Ciena®
Corporation
565/5100/5200 Advanced Services Platform
FW Version: 11.2 and 11.21
HW Versions:
565 – Chassis (NT0H50DAE5 REV 004), Backplane SP Card (NT0H5066E5 Rev 04), QOTR/E Card
(NT0H25BAE5 Rev 2), Filler Card (NT0H52ABE6 Rev 02);
5100 – Chassis (NTPM50AAE5 Rev 11), SP Card (NT0H41ABE5 Rev 8), QOTR/E Card
(NT0H25BAE5 Rev 2), Filler Card (NT0H52ABE6 Rev 02);
5200 – Chassis (NT0H50AA Rev 014), SP Card (NT0H41ABE5 Rev 8), QOTR/E Card (NT0H25BAE5
Rev 2), OCM Card (NT0H40BCE5 Rev 18), Filler Card (NT0H52ABE6 Rev 02)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level: 2
Document Version: 1.9
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Ciena® Corporation Corsec Security, Inc.
1201 Winterson Road
Linthicum, MD 21090
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway, Suite 220
Fairfax, VA 22033
United States of America United States of America
Phone: +1 (613) 599-6430 Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
Email: feedback@ciena.com Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.ciena.com http://www.corsec.com
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................4
1.1 PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................................................................4
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION............................................................................................................................4
2 565/5100/5200...........................................................................................................................5
2.1 OVERVIEW.............................................................................................................................................................5
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION.....................................................................................................................................6
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ..........................................................................................................................................9
2.3.1 565 Interfaces.........................................................................................................................................................9
2.3.2 5100 Interfaces...................................................................................................................................................10
2.3.3 5200 Interfaces...................................................................................................................................................11
2.3.4 QOTR/E Card Interfaces...................................................................................................................................13
2.3.5 SP Card Interfaces...............................................................................................................................................14
2.3.6 OCM Card Interfaces.........................................................................................................................................15
2.4 ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION......................................................................................................16
2.4.1 Crypto Officer Role .............................................................................................................................................16
2.4.2 User Role................................................................................................................................................................17
2.4.3 Authentication.......................................................................................................................................................22
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY...........................................................................................................................................23
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.........................................................................................................................24
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................24
2.8 SELF-TESTS ..........................................................................................................................................................36
2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ..................................................................................................................37
3 SECURE OPERATION .........................................................................................................38
3.1 INITIAL SETUP......................................................................................................................................................38
3.2 SECURE MANAGEMENT .....................................................................................................................................41
3.2.1 Initialization...........................................................................................................................................................41
3.2.2 Management ........................................................................................................................................................41
3.2.3 Zeroization ............................................................................................................................................................42
3.3 USER GUIDANCE................................................................................................................................................42
4 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................................43
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – 565/5100/5200 SHELF DEPLOYMENT................................................................................................................5
FIGURE 2 – 565 FRONT VIEW............................................................................................................................................... 10
FIGURE 3 – 5100 FRONT VIEW ............................................................................................................................................ 10
FIGURE 4 – 5200 FRONT VIEW ............................................................................................................................................ 12
FIGURE 5 – QOTR/E CARD FRONT PANEL....................................................................................................................... 14
FIGURE 6 – SP CARD FRONT PANEL ................................................................................................................................... 15
FIGURE 7 – TAMPER EVIDENT LABEL.................................................................................................................................... 24
FIGURE 8 – EVIDENCE OF TAMPERING................................................................................................................................. 24
FIGURE 9 – TAMPER EVIDENT LABEL PLACEMENT FOR 5200 ........................................................................................... 39
FIGURE 10 – TAMPER EVIDENT LABEL PLACEMENT FOR 5100......................................................................................... 40
FIGURE 11 – TAMPER EVIDENT LABEL PLACEMENT FOR 565 ........................................................................................... 40
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION .........................................................................................................6
TABLE 2 – LIST OF CIRCUIT PACK CARDS.............................................................................................................................7
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TABLE 3 – 565/5100/5200 ADVANCED SERVICES PLATFORM TESTED CONFIGURATION..............................................8
TABLE 4 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPINGS FOR 565 ................................................................................... 10
TABLE 5 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPINGS FOR 5100................................................................................. 11
TABLE 6 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPINGS FOR 5200................................................................................. 13
TABLE 7 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPINGS FOR QOTR/E CARD.............................................................. 14
TABLE 8 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPINGS FOR SP CARD.......................................................................... 15
TABLE 9 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACE MAPPING FOR OCM CARD...................................................................... 15
TABLE 10 – MAPPING OF CO ROLE’S SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS...................... 16
TABLE 11 – USER LEVEL PRIVILEGES..................................................................................................................................... 18
TABLE 12 – MAPPING OF USER ROLE’S SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS.................... 18
TABLE 13 – AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM ..................................................................................................................... 23
TABLE 14 – FIPS-APPROVED ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS........................................................................................ 24
TABLE 15 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS .............................. 26
TABLE 16 – POWER-UP SELF-TESTS .................................................................................................................................... 36
TABLE 17 – POWER-UP CRITICAL FUNCTION TESTS........................................................................................................ 36
TABLE 18 – CONDITIONAL SELF-TESTS .............................................................................................................................. 37
TABLE 19 – ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................................................ 43
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the 565/5100/5200 Advanced Services
Platform from Ciena. This Security Policy describes how the 565/5100/5200 Advanced Services Platform
meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 and how to run the module in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode.
This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 – Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic
modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website, which is maintained by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communication Security Establishment Canada (CSEC):
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.
The 565/5100/5200 Advanced Services Platforms are referred to in this document as the 565/5100/5200,
the cryptographic modules, shelves (or shelf) or the modules. Additionally, each individual shelf is
distinctively referred to by its model number: i.e., 565, 5100 or 5200.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS
140-2 cryptographic module security policy. Additional information for these modules is available from
the following sources:
 The Ciena website (http://www.ciena.com/) contains information on the full line of products from
Ciena.
 The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm)
contains contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related questions for the
module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
 Vendor Evidence document
 Finite State Model
 FIPS security kit
 Other Ciena technical documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security,
Inc. under contract to Ciena. With the exception of this non-proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2
validation submission documentation is proprietary to Ciena and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Ciena.
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2 565/5100/5200
2.1 Overview
The 565/5100/5200 product family of carrier-grade products consist of high-availability, configurable
Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) devices that integrate security capability into rack-mountable
shelves. There are three separate chassis (shelves) in the 565/5100/5200 product family, as shown in
Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively (with front cover removed). The smallest device is the 565,
and the two larger shelves are the 5100 and 5200.
The 565 is a compact and cost-optimized WDM platform that enables a variety of data, storage and video
services to be cost-efficiently aggregated onto an optical wavelength-based network or service. The 5100
and 5200 are the leading convergence platforms for WDM applications. The 565/5100/5200 devices
specialize in converging multiple networks into a simple, scalable and secure network.
The modules are intended to be deployed in high-bandwidth, high-availability (99.999% availability)
networks. The highest-capability modules (5200) are intended to handle core networking, and the smaller
platforms (5100 or 565) are designed for handling lower bandwidth requirements, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 – 565/5100/5200 Shelf Deployment
The 565/5100/5200 shelves accept high-speed incoming traffic from numerous sources in many formats,
encrypt the traffic, and then modulate the protected aggregate traffic as wavelengths on high-density fibre
transmission lines. For example, an enterprise might place one 565 shelf at each of its locations, sending
traffic over an optical metro core network to a headquarters’ location with a 5200 shelf.
The 565/5100/5200 is validated at the FIPS 140-2 Section levels listed in Table 1. The overall security
level of the module is 2. There are two validated versions of the 565/5100/5200, version 11.2 and version
11.21. 565/5100/5200 firmware version 11.21 includes a number of operational enhancements documented
in Ciena PCN-0975-002. The issues rectified include:
 Automatic protection switch failure on 10G Muxponder connections with 1+1 line-side Automatic
Protection Switching configuration as described in FSB 101-2012-139
 Loss of database redundancy on 5100 shelves - upon upgrade to Release 11.20, 5100 shelves may
experience a loss of database redundancy leading to the network element getting into a Loss of
Visibility state.
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 Timing references may be invalidated on MOTR 20G cards - valid Layer 1 timing references may
be invalidated in cases of persistent loss of signal on the line port, leading to potential bit errors
until card is restarted.
The cryptographic and security features of both releases are identical.
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 EMI/EMC2
2
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.2 Module Specification
All three of the 565/5100/5200 Advanced Services Platforms are hardware modules with multi-chip
standalone embodiments. They are validated at overall Level 2 as shown in Table 1 above, with section 3
validated at Level 3. Sections 6 and 11 are not applicable to this hardware module validation.
The cryptographic boundary of the modules is defined as follows:
 The 565 cryptographic boundary surrounds the entire chassis
 The 5100 cryptographic boundary surrounds the front panel section of the chassis and the entire
backplane main-board
 The 5200 cryptographic boundary surrounds the front panel section of the chassis and the entire
backplane main-board
Each 565, 5100 and 5200 module contains a high-speed backplane main-board. The backplane is logically
divided into two sections: the maintenance panel section and the front panel section. The maintenance
panel section (top section) of the backplane provides ports and interfaces for configuring and managing the
module, whereas the front panel section of the backplane provides circuit pack card interfaces (also referred
to as slots). The circuit pack card interfaces can be populated with a number of circuit pack cards (also
known as cards) that provide communications, security, and management services. The 5200 is a rack-
mountable chassis (Part # NT0H50AA Rev 014) featuring twenty slots, and can accommodate up to sixteen
traffic-carrying circuit packs for metro WDM deployments. The four other slots are reserved for special
functions and are not available for traffic-carrying circuit packs. The 5100 is a smaller unit (Chassis Part #
NTPM50AAE5 Rev 11) with six slots, four of which can accommodate circuit packs and two of which are
1
N/A – Not Applicable
2
EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
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reserved for non-traffic carrying functions. The 565 unit (Chassis Part # NT0H50DAE5 REV 004)
provides the same type of services but has only three slots, two of which are available for traffic-carrying
circuit packs. Various circuit pack cards that can be inserted into any of the 565/5100/5200 chassis are
listed in Table 2. The 565/5100/5200 modules were tested and validated using only the circuit pack cards
that are indicated with an asterisk (*) in Table 2. All other circuit pack cards are not included in the current
validation.
Table 2 – List of Circuit Pack Cards
Cards 565 5100 5200
*Optical Transponder (OTR) 10G Quad with
Encryption (QOTR/E)
(Part # NT0H25BAE5 Rev 2)
  
*Enhanced Shelf Processor (eSP)
(Part # NT0H41ABE5 Rev 8)
N/A  
*Optical Channel Manager (OCM)
(Part # NT0H40BCE5 Rev 18)
N/A N/A 
Optical Channel Laser/Detector (OCLD) N/A  
Optical Transponder (OTR)   
Optical Transponder (OTR) 10G Quad (QOTR)   
Multiplexer Optical Transponder (MOTR)   
Optical Channel Interface (OCI) N/A  
Automatic Per-Band Equalizer (APBE) N/A N/A 
Optical Fiber Amplifier (OFA) N/A N/A 
Optical Service Channel (OSC) N/A  
*Filler Card
(Part # NT0H52ABE6 Rev 02)   
*Backplane SP Card (Part #NT0H5066E5 Rev 04)  N/A N/A
Most of the circuit pack cards listed in Table 2 are data carrying traffic cards. The circuit pack cards that
are capable of performing cryptographic operations or store cryptographic keys or CSP3
s are:
 The QOTR/E circuit pack card, which occupies two slot spaces in a chassis.
 The eSP circuit pack card, which occupies one non-traffic-carrying slot in the 5100 and 5200. (The
565 does not require an eSP card since its functionality is integrated into the 565 using the Shelf
3
CSP – Critical Security Parameter
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Processor (SP) card) For the rest of this document, both the SP and eSP circuit pack cards will be
referred to jointly as an SP card.
 The OCM circuit pack card, which occupies one non-traffic-carrying slot in 5200. The OCM card
acts as a cross point switch and manages the flow of traffic inside the 5200 module. On the 5200
devices, the OCM card is also used for storing the database containing configuration details, user
credentials and various keys and CSPs. This card cannot be installed on 5100 or 565.
There are multiple combinations the 565/5100/5200 modules can be configured using various available
circuit pack cards. Although Ciena affirms that the module can be configured with any particular
combination of circuit pack cards, the modules were tested and validated only with the configuration
detailed in Table 3.
Table 3 – 565/5100/5200 Advanced Services Platform Tested Configuration
Module Name Configuration
565 Advanced Services Platform
NT0H50DAE5 REV 004
1x SP Card NT0H5066E5 Rev 04
1x QOTR/E Card NT0H25BAE5 Rev 2
1x Filler Card NT0H52ABE6 Rev 02
1x FIPS Security Kit NT0H25BZ Rev 3
5100 Advanced Services Platform
NTPM50AAE5 Rev 11
1x SP Card NT0H41ABE5 Rev 8
2x QOTR/E Card NT0H25BAE5 Rev 2
1x Filler Card NT0H52ABE6 Rev 02
1x FIPS Security Kit NT0H25BZ Rev 3
5200 Advanced Services Platform
NT0H50AA Rev 014
1x SP Card NT0H41ABE5 Rev 8
8x QOTR/E Card NT0H25BAE5 Rev 2
2x OCM Card NT0H40BCE5 Rev 18
1x Filler Card NT0H52ABE6 Rev 02
1x FIPS Security Kit NT0H25BZ Rev 3
More detailed information about the placement of the circuit pack cards into the modules is provided in the
list below:
 565 – one SP card (which is incorporated as part of the chassis), one QOTR/E card (utilizing slots
1-2), and one filler card in slot 3
 5100 – one SP card (slot 5), one Filler card (slot 6), and two QOTR/E cards (utilizing slots 1-2 &
3-4)
 5200 – one SP card (slot 19), two OCM cards (slots 9 & 10), one Filler card (slot 20), and eight
QOTR/E cards (utilizing the remaining slots)
Ciena affirms that the 565/5100/5200 modules can be configured with any combination of cards under the
following conditions:
 The module shall contain one SP card at all times
 In the case of the 5100, the slot number 5 is reserved for the SP circuit pack card and the slot
number 6 is reserved for an OSC circuit pack card
 In the case of the 5200, the slot number 9 and 10 is reserved for OCM circuit pack cards, the slot
number 19 is reserved for the SP circuit pack card and the slot number 20 is reserved for an OSC
circuit pack card
Circuit pack cards are available for most physical network interface types and speeds such as Gigabit
Ethernet, 10 Gigabit Ethernet, and multiple capacities of Fibre-Channel and Optical Carrier circuits (OC-n).
Some cards contain SFP4
and XFP5
pluggable units for both line-side and client-side entities that enable the
4
SFP – Small Form-factor Pluggable
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cards to operate at different wavelengths or protocol rates. Different circuit packs may also have different
form-factors occupying one, two, three, or four slots. Circuit packs are inserted into available slots
following the restrictions as mentioned above. The remaining empty slots receive filler cards to maintain
air-flow through the chassis.
Neither the traffic-carrying cards mentioned above nor the SP card has the ability to perform bulk
encryption at line speed. Only the QOTR/E circuit pack card, which includes a separate encryption chip
(FPGA6
), is capable of performing AES7
-256 encryption at line speed (10 Gbps8
) rates.
As previously noted, one SP card is required to operate and manage the shelf. On the 5200 and 5100, the
SP is a separate card which occupies a reserved slot. On the 565 the SP card hardware is integrated into the
chassis. Management traffic is directed to the SP. The SP is responsible for final transport of this traffic to
all the other cards in the shelf across the backplane’s bus. The management of the shelf is performed using
these user interfaces:
 The System Manager Interface (SMI) manages the module using SNMP9
v3. The SP will perform
any required SNMP security, and then forwards commands to a destination card (QOTR/E card or
other cards) across the backplane. The SNMP v1 and v2c protocols are disabled in FIPS-Approved
mode of operation.
 The Optical Manager Element Adapter (OMEA) GUI10
is used to manage the module using the
TL111
management protocol commands.
2.3 Module Interfaces
The module’s physical ports can be categorized into the following logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:
 Data Input Interface
 Data Output Interface
 Control Input Interface
 Status Output Interface
Data input/output are the packets utilizing the services provided by the modules. Control input consists of
Configuration or Administrative data entered into the modules. Any user can be given administrative
capabilities only by the User with “Admin” privileges. Status output consists of the status provided by the
logs, events, alarms via user interfaces. In the case of the 565, the status is also provided by the LEDs12
.
Each 565/5100/5200 module has a slightly different set of interfaces and therefore will be discussed
separately. The 565/5100/5200 shelves each have card interfaces where any of the cards mentioned in
Table 2 can be inserted.
2.3.1 565 Interfaces
The front panel of the 565 is shown in Figure 2 with front cover removed.
5
XFP – 10 Gigabit Small Form-factor Pluggable
6
FPGA – Field Programmable Gate Array
7
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
8
Gbps – Gigabits per second
9
SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol
10
GUI – Graphical User Interface
11
TL1 – Transaction Language 1
12
LEDs – Light Emitting Diodes
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Figure 2 – 565 Front View
All of the 565 physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described
in Table 4.
Table 4 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings for 565
Physical
Port/Interface
Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
Ethernet ports 2 Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
QOTR/E Card Front
Panel Interfaces
1 Data Input
Data Output
Filler Card Interface
slot
1 None
LEDs 3 Status Output
Power 2 Power Input
2.3.2 5100 Interfaces
The front panel of the 5100 is shown in Figure 3 with the front cover removed.
Figure 3 – 5100 Front View
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All of the physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described in
Table 5.
Table 5 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings for 5100
Physical
Port/Interface
Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
Proprietary Backplane
Interface for
Maintenance Panel
Card
1 Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
SP Card Front Panel
Interfaces
1 None
QOTR/E Card Front
Panel Interfaces
2 Data Input
Data Output
FAN Status LED 1 Status Output
Proprietary Backplane
Interface for Power
Supply Card
2 Power Input
2.3.3 5200 Interfaces
The front panel of the 5200 is shown in Figure 4 with the front cover removed.
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Figure 4 – 5200 Front View
All of the physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described in
Table 6.
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Table 6 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings for 5200
Physical
Port/Interface
Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
Proprietary Backplane
Interface for Telemetry
card
2 Control Input
Status Output
Proprietary Backplane
Interface for OMX card
2 Control Input
Status Output
Proprietary Backplane
Interface for Alarm
card
1 Control Input
Status Output
Proprietary Backplane
Interface for Ethernet
card
1 Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
Proprietary Backplane
Interface for Serial port
1 Control Input
Status Output
SP Card Front Panel
Interfaces
1 None
QOTR/E Card Front
Panel Interfaces
8 Data Input
Data Output
OCM Card Front Panel
Interfaces
2 None
Proprietary Backplane
Interface for Power
Supply
2 Power Input
2.3.4 QOTR/E Card Interfaces
The QOTR/E card is a dual slot card, as pictured in Figure 5, which includes up to four XFP transceivers.
Its XFP transceivers are hot-swappable, protocol-independent optical transceivers which either operate at a
fixed wavelength within 5.0 to 11.1 Gbps or are tunable over a range of wavelengths. These four XFP
interfaces provide two encrypted-line ports (port 1 and 2) and two clear-text ports (port 3 and 4). These
ports can also be replaced to accommodate different wavelength interfaces (or protocols) for different
network installations.
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Figure 5 – QOTR/E Card Front Panel
All of the physical interfaces are separated into the logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described
in Table 7.
Table 7 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings for QOTR/E Card
Physical
Port/Interface
Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
XFP ports 4 Data Input
Data Output
LEDs 9 None
2.3.5 SP Card Interfaces
The SP acts as a supervisory card for the 565/5100/5200 devices. Management traffic is directed to the SP,
and then rerouted from the SP to other cards across the backplane bus. An SP is always configured into a
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dedicated slot of the 5100 or 5200 shelf. A picture of an SP card is shown in Figure 6. The SP’s physical
interfaces are mapped into FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces in Table 8.
Figure 6 – SP Card Front Panel
Table 8 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings for SP Card
Physical
Port/Interface
Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
Status LED 1 None
2.3.6 OCM Card Interfaces
The OCM card is a single slot card. The primary function of the OCM card is that of a cross point switch.
The OCM card performs switching and manages the flow of traffic inside the module. The OCM card is
also used for storing the database containing configuration details, user credentials and various keys and
CSPs. The OCM card’s physical interfaces are mapped into FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces as shown in
Table 9.
Table 9 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mapping for OCM Card
Physical
Port/Interface
Quantity FIPS 140-2 Interface
Status LED 1 None
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2.4 Roles, Services and Authentication
The module supports identity-based authentication. There are two roles in the module (as required by FIPS
140-2) that users may assume: a Crypto Officer (CO) role and a User role. The User role is further sub-
divided into classes based on their privileges as follows: Admin, Operator, Observer, Customer1 and
Customer2. Descriptions of the services available to the Crypto Officer and User roles are provided below.
Please note that the keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) listed in the table indicate the type of
access required using the following notation:
 R – Read: The CSP is read
 W – Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized
 X – Execute: The CSP is used within an Approved or Allowed security function or authentication
mechanism
2.4.1 Crypto Officer Role
The CO has the ability to provision and query cryptographic keys and CSPs. The CO has the ability to
perform self test audits. Descriptions of the services available to the CO role are provided in Table 10
below.
Table 10 – Mapping of CO Role’s Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Change CO
Password
Change the Crypto
Officer (self)
password via the
SMI and TL1
interfaces
Command Command
response and
status output
CO Password – W
Perform Self Tests Perform on demand
Power-up Self Tests
by manually power
cycling the module
Command Command
response
None
Show Status Facilitates the user
to check the current
status of the module
as well as check
whether the module
is in FIPS-Approved
mode or not via the
SMI and TL1
interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Status output CO Password – X
Alarms Monitoring Facilitates the user
to view any active
alarms via the SMI
and TL1 interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
CO Password – X
Events Monitoring Facilitates the user
to view all logged
events via the SMI
and TL1 interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
CO Password – X
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Service Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Zeroize Keys Zeroize keys and
CSPs over SMI
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
CO Password – W
SMI Session Monitor Key – W
SNMPv3 Authentication Key –
W
SNMPv3 Privacy Key – W
QOTR/E RSA Public Key – W
QOTR/E RSA Private Key – W
QOTR/E Authentication Pre-
shared Key – W
QOTR/E DH Key Pairs – W
QOTR/E Message
Authentication Key – W
QOTR/E Message Encryption
Key – W
QOTR/E Session Encryption
Key – W
IKE DH Key Pairs – W
IPSec IKE Message
Authentication Key – W
IPSec IKE Message Encryption
Key – W
IPSec IKE Session Encryption
Key – W
TLS/DTLS DH Key Pairs – W
TLS/DTLS Session Key – W
DRBG seed – W
DRBG key value – W
DRBG V value – W
ESA13
Provisioning Facilitates the user
to configure the ESA
RSA Passphrases for
various QOTR/E
cards over SMI
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
CO Password – X
ESA RSA Passphrase – W
ESA RSA Encryption Key – W
ESA RSA Signature Key – W
QOTR/E PSK
provisioning
Facilitates the user
to configure the
QOTR/E
Authentication Pre-
shared Key for
various QOTR/E
cards via the SMI
and TL1 interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
CO Password – X
QOTR/E Authentication Pre-
shared Key – W
2.4.2 User Role
The User role is sub-divided into levels based on their privileges as follows: Admin, Operator, Observer,
Customer1 and Customer2. The description of each user level is provided in Table 11 below.
13
ESA – External Security Authentication
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Table 11 – User Level Privileges
User Level Description
Admin The system administrator:
• Has read and write access to all of the system configuration/status
• Can commission and decommission shelves
• Can view and clear security events and alarms
• Can provision the severity of any alarm using System Manager
• Can create, modify and delete other user profiles
• Can zeroize keys on SP
• Can perform on-demand power-up self tests
• Can provision all data on the shelf with the exception of the Pre-Shared
Key or certificate provisioning on the QOTR/E card
Operator The typical user class:
• Has read and write access to most of the system configuration/status
• Can change user’s own password
Observer This user has read-only access; however, can change user’s own password
Customer1 The Customer1 user:
• Can access PM14
data
• Has read-only access to their customer owned network (equipment, facility
and channel assignments)
• Can change own password
• Only sees service affecting alarms plus Optical Power, Far End Client Rx
Signal Fail and PM alarms that concern their operation. All other events,
user requests, and non-service affecting alarms are filtered
Customer2 The Customer2 user:
• Can access PM data
• Has read-only access to their customer owned network (equipment, facility
and channel assignments)
• Can change own password
Descriptions of the services available to the User role are provided in Table 12 below.
Table 12 – Mapping of User Role’s Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service User Level Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
User
Accounts
Management
Admin Manage various
user accounts,
password
complexity and
user privileges
via the SMI and
TL1 interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
User Password – W, X
14
PM – Performance Monitoring
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Service User Level Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Change User
Password
Admin,
Operator,
Observer,
Customer1,
Customer2
Change the User
(self) password
via the SMI and
TL1 interfaces
Command Command
response
and status
output
User Password – W
SNMP
Configuration
and
Management
Admin Facilitates the
user to manage
SNMP
configurations via
SMI only
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
User Password – X
SNMPv3 Authentication Key –
W
SNMPv3 Privacy Key – W
SNMPv3 Proxy Authentication
Key – X
SNMPv3 Proxy Privacy Key –
X
IPsec
Configuration
and
Management
Admin Facilitates the
user to manage
IPsec
configurations via
SMI only
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
User Password – X
IPSec IKE Authentication Pre-
shared Key – X
IKE DH Key Pairs – W
IPSec IKE Message
Authentication Key – W
IPSec IKE Message Encryption
Key – W
IPSec IKE Session Encryption
Key – W
Commission/
De-
commission
the Module
Admin Commission/De-
commission the
module by
following the
user guides and
Security Policy
guidelines via SMI
only
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
None
Perform Self
Tests
Admin Perform on-
demand Power-
up Self Tests for
the module by
manually power
cycling the
module
Command Command
response
None
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Service User Level Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Show Status Admin,
Operator,
Observer,
Customer1,
Customer2
Facilitates the
user to check
the current
status of the
module as well
as check
whether the
module is in
FIPS-Approved
mode or not via
the SMI and TL1
interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Status
output
None
Alarms
Monitoring
Admin,
Operator,
Observer,
Customer1,
Customer2
Facilitates the
user to view any
active alarms via
the SMI and TL1
interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
User Password – X
Events
Monitoring
Admin,
Operator,
Observer,
Customer1,
Customer2
Facilitates the
user to view all
logged events via
the SMI and TL1
interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
User Password – X
Backup and
Restore
Database
Admin Perform backup
or restore of
database
containing
authentication
and configuration
information via
the SMI and TL1
interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
Database Passphrase – W
Database Encryption Key – W
Database Signature Key – W
Software
Upgrades
Admin Facilitates the
user to perform
software
upgrades via the
SMI and TL1
interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
User Password – X
Provision
QOTR/E
equipment
Admin,
Operator
Facilitates the
user to provision
and configure
various QOTR/E
cards and related
equipments in a
module over the
SMI and TL1
interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
User Password – X
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Service User Level Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
Provision
QOTR/E
facility
Admin,
Operator
Facilitates the
user to configure
inventory and
facility
information over
the SMI and TL1
interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
User Password – X
Provision
QOTR/E
connections
Admin,
Operator
Facilitates the
user to provision
and configure
QOTR/E card
connections over
the SMI and TL1
interfaces
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
User Password – X
Zeroize Keys Admin Zeroize keys and
CSPs over SMI.
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
CO or User Password – W
RADIUS Shared Secret – W
SMI Session Monitor Key – W
SNMPv3 Authentication Key –
W
SNMPv3 Privacy Key – W
SNMPv3 Proxy Authentication
Key – W
SNMPv3 Proxy Privacy Key –
W
ISA CA RSA Public Key – W
ISA CA RSA Private Key – W
ISA Shelf RSA Public Key – W
ISA Shelf RSA Private Key –
W
QOTR/E DH Key Pairs – W
QOTR/E Message – W
Authentication Key – W
QOTR/E Message Encryption
Key – W
QOTR/E Session Encryption
Key – W
IPSec IKE Authentication Pre-
shared Key – W
IKE DH Key Pairs – W
IPSec IKE Message
Authentication Key – W
IPSec IKE Message Encryption
Key – W
IPSec IKE Session Encryption
Key – W
TLS/DTLS DH Key Pairs – W
TLS/DTLS Session Key – W
DRBG seed – W
DRBG key value – W
DRBG V value – W
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Service User Level Description Input Output CSP and Type of Access
ISA15
Provisioning
Admin Facilitates the
user to provision
and configure
Inter-shelf
communications
such as
notifications,
shelf enrollment,
etc over SMI
Command
and
parameters
Command
response
User Password – X
ISA CA RSA Public Key – X
ISA CA RSA Private Key – X
ISA Shelf RSA Public Key – X
ISA Shelf RSA Private Key – X
ISA RSA Passphrase – W
ISA RSA Encryption Key – W
ISA RSA Signature Key – W
2.4.3 Authentication
All services provided by the module require the user to assume a role and a specific identity. The module
provides services only to authenticated users. The module performs identity-based authentication.
All users authenticate to the module using a username and password. All users are required to follow the
complex password restrictions.
Table 13 lists the authentication mechanisms used by the module.
15
ISA – Inter-shelf Security Authentication
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Table 13 – Authentication Mechanism
Authentication Type Strength
Password The minimum length of the password is eight characters, with 86 different
case-sensitive alphanumeric characters and symbols possible for usage.
The chance of a random attempt falsely succeeding is 1: (868
), or 1:
2,992,179,271,065,856.
The fastest network connection supported by the module is 100 Mbps.
Hence at most (100 ×106
× 60 = 6 × 109
=) 6,000,000,000 bits of data can
be transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the probability that a random
attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is
1 : [868
possible passwords / ((6 ×109
bits per minute) / 64 bits per
password)]
1: (868
possible passwords / 93,750,000 passwords per minute)
1: 31,916,578 or 1 in 31.9 million,
which is less than 100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2
Public Key Certificates The module supports RSA16
digital certificate authentication of users
during IPsec/IKE17
. Using conservative estimates and equating a 2048 bit
RSA key to a 112 bit symmetric key, the probability for a random attempt
to succeed is 1:2112
or 1: 5.19 x 1033
.
The fastest network connection supported by the module is 100 Mbps.
Hence at most (100 ×106
× 60 = 6 × 109
=) 6,000,000,000 bits of data can
be transmitted in one minute. Therefore, the probability that a random
attempt will succeed or a false acceptance will occur in one minute is
1: (2112
possible keys / ((6 × 109
bits per minute) / 112 bits per key))
1: (2112
possible keys / 53,571,428 keys per minute)
1: 96,922,874,692,650,115,732,569,264 or 1 in 96.9 septillion,
which is less than 100,000 as required by FIPS 140-2.
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) v1/v2 services are disabled in the FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. SNMP v3 is used only for management-related services. RADIUS18
server authentication is
secured over IPsec.
2.5 Physical Security
The 565/5100/5200 shelves are multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules.
All of the module’s components are made up of production-grade material. The modules are enclosed in a
hard and opaque metal case that completely encloses all of its internal components. There are only a
limited set of vent holes provided in the case, and the view of the internal components of the module is
obscured. Tamper-evident labels are applied to the case as well as removable front and rear covers to
provide physical evidence of attempts to gain access to the module’s internal components. All tamper
evident labels are serialized and uniquely identified. The tamper-evident labels are silver seals with self-
adhesive backings, as shown in Figure 7. The labels provide evidence of tampering when any unauthorized
access to the module is attempted. Any attempt to access the module will result in one or more of the
tamper-evident labels being damaged. A “dot” pattern is revealed when the label is removed or tampered
with, as shown in Figure 8. The placement of tamper-evident labels can be found in Section 3.1 of this
document. The CO must periodically ensure that the labels or shelves do not show any signs of tampering.
Section 3.2.2 describes the physical security inspection methods the CO should follow.
16
RSA – Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
17
IKE – Internet Key Exchange
18
RADIUS – Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
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Figure 7 – Tamper Evident Label
Figure 8 – Evidence of Tampering
The module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15,
Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (business use).
2.6 Operational Environment
FIPS 140-2 Operational Environment requirements do not apply to the 565/5100/5200 shelves, because
these modules do not provide a general-purpose operating system (OS) to the user.
All firmware upgrades are digitally-signed and a self-test is performed during each upgrade.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The module implements the FIPS-Approved algorithms in Table 14.
Table 14 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations
Algorithm
Certificate Number
SP QOTR/E
AES-256 in ECB and Counter mode N/A 1682
AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 in CBC mode 1794 1796
AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 in CFB-128 mode 1794 N/A
Triple-DES (Encrypt/Decrypt) in CBC mode (Three-Key) 1161 N/A
SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 1576 1578
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Algorithm
Certificate Number
SP QOTR/E
RSA ANSI X9.31 Key-pair Generate(2048 and 4096) 897 899
RSA PKCSv1.5 Signature Generate/Verify (2048 and 4096) 897 899
HMAC using SHA-1 and SHA-256 1058 1060
SP 800-90 (Counter based DRBG) 130 131
The module utilizes the following non-FIPS-approved but FIPS-allowed algorithm implementation:
 Diffie-Hellman (DH) for key agreement during IPsec: 2048-bit key (provides 112 bits of security)
Additionally, the module implements the following non-FIPS-approved algorithm that are disabled by
default and not allowed for use in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation:
 MD5
 DES
 Blowfish
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The module supports the critical security parameters (CSPs) as shown in Table 15.
Table 15 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
CSP CSP
Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
5200 5100 565
CO or User
Password
Alpha-
Numeric
string
Entered into
module over
Ethernet port via
SNMPv3 or
IPSec
Exits the module in
encrypted format as
a part of the backup
file
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM19
as well
as on OCM
card flash
memory
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in
SP RAM and
QOTR/E flash
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM, SP flash
and QOTR/E
flash
Zeroized when a
User with Admin
privileges issues
zeroization
commands over
SMI or when the
password is
updated with a
new one
Used for
authenticating all
Crypto Officers and
Users
Database
Passphrase
Alpha-
Numeric
string
Entered into
module (by
Admin Users
only) over
Ethernet port via
SNMPv3 or
IPSec
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in RAM Zeroized when
module reboots
Used for deriving
keys which are used
to encrypt and sign
the database file
while performing
database backup or
restore functions
19
RAM – Random Access Memory
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CSP CSP
Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
5200 5100 565
Database
Encryption
Key
AES-256
key
Derived
internally from
Database
Passphrase
following the SP
800-132
specification
(Section 5.4,
Option 1)
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in RAM Zeroized when
module reboots
These key is derived
from Database
Passphrase. This
key is used to
encrypt or decrypt
the database
backup/restore file
Database
Signature Key
HMAC-
SHA 256
key
Derived
internally from
Database
Passphrase
following the SP
800-132
specification
(Section 5.4,
Option 1)
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in RAM Zeroized when
module reboots
These key is derived
from Database
Passphrase. This
key is used to sign
or verify the
database
backup/restore file
RADIUS
Shared Secret
Shared
secret
Entered into
module over
Ethernet port via
SNMPv3 or
IPSec
Exits the module in
encrypted format as
a part of the backup
file
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM as well as
on OCM card
flash memory
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in
SP RAM and
QOTR/E flash
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM, SP flash
and QOTR/E
flash
Zeroized when a
User with Admin
privileges issues
re-provisioning /
reset commands
over SMI
RADIUS server
authentication for
users
SMI Session
Monitor Key
HMAC
SHA-1-96
key
Generated
internally by the
SP during startup
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in SP
RAM
Zeroization can
be performed by
SP reboot
It is used to
maintain and
monitor the
connectivity during
a user session over
SMI
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CSP CSP
Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
5200 5100 565
SNMPv3
Authentication
Key
HMAC
SHA-1-96
key
Generated
internally every
time after SMI
session is
initiated
Exits the module
over TLS
Stored within the module in plaintext in SP
RAM
Zeroized with
session
termination
Used for
authentication
during user SMI
sessions via SNMPv3
SNMPv3
Privacy Key
AES-128
key
Generated
internally every
time after SMI
session is
initiated
Exits the module
over TLS
Stored within the module in plaintext in SP
RAM
Zeroized with
session
termination
Used to encrypt
user SMI sessions
over SNMPv3
SNMPv3
Proxy
Authentication
Key
HMAC
SHA-1-96
key
Default key; but
can be modified
by the User with
Admin privileges
Exits the module in
encrypted format as
a part of the backup
file
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM as well as
on OCM card
flash memory
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in
SP RAM and
QOTR/E flash
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM, SP flash
and QOTR/E
flash
Zeroized when a
User with Admin
privileges issues
zeroization
commands or
when updated
with a new one
Used for
authentication
during inter-shelf
communication via
SNMPv3
SNMPv3
Proxy Privacy
Key
AES-256
key
Default key; but
can be modified
by the User with
Admin privileges
Exits the module in
encrypted format as
a part of the backup
file
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM as well as
on OCM card
flash memory
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in
SP RAM and
QOTR/E flash
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM, SP flash
and QOTR/E
flash
Zeroized when a
User with Admin
privileges issues
zeroization
commands or
when updated
with a new one
Used to encrypt
inter-shelf
communication over
SNMPv3
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CSP CSP
Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
5200 5100 565
ISA CA RSA
Public Key
RSA-2048
Public Key
The module’s
Public key is
generated by an
SP card in the
Enterprise
primary shelf; In
a peer shelf, the
public key of the
CA enters the
module in
plaintext
Exits the primary
shelf module in
encrypted format as
a part of the backup
file or in plaintext
over secure TLS
channel
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM as well as
on OCM card
flash memory
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in
SP RAM and
QOTR/E flash
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM, SP flash
and QOTR/E
flash
Zeroized when a
User with Admin
privileges issues
zeroization
commands over
SMI
Used for
authentication
ISA CA RSA
Private Key
RSA-2048
Private
Key
Generated
internally by an
SP card in the
Enterprise
primary shelf.
No Private Key
exists in a non-
primary shelf
Never exits the
module
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM as well as
on OCM card
flash memory
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in
SP RAM and
QOTR/E flash
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM, SP flash
and QOTR/E
flash
Zeroized when a
User with Admin
privileges issues
zeroization
commands over
SMI
Used to sign other
shelf certificates
ISA Shelf RSA
Public Key
RSA-2048
Public Key
The module’s
Public key is
generated by the
SP card; a peer’s
ISA Shelf RSA
Public Key
enters the
module in
plaintext in a
certificate
Exits the module in
encrypted format
(using ISA RSA
Encryption Key) as a
part of the enrolment
process
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM as well as
on OCM card
flash memory
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in
SP RAM and
QOTR/E flash
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM, SP flash
and QOTR/E
flash
Zeroized when a
User with Admin
privileges issues
zeroization
commands over
SMI
Each shelf has to
have their own Shelf
certificate that
needs to be signed
by the primary Shelf
CA
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CSP CSP
Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
5200 5100 565
ISA Shelf RSA
Private Key
RSA-2048
Private
Key
The module’s
Private key is
generated
internally only by
the SP card
Exits the module in
encrypted format
(using ISA RSA
Encryption Key)
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM as well as
on OCM card
flash memory
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in
SP RAM and
QOTR/E flash
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM, SP flash
and QOTR/E
flash
Zeroized when a
User with Admin
privileges issues
zeroization
commands over
SMI
Used for
authentication
ISA RSA
Passphrase
Alpha-
Numeric
string
Entered into
module (by
Admin Users
only) over
Ethernet port via
SNMPv3 or
IPSec
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in RAM Zeroized when
module reboots
Used for deriving
keys which are used
to encrypt and sign
the ISA RSA key file;
before exporting
the RSA key file.
ISA RSA
Encryption
Key
AES-256
key
Derived
internally from
ISA RSA
Passphrase
following the SP
800-132
specification
(Section 5.4,
Option 1)
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in RAM Zeroized when
module reboots
These key is derived
from ISA RSA
Passphrase. This
key is used to
encrypt or decrypt
the ISA RSA key file
ISA RSA
Signature Key
HMAC-
SHA 256
key
Derived
internally from
ISA RSA
Passphrase
following the SP
800-132
specification
(Section 5.4,
Option 1)
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in RAM Zeroized when
module reboots
These key is derived
from ISA RSA
Passphrase. This
key is used to sign
or verify the ISA
RSA key file
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
Ciena 565/5100/5200 Page 31 of 46
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CSP CSP
Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
5200 5100 565
QOTR/E RSA
Public Key
RSA-2048
Public Key
Imported in an
encrypted
format (ESA RSA
Encryption Key)
format
Exits the module in
encrypted format
(using ESA RSA
Encryption Key)
Stored within the module in encrypted format
(via ESA RSA Encryption Key) format in
QOTR/E flash memory
Zeroized when a
CO issues
zeroization
commands over
SMI
Used for
authentication
before encrypting
traffic data
QOTR/E RSA
Private Key
RSA-2048
Private
Key
Imported in an
encrypted
format (ESA RSA
Encryption Key)
format
Exits the module in
encrypted format
(using ESA RSA
Encryption Key)
Stored within the module in encrypted format
(via ESA RSA Encryption Key) format in
QOTR/E flash memory
Zeroized when a
CO issues
zeroization
commands over
SMI
Used for
authentication
before encrypting
traffic data
ESA RSA
Passphrase
Alpha-
Numeric
string
Entered into
module (by CO
users only) over
Ethernet port via
SNMPv3 or
IPSec
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in RAM Zeroized when
module reboots
Used for deriving
keys which are used
to install the ESA
RSA keys on a
QOTR/E card.
ESA RSA
Encryption
Key
AES-256
key
Derived
internally from
ESA RSA
Passphrase
following the SP
800-132
specification
(Section 5.4,
Option 1)
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in RAM Zeroized when
module reboots
These key is derived
from ESA RSA
Passphrase. This
key is used to
encrypt or decrypt
the ESA RSA key file
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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CSP CSP
Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
5200 5100 565
ESA RSA
Signature Key
HMAC-
SHA 256
key
Derived
internally from
ESA RSA
Passphrase
following the SP
800-132
specification
(Section 5.4,
Option 1)
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in RAM Zeroized when
module reboots
These key is derived
from ESA RSA
Passphrase. This
key is used to sign
or verify the ESA
RSA key file
QOTR/E
Authentication
Pre-shared
Key
Alpha-
Numeric
string
Entered into
module (by CO
users only) over
Ethernet port
Exits the module in
encrypted format as
a part of the backup
file
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM as well as
on OCM card
flash memory
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in
SP RAM and
QOTR/E flash
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM, SP flash
and QOTR/E
flash
Zeroized when a
CO issues
zeroization
commands over
SMI
Used for peer
authentication
before encrypting
traffic data
QOTR/E DH
Key Pairs
2048-bit
DH key
pairs
Generated
internally during
DH key
negotiation
The module’s Public
key is generated
internally; while
public key of a peer
enters the module in
plaintext. Private key
never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in
QOTR/E RAM
Zeroization can
be performed by
reboot or session
termination
Exchanging shared
secret to derive
encryption keys
QOTR/E
Message
Authentication
Key
HMAC-
SHA 256
Generated
internally during
DH key
negotiation
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in
QOTR/E RAM
Zeroization can
be performed by
reboot or session
termination
Used for peer
authentication
before encrypting
messages
QOTR/E
Message
Encryption
Key
AES 256 Derived from
DH key
negotiation
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in
QOTR/E RAM
Zeroization can
be performed by
reboot or session
termination
Used to encrypt
peer-to-peer
messages
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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CSP CSP
Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
5200 5100 565
QOTR/E
Session
Encryption
Key
AES 256 Derived from
DH key
negotiation
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in
QOTR/E RAM
Zeroization can
be performed by
reboot or session
termination
Used to encrypt
traffic data
IPSec IKE
Authentication
Pre-shared
Key
Alpha-
Numeric
string
Entered into
module (by
Admin Users
only) over
Ethernet port
Exits the module in
encrypted format as
a part of the backup
file
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM as well
as on OCM
card flash
memory
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM and
QOTR/E flash
Stored within
the module in
plaintext in SP
RAM, SP flash
and QOTR/E
flash
Zeroized when a
User with Admin
privileges issues
zeroization
commands over
SMI
Used for peer
authentication
before of IKE
session
IKE DH Key
Pairs
2048-bit
DH key
pairs
Generated
internally during
IKE negotiation
The module’s Public
key is generated
internally; while
public key of a peer
enters the module in
plaintext. Private key
never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in SP
RAM
Zeroization can
be performed by
reboot or session
termination
Exchanging shared
secret to derive
encryption keys
during IKE
IPSec IKE
Message
Authentication
Key
HMAC-
SHA 256
or
HMAC-
SHA 1
Generated
internally during
DH key
negotiation
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in SP
RAM
Zeroization can
be performed by
reboot or session
termination
Used for peer
authentication
before encrypting
IPSec packets
IPSec IKE
Message
Encryption
Key
AES 128,
AES 256
or Triple-
DES (3
key)
Derived from
DH key
negotiation
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in SP
RAM
Zeroization can
be performed by
reboot or session
termination
Used to encrypt
peer-to-peer IPSec
messages
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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CSP CSP
Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
5200 5100 565
IPSec IKE
Session
Encryption
Key
AES 128,
AES 256
or Triple-
DES (3
key)
Derived from
DH key
negotiation
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in SP
RAM
Zeroization can
be performed by
reboot or session
termination
Used to encrypt
IPSec session data
TLS/DTLS DH
Key Pairs
2048-bit
DH key
pairs
Generated
internally during
session
negotiation by SP
card
The module’s Public
key is generated
internally; while
public key of a peer
enters the module in
plaintext. Private key
never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in SP
RAM
Zeroization can
be performed by
reboot or session
termination
Exchanging shared
secret to derive
TLS/DTLS session
keys
TLS/DTLS
Session Key
Session
key
Generated
internally by the
SP card
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in SP
RAM
Zeroization can
be performed by
reboot or session
termination
Used to encrypt
TLS/DTLS session
data
DRBG seed Random
Value
Generated
internally by all
QOTR/E and SP
card
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in
individual card RAM
Zeroization can
be performed by
reboot
Used to seed the
DRBG
DRBG key
value
Random
value
Generated
internally
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in
individual card RAM
Zeroized on
reboot or when
the values are
updated based on
the SP 800-90
specification
Used in the process
of generating a
random number
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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CSP CSP
Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
5200 5100 565
DRBG V value Random
value
Generated
internally
Never exits the
module
Stored within the module in plaintext in
individual card RAM
Zeroized on
reboot or when
the values are
updated based on
the SP 800-90
specification
Used in the process
of generating a
random number
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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2.8 Self-Tests
The 565/5100/5200 performs the Known Answer Tests (KAT) and Critical Function Tests at power-up as
shown in Table 16.
Table 16 – Power-Up Self-Tests
Power-Up Test Description
AES firmware KAT KAT for AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 in CBC
and CFB-128 mode
AES hardware KAT (QOTR/E cards only) KAT for AES-256 in ECB and counter mode
DRBG KAT KAT for SP 800-90 Counter based DRBG
HMAC KAT KAT for HMAC using SHA-1, SHA-1-96, SHA-256
and SHA-512
RSA key-pair KAT (QOTR/E cards only) KAT for RSA key-pair generation
RSA pair-wise consistency test KAT to test the RSA pair-wise consistency of
generated key-pair
RSA sign/verify KAT KAT for RSA signature generation/verification
SHA KAT KAT for SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512
SP and QOTR/E cards integrity test Integrity test is performed on the load header as
well as load body of SP and QOTR/E cards using
32-bit CRC
Triple-DES KAT KAT for Triple-DES (Three-Key) in CBC mode
The 565/5100/5200 performs the power-up critical function tests as shown in Table 17.
Table 17 – Power-Up Critical Function Tests
Power-Up Test Critical Function Tested
DRBG critical test Critical function tests are performed for DRBG
instantiation and reseed, as specified in SP 800-90
FPGA integrity test (QOTR/E cards only) Integrity test is performed on the load binary of
cryptographic FPGA present in QOTR/E card using
32-bit CRC
SP card load test (SP card only) The firmware library is checked against the
signature files using RSA every time the firmware is
loaded on the SP card
The 565/5100/5200 performs the conditional self-tests as shown in Table 18.
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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Table 18 – Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional Test Description
Continuous DRBG test Continuous RNG test for SP 800-90 Counter based
DRBG
Firmware upgrade test (SP card only) Test is performed to verify the authenticity of the
upgrades using RSA-2048
Manual key entry test Manual key entry test is performed by forcing the
operator to enter the manual key twice and
comparing both keys
RSA pair-wise consistency test (QOTR/E cards only) Test performed to check the RSA pair-wise
consistency of generated key-pair
All previously mentioned self-tests are performed on a per card basis rather than at the module level.
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2
Level 2 requirements for this validation.
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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3 Secure Operation
The 565/5100/5200 meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to place
and keep the module in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.
3.1 Initial Setup
Before powering-up the module, the CO must ensure that the required tamper-evident labels are correctly
applied to the enclosure. The FIPS security kit (Part Number: NT0H25BZ Rev 3) consists of the following
items:
 Tamper evident labels
 Alcohol wipe packs for cleaning the equipment prior to applying labels
 Security log book
 Security Policy CD20
along with a printed copy
The CO shall perform the following steps to apply the tamper evident labels:
 Labels must be applied 1 hour before the module is placed into operation
 Ensure that the shelf surface temperature is above 10°C
 Clean all label placement locations using the alcohol wipe pack provided in the FIPS security kit.
If the surface of the enclosure is extremely dirty or rough, scuff the painted area where label is to
be applied prior to cleaning using a 400 grit emery paper (not a part of FIPS security kit)
 Ensure that the surface is clean and dry
 Apply the labels on the placement locations as described below:
o Between the front panel and side (Label #1 and #2), between the top cover, side and
maintenance panel (Label #3 and #4), between the rear panel and side (Label #5 and #6),
between the rear panel and top cover (Label #7), and between the air filter and bottom
chassis (Label #8), as shown in Figure 9 in the case of 5200;
o Between the front panel and side (Label #1 and #2), between the rear panel and top cover
(Label #3), and between the rear panel and bottom chassis (Label #4), as shown in Figure
10 in the case of 5100; or
o Between the front panel and side (Label #1 and #2), between the top cover and side
(Label #3 and #4), between the rear panel and side (Label #6), and between the rear panel
and top cover (Label #5), as shown in Figure 11 in the case of 565
 Apply the labels firmly and please note that all the labels are wrapped around the edges
 Record the serial numbers on the labels along with its placement position in the security log book
20
CD – Compact Disc
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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Figure 9 – Tamper Evident Label Placement for 5200
2
3
4
1
5
7
6
8
8
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
Ciena 565/5100/5200 Page 40 of 46
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Figure 10 – Tamper Evident Label Placement for 5100
Figure 11 – Tamper Evident Label Placement for 565
4
1
3
2
4
2
1
3
6
5
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
Ciena 565/5100/5200 Page 41 of 46
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3.2 Secure Management
The modules have a non-modifiable OS. A User with Admin privileges is responsible for commissioning
the module. When a module is powered on for the first time, a User with Admin privileges must provision
the module into FIPS mode by accessing the configuration tab and changing the “FIPS mode” field to
“Enable”. Once a module is provisioned into FIPS mode, the module will operate and remain in FIPS-
Approved mode of operation unless the module is decommissioned by the User with Admin privileges or
the physical security has been breached.
3.2.1 Initialization
As soon as the module is provisioned into “FIPS mode”, it performs power-up self-tests and enters into
FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The following features/services/algorithms are disabled by default and
shall not be enabled or used:
 SNMP v1
 SNMP v2c
 Challenge – Response Authentication
 DES
 MD5
 Blowfish
It is the CO’s responsibility to ensure that the module boots correctly. The CO shall ensure that the module
is running in FIPS-Approved mode by verifying the “FIPS mode” status over SMI. The module is shipped
with three user accounts (Admin, Operator and Observer) and their default passwords. The users must
change the default password as part of the initial configuration. The User with Admin privileges should
create a CO user. The CO must change the initial password to a personal password. All user passwords
must follow the complex password restrictions as mentioned in section 2.4.3. Any user shall not enable
any of the disabled services mentioned previously.
3.2.2 Management
IPsec must be configured to use FIPS-Approved cipher suites. Firmware upgrades are possible only if the
digital signature is successfully verified and if the Firmware upgrade self-test has passed. The Database
Passphrase, ISA RSA Passphrase and ESA RSA Passphrase shall be at least 8 characters long. For security
strength details of passphrases please refer to Table 13. The following features/services are enabled to
maintain security during FIPS-Approved mode of operation:
 IPsec for RADIUS server communications and OMEA services
 Telnet sessions are secured via use of DTLS21
The CO must periodically ensure that the labels or shelves do not show any signs of tampering. Evidence
of tampering can be indicated by any of the following:
 Deformation of the label or “dot” pattern visible
 Label appearing broken or torn
 Missing label (in parts or full) from its expected position
 Warped or bent metal covers
 Scratches in the paint of the module
 Serial number on the labels do not match the log book entries
In case of any evidence indicating that the physical security has been violated, it is up to the CO to ensure
that the module is secured in terms of its functionality and re-apply the tamper evident labels, following the
21
DTLS – Datagram Transport Layer Security
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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procedure as described in section 3.1. If required, the CO should perform a reboot or follow the
Zeroization process as described in section 3.2.3.
3.2.3 Zeroization
There are many critical security parameters within the module’s cryptographic boundary, including public
and private keys, session keys, and authentication credentials. The module’s CSPs reside in multiple
storage media; SP RAM and Flash, OCM Flash, and QOTR/E RAM and Flash. Ephemeral keys that reside
in RAM will be zeroized when the module reboots or when a secure session is terminated. Keys that are
stored in RAM or Flash are subject to the zeroization methods described in Table 15 of this Security Policy.
In order to zeroize the entire module (all keys stored in SP RAM and Flash, OCM Flash, and QOTR/E
RAM and Flash), the User with Admin privileges and CO, together, will have to perform following
consecutive and supervised steps:
1. User with Admin privileges will log in and zeroize the keys they are capable of zeroizing
according to the zeroization methods described in Table 15.
2. The CO will then log in and zeroize all remaining keys according to the zeroization methods
described in Table 15.
During both steps the module shall be under the direct control of both the User with Admin privileges and
CO. After each zeroization step is complete, the SMI console will show a notification stating that
zeroization has taken place.
3.3 User Guidance
A User must be diligent to follow complex password restrictions and must not reveal their password to
anyone. Additionally, the User should be careful to protect FIPS log book, tamper evident labels and any
secret or private keys in their possession.
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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4 Acronyms
This section describes the acronyms.
Table 19 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
APBE Automatic Per-Band Equalizer
C&L Coupler & Splitter Tray
CA Certificate Authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CD Compact Disc
CFB Cipher Feedback
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto Officer
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DCE Data Circuit-Terminating Equipment
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DTE Data Terminal Equipment
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
ECB Electronic Code Book
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
ESA External Security Authentication
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
Gbps Gigabits per second
GFSRM Gigabit Ethernet/Fibre Channel SubRate Multiplexer
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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Acronym Definition
IP Internet Protocol
ISA Inter-shelf Security Authentication
KAT Known Answer Test
LED Light Emitting Diode
MOTR Multiplexer Optical Transponder
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
nm Nanometer
NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
OC Optical Carrier
OCI Optical Channel Interface
OCLD Optical Channel Laser/Detector
OCM Optical Channel Manager
OFA Optical Fiber Amplifier
OMEA Optical Manager Element Adapter
OMX Optical Multiplexer
OMXI Optical Multiplexer Interface
OS Operating System
OSC Optical Service Channel
OTR Optical Transponder
PM Performance Monitoring
QOTR Quad Optical Transponder
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman
SFP Small Form-Factor Pluggable
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMI System Manager Interface
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SRM Subrate Multiplexer
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TL1 Transaction Language 1
TLS Transport Layer Security
WDM Wavelength Division Multiplexing
Security Policy, Version 1.9 December 19, 2012
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Acronym Definition
XFP 10 Gigabit Small Form-Factor Pluggable
Prepared by:
Corsec Security, Inc.
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Highway, Suite 220
Fairfax, VA 22033
United States of America
Phone: +1 (703) 267-6050
Email: info@corsec.com
http://www.corsec.com