



Nutanix Cryptographic Module for OpenSSL

Version 6.0

FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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References

Ref	Full Specification Name
<i>References used in Approved Algorithms Table</i>	
[38A]	NIST SP 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques , Dec 2001
[38B]	NIST SP 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CMAC Mode for Authentication , Oct 2016
[38C]	NIST SP 800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality , Jul 2007
[38D]	NIST SP 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC , Nov 2007
[38E]	NIST SP 800-38E, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices , Jan 2010
[38F]	NIST SP 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping , Dec 2012
[56Ar3]	NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography , Apr 2018
[57P1]	NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 5, Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1 - General , May 2020
[67]	NIST SP 800-67 Rev. 2, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher , Nov 2017
[90A]	NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators , Jun 2015
[133]	NIST SP 800-133 Rev. 2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation , Jun 2020
[135]	NIST SP 800-135 Rev. 1, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions , Dec 2011
[180]	FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS) , Aug 2015
[186]	FIPS 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS) , Jul 2013
[197]	FIPS 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) , Nov 2001
[198]	FIPS 198-1, The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) , Jul 2008
<i>Other References</i>	
[52]	NIST SP 800-52 Rev. 2, Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations , Aug 2019
[140]	FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules , May 2001
[140DTR]	FIPS 140-2 Derived Test Requirements , Jan 2011
[140IG]	Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program , May 2021
[131A]	NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 2, Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths , Mar 2019
[UG]	<i>Nutanix Cryptographic Modules for OpenSSL and OpenSSH - User Guide</i> , Feb 2021

Acronyms and Definitions

Term	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard [197]
AES-NI	Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
API	Application Programming Interface
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO	Cryptographic Officer
CSP	Critical Security Parameter [140]
DRBG	Deterministic Random Number Generator [90A]
DSS	Digital Signature Standard [186]
DTR	Derived Test Requirements [140DTR]
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard [140]
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code [198]
IG	Implementation Guidance [140IG]
KAT	Known Answer Test
KDF	Key Derivation Function
KW	Key Wrap
NDRNG	Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS	Operating System
PAA	Processor Algorithm Accelerators
PCT	Pairwise Consistency Test
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PSP	Public Security Parameter
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman Algorithm [186]
SHA/SHS	Secure Hash Algorithm/Standard [180]
SP	Special Publication
SSP	Sensitive Security Parameter - CSPs and PSPs
TLS	Transport Layer Security

1 Overview

This document defines the non-proprietary Security Policy for the Nutanix Cryptographic Module for OpenSSL version 6.0; hereafter denoted the Module. The Module is a cryptographic software library, designated as a multi-chip standalone embodiment in [140] terminology, used in Nutanix, Inc. (Nutanix) solutions to provide FIPS 140-2 Approved cryptographic algorithms and TLS secure communication.

The Module meets FIPS 140-2 overall Level 1 requirements, with security levels as follows:

Table 1: Security Level of Security Requirements

Security Requirement	Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services, and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
EMI/EMC	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

In Table 1 above, [140] Section 4.5 *Physical Security* is not applicable, as permitted by [140IG] 1.16 *Software Module* and [140IG] G.3 *Partial Validations and Not Applicable Areas of FIPS 140-2*.

The Module design corresponds to the Module security rules. Security rules enforced by the Module are described in the appropriate context of this document.

The Module and this Security Policy are aligned with [52] *Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations*, although [52] is not enforced by [140] validation.

The Module operates within a general-purpose computer. Figure 1 depicts the Module operational environment, with the logical boundary highlighted in red inclusive of all Module entry points (API calls), conformant with [140IG] 14.3 *Logical Diagram for Software, Firmware and Hybrid Modules*.

IMPORTANT ADVISORY: Transitions

PLEASE BE ADVISED of the following algorithm transitions, in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-131Arev2.

- After December 31, 2023, non-compliant [67] three-key TDEA is disallowed for encryption unless specifically allowed by other NIST guidance. Decryption using three-key TDEA is allowed for legacy use. Please see 140-2 Implementation Guidance A.13 for more information.
- After December 31, 2023, non-compliant SP 800-56Brev2, RSA-based key transport schemes that only use PKCS#1-v1.5 padding, is disallowed.




Figure 1: Module Physical and Logical Boundary

The Module conforms to [140IG] 1.16 *Software Module*:

- The physical cryptographic boundary is the general-purpose computer which wholly contains the Module and operating system.
- The logical cryptographic boundary is the set of shared library files and associated HMAC files:
 - libcrypto.so.1.0.2k
 - .libcrypto.so.1.0.2k.hmac
 - libssl.so.1.0.2k
 - .libssl.so.1.0.2k.hmac
- All components are defined in accordance with [140DTR] AS01.08; no components are excluded from [140] requirements.
- The power-up approved integrity test is performed over all components of the logical boundary.
- Updates to the Module are provided as a complete replacement in accordance with [140IG] 9.7 *Software/Firmware Load Test*.
- The Module does not map any interfaces to physical ports. Table 2 defines the Module's [140] logical interfaces.

Table 2: Ports and Interfaces

Description	Logical Interface Type
API function calls or configuration files on filesystem	Control input
API input parameters, kernel I/O - network or files on filesystem	Data input
API return value	Status output
API output parameters, kernel I/O - network or files on filesystem	Data output

Operational testing was performed on the Operating Environments listed in Table 3. The Nutanix product runs an industry-standard hypervisor (ESXi, AHV, or Hyper-V) and the Nutanix Controller VM (CVM). The Nutanix CVM is what runs the Nutanix software and services all the I/O operations for the hypervisor and all VMs running on that host. Acropolis Hypervisor (AHV) is the default hypervisor shipped with AOS. AHV is based upon CentOS KVM. Full hardware virtualization is used for guest VMs.

Table 3: Tested Operating Environments

Operating System	Processor	Platform
CentOS 7.9 on Nutanix Acropolis Hypervisor (AHV) 20201105.1045 (also referred to as AHV 7.1.1)	Intel Xeon Gold 6234 with PAA	Nutanix NX-3360-G7 (CVM)
CentOS 7.9 on Nutanix Acropolis Hypervisor (AHV) 20201105.1045 (also referred to as AHV 7.1.1)	Intel Xeon Gold 6234 without PAA	Nutanix NX-3360-G7 (CVM)
CentOS 7.9	Intel Xeon Gold 6234 with PAA	Nutanix NX-3360-G7 (AHV)
CentOS 7.9	Intel Xeon Gold 6234 without PAA	Nutanix NX-3360-G7 (AHV)

The Module conforms to [140IG] 6.1 *Single Operator Mode and Concurrent Operators*. The tested environments place user processes into segregated spaces. A process is logically removed from all other processes by the hardware and Operating System. Since the Module exists inside the process space of the application, this environment implicitly satisfies the requirement for a single user mode.

The Module conforms to [140IG] 1.21 *Processor Algorithm Accelerators (PAA) and Processor Algorithm Implementation (PAI)*. The Intel Processor AES-NI functions are identified by [140IG] 1.21 as a known PAA.

2 Cryptographic Functionality

The Module implements the FIPS Approved cryptographic functions listed in Table 4. [57P1] notation is used throughout this document to describe key sizes and security strength.

Table 4: Approved CAVP Validated Cryptographic Functions

Cert	Algorithm ¹	Mode	Description	Functions, Caveats
A1403	AES [197]	[38A]: CBC, ECB, CFB-1, CFB-8, CFB-128, CTR, OFB	Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 (bits)	Encryption, Decryption
		[38C]: CCM [38D]: GCM,GMAC	Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 (bits) ²	Authenticated encryption and decryption; message authentication.
		[38B]: CMAC	Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 (bits)	Generation, Verification
		[38E]: XTS	Key sizes: 128, 256 (bits) ³	Encryption, Decryption
Vendor Affirmed	CKG [133]	[133] Section 5.1 Asymmetric signature key generation using unmodified DRBG output		Key Generation
		[133] Section 5.2 Asymmetric key establishment key generation using unmodified DRBG output		
		[133] Section 6.1 Direct symmetric key generation using unmodified DRBG output		
A1403	CVL [135]	TLS 1.0/1.1 KDF TLS 1.2 KDF	SHA-256 and SHA-384	Key derivation
A1403	DRBG [90A]	CTR_DRBG	AES: 128, 192, 256 (bits)	Random bit generation. The default DRBG (used by the module for secure communications) is an AES-256 CTR_DRBG.
		Hash_DRBG	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	
		HMAC_DRBG	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	
A1403	DSA [186]	L = 2048 N = 224; SHA-2 (-224, -256, -384, -512) L = 2048 N = 256; SHA-2 (-256, -384, -512) L = 3072 N = 256; SHA-2 (-256, -384, -512) Legacy use (PQG verify and signature verify only): L = 1024 N = 160; SHA-1, SHA-2 (-224, -256, -384, -512)		Domain parameter (PQG) generate and verify; key generate; signature generate and verify
A1403	ECDSA [186]	P-256, P-384, P-521 with SHA-2 (-224, -256, -384, -512) Legacy use: P-256, P-384, P-521 with SHA-1 (signature verify only)		Key generate and verify; signature generate and verify
A1403	HMAC [198]	HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512		Generate and verify
A1403	KAS-SSC [56Ar3]	KAS ECC SSC	P-256, P-384, P-521 ⁴	Key agreement: Shared secret calculations.
		KAS FFC SSC	FB: $L \geq 2048$ $N = 224$ FC: $L \geq 2048$ $N = 256$ ⁵	

¹ Not all algorithms/modes tested on the CAVP validation certificates are allowed in the Approved mode of operation.

² See the Security Policy, Section 3, item 12.

³ The module provides a check and enforcement that key_1 and key_2 are not equal.

⁴ EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)

⁵ Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)

Cert	Algorithm ¹	Mode	Description	Functions, Caveats
A1403	KTS [38F]	AES KW, KWP Applicable also to AES-GCM and AES-CBC with HMAC [38F] Section 3.3	Key sizes: 128, 192, 256 (bits)	Key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength
A1403	RSA [186]	$k = 2048, 3072$ (9.31, PKCS1.5, PSS); SHA-2 (-224, -256, -384, -512) Legacy use (signature verify only): $k = 1024$; SHA-1, SHA-2 (-224, -256, -384, -512)		Key generate; signature generate and verify
A1403	SHS [180]	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512		Message Digest
A1403	Triple-DES [67]	CBC, CFB1, CFB-8, CFB-64, ECB, OFB [38A]	Key size: 192 (3-Key) ⁶	Decryption
		CMAC [38B]	Key size: 192 (3-key)	Verification

The Module conforms to [140IG] D.11 *References to the Support of Industry Protocols* (Resolution scenario 2) by providing CAVP validated [56A] components along with the CAVP validated [135] Section 4.2 KDF for TLS. In accordance with [140IG] D.11, the remainder of the TLS protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

The Module implements the non-Approved but allowed cryptographic functions listed in Table 5.

Table 5: Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions

Cryptographic Function	Description / Usage
MD5 (No Security Claimed)	Message Digest used only in the TLS 1.0 / 1.1 KDF per [140IG] 1.23

Entropy is provided by an entropy source outside the Module logical boundary which loads 2048 bits of entropy into the module per invocation. Per [140IG] 7.14 Scenario 2, the following caveat applies:

No assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys.

⁶ See the Security Policy, Section 3, item 7.

The Module supports the following non-FIPS 140-2 Approved cryptographic functions, which shall not be used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation. Any use of the non-Approved functions will cause the Module to transition to the non-FIPS mode of operation.

Table 6: Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions

Cryptographic Function	Description / Usage
Camellia	Encryption, Decryption.
CAST	Encryption, Decryption.
DES	Encryption, Decryption.
Diffie-Hellman	Key Agreement with key sizes not listed in Table 4.
DSA	Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification with L and N not consistent with Table 4.
ECDSA	Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification with secp256k1. The module does not implement any predefined curves other than the NIST curves listed in Table 4 and secp256k1.
MD2, MD4	Message Digest.
MD5	Message Digest used outside of the TLS 1.0 / 1.1 KDF.
RC2, RC4, RC5	Encryption, Decryption.
RIPEND	Message Digest.
RNG	ANSI X9.31 AES-128 Random Number Generation.
RSA	Key Wrapping (encrypt/decrypt) with $k < 2048$ bits.
RSA	Key Generation, Signature Generation, Signature Verification with k not listed in Table 4.
RSA Key Transport	RSA key transport, using the validated CVL RSADP with PKCS 1.5 padding and $k = 2048$.
Triple-DES	Encryption, MAC generation
Whirlpool	Message Digest.

3 Modes of Operation, Security Rules and Guidance

The Module supports a FIPS Approved mode of operation and a non-FIPS Approved mode of operation and conforms to [140IG] 1.2 *FIPS Approved Mode of Operation* and 1.19 *non-Approved Mode of Operation*. The value 1 in the file `/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled` confirms operation of the module in the approved mode.

The conditions for using Module cryptographic primitives in the [140] Approved mode of operation are:

1. The Module is a cryptographic library used by a calling application. The calling application is responsible for the usage of the primitives in the correct sequence, and interpretation of return codes.
2. With the exception of CSPs managed within the Module boundary (default DRBG state, TLS shared secrets and TLS KDF derived session keys), the keys used by the Module are managed by the calling application, provided on the caller's stack. The calling application is required to provide keys in accordance with FIPS 140-2 requirements. CSPs are zeroized when released by the appropriate API function calls. CSPs managed within the Module boundary are established using only Approved or allowed methods.
3. The `OPENSSL_ENFORCE_MODULUS_BITS` must be set to disable generation of RSA and DSA key sizes not listed in Table 4.
4. The memory occupied by keys is allocated using utility function `OPENSSL_alloc`. The application is responsible for calling the corresponding `OPENSSL_clear_free` or `OPENSSL_clear_realloc`, which overwrites the memory occupied by keys with predefined values before memory free or reallocation. In case of abnormal termination, or swap in/out of a physical memory page of a process, the keys in physical memory are overwritten by the Linux kernel before the physical memory is allocated to another process.
5. Only the approved and allowed cryptographic functions listed in Table 4 and Table 5 are to be used, along with the guidance detailed in this section. Any use of Table 6 non-approved services will transition the Module to the non-Approved mode of operation.
6. Use of the `ENGINE_register_*`, `ENGINE_set_default_*` function calls, or explicitly setting the module to the non-Approved mode by calling `FIPS_mode_set(FALSE)` transitions the Module to the non-Approved mode of operation.
7. MD5 is called by code within the Module boundary only for use in the TLS 1.0 / 1.1 KDF. Any other use of MD5 must be consistent with [140IG] 1.23 *Definition and Use of a non-Approved Security Function*.
8. The OpenSSL API call of `RAND_cleanup` must not be used, as it will clean and free the default DRBG state and replace the default DRBG with the non-FIPS Approved SSLeay Deterministic Random Number Generator when using the `RAND_*` API calls.
9. The length of a single data unit encrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2^{20} AES blocks (16MB).
10. XTS-AES keys shall only be used to encrypt/decrypt data in storage. The module enforces the [140IG] A.9 requirement to assure $k1 \neq k2$ in the key structure initialization.
11. CSPs defined in an Approved mode of operation are not to be accessed or shared while in a non-Approved mode of operation. CSPs shall not be generated while in a non-approved mode.

The conditions for using the Module's *Secure Communication* service in the [140] Approved mode of operation are:

12. Only the NIST P-256, P-384 and P-521 curves shall be used in the approved mode of operation.
13. All certificates used for *Secure Communications* services must adhere to [131] requirements.
14. In case the Module's power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed.

The `nonce_explicit` part of the IV does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key. The design of the TLS protocol in this module implicitly ensures that the `nonce_explicit`, or counter portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values.

The module complies with IG A.5, provision 1 (“TLS protocol IV generation”). The GCM IV is generated as part of the TLS protocol handshake and key derivation. AES-GCM can only be used in the context of TLSv1.2. The module complies with bullet ii) of this provision: the entire TLS protocol is implemented within the module boundary. The module supports the TLS GCM cipher suites from SP800-52 Rev1, section 3.3.1.

Additionally, although [52] is not within the scope of [140] validation, this Security Policy is aligned with [52] and FedRAMP controls to assist users in configuration and secure use of systems for compliance with the full suite of applicable standards. Table 7 lists the cipher suites consistent with a subset of [52] §3.3.1, using only those cryptographic functions available in the approved mode.

Cipher suites marked with * correspond to the TLS 1.2 cipher suites used by Nutanix products that incorporate the Module. However, since the mechanism for selecting the set of cipher suites used by Nutanix products is outside the boundary, the full capability of the Module at the boundary is represented in this Security Policy.

Table 7: Recommended TLS Cipher Suites

ID	IANA Enumeration	OpenSSL Enumeration
002F	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	AES128-SHA
0035	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	AES256-SHA
0030	TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DH-DSS-AES128-SHA
0031	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DH-RSA-AES128-SHA
0032	TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA
0033	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
0036	TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DH-DSS-AES256-SHA
0037	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DH-RSA-AES256-SHA
0038	TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA
0039	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
003E	TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256 *
003F	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256 *
0040	TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256 *
0067	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 *
0068	TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256	DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256 *
0069	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256	DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256 *
006A	TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256	DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256 *
006B	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 *
009C	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	AES128-GCM-SHA256
009D	TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	AES256-GCM-SHA384
009E	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 *
009F	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 *
00A0	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	DH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 *
00A1	TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	DH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 *
00A2	TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256 *
00A3	TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384 *
00A4	TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	DH-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256 *
00A5	TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	DH-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384 *

ID	IANA Enumeration	OpenSSL Enumeration
C004	TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA
C005	TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA
C009	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA
C00A	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA
C00E	TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA
C00F	TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA
C013	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
C014	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
C023	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 *
C024	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 *
C025	TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 *
C026	TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 *
C027	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 *
C028	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 *
C029	TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256 *
C02A	TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384 *
C02B	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 *
C02C	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 *
C02D	TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 *
C02E	TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 *
C02F	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 *
C030	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 *
C031	TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	ECDH-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 *
C032	TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	ECDH-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 *
C09E	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM	DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM
C09F	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM	DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM
COA2	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8	DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM8
COA3	TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8	DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM8
COAC	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM	ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM
COAD	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM	ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM
COAE	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8	ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM8
COAF	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8	ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM8

4 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys

All CSPs and public keys used by the Module are described in this section. Note that the term SSP refers collectively to critical security parameters (CSPs) and public security parameters (e.g., public keys). The list of SSPs is arranged for consistency with Table 11, which in turn is organized for ease of review.

Prefixes:

DRBG = Deterministic random bit generation (random number generation service);

DS = Digital signature service; GKP = Generate key pair service; KAS = Key agreement service;

KH = Keyed hash service;

SED = symmetric encrypt/decrypt service; TLS = TLS secure communications service.

Table 8: SSPs Used for Cryptographic Primitives

SSP	Description/Usage
DRBG_Seed	DRBG seed, inclusive of entropy input from the registered callback function, sized as (8 * security_strength) + 64 bits; 128 bit nonce and optional personalization string (as defined by caller) for instantiation; optional additional input for reseed (as defined by caller).
DRBG_State	Default DRBG use for key generation: AES-256 CTR_DRBG state: 256-bit K, 128-bit V. CTR_DRBG: V (128 bits) and Key (128, 192 or 256 bits) Hash_DRBG: V (440 to 880 bits) and C (440 to 880 bits) HMAC_DRBG: V (440 to 880 bits) and Key (160 to 512 bits) The libcrypto.so.1.0.2k API provides DRBG functions to calling applications, with the DRBG structure memory allocated, stored and managed by the calling application.
DS_Private	Private component of an ECC ⁷ , DSA ⁸ or RSA ⁹ key pair used by the Digital Signature service.
DS_Public	Public component of an ECC ⁷ , DSA ⁸ or RSA ⁹ key pair used by the Digital Signature service.
GKP_Private	Private component of an ECC ⁷ , DSA/FFC ⁸ or RSA ⁹ key pair generated by the Generate Key Pair service, or managed by the CM service.
GKP_Public	Public component of an ECC ⁷ , DSA/FFC ⁸ or RSA ⁹ key pair generated by the Generate Key Pair service, or managed by the CM service.
KAS_SS	The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ([56A] Section 5.7.1.2 ECC CDH) or Diffie-Hellman ([56A] Section 5.7.1.1 FFC DH) shared secret.
KAS_Private	Private component of an ECC ¹ or FFC ² key pair used by the Key Agreement service.
KAS_Public	Public component of an ECC ¹ or FFC ² key pair used by the Key Agreement service.
KH_Key	CMAC or GMAC: (AES-128, AES-192, AES-256,), or HMAC (160-bit, 256-bit or 512-bit) key use for generating or verifying keyed hashes.
SED_EDK	AES (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit) encrypt/decrypt key.

Table 9: SSPs Used for TLS Secure Communications

SSP / Public	Description/Usage
TLS-DH-Priv	FFC n=2048 or ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521 Private Key used for TLS Diffie-Hellman key agreement

⁷ The approved mode of the Module permits the curves as shown in Table 4 for ECC key generation, ECDSA signature generation and verification and EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement primitives.

⁸ The approved mode of the Module permits the parameter as shown in Table 4 for DSA/FFC key generation, DSA signature generation and verification and Diffie-Hellman key agreement.

⁹ The approved mode of the Module permits the parameters as shown in Table 4 for RSA key generation, RSA signature generation and verification.

TLS-DH-Pub	FFC n=2048 or ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521 Public Key used for TLS Diffie-Hellman key agreement (provided to peer in handshake)
TLS-DH-Peer	FFC n=2048 or ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521 Public Key used for TLS Diffie-Hellman key agreement (provided by peer in handshake)
TLS-Host-Priv	RSA n=2048 and ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521 Private Key
TLS-Host-Pub	RSA n=2048 and ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521 Public Key
TLS-MS	TLS Master Secret: 384-bit secret key material
TLS-PMS	TLS Pre-Master Secret: 2048/384-bit secret key material
TLS-SENC	AES CBC, CCM, GCM 128-bit, 256-bit key used for TLS secure communications session encryption
TLS-SMAC	HMAC-SHA-1 (160 bit) or HMAC-SHA-256 (256 bit). Note that although CCM and GCM accomplish the same message integrity purpose, those algorithms do not require separate keys for cipher and integrity.

5 Roles and Services

The Module supports two distinct operator roles, User and Cryptographic Officer (CO), and does not support multiple concurrent operators, a maintenance role or bypass capability. The Module does not provide an authentication or identification method of its own. The CO and the User roles are implicitly identified by the service requested.

All services implemented by the Module are listed in Table 10. Keys are provided to the Module by the calling application; manual key entry is not supported. Data output is inhibited during self-tests, zeroization, and error states. The module runs in a single-threaded process that inhibits data output when in the self-test state by preventing invocation of any other cryptographic functions via the API. The module responds to specific calls through the API which are deliberate in their function; and thus, the module does not indiscriminately output data. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to Module compromise.

Table 10: Authorized Services Available in FIPS Mode

Service	Description	Role
Certificate Management	Parse and format certificates.	User
Digital signature	Generate or verify DSA, ECDSA or RSA digital signatures.	User
Generate key pair	Generate DSA (FFC), ECDSA, or RSA key pairs.	User
Initialize	Initialize the Module, inclusive of Self-test.	User
Install	Install and configure the Module.	CO
Key agreement	DH (FFC), ECDH key agreement primitives.	User
Keyed hash	Generate or verify data integrity (CMAC, GMAC or HMAC).	User
Message digest	Generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest.	User
Random number generation	[90A] DRBG for random number generation.	User
Secure communications	Establish and use TLS secure communications.	User
Show status	Functions that give Module status feedback.	User
Symmetric encrypt/decrypt	Symmetric data encrypt and decrypt.	User
Zeroize	Functions that destroy CSPs.	User
Utility	Support functions, e.g. number conversion, compression.	User

Table 11 describes Module service access to CSPs and public keys. In each cell below, the following annotations indicate the type of access by the Module service:

- E (Execute): The service uses the CSP or public key for service execution. All CSPs are provided by the calling application as positional parameters on the stack; the calling application owns the stack; the Module zeroizes all local copies of a CSP before returning.
- G (Generate): The Module generates or derives the cryptographic keys/CSPs internally. The Module does not retain copies of the key after call completion. DSA and ECDSA signature services also require a random (the DRBG Generate primitive corresponds to DRBG_State “EG”). The Initialize service initializes and instantiates the default DRBG, and DRBG_REI may also be used for default DRBG reseed or instantiation or reseed of a user requested DRBG instance.
- I (Input): The Module receives the CSP on the stack, or obtains data from the entropy callback function.
- O (Output): The Module outputs a CSP/cryptographic key to the calling application through the logical interface. The Module does not output CSPs through a physical port.
- Z (Zeroize): The Module zeroizes the CSP.

Table 11: CSP Access Rights within Services

Service	Key	DRBG_Seed	DRBG_State	DS_Private	DS_Public	GKP_Private	GKP_Public	KAS_SS	KAS_Private	KAS_Public	KH_Key	SED_EDK	TLS-DH-Priv	TLS-DH-Pub	TLS-DH-Peer	TLS-Host-Priv	TLS-Host-Pub	TLS-MS	TLS-PMS	TLS-SENC	TLS-SMAC	
Certificate Management		--	--	--	--	EIO	EIO	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Deterministic random number generation		EIZ	EG	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Digital signature		--	EG	EI	EI	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Generate key pair		--	EG	--	--	GO	GO	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Initialize		EGZ	EG	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Install		--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Key agreement		--	--	--	--	--	--	GO	EI	EI	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Keyed hash		--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	EI	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Message digest		--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Secure communications		--	EG	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	EI	O	EI	EI	EI	GEZ	GEZ	GEZ	GEZ	GEZ
Show status		--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Symmetric encrypt/decrypt		--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	EI	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Utility		--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Zeroize		--	Z	Z	--	Z	--	Z	Z	--	Z	Z	Z	--	--	Z	--	--	--	--	--	--

6 Self-Tests

Each time the Module is powered up, it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that sensitive data have not been damaged. The Module provides a default entry point to automatically run the power on self-tests without operator intervention compliant with [140IG] 9.10 *Power-Up Tests for Software Module Libraries*. Power on self-tests are available on demand by reloading the Module.

On power-on or reset, the Module performs the self-tests described in Table 12. All KATs must complete successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. Algorithms that rely on random values (DSA, ECDSA, DRBG) are tested using a fixed value.

Table 12: Power-on Self-Tests

Test Target	Description
Software Integrity	HMAC-SHA-256 with a 256-bit key.
AES	Separate encryption and decryption KATs; ECB 128-bit key.
AES CCM	Separate encryption and decryption KATs; 192-bit key.
AES GCM	Separate encryption and decryption KATs; 256-bit key.
AES XTS	Separate encryption and decryption KATs; 128-bit key and 256-bit key.
CMAC	KATs using AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 and 3-Key Triple-DES.
DSA	Pairwise consistency test (PCT), signature generation and verification, L = 2048 N = 256 and SHA-256.
DRBG	Separate KATs for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CTR_DRBG (AES-128, AES-192, AES-256) all with and without prediction resistance, and all with and without derivation function. - HASH_DRBG (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) all with and without prediction resistance. - HMAC_DRBG (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) all with and without prediction resistance, using a 160-bit HMAC key.
ECDSA	Pairwise consistency test (PCT), signature generation and verification; P-256 curve, SHA-256.
HMAC	HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 KATs.
KAS-ECC-SSC	[56A] Section 5.7.1.2 primitive “Z” computation KAT per [140IG] 9.6; P-256 curve.
KAS-FFC-SSC	[56A] Section 5.7.1.1 primitive “Z” computation KAT per [140IG] 9.6; L = 2048 N = 256.
RSA	Separate signature generation and signature verification KATs. Tested with k = 2048, SHA-256.
SHS	SHA-1, SHA-256 (inclusive of SHA-224), SHA-512 KATs (inclusive of SHA-384)
Triple-DES	Decryption KAT; 3-Key.

Table 13: Conditional Self-Tests

Test Target	Description
CRNGT	AS09.42 continuous RNG test performed on entropy source (callback function output).
DSA	PCT, signature generation and verification
ECDSA	PCT, signature generation and verification
RSA	PCT, signature generation and verification, encryption and decryption

PCTs are performed in accordance with [140IG] 9.9 *Pair-Wise Consistency Self-Test When Generating a Key Pair*.