IMS.TD.002500.DRM Page 1 Version 1.2
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I M S - S M
FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Validation
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 1.2
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................3
1.1 PURPOSE ...........................................................................................................3
1.2 REFERENCES .....................................................................................................3
2 IMS-SM OVERVIEW................................................................................................4
3 FIPS 140-2 MODE OF OPERATION .......................................................................6
3.1 APPROVED ALGORITHMS.....................................................................................6
3.2 NON-APPROVED ALGORITHMS.............................................................................7
4 SECURITY LEVELS ................................................................................................8
5 MODULE INTERFACES..........................................................................................9
6 CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS..................................................................10
6.1 SECRET AND PRIVATE KEYS AND OTHER CSPS..................................................10
6.2 PUBLIC KEYS....................................................................................................11
7 ROLES AND SERVICES .......................................................................................12
7.1 PCI USER SERVICES.........................................................................................12
7.2 SMS USER SERVICES.......................................................................................14
7.3 SAS USER SERVICES .......................................................................................16
7.4 SOS (CRYPTO-OFFICER) USER SERVICES .........................................................17
7.5 UN-AUTHENTICATED SERVICES..........................................................................18
7.6 AUTHENTICATION STRENGTH.............................................................................19
8 PHYSICAL SECURITY..........................................................................................20
9 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT..........................................................................21
10 SELF-TESTS .........................................................................................................21
11 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS.....................................................................22
12 SECURITY RULES................................................................................................22
13 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................23
14 DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY........................................................................25
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Doremi
Labs IMS-SM. It describes how this module meets all the requirements specified in the
FIPS 140-2 for security Level 2, and most of the Level 3 requirements. This Policy forms
a part of the submission package provided to the testing lab.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2) specifies the
security requirements for a cryptographic module protecting sensitive information. Based
on four security levels for cryptographic modules this standard identifies requirements in
eleven sections. For more information about the standard, visit:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf.
1.2 References
This Security Policy describes how this module complies with the eleven sections of the
standard.
• For more information on the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program, please refer
to the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/.
• For more information about Doremi Labs solutions, please visit the following website:
http://www.doremilabs.com/
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2 IMS-SM Overview
The IMS-SM is the Security Manager module present in the Doremi Labs IMS1000 that
can be hosted inside D-Cinema DLP projectors. It supports highest JPEG-2000
decoding capabilities and accepts alternative content as well.
The pictures below present the four IMS-SM hardware models:
Front View Rear View
Figure 1: Hardware Model IMS-SM-C1
Front View Rear View
Figure 2: Hardware Model IMS-SM-C2
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Front View Rear View
Figure 3: Hardware Model IMS-SM-E1
Front View Rear View
Figure 4: Hardware Model IMS-SM-E2
The IMS-SM has been designed for compliance with FIPS 140-2, Level 3 requirements,
except from EMI/EMC point of view – it complies with EMI/EMC Level 2 requirements
only.
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3 FIPS 140-2 Mode of Operation
The module only provides a FIPS approved mode of operation. This mode of operation
makes use of approved algorithms and also supports non-approved algorithms that are
allowed in a FIPS approved mode of operation.
In order to verify that the module is in a FIPS approved mode of operation the operator
shall ensure that the firmware and hardware are the FIPS approved versions. The
versions should match those listed on the validation certificate or found on the
cryptographic module validation list webpage (http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/140val-
all.htm). The operator shall also ensure that all self tests pass and that the module
transitions into operational mode.
3.1 Approved Algorithms
The IMS-SM supports the following algorithms approved for use in a FIPS mode of
operation:
 AES (FPGA implementation) with 128 bit keys decryption in CBC mode – see
Certificate #2220
 AES with 128 bit keys for encryption and decryption in CBC mode – see
Certificate #1252
 AES with 128 bit keys for encryption and decryption in ECB mode – see
Certificate #1383
 HMAC-SHA1 – see Certificate #731
 SHA-1 and SHA-256, used by other algorithms (like HMAC-SHA1, FIPS 186-2
RNG or RSA Digital Signature) – see Certificate #1148
 ANSI X9.31 RNG, using TDES-2Keys – see Certificate #696
 FIPS 186-2 RNG – see Certificate #693
 RSA Key generation and Digital Signature Generation/Verification – see
Certificates #600, #601 and #777
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3.2 Non-Approved Algorithms
The IMS-SM also supports the following non-approved algorithms that are allowed for
use in a FIPS mode of operation:
 RSA Decryption (modulus 2048) – used for key unwrapping only, key
establishment methodology provides 112 bits of strength
 TRNG (RNG Hardware based) – used to seed the approved ANSI X9.31 RNG
presented in paragraph 3.1
 MD5 used for TLS key establishment
 HMAC-MD5 used for TLS key establishment
 ECDH - considered as non-security relevant and only used to interoperate with
legacy equipment.
 TI S-box – considered as non-security relevant data obfuscation (plaintext); only
used for status and control.
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4 Security Levels
The IMS-SM design, development, tests and production has satisfied the requirements
to ensure a secure product. It is especially adapted to Digital Cinema security
requirements.
The IMS-SM, Hardware Models IMS-SM-C1, IMS-SM-C2, IMS-SM-E1 and IM-SM-E2
and firmware versions 4.0.3-0, 4.0.0-3, 6.0.3-0, 4.2.0-4, 4.2.0-3, 6.0.12-0 is tested to
meet the FIPS security requirements for the levels shown in the following table.
These configurations are identified as follows:
(Hardware Versions: IMS-SM-C1 and IMS-SM-C2; Firmware Versions: (4.0.3-0, 4.0.0-3
and 6.0.3-0); Hardware)
(Hardware Versions: IMS-SM-E1 and IMS-SM-E2; Firmware Versions: (4.2.0-4, 4.2.0-3
and 6.0.12-0); Hardware)
The overall module is tested FIPS 140-2 Security Level 3, with the exception of the
EMI/EMC tested FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2 only – resulting in an overall FIPS 140-2
Level 2 compliance. As areas 2, 4, 7 and 9 require an overall Level 3 compliance to be
validated as Level 3 individually, these areas are listed with a Level 2 compliance only
(see table below).
Table 1 – FIPS 140-2 Security Level
FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements Section Level
1. Cryptographic Module Specification 3
2. Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3. Roles, Services and Authentication 3
4. Finite State Model 2
5. Physical Security 3
6. Operational Environment N/A
7. Cryptographic Key Management 2
8. EMI/EMC 2
9. Self-Tests 2
10. Design Assurance 3
11. Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
FIPS Overall Level 2
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5 Module Interfaces
The following table lists the logical interfaces of the module and how they map to
physical ports:
Table 2 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Module Physical Ports
Data Input Interface LVDS trace, PCI-express trace, GPIO traces, SDI dual HD input
traces, HDMI input trace, LTC (time code) input connector,
Ethernet traces
Data Output Interface LVDS trace, PCI-express trace, GPIO connectors, Audio traces,
LTC (time code) output connector, Ethernet traces
Control Input Interface LVDS trace, PCI-express trace, Service door and marriage
monitoring traces, Video sync input traces, System reset trace
Status Output Interface LVDS trace, PCI-express trace, Serial Port, Clock output,
Service door and marriage monitoring traces, Status LED traces
Power Interface PCI-express trace, Power traces
No maintenance access interface is present.
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6 Critical Security Parameters
6.1 Secret and Private Keys and Other CSPs
The secret and private keys that exist within the cryptographic module are identified
below:
1. Device Master Key – AES key used to protect the Device Private Key, the External
Private Key, the CSP Secret Key and the AES Binary Update Key.
2. Device Private Key – Private RSA key used for key wrapping, signatures and TLS.
3. External Private Key – Private RSA key used for key wrapping.
4. Extra Private Key – Private RSA key, used for digital signature generation and TLS
client operations.
5. Reset Private Key – Private RSA key used for key wrapping, signatures and TLS.
6. Reset Secret Key – AES key used to protect the Reset Private Key.
7. CSP Secret Key – AES key used to protect the Reset Secret Key, the Doremi
HMAC Key, the AES Shared knowledge Key, the AES Wrapping Key and the PCI
User Authentication Secrets.
8. AES Wrapping Key – AES key used for AES Key Wrapping.
9. AES Content Encryption Keys – AES keys that protect content.
10. AES Binary Update Key – Used to decrypt binaries being imported into the
module.
11. Seed Values – Used to seed the FIPS approved RNGs.
12. AES Shared Knowledge Key – AES key used to secure import/export of CSPs.
13. Doremi HMAC Key – HMAC key used for Firmware Load Test.
14. Content Integrity Keys – HMAC keys used to verify the integrity of HMAC’d
content.
15. TLS AES Session Keys – AES keys used for TLS communication.
16. TLS HMAC Sessions Keys – HMAC keys used for TLS communication.
17. TLS PRF Data – Used for TLS session key establishment.
18. TLS Master Secret – Used for TLS session key establishment.
19. TLS Pre-Master Secret – Used for TLS session key establishment.
20. PCI User Authentication Secrets – PCI User Authentication Secrets used by the
module (8 characters).
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6.2 Public Keys
Public keys are not considered as Critical Security Parameters because of their public
status. The public keys contained in the module are listed below for consistency:
1. Device Public Key – Public RSA key used for TLS and within Digital Certificate.
2. External Public Key – Public RSA key used within Digital Certificate.
3. Extra Public Key – Public RSA key used for TLS client mode and within digital
certificate.
4. Reset Public Key – Public RSA key used for TLS and within Digital Certificate.
5. SMS User Public Key – Public RSA key used for TLS and within Digital Certificate.
6. SAS User Public Key – Public RSA key used for TLS and within Digital Certificate.
7. SOS (Crypto-Officer) User Public Key – Public RSA key used for TLS and within
Digital Certificate.
8. Cinema Equipment Public Key(s) – Public RSA key(s) used for TLS and within
Digital Certificate.
9. Signers Public Key(s) – Public RSA key(s) used to verify XML files signature and
within Digital Certificate.
10. ICP Public Key(s) – Public RSA key(s) used within Digital Certificate for TLS and
Digital Signature verification.
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7 Roles and Services
The cryptographic module supports four distinct operator roles: PCI User, SMS User,
SAS User and SOS (Crypto-officer) User. No maintenance role is supported.
The services belonging to each user are presented in the following paragraphs.
7.1 PCI User Services
Table 3 below summarizes specific services available to the PCI Users only.
Table 3: PCI User Services
Services Description CSP(s) and Public Key(s)
Possibly Involved
Type of
access to
CSP(s) and
Public
Key(s)
Basic
Configuration
This service allows setting and
getting basic configuration
parameters.
AES Shared Knowledge Key,
AES Content Encryption Keys
Read
Content Integrity Keys Read/Write
Advanced
Configuration
This service allows setting and
getting advanced configuration
parameters.
Device Master Key, Doremi
HMAC Key, AES Binary Update
Key, External Private Key, CSP
Secret Key, AES Shared
Knowledge Key, External Public
Key
Read
AES Content Encryption Keys Read/Write
Get Status
Information
This service allows getting
status information.
- -
GPIO This service allows loading and
getting GPIO data.
- -
Get Advanced
Information
This service allows getting
advanced information.
Device Master Key, Device
Private Key, Reset Private Key,
Reset Secret Key, CSP Secret
Key, TLS AES Session Keys, TLS
HMAC Session Keys, TLS PRF
Data, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Pre-Master Secret, Device Public
Key, Reset Public Key, External
Public Key, Extra Public Key,
SMS User Public Key, SAS User
Public Key, SOS (Crypto-Officer)
User Public Key
Read
Cinema Equipment Public Key(s) Write
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Services Description CSP(s) and Public Key(s)
Possibly Involved
Type of
access to
CSP(s) and
Public
Key(s)
Basic Operations This service allows performing
basic operations.
Device Master Key, Device
Private Key, Extra Private Key,
Reset Private Key, Reset Secret
Key, CSP Secret Key, TLS AES
Session Keys, TLS HMAC
Session Keys, TLS PRF Data,
TLS Master Secret, TLS Pre-
Master Secret, AES Wrapping
Key, Device Public Key, Reset
Public Key, SMS User Public Key,
SAS User Public Key, SOS
(Crypto-Officer) User Public Key
Read
AES Binary Update Key, AES
Content Encryption Keys, Content
Integrity Keys, Seed Values,
Signers Public Key(s), Cinema
Equipment Public Key(s), ICP
Public Key(s)
Write
External Private Key, External
Public Key
Read/Write
Network
Configuration
Performs non-security relevant
network related configuration
- -
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7.2 SMS User Services
Table 4 below presents all the services available to the SMS User – Screen Manager.
Table 4: SMS User Services
Services Description CSP(s) and Public Key(s)
Possibly Involved
Type of
access to
CSP(s) and
Public
Key(s)
Get Advanced
Information
This service allows getting
advanced information.
Device Master Key, Device
Private Key, Reset Private Key,
Reset Secret Key, CSP Secret
Key, TLS AES Session Keys, TLS
HMAC Session Keys, TLS PRF
Data, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Pre-Master Secret, Device Public
Key, Reset Public Key, External
Public Key, Extra Public Key,
SMS User Public Key, SAS User
Public Key, SOS (Crypto-Officer)
User Public Key
Read
Cinema Equipment Public Key(s) Write
Basic Operations This service allows performing
basic operations.
Device Master Key, Device
Private Key, Extra Private Key,
Reset Private Key, Reset Secret
Key, CSP Secret Key, TLS AES
Session Keys, TLS HMAC
Session Keys, TLS PRF Data,
TLS Master Secret, TLS Pre-
Master Secret, AES Wrapping
Key, Device Public Key, Reset
Public Key, SMS User Public Key,
SAS User Public Key, SOS
(Crypto-Officer) User Public Key
Read
AES Binary Update Key, AES
Content Encryption Keys, Seed
Values, Signers Public Key(s),
Cinema Equipment Public Key(s),
ICP Public Key(s)
Write
External Private Key, External
Public Key
Read/Write
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Services Description CSP(s) and Public Key(s)
Possibly Involved
Type of
access to
CSP(s) and
Public
Key(s)
Basic Settings This service allows performing
some of the module’s settings.
Device Master Key, Device
Private Key, CSP Secret Key, TLS
AES Session Keys, TLS HMAC
Session Keys, TLS PRF Data,
TLS Master Secret, TLS Pre-
Master Secret, Device Public Key,
SMS User Public Key, SAS User
Public Key, SOS (Crypto-Officer)
User Public Key
Read
AES Binary Update Key, Doremi
HMAC Key, Signers Public Key(s)
Read/Write
Suite Management This service provides suite
management operations.
Device Master Key, Device
Private Key, TLS AES Session
Keys, TLS HMAC Session Keys,
TLS PRF Data, TLS Master
Secret, TLS Pre-Master Secret,
Device Public Key, SMS User
Public Key, SAS User Public Key,
SOS (Crypto-Officer) User Public
Key, External Private Key
Read
AES Binary Update Key, AES
Content Encryption Keys, Content
Integrity Keys, Signers Public
Key(s)
Read/Write
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7.3 SAS User Services
Table 5 below presents all the services available to the SAS User – Security Agent.
Table 5: SAS User Services
Services Description CSP(s) and Public Key(s)
Possibly Involved
Type of
access to
CSP(s) and
Public
Key(s)
All the services listed in Table 4 for the SMS User are also available for the SAS User.
Reset Board This service resets the module. Device Master Key, Device
Private Key, Reset Private Key,
Reset Secret Key, CSP Secret
Key, TLS AES Session Keys, TLS
HMAC Session Keys, TLS PRF
Data, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Pre-Master Secret, Device Public
Key, Reset Public Key, SAS User
Public Key, SOS (Crypto-Officer)
User Public Key
Read
Device Private Key, Device Public
Key, External Private Key,
External Public Key, Extra Private
Key, Extra Public Key, Content
Integrity Keys, Seed Values, AES
Content Encryption Keys, AES
Binary Update Key, Signers Public
Key(s), ICP Public Key(s)
Write
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7.4 SOS (Crypto-Officer) User Services
Table 6 below presents all the services available to the SOS (Crypto-Officer) User –
Security Officer.
Table 6: SOS (Crypto-Officer) User Services
Services Description CSP(s) and Public Key(s)
Possibly Involved
Type of
access to
CSP(s) and
Public
Key(s)
All the services listed in Table 5 for the SAS User are also available for the SOS (Crypto-Officer) User.
SOS Configuration This service allows performing
specific SOS (Crypto-Officer)
User configuration operations.
Device Master Key, Device
Private Key, Reset Private Key,
Reset Secret Key, CSP Secret
Key, TLS AES Session Keys, TLS
HMAC Session Keys, TLS PRF
Data, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Pre-Master Secret, AES Wrapping
Key, Device Public Key, Reset
Public Key, SOS (Crypto-Officer)
User Public Key
Read
Device Private Key, Device
Public Key, External Private Key,
External Public Key, Extra Private
Key, Extra Public Key, SMS User
Public Key
Read/Write
Zeroization This service zeroizes sensitive
data (including all plaintext
CSPs)
Device Master Key, Device
Private Key, Reset Private Key,
Reset Secret Key, CSP Secret
Key, TLS AES Session Keys, TLS
HMAC Session Keys, TLS PRF
Data, TLS Master Secret, TLS
Pre-Master Secret, Device Public
Key, Reset Public Key, SOS
(Crypto-Officer) User Public Key
Read
All plaintext CSPs, Device Public
Key, External Public Key, Extra
Public Key, SMS User Public Key,
Signers Public Key(s), ICP Public
Key(s)
Write
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7.5 Un-authenticated Services
The cryptographic module supports the following unauthenticated services:
Table 7: Un-authenticated Services
Services Description CSP(s) and
Public Key(s)
Possibly
Involved
Type of
access to
CSP(s) and
Public Key(s)
Get Session Id Exports the current Session Id of the module - -
Show Status This “service” corresponds to the status
information exported automatically through the
Serial Port
- -
Host Reset Resets the host
Network
Configuration
Performs non-security relevant network related
configuration
- -
Video Settings Performs video related settings - -
The power recycling of the IMS-SM allows executing the suite of power-up tests required
by FIPS 140-2. No other defined service allows executing these power-up tests. It has to
be considered as an unauthenticated service as it only requires the IMS-SM to be
powered-off and powered-on again.
Note that the following unauthenticated service is accessible by connecting to the
cryptographic module through ECDH and TI S-box, the use of which is considered non-
security relevant data obfuscation from FIPS 140-2 perspective as related to this
cryptographic module; this does not provide any security relevant functions and is not
used to protect sensitive unclassified data. The I/O therein is obfuscated to support
interoperability with existing legacy equipment and is only used to set and retrieve non-
security relevant items. Note that this service is considered to be plaintext with respect to
FIPS 140-2, and does not use the Approved security functions, disclose, modify, or
substitute CSPs or otherwise affect the security of the module:
o Network Configuration service
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7.6 Authentication Strength
The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles using identity-based operator
authentication. The PCI User role is authenticated through the use of “PCI User
Authentication Secrets” – known by Doremi Labs only – associated with the current
Session Id. Note that data to be compared to authentication secrets are imported
encrypted in the module.
SMS, SAS and SOS (Crypto-Officer) User roles are authenticated through the use of
2048 bits RSA Signatures. Note that these authentications rely on the usage of TLS.
Table 8: Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
Role Type of Authentication Authentication Mechanism
PCI User Identity-based operator authentication Authentication Secret Verification
SMS User Identity-based operator authentication 2048 bits RSA Signature Verification
SAS User Identity-based operator authentication 2048 bits RSA Signature Verification
SOS (Crypto-
Officer) User
Identity-based operator authentication 2048 bits RSA Signature Verification
Table 9: Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism
Authentication Secret Verification With 256 possible characters and 8-character Authentication
Secret, the probability that a random attempt will succeed or a
false acceptance will occur is 5.42 x 10ˉ(20) that is less than
1/1,000,000.
The probability of successfully authenticating to the module
within one minute with a replay delays of 1s is 3.25 x 10ˉ(18)
that is less than 1/100,000.
2048 bits RSA Signature Verification It relies on 2048 bits RSA keys known to provide an equivalent
of 112 bits of encryption strength. Therefore, a random attempt
has an associated probability of fault acceptance of (1/2)^112,
which is less than 1/1,000,000.
Given the processing capabilities and the clock speed, the
number of consecutive attempt that could be launched in a
one minute period is extremely limited. An extremely
conservative estimate is that the probability of successfully
authenticating in a one minute period would be (1/2)^69, which
is much less than 1/100,000.
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8 Physical Security
The IMS-SM is classified as a multiple-chip embedded module for FIPS purposes. It is
comprised of production grade components.
The physical security mechanism employed by the module includes a hard, opaque and
tamper-evident metal enclosure that is monitored 24/7 by tamper detection and
response mechanisms; any attempt to remove the metal enclosure results in
instantaneous active zeroization of all plaintext CSPs. The module also includes tamper
evident labels covering each of the mounting hardware for models, IMS-SM-C1, IMS-
SM-C2, IMS-SM-E1 and IMS-SM-E2 – these labels are installed by the manufacturer.
The PCB itself also provides tamper evidence. The tamper evident metal enclosure,
tamper evident labels and tamper evident PCB shall be periodically inspected to ensure
that physical security is maintained.
The cryptographic boundary is the outer perimeter of the module’s edge (see section 2)
and it includes the hard, opaque and tamper-evident metal enclosure covering all
security relevant components.
All the components that reside outside of the metal enclosure are excluded from FIPS
140-2 requirements. Components excluded from the FIPS 140-2 requirements are not
security relevant. The excluded components are the non-security relevant data input and
data output, filtering components (capacitors, resistors, inductance), voltage regulators,
fuses, traces and signals routed to said components, PCB outside metal enclosure, and
connectors.
Table 10: Physical Security Inspection
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency
of Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Metal enclosure with
tamper detection and
response mechanisms
Upon receiving the module
from the manufacturer, and
as often as feasible.
Visually inspect all sides of the metal
enclosure for visible evidence of tampering
(e.g. scratches, scrapes, nics, gauges, etc).
Check the output of the Show Status service
on an on-going basis to confirm that the
module has not tampered/zeroized.
Tamper evident labels Upon receiving the module
from the manufacturer, and
as often as feasible.
Visually inspect the labels for visible evidence
of tampering (e.g. removal, scratches,
scrapes, rips, nics, replacements, gauges,
etc).
Tamper evident PCB Upon receiving the module
from the manufacturer, and
as often as feasible.
Visually inspect the PCB for visible evidence
of tampering (e.g. scratches, scrapes, nics,
gauges, etc)
If any tampering with the module is suspected, please remove the module from service
and contact Doremi Labs Technical Services department immediately at 1-818-562-1101
or email cinemasupport@doremilabs.com.
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9 Operational Environment
The IMS-SM supports a limited operational environment that only allows the loading of
trusted, validated, and HMACed binary images through authenticated service. Doremi
Labs maintains sole possession of the corresponding HMAC key needed to validate the
uploaded binary into the IMS-SM.
10 Self-Tests
The module performs the following self-tests:
 Power Up Self-tests
o Firmware Integrity Test (32 bits CRC)
o AES Encryption/Decryption known answer tests
o HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA256 known answer test
o SHA1 known answer test
o RSA Digital Signature Generation/Validation known answer test
o RNGs known answer test (ANSI X9.31 RNG and FIPS 186-2 RNG)
o Critical Functions Tests:
 CRC 32-bit known answer test
 RSA Encryption/Decryption Pair-wise Consistency Test
 Conditional Tests
o Continuous ANSI X9.31 RNG Test
o Continuous FIPS 186-2 RNG Test
o Continuous TRNG Test (Hardware RNG Test)
o Firmware Load Test (HMAC-SHA1)
o Pair-wise consistency test (RSA Keys Generation: Digital Signature
Generation/Verification; Encryption/Decryption)
The bypass test and the manual key entry test are N/A.
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11 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The IMS-SM does not mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2
requirements.
Table 11: Mitigation of Other Attacks
Other Attacks Mitigation Mechanism Specific Limitations
N/A N/A N/A
12 Security Rules
The cryptographic module’s design corresponds to the module’s security rules. This
section documents the security rules enforced by the cryptographic module to implement
the security requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 2 module.
1. The cryptographic module shall provide four distinct operator roles. These are the
PCI User role, the SMS User role, the SAS User role and the SOS (Crypto-Officer)
User role.
2. The cryptographic module shall provide identity-based authentication.
3. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have
access to any cryptographic services.
4. Data output shall be inhibited during self-tests and error states.
5. Data output shall be logically disconnected from the internal process performing
key generation and zeroization.
6. Status information shall not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could
lead to a compromise of the module.
7. The module shall not support a bypass capability or a maintenance interface.
8. The cryptographic module performs the tests as presented in section 10 above.
9. At any time the operator is capable of commanding the module to perform the
power-up self-test by a power-cycle.
10. Prior to each use, the ANSI X9.31 DRNG, FIPS 186-2 DRNG, and the hardware
based TRNG are tested using the conditional test specified in FIPS 140-2 §4.9.2.
11. The module supports concurrent operators.
12. The module only supports a FIPS mode of operation (i.e. non-FIPS mode is not
supported). To determine that the module is running in FIPS mode, invoke the “Get
Advanced Information” service and check that the firmware versions are the same
as those written in this Security Policy document. Also, check that the hardware
version written on the module’s sticker matches the one specified in this Security
Policy document.
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13 Acronyms
Term Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-EBU Audio Engineering Society – European Broadcasting Union
ANSI American National Standards Institute
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DCI Digital Cinema Initiatives
DRNG Deterministic Random Number Generator
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
GPI General Purpose Input
GPIO General Purpose Input/Output
GPO General Purpose Output
HD High Definition
HMAC Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT Known Answer Test
LTC Linear Time-Code
N/A Not Applicable
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OSD On Screen Display
PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect
PRF Pseudo Random Function
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adelman
RTC Real Time Clock
SAS Security Agent System
SDI Serial Digital Interface
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
IMS.TD.002500.DRM Page 24 Version 1.2
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Term Definition
SMS Screen Management System
SOS Security Officer System
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
TRNG True Random Number Generator
IMS.TD.002500.DRM Page 25 Version 1.2
Doremi Labs
14 Document Revision History
Date Version Description
11/05/2012 1.0 First version
04/30/2013 1.1 Updated to include hardware models IMS-SM-E1, IMS-SM-E2
and firmware versions 4.2.0-4, 4.2.0-3, 6.0.12-0
11/01/2013 1.2 The word “draft” has been removed from the document version