UDP 10 , TCP 11 , DNS 12 , and ENUM 13 Figure 1 below illustrates a typical deployment scenario of the module. Figure 1. Typical Deployment of SBC SWe in a Network Management of the SBC SWe is accomplished using the following tools: - Command Line Interface (CLI), which is accessible remotely via SSH over Ethernet management ports. - Web-based Graphical User Interface (GUI) called Embedded Management Application (EMA), which is accessible remotely via HTTPS over Ethernet management ports. The module also provides an SNMPv3 14 interface for remote management and non-security relevant information about the module's state and statistics. In addition, the module provides an SFTP interface for transferring the Security Event log, the System Event log, release packages, tone and announcement files, CDR 15 logs, and configuration files over the virtual machine's Ethernet management ports. These management interfaces provide authorized operators access to the module for configuration and management of all facets of the module's operation, including system configuration, troubleshooting, security, and service provisioning. Using any of the management interfaces, an operator is able to monitor, configure, control, receive report events, and retrieve logs from the SBC SWe. 6 SSH - Secure Shell 7 SFTP - SSH File Transport Protocol 8 SNMP - Simple Network Management Protocol To support TLS, the module employs the following certificate management techniques: 9 HTTPS - Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure 10 UDP - User Datagram Protocol 11 TCP - Transmission Control Protocol 12 DNS - Domain Name System 13 ENUM - E.164 Number Mapping 14 SNMPv3 - Simple Network Management Protocol version 3 15 CDR - Call Detail Records SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 9 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 - Local - Local certificates are credentials belonging to the SBC SWe itself, which it presents to peers in order to prove its identity. Local certificate files must be downloaded to the module before installing the certificates. - Local-Internal - The SBC SWe generates and installs RSA key pairs and generates Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) internally. The CSR is sent to a CA, and the issued certificate is then installed on the SBC. - Remote - Remote certificates are credentials belonging to CAs. The CA certificates contain public keys only; they do not contain the associated private keys. The CA certificates are Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) format files. #### 2.1.2 Module Type The SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 is a Software module. #### 2.1.3 Module Embodiment The SBC SWe Session Border Controller has a MultiChipStand embodiment. #### 2.1.4 Module Characteristics The module does not have any additional characteristics. #### 2.1.5 Cryptographic Boundary As a software appliance, the module has no physical components. Since the module has no physical characteristics, it makes use of the physical interfaces of the server hosting the virtual environment upon which the module is installed. The hypervisor controls and directs all interactions between the module and the operator, and it is responsible for mapping the module's virtual interfaces to the host server's physical interfaces. The module's cryptographic boundary consists of all functionalities contained within the module's compiled source code. This comprises the following primary components: - SBC SWe application software - Ribbon's proprietary ConnexIP operating system (with crypto libraries) - SonusDB (with configuration files and PostGRES) - HMAC digest files (for integrity checking) The cryptographic boundary is the contiguous perimeter that surrounds all memory-mapped functionality provided by the module when loaded and stored in the host device's memory. The module is entirely contained within the physical perimeter. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 10 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 Figure 2 shows the logical block diagram of the module executing in memory and its interactions with surrounding software components, as well as the module's physical perimeter and cryptographic boundary. Figure 2. Module Block Diagram (with Cryptographic Boundary) #### 2.1.6 Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP) The physical perimeter of the cryptographic module is defined by the hard enclosure around the GPC on which it runs. Figure 3 is a diagram illustrating the hardware components of a GPC (the dashed line surrounding the hardware components represents the module's physical perimeter and identifies the hardware with which the processors interface. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 11 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 Figure 3. Block Diagram of a GPC ### 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification #### 2.2.1 Tested Module Identification - Hardware This section is only applicable for hardware modules. N/A for this module. #### 2.2.2 Tested Module Identification - Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) The module has the following executable code sets shown in the table below. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 12 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 Table 2: Tested Module Identification - Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) | Package or File Name | Software/ Firmware Version | Features | Integrity Test | |-----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------|------------------| | SBC SWe Session Border Controller | 10.01.06 | | Yes | #### 2.2.3 Tested Module Identification - Hybrid Disjoint Hardware The module does not have hybrid disjoint hardware. N/A for this module. #### 2.2.4 Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-3 requirements on the environments listed in the table below. Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid | Operating System | Hardware Platform | Processors | PAA/PAI | Hypervisor or Host OS | Version(s) | |-----------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------|-------------------------|--------------| | Ribbon ConnexIP OS 10 | HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen9 | Intel Xeon CPU E5 v3 (Haswell) | Yes | VMWare ESXi 6.5 | 10.01.06 | | Ribbon ConnexIP OS 10 | HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen9 | Intel Xeon CPU E5 v3 (Haswell) | No | VMWare ESXi 6.5 | 10.01.06 | The module is designed to utilize AES-NI 16 extended instruction set when available by the host platform's CPU for processor algorithm acceleration (PAA) of its AES implementation. #### 2.2.5 Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid The cryptographic module maintains validation compliance when operating in a VM with ConnexIP as the guest OS on any compatible GPC using a KVM hypervisor to provide the virtualization layer. Note that the host GPC may be deployed on-prem or in any of the following supported cloud environments: - OpenStack - Amazon Web Services - Google Cloud Platform - Microsoft Azure | Operating System | Hardware Platform | |-----------------------|---------------------| | OpenStack | | | Amazon Web Services | | | Google Cloud Platform | | | Microsoft Azure | | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 13 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ###### Table 4: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate. ### 2.3 Excluded Components The module does not exclude any components from the requirements. ### 2.4 Modes of Operation #### 2.4.1 Modes List and Description When installed, configured, and operated according to this Security Policy, the module supports the Approved mode of operation only; non-Approved operations are not supported. Table 5: Modes List and Description | Mode Name | Description | Type | Status Indicator | |-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|------------------------------| | Approved | When the module is installed, initialized, and operated as directed in the Security Policy section 11.1, the module supports an Approved mode of operation only. | Approved | Global FIPS status indicator | ### 2.5 Algorithms #### 2.5.1 Approved Algorithms The module employs cryptographic algorithm implementations from the following sources: - Ribbon Cryptographic Library version 10 (Cert. A5061) - Ribbon Entropy Library version 10 (Cert. A4087) - Ribbon IKE KDF 17 Library version 10 (Cert. A5062) - Ribbon SRTP 18 KDF Library (IPP 19 ) version 10 (Cert. A5063) - Ribbon SSH KDF Library version 10 (Cert. A5064) - Ribbon TLS KDF Library version 10 (Cert. A5065) The module implements the Approved algorithms listed in the table below. ##### Ribbon Cryptographic Library | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | AES-CBC | A5061 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CFB1 | A5061 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 14 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-----------------------------------------|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | AES-CFB128 | A5061 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CFB8 | A5061 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CTR | A5061 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-GCM | A5061 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - Internal IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 256 | SP 800-38D | | Counter DRBG | A5061 | Prediction Resistance - No, Yes Mode - AES-128 Derivation Function Enabled - No, Yes | SP 800-90A Rev. 1 | | DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) | A5061 | L - 2048, 3072 N - 224, 256 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) | A5061 | Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates | FIPS 186-5 | | ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5) | A5061 | Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 | FIPS 186-5 | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) | A5061 | Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-5 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) | A5061 | Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-5 | | HMAC-SHA-1 | A5061 | Key Length - Key Length: 112-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-224 | A5061 | Key Length - Key Length: 112-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-256 | A5061 | Key Length - Key Length: 112-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-384 | A5061 | Key Length - Key Length: 112-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | HMAC-SHA2-512 | A5061 | Key Length - Key Length: 112-65528 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | KAS-ECC CDH-Component SP800-56Ar3 (CVL) | A5061 | Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 | A5061 | Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator, responder | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 | A5061 | Domain Parameter Generation Methods - FB, FC Scheme - dhEphem - | SP 800-56A Rev. 3 | | KTS-IFC | A5061 | KAS Role - initiator, responder Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Key Generation Methods - rsakpg1-basic Scheme - KTS-OAEP-basic - KAS Role - initiator, responder Key Transport Method - Key Length - 768 | SP 800-56B Rev. 2 | | PBKDF | A5061 | Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 10-1000 Increment 1 Password Length - Password Length: 8-128 Increment 1 | SP 800-132 | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) | A5061 | Key Generation Mode - probable Modulo - 2048 Primality Tests - 2powSecStr Private Key Format - standard | FIPS 186-5 | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) | A5061 | Modulo - 2048 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5 | FIPS 186-5 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) | A5061 | Modulo - 2048 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5 | FIPS 186-5 | | SHA-1 | A5061 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 15 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | SHA2-224 | A5061 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-256 | A5061 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-384 | A5061 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | | SHA2-512 | A5061 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | ###### Table 6: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon Cryptographic Library Ribbon SRTP KDF Library (IPP) | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |----------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | AES-CBC | A5063 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-CTR | A5063 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | AES-ECB | A5063 | Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256 | SP 800-38A | | HMAC-SHA-1 | A5063 | Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 | FIPS 198-1 | | KDF SRTP (CVL) | A5063 | AES Key Length - 128, 192 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | | SHA-1 | A5063 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-51200 Increment 8 | FIPS 180-4 | ###### Table 7: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon SRTP KDF Library (IPP) | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |----------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) | A5061 | Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P- 256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - Testing Candidates | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4) | A5061 | Curve - B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K- 571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) | A5061 | Curve - B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, P-224, P- 256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) | A5061 | Curve - B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K- 571, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | FIPS 186-4 | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) | A5061 | Key Generation Mode - B.3.3 Modulo - 2048 Primality Tests - Table C.2 Private Key Format - Standard | FIPS 186-4 | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186- 4) | A5061 | Signature Type - PKCS 1.5 Modulo - 2048 | FIPS 186-4 | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186- 4) | A5061 | Signature Type - PKCS 1.5 Modulo - 1024, 2048 | FIPS 186-4 | | TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL) | A5065 | Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | ###### Table 8: Approved Algorithms - | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-----------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | KDF IKEv1 (CVL) | A5062 | Authentication Method - Digital Signature, Pre-shared Key, Public Key Encryption Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 2048 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Preshared Key Length - Preshared Key Length: 64-512 Increment 8 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | | KDF IKEv2 (CVL) | A5062 | Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 224-4096 Increment 8 Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material Length: 160-4096 Increment 8 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. ##### Ribbon IKE KDF Library This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 16 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ##### Ribbon IKE KDF Library Table 10: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon IKE KDF Library | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-----------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | KDF IKEv1 (CVL) | A5062 | Authentication Method - Digital Signature, Pre-shared Key, Public Key Encryption Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 2048 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Preshared Key Length - Preshared Key Length: 64-512 Increment 8 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | | KDF IKEv2 (CVL) | A5062 | Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 224-4096 Increment 8 Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material Length: 160-4096 Increment 8 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | ##### Ribbon SSH KDF Library | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |---------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | KDF SSH (CVL) | A5064 | Cipher - AES-128 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | Table 11: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon SSH KDF Library | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |---------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | KDF TLS (CVL) | A5065 | TLS Version - v1.2 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 | SP 800-135 Rev. 1 | ##### Ribbon TLS KDF Library Table 12: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon TLS KDF Library ##### Ribbon Entropy Library Table 13: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon Entropy Library | Algorithm | CAVP Cert | Properties | Reference | |-------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | SHA3-256 | A4087 | Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 | FIPS 202 | #### 2.5.2 Vendor Affirmed Algorithms The vendor affirms the following cryptographic security methods in the table below: Table 14: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms | Name | Properties | Implementation | Reference | |--------|---------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------| | CKG | CKG:Symmetric | Ribbon Cryptographic Library | Per SP 800-133 Rev. 2, section 4. | #### 2.5.3 Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms The table below lists the non-Approved algorithms implemented by the module that are allowed for use in the Approved mode of operation. N/A for this module. Table 9: Approved Algorithms - Ribbon IKE KDF Library SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 17 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 #### 2.5.4 Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed The module does not offer any non-Approved algorithms allowed in the Approved mode of operation with no security claimed. N/A for this module. #### 2.5.5 Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms The module does not offer non-Approved algorithms not allowed in the Approved mode of operation. N/A for this module. ### 2.6 Security Function Implementations The table below lists the security function implementations for this module. | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |-------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | DRBG for Random Password Generation | DRBG | DRBG for generating random passwords. | | Counter DRBG: (A5061) | | SHA for Password Storage | SHA | SHA2-512 for hashing stored password values. | | SHA2-512: (A5061) | | RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading | DigSig-SigVer | RSA digital signature verification, used for certificate loading. | | SHA2-224: (A5061) SHA2-256: (A5061) SHA2-384: (A5061) SHA2-512: (A5061) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5061) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5061) | | CKG for CDB Key Generation | CKG | CKG for the Config Database (CDB) Key, which is used for the encryption/decryption of RSA or ECDSA private keys and pre-shared secrets for RADIUS. | | Counter DRBG: (A5061) | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 18 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Type | Description | Algorithms | |-----------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | IPsec IKE | KAS-Full | Key Agreement for IKE. Key exchange is performed using ECDH or DH. Public/private keys generation is performed using RSA. | AES-CBC: (A5061) AES-CTR: (A5061) AES-GCM: (A5061) KeyGen (FIPS186- (A5061) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5061) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A5061) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5061) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A5061) KAS-ECC CDH- Component SP800- 56Ar3: (A5061) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A5061) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A5061) IKEv1: (A5062) IKEv2: (A5062) SHA-1: (A5061) SHA2-224: (A5061) SHA2-256: (A5061) SHA2-384: (A5061) SHA2-512: (A5061) Counter DRBG: (A5061) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5061) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5061) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186- (A5061) KeyGen (FIPS186- (A5061) SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5061) SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5061) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186- (A5061) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- (A5061) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5061) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186- (A5061) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186- (A5061) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- (A5061) KeyGen (FIPS186- (A5061) SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A5061) SigVer (FIPS186-4): | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 19 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Type | Description | | | |-----------------|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | SRTP | KAS-Full | Key Agreement for SRTP. Key exchange is performed using ECDH or DH. Public/private keys generation is performed using ECDSA or RSA. | Properties | Algorithms AES-CBC: (A5063) AES-CTR: (A5063) AES-ECB: (A5063) Counter DRBG: (A5061) DSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4): (A5061) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5063) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A5061) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A5061) KAS-ECC CDH- Component SP800- 56Ar3: (A5061) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 5): (A5061) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5061) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5061) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5061) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186- 5): (A5061) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186- 5): (A5061) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5): (A5061) KDF SRTP: (A5063) SHA-1: (A5063) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5061) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186- 4): (A5061) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186- 4): (A5061) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 4): (A5061) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4): (A5061) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A5061) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5061) | | AES for SNMPv3 | BC-UnAuth | AES-CFB for SNMPv3 packet encryption/decryption. | | AES-CFB1: (A5061) AES-CFB8: (A5061) AES-CFB128: (A5061) | | HMAC for SNMPv3 | MAC | HMAC for SNMPv3 packet authentication. | | HMAC-SHA-1: (A5061) SHA-1: (A5061) | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 20 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | | | Type | | Properties | |-----|------|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | SSH | Name | KAS-Full | Description Agreement for SSH. exchange is performed using ECDH Public/private generation is performed using ECDSA RSA. | Algorithms AES-CBC: AES-CTR: (A5061) AES-GCM: Counter DRBG: DSA KeyGen 4): (A5061) HMAC-SHA-1: KAS-ECC CDH- Component 56Ar3: (A5061) KAS-ECC-SSC 56Ar3: (A5061) KAS-FFC-SSC 56Ar3: (A5061) KDF SSH: (A5064) SHA-1: (A5061) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): ECDSA KeyVer 5): (A5061) ECDSA SigGen 5): (A5061) ECDSA SigVer 5): (A5061) RSA KeyGen 5): (A5061) RSA SigGen (A5061) RSA SigVer (A5061) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): ECDSA KeyVer 4): (A5061) ECDSA SigGen 4): (A5061) ECDSA SigVer 4): (A5061) RSA KeyGen 4): (A5061) RSA SigGen (A5061) RSA SigVer | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 21 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Type | Description | Algorithms | |--------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | TLS v1.2 | KAS-Full | Key Agreement for TLS v1.2. Key exchange is performed using ECDH or DH. Public/private keys generation is performed using ECDSA or RSA. | AES-CBC: (A5061) AES-GCM: (A5061) Counter DRBG: (A5061) DSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4): (A5061) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5061) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5061) KAS-ECC CDH- Component SP800- 56Ar3: (A5061) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A5061) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3: (A5061) KDF TLS: (A5065) KTS-IFC: (A5061) TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A5065) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5061) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186- 5): (A5061) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186- 5): (A5061) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5): (A5061) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 5): (A5061) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5061) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5061) ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4): (A5061) ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186- 4): (A5061) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186- 4): (A5061) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 4): (A5061) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4): (A5061) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4): (A5061) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5061) | | DRBG (Random bits) | DRBG | Get random bits from the DBRG. | Counter DRBG: (A5061) | | PBKDF | PBKDF | PBKDF for decrypting certificates | PBKDF: (A5061) | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 22 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 Table 15: Security Function Implementations | Name | Type | Description | Properties | Algorithms | |---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | ECDSA or RSA SigVer for Public Key Certificate Authentication | DigSig-SigVer | ECDSA or RSA signature verification for public key certificate authentication. | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 4): (A5061) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 5): (A5061) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5061) SHA-1: (A5061) SHA2-224: (A5061) SHA2-256: (A5061) SHA2-384: (A5061) Counter DRBG: (A5061) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4): (A5061) | | Entropy Source Conditioner | ENT-Cond | SHA3-256 entropy source conditioner | | SHA3-256: (A4087) | ### 2.7 Algorithm Specific Information The following is algorithm-specific information related to the module: - AES-GCM: The AES-GCM IV 20 is used in the following protocols: - o For TLS v1.2, the module supports acceptable AES-GCM cipher suites from section 3.3.1 of NIST SP 800-52rev2 . Per scenario 1 in FIPS 140-3 IG C.H, the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288 . The counter portion of the IV is strictly increasing. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, a failure in encryption will occur and a handshake to establish a new encryption key will be required. The module will then trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key. - o For SRTP, the AES-GCM IV is constructed at its entirety internally deterministically per section 8.2.1 of NIST SP 800-38D . In compliance with RFC 7714 , the 96-bit IV is formed by first concatenating 16 bits of zeroes, the 32-bit Synchronization Source identifier, the 32-bit rollover counter, and the 16-octet sequence number. As described in scenario 3 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H and, the (key, IV) collision probability does not exceed 2 -32 for a given key distributed to one or more cryptographic modules. In the event that the module's power is lost and then restored, the CO shall establish a new key for use with AES-GCM encryption/decryption. - PBKDF2: The module uses PBKDF2 option 1a from section 5.4 of NIST SP 800-132 . This function takes an input salt that is 128 bits in length with a passphrase containing at least eight characters (in accordance with the module's password complexity requirements) and produces a random value of 128 bits. The underlying pseudorandom function used in this derivation is SHA-1. The function has an iteration count of 2048. This iteration count allows for user-acceptable key generation times while still doubling the recommended minimum count (1000). 20 IV - Initialization Vector SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 23 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 The length of the password/passphrase used in the PBKDF shall be at least 20 characters, and shall consist of lowercase, uppercase, and numeric characters. The upper bound for the probability of guessing the value is estimated to be 1/62 20 = 10 -36 , which is less than 2 -112 . As specified in NIST SP 800-132 , keys derived from passwords/passphrases may only be used in storage applications. - DH and ECDH: The module implements the DH and ECDH key agreement schemes specified in NIST SP 800-56Arev3 . This specification requires that certain checks are performed to provide assurance regarding the keys being used. The following assurance checks are performed by the cryptographic module: - o Assurances of domain parameter validity (section 5.5.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3 ) - o Assurances required by the key pair owner (section 5.6.2.1 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3 ) - o Assurances required by the public key recipient (section 5.6.2.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3 ) - ECDSA: Per FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance C.K, there is currently no scheduled transition away from elliptic curves over binary fields (i.e., K-233, B-233, K-283, B-283, K-409, B-409, K-571, B-571). However, these curves are now deprecated, and it is strongly recommended to use the SP-800-186-defined prime curves (i.e., P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521) for the generation of the ECDSA signatures. Despite their deprecation status, these curves are still considered Approved. ### 2.8 RNG and Entropy The module uses its Approved DRBG to generate cryptographic keys and seeds used to generate cryptographic keys. The resulting symmetric key or generated seed is an unmodified output from the DRBG. The table below specifies the module's entropy certificates. Table 16: Entropy Certificates | Cert Number | Vendor Name | |---------------|-----------------------| | E101 | Ribbon Communications | The table below specifies the module's entropy sources. Table 17: Entropy Sources | Name | Type | Operational Environment | Sample Size | Entropy per Sample | Conditioning Component | |------------------------|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------------------------| | Ribbon Entropy Library | Non- Physical | Ribbon ConnexIP OS 10 on VMware ESXi 6.5 running on Intel Xeon CPU E5 v3 (Haswell) | 64 | Full entropy | SHA3-256 (A4087) | ### 2.9 Key Generation The following is a list of key generation methods that the module implements: SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 24 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 - CKG - ECDSA KeyGen - RSA KeyGen ### 2.10 Key Establishment #### 2.10.1 Key Agreement Information The following is a list of key agreement methods that the module implements: - IKEv1 with DH or ECDH for Key Agreement - IKEv2 with DH or ECDH for Key Agreement - SRTP with DH or ECDH for Key Agreement - SSH with DH or ECDH for Key Agreement - TLS v1.2 with DH or ECDH for Key Agreement The module implements the DH and ECDH key agreement schemes specified in NIST SP 800-56Arev3 . This specification requires that certain checks are performed to provide assurance regarding the keys being used. The following assurance checks are performed by the cryptographic module: - Assurances of domain parameter validity (section 5.5.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3 ) - Assurances required by the key pair owner (section 5.6.2.1 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3 ) - Assurances required by the public key recipient (section 5.6.2.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3 ) Key confirmation is not supported by the module. #### 2.10.2 Key Transport Information Key transport information does not apply to the module. ### 2.11 Industry Protocols The module employs the following industry protocols: - IPsec (IKEv1 and IKEv2) - SRTP - SSH - TLS v1.2 The KDFs associated with these protocols shall only be used within the context of their respective protocols. No parts of these protocols, other than the Approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 25 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## 3. Cryptographic Module Interfaces ### 3.1 Ports and Interfaces The module supports the following logical interfaces: - Data Input - Data Output - Control Input - Status Output As a virtual appliance, the module has no physical characteristics. Its interfaces are logical; the hypervisor provides virtualized ports and interfaces for the module that map to the host server's physical ports and interfaces. The module relies on the physical and electrical characteristics, manual controls, and physical indicators of the host server. The module consists of an application and OS running in a virtual machine. The OS (ConnexIP) communicates directly with the hypervisor, which virtualizes ports and interfaces for the module. A mapping of the virtual ports and interfaces to the defined logical interfaces is provided in the table below. Note that the module does not output control information, and thus has no specified control output interface. Table 18: Ports and Interfaces | Physical Port | Logical Interface(s) | Data That Passes | |-----------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | N/A | Data Input | Encrypted management traffic over TLS (GUI) and SSH (CLI); user data over SSH; encrypted media and signaling traffic over TLS (GUI); redundancy synchronization traffic; operational/system status information | | N/A | Data Output | Encrypted management traffic over TLS (GUI) and SSH (CLI); encrypted media and signaling traffic over TLS (GUI); redundancy synchronization traffic; operational/system status information | | N/A | Control Input | Encrypted management traffic over TLS (GUI) and SSH (CLI); user data over SSH; encrypted media and signaling traffic over TLS (GUI); redundancy synchronization traffic; operational/system status information | | N/A | Status Output | Encrypted management traffic over TLS (GUI) and SSH (CLI); encrypted media and signaling traffic over TLS (GUI); redundancy synchronization traffic; operational/system status information | | N/A | Power | Power | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 26 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## 4. Roles, Services, and Authentication ### 4.1 Authentication Methods Module operators are required to authenticate to the module for assumption of an authorized role. The module supports identity-based authentication. Role assumption is implicit, as module operator roles are assigned to their user account. The module can support multiple operator sessions concurrently from multiple client devices. The maximum number of simultaneous sessions allowed per operator can be configured for any number from 1 to 5. Each session remains active (logged in) and secured until the operator logs out or is automatically logged out from inactivity. When the module is powered off, result of any previous authentication will be cleared, and module operators will need to re-authenticate in order to re-assume their respective roles. The table below lists the authentication methods and the strength of the authentication mechanisms. Table 19: Authentication Methods | Method Name | Description | Security Mechanism | Strength Each Attempt | Strength per Minute | |------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------| | Password | For the first-time module access by the CO, the module ships with a factory-set default username ("admin") and password ("admin") for the EMA and the CLI. User accounts are assigned randomly generated passwords upon account activation. Following first-time login using default/assigned credentials, module operators are prompted to set new passwords. | Username/Password | 1:16,889,161,502,720 | 6:16,889,161,502,720 | | Public Key Certificate | The module supports RSA and ECDSA digital certificate authentication of users during Web GUI/HTTPS (TLS) access. | ECDSA and RSA SigVer | 1:5.19 x 10^33 | 1:96.92 × 10^23 | The strength objectives of the authentication mechanisms are as follows: - For each attempt to use an authentication mechanism, the probability shall be less than one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur. - For multiple attempts to use an authentication mechanism during a one-minute period, the probability shall be less than one in 100,000 that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur. To meet the stated strength objectives for password-based authentication, password policies shall be configured such that all passwords shall require: - Between 8 and 24 characters - At least one lowercase letter - At least one uppercase letter SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 27 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 - At least one digit - At least one special character The Crypto Officer shall set the module's password policies after the initial setup of the module. Password policies can be set via the EMA or CLI. - Using the CLI, password policies are configured using the following command: - Using the EMA, password policies are configured by navigating to Administration -> Users and Application Management -> Application Management from the SBC main screen. The CO shall ensure that the checkbox for 'Use Separate Password Rules for Administrators' is unchecked. ``` % set system admin passwordRules ``` Once set, the module enforces the password policies on all subsequent attempts to change a password. The CO shall also ensure that the default brute force password attack mitigation remains enabled. Per the default settings, the module will lock an account for 30 seconds after three (3) consecutive failed login attempts. The CO can view and/or configure the brute force password attack settings by navigating to the Administration -> Users and Application Management -> Application Management window from the Using the EMA SBC main screen. Using the CLI, the CO can view and/or configure the brute force password attack settings using the following command: % show system admin <systemName> accountManagement bruteForceAttack ### 4.2 Roles The module supports the following vendor-defined groups and capabilities: - Administrator - Read-Write access to all commands and data spaces. - Calea - Read-write access to Lawful Intercept tables and Read access to other tables. Only an Admin user can add or remove user from this group. Only one user named 'Calea' is allowed in this group, and the 'Calea' user cannot be part of any other group. - Field Service - Read-write access to all commands and data spaces excluding some administrative functions only available to admin users. - Guest - Read-only access to all commands and data spaces except commands that deal with user accounts, logging and audit controls, the TOD clock and sensitive administrative items. They do not have access to the Security Event logs and management audit logs. - Operator - Read-write access to all commands and data spaces except commands that deal with user accounts, logging and audit controls, the TOD clock, and sensitive administrative items. They do not have access to the Security Event logs and management audit logs and cannot execute any commands stopping or starting these audit log services. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 28 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 - Security Auditor - Read-only access to view the security logs and management audit logs. The commands executed by the Security Auditor are logged in the Management Audit log. The module supports two defined roles that operators may assume: - Crypto Officer - The CO is responsible for initializing the module for first use, which includes the configuration of passwords, public and private keys, and other SSPs. The CO is also responsible for the management of all keys and SSPs, including their zeroization, and is the only operator that can install and configure the module for Approved mode of operation. The CO has access to all User services. The CO role consists of the vendordefined roles 'Administrator', 'Calea', 'Field Service', and 'Operator'. - User - The User has read-only privileges and can show the status and statistics of the module, show the current status of the module, and connect to the module remotely using HTTPS and SSH. Users can also change their own passwords. The User role consists of the vendor-defined roles 'Guest' and 'Security Auditor'. The table below lists the supported roles. Table 20: Roles | Name | Type | Operator Type | Authentication Methods | |----------------|----------|-----------------|---------------------------------| | Crypto Officer | Identity | CO | Password Public Key Certificate | | User | Identity | User | Password Public Key Certificate | ### 4.3 Approved Services Descriptions of the services available are provided in the table below. When configured according to the guidance in section 11, the module only executes in an Approved mode of operation. Thus, as allowed per section C.H of FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance , the module provides indicators for the use of Approved services through a combination of an explicit indication (via a global FIPS mode indicator) and an implicit indication (via the successful completion of the service). The keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) listed in the table indicate the type of access required using the following notation: - G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP. - R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output). - W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module. - E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. - Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the SSP. | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|----------------| | Commission the module | Commission the module by following the Security Policy guidelines | n/a | n/a | none | None | Crypto Officer | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 29 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Manage SBC license | Installs the license to enable SBC features; delete or update license; view current license status | n/a | Command | Status output | None | Crypto Officer | | Configure the SBC system | Define network interfaces and settings; set protocols; configure authentication information; define policies and profiles | n/a | Command and parameter | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer | | Configure routing policy and control services | Configure IP network parameters and profiles for signaling, media, call routing, call services, zone, IP ACL rules, NTP and DNS servers | n/a | Command and parameter | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer | | Configure Crypto Suite Profile | Select crypto suites for SRTP, SRTCP, and SIP communication | n/a | Command and parameter | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer | | Configure Call Data Record (CDR) | Configure log file behavior | n/a | Command and parameter | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer | | Perform backup and restore services | Back up the current system configuration; restore the system configuration from a backup file; import and export backup files | n/a | Command and parameter | Command response, status output | TLS v1.2 | Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Privacy Key: R,W - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: R,W | | Manage users | Create, edit, and delete users; define user accounts and assign permissions. | n/a | Command and parameter | Command response, status output | DRBG for Random Password Generation SHA for Password Storage DRBG (Random bits) Entropy Source Conditioner | Crypto Officer - User password: R,W - DRBG Entropy Input String: G,E - DRBG Seed: G,E - DRBG 'V' Value: G,E - DRBG 'Key' | | Manage user sessions | Terminate User sessions | n/a | Command and parameter | Command response, status output | SSH TLS v1.2 | Value: G,E Crypto Officer - SSH Session Key: Z - TLS Session Key: Z | | Change password | Modify existing login passwords | n/a | Command and parameter | Command response, status output | SHA for Password Storage | Crypto Officer - Crypto Officer password: W User - User password: W | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 30 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Load certificate | Load new certificates | Global FIPS status indicator | Command | Command response, status output | RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading PBKDF | Crypto Officer - Certificate Load Key: W - TLS Private Key: W - TLS Public Key: W - CA Public Key: W | | Run script | Run a script file (a text file containing a list of CLI commands to execute in sequence) | Global FIPS status indicator | Command | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer | | Perform on- demand self- tests | Perform self-tests on- demand using CLI/EMA command | n/a | Command | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer | | Perform network diagnostics | Monitor connections (e.g., ping) | n/a | Command | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer User | | Show system status | Show the system status (including Approved mode status) | n/a | Command | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer User | | Show system versioning | Show operational status information about module components (including hardware type and application version) | n/a | Command | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer User | | View Event Log | View event status messages | n/a | Command | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer | | Zeroize keys | Zeroize all SSPs (using CLI/EMA command to zeroize) | Completion indicator (message/log) | Command | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer - Config Database (CBD) Key: Z User - Config Database (CBD) Key: Z | | Perform keying of CDB Key | Generate CDB key | Global FIPS status indicator | Command and parameters | Command response, status output | CKG for CDB Key Generation | Crypto Officer - Config Database (CBD) Key: G | | Reboot/Reset | Reboot or reset the module | Global FIPS status indicator | Command | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer - Config Database (CBD) Key: Z | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 31 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Establish IPsec connection | Establish an IPsec session using IKE | Global FIPS status indicator | Command and parameters | Command response, status output | IPsec IKE | Crypto Officer - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,E - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,E - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - IKE RSA Private Key: G,E - IKE RSA Public Key: G,R - IKE Shared Secret: W,E - IKE SKEYID: G,E - IKE Pre-shared Secret: G,E - IKE Encryption Key: G,E - IKE Authentication Key: G,E - IPsec Shared Secret: G,E - IPsec Encryption Key: G,E - IPsec Authentication Key: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E - IKE Key Derivation Key: G,E User - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,E - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,E - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - IKE RSA Private Key: G,E - IKE RSA Public Key: G,R - IKE Shared Secret: W,E - IKE SKEYID: G,E - IKE Pre-shared | |------------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 32 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | Secret: G,E - IKE Encryption Key: G,E - IKE Authentication Key: G,E - IKE Key Derivation Key: G,E - IPsec Shared Secret: G,E - IPsec Encryption Key: G,E - IPsec Authentication Key: G,E | | Establish SRTP connection | Establish a SRTP session using SIP/TLS protocols | Global FIPS status indicator | Command and parameters | Command response, status output | SRTP | Crypto Officer - SRTP Master Key: W,E - SRTP Authentication Key: G - SRTP Session Key: G - AES GCM IV: G,E User - SRTP Master Key: W,E - SRTP Authentication Key: G - SRTP Session Key: G - AES GCM IV: G,E | | Manage SNMPv3 services | Manage keys, trap targets, users, and traps for SNMPv3 | Global FIPS status indicator | Command and parameters | Status output | None | Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Privacy Key: W - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: W User - SNMPv3 Privacy Key: W - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: W | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 33 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|---------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Perform SNMPv3 services | Perform SNMPv3 services | Global FIPS status indicator | Command and parameters | Status output | AES for SNMPv3 HMAC for SNMPv3 | Crypto Officer - SNMPv3 Privacy Key: E - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: W User - SNMPv3 Privacy Key: E - SNMPv3 Authentication Key: W | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 34 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Establish SSH connection | Establish SSH connection | Global FIPS status indicator | Command and parameters | Command response, status output | SSH | Crypto Officer - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,R - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,R - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH Public Key: G,R - SSH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Session Key: G - SSH Authentication Key: G - SSH Shared Secret: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E User - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,R - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,R - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH Public Key: G,R - SSH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Session Key: G - SSH Authentication Key: G - SSH Shared Secret: G,E | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 35 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Perform SFTP functions | Perform FTP functions over SSH | Global FIPS status indicator | Command and parameters | Command response, status output | SSH | Crypto Officer - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,R - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,R - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH Public Key: G,R - SSH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Session Key: G - SSH Authentication Key: G - SSH Shared Secret: G,E - SFTP Private Key: G,E - SFTP Public Key: G,E - SFTP Peer Public Key: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E User - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,R - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,R - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Private Key: G,W,E - SSH Public Key: G,R - SSH Peer Public Key: W,E - SSH Session Key: G,E - SSH Authentication Key: G,E - SSH Shared Secret: G,E | |--------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 36 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |--------|---------------|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | | | - SFTP Private Key: G,E - SFTP Public Key: G,E - SFTP Peer Public Key: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 37 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Establish TLS | Establish TLS | Global FIPS status | Command and parameters | Command response, status | TLS v1.2 | Crypto Officer - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,R - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,R - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - TLS Private Key: G,W,E - TLS Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer Public Key: W,E - TLS Session G - TLS Authentication Key: G - TLS Pre-Master Secret: G,E - TLS Master Secret: G,E - AES GCM IV: User - ECDH Private Key: G,E - ECDH Public Key: G,R - ECDH Peer Public Key: W,E - DH Private Key: G,E - DH Public Key: G,R - DH Peer Public Key: W,E - TLS Private Key: G,W,E - TLS Public Key: G,R,W - TLS Peer Public Key: W,E - TLS Session G - TLS Authentication Key: G - TLS Pre-Master Secret: G,E | |-----------------|-----------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | connection | connection | indicator | | output | | Key: G,E Key: - TLS Master Secret: G,E - AES GCM IV: G,E | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 38 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 Table 21: Approved Services | Name | Description | Indicator | Inputs | Outputs | Security Functions | SSP Access | |-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Logout | Logout of active session | n/a | Command | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer User | | Perform manual zeroization | Zeroize ephemeral SSPs via power-cycle or reboot of host device | n/a | Command | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer | | Perform manual on- demand self- tests | Perform pre- operational self-tests on demand via power- cycle or reboot of host device | n/a | Command | Command response, status output | None | Crypto Officer | | Authenticate via password | Authenticate to the module by password | n/a | Command and parameters | Command response, status output | SHA for Password Storage | Crypto Officer - Crypto Officer password: W - RADIUS Shared Secret: W,E User - User password: W - RADIUS Shared Secret: W,E | | Upgrade firmware | Load new firmware and performs an integrity test using an RSA digital signature | Global FIPS status indicator | Command, firmware image | Command response, status output | RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading | Crypto Officer - Image Verify Key: E | | Authenticate via public key certificate | Authenticate to the module by ECDSA or RSA signature verification | n/a | Command | Command response, service access. | ECDSA or RSA SigVer for Public Key Certificate Authentication | Unauthenticated | ### 4.4 Non-Approved Services The module does not provide any non-Approved services in the non-Approved mode of operation. N/A for this module. ### 4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded The cryptographic module has the capability of loading software from an external source. All loads comprise a complete image replacement that replaces the existing module image in its entirety, thus forming a completely new module. Upon load, the module will verify the integrity of the load package with a 2048-bit RSA signature verification (the public key is loaded in write-protected flash at the factory). If the check fails, the new software is ignored and the current software remains loaded. If successful, the module will force an automatic reboot and will perform the required pre-operational integrity test using HMAC SHA digests. Per FIPS 140-3 IG 10.3.F, the integrity test inherently meets the firmware load test requirement when the load constitutes a full image replacement. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 39 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 Only validated software may be loaded to maintain the module's validation. The new image shall include updated versioning information to represent the newly loaded image. Prior to any execution of the new image, module operators shall zeroize all persistent keys using one of the methods described in section 9.3. All ephemeral keys are zeroized on module reboot. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 40 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## 5. Software/Firmware Security ### 5.1 Integrity Techniques At module start-up, all software components of the cryptographic module are verified using an approved integrity technique implemented within the cryptographic module itself. The module employs a series of HMAC SHA2-256 digests; unsuccessful verification of any of the digest values will cause the module to enter a critical error state. ### 5.2 Initiate on Demand The CO can initiate the pre-operational integrity tests on demand by issuing a reset/reboot command over the module's management interfaces. Also, the module can be made to perform pre-operational self-tests by rebooting or power-cycling the module's VM manually (when using this method, the operator is not required to assume an authorized role). SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 41 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## 6. Operational Environment ### 6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements The SBC SWe Session Border Controller comprises a software cryptographic library that executes in a Modifiable operational environment. The module was tested and found to be compliant with FIPS 140-3 requirements on a Dell EMC PowerEdge r740 server with an Intel Xeon processor running Ribbon's ConnexIP OS as the guest OS in a VM managed by a VMware ESXi 7.0 hypervisor. The cryptographic module has control over its own SSPs. The process and memory management functionality of the guest OS and the hypervisor prevents unauthorized access to plaintext private and secret keys, intermediate key generation values and other SSPs by external processes during module execution. The module only allows access to SSPs through its well-defined interfaces. The operational environment provides the capability to separate individual application processes from each other by preventing uncontrolled access to CSPs and uncontrolled modifications of SSPs regardless of whether this data is in the process memory or stored on persistent storage within the operational environment. Processes that are spawned by the module are owned by the module and are not owned by external processes or operators. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 42 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## 7. Physical Security The SBC SWe is a multi-chip standalone software cryptographic module and does not include physical security mechanisms. Therefore, per ISO/IEC 19790:2012 section 7.7.1, the requirements for physical security are not applicable. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 43 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## 8. Non-Invasive Security This section is not applicable. There are currently no approved non-invasive mitigation techniques references in Annex F of ISO/IEC 19790:2012 . SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 44 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## 9. Sensitive Security Parameters Management ### 9.1 Storage Areas The table below lists sensitive security parameters (SSPs) storage areas for this module. Section 9.4 selects from the storage areas listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the 'Storage' column if applicable to a specific SSP. Table 22: Storage Areas | Storage Area Name | Description | Persistence Type | |---------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------| | Flash Memory | Persistent storage of SSPs on flash memory | Static | | RAM | Dynamic storage of SSPs on RAM | Dynamic | | Spinning Media | Persistent storage of SSPs on spinning media | Static | | SSD | Persistent storage of SSPs on SSD | Static | | CDB on SSD | Persistent storage of SSPs in CDB on SSD | Static | ### 9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods The table below lists SSP input and output methods for this module. Section 9.4 selects from the input and output methods listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the 'Inputs/Outputs' column if applicable to a specific SSP. Table 23: SSP Input-Output Methods | Name | From | To | Format Type | Distribution Type | Entry Type | SFI or Algorithm | |-------------------------------------------|------------|------------|---------------|---------------------|--------------|------------------------------------| | External to RAM via DER file format | External | RAM | Plaintext | Manual | Electronic | | | RAM to External via Encrypted Form | RAM | External | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | TLS v1.2 | | External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate | External | RAM | Plaintext | Automated | Electronic | RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading | | RAM to External via Plaintext | RAM | External | Plaintext | Automated | Electronic | TLS v1.2 | | External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) | External | CDB on SSD | Encrypted | Manual | Electronic | SSH | | External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS) | External | CDB on SSD | Encrypted | Manual | Electronic | TLS v1.2 | | RAM to External via Plaintext Certificate | RAM | External | Plaintext | Automated | Electronic | TLS v1.2 | | Backup to External via TLS | CDB on SSD | External | Encrypted | Automated | Electronic | TLS v1.2 | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 45 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ### 9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods The table below lists SSP zeroization methods for this module. Section 9.4 selects from the zeroization methods listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the 'Zeroization' column if applicable to a specific SSP. Table 24: SSP Zeroization Methods | Zeroization Method | Description | Rationale | Operator Initiation | |------------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------| | Command via CLI or EMA | Zeroization upon command via CLI or EMA | Zeroize all SSPs (using CLI/EMA command to zeroize) | CLI or EMA | | Reboot | Zeroization upon rebooting the module | Reboot to zeroize RAM | Reboot | | Session Termination | Upon Session Termination | Upon Session Termination to zeroize session based SSPs | Terminate session | ### 9.4 SSPs The module supports the keys and other SSPs listed in the tables below. Note that all SSP imports and exports are electronic and performed within the TOEPP. | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------| | Config Database (CBD) Key | Encryption of RSA and ECDSA private keys and pre- shared secrets for RADIUS in CDB | 192 - 192 | Symmetric Key - CSP | DRBG (Random bits) | | CKG for CDB Key Generation | | CA Public Key | Verification of Certificate Authority signatures | 2048 - 112 bits | Public Key - PSP | | | RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading | | ECDH Private Key | Input to ECDH shared secret computation | Between 224 and 512 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits | Private Key - CSP | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | | ECDH Public Key | Used by peer for ECDH shared secret computation | Between 224 and 512 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits | Public Key - PSP | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | | ECDH Peer Public Key | Input to ECDH shared secret computation | Between 224 and 512 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | | DH Private Key | Input to DH shared secret computation | 2048 or 3072 bits - 112 or 128 bits | Private Key - CSP | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | | DH Public Key | Used by peer for DH shared secret computation | 2048 or 3072 bits - 112 or 128 bits | Public Key - PSP | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | | DH Peer Public Key | Input to DH shared secret computation | 2048 or 3072 bits - 112 or 128 bits | Public Key - PSP | | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 46 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|-----------| | IKE RSA Private Key | The key used in IKE authentication | 2048 - 112 bits | Private Key - CSP | IPsec IKE | | IPsec IKE | | IKE RSA Public Key | The key used in IKE authentication | 2048 - 112 bits | Public Key - PSP | IPsec IKE | | IPsec IKE | | IKE Pre-shared Secret | Used in the computation of the SKEYID during IKEv1 Phase 1 | n/a - n/a | Shared Secret - CSP | | | IPsec IKE | | IKE SKEYID | Used as input to IKEv1 KDF to derive IPsec Encryption Key and IPsec Authentication Key | 112 minimum - 112 minimum | Keying material - CSP | | IPsec IKE | IPsec IKE | | IKE Shared Secret | Used as input to IKEv1 KDF to derive IPsec Encryption Key and IPsec Authentication Key | n/a - n/a | Shared Secret - CSP | | IPsec IKE | IPsec IKE | | IKE Encryption Key | Used during IKE Phase 2 to encrypt and decrypt its messages | 128, 192, 256 - Between 128 and 256 bits | Secret Key - CSP | KDF IKEv1 (A5062) | | IPsec IKE | | IKE Authentication Key | Used during IKE Phase 2 to authenticate its messages | 160 bits - 112 minimum | Symmetric Key - CSP | KDF IKEv1 (A5062) | | IPsec IKE | | IKE Key Derivation Key | Used by IKE KDFs for derivation of IPsec Encryption Key and IPsec Authentication Key | 128, 192, 256 - Between 128 and 256 bits | Derivation Key - CSP | KDF IKEv1 (A5062) | | IPsec IKE | | IPsec Shared Secret | Used by IKE KDFs for derivation of IPsec Encryption Key and IPsec Authentication Key | n/a - n/a | Shared Secret - CSP | | IPsec IKE | IPsec IKE | | IPsec Encryption Key | Used during IPsec for traffic protection | 128, 192, 256 - Between 128 and 256 bits | Secret Key - CSP | KDF IKEv1 (A5062) KDF IKEv2 (A5062) | | IPsec IKE | | IPsec Authentication Key | Used during IPsec for payload traffic verification | 160 bits - 112 minimum | Secret Key - CSP | KDF IKEv1 (A5062) KDF IKEv2 (A5062) | | IPsec IKE | | SSH Private Key | Authentication during SSH session negotiation | Between 112 and 256 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits | Private Key - CSP | SSH | | SSH | | SSH Public Key | Authentication by peer during SSH session negotiation | Between 112 and 256 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits | Public Key - PSP | SSH | | SSH | | SSH Peer Public Key | Authentication during SSH session negotiation 1024-bit key is used for signature verification only | Between 112 and 256 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | SSH | | | SSH Session Key | Encryption and decryption of SSH session packets | 128 or 256 bits - 128 or 256 bits | Secret Key - CSP | | SSH | SSH | | SSH Authentication Key | Authentication of SSH session packets | 160 bits - 112 minimum | Secret Key - CSP | | SSH | SSH | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 47 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------------------------------| | TLS Private Key | RSA/ECDSA certificate-based authentication during TLS key negotiation | Between 112 and 256 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits | Private Key - CSP | TLS v1.2 | | TLS v1.2 | | TLS Public Key | RSA/ECDSA certificate-based authentication during TLS key negotiation | Between 112 and 256 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits | Public Key - PSP | TLS v1.2 | | TLS v1.2 | | TLS Peer Public Key | RSA/ECDSA certificate-based authentication during TLS key negotiation | Between 112 and 256 bits - Between 112 and 256 bits | Public Key - PSP | | TLS v1.2 | TLS v1.2 | | TLS Session Key | Encryption and decryption of TLS session packets | 128 or 256 bits - Between 128 or 256 bits | Secret Key - CSP | | TLS v1.2 | TLS v1.2 | | TLS Authentication Key | Authentication of TLS session packets | 160 bits (minimum) - 112 minimum | Secret Key - CSP | | TLS v1.2 | TLS v1.2 | | SRTP Session Key | Encryption or decryption of SRTP session packets | 128 or 256 bits - Between 128 or 256 bits | Secret Key - CSP | | SRTP | SRTP | | SRTP Authentication Key | Authentication of SRTP session packets | 160 bits - 112 minimum | Secret Key - CSP | | SRTP | SRTP | | SFTP Private Key | Used for SFTP key negotiation | 2048 - 112 bits | Private Key - CSP | SSH | | SSH | | SFTP Public Key | Used for SFTP key negotiation | 1024 or 2048 bits - 112 bits | Public Key - PSP | SSH | | SSH | | SFTP Peer Public Key | Used for SFTP key negotiation | 1024 or 2048 bits - 80 or 112 bits | Public Key - PSP | | SSH | SSH | | SNMPv3 Privacy Key | Encrypting SNMPv3 packets | 128 bits - 128 bits | Secret Key - CSP | | | | | SNMPv3 Authentication Key | SNMPv3 Authentication Key | 160 bits (minimum) - 112 minimum | Secret Key - CSP | | | | | Certificate Load Key | Decrypting PKCS #12 certificate files when imported from an external workstation | 128 or 256 bits - Between 128 or 256 bits | Secret Key - CSP | | PBKDF | RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading | | SRTP Master Key | Peer Authentication; Input to SRTP KDF for derivation of the SRTP Session Key and SRTP Authentication Key | n/a - n/a | Secret Key - CSP | | | | | SSH Shared Secret | Input to SSH KDF for derivation of the SSH Session Key and SSH Authentication Key | n/a - n/a | Shared Secret - CSP | | SSH | SSH | | TLS Pre-Master Secret | Input to TLS KDF for derivation of the TLS Master Secret | n/a - n/a | Pre-Master Secret - CSP | DRBG (Random bits) | TLS v1.2 | TLS v1.2 | | TLS Master Secret | Used by TLS KDF for derivation of the TLS Session Key and TLS Authentication Key | n/a - n/a | Master Secret - CSP | | TLS v1.2 | TLS v1.2 | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 48 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Description | Size - Strength | Type - Category | Generated By | Established By | Used By | |---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------| | RADIUS Shared Secret | Peer authentication of RADIUS messages | n/a - n/a | Shared Secret - CSP | | | | | DRBG Entropy Input String | Establishment of seed for CTR_DRBG | 128 - 128 | Entropy Input - CSP | | | DRBG (Random bits) | | DRBG Seed | Generation of random number | 256 - 256 | Seed - CSP | | | DRBG (Random bits) | | DRBG 'V' Value | State value for CTR_DRBG | 128 - 128 | Working state value - CSP | | DRBG (Random bits) | | | DRBG 'Key' Value | State value for CTR_DRBG | 128 - 128 | Working state value - CSP | | | | | Crypto Officer password | Authenticating the Crypto Officer to the module | n/a - n/a | Password - CSP | | | | | User password | Authenticating the User to the module | n/a - n/a | Password - CSP | | | | | AES GCM IV | Initialization vector for the AES GCM key | 96 bits - 112 bits | Initialization Vector - CSP | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | | IPsec IKE SRTP SSH TLS v1.2 | | Image Verify Key | Verifying the RSA signature of the digest of a new image load package | 2048 bits - 112 bits | Public Key - Neither | | | RSA SigVer for Certificate Loading | Table 25: SSP Table 1 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |---------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------| | Config Database (CBD) Key | | SSD:Plaintext | | Command via CLI or EMA | | | CA Public Key | External to RAM via DER file format | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot | Reboot | | | ECDH Private Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Session | Reboot Session Termination | | | ECDH Public Key | RAM to External via Plaintext Certificate | RAM:Plaintext | Session | Reboot Session Termination | | | ECDH Peer Public Key | External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate | RAM:Plaintext | Session | Reboot Session | | | DH Private Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Session | Reboot Session Termination | | | DH Public Key | RAM to External via Plaintext | RAM:Plaintext | Session | Reboot Session Termination | | | DH Peer Public Key | External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate | RAM:Plaintext | Session | Reboot Session Termination | | | IKE RSA Private Key | | SSD:Encrypted | Until zeroized | Command via CLI or EMA | | | IKE RSA Public Key | | SSD:Encrypted | Until zeroized | Command via CLI or EMA | | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 49 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------| | IKE Pre-shared Secret | External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS) | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | IKE SKEYID | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | IKE Shared Secret | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | IKE Encryption Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | IKE Authentication Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | IKE Key Derivation Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | IPsec Shared Secret | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | IPsec Encryption Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session | | | IPsec Authentication Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | SSH Private Key | | SSD:Plaintext | | Command via CLI or EMA | | | SSH Public Key | | SSD:Plaintext | | Command via CLI or EMA | | | SSH Peer Public Key | External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | SSH Session Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | SSH Authentication Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | TLS Private Key | External to RAM via DER file format | SSD:Encrypted | | Command via CLI or EMA | | | TLS Public Key | External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate | SSD:Encrypted | | Command via CLI or EMA | | | TLS Peer Public Key | External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | TLS Session Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | TLS Authentication Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 50 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------| | SRTP Session Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | SRTP Authentication Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | SFTP Private Key | | SSD:Encrypted | | Command via CLI or EMA | | | SFTP Public Key | External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate | SSD:Plaintext | | Command via CLI or EMA | | | SFTP Peer Public Key | External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | SNMPv3 Privacy Key | External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS) Backup to External via TLS | SSD:Encrypted | | Command via CLI or EMA | | | SNMPv3 Authentication Key | External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS) Backup to External via TLS | SSD:Encrypted | | Command via CLI or EMA | | | Certificate Load Key | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot | Reboot | | | SRTP Master Key | RAM to External via Encrypted Form | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | SSH Shared Secret | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session | | | TLS Pre-Master Secret | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | TLS Master Secret | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot or session termination | Reboot Session Termination | | | RADIUS Shared Secret | External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS) | SSD:Encrypted | | Command via CLI or EMA | | | DRBG Entropy Input String | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot | Reboot | | | DRBG Seed | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot | Reboot | | | DRBG 'V' Value | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot | Reboot | | | DRBG 'Key' Value | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot | Reboot | | | Crypto Officer password | External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS) | SSD:Encrypted | | Command via CLI or EMA | | | User password | External to CDB on SSD via CLI (SSH) External to CDB on SSD via EMA (TLS) | SSD:Encrypted | | Command via CLI or EMA | | | AES GCM IV | | RAM:Plaintext | Until reboot | Reboot | | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 51 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 Table 26: SSP Table 2 | Name | Input - Output | Storage | Storage Duration | Zeroization | Related SSPs | |------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|----------------| | Image Verify Key | RAM to External via Encrypted Form External to RAM via Plaintext Certificate | Flash Memory:Plaintext Spinning Media:Plaintext | | N/A | | ### 9.5 Transitions The following list specifies applicable transition periods or timeframes where an algorithm or key length transitions from Approved to non-Approved: - SHA-1: The module includes an implementation of SHA-1 for hashing and digital signature verification. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 52 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## 10. Self-Tests The module performs pre-operational self-tests and conditional self-tests. Pre-operational tests are performed between the time the cryptographic module is instantiated and before the module transitions to the operational state. Conditional self-tests are performed by the module during module operation when certain conditions exist. The following sections list the self-tests performed by the module, their expected error status, and the error resolutions. ### 10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests The module performs the following pre-operational self-test(s): Table 27: Pre-Operational Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | |-----------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------------------| | HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5061) | | Integrity test | SW/FW Integrity | log messages | software integrity test | ### 10.2 Conditional Self-Tests The module performs the following conditional self-tests: | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |----------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------| | AES-GCM (A5061) | 256 bits | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Encrypt/Decrypt | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | Counter DRBG (A5061) | - | instantiate/generate/reseed KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | DRBG | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A5061) | 2048-bit | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Sign/Verify | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5061) | curve P-224/K- 233, SHA2-512 | digital signature generation KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Signature Generation | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) (A5061) | curve P-224/K- 233, SHA2-512 | digital signature generation KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Signature Verification | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | Entropy Stuck Test | - | Entropy Stuck Test | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | SP800-90B tests | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 53 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |----------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------| | Entropy Repetition Stuck Test | - | Entropy Repetition Stuck Test | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | SP800-90B tests | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | Entropy Adaptive Proportion Test | - | Entropy Adaptive Proportion Test | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | SP800-90B tests | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | Entropy Lag Test | - | Entropy Lag Test | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | SP800-90B tests | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A5061) | 128 bits | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Hashed Message Authentication | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | HMAC-SHA2- 224 (A5061) | 128 bits | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Hashed Message Authentication | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | HMAC-SHA2- 256 (A5061) | 256 bits | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Hashed Message Authentication | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | HMAC-SHA2- 384 (A5061) | 192 bits | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Hashed Message Authentication | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | HMAC-SHA2- 512 (A5061) | 256 bits | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Hashed Message Authentication | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5061) | "Z" computation | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Signature Verification | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5061) | "Z" computation | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Primitive 'Z' Computation | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5061) | 2048-bit, SHA2-256, PKCS #1 | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Signature Generation | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5061) | 2048-bit, SHA2-256, PKCS #1 | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Signature Verification | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (A5061) | - | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface | Encrypt/Decrypt | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | SHA3-256 (A4087) | 256 bits | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Hashed Message Authentication | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 54 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 Table 28: Conditional Self-Tests | Algorithm or Test | Test Properties | Test Method | Test Type | Indicator | Details | Conditions | |----------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------| | KDF SRTP (A5063) | - | STRP KDF KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | STRP KDF Test | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A5063) | 128 bits | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Hashed Message Authentication | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | AES-CBC (A5063) | 128 bits | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Encrypt/Decrypt | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | KDF IKEv1 (A5062) | - | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Key Derivation | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | KDF SSH (A5064) | - | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Key Derivation | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | KDF TLS (A5065) | - | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Key Derivation | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5061) | P-256 | PCT | PCT | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Sign/Verify | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5061) | 2048-bit, SHA2-256 | PCT | PCT | On Demand | Sign/Verify and Encrypt/Decrypt | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | | DH Key Generation | - | PCT | PCT | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Key Generation | Conditional before first use. | | ECDH Key Generation | - | PCT | PCT | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Key Generation | Conditional before first use. | | PBKDF (A5061) | | KAT | CAST | Status can be displayed on CLI terminal of Web GUI Interface. | Key Derivation | Performed during module's initial power-up sequence. | ### 10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information The operator may conduct on demand by rebooting or power-cycling the module's VM or host server. On-demand self-test information for pre-operational and conditional self-tests are shown in the tables below. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 55 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 Table 29: Pre-Operational Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-----------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------| | HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5061) | Integrity test | SW/FW Integrity | on module start up | on module reboot | Table 30: Conditional Periodic Information | Algorithm or Test | Test Method | Test Type | Period | Periodic Method | |-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------|-------------------| | AES-GCM (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | Counter DRBG (A5061) | instantiate/generate/reseed KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | DSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5061) | digital signature generation KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186- 4) (A5061) | digital signature generation KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | Entropy Stuck Test | Entropy Stuck Test | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | Entropy Repetition Stuck Test | Entropy Repetition Stuck Test | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | Entropy Adaptive Proportion Test | Entropy Adaptive Proportion Test | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | Entropy Lag Test | Entropy Lag Test | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | HMAC-SHA2-224 (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | HMAC-SHA2-384 (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | HMAC-SHA2-512 (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800- 56Ar3 (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 4) (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | SHA3-256 (A4087) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | KDF SRTP (A5063) | STRP KDF KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | HMAC-SHA-1 (A5063) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | AES-CBC (A5063) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | KDF IKEv1 (A5062) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | KDF SSH (A5064) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | KDF TLS (A5065) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | | ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5061) | PCT | PCT | On Demand | Manual | | RSA KeyGen (FIPS186- 5) (A5061) | PCT | PCT | On Demand | Manual | | DH Key Generation | PCT | PCT | On Demand | Manual | | ECDH Key Generation | PCT | PCT | On Demand | Manual | | PBKDF (A5061) | KAT | CAST | On Demand | Manual | SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 56 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ### 10.4 Error States The table below describes the error states and status indicators of the module. Table 31: Error States | Name | Description | Conditions | Recovery Method | Indicator | |----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------| | Soft Error | Upon failure of the conditional firmware load test | Failure of the conditional firmware load test | Reject firmware load operation. | log file entry / console message | | Critical Error | Upon failure of any other pre- operational self-test or conditional self-test | Failure of any other pre-operational self-test or conditional self-test | Reboot or reload module | log file entry / console message | ### 10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests The operator may initiate self-tests on demand by issuing the reboot command or power cycling the module's VM or host server. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 57 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## 11. Life-Cycle Assurance ### 11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures #### 11.1.1 Secure Installation The module is in an unconfigured operational state upon the initial power-up. The Crypto Officer shall be responsible for all initial setup activities, including configuring the virtual machine, installing the guest operating system, and installing the SBC SWe application software. For detailed guidance regarding these activities, please see the SBC Core 10.1.x Documentation webpage on Ribbon's online Documentation and Support Portal and refer to the following document entries: - [EMA User Guide](https://support.sonus.net/display/SBXDOC101/EMA+User+Guide) - [CLI Reference Guide](https://support.sonus.net/display/SBXDOC101/CLI+Reference+Guide) - [Installing SBC SWe on Virtual and Private Cloud Environments](https://support.sonus.net/display/SBXDOC101/Installing+SBC+SWe+in+Virtual+and+Private+Cloud+Environments) The SBC SWe Session Border Controller is available as a software package that includes both the application software and the operating system. It can be downloaded from the Ribbon Support Portal (login credentials are required for portal access). The SBC SWe must be installed on a VMware-based virtual environment. The CO must follow the applicable guidance found under the document entry 'Installing SBC SWe on VMware', which includes: - creating the virtual machine - uploading the SBC software - installing the SBC OS - installing the SBC application in a standalone or high availability configuration The next step is to configure the module's application software. The CO must follow the instructions under the document entry 'SBC SWe Configuration Procedures', which provides detailed guidance for setting deploymentspecific system settings and configuring various module features. Once the module is installed with network settings properly configured, the Crypto Officer must then initialize the module into Approved mode. #### 11.1.2 Initialization Prior to initializing the module for operation in the Approved mode, SNMPv3 must be reconfigured. All trap targets with securityLevel set for authPriv and authNoPriv must be disabled. The following steps using the CLI provide an example: ``` % show oam snmp trapTarget EMS_-10.54.71.176 ipAddress 10.54.71.176; port 162; trapType v3; targetUsername emstrapuser; ``` SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 58 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ``` targetSecurityLevel authPriv; state enabled; % set oam snmp trapTarget EMS_-10.54.71.176 state disabled % commit ``` To initialize the module for operation in the Approved mode, the CO may use the CLI or the EMA. The sections below describe these initialization methods. ##### 11.1.2.1 Initialization using CLI When using the CLI, the CO shall complete the following procedure: 1. Log in to the CLI using the default username ' admin ' and password ' admin '. 2. Switch to 'configure private' mode using the following command: 3. Execute the following commands: ``` > configure private ``` ``` % set profiles security tlsProfile defaultTlsProfile v1_0 disabled v1_1 disabled v1_2 enabled % set profiles security EmaTlsProfile defaultEmaTlsProfile v1_0 disabled v1_1 disabled v1_2 enabled % set profiles security ikeProtectionProfile AesSha1IkeProfile algorithms dhGroup modp2048 % set oam snmp version v3only % set system admin fips-140-3 mode enabled % commit ``` NOTE: Once the 'fips-140-3 mode' is set to 'enabled', it cannot be disabled through the configuration. A fresh software installation is required to set the operational mode back to 'disabled'. Setting 'fips-140-3 mode' to 'enabled' accomplishes the following: - regenerates all SSH keys. - regenerates encryption keys used by the system configuration database. - zeroizes all persistent CSPs from the system and causes the server to reboot after confirmation. ##### 11.1.2.2 Initialization using EMA + CLI The EMA does not include all of the commands necessary to enable/disable the Approved mode. The user must use the CLI to complete the procedure. When using the EMA and CLI, the CO shall complete the following procedure: 1. Log in to the EMA using the default username ' admin ' and password ' admin '. 2. Navigate to All -> Profiles -> Security -> TLS Profile . The TLS Profile window is displayed, with the TLS Profile List pane. 3. Select the radio button corresponding to the defaultTlsProfile. The Edit Selected TLS Profile pane is displayed. 4. Set the fields V1_0 and V1_1 to 'Disabled'. Set the field V1_2 to 'Enabled'. Click Save to save the changes. 5. Navigate to All -> Profiles -> Security -> EMA TLS Profile . The EMA TLS Profile window is displayed, with the EMA TLS Profile List pane. 6. Select the radio button corresponding to the defaultEmaTlsProfile. The Edit Selected EMA TLS Profile pane is displayed. 7. Set the fields V1_0 and V1_1 to 'Disabled'. Set the field V1_2 to 'Enabled'. Click Save to save the changes. 8. Navigate to All -> OAM -> Snmp . The Snmp window is displayed, with the Edit Snmp pane. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 59 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 9. Set the Version field to 'V3only'. Click Save to save the changes. 10. Log in to the CLI and execute the following commands: ``` % set system admin fips-140-3 mode enabled % commit ``` Setting 'fips-140-3 mode' to 'enabled' accomplishes the following: - regenerates all SSH keys. - regenerates encryption keys used by the system configuration database. - zeroizes all persistent CSPs from the system and causes the server to reboot after confirmation. #### 11.1.3 Startup After completion and confirmation of the above steps, the module's VM will reboot. After this reboot, and on all subsequent reboots, the module will be operating in its Approved mode. The following steps are required for module startup. ##### 11.1.3.1 Restoring EMA in Platform Mode To restore service to the EMA in Platform Mode after 'fips-140-3 mode' is set to 'enabled', CA certificates and newly-generated SBC certificates must be imported using the CLI. - Import CA Certificates - Use the following procedure to import up to twenty CA certificates and associate them with the EmaTlsProfile named "defaultEmaTlsProfile." - Import SBC Certificates - The SBC enables importing SBC server certificates generated with either of two different methods: those generated externally and those generated locally in the SBC. ``` > configure private % set system security pki certificate intermediateCaCert fileName intCaCert.der state enabled type remote % set system security pki certificate rootCaCert fileName rootCaCert.der state enabled type remote % commit % set profiles security EmaTlsProfile defaultEmaTlsProfile ClientCaCert intermediateCaCert % set profiles security EmaTlsProfile defaultEmaTlsProfile ClientCaCert rootCaCert % commit ``` Use the following procedure to import an externally-generated SBC key and certificate in PKCS#12 format: 1. Transfer the PKCS#12 formatted key/certificate file to the SBC and save it as opt/sonus/external/<filename>.p12 . 2. Install the certificate using the following steps (the following example uses a certificate named "sbxCert.p12" with a passPhrase "sonus"): ``` > configure private % set system security pki certificate sbxCert fileName sbxCert.p12 passPhrase sonus state enabled type local % commit % set profiles security EmaTlsProfile defaultEmaTlsProfile serverCertName sbxCert % commit ``` SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 60 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 Use the following procedure to generate an SBC key and CSR locally in the SBC, and then import as a PEM externally-signed certificate: The CO shall ensure that only keys providing at least 112 bits of encryption strength are used for signing certificate requests. ### 1. Generate a CSR: - > request system security pki certificate sbxCert generateCSR keySize keySize2K csrSub 2. Copy the CSR output from the request in step 1 and obtain a signed certificate in a PEM formatted file from the appropriate Certificate Authority. 3. Transfer the certificate to the SBC and save it as /opt/sonus/external/<filename>.pem . 4. Install the certificate using the following steps (the following example uses the certificate file name "sbxCert.pem"): - % commit ``` > configure private % set system security pki certificate sbxCert type local-internal % commit % exit "/C=US/ST=MA/L=Westford/O=Sonus Networks Inc./CN=www.sonusnet.com" ``` ``` > configure private % set system security pki certificate sbxCert fileName sbxCert.pem % commit % set profiles security EmaTlsProfile defaultEmaTlsProfile serverCertName sbxCert ``` ##### 11.1.3.2 Reconfiguring SNMP Keys After 'fips-140-3 mode' is set to 'enabled', the SNMP Authentication Keys and SNMPv3 Privacy Keys must be reconfigured for all SNMPv3 users (this applies to all SNMPv3 users for authPriv/authNoPriv security level trap targets). 1. Use the following CLI commands to reconfigure the keys: 2. Enable the authPriv/authNoPriv trap targets: ``` % set oam snmp users authKey % set oam snmp users privKey % commit ``` ``` % set oam snmp trapTarget state enabled % commit ``` ### 11.2 Administrator Guidance The Crypto Officer is responsible for initialization and security-relevant configuration and management of the module. Once the module is properly configured, the Crypto Officer is responsible for maintaining and monitoring the status of the module to ensure that it is running in its Approved mode. For details regarding the general management of the module, please refer to the appropriate entries on Ribbon's SBC Core 10.1.x Documentation webpage. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 61 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 #### 11.2.1 Status Information Operational mode status of the module can be viewed by navigating to Administration -> Users and Application Management -> Fips-140-3 from the SBC main screen via the EMA and selecting the desired SBC system from the dropdown menu. When running in Approved mode, the radio button marked 'Enabled' will be selected. The Crypto Officer shall monitor the module's status regularly. If any irregular activity is noticed, or the module is consistently reporting errors, customers should contact Ribbon Customer Support. #### 11.2.2 Versioning Information The module's versioning information can be viewed by navigating to Monitoring -> Dashboard -> System Status from the SBC main screen via the EMA. The System Status window display will include the hardware type and SBC application version, which can be correlated with the module name and software version (respectively) on the module's validation record. #### 11.2.3 Software Loading Procedures for loading a new module image can be found under the appropriate entries on Ribbon's Upgrading SBC Core Software webpage. #### 11.2.4 High Availability Configuration When configuring the module for high availability, the VMs for the active instance and the standby instance must reside on the same physical host for operation in the Approved mode. For connection details, refer to the instructions found under the online document entry 'Setting Up Logical Connection Between High Availability Nodes'. #### 11.2.5 Additional Administrator Policies and Guidance This section notes additional policies below that must be followed by the CO: - Once the 'fips-140-3 mode' is set to 'enabled', it cannot be disabled through the configuration. A fresh software installation is required to set the operational mode back to 'disabled'. - To ensure correct functioning and compliance with this Security Policy, module operators must use phones that support TLS v1.2. - When using local certificate management mode, certificates are first stored in encrypted form on the external workstation prior to being sent to the module via SSH. To ensure that the certificate file can be properly decrypted and installed once sent to the module, module operators must ensure the following: - o The encryption algorithm used on the external workstation must be 128-bit AES in CBC mode, and the salt length used on the external workstation as input to the PBKDF2 must be 128 bits. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 62 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 - o As the Certificate Load Key used by the module to decrypt the loaded certificate is established using PBKDF2 as specified in NIST SP 800-132 , the same passphrase that was used on the external workstation must be entered into the module in order to derive the correct key. ### 11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance With the exception of the User password, User role operators do not have the ability to configure sensitive information on the module. The User must be diligent to select strong passwords in adherence to the password policies set by the CO from section 4.1 and must not reveal their password to anyone. Additionally, User role operators should be careful to protect any secret or private keys to which they have access. ### 11.4 Design and Rules By design, the module follows or enforces the following rules of operation: - The module provides two distinct operator roles: User and Cryptographic Officer. - An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role. - The module performs all self-tests without any operator action required. - The module inhibits data output during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states. - Status information output by the module does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module. - The module does not support a maintenance interface or role. - The module does not support manual SSP establishment methods. - The module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data. - The module does not output intermediate key values. - The module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces. ### 11.5 End of Life As the module does not persistently store SSPs, secure sanitization of the module consists of performing the zeroization methods described in section 9.3 above. This will ensure that any SSPs in volatile memory are zeroized. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 63 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## 12. Mitigation of Other Attacks The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-3 Level 1 requirements for this validation. Therefore, per ISO/IEC 19790:2012 section 7.12, requirements for this section are not applicable. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 64 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 ## Appendix A. Acronyms and Abbreviations Table 32 provides definitions for the acronyms and abbreviations used in this document. Table 32. Acronyms and Abbreviations | Term | Definition | |---------|-------------------------------------------------------------| | AES | Advanced Encryption Standard | | CBC | Cipher Block Chaining | | CCCS | Canadian Centre for Cyber Security | | CMVP | Cryptographic Module Validation Program | | CO | Cryptographic Officer | | CPU | Central Processing Unit | | CSP | Critical Security Parameter | | CTR | Counter | | CVL | Component Validation List | | DES | Data Encryption Standard | | DH | Diffie-Hellman | | DRBG | Deterministic Random Bit Generator | | ECB | Electronic Code Book | | ECC CDH | Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman | | ECDH | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman | | ECDSA | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm | | EMI/EMC | Electromagnetic Interference /Electromagnetic Compatibility | | FIPS | Federal Information Processing Standard | | GCM | Galois/Counter Mode | | GMAC | Galois Message Authentication Code | | GPC | General-Purpose Computer | | HMAC | (keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code | | KAS | Key Agreement Scheme | | KAT | Known Answer Test | | KTS | Key Transport Scheme | | KW | Key Wrap | | KWP | Key Wrap with Padding | | NIST | National Institute of Standards and Technology | | OS | Operating System | | PCT | Pairwise Consistency Test | ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 65 of 67 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 0.6 July 8, 2025 SBC SWe Session Border Controller 10.01.06 ©2025 Ribbon Communications, Inc. This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice. Page 66 of 67 ### Prepared by: Corsec Security, Inc. ### 12600 Fair Lakes Circle, Suite 210 Fairfax, VA 22033 United States of America Phone: +1 703 267 6050 Email: info@corsec.com Web: www.corsec.com