© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation
MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver
(Commercial Firmware Version: C.3.7.Z, with Boot Code 2.3.E)
FIPS 140-2
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Document Version 1.8
Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation
20430 Century Boulevard
Germantown, MD 20874
Phone: (240) 686-3300
Fax: (240) 686-3301
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 2 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Revision History
Version Modification Date Description of Changes
0.1 2006-04-21 Initial draft.
0.2 2006-07-21 Updated section two and section three.
0.3 2006-07-26 Incorporated Quality Review feedback on document.
Contents
0.4 2006-09-07 Minor updates.
0.5 2006-10-12 Updated the list of cryptographic keys, cryptographic
key components, and Critical Security Parameters
0.6 2006-12-08 Added PRNG information
0.7 2006-12-20 Added role descriptions for Softload-user and Remote
Administrator
0.8 2007-01-10 Added Softload Secret authentication information.
0.9 2007-01-12 Added algorithm certificate numbers.
1.0 2007-05-18 Added KEK functionality
1.1 2007-08-13 Added AES
1.2 2007-08-27 Clarified KEK operation and size of SK-2/SK-3.
1.3 2007_09_05 Clarification of clamshells. Specify which CSPs are
exclusively Military and Commercial. Clarify that KEK
is authentication,
1.4 2007-09-11 Removed Military references to return document to
Commercial only.
1.5 2007-09-18 Clarified key entry formats, replaced ‘Ab Initialization’
with ‘Ab Initio’.
1.6 2007-11-05 Changed software version to 3.7.Y, added boot version
and boot code functionality.
1.7 2008-02-05 Changed Table 11 from “124-bit” to “128-bit” AES keys,
changed figure 2 to remove the word 'three' when
describing LEDs and changed description of Pin 20
from “Internal LED” to “LED D”. Also updated CMVP
website to new address and shrank size of photos to
reduce document’s file size.
1.8 2008-11-29 Changed software version to 3.7.Z. Changed copyright
dates.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 3 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................................5
1.1 PURPOSE.........................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 REFERENCES...................................................................................................................................................5
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ...........................................................................................................................5
2 MTM-203 SATELLITE MOBILE TRANSCEIVER.......................................................................................6
2.1 OVERVIEW......................................................................................................................................................6
2.2 MODULE SPECIFICATION ................................................................................................................................6
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES ....................................................................................................................................7
2.4 ROLES AND SERVICES.....................................................................................................................................9
2.4.1 Normal Level User Role ......................................................................................................................10
2.4.2 Super-user Role ...................................................................................................................................11
2.4.3 Crypto-Officer Role .............................................................................................................................12
2.4.4 Softload-user and Remote Administrator Roles...................................................................................13
2.4.5 User Role .............................................................................................................................................14
2.4.6 Authentication Mechanism ..................................................................................................................14
2.5 PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................................................15
2.6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT......................................................................................................................16
2.7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT..........................................................................................................17
2.8 SELF-TESTS ..................................................................................................................................................20
2.9 DESIGN ASSURANCE.....................................................................................................................................20
2.10 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS.................................................................................................................20
3 SECURE OPERATION....................................................................................................................................21
3.1 CRYPTO-OFFICER GUIDANCE .......................................................................................................................21
3.1.1 Initial Setup..........................................................................................................................................21
3.1.2 Management ........................................................................................................................................23
3.2 USER GUIDANCE ..........................................................................................................................................23
4 ACRONYMS......................................................................................................................................................24
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – MTM-203 MOBILE SATELLITE TRANSCEIVER BLOCK DIAGRAM................................................................6
FIGURE 2 - MTM-203 MOBILE SATELLITE TRANSCEIVER INTERFACES.........................................................................8
FIGURE 3 – MTM-203 SATELLITE TRANSCEIVER MECHANICAL VIEW ........................................................................16
FIGURE 4 - LEFT LABEL TOP VIEW ..............................................................................................................................21
FIGURE 5 - LEFT LABEL BOTTOM VIEW .......................................................................................................................22
FIGURE 6 - RIGHT LABEL TOP VIEW ............................................................................................................................22
FIGURE 7 - RIGHT LABEL BOTTOM VIEW.....................................................................................................................22
Table of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION..................................................................................................7
TABLE 2 – CONNECTOR PIN FUNCTIONALITY ................................................................................................................8
TABLE 3 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACES................................................................................................................9
TABLE 4 - LIST OF ROLES...............................................................................................................................................9
TABLE 5 – MAPPING OF NORMAL LEVEL USER SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS...........10
TABLE 6 – MAPPING OF SUPER-USER’S SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS.......................11
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 4 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
TABLE 7 – MAPPING OF CRYPTO OFFICER ROLE’S SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS .....12
TABLE 87 - MAPPING OF SOFTLOAD-USER AND REMOTE ADMINISTRATOR’S SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS,
AND TYPE OF ACCESS...........................................................................................................................................13
TABLE 9 – MAPPING OF USER ROLE’S SERVICES TO INPUTS, OUTPUTS, CSPS, AND TYPE OF ACCESS ........................14
TABLE 10 – AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS ..............................................................................................................15
TABLE 11 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS..................................18
TABLE 12 – ACRONYMS...............................................................................................................................................24
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 5 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver
from Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation. This Security Policy describes how the MTM-203 Satellite Mobile
Transceiver meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2 and
describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS
140-2 validation of the module.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 – Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information
about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html
The MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver is referred to in this document as: the MTM-203 transceiver, the
transceiver, cryptographic module or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2
cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:
• The Comtech website (http://www.comtechmobile.com) contains information on the full line of products
from Comtech.
• The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains contact information for
answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
• Vendor Evidence document
• Finite State Machine document
• Other supporting documentation as additional references
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Documentation is proprietary
to Comtech and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents,
please contact Comtech.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 6 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
2 MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver
2.1 Overview
Comtech Mobile Datacom offers secure, real-time packet data messaging and position reporting services using L-
Band satellite networks. Comtech's technology allows government agencies to communicate accurately, securely,
and in a timely manner with vehicles through mobile satellite communications. This end-to-end satellite-based
solution includes earth stations located strategically around the world, leased satellite capacity, mobile terminals,
and tailored software solutions that meet and support Comtech’s clients' critical needs.
Comtech Mobile Datacom has developed miniature L-band transceivers for streamlined messaging and real-time
tracking systems. The miniature transceivers open doors to many new applications, such as covert devices and
handheld units for the dismounted soldier - applications where weight and size limits are very important. The
MTM-203 transceiver module represents a new generation in small-size, low power consumption transceivers for
use in weight-restrictive environments.
The MTM-203 is designed for easy integration into systems that benefit from secure, near real-time, over-the-air
communications. Low power consumption and efficient satellite communications technology make for a long-
battery-life product under field conditions. This device allows dismounted users to maintain situational awareness
and messaging connectivity worldwide with other mobile and terrestrial connected users. The miniature module
operates over MSAT, INMARSAT, Thuraya, Artemis, ACeS, and OPTUS L-band satellite systems without
reconfiguration.
2.2 Module Specification
The transceiver is a hardware module with hard metal covers, which compromise the cryptographic boundary. A
block diagram of the internal components of the cryptographic module is given in Figure 1 below, and the
cryptographic boundary is depicted in this diagram.
HPA
Synthesizer
Baseband
(FPGA, FLASH,
and CPU)
Modulator (D/A
and up-converter)
Down Conversion
and A/D
LNA and RF I/O
MUX
Antenna
Connector
Power Supply
Connector
Pin-out
Connector
Pin-out
Cryptographic Boundary
Figure 1 – MTM-203 Mobile Satellite Transceiver Block Diagram
The module contains a single Printed Circuit Board (PCB) with metal covers. The following is a list of the key
circuit components for the PCB:
1. High Power Amplifier (HPA) – HPA amplifies Radio Frequency (RF) signals for output traffic. It is active
only when the module is transmitting data.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 7 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
2. Modulator: Modulator receives outgoing data from Baseband and converts it into a RF signal during data
transmission.
3. Baseband: Baseband contains the FLASH memory and the Central Processing Unit (CPU) of the module.
This component of the PCB controls the module and performs transceiver functionalities.
4. Synthesizer: Synthesizer controls signal frequency of Down Conversion or Modulator for incoming or
outgoing RF signals, respectively. This component communicates with Baseband to decide on frequency.
5. Low Noise Amplifier (LNA) and RF I/O Multiplexer (MUX): Receives RF signal from the Antenna
Connector.
6. Down Conversion and Analog-to-Digital (A/D) Converter: Down conversion and A/D converts RF signal
to Baseband signal.
The MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver is a multi-chip standalone module that meets overall level 2 FIPS 140-2
requirements. The module is validated at the following FIPS 140-2 Section levels:
Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)/
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
2
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
2.3 Module Interfaces
The MTM-203 Transceiver module provides a single serial interface at Transistor-Transistor Logic (TTL) levels.
Application Programming Interface (API) commands can be provided to the module using the serial interface or the
antenna interfaces. The antenna interface consists of three coaxial connectors,
o Left Hand circularly polarized (LHCP) antenna
o Right Hand circularly polarized (RHCP) antenna
o Global Positioning System (GPS) connection
Two of these connectors deliver the received signal from either a left hand (LH) or right hand (RH) circularly
polarized antenna to the corresponding LNA circuitry. All three interfaces only operate in half duplex mode and use
the High Power Amplifier (HPA) to send the signal to the antenna. Only the transmit or the receive signal is present
on this interface at any given time. The third connector is used to connect to the on-board Global Positioning
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 8 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
System (GPS) device. The transceiver may be configured to automatically switch from LH to RH (or vice versa) by
issuing the appropriate API command.
Figure 2 - MTM-203 Mobile Satellite Transceiver Interfaces
The module’s physical interfaces are composed of Connector pins, Antenna Connectors, and Light Emitting Diodes
(LEDs). Some of the Connector pins are used to provide serial data/control input and data/status output. The
remaining active Connector pins are used to interface with an external power source. Functions of all active
Connector pins are listed in Table 2. Antenna connectors are also used for data/control input or data/status output.
The LEDs that are present on the module provide status concerning transmit or receive mode.
Table 2 – Connector Pin Functionality
Pin Pin Description
1 GND
2 Voltage from Battery (VBATT) 6.5 – 15 V
3 Ground (GND)
4 VBATT (6.5 – 15 V)
5 LED C
6 LED A
7 LED B
8 AUX_PWR CNTL
9 IGN_SENSE
10 MAIN CNTL (ON/OFF) – Must be pulled high (3.3V) for the module to turn on.
11 User Defined: 0–3 V, 8 mA, max, 3 V logic,
12 User Defined: 0–3 V, 8 mA, max, 3 V logic,
13 User Defined: 0–3 V, 8 mA, max, 3 V logic,
14 User Defined: 0–3 V, 8 mA, max, 3 V logic,
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 9 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Pin Pin Description
17 SER DAT IN
18 SER DAT OUT
20 LED D
21 Power for GPS – 1.95-3.6V (40 µA max. at 3.3 V)
The Antenna interfaces on the MTM-203 Transceiver consists of three coaxial connectors: two connectors for
external CP antennas (J2 and J3 in Figure 2), and a third connector (J1 in Figure 2) for an external GPS antenna.
• Antenna-LHCP (J3): Connector J3 feeds the LHCP LNA circuitry when in receive mode, and connects to
the LHCP HPA circuitry when the unit is in transmit mode.
• Antenna-RHCP (J2): Connector J2 feeds the RHCP LNA circuitry in the receive mode, and connects to the
RHCP HPA circuitry when the module is in transmit mode. The RHCP LNA also feeds the internal GPS
module as well as the J1 connector.
• The third coaxial connector, J1, feeds the GPS signal to an external GPS module. The signal output from
this connector is only available when the unit is in the receive mode.
All of these physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described in the
following table:
Table 3 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Port/Interface
Data Input Pin 17, J2, J3
Data Output Pin18, J1, J2, J3
Control Input Pin 9, pin 10, pin11, pin 12, pin13, pin14, pin 17, J2, J3
Status Output Pin 8, pin11, pin 12, pin13, pin14, pin 18, LEDs
Power Pin 1, pin 2, pin 3, pin 4, pin 21
2.4 Roles and Services
The module supports role-based authentication. There are six roles in the module that operators may assume:
Table 4 - List of Roles
Role Interface Authentication
Normal Level User Serial port Not authenticated.
Super-User Serial port Super-User password.
Crypto-Officer Serial port Crypto-Officer password.
User Satellite
connection
Possession of correct identity and traffic TDES keys.
Remote Administrator Satellite
connection
Possession of identity and traffic keys.
Solftload User Satellite
connection
Possession of correct “softload secret” (9 bytes of random value used to derive a
192-bit TDES softload user key)
The User role is assumed by operators who utilize the module’s data transmitting functionalities. The Crypto-
Officer, Super-user, Softload-user, and Remote Administrator roles are used to perform administrative services on
the module, such as initialization, configuration, and monitoring of the module. The Normal level user is an
unauthorized role who can perform only non-security relevant operation on the module. Normal level users cannot
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 10 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
modify or view any Critical Security Parameters (CSPs). Users and Remote Administrators only access the module
via the Antenna interface, whereas other roles access the module locally via the serial port. To access the module as
Crypto-Officer or a Super-user, the operator must first access the module locally as a Normal level user, and then
enter a password to log in as a Crypto-Officer or a Super-user.
All roles except for the Softload User can ‘Execute’ the Traffic and Identity keys to encrypt and decrypt messages.
The Softload User and Remote Administrator can ‘Read’ keys from and ‘Write’ keys to the transceiver. 'Execute'
means that the role can use a key to encrypt or decrypt a message, but the ability to 'Execute' does not provide access
to the raw key material. 'Read' means that the role can view the raw key material. 'Write' means that the role can add,
or replace, the raw key material.
2.4.1 Normal Level User Role
The Normal level user is an unauthorized role which has access to the following non-security relevant services:
Table 5 – Mapping of Normal Level user Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service Description Input Output CSPs and Module’s
Access Level
API Modes Controls display of
command provided to the
module over serial port
Command Status output --
General
Information
Shows module status Command Status output --
Identities and
Nodes
Shows identity list and
associated data
Command and
identity name
Status output --
Viewing
Messages
Monitors message
transaction
Command Status output --
Formatting a
Message Payload
Formats payload data Command Status output --
Message Formats Formats incoming or
outgoing messages
Command and data Status output --
Sending a
Message
Transmits a message Command and data Status output --
DSP Configures and monitors
DSP setting
Command DSP configured and
status output
--
Host Processor Configures and monitors
Host configuration to the
EEPROM.
Command Status output --
GPS Configures and monitors
GPS setting
Command DSP configured and
status output
--
Digital I/O Sets up antenna
configuration
Command Antenna configured
and status output
--
Power Sets up auxiliary power and
‘powersave’ mode
Command and power Status output --
Emergency
Mode
Sets emergency mode Command Status output --
LED Tests LEDs Command Status output --
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 11 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Service Description Input Output CSPs and Module’s
Access Level
Provisioning Provisions the module Command Module ready for
service
--
Diagnostics Diagnostic operations on the
module
Command Status output --
Send message Sends a message Network packet with
data
Data transmitted Identity Key –
Execute
Traffic Key –
Execute
Receive message Receives a message Network packet with
data
Data received Identity Key –
Execute
Traffic Key –
Execute
Erase firmware
holding area
Used by boot code protocols
prior to upload of new
firmware to holding areas in
non-volatile memory
Commands Status responses --
Write firmware
holding area
Used by boot code protocols
to upload new firmware to
holding areas in non-volatile
memory
Commands and
firmware image data
Status responses --
Verify firmware
holding area
Used by boot code protocols
prior to request checksum
test of holding areas in non-
volatile memory
Commands and
checksum data
Status responses --
2.4.2 Super-user Role
The Super-user is an authorized role with following privileges:
Table 6 – Mapping of Super-user’s Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service Description Input Output CSPs and Module’s
Access Level
General Setup Shows module status Command Status output --
Access Levels Changes access level
to Crypto-Officer or
Super user level
Command and
password
Change in access level Password – Read
Nodes and
Identities
Monitors and sets
identity list and
associated data
Command and
identity name
Status output --
Sending a Message Transmits a message Command and data Status output --
DSP Configures and
monitors DSP setting
Command DSP configured and
status output
--
GPS Configures and
monitors GPS setting
Command DSP configured and
status output
--
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 12 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Service Description Input Output CSPs and Module’s
Access Level
Power Sets up auxiliary
power and ‘powersave’
modes
Command and power Status output --
Send message Sends a message Network packet with
data
Data transmitted Identity Key –
Execute
Traffic Key – Execute
Receive message Receives a message Network packet with
data
Data received Identity Key –
Execute
Traffic Key – Execute
2.4.3 Crypto-Officer Role
Descriptions of the services available to the Crypto-Officer role are provided in the table below.
Table 7 – Mapping of Crypto Officer Role’s Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service Description Input Output CSPs and Module’s
Access Level
Node and Identities Monitors and sets
identity list and
associated data
Command and
identity name
Status output --
Access Levels Changes access level
to Crypto-Officer or
Super user level
Command and
password
Change in access
level
Password – Read
Enable Internal GPS Configures and
monitors GPS setting
Command DSP configured and
status output
--
Monitor Maps Manages and
monitors inbound and
outbound network
maps.
Command Status output --
Process CMDC Changes the
transceiver packet
display mode.
Command Status output --
Set Transmit Adjusts the module’s
transmit power level
and DSP setting.
Command Status output --
Test cryptographic
algorithm
Tests TDES
encryption/decryption
algorithm
Command Status output --
Send message Sends a message Network packet with
data
Data transmitted Identity Key –
Execute
Traffic Key –
Execute
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 13 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Service Description Input Output CSPs and Module’s
Access Level
Receive message Receives a message Network packet with
data
Data received Identity Key –
Execute
Traffic Key –
Execute
2.4.4 Softload-user and Remote Administrator Roles
Softload-user and Remote Administrator users are authorized roles whose privileges are listed in Table 8. These
two roles can also access all module management related commands defined for Crypto-Officer and Super user
roles.
Table 8 - Mapping of Softload-user and Remote Administrator’s Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type
of Access
Service Description Input Output CSPs and
Module’s
Access Level
NC_ESTABLISH_KEY
SET
Adds keyset to the keyset tables Command and
key data
Keyset table
changes
Traffic key –
Read/Write
AB
Initialization
Key –
Read/Write
NC_ESTABLISH_ENC
RYPTED_KEYSET
Adds the keyset to the keyset tables Command and
key data
Keyset table
changes
Traffic key –
Read/Write
Ab Initio Key
– Read/Write
NC_ESTABLISH_NOD
E
Builds incoming and outgoing maps in
non-volatile memory.
Command and
node name
Status output --
NC_ADD_IDENTITY Establishes the maps to add a node as
a destination identity within the
transceiver.
Command and
data
Status output --
NC_SET_DEFAULT_T
O
Sets a node as the active default
destination node.
Command Status output --
NC_SET_DEFAULT_F
ROM
Sets a node as the active default source
node.
Command Status output --
NC_SET_DEFAULT_T
O_AND_FROM
Sets the active source and destination
nodes appropriately
Command Status output --
NC_REMOVE_KEYSE
T
Removes a keyset Command Status output --
NC_REMOVE_NODE Removes a node from the maps Command Status output --
NC_REMOVE_IDENTI
TY
Removes a node from the identities
within the transceiver.
Command Status output --
NC_SET_ALL_RADIO
_PARAMETERS
Configures and monitors channel Command DSP
configured and
status output
--
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 14 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Service Description Input Output CSPs and
Module’s
Access Level
NC_SET_OUTPUT_G
AIN_FACTOR
Sets the transmit gain value to the
value of the included parameter
Command Status output --
NC_SET_TX_AUTHO
RIZATION_MASK
Sets the transceiver transmit
authorization mask to the value of the
included parameter
Command Status output --
NC_SET_CURRENT_
AUTHORIZATION_M
ASK
Sets the current beam transmit
authorization mask to the value of the
included parameter
Command Status output --
NC_USE_CONFIGUR
ATION
Configures and monitors DSP setting Command DSP
configured and
status output
--
NC_REMOVE_AB_INI
TIO
Removes Ab Initio keys, maps and
identities from memory.
Command Ab Initio Key
removed
Ab Initio Key
– Read/Write
NC_WRITE_DSP_FLA
SH
Writes the data to the appropriate
location in Flash memory
Command and
data
Status output --
NC_MT2011_COMPA
TIBILITY
Sets the compatibility flags to the
value
Command Status output --
Send message (Remote
Administrator only)
Sends a message Network
packet with
data
Data
transmitted
Identity Key –
Execute
Traffic Key –
Execute
2.4.5 User Role
The User role has the ability to utilize the module’s data transmitting functionalities via Antenna interface only.
Descriptions of the services available to the Users are provided in the table below.
Table 9 – Mapping of User Role’s Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access
Service Description Input Output CSPs and Module’s
Access Level
Send message Sends a message Network packet with
data
Data transmitted Identity Key –
Execute
Traffic Key –
Execute
Receive message Receives a message Network packet with
data
Data received Identity Key –
Execute
Traffic Key –
Execute
2.4.6 Authentication Mechanism
The Crypto-Officers, Super-users, and Softload-users are able to access the module through directly connected
console port. Users and Remote Administrators access the module only via the Antenna interface network and
authenticate themselves with Traffic keys (AES or TDES keys). Crypto-Officer and Super-user authenticate
themselves using passwords. Softload-users authenticate with a 192-bit TDES key derived from Softload Secret.
Softload Secret is a 9 byte random value.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 15 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Table 10 – Authentication Mechanisms
Authentication Type Strength Strength Within One Minute
Passwords The minimum length of the password is six
alphanumeric characters with any printable
symbols. Assuming only 94 characters with
repetition, the chance of a random attempt
falsely succeeding is 1 in (946
=)
689,869,781,056.
Because of the serial interface speed, the
module can accept only 69,120 password
attempts in a minute. So the chance of
random success is 1 in (946
/69,120) or 1 in
about 9,980,754.
TDES Keys The Softload-user authentication keys are 192
bit TDES keys with 112 bits of security.
Users and Remotes Administrators can also
authenticate with 192 bit TDES keys. The
chance of a random attempt falsely
succeeding is 1 in (2112
=) 5.192296858
x1033
.
The processor speed means the module can
go through 4.5*109
cycles per minute. If
each authentication attempt took only one
minute, the chance of random success would
be 1 in (2112
/4.5*109
) or 1 in 1.15 * 10^24.
AES Keys Users and Remote Administrators can
authenticate with 128, 192 or 256 bit AES
keys. The chance of a random attempt falsely
succeeding is 1 in (2128
= ) 3.402823669 x
1038
, 1 in (2192
= ) 6.277101735 x 1057
, and 1
in (2256
= ) 1.157920892 x 1077
, respectively.
Due to the processor speed cite above, the
minimum chance of a random success in one
minute would be 1 in (2128
/4.5*109
) or about
1 in 7 * 1028
.
Softload Secret Softload Secret is a 9 byte random value, the
chance of a random attempt falsely
succeeding is 1 in (272
=)
4,722,366,482,869,645,213,696.
Again, due to processor speed, the chance of
random success in a minute would be a most
1 in (272
/4.5*109
) or 1.04*1012
.
2.5 Physical Security
The MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The module is
contained within a hard metal clamshell. The module’s cover is resistant to probing and is opaque within the visible
spectrum. Tamper-evident seals are placed on the cryptographic module so that the seal must be broken to attain
physical access
The cryptographic boundary is defined as encompassing the “top,” “front,” “left,” “right,” “rear,” and “bottom”
surfaces of two clamshell metal housing that are firmly held together with twelve screws. The metal housing
exposes interfaces for the Control Connector, Antenna Connectors, and LEDs at front side.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 16 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Figure 3 – MTM-203 Satellite Transceiver Mechanical View
The metal covers do not have any openings or ventilation holes. This module employs tamper-evident labels to
detect the opening of the covers. The tamper-evident labels are applied by Comtech before providing the module to
the Crypto-Officer, and the description of where these labels are located is described in the “Secure Operation”
section of this document.
The module conforms to the Electromagnetic Interference/ Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) requirements
specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, and
Class A (for business use).
2.6 Operational Environment
The operational environment requirements do not apply to the MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver, because the
module does not provide a general-purpose operating system (OS) to the user. The OS is not externally accessible
and only the module’s custom written firmware provides a logical interface into the module. The module provides a
method to update the firmware in the module with a new version. A HMAC-SHA-1 keyed hash is verified over the
firmware update to ensure its integrity.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 17 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
2.7 Cryptographic Key Management
The cryptographic module implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
• Triple DES – CBC; 1 and 2 keying option; encrypt/decrypt (certificate #502)
• SHA-1 Byte oriented (certificate #561)
• HMAC SHA-1 – (certificate #245)
• ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 PRNG – (certificate #271)
• AES – 128, 192 and 256 bit keying, CBC, encrypt/decrypt (certificate #626)
The cryptographic module implements the following non-FIPS-approved algorithms:
• Digital Encryption Standard (DES)
• Non-FIPS-approved RNG used to seed the FIPS approved PRNG
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 18 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
The module supports the following critical security parameters:
Table 11 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
Key Key Type Generation / Input Output Storage Zeroization Use
Identity Key TDES 192-bit CBC
key, or AES 128, 192
or 256 bit CDB key
Generated externally;
input in plaintext or
ciphertext, depending
upon user role
Output in plaintext Stored in Flash in
plaintext
Erasing flash image Encrypts and decrypts
session data
Traffic Key TDES 192-bit CBC
key, or AES 128, 192
or 256 bit CDB key
Generated externally;
input in plaintext or
ciphertext, depending
upon user role
Output in plaintext Stored in Flash in
plaintext
Erasing flash image Encrypts and decrypts
session data
Ab Initio Keys TDES 192-bit CBC key Generated externally;
hardcoded in
application
Output in plaintext Stored in Flash in
Plaintext or hardcoded
in application
Erasing flash image Encrypts and decrypts
session data for unit
recovery.
Softload Secret
(Note: communication
encrypted with the
Softload Key is
considered plaintext for
FIPS purposes.)
9 bytes of random data Generated externally;
hardcoded in
application
Never output from
module
Hard coded in
application firmware in
plaintext
Erasing flash image Derives key to encrypt
and decrypt Softload
session data. Derived
keys are considered as
authentication for
softload user.
Password Crypto-Officer or
Super-user password
Generated externally Never output from
module
Stored in Flash in
plaintext
Erasing flash image Authenticates Crypto-
Officer and Super-user
Firmware Upgrade key 20 bytes HMAC key Generated externally;
hardcoded in
application
Never output from
module
Hard coded in
application firmware in
plaintext
Erasing flash image Perform Integrity check
for firmware upgrade
PRNG seed 8 bytes of seed Generated internally Never output from
module
Resides in volatile
memory
Power cycle Seeds the FIPS
approved PRNG
2.7.1.1 Key Generation
The module has a nonapproved RNG to gather entropy and seed the FIPS approved PRNG. The module does not generate any cryptographic keys internally.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 19 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
2.7.1.2 Key Storage
The Firmware Upgrade Key is held in volatile memory only in plaintext during firmware upgrade. The Softload Secret and passwords are stored in flash
memory in plaintext. The Ab Initio key is stored in Flash memory in plaintext form. The Identity keys and Traffic keys are stored in flash memory, in plaintext
form.
2.7.1.3 Key Entry and Output
All keys and CSPs that are entered into the module are electronically entered. Identity Keys, Traffic Keys, and Ab Initio Keys exit module in plaintext, no other
keys or CSPs exit the module. Ab Initialization Keys are hardcoded in application. Identity Key and Traffic Keys can enter the module plaintext or in encrypted
form.
2.7.1.4 Key Zeroization
All keys and CSPs can be zeroized by erasing the flash image. The user can erase the flash image by either engaging a zeroize mechanism via the serial user
interface, or by commands sent to the unit over the satellite connection.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 20 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
2.8 Self-Tests
The MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver performs the following self-tests at power-up:
• Software integrity check using Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)-32 checksum, on both Boot code and Host
application code.
• Known Answer Tests (KATs)
o Triple-DES KAT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o PRNG KAT
o AES KAT
If any of the above self-tests fail, the module prints a failure indicator message on the serial port. Otherwise, a
success indicator message is posted on the serial port. Failure of the Boot code software integrity check is indicated
by a flashing pattern on the LEDs, as the serial interface has not been activated at that point.
The MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Software update test using HMAC SHA-1
• Continuous RNG Test for FIPS approved PRNG and non-approved RNG
Upon failing conditional self-tests, the module posts a message on the serial port.
2.9 Design Assurance
The source code is primarily written in C. Some portions are written in assembler for performance reasons.
Comtech uses Code Co-op version 4.6e to perform source code versioning and management and stores release notes
within for versions of the firmware.
Additionally, Microsoft Visual Source Safe (VSS) version 6.0 is used to provide configuration management for the
MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver’s FIPS documentation. This software provides access control, versioning,
and logging.
2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not mitigate other attacks.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 21 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
3 Secure Operation
The MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver meets Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below
describe how to place and keep the module in FIPS-approved mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto-Officer Guidance
The module is available directly from Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation and is shipped via a third party
shipping company, such as FedEx or UPS. The module sealed with an anti-static bag is provided in a carton. The
Crypto-Officer must inspect the box, packing materials, and module for signs of tamper, including damage to the
box, packing materials, or the module itself.
The Crypto-Officer (CO) is responsible for initial setup and maintenance to the FIPS mode of operation of the
module.
3.1.1 Initial Setup
The MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver comes to the CO in a compact, rugged, solid-state device with no
moving parts. The following materials are needed to run the MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver:
1. Antenna
2. RS-422 serial cable
3. Interface from the Connector pin-outs to serial port
4. External Power Supply (40 uA max, 3.3V)
5. 20AWG wiring gauge
Crypto-Officer receives the module with tamper evident labels on. The module requires two (2) a labels to detect
any tampering.
1. One label is at the seam covering top and bottom surface of the clamshells at left side.
Figure 4 - Left Label Top View
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 22 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
Figure 5 - Left Label Bottom View
2. Another label is applied at the seam covering top and bottom surface of the clamshells at right side.
Figure 6 - Right Label Top View
Figure 7 - Right Label Bottom View
Tamper evident labels usually become torn upon an attempt to remove them, and always either break into small
pieces or become noticeably warped whenever a successful removal attempt is made. Thus, attempts at removal
always show evidence of tampering. After confirming that there is no evidence of label damage that would indicate
tampering with the module, the Crypto-Officer should run the power-on test. This procedure requires a terminal or
computer running terminal emulation software set for 9600 baud with 8 bits, no parity, 1 stop bit, and no flow
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 23 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
control. Initialization messages should appear on console port when an RS-422 serial cable with an RJ-45 male
connector is connected to the terminal and with power turned on.
Comtech ships the module fully provisioned. Provisioning establishes the profile of configuration commands
inherent to the module.
3.1.2 Management
The Crypto-Officer must ensure that the module is always operating in a FIPS-approved mode of operation. This
can be achieved by ensuring the following:
• Ensure via the “show version” command that the FIPS-Approved versions of the Boot Code and
Commercial Firmware are loaded on the transceiver (see pg.1 of this document for the applicable version
numbers).
• Passwords must be at least six characters long.
• To login over serial port as a Crypto-Officer or Superuser role, ‘superuser’ command needs to be issued
followed by a ‘enter’ key, then password needs to be entered.
• The module logs must be monitored. If suspicious log entries are noted, the Crypto-Officer should take the
module off-line and investigate.
• The tamper-evident labels must be regularly examined for signs of tampering (Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6,
and Figure 7) to detect any opening of the covers.
• ‘softload’ should be used only via serial port.
• The Crypto-Officer must ensure that only AES or Triple-DES keys are loaded into the module and used for
encryption/decryption. DES keys must be explicitly disallowed.
3.2 User Guidance
The end Users do not have the ability to configure sensitive information on the module. The User should be careful
not to provide Traffic key information to other parties.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 1.8 October 29,2008
Comtech MTM-203 Satellite Mobile Transceiver Page 24 of 24
© 2008 Comtech Mobile Datacom Corporation – This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact
including this copyright notice.
4 Acronyms
Table 12 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
A/D Analog to Digital Converter
API Application Programming Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto-Officer
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSP Critical Security Parameter
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GPS Global Positioning System
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
HPA High Power Amplifier
KAT Known Answer Test
LED Light Emitting Diode
LH Left Hand
LHCP Left-Hand Circularly Polarized
LNA Low Noise Amplifier
MUX Multiplexer
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS Operating System
PCB Printed Circuit Board
RF Radio Frequency
RH Right Hand
RHCP Right-Hand Circularly Polarized
TTL Transistor-Transistor Logic
VBATT Voltage from Battery
VSS Visual Source Safe