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Google, LLC
B227 True Random Number Generator (TRNG) Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Table of Contents
1 General............................................................................................................................................................................................. 6
1.1 Overview .................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Security Levels ........................................................................................................................................................................... 7
1.3 Additional Information................................................................................................................................................................. 7
2 Cryptographic Module Specification.................................................................................................................................................. 7
2.1 Description ................................................................................................................................................................................. 7
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification................................................................................................ 10
2.3 Excluded Components.............................................................................................................................................................. 10
2.4 Modes of Operation.................................................................................................................................................................. 10
2.5 Algorithms ................................................................................................................................................................................ 11
2.6 Security Function Implementations........................................................................................................................................... 12
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .................................................................................................................................................. 12
2.8 RBG and Entropy ..................................................................................................................................................................... 12
2.9 Key Generation......................................................................................................................................................................... 13
2.10 Key Establishment.................................................................................................................................................................. 13
2.11 Industry Protocols................................................................................................................................................................... 13
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces..................................................................................................................................................... 13
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ................................................................................................................................................................. 13
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication................................................................................................................................................ 14
4.1 Authentication Methods ............................................................................................................................................................ 14
4.2 Roles........................................................................................................................................................................................ 14
4.3 Approved Services ................................................................................................................................................................... 15
4.4 Non-Approved Services............................................................................................................................................................ 16
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded......................................................................................................................................... 16
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4.6 Bypass Actions and Status....................................................................................................................................................... 17
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status ................................................................................................................................. 17
5 Software/Firmware Security ............................................................................................................................................................ 17
5.1 Integrity Techniques ................................................................................................................................................................. 17
5.2 Initiate on Demand ................................................................................................................................................................... 17
6 Operational Environment................................................................................................................................................................. 17
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ................................................................................................................... 17
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions .................................................................................................................................... 18
7 Physical Security............................................................................................................................................................................. 18
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required........................................................................................................................................... 18
8 Non-Invasive Security ..................................................................................................................................................................... 18
8.1 Mitigation Techniques............................................................................................................................................................... 18
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management................................................................................................................................... 18
9.1 Storage Areas .......................................................................................................................................................................... 18
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods....................................................................................................................................................... 19
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods......................................................................................................................................................... 19
9.4 SSPs ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 19
10 Self-Tests...................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ..................................................................................................................................................... 21
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests............................................................................................................................................................. 21
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information................................................................................................................................................. 21
10.4 Error States ............................................................................................................................................................................ 22
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .............................................................................................................................................. 23
11 Life-Cycle Assurance .................................................................................................................................................................... 23
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures................................................................................................................... 23
11.2 Administrator Guidance .......................................................................................................................................................... 23
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11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance................................................................................................................................................... 23
11.4 Maintenance Requirements.................................................................................................................................................... 23
11.5 End of Life .............................................................................................................................................................................. 23
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ............................................................................................................................................................ 23
12.1 Attack List............................................................................................................................................................................... 24
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels....................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ............................................................................................................................. 10
Table 3: Modes List and Description .................................................................................................................................................. 10
Table 4: Approved Algorithms............................................................................................................................................................ 11
Table 5: Security Function Implementations....................................................................................................................................... 12
Table 6: Entropy Certificates.............................................................................................................................................................. 12
Table 7: Entropy Sources................................................................................................................................................................... 13
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces ............................................................................................................................................................. 14
Table 9: Roles.................................................................................................................................................................................... 14
Table 10: Approved Services ............................................................................................................................................................. 16
Table 11: Mechanisms and Actions Required .................................................................................................................................... 18
Table 12: Storage Areas .................................................................................................................................................................... 19
Table 13: SSP Input-Output Methods................................................................................................................................................. 19
Table 14: SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................................................................... 19
Table 15: SSP Table 1....................................................................................................................................................................... 20
Table 16: SSP Table 2....................................................................................................................................................................... 20
Table 17: Pre-Operational Self-Tests................................................................................................................................................. 21
Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests ........................................................................................................................................................ 21
Table 19: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.................................................................................................................................. 22
Table 20: Conditional Periodic Information......................................................................................................................................... 22
Table 21: Error States........................................................................................................................................................................ 22
List of Figures
Figure 1: Block Diagram....................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Figure 2: Single-chip picture................................................................................................................................................................. 9
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1 General
1.1 Overview
Introduction
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules specifies
requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but Unclassified environment. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program
(CMVP) run the FIPS 140-3 program. NVLAP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140-3 testing; the CMVP validates
modules meeting FIPS 140-3 validation. Validated is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS
140-3 criteria. More information is also available on the CMVP website at: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html
About this Document
This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the B227 True Random Number Generator (TRNG) Cryptographic
Module from Google LLC. provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets the overall Level 1
security requirements of FIPS 140-3. The B227 True Random Number Generator (TRNG) Cryptographic Module can also be
referred to as “B227 TRNG” or the “module” in this document.
Disclaimer
The contents of this document are subject to revision without notice due to continued progress in methodology, design, and
manufacturing. Google LLC. shall have no liability for any error or damages of any kind resulting from the use of this document.
Notices
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.
This document describes the cryptographic module security policy for Google LLC. B227 True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
Cryptographic Module. It contains specifications of the security rules under which the cryptographic module operates, including the
security rules derived from the requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard.
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1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security N/A
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
1.3 Additional Information
The module claims an overall Security Level of 1 with all individual sections at a Security Level 1. The module does not implement
any non-invasive security mitigations or mitigations of other attacks and does not contain any firmware. Thus, the requirements per
the Non-Invasive Security, Mitigation Of Other Attacks and Software/Firmware Security sections are inapplicable.
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
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The purpose of the module is to provide random bits to the Integrated Compute Complex (ICC) module and other sub-systems within
the Google IN763 SoC. Specifically, the B227 True Random Number Generator (TRNG) Cryptographic Module provides seed values
to the firmware DRBG implemented in the ICC module for key generation functions.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Single Chip
Module Characteristics: SubChip
Cryptographic Boundary:
The B227 True Random Number Generator (TRNG) Cryptographic Module is a sub-chip cryptographic subsystem hardware module
within a single chip embodiment.
The module does not contain any persistent storage.
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
The module is of type hardware and the physical perimeter is the entirety of the IN763 SoC.
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Figure 1: Block Diagram
Figure 2: Single-chip picture
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2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or
Part Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
IN763 SoC A0 3.00b N/A N/A N/A
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2.3 Excluded Components
No components have been excluded from the cryptographic boundary of the module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status
Indicator
Approved
Mode
No configuration of the module or installation steps are required by the operator. When
the module is powered on its self-tests are executed without any operator intervention;
The module enters the Approved mode of operation automatically if the self-tests at
boot complete successfully
Approved PSP initialized,
self-test pass
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The module only supports one mode of operation where only Approved cryptographic functions and services are available.
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The module only supports an Approved mode of operation.
Degraded Mode Description:
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The module does not support a degraded mode of operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
Conditioning Component Block Cipher Derivation Function
SP800-90B
A2272 - SP 800-90B
Counter DRBG A2721 Prediction Resistance - No,
Yes
Mode - AES-128, AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled -
No
SP 800-90A Rev.
1
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The module does not support any Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not support any Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
The module does not support any Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with no Security claimed.
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Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not support any Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Random Bit Generation DRBG Generation of random
bits
Counter DRBG:
(A2721)
Entropy ENT-ESV Entropy source (TRNG)
within the module
Conditioning
Component Block
Cipher Derivation
Function SP800-90B:
(A2272)
Table 5: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
Per IG D.L, the CSPs for the approved DRBG have been defined in Section 9.4 SSP Table 1 and SSP Table 2.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor
Name
E137 Google
Table 6: Entropy Certificates
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Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
TRNG Entropy Source Physical IN763 SoC A0 128 bits 128 bits (full entropy) BlockCipher_DF (A2272)
Table 7: Entropy Sources
The module is a sub-chip cryptographic subsystem hardware module containing a hardware-based DRBG conformant to NIST SP
800-90Ar1, which is seeded by an NIST SP 800-90B compliant entropy source with the required 384 bits. The module’s entropy
source is consistent with Scenario 1 (a) described in FIPS 140-3 IG 9.3.A.
2.9 Key Generation
The module does not generate any SSPs (Sensitive Security Parameters) but provides random bits to other sub-systems
(specifically, the ICC) within the IN763 SoC.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module does not support SSP establishment.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The module does not support any industry protocols.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
AMBA (On-chip system bus) Serial
Peripheral Interface (SPI)
Data Input Requests for random bits
AMBA (On-chip system bus) Data Output Random bits
AMBA (On-chip system bus) Control Input Reset signal
Physical power connector Power Provides power to the module
AMBA (On-chip system bus) Status
Output
Status of the Approved Mode of operation and self-tests i.e. success/failure
indicator for the NIST SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG health tests
Table 8: Ports and Interfaces
The module does not support control output.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
N/A for this module.
The module does not support operator authentication; assumption of the Crypto Officer (CO) role is implicit based on the selected
service(s). The CO role has access to all module services, and the module does not support a User/Maintenance role.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
CO Role Crypto Officer None
Table 9: Roles
The module does not allow concurrent operators. The Crypto Officer role is implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services
implemented by the module.
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4.3 Approved Services
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Random Bit
Generation
Provides random bits
to the ICC module
Approved mode
indicator combined with
successful completion
of the service
Request for
ranbom bits from
the ICC
Random bits Random Bit
Generation
Entropy
CO
- B227
DRBG
Entropy
Input
String: G,E
- B227
DRBG
Seed: G,E
- B227
DRBG V:
G,E
- B227
DRBG
Key: G,E
- B227
DRBG
Output:
G,R
Show Status Current state of the
module
Approved mode
indicator/Hard Error
State indicator
combined with
successful completion
of the service
Reboot to trigger
CAST execution
Status None CO
Show
module's
versioning
information
Retrieval of the
module ID and
hardware version
Approved mode
indicator combined with
successful completion
of the service
command "mem
read32
0x200780001c"
Hardware
version:
3.00b;
Module ID: 0
None CO
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Perform self-
tests
On demand self-test
execution on rebooting
the module
0 Power cycle Status None CO
Perform
zeroisation
Reboot/power-cycle of
the module zeroises
all SSPs as they are
stored ephemerally
Approved mode
indicator combined with
successful completion
of the service
Power
cycle/reboot
Status None CO
- B227
DRBG
Entropy
Input
String: Z
- B227
DRBG
Seed: Z
- B227
DRBG V: Z
- B227
DRBG
Key: Z
- B227
DRBG
Output: Z
Table 10: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The module does not support any Non-Approved Services.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not support loading of any firmware.
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4.6 Bypass Actions and Status
The module does not support a bypass capability.
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status
The module does not support a self-initiated cryptographic output capability.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module is implemented entirely in hardware and is non-modifiable. Therefore, the integrity test requirements do not apply in
accordance with IG 5.A. Per the allowance in the IG, instead, the module implements the NIST SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG Cryptographic
Algorithm Self-Tests (CAST) and is designed to execute the same on every boot.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test (CAST) can be initiated on demand by rebooting the module.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Non-Modifiable
How Requirements are Satisfied:
The module is a sub-chip cryptographic subsystem hardware module. The procurement, build, and configuration procedure are
controlled by the manufacturer. Therefore, the operational environment is considered non-modifiable.
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6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions
Additional restrictions do not apply.
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection
Guidance
Standard passivation applied on the IN763 SoC None None
Table 11: Mechanisms and Actions Required
The B227 True Random Number Generator (TRNG) Cryptographic Module is a sub-chip cryptographic subsystem hardware module
implemented as part of the IN763 SoC, which is the physical perimeter of the sub-chip module. The IN763 SoC is a single chip with a
production grade IC packaging and hence conforms to the Level 1 requirements for physical security.
8 Non-Invasive Security
8.1 Mitigation Techniques
The module does not support any non-invasive attack mitigations.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
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Storage Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
Internal registers Ephemeral storage of SSPs in plaintext Dynamic
Table 12: Storage Areas
The module does not maintain any persistent SSP storage.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Random bits Internal registers ICC module Plaintext Manual Electronic
Table 13: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator
Initiation
Zeroised on
reset
SSPs stored ephemerally are zeroised on
resetting the module
SSPs stored ephemerally are zeroised on
resetting the module
Operator
Initiated
Table 14: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
B227 DRBG
Entropy Input
String
Entropy Input provided by the
entropy source; Defined as a CSP
per IG D.L Resolution 3. for
CTR_DRBG
384 bits -
256 bits
Entropy Input
- CSP
Entropy Random Bit
Generation
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used By
B227 DRBG
Seed
Seed provided to the NIST SP 800-
90Ar1 DRBG; Defined as a CSP
per IG D.L Resolution 3. for
CTR_DRBG
384 bits -
256 bits
DRBG Seed -
CSP
Random Bit
Generation
Random Bit
Generation
B227 DRBG
V
NIST SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG state V
value; Defined as a CSP per IG D.L
Resolution 3. for CTR_DRBG
128 bits -
128 bits
Internal state
of DRBG -
CSP
Random Bit
Generation
Random Bit
Generation
B227 DRBG
Key
NIST SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG state
Key value; Defined as a CSP per IG
D.L Resolution 3. for CTR_DRBG
256 bits -
256 bits
Internal state
of DRBG -
CSP
Random Bit
Generation
Random Bit
Generation
B227 DRBG
Output
NIST SP 800-90Ar1 DRBG random
bit output
128 bits -
128 bits
Random bits -
CSP
Random Bit
Generation
Table 15: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
B227 DRBG Entropy
Input String
Internal
registers:Plaintext
Until
reset
Zeroised on
reset
B227 DRBG Seed:Derives
B227 DRBG Seed Internal
registers:Plaintext
Until
reset
Zeroised on
reset
B227 DRBG Entropy Input
String:Derived From
B227 DRBG Output:Derives
B227 DRBG V Internal
registers:Plaintext
Until
reset
Zeroised on
reset
B227 DRBG Seed:Derived From
B227 DRBG Key:Paired With
B227 DRBG Key Internal
registers:Plaintext
Until
reset
Zeroised on
reset
B227 DRBG Seed:Derived From
B227 DRBG V:Paired With
B227 DRBG Output Random
bits
Internal
registers:Plaintext
Until
reset
Zeroised on
reset
B227 DRBG Seed:Derived From
Table 16: SSP Table 2
-- CSP: Critical Security Parameter
-- PSP: Public Security Parameter
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Please Note: The module’s entropy source has been validated under NIST SP 800-90B per the ESV Cert. #E137. The Public Use
Document for the same can be found at: https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/documents/entropy/E137_PublicUse.pdf.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
Counter DRBG
(A2721)
CTR_DRBG (AES-
CTR, 256 bits)
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
0 Used as approved DRBG for generation of
random bits according to SP800-90Ar1
Table 17: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
Counter DRBG (A2721) CTR_DRBG (AES-CTR, 256 bits) KAT CAST 0 - During boot
NIST SP 800-90B Entropy
Source Repetition Count
Test (RCT)
Cutoff value (C) = 41; False
positive error rate (alpha) = 2^-20
RCT CAST the core is
ready to be
used
- During boot and
continuously
NIST SP 800-90B Entropy
Source Adaptive Proportion
Test (APT)
Cutoff value (C) = 793; Window
Size (w)=1024 False positive error
rate (alpha) = 2^-20
APT CAST the core is
ready to be
used
- During boot and
continuously
Table 18: Conditional Self-Tests
In the event that any of the above conditional tests fail, the cryptographic module will be halted, and data output will be inhibited.
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Counter DRBG (A2721) KAT SW/FW Integrity On Demand Manually, via a reboot
Table 19: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Counter DRBG (A2721) KAT CAST On Demand Manually, via a reboot
NIST SP 800-90B
Entropy Source
Repetition Count Test
(RCT)
RCT CAST On Demand Manually, via a reboot
NIST SP 800-90B
Entropy Source
Adaptive Proportion
Test (APT)
APT CAST On Demand Manually, via a reboot
Table 20: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Hard
Error
state
No cryptographic functions can be
executed and all data output is
inhibited; An operator can attempt
to reset the state by cycling the
power
Failure of a
CAST
The module would have to
be re-initialized via a power-
cycle of the IN763 SoC i.e.,
by rebooting the module
FAILED_TEST_ID_0 has non-
zero value in case of a failure in
the DRBG CAST
Soft
Error
state
The Soft Error state is cleared
automatically by the entropy
source (the source raises an
alarm, zeroises itself and
becomes operational again)
Failure of a
NIST SP 800-
90B Health Test
The entropy source (and
thus the module as a whole)
recovers automatically
Failure of a NIST SP 800-90B
Health Test causes the entropy
source to raise an alarm and
zeroise itself
Table 21: Error States
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10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
An operator can initiate pre-operational and conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests on demand by rebooting the module.
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
No specific instructions are required for initialization of the module in an Approved mode apart from powering on the underlying
SoC/chip.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
Please see Sections 2, 3, 4 and 11 in this document.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
Please see Sections 2, 3, 4 and 11 in this document. The module only supports the role of a Crypto Officer (Administrator).
11.4 Maintenance Requirements
No specific maintenance requirements apply.
11.5 End of Life
The module can be zeroised to perform secure sanitization.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
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12.1 Attack List
The module does not support mitigation of any other attacks and thus the requirements of this section do not apply.