LEVEL 3 NON-PROPRIETARY SECURITY POLICY FOR
ProtectServer Internal Express 2 (PSI-E2)
© Copyright 2019 Gemalto
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Gemalto reserves the right to make changes in the product or its specifications mentioned in
this publication without notice. Accordingly, the reader is cautioned to verify that information
in this publication is current before placing orders. The information furnished by Gemalto in
this document is believed to be accurate and reliable. However, no responsibility is assumed
by Gemalto for its use, or for any infringements of patents or other rights of third parties
resulting from its use.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section Title Page
1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Purpose............................................................................................................................................ 4
1.2 References....................................................................................................................................... 4
1.3 Terminology ..................................................................................................................................... 5
1.4 Document Organization ................................................................................................................... 5
2. THE PSI-E2 CARD ................................................................................................................................. 5
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification ................................................................................................ 5
2.2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces..................................................................................... 6
2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication ................................................................................................ 7
2.3.1 Services for Authorized Roles .................................................................................................. 8
2.3.2 Administrator Security Officer................................................................................................... 8
2.3.3 Administrator............................................................................................................................. 9
2.3.4 Token SO.................................................................................................................................. 9
2.3.5 Token User ............................................................................................................................. 10
2.3.6 Unauthenticated Operators..................................................................................................... 10
2.4 Physical Security............................................................................................................................ 11
2.5 Operational Environment ............................................................................................................... 11
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management ................................................................................................... 11
2.6.1 Key Generation....................................................................................................................... 11
2.6.2 Key Access / Storage.............................................................................................................. 11
2.6.3 Security Functions .................................................................................................................. 15
2.7 Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................... 18
2.7.1 Power-Up Self-Tests............................................................................................................... 18
2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests............................................................................................................. 20
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks............................................................................................................. 20
3. FIPS APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION......................................................................................... 20
3.1 Description ..................................................................................................................................... 20
3.2 Invoking Approved Mode of Operation .......................................................................................... 21
3.3 Mode of Operation Indicator........................................................................................................... 21
3.4 Invoking Mode of Operation Indicator ............................................................................................ 21
4. DESIGN ASSURANCE......................................................................................................................... 21
4.1 Distribution and Delivery of Module ............................................................................................... 21
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LIST OF TABLES
Table Title Page
Table 2-1 FIPS 140-2 Security Levels..........................................................................................................6
Table 2-2 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces......................................................................................................7
Table 2-3 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication .................................................................7
Table 2-4 Types of Available Services .........................................................................................................8
Table 2-5 List of Keys Stored in Module ....................................................................................................14
Table 2-6 Access to Keys for Authorized Services ....................................................................................14
Table 2-7 FIPS Approved Security Functions ............................................................................................17
Table 2-8 Non-Approved FIPS Allowed Security Functions.......................................................................17
Table 2-9 Non-Approved FIPS Allowed Key Derivation Mechanisms........................................................17
Table 2-10 Non-Approved Key Derivation Mechanisms ............................................................................18
Table 2-11 Power-up Self-Tests.................................................................................................................19
Table 2-12 Conditional Self-Tests ..............................................................................................................20
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Title Page
Figure 2-1 ProtectServer Internal Express 2 Card .......................................................................................5
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix Title Page
APPENDIX A. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................22
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the ProtectServer Internal
Express 2 (PSI-E2). This security policy describes how the PSI-E2 meets the security
requirements of FIPS 140-2 and how to operate the PSI-E2 in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This
policy was prepared as a part of the Level 3 FIPS 140-2 validation of the PSI-E2.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 - Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program
is available on the NIST web site at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the PSI-E2 in the technical terms of
a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the PSI-E2
and other Gemalto products from the following sources:
• The Gemalto internet site contains information on the full line of security products at
https://safenet.gemalto.com/data-encryption/hardware-security-modules-hsms/protectserver-
security-module/
• For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the
Gemalto internet site at https://safenet.gemalto.com/contact-us/
Gemalto Contact Information:
Gemalto (Corporate Headquarters) 4690 Millennium Drive
Belcamp, MD 21017
Telephone: 410-931-7500
TTY Users: 800-735-2258
Fax: 410-931-7524
Gemalto (Ottawa) 20 Colonnade Road
Suite 200
Ottawa, Ontario
K2E 7M6
Telephone: +1 613 723 5077
Fax: +1 613 723 5079
Gemalto Sales:
U.S. (800) 533-3958
International +1 (410) 931-7500
Gemalto Technical Support:
U.S. (800) 545-6608
International +1 (410) 931-7520
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Gemalto Customer Service:
U.S. (866) 251-4269
EMEA +44 (0) 1276 60 80 00
APAC 852 3157 7111
1.3 Terminology
In this document the Gemalto ProtectServer Internal Express 2 card is referred to as the PSI-E2,
the adapter, or the module.
1.4 Document Organization
This document provides an overview of the PSI-E2 and explains the secure configuration and
operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the
general features and functionality of the PSI-E2. Section 3 specifically addresses the required
configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.
2. THE PSI-E2 CARD
2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification
The Gemalto PSI-E2 is a cryptographic module is a multi-chip embedded hardware cryptographic
module in the form of a PCI-Express card that provides a wide range of cryptographic functions
using firmware and dedicated hardware processors. This document refers specifically to PSI-E2
hardware version VBD-05, Version Code 0200 with Firmware Version 5.03.01 and 5.03.02.
Figure 2-1 ProtectServer Internal Express 2 Card
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The module, running Gemalto’s Cprov firmware, implements the Cryptoki cryptographic API as
defined by RSA Data Security. While certain Cryptoki features are not supported, the module
does provide a comprehensive compliance to the PKCS#11 standard as well as vendor-specific
extensions.
The cryptographic boundary for this module includes the metal cover enclosure that is outlined in
red above, under which a hard epoxy coating is protecting the PCB. This boundary encapsulates
the Data Ciphering Processor (DCP), embedded processor, SDRAM memory chips, and the Real
Time Clock (RTC). The battery, battery isolation link, and external alarm input link are excluded
from the FIPS 140-2 security requirements.
The module provides key management (e.g., generation, storage, deletion, and backup), an
extensive suite of cryptographic mechanisms, and process management including separation
between operators. The PSI-E2 also features non-volatile tamper protected memory for key
storage, a hardware random number generator, and an RTC.
The FIPS 140-2 cryptographic boundary is defined by the perimeter of the protection covers.
The PSI-E2 meets all level 3 requirements for FIPS 140-2 as summarized in Table 2-1.
Section Section title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 3
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 3
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Machine 3
5 Physical Security 3
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 3
8 EMI/EMC 3
9 Self Tests 3
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 2-1 FIPS 140-2 Security Levels
2.2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
The PSI-E2 has the following physical interfaces:
• A standard PCI Express bus interfacing to the motherboard of the host machine;
• One USB serial connector;
• One Luna Remote PED connector (not used);
• One external battery isolation connector; and
• One External tamper input.
The PSI-E2 provides a tightly secured cryptographic element. All requests for services sent to
the adapter over the PCI bus or the serial ports are captured by the adapter’s processor, which
controls the level of access to the on-board cryptographic services and the keys. The adapter’s
processor also responds to PKCS #11 commands, ensuring that during FIPS operation only
authenticated users receive cryptographic services.
The module’s physical interfaces are separated into the logical interfaces, defined by FIPS 140-2,
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and described in Table 2-2:
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces Adapter Physical Interfaces
Data Input Interface PCI Bus, USB Serial port
Data Output Interface PCI Bus, USB Serial port
Control Input Interface PCI Bus, External tamper input
Status Output Interface PCI Bus
Power Interface PCI Bus, External battery isolation
connector
Table 2-2 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication
The PSI-E2 supports identity-based authentication of its operator. Operators are identified by a
token name and PIN. The different roles and required authentication are shown in Table 2-3.
Operator Role Type of authentication Authentication Data
Administrator
SO
Crypto Officer Identity Based Operator Unique PIN
Administrator User Identity Based Operator Unique PIN
Token SO Crypto Officer Identity Based Operator Unique PIN
Token User User Identity Based Operator Unique PIN
Audit User User Identity Based Operator Unique PIN
Table 2-3 Roles and Required Identification and Authentication
The PSI-E2 supports three types of Tokens: one Administration Token, multiple Cprov Tokens
and one or more Smart Card Tokens. All Tokens have two operators: a Security Officer (SO) and
a User. For the Administration Token, the Administrator SO is the FIPS 140-2 Crypto Officer and
the Administrator is the User. For all other Tokens, the Token SO is the FIPS 140-2 Crypto
Officer and the Token User is the User.
The operator explicitly selects a role when logging in by selecting a PKCS#11 Token and
nominating either User or SO Role. The adapter provides restricted services to an operator
based on the role to which the operator authenticated. There is only one operator assigned to
each role. The Administrator SO and Token SO perform FIPS 140-2 Crypto Officer roles while the
Administrator and Token User performs a FIPS 140-2 User role.
The PSI-E2 enforces a minimum PIN length of 4 characters and a maximum PIN length of 32
characters. The module allows the PIN character to be any value but the software typically used
with the module restricts the dictionary to the ANSI C character set. This character set provides
for 92 visible characters which, with a 4 character PIN, provides a probability of less than one in
1,000,000 that a random PIN attempt (e.g., guess) will succeed (actual probability is
approximately 1/71,600,000). The module is protected from brute force PIN attacks by imposing
an increasing delay for every failed PIN attempt after the first three failed attempts. The initial
delay is 5 seconds and increases by an additional 5 seconds for each subsequent failed attempt,
e.g., 3 fails causes a 5 second delay; 4 fails causes a 10 second delay; 5 fails causes a 15
second delay; etc.
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2.3.1 Services for Authorized Roles
Table 2-4 lists the services related to each authorized role within the adapter:
Role Services
Administrator SO Initialize Administrator Token User PIN
Administrator Manage Adapter and Administrator Token
Token SO Manage Token
Token User Use Token and manage token keys
Unauthenticated operator Unauthenticated services
Audit User Manage Audit Key and logs
Table 2-4 Types of Available Services
All services listed in Sections 2.3.1 through 2.3.6 can be accessed in FIPS and non-FIPS mode. The services
listed in Sections 2.3.1 through 2.3.6 use the security functions listed in Table 2-7, Table 2-8, Table 2-9, and
Table 2-10. When the module is operating in FIPS-approved mode as described in Section 3, the Non-FIPS
Approved key derivation mechanisms in Table 2-10 are disabled and cannot be used for these services. The
non-Approved functions in Table 2-10 can only be accessed through the services when the module is in non-
FIPS Approved mode.
2.3.2 Administrator Security Officer
The primary role of the Administrator Security Officer (ASO) is to introduce the Administrator to
the system. The ASO is able to set the initial Administrator PIN value but is not able to change
the administration PIN after it is initialized. The ASO can perform the following services:
• Set the initial Administrator PIN value (may not change it later);
• Set the CKA_TRUSTED attribute on a Public object in the Administrator Token;
• Set the CKA_EXPORT attribute on a Public object in the Administrator Token;
• Manage Host Interface Master Keys;
• Exercise cryptographic services with Public objects
• Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive1 Public objects;
• May change his/her own PIN;
• Read the Hardware Event Log;
• May modify Monotonic Counter object2 and
1 Key Derive operations are listed in Table 2-9.
2 Monotonic counter objects represent hardware counters which exists on the device. The counters are
incremented sequentially each time it is read. There is only one monotonic counter per token.
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• Power-up self-test on demand.
2.3.3 Administrator
The Administrator is responsible for the overall security management of the adapter. Token
Security Officers and Slots are controlled by the Administrator. The following services are
available to the Administrator:
• Set or Change RTC value3;
• Read the Hardware Event Log;
• Purge a full Hardware Event Log;
• Configure the Transport Mode feature4;
• Specify the Security Policy of the adapter;
• Create new Cprov Slots/Tokens and specify their Labels, SO PINs, and minimum PIN
Length;
• Initialize smart cards and specify their Labels and SO PINs;
• Destroy individual Cprov Slots/Tokens;
• Zeroize all adapter Secure Memory including all PINs and User Keys;
• Perform Firmware Upgrade Operation;
• Manage Host Interface Master Keys;
• Exercise cryptographic services with Public objects on Administrator Token;
• Exercise cryptographic services with Private objects on Administrator Token;
• Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Public objects on Administrator Token;
• Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Private objects on Administrator Token;
• May change his/her own PIN; and
• Power-up self-test on demand.
2.3.4 Token SO
The Token SO is responsible for granting and revoking ownership of the token. If the Token does
not have a User PIN, the Token SO should initialize it by assigning the Label and User PIN. The
token SO may also revoke the Token User’s privileges (and possibly reassign the token to
another operator) but only by destroying all the key material of the original operator first. The
following services are available to the Token SO:
• Set the initial User PIN value (may not change it later)
• Reset (re-initialize) the Token (destroys all keys and User PIN on the Token) and set a new
Label
• Set the CKA_TRUSTED attribute on a Public object in his or her Token
• Set the CKA_EXPORT attribute on a Public object in his or her Token
3 The clock on the module can be synched to the host where it is installed.
4 Transport Mode allows removal of HSM from the PCI slot. The removal can be single time or continuous for
storage. This feature depends upon the battery backup.
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• Exercise cryptographic services with Public objects in his or her Token;
• Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Public objects in his or her Token
• May change his/her own PIN;
• May modify Monotonic Counter object; and
• Power-up self-test on demand.
2.3.5 Token User
Token users may manage and use private and public keys on their own tokens. The following
services are available to the Token User:
• Exercise cryptographic services with Public objects in his or her Token;
• Exercise cryptographic services with Private objects in his or her Token;
• Create, destroy, import, export, generate, derive Public objects in his or her Token;
• Create, destroy, import, export, generate, and derive Private objects in his or her Token;
• May change his/her own PIN; and
• Power-up self-test on demand.
2.3.6 Unauthenticated Operators
Certain services are available to operators who have not (yet) authenticated to the adapter:
• Exercise status querying services;
• Authenticate to a Token; and
• Force session terminate, restart adapter by setting a register which is memory mapped to the
PCI bus. The host application can force a restart by writing a certain value to the register
through the PSI-E2 device driver. The transparent PCI chip will then generate a bus cycle
restart which in turn will restart the adapter.
All of the services available to the Unauthenticated Operators are also available to all
authenticated operators.
2.3.7 Audit User
The AuditUser role is present on the Admin Token and can be initialized by the AdminSO role.
The responsibility of this role is limited to:
• Create/Destroy AUDIT_KEY; and
• Verify the generated audit logs.
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2.4 Physical Security
The adapter provides tamper evidence and tamper response mechanisms. A metal casing
covers the epoxy-covered PCB board. The epoxy provides a strong tamper evident enclosure.
The Administrator should perform routine visual inspection of the module for evidence of tamper
such as scratches.
The module is actively protected through a combination of an external tamper jumper switch and
a voltage monitor. The PSI-E2 protection can also be activated by removal of the adapter from
the host machine or via an external alarm input capability. In the event of a tamper the PSI-E2
enters a Tamper state in which all processing is halted and the Non-Volatile secure memory is
zeroized.
Hardness testing of the epoxy was performed from a low of -50° to +60° Celsius. No assurance is
provided for Level 3 hardness conformance at any other temperature.
2.5 Operational Environment
This section does not apply. The PSI-E2 does not provide a modifiable operational environment.
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management
The PSI-E2 is a general-purpose cryptographic management device and thus securely
administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters (CSPs) such as
passwords.
2.6.1 Key Generation
The PSI-E2 Module supports the generation of DSA, RSA, ECDSA (also known as ECC), and DH
public and private keys. The module also supports the generation of three-key Triple-DES keys
as well as AES 128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit keys. The module implements a FIPS approved
AES-CTR DRBG specified in NIST SP 800-90A. ECDH is supported for key derivation functions.
2.6.2 Key Access / Storage
All keys except module specific keys are stored in one of three media.
Flash memory is used to store encrypted keys, plaintext keys are stored either in Volatile RAM or
in tamper responding secure memory (battery-backed RAM). The module prevents physical
access all these media through the physical security mechanisms discussed in section 2.4.
Logical access to keys and other CSPs is restricted to authenticated operators with valid
permissions. The communication to the module including key generation and key creation is
performed over a Three Key Triple DES encrypted trusted channel and the module only allows
keys to be output if they are wrapped using a FIPS Approved algorithm.
Table 2-5 outlines all the keys stored by the module.
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CSP CSP Type Generation Input/Output Storage Destruction Mechanism Use
Firmware upgrade
Public Key
2048 bit RSA FIPS 186-4 RNG Not input/output Plaintext in Flash None To verify the signature attached to a
new firmware image. Generation done
at manufacture.
Default Administrator
Token SO PIN
PIN N/A Not input/output Plaintext in Flash Replaced as part of the
initialization process
For initial authentication to the module.
Replaced after the module is initialized.
DH Key Agreement
Keys
2048, 3072 and
4096 - bit Modulus
Size
Private Component
Generated Via
FIPS approved
RNG; Public Value
Computed via
Diffie-Hellman
Public key
exported as part
of key
agreement
Working memory Power cycle, tamper, or
C_DestroyObject() API
To establish an encrypted channel
between an operator and the module.
Message Encryption
Shared Secret Key
3-key Triple-DES Established via DH Not input/output Working memory Power cycle, tamper, or
C_DestroyObject() API
Protects data between an operator and
the module. Triple-DES is used to
protect the secure channel established
using DH.
Message
Authentication Key
HMAC-SHA-1 Established via DH Not
Input/Output
Working memory Power cycle, tamper, or
C_DestroyObject() API
Provide data authentication of
encrypted data between an operator
and the module.
Operating PINs PIN N/A Input
encrypted5
Obfuscated with
MMK
Tamper or Zeroize
command (ctconf –x) or
C_DestroyObject() API
All users’ PINs – Administrator Token
SO, Administrator Token User, Token
SOs, and Token users used to
authenticate to the module.
Module Master Key 3-key Triple-DES FIPS Approved
RNG
Not input/output Tamper responsive
memory in NVRAM
of RTC
Tamper or Zeroize
command
(ctconf –x)
Obfuscates other keys and zerorizes
contents of secure memory on object
deletion.
5
PINs encrypted using Triple-DES
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CSP CSP Type Generation Input/Output Storage Destruction Mechanism Use
ECDH Key Agreement
Keys
ECDH (P224-P521) Private
Component
Generated Via
FIPS approved
RNG; Public Value
Computed via
Diffie-Hellman
Public key
exported as part
of key
agreement
Working memory Power cycle, tamper, or
C_DestroyObject() API User-created keys for use by user
applications
D-H Key Agreement
Keys
2048-4096 bit
Modulus Size
Private Component
Generated Via
FIPS approved
RNG; Public Value
Computed via
Diffie-Hellman
Public key
exported as part
of key
agreement
Working memory Power cycle, Tamper,
Zeroize command (ctconf
–x) or C_DestroyObject()
API
User-created keys for use by user
applications for key agreement
Secret Key 3-Key Triple-DES,
AES 128, 192 and
256 bit
Established via
ECDH, DH,
transported using
RSA or Secret Key
or generated by
FIPS approved
RNG
Encrypted6
or
split knowledge
Working memory or
Secure Memory
obfuscated with
MMK
Power cycle, Tamper,
Zeroize command (ctconf
–x) or C_DestroyObject()
API
User-created keys for use by user
applications for Encryption,
Decryption, or Signature
Verification/Generation and key
wrapping/unwrapping
RSA Public/Private
Keys
2048, 3072 bit RSA FIPS 186-4 Public key
exported
Working memory or
Secure Memory
obfuscated with
MMK
Power cycle, Tamper,
Zeroize command (ctconf
–x) or C_DestroyObject()
API
User-created keys for use by user
applications for Signature
Generation/Verification
DSA Public/Private
Keys
2048 – 4096 bit DSA FIPS 186-4 Public key
exported
Working memory or
Secure Memory
obfuscated with
MMK
Power cycle, Tamper,
Zeroize command (ctconf
–x) or C_DestroyObject()
API
User-created keys for use by user
applications for encryption, Decryption,
and Signature Generation/Verification
ECDSA Public/Private
Keys
224 – 512 bit
ECDSA
FIPS 186-4 Public key
exported
Working memory or
Secure Memory
obfuscated with
MMK
Power cycle, Tamper,
Zeroize command (ctconf
–x) or C_DestroyObject()
API
User-created keys for use by user
applications for encryption, Decryption,
Key wrapping/Unwrapping and
Signature Generation/Verification
6
Token Keys encrypted using AES or Triple-DES Application Keys
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CSP CSP Type Generation Input/Output Storage Destruction Mechanism Use
DRBG Seed 384 bits H/W RNG Not input/output Not permanently
stored
Power cycle or tamper Used as part of the RNG process.
DRBG V 128 bits Hardware Random
Source
Not input or
output
Not permanently
stored
Power cycle or tamper Part of the secret state of the approved
DRBG. The value is generated using the
methods described in NIST SP 800-90A.
DRBG Key AES-256 Hardware Random
Source
Not Input or
Output
Not permanently
stored
Power cycle or tamper 32 bytes AES key stored in the RAM.
Used in an implementation of the NIST
SP 800-90A CTR (AES) DRBG.
DRBG Entropy Input 384 bits Hardware Random
Source
Not Input or
Output
Not permanently
stored
Power cycle or tamper The 384-bit entropy value used to
initialize the approved DRBG.
Table 2-5 List of Keys Stored in Module
Table 2-6 outlines the access that “Authorized Services” (see Table 2-4) have to the keys listed in Table 2-5. Here ‘R’ stands for “Read”, ‘W’ stands
for “Write”, X stands for “Execute” and “Z” stands for “Zeroize”.
FW
Upgrade
Cert
Default
Administrator
Token SO PIN
DH / ECDH
Ephemeral
Keys
Key
Agreement
Keys
Message
Authentication
Key
Operating
PINs
Token
Keys
(Public)
Token
Keys
(Private)
DRBG Module
Master
Key
Initialization - - - X - WX - - - W
Administrator SO WX WX - WXZ - WXZ RWXZ RWXZ - RWXZ
Administrator - - WZ X WZ WXZ - - - RWXZ
Token SO - - RXZ X RXZ X - - - -
Token User - - RXZ X RXZ X XZ XZ XW -
Unauthenticated
Operators
- - - - - X - - - -
Table 2-6 Access to Keys for Authorized Services
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Please note that the FW Upgrade Cert is never zeroized because it is a public key. The Default
Administrator Token SO PIN is never zeroized because it’s a pre-initialization value. The DRBG
Seed is zeroized when a tamper event is detected or overwritten when the module is restarted.
All other CSPs/Keys identified in Table 2-5 are zeroized by a call to C_DestroyObject() API by the
respective role or through a tamper event.
2.6.3 Security Functions
The PSI-E2 supports a wide variety of security functions. FIPS 140-2 requires that only FIPS
Approved algorithms be used whenever there is an applicable FIPS standard.
Table 2-7 lists the PSI-E2 FIPS Approved security functions. In the FIPS mode of operation these
Approved security functions are available.
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FIPS Approved Security Function Firmware SafeXcel-3120 SafeXcel-1746
AES
ECB, CBC, OFB, KW, KWP, CMAC, GCM (The
module generates IVs internally using the
Approved DRBG which are at least 96-bits in
length)
(Key Size = 128, 192, 256)
5571 n/a n/a
AES
ECB, CBC
(Key Size = 128, 192, 256)
n/a 4849 4960
KTS (AES Cert. #5571; key establishment
methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits
of encryption strength)
5571 n/a n/a
DSA
Parameter Generation [2048,3072],
Key Generation [2048,3072],
Signature Generation [2048,3072],
Signature Verification [1024,2048,3072]
1434
n/a n/a
ECDSA– Only NIST Recommended Curves
Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature
Verification
Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
1503 n/a n/a
RSA
Key Generation [2048], Signature Generation
[2048,3072],Signature Verification
[1024,2048,3072] 2998
n/a n/a
KAS (FFC)
dhEphem, dhOneFlow 192 n/a n/a
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 4476 n/a n/a
SHA3 57 n/a n/a
HMAC: SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512
3713 n/a n/a
Triple-DES
ECB, CBC, KW, OFB 2807
n/a n/a
Triple-DES
ECB, CBC
n/a n/a 2573
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KTS (Triple-DES Cert. #2807 ; key establishment
methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength)
2807
n/a n/a
DRBG
NIST SP 800-90A DRBG (CTR) AES-256 n/a
1704 n/a
CKG
Vendor Affirmed (Resulting Symmetric keys and seeds
used for asymmetric key generation are an unmodified
output from the Approved DRBG.)
Table 2-7 FIPS Approved Security Functions
Table 2-8 lists the PSI-E2 Non-Approved but FIPS allowed security functions. In the FIPS mode of operation
Non-Approved FIPS but Allowed Security Functions
AES (Cert. #5571, key unwrapping; key establishment
methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength)
Triple-DES (Cert. #2807, key unwrapping; key establishment
methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment
methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits of
encryption strength)
RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides
between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment
methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of
encryption strength)
NDRNG7
Table 2-8 Non-Approved FIPS Allowed Security Functions
Table 2-9 lists the PSI-E2 key derivation mechanisms that are non-Approved but Allowed in FIPS mode.
MECHANISMS FOR SPLIT KNOWLEDGE
ENTRY/OUTPUT OF KEY
(Allowed in FIPS Mode)
CKM_SECRET_SHARE_WITH_ATTRIBUTES
Table 2-9 Non-Approved FIPS Allowed Key Derivation Mechanisms
Table 2-10 lists the PSI-E2 key derivation mechanisms that are non-Approved and not Allowed in FIPS mode.
These key derivation mechanisms are actively disabled by the module when operating in FIPS mode.
7 This is being built-in 3120 SafeExcel module. The estimated amount of entropy provided by the NDRNG is 4 bits per each byte of data
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NON-ALLOWED DERIVATION METHODS
(Disabled in FIPS Mode)
CKM_DES3_DERIVE_CBC
CKM_DES3_DERIVE_ECB
CKM _SHAxxx_KEY_DERIVATION
CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE
CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY
CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY
CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY
CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA
CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_KEY
Table 2-10 Non-Approved Key Derivation Mechanisms
2.7 Self-Tests
The PSI-E2 Module performs a number of power-up and conditional self-tests to ensure proper
operation.
2.7.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
When the module is initially powered-on, each cryptographic library in the module executes its
own battery of power-up self-tests. If any of the power-up self-tests fail in any of the
cryptographic library implementations, the module will enter an error state and prohibit an
operator from exercising the module’s cryptographic functionality. Table 2-11 lists the power-up
self-tests:
Test Function Where Performed
FIPS 140-
2
Required
Secure Memory File
System Integrity
Initializes and checks the module’s secure memory file
system
Firmware No
DRBG KAT Performs a known answer test for the AES CTR DRBG. SafeXcel-3120 Yes
Symmetric Cipher
KATs
Performs known answer tests for AES, Triple-DES,
CAST, IDEA, RC2, DES, and RC4 operations
(encrypt/decrypt)
Firmware,
SafeXcel-3120,
SafeXcel-1746
(AES)
Firmware,
SafeXcel-1746
(Triple-DES)
AES and
Triple-
DES
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Test Function Where Performed
FIPS 140-
2
Required
MAC
and
HMAC KATs
Performs known answer tests for CAST MAC, IDEA
MAC, RC2 MAC, DES MAC and Triple-DES MAC.
Performs known answer tests for MD5 HMAC, HMAC-
SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, RMD128 HMAC and
RMD160 HMAC.
Firmware HMAC-
SHA-1,
HMAC-
SHA-224,
HMAC-
SHA-256,
HMAC-
SHA-384,
HMAC-
SHA-512
Asymmetric Cipher
KATs
Performs known answer tests for RSA operations (sign
and verify, encrypt/decrypt).
Firmware Yes
Asymmetric Key
Derive KATs
Performs known answer tests for ECDH Derive Firmware No
Asymmetric Pairwise
Consistency Test
Performs a pairwise consistency test on a DH key pair Firmware No
DH X9.42 Parameter
Verification KAT
Performs a known answer test on DH X9.42 Parameter
Verification algorithm
Firmware Yes
DH X9.42 Pairwise
Consistency Test
Performs a pairwise consistency test on a random DH
X9.42 key pair
Firmware Yes
DH X9.42 ASN1 KDF
KAT: CS_DA_SHA1
Known answer Test of ASN1 KDF Firmware Yes
DH X9.42
Concatenate KDF
KAT: CS_DA_SHA1
Known answer Test of Concatenate KDF Firmware Yes
Sign/Verify Known Answer signature/verification tests for RSA, DSA
and ECDSA.
Firmware Yes
Message Digest
KATs
Verifies known message/hash pairs for MD2, MD5,
RMD128, RMD 160, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512 and SHA-3
Firmware SHA-1,
SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384,
SHA-512
SHA-3
Software/Firmware
Integrity
Ensures that the software/firmware on the module has
not been modified / damaged by calculating a SHA-1
hash over all software/firmware components and
comparing the result to a known good result.
Firmware Yes
Table 2-11 Power-up Self-Tests
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2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs conditional self-tests as outlined in Table 2-12.
Test Function
Where
Performed
FIPS 140-2
Required
Pairwise Consistency Runs a pairwise consistency check each
time the module generates a DSA, RSA,
ECDSA, or DH public/private key pair.
Firmware DSA, RSA,
ECDSA
Continuous HW RNG Performs the FIPS 140-2 required
continuous RNG check each time the
module’s Hardware RNG is used to
produce random data.
SafeXcel-3120 Yes
Continuous RNG Performs the FIPS 140-2 required
continuous RNG check each time the
module’s RNG is used to produce random
data.
Firmware Yes
Firmware Load Checks that the firmware to be loaded is
verified with a digital signature. If the
signature cannot be verified, the module
will report an error and the firmware will
not be loaded. The verification algorithm
used is RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using
SHA512 and 2048 bit key.
Note: Following a successful verification,
all keys and CSPs will first be zeroized
and then the firmware will be updated
A firmware upgrade in FIPS mode will
reset the HSM to factory default state,
forcing the user to re-initialize the module,
enable the FIPS mode and re-load the
cryptographic keys.
Firmware Yes
Table 2-12 Conditional Self-Tests
2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The PSI-E2 does not employ any technology specifically intended to mitigate against other
attacks.
3. FIPS APPROVED MODE OF OPERATION
3.1 Description
The PSI-E2 allows its administrators the choice of employing a wide range of security
technologies. To comply with FIPS mode of operation the PSI-E2 must be configured in a secure
manner. This includes:
• Operation with FIPS Approved algorithms as listed in Table 2-7, Non-Approved but FIPS
allowed algorithms as listed in Table 2-8 and Table 2-9;
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• Not permitting the export of clear keys;
• In accordance to SP 800-67Rev2, the firmware implements a counter to ensure the same
Triple-DES keys used for encryption are not utilized more than 228
operations.
• Locking the security mode to prevent circumvention of the mode setting;
• Not permitting PINs to be used in clear;
• Not permitting changes to the PSI-E2 firmware without first clearing all protected keys and
CSPs; and
• Providing authentication and session management security.
This Security Policy describes a particular PSI-E2 firmware and hardware. The PSI-E2 firmware
can be replaced (with a firmware upgrade operation) or extended (by loading Functionality
Modules [FMs]). Operators can load their own trusted code into the module. However, by doing
so, the module is no longer FIPS validated unless the FM has been separately FIPS validated.
The PSI-E2 checks that new firmware is digitally signed before it can be loaded. Following a
successful verification all keys and CSPs will be zeroized. After the zeroization, the PSI-E2 will
automatically transition to a non-FIPS mode and will require reconfiguration to return to FIPS
mode.
3.2 Invoking Approved Mode of Operation
An operator may easily place the PSI-E2 in “FIPS mode” by simply running the administrative
CTCONF -fF command from the remote management facility. Once this command is executed
the PSI-E2 will reject all requests for non-FIPS algorithms or configurations. Please note that the
operator has to be logged in as an Administrator to invoke the FIPS mode of operation.
3.3 Mode of Operation Indicator
Running the display status command from a remote management facility will return a status
displaying the current PSI-E2 operating mode.
Security Mode: FIPS 140-2 Mode: <list of flags indicating attributes set for FIPS>
When the module is not running in FIPS mode, this status displays as:
Security Mode:
3.4 Invoking Mode of Operation Indicator
An operator may easily view the current PSI-E2 mode of operation by simply running the
administrative CTCONF –v command from the remote management facility. Once this
command is executed the PSI-E2 will respond with full details of the adapter configuration. The
configuration details include details of the firmware loaded and a listing of the adapter security
mode flags one of which indicates that the module is in the FIPS mode of operation.
4. DESIGN ASSURANCE
4.1 Distribution and Delivery of Module
The module is shipped in an anti-static shipping envelope that is sealed with a Gemalto security
sticker and placed inside a Gemalto shipping box. The user should inspect the product shipping
boxes to make sure they have not been tampered with or damaged upon receiving the modules,
which could indicate a security compromise.
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APPENDIX A. CRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AK Application Key
ANSI American National Standards Institute
API Application Programming Interface
ARIA Korean Government Standard Encryption Algorithm
ATSO Administrator Token Security Operator
ATU Administrator Token User
CA Certificate Authority
CPU Central Processing Unit
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DHEK Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Key
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDHEK Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Key
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HRNG Hardware Random Number Generator
IDEA International Data Encryption Algorithm
KAT Known Answer Test
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAK Message Authentication Key
MD2 Message Digest Algorithm 2
MD5 Message Digest Algorithm 5
MD5 HMAC MD5 Hashed Message Authentication Code
MMK Module Master Key
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NO Normal Operator
PSI-E2 ProtectServer Internal-Express 2
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Acronym Definition
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RAM Random Access Memory
RC2 Rivest’s Code 2
RC4 Rivest’s Code 4
RNG Random Number Generator
RoHS Restriction on Hazardous Substances
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
RWXZ Read, Write, Execute, Zeroize
SDRAM Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SO Security Operator
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
Triple-DES Triple Data Encryption Standard
USB Universal Serial Bus
USO User Security Operator
VGA Video Graphics Array