Copyright Juniper, 2019 Version 1.1 Page 1 of 22
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Juniper Networks MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2010, MX2020
3D Universal Edge Routers and EX9204, EX9208, EX9214
Ethernet Switches with RE1800 Routing Engine
Firmware: Junos OS 17.3R2
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security
Policy
Document Version: 1.1
Date: February 18, 2019
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net
Copyright Juniper, 2019 Version 1.1 Page 2 of 22
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Contents
1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................4
1.1 Hardware and Physical CryptographicBoundary ..........................................................................7
1.2 Modes of Operation......................................................................................................................8
1.2.1 FIPS ApprovedMode....................................................................................................................8
1.2.2 Non-ApprovedMode ...................................................................................................................8
2 Cryptographic Functionality ..................................................................................................................9
2.1 AllowedAlgorithms and Protocols ................................................................................................9
2.2 Disabled Algorithms and Protocols ...................................................................................................11
2.3 Critical Security Parameters ..............................................................................................................12
3 Roles, Authentication and Services .....................................................................................................13
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles..........................................................................13
3.2 Authentication Methods .............................................................................................................13
3.3 Services .......................................................................................................................................14
3.4 Non-Approved Services...............................................................................................................15
4 Self-tests..............................................................................................................................................17
5 Physical Security Policy........................................................................................................................18
6 Security Rules and Guidance...............................................................................................................20
7 References and Definitions .................................................................................................................23
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Hardware Configurations .......................................................................5
Table 2- Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................6
Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................................8
Table 4 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions..................................................................................9
Table 5 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions..................................................................................9
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions..............................................................................9
Table 7 - Allowed Cryptographic Functions...............................................................................................10
Table 8 - Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode.................................................................................................11
Table 9 - Critical Security Parameters (CSPs).............................................................................................12
Table 10 - Public Keys.................................................................................................................................12
Table 11 - Authenticated Services .............................................................................................................14
Table 12 - Unauthenticated Services.........................................................................................................14
Table 13 - CSP Access Rights within Services.............................................................................................15
Table 14 - - Authenticated Services ...........................................................................................................16
Table 15 - Unauthenticated Services.........................................................................................................16
Table 16 - References.................................................................................................................................23
Table 17 - Acronyms and Definitions.........................................................................................................23
Table 18 - Datasheets.................................................................................................................................24
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary (Left to Right: MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2010, MX2020)
......................................................................................................................................................................7
Figure 2 - Physical Cryptographic Boundary (Left to Right: EX9204, EX9208, EX9214)..............................7
Copyright Juniper, 2019 Version 1.1 Page 4 of 22
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1 Introduction
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Juniper Networks MX Series 3D
Universal Edge Routers with the RE1800 routing engine (the “MX Series”) and the EX9200 series
switches with the RE1800 routing engine. The MX series provides dedicated high-performance
processing for flows and sessions and integrates advanced security capabilities that protect the
network infrastructure as well as user data. The EX9200 series enables collaboration and provides
simple and secure access for the delivery of mission-critical applications in the enterprise
campus. In the data center, it simplifies operations to align the network with fast-changing
business requirements.
This FIPS 140-2 validation includes the following MX series router models: the MX240, MX480, MX960,
MX2010 and MX2020 and the following EX series switch models: EX9204, EX9208, EX9214. The FIPS
validated version of firmware is Junos OS 17.3R2.
The cryptographic boundary for this MX Series and EX Series is defined as follows for the validation:
• the outer edge of the chassis includes the Routing Engine (RE), Switch Control Board
(SCB/SFB/SF), slot cover in the following configurations:
o For MX240 (2 available RE slots, 2 additional slots): 1 SCB and 1 RE. All empty module
bays must have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air circulation.
o MX480 (2 available RE slots, 6 additional slots): 1 SCB and 1 RE. All empty module
bays must have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air circulation.
o For MX960 (2 available RE slots, 12 additional slots): 1 SCB and 1 RE. All empty module
bays must have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air circulation.
o For MX2010 (2 available RE slots, 10 additional slots): 1 SFB and 1 RE. All empty module
bays must have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air circulation.
o For MX2020 (2 available RE slots, 20 additional slots): 1 SFB and 1 RE. All empty module
bays must have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air circulation.
o For EX9204 (2 available RE slots, 2 additional slots): 1 SF module and 1 RE. All empty
module bays must have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air circulation.
o For EX9208 (2 available RE slots, 6 additional slots): 1 SF module and 1 RE. All empty
module bays must have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air circulation.
o For EX9214 (2 available RE slots, 12 additional slots): 1 SF module and 1 RE. All empty
module bays must have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air circulation.
• includes the inverse three-dimensional space where non-crypto-relevantline cards fit,
with the backplane port serving as the physical interface
• excluding the power distribution module on the rear of the device.
The cryptographic modules provide for an encrypted connection, using SSH, between the management
station and the module. All other data input or output from the module is considered plaintext for this
FIPS 140-2 validation.
The cryptographic modules are defined as multiple-chip standalone modules that execute Junos OS
17.3R2 firmware on any of the Juniper Networks MX 3D Universal Edge Routers listed in Table 1 below.
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Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Hardware Configurations
Chassis PN SCB PN RE PN
MX240 SCBE2-MX
RE-S-1800X4-YYG
(YY = 8, 16 or 32 GB memory)
MX480 SCBE2-MX
MX960 SCBE2-MX
MX2010
MX2K-SFB
MX2020
MX2K-SFB
EX9204 EX9200-SF2
RE-S-1800X4-YYG
(YY = 8, 16 or 32 GB memory)
Note: This part is also known as the
EX9200-RE
EX9208 EX9200-SF2
EX9214 EX9200-SF2
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The modules are designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 1 overall:
Table 2- Security Level of Security Requirements
Area Description Level
1 Module Specification 1
2 Ports and Interfaces 1
3
Roles, Services, and
Authentication
3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-test 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 1
The modules have a limited operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definitions. It includes a
firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this
validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into the
modules are out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
The modules do not implement any mitigations of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2.
Copyright Juniper, 2019 Version 1.1 Page 7 of 22
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1.1 Hardware and Physical CryptographicBoundary
The cryptographic modules’ operational environment is a limited operational environment.
The image below depicts the physical boundary of the modules, including the Routing Engine and SCB.
The boundary excludes the non-crypto-relevant line cards included in the figure.
Figure 1 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary (Left to Right: MX240, MX480, MX960, MX2010, MX2020)
Figure 2 - Physical Cryptographic Boundary (Left to Right: EX9204, EX9208, EX9214)
Copyright Juniper, 2019 Version 1.1 Page 8 of 22
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Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces
Port Description Logical Interface Type
Ethernet (data) LAN Communications Control in, Data in, Status out, Data out
Ethernet (mgmt.) Remote Management Control in, Data in, Status out, Data out
Serial Console serial port Control in, Data in, Status out, Data out
Power Power connector Power
Reset Button Reset Control in
LED Status indicator lighting Status out
USB Load Junos OS image Control in, Data in
Backplane Line card backplane interfaces Control in, Data in, Status out, Data out
Chassis Cluster
Control
Disabled N/A
Aux Disabled N/A
1.2 Modes of Operation
The module supports a FIPS Approved mode of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. The
module must always be zeroized when switching between a FIPS Approved mode of operation and the
non-Approved mode of operation and vice versa.
1.2.1 FIPS Approved Mode
The Crypto-Officer places the module in an Approved mode of operation by following the instructions in
section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2.
The Crypto-Officer can verify that the cryptographic module is in an Approved mode by observing the
console prompt and running the “show version” command. When operating in FIPS mode, the
prompt will read “<user>@<devicename>: fips#” (e.g. crypto-officer@mx240:fips#). The “show
version” command will allow the Crypto-Officer to verify that the validated firmware version is
running on the module. The Crypto-Officer can also use the “show system fips level” command to
determine if the module is operating in FIPS mode.
1.2.2 Non-Approved Mode
The cryptographic module supports a non-Approved mode of operation. When operated in the non-
Approved mode of operation, the module supports the algorithms identified in Section 2.1 as well as the
algorithms supported in the Approved mode of operation.
The Crypto-Officer can place the module into a non-approved mode of operation by following the
instructions for zeroizing the module found in section 6.2.2. Zeroizing the system will set it back to the
factory default state.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
2.1 Allowed Algorithms and Protocols
The module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions
listed in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 below. Table 10 summarizes the high-level protocol algorithm support.
There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the
algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in these tables.
Table 4 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
1896 DRBG SP800-90A HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
3393 HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication,
DRBG Primitive
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits, λ =
128, 256
4139 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
Message Digest
Generation
Table 5 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
3394 HMAC PUB 198 SHA-1
Key size: 112, 160 bits, λ
= 160
Message Authentication
4140 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
5089 AES PUB 197-38A
CBC
CTR
Key Sizes: 128, 192,
256
Encrypt, Decrypt
N/A1
CKG SSH-PUB 133
Section 6.1
Section 6.2
Asymmetric key
generation using
unmodified DRBG
output
1
Vendor Affirmed
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1641 CVL SP 800-135 SSH SHA 1, 256, 512 Key Derivation
1895 DRBG SP 800-90A HMAC SHA-256
1319 ECDSA PUB 186-4
P-256 (SHA 256, 384,
512)
P-384 (SHA 256, 384,
512)
P-521 (SHA 256, 384,
512)
SSH: SigGen, KeyGen,
SigVer
Package: SigVer
3392 HMAC
PUB 198
SHA-1
Key size: 160 bits, λ =
160
Message Authentication
SHA-512
Key size: 512 bits, λ =
512
SHA-256 Key size: 256, λ = 256
Message Authentication
DRBG Primitive
N/A KTS
AES Cert. #5089 and HMAC Cert.
#3392
Key establishment
methodology provides
between 128 and 256
bits of encryption
strength
Triple-DES Cert. #2622 and HMAC
Cert. #3392
key establishment
methodology provides
112 bits of encryption
strength
4138 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation,
KDF Primitive
2622 Triple-DES SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
Table 7 - Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman [IG] D.8
Provides between 128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength.
key agreement; key establishment
NDRNG [IG] 7.14
Scenario 1a
The module generates a minimum of
256 bits of entropy for key generation.
Seeding the DRBG
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Table 8 - Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Auth Cipher Integrity
SSHv22
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384, P-521
ECDSA P-256
Triple-DES CBC
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES CTR
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-512
No part of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. The SSH
algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and integrity. In
Table 8 above, each column of options for a given protocol is independent and may be used in any
viable combination.
2.2 Disabled Algorithms and Protocols
These algorithms and protocols are non-Approved algorithms and protocols that are disabled
when the module is operated in an Approved mode of operation. The algorithms are available as
part of the SSH connect service when the module is operated in the non-Approvedmode.
Algorithms
• RSA
• AES-GCM
• ECDSA with ed25519 curve
• ECDH with ed25519 curve
• ARCFOUR
• Blowfish
• CAST
• DSA (SigGen, SigVer; non-compliant)
• HMAC-MD5
• HMAC-RIPEMD160
• UMAC
Protocols
• Finger
• ftp
• rlogin
• telnet
• tftp
• xnm-clear-text
2
RFC 4253 governs the generation of the Triple-DES encryption key for use with the SSHv2 protocol
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2.3 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section.
Table 9 - Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage
DRBG_Seed Seed material used to seed or reseed the DRBG
DRBG_State Values V and Key which comprise the HMAC_DRBG state
Entropy Input
String
256 bits entropy (min) input used to instantiate the DRBG
ECDH Shared
Secret
The shared secret used in Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) key exchange. 256, 384 or 521
bits. Established per the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
SSH PHK
SSH Private host key. 1st
time SSH is configured, the keys are generated. ECDSA P-256.
Used to identify the host.
SSH ECDH Ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman private key used in SSH. ECDH P-256, P-384, or P-521
SSH-SEKs
SSH Session Keys: SSH Session Encryption Key: 3-Key Triple-DES or AES (128,192,256); SSH
Session Integrity Key: HMAC.
HMAC key The LibMD HMAC keys: message digest for hashing password and critical function test.
User Password Passwords used to authenticate Users to the module.
CO Password Passwords used to authenticate COs to the module.
Table 10 - Public Keys
Name Description and usage
SSH-PUB SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. ECDSA P-256.
SSH-ECDH-
PUB
Ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman public key used in SSH key establishment. ECDH P-256, P-384, or
P-521
Auth-User Pub
User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the module. ECDSA P-256, P-
384, or P-521
Auth-CO Pub
CO AuthenticationPublic Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module. ECDSA P-256, P-384,
or P-521
Root CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package CA at
software load and also at runtime for integrity.
Package CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity the Juniper Image at software load
and also at runtime for integrity.
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles
The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent
operators, but does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces
the separation of roles using identity-based operator authentication.
The Cryptographic Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection.
As root or super-user, the Cryptographic Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the
module..
The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The User role cannot change the
configuration.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements two forms of Identity-Based authentication, Username and password over the
Console and SSH as well as Username and ECDSA public key over SSH.
Password authentication: The module enforces 10-character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the
96 human readable ASCII characters. The maximum password length is 20-characters. Thus
the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1 million.
The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming
0 time to process), no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5-
second delay. Each failed attempt thereafter results in an additional 5-second delay above the previous
(e.g. 4th
failed attempt = 10-second delay, 5th
failed attempt = 15-second delay, 6th
failed attempt = 20-
second delay, 7th
failed attempt = 25-second delay).
This leads to a maximum of 7 possible attempts in a one-minute period for each getty. The best
approachfor the attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts, and wait for a new getty to
be spawned. This would allow the attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute (576 attempts
per hour/60 mins); this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no such thing as 0.6
attempts. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is
9/(9610
), which is less than 1/100,000.
ECDSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. Processing constraints allow for a maximum
of 5.6e7 ECDSA attempts per minute. The module supports ECDSA (P-256, P-384, and P-521), which has
a minimum equivalent computational resistance to attack of 2128
depending on the curve. Thus the
probability of a successful random attempt is 1/ (2128
), which is less than 1/1,000,000. Processing speed
(partial establishment of an SSH session) limits the number of failed authentication attempts in a one-
minute period to 5.6e7 attempts. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a
one-minute period is 5.6e7/(2128
), which is less than 1/100,000.
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3.3 Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 13 lists the access to
CSPs by each service.
Table 11 - Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure
security
Security relevant configuration x
Configure Non-security relevant configuration x
Status Show status x x
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset Software initiated reset conducted over SSH
connection to the management port. The remote reset
service is used to perform self-tests on demand.
x
Load Image Verification and loading of a validated firmware image
into the switch.
x
Table 12 - Unauthenticated Services
Service DDescription
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services (e.g. OSPF, BGP)
LED Status Basic
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Table 13 - CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
DRBG_Seed
DRBG_State
Entropy
Input
String
ECDH
Shared
Secret
SSH
PHK
SSH
ECDH
SSH-SEK
HMAC
Key
CO-PW
User-PW
Configure
security
-- E -- GWR GWR -- -- G W W
Configure -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
SSH
connect
-- E -- E E GE GE -- E E
Console
access
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
Remote
reset
GEZ GZ GZ Z -- Z Z Z -- --
Load
Image
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Local
reset
GEZ GZ GZ Z -- Z Z -- -- --
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output)
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP
W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the module (persistent
storage) Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
3.4 Non-Approved Services
The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. The security functions
provided by the non-Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts with the exception of
SSH Connect (non-compliant). SSH Connect (non-compliant) supports the security functions identified in
Section 2.2 and the SSHv2 row of Table 8.
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Table 14 - - Authenticated Services
Service Description CO User
Configure security
(non-compliant)
Security relevant configuration x
Configure
(non-compliant)
Non-security relevant configuration x
Status
(non-compliant)
Show status x x
Zeroize
(non-compliant)
Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
(non-compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
Console access
(non-compliant)
Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset
(non-compliant)
Software initiated reset x
Load Image
(non-compliant)
Verification and loading of a validated firmware image
into the switch.
x
Table 15 - Unauthenticated Services
Service DDescription
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services (e.g. OSPF, BGP)
LED Status Basic
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4 Self-tests
Each time the module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly,
and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by
power cycling the module (Remote reset service).
On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the KATs fails,
the module enters the Critical Failure error state.
The module performs the following power-up self-tests:
• Firmware Integrity check using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256
• Kernel KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
• OpenSSL KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o ECDSA P-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o ECDH P-256 KAT
▪ Derivation of the expected shared secret.
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
o KDF-SSH KAT
o SHA-384 KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
• LibMD KATs
o HMAC SHA-1
o HMAC SHA-256
o SHA-512
• Critical Function Test
o The cryptographic module performs a verification of a limited operational environment,
and verification of optional non-critical packages.
The module also performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Continuous RNG Test on the OpenSSL SP 800-90A HMAC-DRBG
• Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG
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• Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA key pairs.
• Firmware Load Test (ECDSA signature verification)
5 Physical Security Policy
The modules physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 1 Physical
Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated,
cold rolled steel, plated steel and brushed aluminum enclosure.
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6 Security Rules and Guidance
6.1 Security Rules
The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term must in this context
specifically refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all
other statements indicate a security rule implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services.
3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to
a compromise of the module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting
plaintext CSPs.
11. The cryptographic officer must determine whether firmware being loaded is a legacy use of the
firmware load service.
12. The cryptographic officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
13. The Triple-DES encryption key is generated as part of recognized IETF protocols (RFC 4253 SSH).
The operator shall ensure that the number of 64-bit blocks encrypted by the same key does not
exceed 2^20.
14. Virtual Chassis is not supported in FIPS mode and shall not be configured on the modules.
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6.2 Crypto-Officer Guidance
6.2.1 Enabling FIPS mode
When Junos OS is installed on a router and the router is powered on, it is ready to be configured.
Initially, you log in as the user root with no password. When you log in as root, your SSH connection
is enabled by default.
As Crypto Officer, you must establish a root password conforming to the FIPS password requirements:
1. Passwords must contain between 10 and 20 characters.
2. Passwords must contain at least three of the following five defined character sets:
a. Uppercase letters
b. Lowercase letters
c. Digits
d. Punctuation marks
e. Keyboard characters not included in the other four sets—such as the percent sign (%)
and the ampersand (&)
3. Authentication requirements. All passwords and keys used to authenticate peers must contain
at least 10 characters, and in some cases the number of characters must match the digest size.
When you enable FIPS mode in Junos OS on the router , you cannot configure passwords unless they
meet this standard.
To enable FIPS mode in Junos OS on the device:
1. Zeroize the device to delete all CSPs before entering FIPS mode. See section 6.2.2
2. After the device comes up in the factory default state, login using username root and password ""
(blank).
3. Configure root authentication.
root> edit
Entering configuration mode
[edit]
root# set system root-authentication plain-text-password
New password:
Retype new password:
[edit]
root# commit
commit complete
4. Load configuration onto device and commit new configuration.
5. Configure chassis boundary fips by setting “set system fips level 1” and commit.
6. The device needs to reboot to enter FIPS mode using the “request system reboot” command.
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6.2.2 Zeroize
1. To zeroize the module:
If the module is not in FIPS mode use the command “request system zeroize”. Once the module is in
FIPS mode and the module needs to be zeroized use the command “request system zeroize”.
From the CLI, enter:
user@router> request system zeroize
warning: System will be rebooted and may not boot without configuration
2. To initiate the zeroization process, type yes at the prompt:
Erase all data, including configuration and log files? [yes,no] (no) yes
re0:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
warning: zeroizing re0
The entire operation can take considerable time depending on the size of the media, but all critical
security parameters (CSPs) are removed within a few seconds. The physical environment must remain
secure until the zeroization process is complete.
6.3 User Guidance
All FIPS users, including the Crypto Officer, must observe security guidelines at all times.
All FIPS users must:
• Keep all passwords confidential.
• Store router and documentation in a secure area.
• Deploy router or switches in secure areas.
• Check audit files periodically.
• Conform to all other FIPS 140-2 security rules.
• Follow these guidelines:
• Users are trusted.
• Users abide by all security guidelines.
• Users do not deliberately compromise security.
• Users behave responsibly at all times.
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7 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 16 - References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendationfor Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, January 2011
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
Table 17 - Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
MD5 Message Digest 5
RE Routing Engine
RSA Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SCB Switch Control Board
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SSH Secure Shell
Triple-DES Triple - Data Encryption Standard
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Table 18 - Datasheets
Model Title URL
MX240
MX480
MX960
MX240, MX480, MX960 3D
Universal Edge Routers
https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datashee
ts/1000597-en.pdf
MX2010
MX2020
MX2000 3D
Universal Edge Routers
https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datashee
ts/1000417-en.pdf
EX9200
EX9200 Ethernet Switch https://www.juniper.net/us/en/local/pdf/datasheets/100
0432-en.pdf