FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy: AWS Key Management Service HSM
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FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
AWS Key Management Service HSM
(Hardware version 2.0, firmware versions 1.6.109, 1.6.163 and 1.6.165)
Document Version 1.08
January 5, 2022
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................4
1.1 About FIPS 140 .............................................................................................................................................4
1.2 About this Document....................................................................................................................................4
1.3 External Resources .......................................................................................................................................4
1.4 Notices..........................................................................................................................................................5
1.5 Acronyms......................................................................................................................................................5
2 AWS Key Management Service HSM .............................................................................................................7
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification ............................................................................................................7
2.1.1 Validation Level Detail .............................................................................................................................8
2.1.2 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms .......................................................................................................9
2.1.3 Non-Approved but Allowed Algorithms.................................................................................................11
2.2 Module Interfaces ......................................................................................................................................12
2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication ...........................................................................................................12
2.3.1 Strength of Authentication ....................................................................................................................13
2.3.2 Cryptographic Services and Descriptions...............................................................................................13
2.3.3 Configuration Services and Descriptions ...............................................................................................21
2.3.4 Audit Log Services and Descriptions......................................................................................................30
2.3.5 Show Status ...........................................................................................................................................30
2.3.6 Zeroization.............................................................................................................................................31
2.4 Physical Security.........................................................................................................................................31
2.5 Operational Environment...........................................................................................................................31
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management ...............................................................................................................31
2.6.1 Critical Security Parameters...................................................................................................................31
2.6.2 Public Keys .............................................................................................................................................38
2.7 Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................................38
2.7.1 Power-On Self-Tests...............................................................................................................................38
2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests ............................................................................................................................39
2.7.3 On-demand Self-Tests............................................................................................................................39
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks .......................................................................................................................39
3 Guidance and Secure Operation..................................................................................................................40
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance .............................................................................................................................40
3.1.1 Module Inspection.................................................................................................................................40
3.1.2 Initial Configuration ...............................................................................................................................40
3.2 User Guidance ............................................................................................................................................41
3.2.1 General Guidance ..................................................................................................................................41
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms......................................................................................................................................6
Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section...........................................................................................................8
Table 3 - FIPS-Approved Algorithms and Certificate Numbers....................................................................................10
Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation..........................................................11
Table 5 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms ...............................................................................11
Table 6 – Interface Descriptions..................................................................................................................................12
Table 7 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping ............................................................................................12
Table 8 – Roles and Authentication.............................................................................................................................13
Table 9 - Cryptographic Services and Descriptions......................................................................................................21
Table 10 - Configuration Services and Descriptions ....................................................................................................29
Table 11 – Audit Log Services and Descriptions ..........................................................................................................30
Table 12 - Status Services and Descriptions ................................................................................................................30
Table 13 – Module Keys/CSPs......................................................................................................................................37
Table 14 – Public Keys .................................................................................................................................................38
Table 15 – Power-On Self-Tests...................................................................................................................................39
Table 16 – Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................................................39
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Cryptographic Module Boundary..................................................................................................................7
Figure 2 – Tamper Evidence Label Locations...............................................................................................................40
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1 Introduction
1.1 About FIPS 140
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive
but Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian
Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140-2
program. The National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accredits independent
testing labs to perform FIPS 140-2 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS 140-2
requirements. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS
140-2 criteria.
More information is available on the CMVP website at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
1.2 About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the AWS Key Management Service (KMS)
Hardware Security Module (HSM) from Amazon Web Services (AWS) provides an overview of the HSM
and a high-level description of how it meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2. This document
contains details on the module’s cryptographic keys and critical security parameters. This Security Policy
concludes with instructions and guidance on running the module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation.
AWS Key Management Service HSM may also be referred to as the “module” in this document.
The AWS Key Management Service HSM is used exclusively by AWS as a component of the AWS Key
Management Service (KMS). The module is not directly accessible to customers of KMS. The
cryptographic functions of the module are used to fulfill requests under specific public AWS KMS APIs.
1.3 External Resources
The AWS website (http://aws.amazon.com/kms/) contains information on AWS services that utilizes the
module. The list of public AWS KMS APIs is found on the AWS documentation website
(http://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/APIReference/Welcome.html).
The Cryptographic Module Validation Program website contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and
AWS contact information.
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1.4 Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
1.5 Acronyms
Table 1 defines acronyms found in this document:
Acronym Term
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
AWS Amazon Web Services
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CDK Customer Data Key
CMK Customer Master Key
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CCCS Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CSK Customer Supplied Key
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter
DH Diffie-Hellman
DK Domain Key
DKEK Domain Key Encryption Key
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Codebook
EC Elliptic Curve
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GMAC Galois Message Authentication Code
HBK HSM Backing Key
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
HOSK HSM-to-Operator Session Key
HSK HSM Signature Key Pair
HSKEK HSM Session Key Encryption Key
HSM Hardware Security Module
IPMI Intelligent Platform Management Interface
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Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KAT Known Answer Test
KBKDF Key Based Key Derivation Function
KDF Key Derivation Function
KMS Key Management Service
KTS Key Transport Scheme
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD Message Digest
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NMI Non-Maskable Interrupt
OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
QOEAK Operator Ephemeral Agreement Public Key
QOS Operator Signature Public Key
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SP Special Publication
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2 AWS Key Management Service HSM
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification
AWS customers can use the AWS Key Management Service to generate and manage cryptographic keys
and operate as a cryptographic service provider for protecting data within AWS. The AWS Key
Management Service HSM provides dedicated cryptographic functions for the AWS Key Management
Service.
The module runs firmware version 1.6.109, 1.6.163 or 1.6.165 on hardware version 2.0 and is classified
as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The physical cryptographic boundary is defined as the
module case, and the module runs on a non-modifiable operating environment.
Figure 1 – Cryptographic Module Boundary
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2.1.1 Validation Level Detail
Table 2 lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:
FIPS 140-2 Section Title Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 2
Physical Security 3
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 2
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility 2
Self-Tests 2
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section
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2.1.2 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module’s cryptographic algorithm implementations have received the following certificate numbers
from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP). Although additional modes and key
lengths were included in the CAVP algorithm testing, the table below represents the actual modes and
key lengths used by the services of the module.
CAVP Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode/Method
Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli Use
4527 AES FIPS 197
SP 800-38A
ECB, CBC, CTR 128, 256 Encryption,
Decryption
4527 GCM/GMAC1
SP 800-38D AES 128, 256 Generation,
Authentication,
Encryption,
Decryption
4527 KTS SP 800-38F
IG D.9
AES KWP
AES GCM
256 Key Transport using
AES KWP, Key
Transport using AES
GCM
1487 DRBG SP 800-90A CTR DRBG 256 Random Bit
Generation
1102
1209 (CVL)
ECDSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation
Component, Key Pair
Generation, Signature
Generation, Signature
Verification, Public Key
Validation
P-256, P-384,
P-521
Digital Signature
Services
2987 HMAC FIPS 198-1 SHA-256 256 Generation,
Authentication
133 KBKDF, using
Pseudorandom
Functions
SP 800-108 Counter Mode HMAC-based KDF
with SHA-256
1
The AES GCM IV is generated internally in the cryptographic module using the module's Approved NIST SP 800-
90A DRBG and the IV length used is at least 96 bits (per SP 800-38D and IG A.5 Scenario 2).
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CAVP Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode/Method
Key Lengths,
Curves or
Moduli Use
2464
1208 (CVL)
RSA FIPS 186-4 2048, 3072 and
40962
bits
Key Pair
Generation,
Signature
Generation,
Signature
Verification,
Component Test
3708 SHA FIPS 180-4 SHA-256, SHA-384 -- Digital Signature
Generation, Digital
Signature
Verification, non-
Digital Signature
Applications
Table 3 - FIPS-Approved Algorithms and Certificate Numbers
The following Approved cryptographic algorithms were tested with vendor affirmation.
Algorithm IG Reference Use
KTS Vendor Affirmed IG
D.4
[SP 800-56B, Section 9]
Optional RSA encapsulation schemes for protecting
keys that customers import into AWS KMS.
Section 9.2: RSA-OAEP with, and without key
confirmation
Key sizes: 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits
Section 9.3: Hybrid Key-Transport scheme
incorporating KTS-OAEP and SP 800-38F
2
RSA 4096 was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per IG A.14, because RSA SigGen /
SigVer were tested in accordance with FIPS 186-4 for the 2048 and 3072 bit modulus sizes, and testing for modulus
sizes higher than 3072 is not available under CAVS.
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Algorithm IG Reference Use
KAS-SSC Vendor Affirmed IG
D.8 Scenario X1 and
IG D.1rev3
[SP 800-56Arev3]
(Cofactor) Ephemeral Unified and (Cofactor) One-
Pass Diffie-Hellman schemes without key
confirmation
P-384 Domain Parameter selection according to FIPS
186-4
Full Public Key Validation
KDA Vendor Affirmed IG
D.10
[SP 800-56Crev1]
One-step key derivation
SHA-384
CKG Vendor Affirmed IG
D.12
[SP 800-133rev2, Section 5]
Seeding for asymmetric key generation uses
unmodified DRBG output
[SP 800-133rev2, Section 6.1]
Symmetric key generation uses unmodified DRBG
output
Table 4 – Approved Cryptographic Functions Tested with Vendor Affirmation
2.1.3 Non-Approved but Allowed Algorithms
The module supports the following non-FIPS 140-2 approved but allowed algorithms that may be used in
the Approved mode of operation.
Algorithm Use
RSA Key Transport with PKCS #1
v1.5
[IG D.9]
Optional RSA encapsulation scheme for protecting keys that customers
import into AWS KMS.
Key sizes: 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits (key wrapping; key establishment
methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
ECDSA secp256k1 [IG A.2]
Curves: secp256k1; ECDSA (signature generation and verification;
provides 128 bits of security strength);
NDRNG Provides seeding material for the DRBG. The NDRNG provides a minimum
of 384 bits of entropy.
Table 5 – Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms
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2.2 Module Interfaces
Table 6 describes the main interfaces of the module:
Physical Interface Description / Use
10 Gigabit Ethernet Port Main session interface for cryptographic services
IPMI / Gigabit Ethernet Port Provides serial console access to query power on / off, control input, and status
output.
Power Interface Accept and provide power to the module
Power Button / Indicator Turns the module on or off
Reset Button / Indicator Restarts the module. The Reset Indicator is always on.
NMI Button / Indicator Log hardware status information, such as fan speed and temperature to the IPMI
system event log. The NMI Indicator is always on.
Table 6 – Interface Descriptions
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to four FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input,
data output, control input, and status output. The logical interfaces and their mapping are provided in
the following table:
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Module Physical Interface
Data Input 10 Gigabit Ethernet Port
Data Output 10 Gigabit Ethernet Port
Control Input 10 Gigabit Ethernet Port
IPMI / Gigabit Ethernet Port
Power Button / Indicator
Reset Button / Indicator
NMI Button / Indicator
Status Output 10 Gigabit Ethernet Port
IPMI / Gigabit Ethernet Port
Power Button / Indicator
Reset Button / Indicator
NMI Button / Indicator
Power Power Plug
Table 7 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping
2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication
Operators of the module may assume the following three roles:
Roles Description Authentication
KMS Front End Role
(KMS-FE)
The KMS front end hosts perform actions on
behalf of customers of AWS KMS.
RSA 2048, 4096 or ECDSA P384
KMS Coordinator
Role (KMS-C)
Non-public facing KMS hosts perform actions on
behalf of KMS administrators in the Administrator
Role.
RSA 2048, 4096 or ECDSA P384
Administrator Role
(Admin)
Employees of AWS who are authorized to manage
the module.
RSA 2048, 4096 or ECDSA P384
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Table 8 – Roles and Authentication
For FIPS purposes, the KMS Coordinator and Administrator roles serve as the Cryptographic Officer role
per FIPS 140-2 requirements. The KMS-Front End role serves as the User role per FIPS 140-2
requirements.
The module supports identity-based authentication, and the respective services for each role are
described in the following sections. The module does not support a Maintenance role.
Services supported by the module may also be referred to as APIs in this document.
The module supports authentication using RSA with 2048 and 4096 bit keys, and ECDSA with P-384.
Operators of the module are identified by unique Operator Signature Public Key (QOS). The list of
operator keys and the role of each operator are configured using either the Initialize or
InitializeAndCreateDomain service. Operators interact with the module by submitting digitally sign
commands to the module. The module authenticates operators by verifying the digitally signed
commands submitted to the module.
The list of services supported by the module are listed in Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11. Unless
otherwise specified, access to services can be configured to require one or more members of one or
more roles listed in Table 8. These services are used only by components of KMS to fulfill requests under
specific public AWS KMS APIs and cannot be used directly by KMS customers. See
http://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/APIReference/Welcome.html for a list of the current public
AWS KMS APIs.
2.3.1 Strength of Authentication
Authentication to the module requires RSA or ECDSA signature verification. These authentication
methods are cryptographically strong. The possibility of a single random authentication attempt
succeeding is far less than the required minimum of less than 1/1,000,000.
The possibility of a random authentication succeeding within a one-minute period is significantly less
than 1/100,000. The cryptographic strengths of the digital signatures used for authentication create
such difficulty in achieving a successful random authentication attempt that even the theoretical
maximum bandwidth of the 10 Gb/second Ethernet port is not significant to allow enough attempts in a
one-minute period.
2.3.2 Cryptographic Services and Descriptions
For all cryptographic services in this section, all key/CSP input and output are encrypted using the HSM-
to-Operator Session Key (HOSK) using 256 bit AES GCM. The use of the HOSK provides transport security
between the HSM and other KMS Operators (as defined in section 2.3 above).
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Create KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Generates and encrypts either an HSM Backing Key (HBK) or an Import Wrapping
Key (IWK) private key.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: The Create API returns either:
• A HSM Backing Key encrypted with the active Domain Key (DKn), or
• An Import Wrapping Key (IWK) key pair.
a. The IWK private key is encrypted with the active Domain Key (DKn).
b. The IWK public key.
Key/CSP Generated:
• HSM Backing Key
• IWK public and private keys
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active Domain Key (DKn)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The Create API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session
Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator.
The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
ImportKey KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Decrypts a Customer Supplied Key (CSK) and re-encrypts it with the active
Domain Key (DKn)
Key/CSP Input:
• The private key of an Import Wrapping Key Pair (IWK) encrypted with the
active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• Customer Supplied Key (CSK), encrypted with the public key of the Import
Wrapping Key. This may use the wrapping methods as defined in section 9.2
or 9.3 of SP 800-56B, using the ephemeral Import Wrapping Envelope Key
(IWEK).
Key/CSP Output: The Customer Supplied Key, encrypted with the current active
domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of Domain Key (DKn or DKn-1) used to encrypt the
IWK private key
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The ImportKey API validates the HSM-to-Operator
Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated
operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
RefreshKey KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Re-encrypts an HSM Backing Key (HBK) key or Customer Supplied Key (CSK)
encrypted with a recent iteration of the domain key (DKn-1) with the active
domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Input: HBK or CSK encrypted with a recent iteration of a Domain Key
(DKn-1)
Key/CSP Output: HBK or CSK encrypted with the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of Domain Key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The RefreshKey API validates the HSM-to-Operator
Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated
operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
Encrypt KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Encrypt an arbitrary set of bytes using the DEK derived from the provided HBK or
CSK.
Key/CSP Input: A HBK or CSK encrypted with the active or a recent iteration of
domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
Key/CSP Output: N/A (encrypted ciphertext)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of Domain Key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The Encrypt API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session
Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator.
The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
Decrypt KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Decrypts ciphertext using the DEK derived from the provided HBK or CSK.
Key/CSP Input:
• A HBK or CSK encrypted with a Domain Key (DKn)
• Ciphertext or encrypted Customer Data Key (CDK)
Key/CSP Output: Arbitrary data or CDK encrypted using the HOSK
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Additional Information: The Decrypt API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session
Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator.
The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
ReEncrypt KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Decrypts ciphertext using the DEK derived from the provided HBK or CSK, then
re-encrypts the resulting plaintext under the DEK from a separately provided HBK
or CSK. This operation does not expose the plaintext.
Key/CSP Input:
• A HBK or CSK encrypted with the active or a recent iteration of domain
key (DKn or DKn-1) used to decrypt the provided ciphertext
• A HBK or CSK encrypted with the active or a recent iteration of domain
key (DKn or DKn-1) used to encrypt the resulting plaintext
• Ciphertext or encrypted Customer Data Key (CDK)
Key/CSP Output: N/A (encrypted ciphertext)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of Domain Key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The ReEncrypt API validates the HSM-to-Operator
Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated
operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
Sign KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Performs an ECDSA or RSA sign operation, or HMAC-SHA256 operation using the
provided HBK or CSK
Key/CSP Input: HBK or CSK encrypted with the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The Sign API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session Key
(HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator. The
HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
Verify KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Performs an ECDSA or RSA verify, or HMAC-SHA256 operation using the provided
HBK or CSK
Key/CSP Input: HBK or CSK encrypted with the active domain key (DKn)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The Verify API validates the HSM-to-Operator Session
Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated operator.
The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
EncryptRand
omBytes
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Generate a number of random bytes and encrypt it using the DEK derived from
the specified HBK or CSK. The random bytes may be used as cryptographic key
material as Customer Data Keys (CDK).
Key/CSP Input: HBK or CSK encrypted by the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Output: A number of random bytes that may be used as Customer Data
Keys (CDK) encrypted by the HBK or CSK.
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The EncryptRandomBytes API validates the HSM-to-
Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an
authenticated operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output
parameters.
GenerateAnd
EncryptRand
omBytes
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Generate a number of random bytes for use and encrypt it using the DEK derived
from the specified HBK or CSK. The random bytes may be used as cryptographic
key material as Customer Data Keys (CDK). Note that the
GenerateAndEncryptRandomBytes API will return encrypted versions of the
random bytes in 2 forms.
Key/CSP Input: HBK or CSK encrypted by the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Output:
• A number of random bytes that may be used as Customer Data Keys (CDK)
encrypted by the HOSK
• A number of random bytes that may be used as Customer Data Keys (CDK)
encrypted by the HBK or CSK.
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Additional Information: The GenerateAndEncryptRandomBytes API validates the
HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an
authenticated operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output
parameters.
GenerateDat
aKeyPair
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Generate an asymmetric key pair and encrypt it with the specified HBK or CSK.
The asymmetric key pair will be used as cryptographic key material as Customer
Data Keys (CDK). Note that the GenerateDataKeyPair API will return encrypted
versions of the CDK in 2 forms.
Key/CSP Input: HBK or CSK encrypted by the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Output:
• An asymmetric Customer Data Key (CDK) private key encrypted by the HOSK
• An asymmetric Customer Data Key (CDK) private key encrypted by the HBK
or CSK
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The GenerateDataKeyPair API validates the HSM-to-
Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an
authenticated operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output
parameters.
GenerateDat
aKeyPairWith
outPlaintext
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Generate an asymmetric key pair and encrypt it with the specified HBK or CSK.
The asymmetric key pair will be used as cryptographic key material as Customer
Data Keys (CDK).
Key/CSP Input: HBK or CSK encrypted by the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Output:
• An asymmetric Customer Data Key (CDK) private key encrypted by the HBK
or CSK
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The GenerateDataKeyPairWithoutPlaintext API validates
the HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from
an authenticated operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output
parameters.
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Generate KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Generate a specified number of random bytes, up to 1024 bytes.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The Generate API validates the HSM-to-Operator
Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an authenticated
operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output parameters.
GetParamete
rsForReplicat
ion
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
This API generates a new Replication Agreement Key Pair (dRAK1, QRAK1). The
Private Replication Agreement Key (dRAK1) is encrypted with the domain key
(DKn).
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output:
• Public Replication Agreement Key (QRAK1)
• Private Replication Agreement Key (dRAK1) encrypted by the active domain
key (DKn)
Key/CSP Generated:
• Replication Agreement Key Pair (dRAK1, QRAK1)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• Active or a recent iteration of a Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn or
dRSKn-1)
Additional Information: The GetParametersForReplication API validates the
HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an
authenticated operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output
parameters.
The API also signs all output with the Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn or
dRSKn-1).
WrapKeyFor
Replication
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
This API takes an an input a public Replication Agreement Key (QRAK1) generated
from an HSM, and generates a new Replication Agreement Key pair (dRAK2,
QRAK2). QRAK1 and dRAK2 are combined using the Diffie-Hellmann key exchange
to produce a shared secret and derive a symmetric secret key (the Replication
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Wrapping Key, RWK). The RWK is then used to encrypt an HBK, resulting in a
Customer Replicated Key (CRK).
Key/CSP Input:
• Public Replication Agreement Key (QRAK1)
• HBK encrypted by the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Generated:
• Replication Agreement Key Pair (dRAK2, QRAK2)
Key/CSP Output:
• Public Replication Agreement Key (QRAK2)
• Customer Replicated Key (CRK) encrypted by the Replication Wrapping Key
(RWK)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• Active or a recent iteration of the Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn or
dRSKn-1)
• Active or a recent iteration of the Public Replication Singing Key (QRSKn or
QRSKn-1)
Additional Information: The WrapKeyForReplication API validates the HSM-to-
Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an
authenticated operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output
parameters.
The API also verifies input using the Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn or
QRSKn-1), and signs all output with the Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn or
dRSKn-1).
ImportReplic
atedKey
KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
This API combines two Replication Agreement Key (dRAK1 and QRAK2) using the
Diffie-Hellmann key exchange to produce a shared secret and derive a
Replication Wrapping Key (RWK). The RWK is used to decrypt the Customer
Replicated Key (CRK), obtaining an HBK, which is then re-encrypted using the
Domain Key (DKn).
Key/CSP Input:
• Private Replication Agreement Key (dRAK1) encrypted by the active domain
key (DKn)
• Public Replication Agreement Key (QRAK2)
• Customer Supplied Key (CSK) encrypted by the Replication Wrapping Key
(RWK)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Key/CSP Output:
• HBK encrypted by the active domain key (DKn)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• Active or a recent iteration of the Public Replication Singing Key (QRSKn or
QRSKn-1)
Additional Information: The ImportReplicatedKey API validates the HSM-to-
Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an
authenticated operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output
parameters.
The API also validates input using the Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn or
QRSKn-1).
Table 9 - Cryptographic Services and Descriptions
2.3.3 Configuration Services and Descriptions
HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
CreateDomain KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
Creates a new domain token for a new domain, but does not join the HSM to the
domain yet.
Key/CSP Input:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
Key/CSP Generated:
• HSM Signature Key Pair (HSK)
• HSM Agreement Key Pair (HAK)
• Initial Domain Key (DK0)
• Replication Signing Key (dRSK0, QRSK0)
Key/CSP Output: A Domain Token containing:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Initial Domain Key (DK0)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSK0)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSK0)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Key/CSP Read Access: None
IngestDomain KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
Joins a domain or receive an updated domain token.
Key/CSP Input: A Domain Token containing the following CSPs:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Domain Keys (DKn)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Key/CSP Generated: None
Key/CSP Output: The unmodified input Domain Token
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM Signature Public Key (QHSK) of a known member of the domain
• HSM Agreement Private Key (dHAK)
• Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
Key/CSP Write Access:
• Domain Key (DKn)
• Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Additional Information: When using the IngestDomain API to set up the first
domain member, the operator(s) must meet the quorum configuration in the to-
be-ingested domain. When using the IngestDomain API to ingest subsequent
domains, the operator(s) must meet the quorum configuration in both the first
domain, and in the to-be-ingested domain.
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
ForgetDomain KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
Deletes domain information as it pertains to a particular domain on the module
including all Domain Keys (DKn, DKn-1), effectively leaving the domain.
Key/CSP Input: A Domain Token containing the following CSPs:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Domain Keys (DKn)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Key/CSP Output: The unmodified input Domain Token
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Domain Key (DKn)
• Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
Key/CSP De-Referenced:
• Domain Key (DKn)
• Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
GetDomain KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
Retrieves the current version of the domain token for a specified domain.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: A Domain Token containing:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Domain Keys (DKn)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Domain Key (DKn)
• Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
ChangeDomain KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
Modifies the current state of an operational domain.
Key/CSP Input:
• A Domain Token containing:
o List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
o List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the
domain
o List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of
the domain
o Encrypted Domain Keys (DKn)
o Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
o Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
o Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
• HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) and HSM Key Agreement Public Keys
(QHAK) of the domain members to be added (optional)
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS) (optional)
• List of Public Replication Signing Keys (QRSKm, …, QRSKn) (optional)
Key/CSP Generated:
• Domain Key Encrypting Key (DKEK)
• HSM Ephemeral Agreement Key (dE, QE)
Key/CSP Output: An updated Domain Token containing the following CSPs:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Domain Keys (DKn)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Key/CSP Read Access: Domain Key (DKn), HSM Agreement Key (HAK), HSM
Signature Key (HSK)
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Initialize All /
unauthenticated
Initializes the HSM by generating the HSM Signature Key and HSM Agreement
Key and configuring the HSM’s operator and access control using a domain token
from another HSM.
The Initialize API is only used during the module setup and initialization process.
If the HSM is already initialized by a call to either the Initialize or
InitializeAndCreateDomain API, the Initialize API will return an error as the HSM
cannot be Initialized again without a reboot.
Key/CSP Input: One or more Domain Tokens. Each Domain Token contains:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Domain Keys (DKn)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Key/CSP Generated:
• HSM Signature Key (HSK)
• HSM Agreement Key (HAK)
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: None
Key/CSP Write Access:
• HSM Signature Key (HSK)
• HSM Agreement Key (HAK)
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
• Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
Additional Information: The Initialize API is unauthenticated. Initialize will fail if
the HSM is already initialized by a call to either the Initialize or
InitializeAndCreateDomain API.
InitializeAndCre
ateDomain
All /
unauthenticated
Initializes the HSM by generating the HSM Signature Key and HSM Agreement
Key, configuring the list of operators, roles and the quorum-based access control
ruleset for all services / APIs.
The InitializeAndCreateDomain API is only used during the module setup and
initialization process. If the HSM is already initialized by a call to either the
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Initialize or InitializeAndCreateDomain API, the InitializeAndCreateDomain API
will return an error as the HSM cannot be Initialized again without a reboot.
Key/CSP Input:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
Key/CSP Generated:
• HSM Signature Key Pair (HSK)
• HSM Agreement Key Pair (HAK)
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
• Initial Domain Key (DK0)
Key/CSP Output: A Domain Token containing:
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
• List of HSM Signature Public Keys (QHSK) of all members of the domain
• List of HSM Key Agreement Public Keys (QHAK) of all members of the domain
• Encrypted Initial Domain Key (DK0)
• Encrypted Domain Key Encryption Key (DKEK)
• Encrypted Private Replication Signing Key (dRSKn)
• Public Replication Signing Key (QRSKn)
Key/CSP Read Access: None
Key/CSP Write Access:
• HSM Signature Key (HSK)
• HSM Agreement Key (HAK)
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
• List of Operator Signature Public Keys (QOS)
Additional Information: The InitializeAndCreateDomain API is unauthenticated.
The InitializeAndCreateDomain API will fail if the HSM is already initialized by a
call to either the Initialize or InitializeAndCreateDomain API.
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
Attest KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
The Attest API is used by operators to attest an initialized HSM to ensure that the
system is running the correct software, and to obtain an authentic copy of its
credentials prior to being added to a domain.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output:
• HSM Signature Public Key (QHSK)
• HSM Agreement Public Key (QHAK)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM Signature Key Pair (dHSK, QHSK)
• Host Agreement Public Key (QHAK)
• Operator Signature Public Key(s) (QOS)
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: If an optional attestation challenge is included in the
request, the Attest API requires the use of the HSM-to-Operator Session Key
(HOSK) to encrypt all input and output parameters.
GetAttestationC
hallenge
KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
The GetAttestationChallenge API is used by operators to retrieve a token that can
be used to validate the identity of another HSM.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None.
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Active or a recent iteration of domain key (DKn or DKn-1)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The GetAttestationChallenge API validates the HSM-to-
Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an
authenticated operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output
parameters.
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
GetAttestationI
dentity
KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
The GetAttestationIdentity API is used by operators to retrieve information to
attest the identity of the HSM.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access:
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
• HSM-to-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Additional Information: The GetAttestationIdentity API validates the HSM-to-
Operator Session Key (HOSK) to authenticate the call originates from an
authenticated operator. The HOSK is also used to encrypt all input and output
parameters.
Wipe All /
unauthenticated
The Wipe API will delete the HSM Signature Key and HSM Agreement Key from
volatile memory. The Wipe API will fail unless all previously created domains in
the module have been deleted using the ForgetDomain API.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: None
Key/CSP De-Referenced:
• HSM Signature Key Pair (HSK)
• HSM Agreement Key Pair (HAK)
• HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
Additional Information: This call is unauthenticated.
GetInitialDomai
nName
All /
unauthenticated
Retrieves the initial domain name from an initialized HSM that is used as part of
the domain creation bootstrap process.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: No access to Keys/CSPs.
Additional Information: This call is unauthenticated.
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HSM Service
(API)
Roles Description
DeactivateAndR
eboot
(This service
also performs
the self-tests to
run after the
module is
rebooted)
All /
unauthenticated
The DeactivateAndReboot API returns the HSM to the factory state and reboots
after verifying the HSM Signature Key and HSM Agreement Key have been
deleted by the Wipe API.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: No access to Keys/CSPs.
Additional Information: This call is unauthenticated.
NegotiateSessio
nKey
One member from
any role
Uses a set of identity keys to securely negotiate a session key that can be used
between a KMS host and any HSM in the domain. The NegotiateSessionKey API
will return encrypted versions of the HSM-Operator Session Key (HOSK) in 2
forms.
Key/CSP Input:
• Operator Ephemeral Agreement Public Key (QOEAK)
Key/CSP Generated:
• HSM Ephemeral Agreement Key Pair (dE, QE)
• HSM-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
Key/CSP Output:
• Encrypted HSM-Operator Session Key (HOSK) encrypted with the Domain
Key (DK) or HSM Session Key Encryption Key (HSKEK)
• HSM-Operator Session Key (HOSK) encrypted with a 256 bit key derived from
the shared secret established using elliptic curve Diffie Hellman key
exchange (NIST-P384) using the HSM Ephemeral Agreement Key (QE) and
the Operator Ephemeral Agreement Public Key (QOEAK).
• HSM Ephemeral Agreement Public Key (QE)
Key/CSP Read Access:
• Operator Signature Public Key (QOS)
• HSM Signature Key (dHSK)
Key/CSP Write Access:
• HSM-Operator Session Key (HOSK)
UpdateHostCon
figuration
KMS Front End,
KMS Coordinator,
Administrators
Allows updates of non-security-relevant host configuration.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: Operator Signature Public Key (QOS)
Table 10 - Configuration Services and Descriptions
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2.3.4 Audit Log Services and Descriptions
Service (API) Role Description
ListLogs KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Returns a list of audit log file names.
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: Operator Signature Public Key (QOS)
GetLog KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Retrieves specified audit log files
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: Operator Signature Public Key (QOS)
DeleteLog KMS Front End, KMS
Coordinator,
Administrators
Deletes specified audit log file
Key/CSP Input: None
Key/CSP Output: None
Key/CSP Read Access: Operator Signature Public Key (QOS)
Table 11 – Audit Log Services and Descriptions
2.3.5 Show Status
The module supports the following APIs to return status information.
Status Service
(API)
Description
Ping Returns “healthy” if the module is initialized and has ingested a domain
Returns “failure” otherwise
Additional Information: This call is unauthenticated.
Fips Returns “healthy” if the module is operating in FIPS mode
Returns “failure” if the module is not operating in FIPS mode
Additional Information: This call is unauthenticated.
Table 12 - Status Services and Descriptions
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In addition, an operator with access to the serial console can obtain hardware status information such as
temperature, fan speed, etc.
2.3.6 Zeroization
Zeroization is accomplished by powering off the module.
2.4 Physical Security
The module is a multiple-chip standalone module and conforms to Level 3 requirements for physical
security. The module’s production-grade enclosure is made of a hard metal, and the enclosure contains
a removable cover. The baffles installed by AWS satisfy FIPS 140-2 requirements for module opacity, and
an internal tamper switch zeroizes CSPs at power on / power off when triggered, satisfying Level 3
requirements.
2.5 Operational Environment
The module operates in a non-modifiable operational environment.
The module meets Federal Communications Commission (FCC) FCC Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)
and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for business use as defined by 47 Code of
Federal Regulations, Part15, Subpart B.
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management
2.6.1 Critical Security Parameters
Table 13 provides a complete list of Critical Security Parameters used within the module. All keys and
CSPs are zeroized by powering off the module.
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Keys and
CSPs
Key Description Algorithm
and Key
Size
Generation Input / Output Method Storage
HSM
Backing Key
(HBK)
HSM Backing Keys (HBK)
can be of two different
forms – symmetric or
asymmetric keys.
The first form is a 256-bit
master key, from which
specific-use keys may be
derived using the SP800-
108 CTR key derivation
function. The HBK or keys
derived from the HBK are
used to encrypt CDKs.
The second form is an
asymmetric private key.
The HBK maps to the
Customer Master Key
construct exposed in the
public AWS KMS API.
AES GCM
256 bits
RSA: 2048,
3072, or
4096 bits
ECDSA:
curves P-
256, P-384,
P-521, or
secp256k1
Internally
using DRBG,
or imported
from another
member of a
Domain
Input: Encrypted with the
Domain Key using AES GCM.
Output: Encrypted with the
Domain Key using AES GCM.
Volatile
memory
only
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Keys and
CSPs
Key Description Algorithm
and Key
Size
Generation Input / Output Method Storage
Customer
Data Key
(CDK)
Customer data keys are
exported by the
EncryptRandomBytes,
GenerateAndEncryptRando
mBytes,
GenerateDataKeyPair, and
GenerateDataKeyPairWitho
utPlaintext APIs.
Customer Data Keys (CDK)
can be of two different
forms – symmetric and
asymmetric keys.
The use of CDKs are
unknown to the module.
The customer may obtain
the CDK by sending the
encrypted CDK to KMS to
decrypt under an
authenticated and
authorized request.
For
symmetric
keys,
random
bits length
specified
by
customer
(in the
range of 8
bits to
65536
bits).
For RSA:
2048,
3072, or
4096 bits
For ECDSA:
curves P-
256, P-384,
P-521, or
secp256k1
Internally
using DRBG
or imported
from another
member of a
Domain
Input: Encrypted using AES
GCM with the DEK derived
from an HBK or CSK.
Output: Encrypted in 2 forms
by the
GenerateAndEncryptRandomB
ytes and GenerateDataKeyPair
APIs:
• Encrypted with the DEK
derived from an HBK or
CSK; and
• Encrypted with the HOSK
to provide secure
transport to the requesting
service operator/role.
EncryptRandomBytes and
GenerateDataKeyPairWithoutP
laintext APIs export the CDK
encrypted with the DEK from
an HBK or CSK.
Volatile
memory
only
Data
Encryption
Key (DEK)
A DEK is a per-message key
derived from an HBK or CSK
using the SP 800-108 KDF in
counter mode using HMAC
with SHA256.
AES GCM
256 bits
Derived
internally
using SP 800-
108 CTR KDF
Input: N/A
Output: N/A
Volatile
memory
only
Domain Key
(DK)
A Domain Key is shared
among all the members of a
Domain and is used to
encrypt HBKs, CSKs HOSKs
AES GCM
256 bits
Internally
using DRBG,
or imported
from another
member of a
Domain
Input: DK encrypted with the
DKEK may be imported to
other members of a Domain
Output: DK encrypted with the
DKEK may be exported to other
members of a Domain
Volatile
memory
only
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Keys and
CSPs
Key Description Algorithm
and Key
Size
Generation Input / Output Method Storage
Domain Key
Encryption
Key (DKEK)
A Domain Key Encryption
Key is generated on a Host
and is used for encrypting
the current set of domain
keys when sharing of the
domain state between HSM
hosts.
AES GCM
256 bits
Internally
using DRBG
or externally
by another
member of a
Domain
Input: The DKEK is encrypted
with the shared secret
generated from the HSM’s Key
Agreement Key (QHAK) and
another HSM’s Ephemeral Key
Agreement Key (dE).
Output: The DKEK is encrypted
with the shared secret
generated from the HSM’s Key
Agreement Key (dHAK) and
another HSM’s Ephemeral Key
Agreement Key (QE).
Volatile
memory
only
HSM
Agreement
Key Pair
(dHAK,
QHAK)
Every initialized HSM has a
locally generated Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman
agreement key pair used to
encrypt/decrypt DKEKs
between HSMs.
Elliptic
Curve
Diffie-
Hellman
agreement
key pair on
the curve
secp384r1
(NIST-
P384)
Internally
using DRBG
Input: N/A
Output: The public key (QHAK)
is exported in plaintext
Volatile
memory
only
HSM
Ephemeral
Agreement
Key Pair
(dE, QE)
These keys are generated in
two cases: (i) to establish a
HSM-to-HSM encryption
key to transport DKEKs in
domain tokens; (ii) to
establish HSM-to-operator
session keys to protect
sensitive HSM-operator
communications.
Elliptic
curve
Diffie-
Hellman
keys on the
curve
secp384r1
(NIST-
P384)
Internally
using DRBG
Input: N/A
Output: The public key (QE) is
exported in plaintext
Volatile
memory
only
HSM Session
Key
Encryption
Key (HSKEK)
Encrypts the HSM-Operator
Session Key (HOSK) for the
following operations:
Initialize,
InitializeAndCreateDomain,
Attest,
GetAttestationIdentity, and
Wipe.
AES GCM
256 bits
Internally
using DRBG
Input: N/A
Output: N/A
Volatile
memory
only
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Keys and
CSPs
Key Description Algorithm
and Key
Size
Generation Input / Output Method Storage
HSM
Signature
Key Pair
(dHSK,
QHSK)
Every initiated HSM has a
locally generated Elliptic
Curve Signature key pair
used to sign data created
on the HSM.
Elliptic
Curve
Signature
key pair on
the curve
secp384r1
(NIST-
P384)
Internally
using DRBG
Input: N/A
Output: The public key (QHSK)
is exported in plaintext
Volatile
memory
only
HSM-
Operator
Session Key
(HOSK)
Operator services establish
an AES-256-GCM session
key with the HSM to protect
communication between
operator services and HSMs
in the same domain.
AES GCM
256 bits.
Internally
using DRBG,
or imported
from an HSM
that is a
member of
the same
domain
Input: The HOSK is encrypted
with the domain key (DK).
Output:
The HOSK is encrypted in two
forms. The first form is
encrypted with either the
domain key (DK) or the HSM
Session Key Encryption Key
(HSKEK) using AES GCM. The
second form is encrypted using
AES GCM with a 256 bit key
derived from the shared secret
established using elliptic curve
Diffie Hellman key exchange
(NIST-P384) using the HSM
Ephemeral Agreement Key
(dE,QE) and the Operator
Ephemeral Agreement Public
Key (dOEAK, QOEAK).
Volatile
memory
only
Import
Wrapping
Key (dIWK,
QIWK)
The public key is used by
customers of KMS to wrap
their CSK for import via the
public AWS KMS API.
RSA 2048,
3072, and
4096 bits
Internally
using DRBG
or imported
from another
member of a
Domain
Input: The private key (dIWK) is
encrypted with the Domain Key
(DK) using AES-GCM.
Output: the private key (dIWK)
is encrypted with the Domain
Key (DK) using AES-GCM. The
public key (QIWK) is exported
in plaintext.
Volatile
memory
only
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Keys and
CSPs
Key Description Algorithm
and Key
Size
Generation Input / Output Method Storage
Import
Wrapping
Envelope
Key (IWEK)
Key generated by a
customer of KMS outside
the AWS KMS system.
Ephemeral key-wrapping-
key used to encrypt CSKs
for the ImportKey API when
AES-KWP is used per
section 9.3 of SP 800-56B.
AES KWP
256 bits
Externally by
AWS KMS
customers
Input: IWEK is encrypted using
Import Wrapping Key (QIWK)
when used with the ImportKey
API when the customer
imports a CSK into the AWS
KMS system.
Output: N/A
Volatile
memory
only
Customer
Supplied
Key (CSK)
Key generated by a
customer of KMS outside
the AWS KMS system.
Customer Supplied Keys
(CSK) can be of two
different forms – symmetric
and asymmetric keys.
The first form is a 256-bit
master key, from which
specific-use DEKs may be
derived using the SP800-
108 CTR key derivation
function. The CSK or DEKs
derived from the CSK are
used to encrypt CDKs.
The second form is an
asymmetric private key.
The CSK maps to the
Customer Master Key
construct exposed in the
public AWS KMS API.
AES GCM:
256 bits
RSA: 2048,
3072, or
4096 bits
ECDSA:
curves P-
256, P-384,
P-521, or
secp256k1.
Externally by
AWS KMS
customers
Input: CSK is encrypted using
Import Wrapping Key (QIWK)
(and, optionally, the ephemeral
ImportWrapping Envelope Key
(IWEK)) when used with the
ImportKey API when the
customer imports the key into
the AWS KMS system. After
import, the CSK is encrypted
with the Domain Key using AES
GCM.
Output: CSK encrypted by a
Domain Key (DK).
Volatile
memory
only
DRBG (CTR
AES)
Entropy input (length
dependent on security
strength)
SP 800-90A
CTR DRBG
V (128 bits)
AES key (
256)
Internally by
NDRNG
Input: Directly from the
internal NDRNG
Output: N/A
Volatile
memory
only
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Keys and
CSPs
Key Description Algorithm
and Key
Size
Generation Input / Output Method Storage
Replication
Signing Key
Pair (dRSKn,
QRSKn)
The private key (dRSKn) is
used to sign the outputs of
GetParametersForReplicatio
n and
WrapKeyForReplication
APIs.
The public key (QRSKn) is
used to verify the input of
WrapKeyForReplication and
ImportReplicatedKey APIs.
ECDSA on
curve P-
384
Internally
using DRBG,
or imported
from another
member of a
Domain
Input: dRSKn encrypted with
the DKEK may be imported to
other members of a Domain;
QRSKn may be imported by an
operator
Output: dRKSn encrypted with
the DKEK may be exported to
other members of a Domain;
QRSKn may be exported in
plaintext
Volatile
memory
only
Replication
Agreement
Key (dRAKk,
QRAKk)
Key used for key agreement
to derive a Replication
Wrapping Key (RWK)
ECDH on
curve P-
384
Internally
using DRBG,
or imported
from a
member of a
different
Domain
Input: QRAKk may be obtained
in plaintext from another HSM;
dRAKk may be obtained
encrypted with the domain key
(DKn) from another HSM
Output: QRAKk may be
exported in plaintext; dRAKk
may be exported encrypted
with the domain key (DKn)
Volatile
memory
only
Replication
Wrapping
Key (RWK)
Key used to encrypt an HBK AES GCM:
256 bits
Internally
derived from
a Public
Replication
Agreement
Key (QRAK1)
and a Private
Replication
Agreement
Key (dRAK2)
Input: N/A
Output: N/A
Volatile
memory
only
Customer
Replication
Key (CRK)
Customer key that is being
transmitted between two
HSMs.
Customer Replication Keys
(CRK) may be of two types:
symmetric or asymmetric.
CRKs are encrypted with
Replication Wrapping Keys
(RWK).
AES GCM:
256 bits
RSA: 2048,
3072, or
4096 bits
ECDSA:
curves P-
256, P-384,
P-521, or
secp256k1
Internally
from an HBK
encrypted
with a
domain key
(DKn)
Input: CRK may be obtained by
decrypting an HBK using a
domain key (DKn) and re-
encrypting it using a
Replication Wrapping Key
(RWK)
Output: CRK is exported
encrypted with a Replication
Wrapping Key (RAK)
Volatile
memory
only
Table 13 – Module Keys/CSPs
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2.6.2 Public Keys
Table 14 shows the list of Public Keys used within the module with associated private keys that only exist
outside of the module. All Public Keys are generated outside of the module.
Public Key Key Description Algorithm and Key
Size
Input / Output Method Storage
Operator
Ephemeral
Agreement
Public Key
(QOEAK)
Operators establish a
session key (HSM-
Operator Session Keys)
using an Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman key
exchange on the curve
secp384r1 (NIST-P384).
Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (EC
DH) ephemeral key
agreement on the
curve secp384r1
(NIST-P384)
Input: When an operator calls the
NegotiateSessionKey service.
Output: N/A
Volatile
memory
Operator
Signature
Public Key
(QOS)
Both service operators
and human operators
have an identity signing
key used to authenticate
to the HSM.
Elliptic Curve
Signature (EC DSA)
on the curve
secp384r1 (NIST-
P384), RSA 2048,
or RSA 4096 bits
Input: The public key (QOS) is imported in
plaintext when an administrator calls
InitializeAndCreateDomain,
CreateDomain, and ChangeDomain. They
are also imported by APIs that accepts a
Domain Token.
Output: The public keys are exported
from the HSM in plaintext by APIs that
exports a Domain Token.
Volatile
memory
Table 14 – Public Keys
2.7 Self-Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires the module to perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the
correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. Some functions require conditional tests
during normal operation of the module. All of these tests are listed and described in this section. In the
event of a self-test error, the module will log the error and enter the error state. Once in the error state,
all CSPs are zeroized and the module becomes unusable.
2.7.1 Power-On Self-Tests
Power-on self-tests are run upon the initialization of the module and do not require operator
intervention to run. If any of the tests fail, the module will not initialize. The module will enter an error
state and no services can be accessed by the operator. The module implements the following power-on
self-tests:
Type Test
Integrity Check • 160 bit error detection code (EDC) on all module components
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Type Test
Known Answer
Tests
• AES (Encryption and decryption in ECB mode. Key size: 128 bit)
• AES GCM / GMAC (Generation and verification. Key size: 128 bit)
• ECC KAS (ECDH) (Primitive Z test. Parameter set: EC)
• ECDSA (signature generation and verification. Curve: P-256)
• RSA (Signature generation and verification, key transport)
• HMAC (Generation and verification with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)
• SHS (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, verified as part the respective HMAC tests)
• SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG
• SP 800-108 CTR KDF (HMAC-SHA-256)
Table 15 – Power-On Self-Tests
Each module performs all power-on self-tests automatically when the module is initialized. All power-on
self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The Power-on self-tests can
be run on demand by rebooting the module.
2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional self-tests are test that run during operation of the module. If any of these tests fail, the
module will enter an error state, where no services can be accessed by the operators. The module can
be re-initialized to clear the error and resume FIPS mode of operation. Each module performs the
following conditional self-tests:
Type Description
Pair-wise Consistency
Tests
• RSA key pair generation
• ECDSA key pair generation
SP 800‐56A
Assurances
• Performed per SP 800‐56Arev3 Sections 5.5.2 and 5.6.2
Continuous RNG Tests • Performed on NDRNG per IG 9.8
• SP 800-90 CTR_DRBG
DRBG Health Tests • Performed on DRBG, per SP 800‐90A Section 11.3. Required per IG C.1.
Table 16 – Conditional Self-Tests
The module does not perform a firmware load test because no additional firmware can be loaded in the
module. Please see Section 3 for guidance on configuring and maintaining FIPS mode.
2.7.3 On-demand Self-Tests
On-demand self-tests can be performed by rebooting the module which will perform the power-on self-
tests as described in 2.7.1.
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not mitigate other attacks.
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3 Guidance and Secure Operation
The module only supports FIPS-mode of operation. Beyond initial setup, no specific technical steps are
required to configure FIPS-mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
Only authorized AWS employees may assume the Administrator (Crypto Officer) role.
The following section provides a high-level overview to configure the HSM. Members of the
Administrator role (Crypto Officer) must follow the AWS internal guidance published in the Operation
Guidance for the AWS Key Management Service.
3.1.1 Module Inspection
Tamper evidence labels on the module must be inspected to verify that no attempts have been made to
open the module.
The module must be inspected upon initial delivery and after the module reboots due to
unscheduled/unexpected power events.
If evidence of a tamper is discovered, the module shall be removed from operation immediately. If new
seals are required, the module shall be replaced with a new module with factory-applied seals
Figure 2 identifies the locations of the four tamper evidence labels applied during the manufacturing
process.
Figure 2 – Tamper Evidence Label Locations
3.1.2 Initial Configuration
When setting up the first HSM member of a new domain, call the InitializeAndCreateDomain service
with the list of operators’ Operator Signature Public Keys, their respective roles and the access policy for
each service (API) in accordance with AWS internal guidance and procedures.
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Services / APIs that modifies an HSM’s domain membership or configuration must be configured to
require a quorum of two Crypto Officers.
When setting up subsequent members of an existing domain, the administrator first retrieves domain
information from an existing domain member using the GetDomain service. The Initialize service can
then be used to initialize the new HSM with the configuration of the existing domain.
Ensure each HSM is operating in FIPS mode by calling the Fips status API.
3.2 User Guidance
3.2.1 General Guidance
No additional guidance is required to maintain FIPS mode of operation. The only users of the HSM are
the front-end hosts of the AWS Key Management Service.