Micron Technology
Copyright Micron Technology, Inc., 2024
Micron Technology, Inc. Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Micron Technology
Micron 7400 SSD Controller Sub Chip Security Subsystem
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy
Document Version: 1.3
Date: April 11th, 2024
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Table of Contents
1 General............................................................................................................................4
2 Cryptographic Module Specification................................................................................5
2.1 Operational Environment.............................................................................................................5
2.2 Cryptographic Boundary ..............................................................................................................5
2.3 Modes of Operation.....................................................................................................................6
2.4 Security Functions ........................................................................................................................7
2.5 Security Function Implementation...............................................................................................9
2.6 Overall Security Design.................................................................................................................9
2.7 Rules of Operation .................................................................................................................... 10
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces...................................................................................11
4 Roles, Services and Authentication................................................................................12
4.1 Assumption of Roles and Related Services ............................................................................... 12
4.2 Authentication Methods ........................................................................................................... 13
4.3 Services...................................................................................................................................... 13
5 Software/Firmware Security..........................................................................................17
6 Operational Environment ..............................................................................................18
7 Physical Security............................................................................................................19
8 Non-Invasive Security ....................................................................................................19
9 Sensitive Security Parameter (SSP) Management ..........................................................20
9.1 Sensitive Security Parameters (SSP).......................................................................................... 20
9.2 DRBG Randomness Source........................................................................................................ 23
10 Self-Tests.......................................................................................................................23
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ......................................................................................................24
11.1 Security Initialization................................................................................................................. 24
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...........................................................................................25
13 References and Definitions............................................................................................25
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Security Levels.................................................................................................................................. 4
Table 2 – Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration................................................................................... 5
Table 3 – Approved Algorithms ....................................................................................................................... 7
Table 4 – Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed
......................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Table 5 - Security Function Implementation.................................................................................................... 9
Table 6 – Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................................... 11
Table 7 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output................................................................................. 12
Table 8 – Roles and Authentication............................................................................................................... 13
Table 9 – Approved Services.......................................................................................................................... 14
Table 10 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines ....................................................................................... 19
Table 11 – SSPs............................................................................................................................................... 20
Table 12 – Error States and Indicators........................................................................................................... 23
Table 13 – Pre-Operational Self-Test............................................................................................................. 23
Table 14 – Conditional Self-Tests................................................................................................................... 24
Table 15 – References.................................................................................................................................... 25
Table 16– Acronyms and Definitions ............................................................................................................. 26
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Micron 7400 ASIC............................................................................................................................ 5
Figure 2 – Module............................................................................................................................................ 6
Figure 3 – Tamper Evidence Example............................................................................................................ 19
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1 General
This document defines the non-proprietary Security Policy for the Micron Technology, Inc. Micron 7400 SSD
Controller Security Subsystem module, hereafter denoted as the Module. The Module is a Single Chip
Hardware sub-chip cryptographic subsystem, as defined in FIPS 140-3 Implementation Guidance 2.3.B.
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 1 – Security Levels
ISO/IEC 24759 Section
6. [Number Below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 2
4 Roles, Services and, Authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Physical Security 2
8 Non-Invasive Security N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management 2
10 Self-Tests 2
11 Life-Cycle Assurance 2
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
The Module is a Single Chip Hardware Sub-Chip cryptographic module operating on a single chip
embodiment.
The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated
cryptographic controllers. The Module is embedded in the ASIC 7400 Controller package (see Figure 1
below).
Figure 1 – Micron 7400 ASIC
2.1 Operational Environment
The cryptographic module is tested on the following operational environment.
Table 2 – Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration
Model Hardware [Part Number and
version]
Firmware version Distinguishing
Features
Micron 7400
SSD Controller
Security
Subsystem
SCCS v1.0 Runtime SCSS v2.3
Bootloader v1.0
Function ROM v2.0
Boot ROM v1.0
Tested Configuration:
7400 SSD
Controller v20190703
Module operational environment information is provided from the Module from the get status service and
is returned from the controller as TCG Level 0 discovery content.
2.2 Cryptographic Boundary
The physical form of the Module is depicted above in Figure 1. The cryptographic boundary of the Module
is defined by the Security Subsystem and includes all cryptographic algorithm implementations. The physical
embodiment is the Micron 7400 Controller ASIC and includes its package. The cryptographic boundary is
depicted by the red outline line in Figure 2 below. The Module is a Single Chip Hardware Sub-Chip
cryptographic module operating on a single chip embodiment. Table 2 above specifies the firmware
components of the module.
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M7400 SSD
NAND
NAND
NAND
NAND
M7400 Controller
NAND
NAND
NAND
NAND
NAND
NAND
NAND
NAND
Security
Subsystem
NVMe
Figure 2 – Module
2.3 Modes of Operation
The Module only supports an Approved mode and cannot be configured to operate otherwise. To verify
that the Module is in the Approved mode of operation, the operator may invoke the “Get Status” service,
which will indicate the Approved mode of operation, as well as the version information for the Module.
The following states are defined for the module.
• Firmware Load State – In this state, the Module is capable of performing self-tests, key manifest
verification, and firmware loading.
• NVMe State – In this operating state, TCG ownership of the drive has not been taken. In this state
the SSD provides services through NVME industry standard commands.
• TCG State – Once TCG ownership has been taken the Module shall operate in this state. In this
state the SSD provides services through NVME industry standard commands as well as TCG
commands addressed to both the TCG Admin SP and the TCG locking SP. In addition, extra
features are provided through the TCG commands. These commands are processed within the
controller and are translated into security subsystem services. The Module provides these services
to support the TCG mode of operation but is not responsible for TCG management functions. To
initialize in this mode, the Module owner must take ownership of the device by invoking the
Activate method on the Locking SP. This State has the capability to have multiple Users with
independent access control to read, write or erase the data areas (LBA ranges).
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Note: By default, the drive is issued with a single namespace encompassing the whole capacity of
the drive. Once the drive is TCG activated this default namespace’s attributes are managed by the
TCG “Global Range”.
2.4 Security Functions
The Module implements the cryptographic functions listed in table 3 below. The numbers and letters within
square brackets reference standards which are defined in the References and Definitions section of this
Security Policy.
Table 3 – Approved Algorithms
CAVP Cert Algorithm
and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
A2520 AES [197]
AES-KW [38F] Key Sizes: 256 Authenticated Encrypt,
Authenticated Decrypt
(Uses Auxiliary ECB)
A2522 AES [197]
AES-ECB [38A] Key Sizes: 256
Encrypt, Decrypt
(Auxiliary)
AES-XTS1
Testing
Revision 2.0 [38E]
Key Sizes: 256
Encrypt, Decrypt
(Auxiliary)
A2523 AES [197]
AES-ECB [38A] Key Sizes: 256
Encrypt, Decrypt
(Datapath)
AES-XTS1
Testing
Revision 2.0 [38E]
Key Sizes: 256
Encrypt, Decrypt
(Datapath)
VA CKG [IG D.H]
[133] Sections 4 and 6.1 Direct symmetric key
generation using unmodified DRBG output
Key Generation
[133] Section 6.2.2 Symmetric Keys Derived from a
Pre-existing Key
[133] Section 6.2.3 Derivation of symmetric keys from a
password
[133] Section 6.3 Symmetric Keys Produced by
Combining Multiple Keys and Other Data
A2520
HASH DRBG
[90A]
HASH DRBG SHA2-256
Deterministic Random
Bit Generation
Security Strength = 256
A2521
HMAC-
SHA2-256
[198]
SHA2-256
Key Size: 256
MAC = 256
Key derivation. Data
Authentication
A2521 KDF [108]
Counter Mode
KDF SP800-108
HMAC-SHA2-256
Supported Lengths: 256
Fixed Data Order: Before Fixed
Data
Key Based Key Derivation
1
The XTS algorithm implementation includes a check to ensure Key_1 ≠ Key_2. XTS may only be used in
storage applications.
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CAVP Cert Algorithm
and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
Counter Length: 8
Custom Key in Length: 0
A2520 KTS [38F] AES-KW Key Sizes: 256
CSP
Wrapping/Unwrapping
A2520
KTS-IFC
[56Br2]
KTS-OAEP-basic
n = 20482
SHA2-256
n = 30722
SHA2-256
Key transport
methodology provides
between 112 and 128
bits of encryption
strength; Encapsulation
Only.
A2520 PBKDF [132] Option 1a
sLen = 256
C = 300
HMAC-SHA2-256
Password Based Key
Derivation. Keys derived
from passwords may
only be used in storage
applications. Password
length is 32 bytes and
only five attempts are
permitted before a reset
is required.
The PBKDF iteration
count (C) is chosen to be
as high as can be
tolerated without
impacting system boot
up performance.
A2521
RSA SigVer
[186]
PKCS1_v1.5
n = 2048 SHA2-256
n = 3072 SHA2-256
Public Exponent Mode: Fixed
Fixed Public Exponent: 010001
Signature verification
A2522
SHA2-256
[180]
SHA2-256 -
Message Digest
Generation
The module does not implement any “Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of
Operation” or “Non-Approved Algorithms Not Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation” per SP800-
140B. Only “Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security
Claimed” are supported per Table 4 below.
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Table 4 – Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation with No Security Claimed
Algorithm Caveat Use / Function
RBG
No security claimed per IG 2.4.A. Generates a 64-byte personalization
string for the DRBG. Per [90A], the
personalization is entirely optional, is
not required to contain any entropy,
and may be provided by a non-
Approved RBG.
2.5 Security Function Implementation
The following table shows the Security Function Implementations that the module implements:
Table 5 - Security Function Implementation
2.6 Overall Security Design
1. The Module provides one distinct operator role: Controller, which acts as the Cryptographic Officer
2. The Module provides role-based authentication.
3. The Module clears previous authentications on reset.
4. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.
5. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or resetting the
Module.
6. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
7. Data outputs are inhibited during firmware loading, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
8. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the Module.
9. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service, except for the
KManifestPUB_ROM.
10. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
11. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
12. The Module does not support manual SSP establishment method.
13. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
14. The Module does not output plaintext CSPs or intermediate key values.
Name Type Description SF Properties Algorithms/CAVP Cert
KTS KTS
AES-KW – AES
Cert. #A2520
Key establishment methodology provides 256
bits of encryption strength AES-KW/Cert. #A2520
KTS-IFC KTS
KTS-IFC - RSA
Cert. #A2520
Key transport methodology provides between
112 and 128 bits of encryption strength KTS-IFC/Cert. #A2520
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15. The Module does not provide bypass services.
16. The Module zeroizes temporary values generated and used during self-tests.
2.7 Rules of Operation
The Module is embedded within the Micron 7400 controller of the SSD. The Module shall be operated
according to Section 11.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
The Module’s ports and associated FIPS defined logical interface categories are listed in Table 5 above.
Table 6 – Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical Interface Data that passes over port/interface
AESE (encryption engine) Control in | Data in |
Data out | Status out
User data
AESD (decryption engine) Control in | Data in |
Data out | Status out
User data
Mbox (Mailbox) Control in | Status out Service info input
Controller output (response to Mbox) Data out Service info output
External Interrupt (JTAG, AHB bypass
and inter-CPU interrupts)
Disabled Disabled
Reset/Interrupt Control in None
BMG-128 (S-DMA Interface) Data in | Data out Service info data (command/response)
Power Power in None
JTAG / AHB-32 bypass Disabled Disabled
LDPC Decoder Data In Firmware Images
UART Status out Status Data
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4 Roles, Services and Authentication
4.1 Assumption of Roles and Related Services
The Module supports one distinct operator role, Controller (Cryptographic Officer).
Table 6 lists the operator role supported by the Module and their related services. In addition to the services
listed in Table 6, the Module also supports a Self-Test service, which is invoked by power cycling the Module.
The Module does not support a maintenance role or bypass capability. The Module does not support
concurrent operators.
Table 7 – Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output
Role Service Input Output
Any Self-Test N/A N/A
Controller SUP Authenticate Password Response
Controller SUP Generate None Encrypted blob
Controller TCG Authenticate Wrapped RdsKey or
SumRdsKey, Password
Response
Controller Clear TCG Authentications None Response
Controller Random Size/Location Random Value
Controller NVMe Allocate and associate Key Namespace Information Response
Controller NVMe Deallocate and disassociate
Key
Namespace information Response
Controller NVMe Update Key Namespace information Response
Controller Public HMAC Generation Target input HMAC
Controller Load Range and Key Range and key (index)
Information
Response
Controller AWOR None Encrypted block
Controller TCG Allocate and associate Key Range Information Response
Controller TCG Deallocate and disassociate Key Range Information Response
Controller TCG Update Key Range Information Response
Controller TCG Set PIN Password Response
Controller TCG Revert, Activate, Reactivate Command information Response
Controller TCG HMAC Generation Target HMAC HMAC
Controller Manifest Load Manifest Verification status
Controller CSP Load CSP Block Verification status
Controller Write/Read Read/Write Location Read information Status
Controller Get Status None Status
Controller Firmware Signature Check Firmware block Verification status
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Role Service Input Output
Controller Factory Auth Signature Verification status
Controller* Device Deprovision Deprovision ID Status
Controller* Generate KeyDerivationKey Mode Status
Controller* Zeroize None Status
*Requires additional authorization
4.2 Authentication Methods
The role-based authentication methods are defined in Table 8 below.
Table 8 – Roles and Authentication
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
Controller Signature Verification RSA 2048/3072 has a key strength of 112/128 bits. The probability of a
successful verification from a single random attempt is at least 1/2112
which is < 1/1,000,000. This effectively eliminates the possibility of
determining the private key through exhaustive methods. Using a
conservative estimate of 1ms per verification attempt, the maximum
number of attempts which can be made in 1 minute is 60,000. This
results in a probability of at least 60,000/2112
that multiple attempts in a
given minute of time is successful, which is less than 1/100,000.
4.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the Table 9 below. The services provided by the Module
are defined in terms of the services being exposed at the Module (logical) boundary. Each service description
also describes the operator roles involved along with the interface command associated with the service.
The SSPs modes of access shown in Table 9 are defined as:
• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the SSP.
• R = Read: The SSP is read from the Module (e.g., the SSP is output).
• W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the Module.
• E = Execute: The Module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation. Implicitly include
Read.
• Z = Zeroize: The Module zeroizes the SSP.
The service indicator for approved services is the return code from an approved security service call (CCS).
CCS = Command completion status, complies with the Approved Security Service Indicator defined in IG
2.4.C, Example Scenario #2.
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Table 9 – Approved Services
Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
Self-Test Run KAT tests on all
cryptographic algorithms.
All NA Any
This service is
unauthenticat
ed.
N/A CCS
SUP Authenticate Unwrap SUP blob using
PBKDF derived key.
PBKDF, AES-KW Password;
PasswordWrapKey
Controller W, E
G, E
CCS
SUP Generate KTS-IFC wrap an internally
generated random.
DRBG, CKG
KTS-IFC,
AES-KW,
PBKDF
DrbgState;
KDeviceWrappingPub;
PasswordWrapKey;
SUP Seed
Controller W, E;
E;
G, E, Z;
G, E, Z
CCS
TCG Authenticate Unwrap TCG SSP using PBKDF
derived key.
PBKDF, AES-KW, CKG Password;
SumRDSKey;
RdsKey;
PasswordWrapKey;
AuthenticatedUseHmacKey;
EphemeralSumRdskWrapKey
Controller E;
W;
W;
G, E, Z;
E;
E
CCS
Clear TCG
Authentications
Remove status of all past
authentication and their
privileges
NA NA Controller N/A CCS
Random Returns a 256-bit random
number
DRBG DrbgState Controller E, W CCS
NVMe Allocate and
associate Key
Generate a key, wrap key and
associate key with an entity.
DRBG, AES-KW, CKG DrbgState;
WrapKey;
RdsKey;
SumRdsKey;
NamespaceDEK;
AuthenticatedUseHmacKey;
EphemeralSumRdskWrapKey
Controller E, W;
E;
G, E, R;
G, E, R;
G, R;
E;
E
CCS
NVMe Deallocate
and disassociate
Key
Zeroize key and disassociate
key from an entity.
AES-KW NamespaceDEK;
WrapKey;
AuthenticatedUseHmacKey
Controller Z;
E;
E
CCS
NVMe Update Key Erase user data in a
namespace by changing the
encryption key
DRBG, AES-KW, CKG DrbgState;
WrapKey;
RdsKey;
SumRdsKey
NamespaceDEK;
LockingObjectDEK;
AuthenticatedUseHmacKey;
EphemeralSumRdskWrapKey
Controller E;
E;
E;
W, E;
Z, G, R;
Z, G, R;
E;
E
CCS
Public HMAC
Generation
Generate an HMAC over the
prescribed content.
HMAC SHA2-256 RootPublicMacKey;
PspHmacKey
Controller E;
E
CCS
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Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
Load Range and Key Load DEK into DPE for
indicated range
AES-KW TweakKey;
LockingObjectDEK;
NamespaceDEK;
RdsKey;
SumRdsKey;
WrapKey;
EphemeralSumRdskWrapKey
Controller W;
W;
W;
E;
W, E;
E;
E;
CCS
AWOR Save, restore security
operational context.
KDF, AES-KW, HMAC,
CKG
AworWrapKey;
AworHmacKey;
DrbgState;
WrapKey;
AuthenticatedUseHmacKey;
PspHmacKey;
TweakKey;
RdsKey;
SumRdsKey;
RootHmacKey;
RootKeyWrapKey;
RootPublicMacKey;
EphemeralSumRdskWrapKey
Controller E;
E;
W, R;
W, R;
W, R;
W, R;
W, R;
W, R;
W, R;
W, R;
W, R;
W, R;
W, R
CCS
TCG Allocate and
associate Key
Generate a key, wrap key and
associate key with an entity.
DRBG,
AES-KW,
CKG
DrbgState;
WrapKey;
RdsKey;
SumRdsKey;
LockingObjectDEK;
EphemeralSumRdskWrapKey
;
AuthenticatedUseHmacKey
Controller E;
E;
G, E, R;
G, E, R;
G, R;
E;
E
CCS
TCG Deallocate and
disassociate Key
Zeroize key and disassociate
key from an entity.
NA WrapKey;
LockingObjectDEK
AuthenticatedUseHmacKey
Controller E;
Z, R;
E;
CCS
TCG Update Key Erase user data in a
namespace by changing the
encryption key.
DRBG, AES-KW,
CKG
DrbgState;
WrapKey;
RDSKey;
SumRDSKey;
LockingObjectDEK;
EphemeralSumRdskWrapKey
;
AuthenticatedUseHmacKey
Controller E;
E;
E;
E, W;
Z, G, R;
E;
E
CCS
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Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
TCG Set PIN Set PIN which is used in
generating a key to wrap a
TCG credential.
PBKDF,
DRBG,
AES-KW,
CKG,
HMAC
Password;
DrbgState;
WrapKey;
PasswordWrapKey;
RDSKey;
SumRDSKey;
EphemeralSumRdskWrapKey
;
AuthenticatedUseHmacKey
Controller W, E, Z;
E;
E;
G, E, Z;
G, W;
G, W;
E;
E
CCS
TCG Revert,
Activate, Reactivate
Revert to FOB,
Revert to FOB with TCG
Activated.
AES-KW, HMAC, DRBG,
CKG
RootHmacKey;
DrbgState;
WrapKey;
RdsKey;
SumRdsKey;
NameSpaceDEK;
LockingObjectDEK;
AuthenticatedUseHmacKey
Controller E;
E;
E;
Z;
Z;
Z, G;
Z, G;
E
CCS
TCG HMAC
Generation
Generate an HMAC over the
prescribed TCG content.
HMAC AuthenticatedUseHmacKey;
DrbgState;
RootKeyWrapKey;
TweakKey;
WrapKey;
Password;
PassordWrapKey
Controller E;
R;
E;
R;
E, R;
G, E;
G, E
CCS
Manifest Load RSA Verify trusted list of PKs. RSA Verify KManifestPub_ROM
Controller E CCS
CSP Load Restore persistent SSPs. AES-KW
HMAC
RootHmacKey;
RootKeyWrapKey;
DrbgState;
WrapKey;
AuthenticatedUseHmacKey;
TweakKey;
PspHmacKey
Controller E;
E;
W;
W;
W;
W;
W
CCS
Write/Read Encryption / Decryption of
user data to / from a user
data range.
DPE-AES-XTS NamespaceDEK;
LockingObjectDEK;
TweakKey
Controller E;
E;
E
CCS
Get Status Get information about the
operational state of the
drive.
This service provides the
requisite data for the Show
module’s versioning
information requirement.
NA NA Controller NA CCS
Firmware Signature
Check
Verify firmware image
signature before persisting.
RSA Verify KFWCBootloaderVerify;
KFWModuleVerify;
KFWControllerVerify
Controller E;
E;
E
CCS
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Service Description
Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access
rights to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
Factory Auth Authentication for factory-
restricted services.
RSA Verify, DRBG KAuthPub;
KVSAuthPub;
DrbgState
Controller E;
E;
E, W
CSS
Device Deprovision Deprovision the device,
zeroize all SSPs.
NA All CSPs Controller Z CCS
Generate
KeyDerivationKey
Generate a new
KeyDerivationKey.
DRBG, CKG DrbgState;
KeyDerivationKey;
Entropy Input;
RootHmacKey;
RootKeyWrapKey;
RootPublicMacKey;
AworHmacKey;
AworWrapKey;
WrapKey;
AuthenticatedUseHmacKey;
PspHmacKey;
TweakKey
Controller G, E;
G, E;
W, E;
G, E;
G, E;
G;
G;
G;
G, E;
G, E;
G;
G
CCS
Zeroize Destroys all keys. Must be
performed under the direct
control of the operator.
Factory zeroization
process
All CSPs Controller Z CCS
5 Software/Firmware Security
The Module is composed of the following firmware components:
• Security Subsystem Operational: Runtime SCSS V2.3
• Security Subsystem Bootloader: Bootloader V1.0
• Function ROM v2.0
• Boot ROM v1.0
The pre-operational firmware integrity tests are performed using RSA SHA2-256 signature verification with
a 2048-bit or 3072-bit key. The bootloader and operational runtime firmware are loadable components
and are protected with the authentication technique, RSA SHA2-256 signature verification with a 2048-bit
or 3072-bit key. Firmware candidates are isolated from load until they have successfully passed the
Firmware Load Test. Firmware load and integrity checks are defined in the self-test section of this security
policy.
The ROM components are implemented in Non-Reconfigurable-Memory and are not subject to firmware
integrity test per FIPS 140-3 IG 5.A.
The operator can initiate the firmware integrity test on demand by power cycling/resetting the SSD.
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6 Operational Environment
The Module has a limited operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. The tested operational
environment is listed in Table 2.
The Module includes a firmware verification and load service to support necessary updates. Firmware
versions validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP will be explicitly identified on a validation certificate. Any
firmware not identified in this Security Policy does not constitute the Module defined by this Security Policy
or covered by this validation.
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7 Physical Security
The Module is a Single Chip Hardware sub-chip cryptographic subsystem, and the embodiment is a single
chip. The chip is encapsulated in a standard IC package. The IC packaging itself provides the necessary
opacity and tamper evidence required for Level 2 conformance.
Table 10 – Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
IC packaging On initial receipt of the device
and periodically afterwards
Inspect for evidence of prying or
removal of the chip packaging. See
Examples below.
If tampering is suspected, then the
device containing the IC should be
removed from service and the site
administrator should be contacted.
Figure 3 – Tamper Evidence Example
8 Non-Invasive Security
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameter (SSP) Management
The SSPs access methods are described in below.
The SSPs management methods as shown in Table 11 below are defined as:
• G1 = Externally generated and installed during manufacturing
• G2 = Internally generated using the DRBG
• G3 = Derived using SP 800-108 compliant KBKDF
• G4 = Derived using SP 800-132 compliant PBKDF2
• S1 = Only stored in volatile memory (RAM).
• S2 = Stored in e-Fuse in plaintext
• S3 = Stored in register in plaintext
• S4 = Stored in ROM in plaintext
• E1 = Input in plaintext
• E2 = Input signed and verified using KManifestPub_ROM
• E3 = Input using SP800-38F AES key Transport
• O1 = Output in plaintext public key
• O2 = Output using SP800-38F Key Transport (specify AES key wrap key)
• O3 = Output using KTS-IFC [56Br2]
• Z1 = Zeroized implicitly after use, by Module power cycle, and reset
• Z2 = Zeroized explicitly by the “zeroize” service by overwriting with a fixed pattern
9.1 Sensitive Security Parameters (SSP)
All CSPs and PSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these SSPs by the Module
is described in the services detailed in Section 4.3. The numbers and letters within square brackets reference
standards which are defined in the References and Definitions section of this Security Policy.
Table 11 – SSPs
Key/SSP/Name/T
ype
Strength Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Gene-
ration
Import /Export Establish
ment
Storage Zeroiza-
tion
Use & Related
keys
AuthenticatedUse
HmacKey
256 HMAC
#A2521
G2 E3 / O2 by
RootKeyWrapKey
or AworWrapKey
N/A S1 Z1, Z2 Integrity
verification of
TCG table data
AworWrapKey 256 KTS
#A2520
G3 from
KeyDerivat
ionKey
N/A N/A S1 Z1, Z2 Key encryption
AworHmacKey 256 HMAC
#A2521
G3 from
KeyDerivat
ionKey
N/A N/A S1 Z1, Z2 Integrity
verification of
TCG context data
DrbgState 256 HASH
DRBG
#A2520
G2 E3 / O2 by
RootKeyWrapKey
or AworWrapKey
N/A S1 Z1, Z2 HASH_DRBG
internal state (V
and C are each 55
bytes)
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Key/SSP/Name/T
ype
Strength Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Gene-
ration
Import /Export Establish
ment
Storage Zeroiza-
tion
Use & Related
keys
EphemeralSumRd
skWrapKey
256 KTS
#A2520
G2 E3 / O2 by
AworWrapKey
N/A S1 Z1, Z2 Key wrap of
SumRdsKey
Entropy Input 256 HASH
DRBG
#A2520
G1 E1 N/A S1 Z1 128 bytes of
Entropy and 64
bytes of Nonce
KeyDerivationKey 256 KDF
#A2521
G2 N/A N/A S2 Z2 Master key used
to derive other
keys
LockingObjectDEK 256 AES
#A2523
G2 E3 / O2 by RdsKey,
SumRdsKey or
WrapKey
N/A S1, S3 Z1, Z2 Data encryption
NamespaceDEK 256 AES
#A2523
G2 E3 / O2 by RdsKey,
SumRdsKey or
WrapKey
N/A S1, S3 Z1, Z2 Data encryption
Password 256 PBKDF
#A2520
N/A E1 N/A S1 Z1 Used with
PBKDF2 to derive
the
PasswordWrapKe
y, Password is 32
bytes in length
PasswordWrapKe
y
256 KTS
#A2520
G4 N/A N/A S1 Z1 Key wrap of
RdsKey or
SumRdsKey
PspHmacKey 256 HMAC
#A2521
G2 E3 / O2 by
RootKeyWrapKey
or AworWrapKey
N/A S1 Z1, Z2 Integrity
verification of
public TCG
content
RdsKey 256 KTS
#A2520
G2 E3 / O2 by
PasswordWrapKey
or AworWrapKey
N/A S1 Z1, Z2 Key wrap of
LockingObjectDE
K and
NameSpaceDEK
RootHmacKey 256 HMAC
#A2521
G3 from
KeyDerivat
ionKey
E3 / O2 by
AworWrapKey
N/A S1 Z1, Z2 Integrity checking
RootKeyWrapKey 256 KTS
#A2520
G3 from
KeyDerivat
ionKey
E3 / O2 by
AworWrapKey
N/A S1 Z1, Z2 Key wrapping
RootPublicMacKe
y
256 HMAC
#A2521
G3 from
KeyDerivat
ionKey
E3 / O2 by
AworWrapKey
N/A S1 Z1, Z2 Integrity
verification of
external TCG
content
SumRdsKey 256 KTS
#A2520
G2 E3 / O2 by
AworWrapKey,
EphemeralSumRds
kWrapKey, or by
PasswordWrapKey
N/A S1 Z1, Z2 Key wrap of
LockingObjectDE
K and
NameSpaceDEK
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Key/SSP/Name/T
ype
Strength Security
Function
and Cert.
Number
Gene-
ration
Import /Export Establish
ment
Storage Zeroiza-
tion
Use & Related
keys
SUP Seed 256 PBKDF
#A2520
G2 O3 by
KDeviceWrappingPub
N/A S1 Z1 Random value
used in password
creation
TweakKey 256 AES
#A2523
G2 E3 / O2 by
RootKeyWrapKey
or AworWrapKey
N/A S1, S3 Z1, Z2 Data encryption
WrapKey 256 KTS
#A2520
G2 E3 / O2 by
RootKeyWrapKey
or AworWrapKey
N/A S1 Z1, Z2 Key wrap of
LockingObjectDE
K and
NameSpaceDEK
KAuthPub 112
128
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4)
#A2521
N/A E2 / O1 N/A S1 Z1 RSA 2048/3072
Public Key for
Factory-restricted
services signature
verification
KDeviceWrappingPub 112
128
KTS-IFC
#A2520
N/A E2 / O1 N/A S1 Z1 RSA 2048/3072
Public Key for
SUP Generate
KFWCBootloaderVerify
(Not an SSP)
112
128
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4)
#A2521
N/A E2 N/A S1 Z1 RSA 2048/3072
Public Key for
Bootloader
firmware
signature
verification
KFWControllerVerify 112
128
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4)
#A2521
N/A E2 N/A S1 Z1 RSA 2048/3072
Public Key for
Controller
signature
verification
KFWModuleVerify
(Not an SSP)
112
128
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4)
#A2521
N/A E2 N/A S1 Z1 RSA 2048/3072
Public Key for
runtime firmware
signature
verification
KManifestPub_ROM
(Not an SSP)
112
128
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4)
#A2521
N/A N/A. Pre-installed. N/A S4 N/A.
Used
solely for
self-tests
and can
be
revoked
RSA 2048/3072
Public Key for
manifest
signature
verification
KVSAuthPub 112
128
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4)
#A2521
N/A E2 / O1 N/A S1 Z1 RSA 2048/3072
Public Key for
Factory-restricted
signature
verification
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9.2 DRBG Randomness Source
The DRBG Randomness source (i.e., entropy) is loaded at manufacturing. Per IG 9.3.A, Example 2A, there is
no assurance of the minimum strength of generated SSPs. The DRBG mechanism is SHA2-256, which has a
security strength of 256-bits (per SP800-57, Part 1, Revision 5). The HASH DRBG is seeded with 128 bytes of
entropy and 64 bytes of nonce material during manufacturing and is assumed to initialize the HASH DRBG
to the full 256-bits security strength.
10 Self-Tests
The Module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the Module. Per FIPS 140-3 these are
categorized as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests.
Pre-operational and conditional self-tests are available on demand by resetting or power cycling the
Module.
The self-tests error states and status indicator are described in Table 12 below:
Table 12 – Error States and Indicators
Error
state
Description Indicator
ES1 The Function ROM fails a KAT Triggered by cryptographic KAT failure. The Module enters
the ES1 error state and outputs A Cryptographic Self-Test
Failure status in response to any service request
ES2 The Module fails the firmware load test or
the Firmware Integrity test
The Module enters the ES2 error state and outputs a
verification failure status in response to the firmware load
test or the firmware integrity test
ES3 The Module fails conditional KAT self-test.
Non-operational state. No services beside
status services are allowed
The Module enters the ES3 error state and will output a
self-test failure status to any service request
The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests:
Table 13 – Pre-Operational Self-Test
Security Function Method Description Error state
Bootloader Firmware
(Bootloader V1.0)
integrity test
RSA SHA2-256
Signature Verification
An RSA 2048 or 3072-bit Signature Verification is
executed on the whole Bootloader copied into
the Module
ES2
SEE Firmware
(Runtime SCSS V2.3)
integrity test
RSA SHA2-256
Signature Verification
An RSA 2048 or 3072-bit Signature Verification is
executed on the whole Bootloader copied into
the Module
ES2
The Module performs the following conditional self-tests:
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Table 14 – Conditional Self-Tests
Security Function Method Description Error state
ROM HMAC HMAC_
SHA2-256
HMAC SHA2-256 KAT. This test occurs before the Pre-
Operational firmware integrity test.
ES1
ROM RSA SHS/RSA 2048 RSA PKCS#1_v1.5 Verification KAT with SHA2-256 KAT,
which satisfies the self-test requirements for KTS-IFC per IG D.G;
the Module only supports the public key operations for RSA
Signature Verification and KTS-IFC Encapsulation. This test
occurs before the Pre-Operational firmware integrity test.
ES1
AES – KW (Key
Wrap)
KAT (Auxiliary) AES-256 KW encryption KAT – Inclusive of AES ECB
testing with 256-bit key per IG 10.3.B.
ES3
AES – KW (Key
Unwrap)
KAT (Auxiliary) AES-256 KW decryption KAT – Inclusive of AES ECB
testing with 256-bit key per IG 10.3.B.
ES3
AES XTS – AUX and
DPE Encryption
Comparative 256-bit AES-XTS encryption Comparative Answer Test with the
AES-AUX and DPE AES-XTS implementations.
ES3
AES XTS – AUX and
DPE Decryption
Comparative 256-bit AES-XTS decryption Comparative Answer Test with the
AES-AUX and DPE AES-XTS implementations.
ES3
DRBG KAT HASH_DRBG (SHA2-256) instantiation, generate, and reseed
KATs performed before the first random data generation.
ES3
PBKDF KAT Option 1a using HMAC SHA2-256. Password size is 32 Bytes. Key
generated is 256 bits.
ES3
KBKDF KAT Known answer test. Inclusive of HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT. Key size
requested is 256 bits.
ES3
BootLoader
Firmware Load test
RSA
PKCS#1_v1.5
SHA2-256
A 2048 or 3072-bit RSA Signature Verification is executed on the
bootloader copied into the Module.
ES2
SEE Firmware Load
test
RSA
PKCS#1_v1.5
SHA2-256
A 2048 or 3072-bit RSA Signature Verification is executed on the
SEE firmware copied into the Module.
ES2
DPE self-tests are initiated when functionality is requested. All other self-tests are initiated automatically
when the module boots. The self-tests cannot be interrupted and will run to completion.
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
This section documents the operational behavior of the device.
11.1 Security Initialization
The device is shipped from the factory in the Approved mode of operation and no further initialization is
required to operate in the Approved mode. Going further, it is not possible to configure the module in
such a way that it would operate in a non-compliant state or non-Approved mode. On receipt of the
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Module, examine the product to ensure it has not been tampered with during shipping according to the
procedures outlined in Section 7.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks.
13 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 15 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-3] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, March 22, 2019
[ISO19790] International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology — Security techniques — Test
requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017
[ISO24759] International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology — Security techniques — Test
requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15 December 2015
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, May 16, 2022
[108] NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom
Functions (Revised), October 2009
[131A] Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths, Revision 2, March 2019
[132] NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, Part
1: Storage Applications, December 2010
[133] NIST Special Publication 800-133, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation,
Revision 2, June 2020
[186] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013.
[197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[198] National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008
[180] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015
[38A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001
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Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[38B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005
[38E] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, Special Publication 800-
38E, January 2010
[38F] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F, December 2012
[56Br2] NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Finite Field Cryptography, March 2019
[90A] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, Revision
1, June 2015.
[90B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources
Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018.
[ACS-3] ACS-3 Reporting Security Compliance December 1,2009
[TCG-SSC-
Opal]
TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal, Specification
[TCG-SACS] TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification
[TCG-SIIS] TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification
Table 16– Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
KAT Known Answer Test
SSP Sensitive Security Parameter
AK Authentication key
DEK Data Encryption Key
LBA Logical Block Address
MSID Manufacturing SID. Public value used as part of the default PIN
PSID Physical SID, a public unique value for each drive
SED Self-Encrypting Drive
SID Security ID, PIN for Drive Owner CO Role - TCG OPAL
TCG Trusted Computing Group