© 2023 Western Digital Corporation or its affiliates. Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Ultrastar®
DC HC310 TCG Enterprise HDD
Ultrastar®
DC HC320 TCG Enterprise HDD
Ultrastar®
DC HC330 TCG Enterprise HDD
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Protection of Data at Rest
Version: 1.9
2023-08-07
Ultrastar® DC HC310/HC320/HC330 TCG Enterprise HDD Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
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CONTENTS
1. Cryptographic Module Overview...........................................................................................................................4
1.1 Models.................................................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Level .....................................................................................................................................................................5
2. Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................................6
2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation..............................................................................................................................6
2.2 Approved Algorithms.......................................................................................................................................................6
3. Ports and Interfaces..................................................................................................................................................7
4. Identification and Authentication Policy...............................................................................................................8
4.1 Crypto Officer....................................................................................................................................................................8
4.1.1 Secure ID (SID) Authority...................................................................................................................................................8
4.1.2 EraseMaster Authority..........................................................................................................................................................8
4.2 BandMaster Authority (User) ..........................................................................................................................................8
4.3 Anybody..............................................................................................................................................................................8
4.4 Makers .................................................................................................................................................................................8
4.5 Maintenance .......................................................................................................................................................................8
5. Access Control Policy ............................................................................................................................................10
5.1 Roles and Services ...........................................................................................................................................................10
5.2 Unauthenticated Services ...............................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)......................................................................................................12
5.4 Definition of Public Security Parameters ....................................................................................................................13
5.5 SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations ...................................................................................................13
5.6 Definition of CSP Modes of Access ............................................................................................................................14
6. Operational Environment .....................................................................................................................................15
7. Security Rules ..........................................................................................................................................................15
7.1 Invariant Rules.................................................................................................................................................................15
7.2 Initialization Rules...........................................................................................................................................................17
7.3 Zeroization Rules.............................................................................................................................................................18
8. Physical Security Policy..........................................................................................................................................18
8.1 Mechanisms......................................................................................................................................................................18
8.2 Operator Responsibility..................................................................................................................................................19
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy ......................................................................................................................19
10. Definitions ...............................................................................................................................................................19
11. Acronyms.................................................................................................................................................................20
12. References................................................................................................................................................................21
12.1 NIST Specifications ........................................................................................................................................................21
12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications ..................................................................................................................22
12.3 International Committee on Information Technology Standards T10 Technical Committee Standards.........22
12.4 Documents .......................................................................................................................................................................22
12.5 SCSI Commands..............................................................................................................................................................22
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Tables
Table 1 - Ultrastar DC HC310 TCG Enterprise 3.5-inch HDD Model.................................................................5
Table 2 - Ultrastar DC HC320 TCG Enterprise 3.5-inch HDD Model.................................................................5
Table 3 - Ultrastar DC HC330 TCG Enterprise 3.5-inch HDD Model.................................................................5
Table 4 - Module Security Level Specification............................................................................................................5
Table 5 - FIPS Approved Algorithms ..........................................................................................................................6
Table 6 - Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation..................................................7
Table 7 - FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces...................................................................................................................8
Table 8 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication.............................................................................9
Table 9 - Authentication Mechanism Strengths..........................................................................................................9
Table 10 - Authenticated CM Services (Approved and Non-Approved Mode)..................................................10
Table 11 - Unauthenticated Services...........................................................................................................................11
Table 12 - CSPs and Private Keys...............................................................................................................................12
Table 13 - Public Security Parameters ........................................................................................................................13
Table 14 – CSP and PSP Access Rights within Services .........................................................................................14
Table 15 - SCSI Commands.........................................................................................................................................22
Figures
Figure 1: Cryptographic Boundary for Ultrastar DC HC310....................................................................................4
Figure 2: Cryptographic Boundary for Ultrastar DC HC320....................................................................................4
Figure 3: Cryptographic Boundary for Ultrastar DC HC330....................................................................................4
Figure 4: Tamper-Evident Seal over PCBA...............................................................................................................18
Figure 5: Wrapping Tamper-Evident Seals................................................................................................................18
Figure 6: Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seals ...........................................................................................................19
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1. Cryptographic Module Overview
The self-encrypting Ultrastar® DC HC310 TCG Enterprise HDD hereafter referred to as “Ultrastar DC HC310” or
“Cryptographic Module” is a multi-chip embedded module that complies with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security. The self-
encrypting Ultrastar® DC HC320 TCG Enterprise HDD hereafter referred to as “Ultrastar DC HC320” or
“Cryptographic Module” is a multi-chip embedded module that complies with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security. The self-
encrypting Ultrastar® DC HC330 TCG Enterprise HDD, hereafter referred to, respectively, as “Ultrastar DC HC330”
or “Cryptographic Module” is a multi-chip embedded module that complies with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security. All
Cryptographic Modules comply with the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) SSC: Enterprise Specification. The drive
enclosure defines the cryptographic boundary. See Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 for additional information. The
SIO port pins to the right of the SAS connector are disabled in FIPS Approved Mode. Except for the four-conductor
motor control cable, all components within the cryptographic boundary tested are compliant with FIPS 140-2
requirements. The control cable is not security relevant and therefore excluded from FIPS 140-2 requirements.
Figure 1: Cryptographic Boundary for Ultrastar DC HC310
Top View SAS Port View
Figure 2: Cryptographic Boundary for Ultrastar DC HC320
Top View SAS Port View
Figure 3: Cryptographic Boundary for Ultrastar DC HC330
Top View SAS Port View
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1.1 Models
Table 1 defines the characteristics and firmware version associated with each validated Ultrastar DC HC310 model.
Table 2 defines the characteristics and firmware version associated with the validated Ultrastar DC HC320 model.
Table 3 defines the characteristics and firmware version associated with the validated Ultrastar DC HC330 model.
The formatting of an Ultrastar DC HC310, Ultrastar DC HC320, and Ultrastar DC HC330 can be converted from
512e to 4Kn and vice versa.
Table 1 - Ultrastar DC HC310 TCG Enterprise 3.5-inch HDD Model
Model Number Firmware Description
HUS726T4TAL5205 R984, R9G0, R9U0 4TB, 512e, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s, SAS
HUS726T4TALS205 R984, R9G0, R9U0 4TB, 512n, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s, SAS
HUS726T6TAL5205 R984, R9G0, R9U0 6TB, 512e, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s, SAS
Table 2 - Ultrastar DC HC320 TCG Enterprise 3.5-inch HDD Model
Model Number Firmware Description
HUS728T8TAL5205 R980, R9G0, R9U0 8TB, 512e, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s, SAS
Table 3 - Ultrastar DC HC330 TCG Enterprise 3.5-inch HDD Model
Model Number Firmware Description
WUS721010AL5205
R920, R942, R944, R980, R9G0, R9L2,
R9U0, LE01, LE02, NA00, NA01,
NA02, NE00, NE01, NE02
10 TB, 512e, 7200 RPM, 12 Gb/s, SAS
1.2 Security Level
The Cryptographic Module meets all requirements applicable to FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Security.
Table 4 - Module Security Level Specification
FIPS 140-2
Security Requirements Section
FIPS 140-2
Security Level Achieved
Cryptographic Module Specification 2
Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 2
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 2
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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2. Modes of Operation
2.1 FIPS Approved Mode of Operation
The Cryptographic Module has a single FIPS Approved mode of operation. Configuration and policy determine the
Cryptographic Module’s mode of operation. The Cryptographic Module enters FIPS Approved Mode after
successfully completing the Initialize Cryptographic service instructions referenced in Section 7.2. The operator can
determine if the Cryptographic Module is operating in a FIPS Approved mode by invoking the Get FIPS mode
service. A return value of 1 indicates that the Cryptographic Module is operating in FIPS Approved mode. The
Crypto Officer shall not enable the Makers Authority after a Cryptographic Module enters FIPS Approved mode.
The Cryptographic Module is in FIPS non-Approved mode whenever the Makers Authority or the Maintenance mode
is enabled. If the Crypto Officer enables the Makers Authority after the Cryptographic Module enters FIPS
Approved mode, the Crypto Officer must also execute the TCG Revert Method to zeroize the Cryptographic Module.
If the Crypto Officer subsequently executes the Initialize Cryptographic service instructions provided in Section 7.2
with the intent of placing the Cryptographic Module in FIPS Approved mode, the Crypto Officer must first execute
the TCG Revert Method to zeroize the Cryptographic Module.
For the respective models, the Ultrastar DC HC310 Product Specification, Ultrastar DC HC320 Product
Specification, and Ultrastar DC HC330 Product Specification provide information on how to execute the Initialize
Cryptographic service as well as the TCG Revert Method.
2.2 Approved Algorithms
The Cryptographic Module supports the following FIPS Approved algorithms. All algorithms and key lengths
comply with NIST SP 800-131A rev2. All algorithms are supported in FIPS Approved and non-Approved mode.
Table 5 - FIPS Approved Algorithms
Algorithm Description Cert #
AES Firmware
[FIPS 197, SP800 38A, SP 800 38F]
Functions: Encryption, decryption, and key wrapping to protect an
associated MEK in data storage applications
Modes: ECB, KW
Key Sizes: 256
AES 3880
AES Hardware1
[FIPS 197, SP800 38A]
Functions: Encryption and decryption
Modes: ECB
Key Sizes: 128, 256
AES 3881
AES XTS Hardware2
[FIPS 197, SP800 38A, SP800 38E]
Functions: Encryption and decryption in storage applications
Modes: XTS
• XTS-AES Key1 does not equal XTS-AES Key2
• The length of the XTS-AES data unit does not exceed 220 blocks.
Key Sizes: 128, 256
AES 3881
1
AES ECB-128 was tested but is not utilized by the Cryptographic Module
2 AES XTS-128 was tested but is not utilized by the Cryptographic Module.
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Algorithm Description Cert #
DRBG Firmware
[SP800 90A]
Functions: Deterministic random number generator that uses an AES-256
block cipher derivation function.
Modes: CTR
Security Strength: 256 bits
DRBG 1108
HMAC Firmware
[FIPS 198-1]
Functions: Key encrypting key (KEK) derivation used within the PBKDF
SHA sizes: SHA-256
HMAC 2522
RSA Firmware
[FIPS 186-4, PSS]
Functions: Digital signature verification with SHA-2563
Key sizes: 2048
RSA 1978
SHA Firmware
[FIPS 180-4]
Functions: AUTH Digest and KEK generation
SHA sizes: SHA-256
SHS 3203
SHA Hardware/Firmware
[FIPS 180-4]
Functions: Digital Signature verification
SHA sizes: SHA-256
SHS 3204
Table 6 - Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
Algorithm Description Rationale
CKG
[SP800 133] Cryptographic Key Generation
Functions: Generated from the DRBG without further
modification or post processing
Vendor Affirmed
[FIPS140] IG D.12
[SP800-133] Sections 4, 6.1, and 6.2.3.
PBKDF
[SP800 132] Password Based Key Derivation Function
Functions: Key Encrypting Key
Modes: HMAC-SHA-256
Key Sizes: 256 bits
Vendor Affirmed
[FIPS140] IG D.6
[SP800 132] Section 5.4
The Cryptographic Module supports the following non-Approved but allowed algorithm:
• A hardware NDRNG seeds the Approved [SP800 90A] CTR_DRBG. Available entropy does not modify the
bit strength of cryptographic keys generated by the CTR_DRBG. Each 2-bit NDRNG sample contains at
least 1.00167 bits of min entropy. Each time the CTR_DRBG is instantiated or reseeded, one thousand
twenty-four (1024) 2-bit samples seed the CTR_DRBG. This equates to 2048 bits of entropy data and
translates to 1025 bits of min-entropy. A min-entropy of 1025 bits is sufficient to assert that the
CTR_DRBG has a bit security of 256 bits. A security strength of 256 bits exceeds the minimum requirement
of 112 bits of security strength established by NIST.
3. Ports and Interfaces
The Cryptographic Module uses a standard 29-pin Serial Attached SCSI (SAS) connector that conforms to the
mechanical requirements of SFF 8680. Table 7 below identifies the Cryptographic Module’s ports and interfaces. The
Cryptographic Module does not provide a separate maintenance access interface.
3 SHA-256 Cert. #3204
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Table 7 - FIPS 140-2 Ports and Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Interface Cryptographic Module Ports
Power Power connector [SAS]
Control Input SAS connector [SAS], SIO Port (disabled)
Status Output SAS connector [SAS], SIO Port (disabled)
Data Input SAS connector [SAS], SIO Port (disabled)
Data Output SAS connector [SAS], SIO Port (disabled)
4. Identification and Authentication Policy
The Cryptographic Module enforces role separation by requiring a role identifier and an authentication credential
(Personal Identification Number or PIN). The Cryptographic Module enforces the following FIPS140-2 operator
roles.
4.1 Crypto Officer
4.1.1 Secure ID (SID) Authority
This TCG authority initializes the Cryptographic Module. Section 11.3.1 of the TCG Storage Security Subsystem
Class: Enterprise Specification defines this role.
4.1.2 EraseMaster Authority
This TCG authority can selectively zeroize bands within the Cryptographic Module. Section 11.4.1 of the TCG
Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification defines this role. The TCG EraseMaster authority can
disable Users and erase LBA bands (user data regions).
4.2 BandMaster Authority (User)
User roles correspond to Bandmaster Authorities. Section 11.4.1 of the TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class:
Enterprise Specification provides a definition. Users have the authority to lock, unlock, and configure LBA bands
(user data regions) and to issue read and write commands to the SED. The TCG EraseMaster authority can disable a
Bandmaster.
4.3 Anybody
Services are provided that do not require authentication. With one exception, these do not disclose, modify, or
substitute Critical Security Parameters, use an Approved security function, or otherwise affect the security of the
Cryptographic Module. The excepted service is the Generate Random service, which provides output from an
instance of the [SP800 90A] DRBG.
4.4 Makers
For failure analysis purposes, the vendor can enable a logical diagnostic port to perform diagnostics and gather data
on the failure. A power cycle automatically disables the logical diagnostic port. An operator must authenticate to the
SID authority and the Makers authority to enable the logical diagnostic port. The Cryptographic Module is in FIPS
non-Approved mode whenever the Crypto Officer enables the Makers authority. The vendor performs failure
analysis within the vendor’s facility. Makers authentication data shall not leave the vendor’s facilities. During normal
operation, the Crypto Officer disables the Makers authority when invoking the Initialize Cryptographic Module
service.
4.5 Maintenance
For failure analysis purposes, the vendor can enable a privilege mode to perform diagnostics and gather drive health
and failure data. Power cycling the module automatically negates the Maintenance role authentication. After
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authentication, Vendor Unique Commands (VUC) support diagnostic functions for testing the drive media and the
SCSI bus integrity. The operational environment cannot be modified while authenticated to the maintenance role.
The following table maps TCG authorities to FIPS 140-2 roles.
Table 8 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Authority Description
Authentication
Type
Authentication Data
SID Authority
The SID Authority is a Crypto Officer role
that initializes the Cryptographic Module
and authorizes Firmware downloads.
Role-based
CO Identity (TCG SID
Authority) and PIN (TCG SID
Authority PIN)
EraseMaster
Authority
The EraseMaster Authority is a Crypto
Officer role that zeroizes Media Encryption
keys and disables Users.
Role-based
CO Identity (TCG EraseMaster
Authority) and PIN (TCG
EraseMaster PIN)
BandMaster N
(N = 0 to 15)
BandMaster is a User role that controls
read/write access to LBA Bands. Role-based
User Identity (TCG BandMaster
Authority) and PIN (TCG
BandMaster PIN)
Anybody
Anybody is a role that does not require
authentication.
Unauthenticated N/A
Makers (Disabled)
Completion of the Initialize Cryptographic
Module service disables the Makers
Authority
Role-based
CO Identity (TCG SID
Authority) and PIN (Makers
PIN)
Maintenance
Maintenance role for Diagnostics
commands
Role-based 32-bit EDC
Table 9 - Authentication Mechanism Strengths
Authentication Mechanism Mechanism Strength
TCG Credential (PIN)
TCG Credentials are 256 bits, which provides 2256 possible values. The probability that
a random attempt succeeds is 1 chance in 2256 (approximately (8.64 x 10-78) which is
significantly less than 1/1,000,000 (1x 10-6).
Multiple, successive authentication attempts can only occur sequentially (one at a time)
and only when the failed authentication Tries count value does not exceed the associated
TriesLimit value.
Each authentication attempt consumes 1.28 milliseconds. Therefore, at most, 46875
authentication attempts are possible within a one-minute interval. Thus, the probability
that a false acceptance occurs within a one-minute interval is 4.05 x 10-73, which is
significantly less than 1 chance in 100,000 (1 x 10-5).
Maintenance Role Credential
The maintenance role credential embedded within the VUC that enables the
maintenance role is a 32-bit EDC, which provides 232 possible values. The probability
that a random attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is at least 1 chance in
232 (2.33 x10-10), which is significantly less than 1/1,000,000 (1x 10-6).
Authentication attempts consume approximately 7.9 milliseconds. Therefore, at most,
7559 authentication attempts are possible within a one-minute interval. Thus, the
probability that a false acceptance occurs within a one-minute interval is 1.76 x 10-6,
which is less than 1 chance in 100,000 (1 x 10-5).
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5. Access Control Policy
5.1 Roles and Services
Table 10 - Authenticated CM Services (Approved and Non-Approved Mode)
Service Description Role(s)
Approved
Mode
Non-Approved
Mode
Initialize Cryptographic Module4
Crypto Officer provisions the
Cryptographic Module from
organizational policies
CO
(SID Authority)
X X
Authenticate
Input a TCG Credential for
authentication
CO (SID
Authority,
EraseMaster),
Users,
(BandMasters)
X X
Lock/Unlock Firmware Download
Control
Deny/Permit access to Firmware
Download service
CO
(SID Authority)
X X
Firmware Download
Load and utilize RSA2048 PSS
and SHA-256 to verify the entire
firmware image. If the new self-
tests complete successfully, the
SED executes the new code.
Unlocking the Firmware
Download Control enables the
downloading of firmware.
CO
(SID Authority)
X
Zeroize (TCG Revert)
The TCG Revert method
zeroizes a drive and return the
Cryptographic Module to its
original manufactured state.
CO (SID
Authority,
EraseMaster),
Users,
(BandMasters)
X X
Set
Write data structures; access
control enforcement occurs per
data structure field. This service
can change PINs.
CO (SID
Authority,
EraseMaster),
Users,
(BandMasters)
X X
Set LBA Band
Set the starting location, size, and
attributes of a set of contiguous
Logical Blocks
Users
(BandMasters)
X X
Lock/Unlock
LBA Band
Deny/Permit access to a LBA
Band
Users
(BandMasters)
X X
Write Data
Transform plaintext user data to
ciphertext and write in a LBA
band
Users
(BandMasters)
X X
4
See Cryptographic Module Acceptance and Provisioning within the Ultrastar DC HC330 Product Specification
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Service Description Role(s)
Approved
Mode
Non-Approved
Mode
Read Data
Read ciphertext from a LBA band
and output user plaintext data
Users
(BandMasters)
X X
Set Data Store
Write a stream of bytes to
unstructured storage
Users
(BandMasters)
X X
Erase LBA Band
Band is cryptographically erased
by changing LBA band
encryption keys to new values.
Erasing an LBA band with
EraseMaster sets the TCG
Credential to the default value.
CO
(EraseMaster)
X X
Set Vendor Data (Diagnostics)
A Non-Approved service that is
unavailable after the Initialize
Cryptographic Module service
completes. For failure analysis
purposes, the vendor can enable a
logical diagnostic port to perform
diagnostics and gather data on the
failure.
Makers X
Diagnostics
For failure analysis purposes, the
vendor can enable a maintenance
role to perform diagnostics and
gather failure and drive health
data. Vendor Unique
Commands (VUC) support
diagnostic functions for testing
the drive media and the SCSI bus
integrity.
Maintenance X
5.2 Unauthenticated Services
Table 11 - Unauthenticated Services lists the unauthenticated services the Cryptographic Module provides.
Table 11 - Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Reset Module Power on Reset
Self-Test The Cryptographic Module performs self-tests when it powers up
Status Output TCG (IF-RECV) protocol
Get FIPS Mode TCG ‘Level 0 Discovery’ method outputs the FIPS mode of the Cryptographic
Module.
Start Session Start TCG session
End Session End a TCG session by clearing all session state
Generate Random TCG Random method generates a random number from the [SP800 90A] DRBG
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Service Description
Get Reads data structure; access control enforcement occurs per data structure field
Get Data Store Read a stream of bytes from unstructured storage
Zeroize (TCG Revert) The TCG Revert method returns the Cryptographic Module to its original
manufactured state; authentication data (PSID) is printed on the external label
SCSI [SCSI Core] and [SCSI Block] commands to function as a standardized storage
device. See Table 15 - SCSI Commands
FIPS 140 Compliance
Descriptor5
This service reports the FIPS 140 revision as well as the cryptographic module’s
overall security level, hardware revision, firmware revision and module name.
5.3 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The Cryptographic Module contains the CSPs listed in Table 12 - CSPs and Private Keys. Zeroization of CSPs
complies with the purge requirements for SCSI hard disk drives within [SP800 88], Guidelines for Media Sanitization.
Table 12 - CSPs and Private Keys
Name Type Description
AUTH Digest 256-bit authentication data SHA-256 digest of a PIN and a PIN salt
Crypto Officer PIN - TCG Credential (2
total)
256-bit authentication data
The PBKDF uses this PIN to authenticate a
Crypto Officer’s credentials.
DRBG Seed 256-byte Entropy input Internal state associated with the [SP800-90A]
CTR_DRBG using AES-256
Sourced from NDRNG
DRBG State: Key 256-bit value Internal state associated with the [SP800-90A]
CTR_DRBG using AES-256
DRBG State: V 128-bit value Internal state associated with the [SP800-90A]
CTR_DRBG using AES-256.
KEK – Key Encrypting Key (16 total)
SP 800-132 PBKDF (256
bits)
Ephemeral keys derived from BandMaster PINs
and 256-bit KDF salts that wrap the MEKs
using an SP 800-38F AES-256 Key Wrap.
Note: Keys protected by this SP 800-132
PBKDF derived key shall not leave the module.
Maintenance Role Credential 32-bit authentication
A 32-bit EDC authenticates the credentials of
the VUC that enables the maintenance role.
MEK - Media Encryption Key6
(16 total - 1 per LBA band)
XTS-AES-256 (512 bits)
Encrypts and decrypts LBA Bands. Each key is
only associated with one LBA band. The
Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates
MEKs without modification.
NDRNG 256-byte Entropy output Entropy source for DRBG
User PIN –TCG Credential (16 total) 256-bit authentication data
The PBKDF uses this PIN to authenticate a
User’s credentials.
5 See FIPS140 Compliance Descriptor Overview within the[SFSC] Security Features for SCSI Commands
6
A concatenation of XTS-AES Key1 (256 bits) and XTS-AES Key2 (256 bits)
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5.4 Definition of Public Security Parameters
The Cryptographic Module utilizes several public security parameters (PSP). Table 13 - Public Security Parameters
lists the PSPs. The Cryptographic Module uses a public key to verify the digital signature of a firmware download
image. If the digital signature verification process fails when utilizing the primary public key, the Cryptographic
Module attempts to use the secondary public key to verify the digital signature. The Cryptographic Module rejects the
downloaded firmware image if both attempts to verify the digital signature fail.
Table 13 - Public Security Parameters
Key Name Type Description
KDF Salt - Key Derivation
Function Salt (16 total)
256-bit key The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates
KDF salts without modification.
PIN Salt (16 total) 256-bit key The Cryptographic Module’s DRBG generates
PIN salts without modification.
PSID Twenty-character alpha-
numeric string
A unique value generated in the factory and
printed on the Cryptographic Module’s label.
The PSID provides authentication data and
proof of physical presence for the Zeroize
service.
RSAPublicKey[0] RSA 2048 public key Primary public key used to verify the digital
signature of a firmware image.
RSAPublicKey[1] RSA 2048 public key Secondary public key used to verify the digital
signature of a firmware image.
MSID
32-character alphanumeric
string
The MSID is derived by concatenating the
Cryptographic Module’s serial number four
times. For example, if the serial number were
KF7B98G3 then the MSID would be
KF7B98G3KF7B98G3KF7B98G3KF7B98G3.
5.5 SP800-132 Key Derivation Function Affirmations
• The Cryptographic Module utilizes a [SP800 132] Password Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF).
• The Cryptographic Module complies with Option 2a within [SP800 132].
• The Cryptographic Module tracks TCG Credentials (PINs) by hashing the concatenation of a 256-bit PIN
salt and the TCG Credential PIN. The Cryptographic Module stores the SHA-256 AUTH Digest and
associated PIN salt in the Reserved Area.
• Security policy rules set the minimum TCG Credential PIN length at 32 bytes. The Cryptographic Module
allows values from 0x00 to 0xFF for each byte of a PIN
• The upper bound for the probability of guessing a TCG Credential PIN is 2-256. The difficulty of guessing the
PIN is equivalent to a brute force attack.
• KEKs ([SP800 132] Master Keys) derive from passing a TCG Credential PIN ([SP800 132] Password) and a
256-bit KDF salt though an [SP800 132] PBKDF. The Cryptographic Module creates a unique KEK for
each LBA Band. The KEK generation process utilizes the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm. Each KEK has a
security strength of 128-bits against a collision attack.
• Each 256-bit salt is a random number generated using the [SP800 90A] DRBG.
• The sole use of a KEK is to wrap and unwrap its associated Media Encryption Key (MEK), which is used in
storage applications.
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5.6 Definition of CSP Modes of Access
Table 14 – CSP and PSP Access Rights within Services defines the relationship between access to Critical Security
Parameters (CSPs) and the different Cryptographic Module services. The definitions provided below define the
access modes listed in Table 14.
• G = Generate: The Cryptographic Module generates a CSP from the [SP800-90A] DRBG, derives a CSP with
the Key Derivation Function or hashes authentication data with SHA-256.
• I = Input: The Cryptographic Module imports a CSP or PSP from outside the cryptographic boundary.
• O = Output: The Cryptographic Module does not support the output of CSPs outside the cryptographic
boundary. The Cryptographic module outputs the value of selective PSPs.
• E = Execute: The module executes a service that uses the CSP or PSP.
• S = Store: The Cryptographic Module stores a CSP or PSP persistently on media within the cryptographic
module.
• Z = Zeroize: The Cryptographic Module zeroizes a CSP or PSP that is stored in volatile or non-volatile
memory.
Table 14 – CSP and PSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSP PSP
AUTH
Digest
CO
PIN
DRBG
NDRNG
KEK
MEK
User
PIN
Maintenance
Role
Credential
RSAPublicKey[0.1]
MSID
PSID
PIN
salt
KDF
Salt
Initialize Cryptographic
Module
GS IE GE GE G GS IE OIE GS GS
Authenticate E IE GE E IE E E
Lock/Unlock Firmware
Download Control
Firmware Download IE
Set
Set LBA Band
Lock/Unlock LBA
Band
Write Data E
Read Data E
Set Data Store
Set Vendor Data
(Diagnostics)
Diagnostics E
Erase LBA Band GSZ
Self-Test (KATs)
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Service
CSP PSP
AUTH
Digest
CO
PIN
DRBG
NDRNG
KEK
MEK
User
PIN
Maintenance
Role
Credential
RSAPublicKey[0.1]
MSID
PSID
PIN
salt
KDF
Salt
Reset Module (Power
on Reset)
GE GE
Status Output
Get FIPS mode
Start Session
End Session
Generate Random GE E
Get Data Store
Get
Zeroize
(TCG Revert)
Z Z GE Z G GSZ Z E I
GS
Z
GS
Z
SCSI
FIPS 140 Compliance
Descriptor
6. Operational Environment
The Cryptographic Module operating environment is non-modifiable. Therefore, the FIPS 140-2 operational
environment requirements are not applicable to this module. While operational, the code working set cannot be
added, deleted, or modified. For firmware upgrades, the Cryptographic Module uses an authenticated download
service to upgrade its firmware in its entirety. If the download operation is successful, authorized and verified, the
Cryptographic Module will begin operating with the new code working set. Firmware loaded into the Cryptographic
Module that is not on the FIPS 140-2 certificate is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS
140-2 validation.
7. Security Rules
The Cryptographic Module enforces applicable FIPS 140-2 Level 2 security requirements. This section documents
the security rules that the Cryptographic Module enforces.
7.1 Invariant Rules
1. The Cryptographic Module supports four distinct types of operator roles: Crypto Officer, User, Maintenance,
and Makers. Initialization disables the Makers role.
2. Power cycling a Cryptographic Module clears all existing authentications.
3. After the Cryptographic Module has successfully completed all self-tests and initialized according to the
instructions provided in Section 7.2, it is in FIPS Approved mode. The Crypto Officer shall not enable the
Makers Authority after the Cryptographic Module enters FIPS Approved mode.
4. When the Cryptographic Module is unable to authenticate TCG Credentials, operators do not have access to
any cryptographic service other than the unauthenticated Generate Random service.
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5. The Cryptographic Module performs the following tests. Upon failure of any test, the Cryptographic Module
enters a soft error state. A failing Cryptographic Module reports the error condition by transmitting an UEC
via the [SCSI] protocol. After entering the soft error state, a failing Cryptographic Module does not process
functional commands unless a power cycle occurs, and the error state clears.
A. Power up Self-Tests
1) Firmware Integrity 32-bit EDC
2) Firmware AES Encrypt KAT, Cert AES 3880
3) Firmware AES Decrypt KAT, Cert AES 3880
4) RSA 2048 PSS Verify KAT, Cert RSA 1978
5) DRBG KAT7, Cert DRBG 1108
6) Firmware SHA-256 KAT, Cert SHS 3203
7) HMAC-SHA-256 KAT, Cert HMAC 2522
8) Hardware AES Encrypt KAT, Cert AES 3881
9) Hardware AES Decrypt KAT, Cert AES 3881
10) HW/FW SHA-256 KAT, Cert SHS 3204
11) Key Wrap KAT, KW-AE, Cert. AES 3880
12) Key Wrap KAT, KW-AD, Cert. AES 3880
B. Conditional Tests
1) The Cryptographic Module performs a Continuous Random Number Generator test on the DRBG.
2) The Cryptographic Module performs a Continuous Random Number Generator test on the hardware
NDRNG entropy source.
3) The Cryptographic Module performs an Adaptive Proportion test and a Repetition Count test on the
hardware NDRNG entropy source.
4) The Cryptographic Module performs a key comparison test on XTS-AES Key1 and XTS-AES Key2 that
satisfies IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements.
5) Firmware Download Test, RSA 2048 PSS (Cert#1978), SHA-256 (Cert#3204)
6. An operator can command the Cryptographic Module to perform the power-up self-test by power cycling the
device.
7. Power-up self-tests do not require operator action.
8. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
9. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused, could compromise the
Cryptographic Module.
10. The zeroization service deletes all plaintext keys and CSPs.
11. The Cryptographic Module supports a maintenance role. The operator must execute the TCG Revert
Method to zeroize the Cryptographic Module before entering and exiting the maintenance role. The operator
must also execute the TCG Revert Method to zeroize the Cryptographic Module after exiting the
maintenance role.
12. The Cryptographic Module does not support manual key entry.
13. The Cryptographic Module does not have any external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
14. The Cryptographic Module does not output plaintext CSPs.
15. The Cryptographic Module does not output intermediate key values.
16. The Cryptographic Module does not support concurrent operators.
7
The DRBG KAT is inclusive of the instantiate, generate and reseed function health tests required in SP 800-90A rev 1
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17. The End Session service deletes the current operator authentication. The Cryptographic Module requires
operators to re-authenticate upon execution of the End Session service.
18. The host shall authenticate to LBA Bands after a power cycle.
19. The Crypto Officer shall assure that all host issued PINs are 32-bytes in length.
20. After a Firmware Download, the CO must execute “Set ‘Firmware_Dload_Port.PortLocked = True’ ”.
7.2 Initialization Rules
The Crypto Officer shall follow the instructions provided in the FIPS 140 Crypto Officer Instructions section of the
Ultrastar DC HC310 Product Specification, Ultrastar DC HC320 Product Specification or Ultrastar DC HC330
Product Specification and the Delivery & Operation (Crypto Officer’s) Manual for acceptance and end of life
procedures.
The Crypto Officer shall initialize the modules cryptographic services by executing the TCG methods listed below.
1. StartSession and SyncSession using the ‘Admin SP’
a. Get MSID
b. Use the MSID to authenticate to the SID
i. An authentication failure indicates that a tamper event has occurred for the Cryptographic
Module
c. Set ‘SID PIN’ to an organizational value
d. Set ‘Makers.Enabled = FALSE’
e. Set ‘Firmware_Dload_Port.PortLocked = True
f. Set ‘Firmware_Dload_Port.LockOnReset = PowerCycle’
g. EndSession
2. StartSession and SyncSession using the ‘Locking SP’
a. Use the MSID to authenticate to the EraseMaster
i. An authentication failure indicates that a tamper event has occurred for the Cryptographic
Module
b. Set ‘EraseMaster PIN’ to a new value
c. Erase Band0
d. Use the MSID to authenticate to the BandMaster[0]
i. An authentication failure indicates that a tamper event has occurred for the Cryptographic
Module.
e. Set ‘BandMaster[0] PIN’ to a new value
f. As required by organizational policy, repeat steps 2.d to 2.e for each LBA band
g. EndSession
3. Power cycle or reset the Cryptographic Module.
The instructions provided above accomplish the following:
• Establish authentication data for the TCG Authorities by replacing the MSID (default PIN value).
• Erase the LBA Bands. When the Cryptographic Module erases LBA bands it also cryptographically erases
the Media Encryption Keys associate with each LBA band.
• Establish the LBA Bands. When the Cryptographic Module establishes LBA bands it also generates a unique
Media Encryption Key for each LBA band.
• Disable the Makers Authority
• Lock the Firmware Download service and set the Firmware Download service to lock automatically after a
power cycle.
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At the end of the initialization process, the Cryptographic Module will be in FIPS Approved mode. While in FIPS
Approved mode, only an authenticated Crypto Officer can change the state of the firmware download service.
7.3 Zeroization Rules
The Crypto Officer shall use the TCG Revert Method to perform the zeroization function. After successfully
executing TCG Revert the Crypto Officer shall power cycle the module. Power cycling a Cryptographic Module
assures the erasure of all CSPs stored in volatile memory. Reverting and power cycling the cryptographic module
zeroizes all Critical Security Parameters.
8. Physical Security Policy
8.1 Mechanisms
The Cryptographic Module does not make claims in the Physical Security area beyond FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2.
• All components are production-grade materials with standard passivation.
• The enclosure is opaque.
• Engineering design supports opacity requirements.
• Western Digital applies four (4) tamper-evident security seal during manufacturing. Seal number 1 covers the
PCBA on the bottom of the Cryptographic Module. Seal numbers 2, 3, and 4 wrap from the top cover of the
Cryptographic Module to the side of the Cryptographic Module.
• Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate where Western Digital factory personnel apply the tamper seals.
• The tamper-evident security seal cannot be penetrated or removed and reapplied without evidence of
tampering. In addition, the tamper-evident security seals are difficult to replicate.
Figure 4: Tamper-Evident Seal over PCBA Figure 5: Wrapping Tamper-Evident Seals
2
1
4
3
© 2023 Western Digital Corporation or its affiliates. Public Material - May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
8.2 Operator Responsibility
The Crypto Officer shall inspect the Cryptographic Module enclosure for evidence of tampering at least once a year.
If the inspection reveals evidence of tampering, the Crypto Officer should return the module to Western Digital.
Figure 6: Tamper Evidence on Tamper Seals
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Cryptographic Module is not designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of the requirements
within FIPS 140-2.
10. Definitions
• Allowed: NIST approved, i.e., recommended in a NIST Special Publication, or acceptable, i.e., no known
security risk as opposed to deprecated, restricted and legacy-use. [SP800 131A] for terms
• Anybody: A formal TCG term for an unauthenticated role. [TCG Core]
• Approved: [FIPS140] approved or recommended in a NIST Special Publication.
• Approved mode of operation: A mode of the Cryptographic Module that employs only approved security
functions. [FIPS140]
• Authenticate: Prove the identity of an Operator or the integrity of an object.
• Authorize: Grant an authenticated Operator access to a service or an object.
• Ciphertext: Encrypted data transformed by an Approved security function.
• Confidentiality: A cryptographic property that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized parties.
• Credential: A formal TCG term for data used to authenticate an Operator. [TCG Core]
• Critical Security Parameter (CSP): Security-related information (e.g., secret and private cryptographic keys,
and authentication data such as credentials and PINs) whose disclosure or modification can compromise the
security of a cryptographic module. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic Boundary: An explicitly defined continuous perimeter that establishes the physical bounds
of a Cryptographic Module and contains all the hardware, software, and/or firmware components of a
cryptographic module. [FIPS140]
• Cryptographic key (Key): An input parameter to an Approved cryptographic algorithm
• Cryptographic Module: The set of hardware, software, and/or firmware used to implement approved
security functions contained within the cryptographic boundary. [FIPS140]
• Crypto Officer: An Operator performing cryptographic initialization and management functions. [FIPS140]
• Data at Rest: User data residing on the storage device media when the storage device is powered off.
• Discovery: A TCG method that provides the properties of the TCG device. [TCG Enterprise]
• Integrity: A cryptographic property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorized
and undetected manner.
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• Interface: A logical entry or exit point of a Cryptographic Module that provides access to the Cryptographic
Module for logical information flows. [FIPS140]
• Key Derivation Function (KDF): An Approved cryptographic algorithm by which one or more keys are
derived from a shared secret and other information.
• Key Encrypting Key (KEK): A cryptographic key that is used to encrypt or decrypt other keys.
• Key management: The activities involving the handling of cryptographic keys and other related security
parameters (e.g., authentication data) during the entire life cycle of the Cryptographic Module.
• Key Wrap: An Approved cryptographic algorithm that uses a KEK to provide Confidentiality and Integrity.
• LBA Band: A formal [TCG Core] term that defines a contiguous logical block range (sequential LBAs) to
store encrypted User Data; bands do not overlap, and each has its own unique encryption key and other
settable properties.
• Manufactured SID (MSID): A unique default value that vendors assign to each SED during manufacturing.
An externally visible MSID value is not required if the user can derive the MSID from other information
printed on the drive. The MSID is readable with the TCG protocol. It is the initial and default value for all
TCG credentials. [TCG Core]
• Method: A TCG command or message. [TCG Core]
• Operator: A consumer, either human or automation, of cryptographic services that is external to the
Cryptographic Module. [FIPS140]
• Personal Identification Number (PIN): A formal TCG term designating a string of octets used to
authenticate an identity. [TCG Core]
• Plaintext: Unencrypted data.
• Port: A physical entry or exit point of a Cryptographic Module that provides access to the Cryptographic
Module for physical signals. [FIPS140]
• PSID (Physical Security Identifier): A SED unique value printed on the Cryptographic Module’s label
used as authentication data and proof of physical presence for the Zeroize service.
• Public Security Parameters (PSP): Public information whose modification can compromise the security of
the Cryptographic Module (e.g., a public key).
• Read Data: An external request to transfer User Data from the SED. [SCSI Block]
• Reserved Area: Private data on the Storage Medium that is not accessible outside the Cryptographic
Boundary.
• Security Identifier (SID): A TCG authority used by the Crypto Officer. [TCG Core]
• Self-Encrypting Drive (SED): A storage device that provides data storage services, which automatically
encrypts all user data written to the device and automatically decrypts all user data read from the device.
• Session: A formal TCG term that envelops the lifetime of an Operator’s authentication. [TCG Core]
• Storage Medium: The non-volatile, persistent storage location of a SED; it is partitioned into two disjoint
sets, a User Data area and a Reserved Area.
• User: An Operator that consumes cryptographic services. [FIPS140]
• User Data: Data transferred from/to a SED using the Read Data and Write Data commands. [SCSI Block]
• Vendor Unique Command: An SCSI command that is available at the discretion of an implementer.
• Write Data: An external request to transfer User Data to a SED. [SCSI Block]
• Zeroize: Invalidate a Critical Security Parameter. [FIPS140]
11. Acronyms
• CO: Crypto Officer [FIPS140]
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• CRC: Cyclic Redundancy Check
• CSP: Critical Security Parameter [FIPS140]
• DRAM: Dynamic Random Access Memory
• DRBG: Deterministic Random Bit Generator
• EDC: Error Detection Code
• EMI: Electromagnetic Interference
• FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard
• HDD: Hard Disk Drive
• KAT: Known Answer Test
• KDF: Key Derivation Function
• LBA: Logical Block Address
• MEK: Media Encryption Key
• MSID: Manufactured Security Identifier
• NDRNG: Non-deterministic Random Number Generator
• NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology
• PIN: Personal Identification Number
• PSID: Physical Security Identifier
• PSP: Public Security Parameter
• SAS: Serial Attached SCSI
• SCSI: Small Computer System Interface
• SED: Self-encrypting Drive
• SID: TCG Security Identifier, the authority representing the Cryptographic Module owner
• SSD: Solid-state Drive
• TCG: Trusted Computing Group
• VUC: Vendor Unique Command
• UEC: Universal Error Code
• XTS: A mode of AES that utilizes "Tweakable" block ciphers
12. References
12.1 NIST Specifications
• [AES] Advanced Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 197, NIST, November 2001
• [DSS] Digital Signature Standard, FIPS PUB 186-4, NIST, July 2013
• [FIPS140] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-2, NIST, December 2002
• [HMAC] The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, FIPS PUB 198-1, July 2008
• [SHA] Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, NIST, August 2015
• [SP800 38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques, NIST,
December 2001
• [SP800 38E] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for
Confidentiality on Storage Devices, NIST, January 2010
• [SP800 38F] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, NIST,
December 2012
• [SP800 57] Recommendation for Key Management – Part I General (Revision 4), NIST, January 2016
• [SP800 88] Guidelines for Media Sanitization, NIST, December 2014
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• [SP800 90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit
Generators (Revision 1), NIST, June 2015
• [SP800 90B] Recommendation for Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, NIST, January 2018
• [SP800 131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths (Revision 2), NIST, March 2019
• [SP800 132] Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, NIST, December 2010
• [SP800 133] Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, NIST (Revision 2), June 2020
12.2 Trusted Computing Group Specifications
• [TCG Core] TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, Version 2.0 Revision 1.0 (April 20, 2009)
• [Enterprise] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Enterprise Specification, Version 1.00 Revision 3.00
(January 10, 2011)
• [TCG App Note] TCG Storage Application Note: Encrypting Storage Devices Compliant with SSC:
Enterprise, Version 1.00 Revision 1.00 Final
• [TCG Opal] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification, Version 2.00 Final Revision 1.00 (February
24, 2012)
• TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification (SIIS), Version 1.02, (2011)
12.3 International Committee on Information Technology Standards T10 Technical Committee
Standards
• [SCSI Core] SCSI Primary Commands (SPC-4)
• [SCSI Block] SCSI Block Commands (SBC-3)
• [SAS] Serial Attached SCSI (SAS-3)
• [SFSC] Security Features for SCSI Commands
12.4 Documents
• [Product Specification] Hard Disk Drive Specification Ultrastar™ DC HC310 3.5 inch Serial Attached SCSI
Hard Disk Drive, August 2018, https://www.westerndigital.com/products/data-center-drives/ultrastar-dc-
hc300-series-hdd
• [Product Specification] Hard Disk Drive Specification Ultrastar™ DC HC320 3.5 inch Serial Attached SCSI
Hard Disk Drive , August 2018, https://www.westerndigital.com/products/data-center-drives/ultrastar-dc-
hc300-series-hdd
• [Product Manual] Ultrastar® DC HC330 3.5 inch Serial Attached SCSI Hard Disk Drive Product Manual ,
October 2019, 2679-810033-A01, https://www.westerndigital.com/products/data-center-drives/ultrastar-dc-
hc300-series-hdd
• [Datasheet] Ultrastar® DC HC310 Datasheet, (July 2018), https://www.westerndigital.com/products/data-
center-drives/ultrastar-dc-hc300-series-hdd
• [Datasheet] Ultrastar® DC HC320 Datasheet, (June 2018), https://www.westerndigital.com/products/data-
center-drives/ultrastar-dc-hc300-series-hdd
• [Datasheet] Ultrastar® DC HC330 Datasheet, (August 2019),
https://www.westerndigital.com/products/data-center-drives/ultrastar-dc-hc300-series-hdd
• [D&O] Delivery & Operation (Crypto Officer) Manual, Version: 0.12 (January 7, 2017)
12.5 SCSI Commands
Table 15 - SCSI Commands
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Description Code Description Code
FORMAT UNIT 04h RESERVE 16h
INQUIRY 12h RESERVE 56h
LOG SELECT 4Ch REZERO UNIT 01h
LOG SENSE 4Dh SANITIZE 48h
MODE SELECT 15h SEEK (6) 0Bh
MODE SELECT 55h SEEK (10) 2Bh
MODE SENSE 1Ah SEND DIAGNOSTIC 1Dh
MODE SENSE 5Ah SET DEVICE IDENTIFIER A4h/06h
PERSISTENT RESERVE IN 5Eh START STOP UNIT 1Bh
PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT 5Fh SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (10) 35h
PRE-FETCH (16) 90h SYNCHRONIZE CACHE (16) 91h
PRE-FETCH (10) 34h TEST UNIT READY 00h
READ (6) 08h UNMAP 42h
READ (10) 28h VERIFY (10) 2Fh
READ (12) A8h VERIFY (12) AFh
READ (16) 88h VERIFY (16) 8Fh
READ (32) 7Fh/09h VERIFY (32) 7Fh/0Ah
READ BUFFER 3Ch WRITE (6) 0Ah
READ CAPACITY (10) 25h WRITE (10) 2Ah
READ CAPACITY (16) 9Eh/10h WRITE (12) AAh
READ DEFECT DATA 37h WRITE (16) 8Ah
READ DEFECT DATA B7h WRITE (32) 7Fh/0Bh
READ LONG (16) 9Eh/11h WRITE AND VERIFY (10) 2Eh
READ LONG 3Eh WRITE AND VERIFY (12) AEh
REASSIGN BLOCKS 07h WRITE AND VERIFY (16) 8Eh
RECEIVE DIAGNOSTICS RESULTS 1Ch WRITE AND VERIFY (32) 7Fh/0Ch
RELEASE 17h WRITE BUFFER 3Bh
RELEASE 57h WRITE LONG (10) 3Fh
REPORT DEVICE IDENTIFIER A3h/05h WRITE LONG (16) 9Fh/11h
REPORT LUNS A0h WRITE SAME (10) 41h
REPORT SUPPORTED OPERATION CODES A3h/0Ch WRITE SAME (16) 93h
REPORT SUPPORTED TASK
MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
A3h/0Dh WRITE SAME (32) 7Fh/0Dh
REQUEST SENSE 03h