Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module

version rhel8.20231130

FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy

version 1.4

Last Update: 2024-06-19

Table of Contents

1 Cryptographic Modules' Specifications

This document is the non-proprietary Security Policy for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module version rhel8.20231130 and was prepared as part of the requirements for conformance to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Level 1.

1.1 Description of the Module

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as the "Module") is a software library supporting FIPS 140-2 Approved cryptographic algorithms. The code base of the Module is formed in a combination of standard OpenSSL shared library, OpenSSL FIPS Object Module and development work by Red Hat. The Module provides a C language application program interface (API) for use by other processes that require cryptographic functionality.

The following table shows the security level for each of the eleven sections of the validation.

Security Component	FIPS 140-2 Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
EMI/EMC	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	1
Mitigation of Other Attacks	1
Overall Level	1

Table 1: Security Level of the Module

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module has been tested on the following multi-chip standalone platforms:

Manufacturer	Model	O/S & Ver.	Processor
Dell	PowerEdge R440	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8	Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver 4216
IBM	IBM 9009-42A	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 with PowerVM FW950.00 with VIOS 3.1.2.00	IBM POWER9
IBM	IBM 9080-HEX	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 with PowerVM FW1010.22 with VIOS 3.1.3.00	IBM POWER10
IBM	IBM System z15	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8	IBM z15

Table 2: Test Platforms

NOTE: This validation is only for the tested platforms listed in Table 2 of this document. It does not cover other derivatives of the Operating Systems (I.e, CentOS or Fedora).

The Module has been tested for the following configurations:
- 64-bit library, x86_64 with and without PAA (AES-NI) enabled
- 64-but library, z15 with and without PAI (CPACF) enabled
- 64-bit library, POWER9 and POWER10 with and without PAA (ISA) enabled

To operate the Module, the operating system must be restricted to a single operator mode of operation. (This should not be confused with single user mode which is run level 1 on Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL). This refers to processes having access to the same cryptographic instance which RHEL ensures this cannot happen by the memory management hardware.)

The following platform has not been tested as part of the FIPS 140-2 level 1 certification however Red Hat "vendor affirms" that this platform is equivalent to the tested and validated platform. Additionally, Red Hat affirms that the module will function the same way and provide the same security services on any of the systems listed below.

Manufacturer	Model	O/S & Ver.	Processor
Dell	PowerEdge R430	Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8	Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5

Table 2A: Vendor Affirmed Operating Environment

Per FIPS 140-2 IG G.5, the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

1.2 Description of the Approved Modes

The Module supports two modes of operation:

- in "FIPS mode" (the FIPS Approved mode of operation) only approved or allowed security functions with sufficient security strength can be used.
- in "non-FIPS mode" (the non-Approved mode of operation) non-approved security functions can also be used.

The Module verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA-256 digest computed at build time. If the digests matched, the power-up self-test is then performed. The module enters FIPS mode after power-up tests succeed. Once the module is operational, the mode of operation is implicitly assumed depending on the security function invoked and the security strength of the cryptographic keys.

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module supports the following FIPS 140-2 Approved algorithms in FIPS Approved mode:

Algorithm	Validation Certificate	Standards/Usage/Mode	Keys/CSPs
AES	Certs. #A1811, #A1812, #A1813, #A1814, #A1815, #A1816, #A1817, #A1818, #A1819, #A2776, #A2780, #A2781, #A2898 and #A2900	FIPS 197 (AES) SP 800-38D (GCM) SP 800-38D (GMAC) Encryption and Decryption	AES keys 128 bits, 192 bits (except XTS-AES) and 256 bits
	Certs. #A1793, #A1794, #A1795, #A1797, #A1798, #A1799, #A1800, #A2774, #A2775, #A2896, #A2897 and #A2899	FIPS 197 (AES) SP 800-38A (ECB) Encryption and Decryption	
	Certs. #A1793, #A1794, #A1795, #A2775, #A2897 and #A2899	FIPS 197 (AES) SP 800-38A (CBC, OFB, CFB1, CFB8, CFB128, CTR) SP 800-38C (CCM) SP 800-38E (XTS) SP 800-38F (KW, KWP) Encryption and Decryption	
	Certs. #A1793, #A1794, #A1795, #A2775, #A2897 and #A2899	SP 800-38B (CMAC) Encryption and Decryption	
Triple-DES	Certs. #A1792, #A1797, #A1798, #A1799, #A1800, #A2774 and #A2896	SP 800-67 SP 800-38A (ECB) Encryption and Decryption	Triple-DES keys 168 bits
	Cert. #A1792	SP 800-67 SP 800-38A (CBC, OFB, CFB1, CFB8, CFB64) SP 800-38B (CMAC) Encryption and Decryption	Triple-DES keys 168 bits
DSA	Certs. #A1820, #A1821, #A1822, #A1823, #A2772 and #A2895	FIPS 186-4 Key Generation DSA keys:	DSA key pair

Algorithm	Validation Certificate	Standards/Usage/Mode	Keys/CSPs
		• L=2048, N=224 • L=2048, N=256 • L=3072, N=256	
		FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation DSA keys: • L=2048, N=224 • L=2048, N=256 • L=3072, N=256 SHA-224,SHA-256,SHA-384,SHA-512 (SHA-224 only approved for L=2048, N=224)	
		FIPS 186-4 Domain Parameters Generation DSA keys: • L=2048, N=224 • L=2048, N=256 • L=3072, N=256 SHA-256,SHA-384,SHA-512	
		FIPS 186-4 Signature Verification DSA keys: • L=1024, N=160 • L=2048, N=224 • L=2048, N=256 • L=3072, N=256 Note: 1024 bit DSA signature verification is legacy-use.	
		FIPS 186-4 Domain Parameters Verification DSA keys: • L=2048, N=224 • L=2048, N=256 • L=3072, N=256 SHA-224 only approved for	

Algorithm	Validation Certificate	Standards/Usage/Mode	Keys/CSPs
		L=2048, N=224 and SHA-256 only approved for L=2048/3072, N=256	
RSA	Certs. #A1820, #A1821, #A1822, #A1823, #A2772 and #A2895	FIPS 186-4 Appendix B.3.3 Key Generation RSA keys • 2048 bits • 3072 bits • 4096 bits	RSA key pair
		Signature Generation (PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS) RSA keys: • 2048 bits • 3072 bits • 4096 bits SHA-224,SHA-256,SHA-384,SHA-512	
		Signature Verification (PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS) RSA keys: • 1024 bits • 2048 bits • 3072 bits • 4096 bits Note: 1024 bit RSA signature verification is legacy-use. SHA-1,SHA-224,SHA-256,SHA-384,SHA-512	
		Signature Generation (ANSI X9.31) RSA keys: • 2048 bits • 3072 bits • 4096 bits SHA-256,SHA-384,SHA-512	
		Signature Verification (ANSI X9.31)	

Algorithm	Validation Certificate	Standards/Usage/Mode	Keys/CSPs
		RSA keys: • 1024 bits • 2048 bits • 3072 bits • 4096 bits Note: 1024 bit RSA signature verification is legacy-use. SHA-1,SHA-256,SHA-384,SHA-512	
ECDSA	Certs. #A1820, #A1821, #A1822, #A1823, #A2772, #A2773 and #A2895	FIPS 186-4 Key Pair Generation and Public Key Verification ECDSA keys based on P-224, P-256, P-384, or P-521 curve	ECDSA key pair
		FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation ECDSA keys based on P-224, P-256, P-384, or P-521 curve SHA-224,SHA-256,SHA-384,SHA-512	
		FIPS 186-4 Signature Verification ECDSA keys based on P-224, P-256, P-384, or P-521 curve SHA-1,SHA-224,SHA-256,SHA-384,SHA-512	
DRBG	Certs. #A1793, #A1794, #A1795, #A2775, Cert. #A2897 and Cert. #A2899	SP 800-90A (CTR_DRBG) Random Number Generation AES-128,AES-192,AES-256	Entropy input string, seed, V and K
SHS	Certs. #A1820, #A1821, #A1822, #A1823, #A2772 and #A2895	FIPS 180-4 (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) Hashing	N/A

Algorithm	Validation Certificate	Standards/Usage/Mode	Keys/CSPs
SHA-3	Certs. #A1801, #A1802, #A1803 and #A2773	FIPS 202 (SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256) Hashing	N/A
HMAC	Certs. #A1820, #A1821, #A1822, #A1823, #A2772 and #A2895	FIPS 198-1 (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, Message Integrity	At least 112 bits HMAC Key
	Certs. #A1801, #A1802, #A1803 and #A2773	HMAC-SHA3-224, HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384, HMAC-SHA3-512) Message Integrity	
KAS-ECC-SSC	Certs. #A1820, #A1821, #A1822, #A1823, #A2772 and #A2895	SP 800-56Arev3 ECC Ephemeral Unified Scheme for EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement and Shared Secret Computation NIST curves P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	EC Diffie-Hellman key pair Shared secret
KAS-FFC-SSC	Cert. #A1834	SP 800-56Arev3 dhEphem Scheme with safe prime groups for Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement and Shared Secret Computation Safe Prime Groups: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192	Diffie-Hellman key pair Shared secret
Safe Primes Key Generation and Verification	Cert. #A1834	SP 800-56Arev3 Safe Prime Groups: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192	Diffie-Hellman key pair

Algorithm	Validation Certificate	Standards/Usage/Mode	Keys/CSPs
		for Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	
SP 800-135 Section 4.2 Key Derivation in TLS v1.0, v1.1 and v1.2 (CVL)	CVL Certs. #A1820, #A1821, #A1822, #A1823, #A2772 and #A2895	SP800-135 Key Derivation in TLS SHA-256,SHA-384 RFC 5246	TLS Pre-Master Secret, Master Secret, derived key
KDA HKDF KDF	Cert: #A1796	SP800-56Crev1 Key Derivation in TLS 1.3 SHA-224,SHA-256,SHA-384,SHA-512	TLS Pre-Master Secret, Master Secret, derived key
KBKDF KDF	Cert. #A1835	SP800-108 Counter KDF mode and Feedback KDF mode (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512) Counter KDF mode and Feedback KDF mode (CMAC-AES128, CMAC-AES192, CMAC-AES256) Counter KDF mode and Feedback KDF mode (CMAC-TDES)	Key derivation key, KBKDF Derived Key
PBKDF	#A1820, #A1821, #A1822, #A1823, #A2772 and #A2895	SP 800-132 (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-512)	PBKDF password PBKDF Derived Key
	#A1801, #A1802, #A1803 and #A2773	SP 800-132 (SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512)	
SSH KDF (CVL)	CVL Certs. #A1797, #A1798, #A1799, #A1800, #A2774 and #A2896	SP 800-135 AES (128, 192, 256), Triple-DES with SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA384, SHA-512	SSH-KDF Derived Key Shared secret
KTS	Certs. #A1793, #A1794, #A1795, #A2775, #A2897 and	SP800-38F AES KW, KWP	AES keys 128, 192, 256 bits

Algorithm	Validation Certificate	Standards/Usage/Mode	Keys/CSPs
	#A2899	SP800-38F AES CCM	AES keys 128, 192, 256 bits
	Certs. #A1811, #A1812, #A1813, #A1814, #A1815, #A1816, #A1817, #A1818, #A1819, #A2776, #A2780, #A2781, #A2898 and #A2900	SP800-38F AES GCM	AES keys 128, 192, 256 bits
	AES Certs. #A1793, #A1794 and #A1795 HMAC Certs. #A1820, #A1821, #A1822, #A1823, #A2772 and #A2895	SP800-38F AES CBC and HMAC	AES keys 128, 256 bits
	Triple-DES Cert. #A1792 HMAC Certs. #A1820, #A1821, #A1822, #A1823, #A2772 and #A2895	SP800-38F Triple-DES CBC and HMAC	Triple-DES keys 168 bits Note: with encryption strength of 112 bits
	Certs. #A1820, #A1821, #A1822 and #A1823	SP800-56Br2 RSA OAEP key wrapping	RSA keys 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144 and 8192 bits
ENT (NP)	N/A	SP800-90B	N/A

Table 3: Approved Algorithms

The Module supports the following non-Approved algorithms but allowed in FIPS Approved mode:

Algorithm	Usage	Keys/CSPs
RSA (encrypt, decrypt) with key size equal or larger than 2048 bits up to 16384 bits	PKCS#1 v1.5 key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength	RSA private key
MD5 (No security claimed per IG 1.23)	Message Digest used only in TLS	N/A

Table 4: Non-Approved but allowed Algorithms

The Module supports the following non-FIPS 140-2 Approved algorithms. Any use of the non-Approved functions will cause the Module to operate in the non-FIPS mode implicitly:

Algorithm	Usage	Keys
RSA (encrypt, decrypt) with key size smaller than 2048 bits	key wrapping	RSA keys
RSA with key sizes not listed in Table 3	sign, verify, and key generation	RSA keys
RSA OAEP with non-approved key sizes	key wrapping	RSA keys
Digital Signature Generation (DSA, ECDSA and RSA) using SHA-1	sign	DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys
DSA with key sizes not listed in Table 3	sign, verify, and key generation	DSA keys
ECDSA with P-192 curve	Key generation/Key verification/Signature generation/Signature Verification	ECDSA keys
Diffie-Hellman with key sizes not listed in Table 3	Key agreement, shared secret computation	Diffie-Hellman keys
Diffie-Hellman keys generated with domain parameters other than safe primes.	Key agreement, shared secret computation	Diffie-Hellman keys
EC Diffie-Hellman with P-192 curve	Key agreement, shared secret computation	EC Diffie-Hellman keys
ANSI X9.31 RNG (with AES-128 core)	random number generation	PRNG seed value and seed key 128 bits
AES-OCB	Authenticated Encryption/Decryption	Symmetric key
ARIA	Encryption/decryption	Symmetric key
BLAKE2	Hash function	N/A
Blowfish	Encryption/decryption	Symmetric key
Camellia	Encryption/decryption	Symmetric key
CAST	Encryption/decryption	Symmetric key
CAST5	Encryption/decryption	Symmetric key
ChaCha20	Encryption/decryption	Symmetric key
ChaCha20 and Poly1305	Authenticated Encryption/Decryption	Symmetric key
DES	Encryption/decryption	Symmetric key
Hash_DRBG	Random Number Generation	SP 800-90A DRBG internal values (C and V values)
HMAC_DRBG	Random Number Generation	SP 800-90A DRBG internal values (K and V values)

GHASH	Hash function	N/A
HMAC with less than 112-bit keys	Message Authentication Code.	Symmetric key
IDEA	Encryption/decryption	Symmetric key
Single step KDF	Key derivation	Derived key
KRB5KDF	Key derivation	Derived key
MD2	Hash function	N/A
MD4	Hash function	N/A
MD5	Hash function	N/A
RC2	Encryption/decryption	Symmetric key
RC4	Encryption/decryption	Symmetric key
RC5	Encryption/decryption	Symmetric key
RIPEMD	Hash function	N/A
SEED	Encryption/decryption	Symmetric key
SipHash	Message Authentication Code.	Symmetric key
SM3	Hash function	N/A
SRP	Key agreement	SRP keys
Whirlpool	Hash function	N/A

Table 5: Non-Approved Algorithms

1.3 Cryptographic Boundary

The Modules' physical boundaries are the surface of the case of the platform (depicted in the hardware block diagram).

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module logical cryptographic boundary is the shared library files and their integrity check HMAC files, which are delivered through Red Hat Package Manager (RPM) 64-bit files as listed below:

- openssl-libs-1.1.1k-12.el8_6.x86_64.rpm
- openssl-libs-1.1.1k-12.el8_8.x86_64.rpm
- openssl-libs-1.1.1k-12.el8_9.x86_64.rpm
- openssl-libs-1.1.1k-12.el8_6.ppc64le.rpm
- openssl-libs-1.1.1k-12.el8_8.ppc64le.rpm
- openssl-libs-1.1.1k-12.el8_9.ppc64le.rpm
- openssl-libs-1.1.1k-12.el8_6.s390x.rpm
- openssl-libs-1.1.1k-12.el8_8.s390x.rpm
- openssl-libs-1.1.1k-12.el8_9.s390x.rpm

These RPMs contain the following files that are part of the module boundary:
- /usr/lib64/.libcrypto.so.1.1.1k.hmac

- /usr/lib64/.libssl.so.1.1.1k.hmac

- /usr/lib64/libcrypto.so.1.1.1k

- /usr/lib64/libssl.so.1.1.1k

The OpenSSL RPM package of the Module includes the binary files, integrity check HMAC files, Man Pages and the OpenSSL Engines provided by the standard OpenSSL shared library. The OpenSSL Engines and their shared object files are not part of the Module, and therefore they must not be used.

1.3.1 Hardware Block Diagram

Figure 1: Hardware Block Diagram

### 1.3.2 Software Block Diagram

Figure 2: Software Block Diagram(the cryptographic boundary includes the HMAC integrity files)

2 Cryptographic Modules' Ports and Interfaces

The physical ports of the Module are the same as the computer system on which it executes. The logical interface is a C-language Application Program Interface (API).

The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions. The Data Output interface consists of the output parameters of the API functions. The Control Input interface consists of the actual API functions. The Status Output interface includes the return values of the API functions. The ports and interfaces are shown in the following table.

FIPS Interface	Physical Port	Modules' Interfaces
Data Input	Ethernet ports	API input parameters, kernel I/O – network or files on filesystem
Data Output	Ethernet ports	API output parameters, kernel I/O – network or files on filesystem
Control Input	Keyboard, Serial port, Ethernet port, Network	API function calls, or configuration files on filesystem
Status Output	Serial port, Ethernet port, Network	Return values of API
Power Input	PC Power Supply Port	N/A

Table 6: Ports and Interfaces

3 Roles, Services and Authentication

This section defines the roles, services, and authentication mechanisms and methods with respect to the applicable FIPS 140-2 requirements.

3.1 Roles

There are two users of the Module:
- User
- Crypto Officer

The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services implemented by the Module. For User documentation, please refer to the man pages of ssl(3), crypto(3) as an entry into the Modules' API documentation for SSL/TLS and generic crypto support. Installation of the Module is only done by the Crypto Officer.

3.2 Services

The Module supports services that are available to users in the various roles. All of the services are described in detail in the Modules' user documentation. The following tables show the services available to the various roles and the access to cryptographic keys and CSPs resulting from services.

The following table lists the Approved services available in FIPS Approved mode. Please refer to Table 3 and Table 4 for the Approval key size of each algorithm used in the services.

Service	Role	CSPs	Access
Symmetric encryption/decryption	User	AES and Triple-DES key	read/execute
Asymmetric Encryption/Decryption	User	RSA private key	read/execute
Asymmetric key generation	User	RSA, DSA and ECDSA private key	read/write/execute
ECDSA key verification	User	ECDSA private key	read/execute
Digital signature generation and verification	User	RSA, DSA and ECDSA private key	read/execute
DSA domain parameter generation/verification	User	None	N/A
TLS network protocol	User	AES or Triple-DES key, HMAC Key	read/execute
TLS key agreement	User	AES or Triple-DES key, RSA, DSA or ECDSA private key, HMAC Key, Premaster Secret, Master Secret, Diffie-Hellman Private Components and EC Diffie-Hellman Private Components	read/write/execute
Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation	User	Diffie-Hellman shared secret and private key	read/write/execute
Diffie-Hellman key generation and verification using safe primes	User	Diffie-Hellman private key	read/write/execute
EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation	User	EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret and private key	read/write/execute
AES key wrapping	User	AES key	read/execute
RSA key wrapping	User	RSA, private key	read/execute
Certificate Management/ Handling	User	RSA, DSA or ECDSA private key parts of certificates	read/write/execute
Keyed Hash (HMAC)	User	HMAC Key	read/execute
Keyed Hash (CMAC)	User	CMAC key	read/execute
Message digest (SHS)	User	none	N/A
Random number generation (SP800-90A DRBG)	User	Entropy input string, seed, K and V values	read/write/execute
Key Derivation through PBKDF	User	PBKDF password and derived key	read/write/execute
Key Derivation through SSH-KDF	User	SSH-KDF derived key and shared secret	read/write/execute
Key Derivation through HKDF	User	HKDF derived key and shared secret	read/write/execute

Service	Role	CSPs	Access
Key Derivation through KBKDF	User	Key derivation key for KBKDF and KBKDF derived key	read/write/execute
Show status	User	none	N/A
Module initialization	User	none	N/A
Self-test	User	none	N/A
Zeroize	User	All aforementioned CSPs	read/write/execute
Module installation	Crypto Officer	none	N/A

Table 7: Approved Service Details

The following table lists the non-Approved services available in non-FIPS mode. Please refer to Table 5 for the non-Approved key size of each algorithm.

Service	Role	Access
Asymmetric encryption/decryption using non-Approved RSA key size or OAEP padding using non-Approved key size	User	read/execute
Symmetric encryption/decryption using non-Approved algorithms	User	read/execute
Hash operation using non-Approved algorithms	User	read/execute
Digital signature generation and verification using RSA, DSA and ECDSA restrictions listed in Table 5	User	read/execute
Digital signature generation using SHA-1	User	read/execute
Diffie-Hellman with non-compliant key size	User	read/write/execute
Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation with restrictions listed in Table 5	User	read/write/execute
EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation with restrictions listed in Table 5	User	read/write/execute
TLS connection using keys established by Diffie-Hellman, EC Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSA and ECDSA with non-Approved key sizes/curves	User	read/write/execute
Asymmetric key generation using non-Approved RSA, DSA and ECDSA key/curve	User	read/write/execute
Asymmetric key verification using non-Approved ECDSA curves	User	read/write/execute
Random number generation using no approved algorithms listed in Table 5	User	read/write/execute
Keyed Hash using HMAC with less than 112-bit keys	User	read/execute
Authenticated encryption/decryption using non-Approved algorithms.	User	read/execute
Key agreement using non-Approved algorithms	User	read/execute
Key Derivation using non-Approved algorithms	User	read/execute

Table 8: Non-Approved Service Details

Note:
The Module does not share CSPs between an Approved mode of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. All cryptographic keys used in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation must be generated in the FIPS-Approved mode or imported while running in the FIPS-Approved mode. If the DRBG is used for key generation for non-Approved services in non-FIPS mode, reseeding the DRBG before and after the key generation is mandatory.

More information about the services and their associated APIs can be found in the Man Pages included in the rpm packages. The evp(3) is the starting point of the Man Pages.

3.3 Operator Authentication

At security level 1, authentication is neither required nor employed. The role is implicitly assumed on entry.

3.4 Mechanism and Strength of Authentication

At security level 1, authentication is not required.

4 Physical Security

The Module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.

5 Operational Environment

5.1 Applicability

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system is used as the basis of other products which include but are not limited to:

- Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS
- Red Hat Virtualization (RHV)
- Red Hat OpenStack Platform
- OpenShift Container Platform
- Red Hat Gluster Storage
- Red Hat Ceph Storage
- Red Hat CloudForms
- Red Hat Satellite.

Compliance is maintained for these products whenever the binary is found unchanged.

The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifications. The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the hardware specified in section 1.2.

5.2 Policy

The operating system is restricted to a single operator (concurrent operators are explicitly excluded). The application that request cryptographic services is the single user of the module, even when the application is serving multiple clients.

In the operational mode, the ptrace(2) system call, the debugger (gdb(1)), and strace(1) shall be not used.

6 Cryptographic Key Management

6.1 Random Number and Key Generation

The Module provides an SP800-90A-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) for creation of key components of asymmetric keys, and random number generation.

The seeding (and automatic reseeding) of the DRBG is done with getrandom().

The module employs the Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on [SP800-90A] for the random number generation. The DRBG supports the CTR_DRBG mechanisms. The module performs the DRBG health tests as defined in section 11.3 of [SP800-90A]. The module uses CPU jitter as a noise source provided by the operational environment which is within the module's physical boundary but outside of the module's logical boundary. The source is compliant with [SP 800-90B] and marked as ENT (NP) on the certificate. The module collects 384 bits of entropy from the kernel CPU Jitter source, which is provided to an HMAC_DRBG in the kernel, which preserves the 384-bits of entropy upon output. This 384-bits of entropy is the initial seed during initialization of the CTR_DRBG, and reseeding internally which occurs less than 2^{48} times of DRBG services request. The module obtains at least 384 bits of entropy from the CPU Jitter source per each call. The caveat, "The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy" applies.

The Key Generation methods implemented in the module for Approved services in FIPS mode is compliant with [SP800-133].

For generating RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys the module implements asymmetric key generation services compliant with [FIPS186-4]. A seed (i.e. the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is directly obtained from the [SP800-90A] DRBG.

The public and private keys used in the EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement schemes are generated internally by the module using the ECDSA key generation method compliant with [FIPS186-4] and [SP800-56Arev3]. The Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme is also compliant with [SP800-56Arev3], and generates keys using safe primes defined in RFC7919 and RFC3526, as described in the next section.

6.2 Key Establishment

The module provides Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation compliant with SP800-56Arev3, in accordance with scenario X1 (1) of IG D.8.

The module provides Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement schemes compliant with SP800-56rev3 and used as part of the TLS protocol key exchange in accordance with scenario X1 (2) of IG D.8; that is, the shared secret computation (KAS-FFC-SSC and KAS-ECC-SSC) followed by the derivation of the keying material using SP800-135 KDF.

For Diffie-Hellman, the module supports the use of safe primes from RFC7919 for domain parameters and key generation, which are used in the TLS key agreement implemented by the module.

- TLS (RFC7919)

    ◦ ffdhe2048 (ID = 256)

    ◦ ffdhe3072 (ID = 257)

    ◦ ffdhe4096 (ID = 258)

    ◦ ffdhe6144 (ID = 259)

    ◦ ffdhe8192 (ID = 260)

The module also supports the use of safe primes from RFC3526, which are part of the Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups that can be used for Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Note that the module only implements key generation and verification, and shared secret computation using safe primes, but no part of the IKE protocol.

- IKEv2 (RFC3526)

    ◦ MODP-2048 (ID=14)

    ◦ MODP-3072 (ID=15)

    ◦ MODP-4096 (ID=16)

    ◦ MODP-6144 (ID=17)

    ◦ MODP-8192 (ID=18)

According to Table 2: Comparable strengths in [SP 800-57], the key sizes of AES, Triple-DES, RSA, Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman provide the following security strength in FIPS mode of operation:

- Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength.

- EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength.

- Diffie-Hellman key agreement with TLS KDF provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength.

- EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement with TLS KDF provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength.

- RSA key wrapping with PKCS#1-v1.5 provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength; Allowed per IG D.9

- AES key wrapping with KW, KWP, CCM and GCM key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.

- AES key wrapping with AES CBC and HMAC key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength.

- Triple-DES Key wrapping with Triple-DES CBC and HMAC key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength.

- RSA key wrapping with OAEP key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 200 bits of encryption strength.

RSA key wrapping meets the assurances requited in section 6.4 of the SP 88056BRev2.

6.3 Key/Critical Security Parameter (CSP)

An authorized application as user (i.e., the User role) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the Module. The following table summarizes the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module:

Key/CSP	Generation	Storage	Zeroization
AES Symmetric Key	N/A(passed in as API input parameter) Alternatively, key can be established during a TLS handshake	RAM	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free()
Triple-DES Symmetric Key			
HMAC Key			HMAC_CTX_cleanup()
CMAC Key	N/A(passed in as API input parameter)	RAM	CMAC_CTX_cleanup()
RSA Private Key	Generated using FIPS 186-4 key generation method and the random value used in the key generation is generated using SP800-90A DRBG.	RAM	RSA_free()
DSA Private Key			DSA_free()
ECDSA Private Key			EC_KEY_free()
Diffie-Hellman Private Components	Public and private keys are generated using the SP 800-56Arev3 Safe Primes key generation method, random values are obtained from the SP800-90A DRBG.	RAM	DH_free()
EC Diffie-Hellman Private Components	Public and private keys are generated using the FIPS 186-4 key generation method, random values are obtained from the SP800 90A DRBG.	RAM	EC_KEY_free()
Shared secret.	Generated during the Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation	RAM	DH_free(), EC_KEY_free()
SP 800-90A DRBG entropy input string	Obtained from CPU jitter source	RAM	FIPS_drbg_free()
SP 800-90A DRBG seed, internal values (K and V values)	Derived from the entropy input using SP800-90A mechanisms		
TLS Pre-Master Secret and Master Secret TLS 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2	Established during the TLS handshake	RAM	SSL_free() and SSL_clear()
HKDF Derived key	Derived SP800-56Crev1 HKDF KDF mechanisms	RAM	kdf_hkdf_free()
PBKDF Password	N/A	RAM	kdf_pbkdf2_free()
PBKDF Derived Key	Derived SP800-132 PBKDF mechanisms		kdf_pbkdf2_free()
SSH-KDF Derived Key	Derived SP800-135 SSH KDF mechanisms	RAM	kdf_sshkdf_free()
Key derivation key	N/A	RAM	kbkdf_free()

Key/CSP	Generation	Storage	Zeroization
for KBKDF			
KBKDF Derived key	Derived SP800-108 KBKDF KDF mechanisms	RAM	kbkdf_free()

Table 9: Key Life Cycle

6.4 Key/CSP Storage

Public and private keys are provided to the Module by the calling process, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. The Module does not perform persistent storage of CSPs.

6.5 Key/CSP Zeroization

The application that uses the Module is responsible for appropriate destruction and zeroization of the key material. The library provides functions for key allocation and destruction, which overwrites the memory that is occupied by the key information with "zeros" before it is deallocated.

The memory occupied by keys is allocated by regular libc malloc/calloc() calls. The application is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions from the OpenSSL API. The destruction functions then overwrite the memory occupied by keys with pre-defined values and deallocates the memory with the free() call. In case of abnormal termination, or swap in/out of a physical memory page of a process, the keys in physical memory are overwritten by the Linux kernel before the physical memory is allocated to another process.

6.6 Key Derivation

The module supports the following key derivation methods according to [SP800-135]:

- TLSv1.0/1.1 and TLSv1.2 SP 800-135 KDF are used in the TLS protocol. The KDF uses HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-384 PRF.

- KDF for the SSHv2 protocol.

The module supports the following key derivation methods according to [SP800-56Crev1]:

- HKDF for the TLS protocol TLSv1.3.

The module supports the following key derivation methods according to [SP800-108]:

- KBKDF for deriving a key from repeated application of HMAC/CMAC to an input secret (and other optional values).

The module also supports password-based key derivation (PBKDF). The implementation is compliant with option 1a of [SP-800-132]. Keys derived from passwords or passphrases using this method can only be used in storage applications.

7 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)

MARKETING NAME........................... PowerEdge R440
REGULATORY MODEL..................... E45S
REGULATORY TYPE......................... E45S001
EFFECTIVE DATE............................March 01, 2020
EMC EMISSIONS CLASS.................. Class A

MARKETING NAME........................... IBM z15
REGULATORY MODEL..................... z15
EFFECTIVE DATE............................August 21, 2019
EMC EMISSIONS CLASS.................. Class A

MARKETING NAME........................... IBM Power System
REGULATORY MODEL..................... 9009-42A
EFFECTIVE DATE............................June 26, 2020
EMC EMISSIONS CLASS.................. Class A

MARKETING NAME........................... IBM Power System
REGULATORY MODEL..................... 9080-HEX
EFFECTIVE DATE............................October 13, 2021
EMC EMISSIONS CLASS.................. Class A

7.1 Statement of compliance

This product has been determined to be compliant with the applicable standards, regulations, and directives for the countries where the product is marketed. The product is affixed with regulatory marking and text as necessary for the country/agency. The validation environments meet the requirements of 47 CFR FCC PART 15, Subpart B, Class A (Business use).

8 Self-Tests

FIPS 140-2 requires that the Module performs self-tests to ensure the integrity of the Module, and the correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, some functions require continuous verification of function, such as the Random Number Generator. All of these tests are listed and described in this section. No operator intervention is required during the running of the self-tests.

See section 9.2.6 for descriptions of possible self-test errors and recovery procedures.

8.1 Power-Up Tests

The Module performs both power-up self-tests (at module initialization) and continuous conditional tests (during operation). The power-up self test start with the integrity test, where the FIPS_mode_set() function verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC SHA-256 digest, which is computed at build time. If this computed HMAC SHA-256 digest matches the stored, known digest, then the rest of the power-up self-test (consisting of the algorithm-specific Pairwise Consistency and Known Answer Tests) is performed. Input, output, and cryptographic functions cannot be performed while the Module is in a self-test or error state because the Module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling application until the power-up self-tests are complete. After successful completion of the power-up tests, the module is loaded and cryptographic functions are available for use. If the power-up self-tests fail the module will enter the error state, subsequent calls to the Module will fail - thus no further cryptographic operations are possible.

Algorithm	Test
AES	KAT AES ECB mode with 128-bit key, encryption and decryption (separately tested) KAT AES CCM mode with 192-bit key, encryption and decryption (separately tested) KAT AES GCM mode with 256-bit key, encryption and decryption (separately tested) KAT AES XTS mode with 128 and 256-bit keys, encryption and decryption (separately tested)
Triple-DES	KAT Triple-DES ECB mode, encryption and decryption (separately tested)
DSA	PCT sign and verify with L=2048, N=224 and SHA-256
RSA	KAT RSA with 2048-bit key, PKCS#1 v1.5 scheme and SHA-256, signature generation and verification (separately tested) KAT RSA with 2048-bit key, PSS scheme and SHA-256, signature generation and verification (separately tested) KAT RSA with 2048-bit key, public key encryption and private key decryption (separately tested)
ECDSA	PCT sign and verify with P-256 and SHA-256
Diffie-Hellman	Primitive "Z" Computation KAT with 2048-bit key
EC Diffie-Hellman	Primitive "Z" Computation KAT with P-256 curve
TLS KDF	KAT with SHA-256
SSH KDF	KAT with SHA-256
PBKDF KDF	KAT with SHA-256
HKDF KDF	KAT with SHA-256
KBKDF KDF	KAT with SHA-256
SP 800-90A DRBG	KAT CTR_DRBG with AES with 128, 192, 256-bit keys with and without DF, with and without PR Health test per section 11.3 of SP 800-90A DRBG
HMAC	KAT HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512
SHS	KAT SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512
SHA-3	KAT SHA3-256, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128 and SHAKE-256
CMAC	KAT AES CMAC with 128, 192 and 256 bit keys, MAC generation

Algorithm	Test
	KAT Triple-DES CMAC, MAC generation
Module integrity	HMAC-SHA-256
Entropy source ENT (NP)	Start-up tests: As required per SP 800-90B section 4, RCT and APT health tests are performed over 1024 consecutive samples by the entropy source implemented as part of the operational environment (i.e. module's physical boundary).

Table 10: Modules' Self-Tests

8.2 Conditional Tests

Algorithm	Test
DSA	PCT: signature generation and verification
ECDSA	PCT: signature generation and verification
RSA	PCT: signature generation and verification, encryption and decryption

Table 11: Modules' Conditional Tests

The entropy source (i.e. part of module's physical boundary) also performs continuous RCT and APT as specified in section 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 of SP 800-90B.

9 Guidance

9.1 Crypto Officer Guidance

The version of the RPM containing the FIPS validated Module is stated in section 1. The RPM package of the Module can be installed by standard tools recommended for the installation of RPM packages on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (for example, yum, rpm, and the RHN remote management tool). The integrity of the RPM is automatically verified during the installation of the Module and the Crypto Officer shall not install the RPM file if the RPM tool indicates an integrity error.

The OpenSSL static libraries libcrypto.a and libssl.a in openssl-static package are not approved to be used. The applications must be dynamically linked to run the OpenSSL.

9.1.1 FIPS module installation instructions

Recommended method

The system-wide cryptographic policies package (crypto-policies) contains a tool that completes the installation of cryptographic modules and enables self-checks in accordance with the requirements of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2. We call this step "FIPS enablement". The tool named fips-mode-setup installs and enables or disables all the validated FIPS modules and it is the recommended method to install and configure a RHEL-8 system.

1. To switch the system to FIPS enablement in RHEL 8:

    ```
    # fips-mode-setup --enable
    Setting system policy to FIPS
    FIPS mode will be enabled.
    Please reboot the system for the setting to take effect.
    ```

2. Restart your system:

    ```
    # reboot
    ```

3. After the restart, you can check the current state:

    ```
    # fips-mode-setup --check
    FIPS mode   is enabled.
    ```

Note: As a side effect of the enablement procedure the fips-mode-enable tool also changes the system-wide cryptographic policy level to a level named "FIPS", this level helps applications by changing configuration defaults to approved algorithms.

Manual method

The recommended method automatically performs all the necessary steps.
The following steps can be done manually but are not recommended and are not required if the systems has been installed with the fips-mode-setup tool:
-   create a file named /etc/system-fips, the contents of this file are never checked
-   ensure to invoke the command 'fips-finish-install --complete' on the installed system.
-   ensure that the kernel boot line is configured with the fips=1 parameter set
-   Reboot the system

NOTE: If `/boot` or `/boot/efi` resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter `boot=<boot partition>` must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command "`df | grep boot`". For example:

```
$ df |grep boot
```

| /dev/sda1 | 233191 | 30454 | 190296 | 14% | /boot |

The partition of the `/boot` file system is located on `/dev/sda1` in this example.

Therefore the parameter `boot=/dev/sda1` needs to be appended to the kernel command line in addition to the parameter `fips=1`.

9.2 User Guidance

To operate the Module in FIPS Approved mode, the user should use services and security functions listed in section 3.2. Any use of non-approved services will put the module in the non-FIPS mode implicitly.

Interpretation of the return code is the responsibility of the host application.

9.2.1 TLS and Diffie-Hellman

The TLS protocol implementation provides both, the server and the client sides. As required by SP800-56Arev3, for TLS use case only safe prime groups listed in RFC7919 are approved to be used in FIPS mode for Diffie-Hellman. The TLS protocol cannot enforce the support of FIPS Approved Diffie-Hellman key sizes. To ensure full support for all TLS protocol versions, the TLS client implementation of the cryptographic module must accept Diffie-Hellman key sizes smaller than 2048 bits offered by the TLS server.
The TLS server implementation of the cryptographic Module allows the application to set the Diffie-Hellman key size. The server side must always set the DH parameters with the API call of:

```
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh)
```

Alternatively it is possible to use SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1); function call that makes OpenSSL to use built-in 2048 bit parameters when the server RSA certificate is at least 2048 bits and 3072 bit DH parameters with RSA certificate of 3072 bits.

To comply with the FIPS 140-2 standard the requirement to not allow Diffie-Hellman key sizes smaller than 2048 bits must be met, to do this the Crypto Officer must ensure that:
 * in case the Module is used as TLS server, the Diffie-Hellman parameters (dh argument) of the aforementioned API call must be 2048 bits or larger;
 * in case the Module is used as TLS client, the TLS server must be configured to only offer Diffie-Hellman keys of 2048 bits or larger.

Using DH parameters and keys smaller than 2048 bits will implicitly place the module into non-FIPS mode, as specified in section 1.2 of the Security Policy.

9.2.2 AES-XTS Guidance

The length of a single data unit encrypted or decrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2^{20} AES blocks that is 16MB of data per AES-XTS instance. An XTS instance is defined in section 4 of SP 800-38E.

The AES-XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices. The AES-XTS shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in transit.

9.2.3 AES-GCM IV

In case the module's power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or decryption shall be redistributed.

The nonce_explicit part of the IV does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. The design of the TLS protocol in this module implicitly ensures that the nonce_explicit, or counter portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values.

The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with the [RFC5288] and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-2_IG] IG A.5, provision 1 ("TLS protocol IV generation"); thus, the module is compliant with [SP800-52].

When a GCM IV is used for decryption, the responsibility for the IV generation lies with the party that performs the AES GCM encryption.

The module supports the TLS GCM ciphersuites from SP800-52 Rev1, section 3.3.1.

9.2.4 Triple-DES Keys

According to IG A.13, the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 2^{16} 64-bit blocks of data. It is the user's responsibility to make sure that the module complies with this requirement and that the module does not exceed this limit.

9.2.5 RSA and DSA Keys

The Module allows the use of 1024 bit RSA and DSA keys for legacy purposes, including signature generation.

RSA must be used with either 2048, 3072 or 4096-bit keys because larger key sizes have not been CAVP tested.

DSA must be used with either 2048 or 3072-bit keys because larger key sizes have not been CAVP tested.

Application can enforce the key generation bit length restriction for RSA and DSA keys by setting the environment variable OPENSSL_ENFORCE_MODULUS_BITS. This environment variable ensures that 1024 bit keys cannot be generated.

9.2.6 Handling Self-Test Errors

Any self-test error transitions the module into the error state. The application must be restarted to recover from these errors. Self-test errors include:

- Pairwise consistency test failure: failing a PCT for RSA, DSA or ECDSA
- Integrity test failure: failure to verify the integrity of the module and its shares libraries
- Known-Answer-Test failure: failure to pass a KAT for any algorithm.

These errors are reported through the regular ERR interface of the module and can be queried by functions such as ERR_get_error(). See the OpenSSL manual page for the function description.

When a fatal error occurs, the module enters the error state. Any calls to a crypto function of the module returns an error with the error message: 'FATAL FIPS SELFTEST FAILURE' printed to stderr and the Module is terminated with the abort() call.

The only way to recover from the error state is to restart the module. If failures persist, the module must be reinstalled. If downloading the software, make sure to verify the package hash to confirm a proper download.

9.2.7 Key derivation using SP800-132 PBKDF

The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF), compliant with SP800-132. The module supports option 1a from section 5.4 of [SP800-132], in which the Master Key (MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK).

In accordance to [SP800-132], the following requirements shall be met.

Derived keys shall only be used in storage applications. The Master Key (MK) shall not be used for other purposes. The length of the MK or DPK shall be of 112 bits or more.

A portion of the salt, with a length of at least 128 bits, shall be generated randomly using the SP800-90A DRBG,

The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. The minimum value shall be 1000.

Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF, shall not be used as cryptographic keys.

The length of the password or passphrase shall be of at least 20 characters, and shall consist of lower-case, upper-case and numeric characters. The probability of guessing the value is estimated to be $1/62^{20} = 10^{-36}$, which is less than 2^{-112}.

The calling application shall also observe the rest of the requirements and recommendations specified in [SP800-132].

10 Mitigation of Other Attacks

RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can measure the time of RSA decryption or signature operations, blinding must be used to protect the RSA operation from that attack.

The API function of RSA_blinding_on turns blinding on for key rsa and generates a random blinding factor. The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling RSA_blinding_on.
Weak Triple-DES keys are detected as follows:

```
/* Weak and semi week keys as taken from
 * %A D.W. Davies
 * %A W.L. Price
 * %T Security for Computer Networks
 * %I John Wiley & Sons
 * %D 1984
 * Many thanks to smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) for the reference
 * (and actual cblock values).
 */
#define NUM_WEAK_KEY    16
static const DES_cblock weak_keys[NUM_WEAK_KEY]={
        /* weak keys */
        {0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01},
        {0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE},
        {0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E},
        {0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1},
        /* semi-weak keys */
        {0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE},
        {0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01},
        {0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1},
        {0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E},
        {0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1},
        {0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1,0x01},
        {0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE},
        {0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E},
        {0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E},
        {0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E,0x01},
        {0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE},
        {0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1}};
```

Please note that there is no weak key detection by default. The caller can explicitly set the DES_check_key to 1 or call DES_check_key_parity() and/or DES_is_weak_key() functions on its own.

11 Glossary and Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Specification
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC	Cypher Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Auhentication Code
CFB	Cypher Feedback
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
ECB	Electronic Code Book
HMAC	Hash Message Authentication Code
MAC	Message Authentication Code
NIST	National Institute of Science and Technology
OFB	Output Feedback
RHEL	Red Hat Enterprise Linux
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS	Secure Hash Standard

12 References

[1] OpenSSL man pages where crypto(3) provides the introduction and link to all OpenSSL APIs regarding the cryptographic operation and ssl(3) to all OpenSSL APIs regarding the SSL/TLS protocol family

[2] FIPS 140-2 Standard, https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/standards

[3] FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance, https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-Program/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf

[4] FIPS 140-2 Derived Test Requirements,https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-Program/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402DTR.pdf

[5] FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf

[6] FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf

[7] FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.198-1.pdf

[8] FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf

[9] ANSI X9.52:1998 Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation, http://webstore.ansi.org/FindStandards.aspx?Action=displaydept&DeptID=80&Acro=X9&DpName=X9,%20Inc.

[10] NIST SP 800-67 Revision 2, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf

[11] NIST SP 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38b.pdf

[12] NIST SP 800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf

[13] NIST SP 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf

[14] NIST SP 800-38E, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38e.pdf

[15] NIST SP 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf

[16] NIST SP 800-90A Revision 1, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf