Cisco Firepower Threat Defense on ASA Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Version 0.4
October 18, 2018
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................1
1.1 PURPOSE............................................................................................................................. 1
1.2 MODULE VALIDATION LEVEL ............................................................................................ 1
1.3 REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 1
1.4 TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 2
1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................... 2
2 CISCO FIREPOWER THREAT DEFENSE ON ASA CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE...3
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS .................................................. 3
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY............................................................................................. 3
2.3 MODULE INTERFACES......................................................................................................... 4
2.4 PLATFORM OVERVIEW........................................................................................................ 5
2.5 ROLES AND SERVICES....................................................................................................... 10
2.6 USER SERVICES ................................................................................................................ 11
2.7 CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES.............................................................................................. 12
2.8 NON-FIPS MODE SERVICES .............................................................................................. 13
2.9 UNAUTHENTICATED SERVICES ......................................................................................... 13
2.10 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY/CSP MANAGEMENT...................................................................... 13
2.11 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS ........................................................................................ 18
2.11.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ..................................................................................................................... 18
2.11.2 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode ..................................................................................... 19
2.11.3 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms ............................................................................................................ 19
2.12 SELF-TESTS ...................................................................................................................... 20
2.13 PHYSICAL SECURITY......................................................................................................... 21
2.13.1 Opacity Shield Security .......................................................................................................................................... 21
ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X Opacity Shield................................................................................................. 21
ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Opacity Shield ............................................................................................................ 22
2.13.2 Tamper Evidence Labels (TELs)............................................................................................................................ 22
Appling Tamper Evidence Labels ................................................................................................................................. 31
3 SECURE OPERATION...........................................................................................................32
3.1 CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE - SYSTEM INITIALIZATION .................................................. 32
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 1
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1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco Firepower
Threat Defense on ASA Cryptographic Module. The firmware version is 6.2. This security
policy describes how this module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2 and
how to run the module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation. This Security Policy may be freely
distributed.
FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules) details the U.S. Government requirements for
cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program
is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html.
1.2 Module Validation Level
The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.
No. Area Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 3
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key management 2
8 Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility 2
9 Self-Tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall module validation level 2
Table 1 Module Validation Level
1.3 References
This document deals only with the operations and capabilities of the Cisco Firepower Threat
Defense on ASA Cryptographic Module listed in section 1.1 above as it relates to the technical
terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available from
the following sources:
The Cisco Systems website contains information on the full line of Cisco Systems security.
Please refer to the following websites:
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/index.html
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/fxos/roadmap/fxos-roadmap.html
For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco
Systems website at www.cisco.com.
The NIST Validated Modules website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html)
contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.
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1.4 Terminology
In this document, the Cisco Firepower Threat Defense on ASA Cryptographic Module is referred
to as FTD on ASA Cryptographic Module or Module.
1.5 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this
document, the Submission Package contains:
Vendor Evidence document
Finite State Machine
Other supporting documentation as additional references
This document provides an overview of the Cisco Firepower Threat Defense on ASA
Cryptographic Module identified in section 1.1 above and explains the secure layout,
configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2,
which details the general features and functionality of the module. Section 3 specifically
addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.
With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation
Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 3
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2 Cisco Firepower Threat Defense on ASA Cryptographic Module
The module provides cryptographic services to a solution which offers the combination of the
industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive range of next-generation
network security services, intrusion prevention system (IPS), content security, secure unified
communications, TLSv1.2, SSHv2, IKEv2, and Cryptographic Cipher Suite B.
The Firepower eXtensible Operating System (FX-OS), is a next-generation network and content
security solution. The FX-OS is part of the Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) and provides an
agile, open, built for scalability, consistent control, and simplified management. This makes it
easy to configure platform settings and interfaces, provision devices, and monitor system status.
The Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances include the following models:
Small Scale Models:
 ASA 5506-X
 ASA 5506H-X
 ASA 5506W-X
 ASA 5508-X
 ASA 5516-X
Medium Scale Models:
 ASA 5525-X
 ASA 5545-X
 ASA 5555-X
2.1 Cryptographic Module Physical Characteristics
The Cisco FTD on ASA Cryptographic Module is an integrated network security module, which
is designed to integrate into the versatile one-rack units (ASA 5506-X, ASA 5506H-X, ASA
5506W-X, ASA 5508-X, ASA 5516-X, ASA 5525-X, ASA 5545-X, and 5555-X).
2.2 Cryptographic Boundary
The Cisco ASA 5506-X, ASA 5506H-X, ASA 5506W-X, ASA 5508-X, ASA 5516-X, ASA
5525-X, ASA 5545-X, ASA 5555-X, contain a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module.
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire modules’ chassis unit encompassing the
"top," "front," "left," "right," “rear” and "bottom" surfaces of the case along with associated
opacity shields.
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Diagram 1 Block Diagram
2.3 Module Interfaces
The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical
interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical
interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The logical interfaces
and their mapping are described in the following table:
FIPS 140-2
Logical Interface
ASA 5506-X, ASA 5506W-X, ASA 5506H-X, ASA 5508-X,
ASA 5516-X, ASA 5525-X, ASA 5545-X, ASA 5555-X
Physical Interface
Data Input
Interface
Ethernet ports
MGMT Port
Console Port
Data Output
Interface
Ethernet ports
MGMT Port
Console Port
Control Input
Interface
Ethernet ports
MGMT Port
Console Port
Reset Pin/Switch/Button (only on 5506-X, 5506H-X, 5506W-X,
5508-X, 5516-X, 5525-X)
Status Output
Interface
Ethernet ports
MGMT Port
LEDs
Console Port
Power Interface Power Plug
Unused Interface USB Port (USB Type A port and mini-USB Type B Console port)
Table 2 Hardware/Physical Boundary Interfaces
C
Mgmt
Port Ethernet
SFP
FMC Ethernet
over SFP
Console
Port
Intel
Atom
Octeon
Process Manager
FTD 6.2
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2.4 Platform Overview
Figure 1 Cisco ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Appliance Font Panel
1 Power LED:
Green -> power applied OK
6 Console Ports: RJ-45 Console port and mini-
USB Type B Console port. The mini USB Type
B Console port is disallowed in FIPS mode.
2 Status LED:
Green blinking -> system is booting up
Green solid -> successful boot
Orange -> error during boot-up
7 GE Management Port
3 Active LED:
Green -> unit is Active in failover pair
Orange -> unit is Standby in failover pair
Off -> not part of a failover pair
8 USB port is disallowed in FIPS mode
4 WLAN Module
Only lit for 5506W-X Controlled by AP
module, same color/blink behavior as
existing AP702i Access Point
9 Reset Pin
5 GE ports:
Left-side LED Green -> link
Right-side LED blinking -> network activity
10 Power Supply
5 9
6
8
10
Figure 2 Cisco ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Appliance Rear Panel
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 6
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Figure 3 ASA 5506H-X Appliance Front Panel
Figure 4 ASA 5506H-X Appliance Rear Panel
1 Power cord socket. The chassis power-supply socket. See Power Supply for more information
about the chassis power supply.
Note The ASA is powered on when you plug in the AC power supply.
2 Status LEDs The locations and meanings of the status LEDs are described in Status Lights.
3 Network data ports Four Gigabit Ethernet RJ-45 (8P8C) network I/O interfaces. The ports are
numbered (from top to bottom) 1, 2, 3, 4. Each port includes a pair of LEDs,
one each for connection status and link status. The ports are named and
numbered Gigabit Ethernet 1/1 through Gigabit Ethernet 1/4.
4 Management port A Gigabit Ethernet interface restricted to network management access only.
Connect with an RJ-45 cable.
5 Console ports Two serial ports, a standard RJ-45 (8P8C), and a mini USB Type B, are
provided for management access via an external system. See Console Ports
for additional information. The mini USB Type B Console port is disallowed
in FIPS mode.
6 USB port USB Port is disallowed in FIPS mode
7 Reset button A small recessed button that if pressed for longer than three seconds resets the
ASA to its default “as-shipped” state following the next reboot. Configuration
variables are reset to factory default. However, the flash is not erased and no
files are removed.
Note
You can use the service sw-reset-button to disable the reset button.
The default is enabled.
Note: Please refer to Cisco ASA 5500-X Series Hardware Installation Guide for more information.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 7
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Figure 5 ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Appliances Front Panel
Figure 6 ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Appliances Rear Panel
1 Power Switch Standard power on/off switch
2 Power cord socket Chassis power-supply sockeet
3 Status LEDS LED status indicator
4 Network data ports Eight gigabit ethernet RJ-45 network I/O interface.
Each port includes pair of LED status.
5 Management port A gigabit Ethernet interface restricted to network
management access only
6 Console port Serial ports, mini USB Type B and standard RJ-45
are provided for management access. The mini
USB Type B Console port is disallowed in FIPS
mode
7 USB port Disallowed in FIPS mode
8 Reset button Small recessed button that is pressed for longer than
three seconds resets the unit.
9 SSD LED Status light for installed solid-state drive.
10 SSD bay Covered slot for SSD installation.
Figure 7 ASA 5525-X Appliances
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Figure 8 ASA 5525-X Appliances Front Panel
LED Description
1 Power Button A hard switch that turns the system on and off. Once depressed, the button stays in the "on"
position:
 On–The power symbol on the button illuminates.
 Off–The power symbol on the button is dark.
For information about the power state, see the “Power Supply Considerations” section.
2 Hard disk release
button
Releases the hard disk from the device.
3 Alarm Indicates system operating status:
 Off–Normal operating system function.
 Flashing amber–Critical Alarm indicting one or more of the following:
- a major failure of a hardware or software component.
- an over-temperature condition.
- power voltage is outside of the tolerance range.
4 VPN Indicates VPN tunnel status:
 Solid green–VPN tunnel is established.
 Off–No VPN tunnel is established.
5 HD Indicates Hard Disk Drive status:
 Flashing green–Proportioned to read/write activity.
 Solid amber–Hard disk drive failure.
 Off–The power symbol on the button is dark.
6 PS Indicates the power supply status.
7 Active Indicates the status of the failover pair:
 Solid green–Failover pair is operating normally.
 Off– Failover is not operational.
8 Boot Indicates power-up diagnostics:
 Flashing green–Power-up diagnostics are running, or system is booting.
 Solid amber–System has passed power-up diagnostics.
 Off– Power-up diagnostics are not operational.
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Figure 9 ASA 5525-X Appliances Rear Panel
Description
1 Management 0/0
interface
Indicates the Gigabit Ethernet Interface that is restricted to management use only.
Connect with an RJ-45 cable.
(See the “Management 0/0 Interface on the ASA 5500-S Series” section.)
2 Power supply Indicates the chassis power supply.
3 RJ-45 Ethernet
ports
Indicates the Gigabit Ethernet customer data interfaces.
The top row port numbers are (from left to right) 5, 3, 1.
The bottom row port numbers are (from left to right) 4, 2, 0.
4 USB ports Disallowed in FIPS mode
5 Console port Indicates the console port that directly connects a computer to the ASA.
Figure 10 ASA 5545-X and ASA 5555-X Appliances
Figure 11 ASA 5545-X and ASA 5555-X Appliances Front Panel
1 Power Button Switch for on/off power
2 Hard disk slot Hard disk 1 slot
3 Hard disk release button Release hard disk 1 from device
4 Hard disk release button Release hard disk 0 from device
5 Hard disk slot Hard disk 0 slot
6 Alarm Indicates system operational status
 0ff – normal operating mode
 Flashing amber – Critical alarm
- A major failure
- Over-temperature
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- Power voltage in outside of tolerance
range
7 VPN Indicates VPN tunnel status
 Solid green – VPN established
 Off – No VPN tunnel established
8 HD1 Indicates hard drive status
 Flashing green – read/write activity
 Solid amber – drive failure
 Off – no hard drive present
9 HD0 Indicates hard drive status
 Flashing green – read/write activity
 Solid amber – drive failure
 Off – no hard drive present
10 PS1 Indicates status of optional redundant power
11 PS0 Indicates status or primary power
12 Active Indicates status of failover pair
 Solid green – operating normal
 Off – not operational
13 Boot Indicates power on diagnostics
 Flashing green – diagnostics running
 Solid green – passed diagnostics
 Off – diagnostics not operational
Figure 12 ASA 5545-X and ASA 5555-X Appliances Rear Panel
1 I/O slot Slot for optional card.
2 Thumbscrew Tighens and loosens chassis cover
3 Management 0/0 port Indicates gigabit ethernet interface that is restricted to
management use only.
4 RJ-45 ports Gigabit ethernet data interfaces
5 Power supplies Slots for primary and optional power supply
6 USB port Disallowed in FIPS mode
7 Console port Indicates console port that directly connects a
computer to ASA
8 Rear panel LEDs Shows rear panel LED
2.5 Roles and Services
The appliances can be accessed in one of the following ways:
 Console Port
 IPSec/IKEv2
 SSHv2
 HTTPS/TLSv1.2
Authentication is identity-based. As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles that operators
may assume: a Crypto Officer role and User role. The module, upon initial access to the module,
authenticates both of these roles. The module also supports RADIUS and TACACS+ as another
means of authentication, allowing the storage of usernames and passwords on an external server
as opposed to using the module’s internal database for storage.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 11
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The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets must each be at a minimum eight
(8) characters long. There must be at least one special character and at least one number
character (enforced procedurally) along with six additional characters taken from the 26 upper
case, 26 lower case, 10 numbers and 32 special characters. See the Secure Operation section for
more information. If six (6) special/alpha/number characters, one (1) special character and one
(1) number are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit value, the probability of randomly
guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 187,595,543,116,800. This is calculated by
performing 94 x 93 x 92 x 91 x 90 x 89 x 32 x 10. In order to successfully guess the sequence in
one minute would require the ability to make over 3,126,592,385,280 guesses per second, which
far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module.
Additionally, when using RSA based authentication, RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048
bits, thus providing 112 bits of strength. Assuming the low end of that range, an attacker would
have a 1 in 2112
chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a
million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful
random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately
8.65x1031
attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module to
support.
2.6 User Services
A User enters the system by either SSHv2 or HTTPS/TLSv1.2. The module prompts the User for
username and password. If the password is correct, the User is allowed entry to the module
management functionality. The other means of accessing the console is via an IPsec session. This
session is authenticated either using a shared secret or RSA digital signature authentication
mechanism. The services available to the User role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read
(r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:
Services Description Keys and CSPs Access
Status Functions View state of interfaces and protocols, version of
the firmware currently running.
Operator password (r, w, d)
Terminal Functions Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal,
adjust flow control).
Operator password (r, w, d)
Directory Services Display directory of files kept in flash memory. Operator password (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand. N/A
IPsec VPN Negotiation and encrypted data transport via IPSec
VPN.
Operator password, skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE
session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key,
ISAKMP preshared, IKE authentication private Key, IKE
authentication public key, IPsec encryption key, IPsec
authentication key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed,
DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
SSHv2 Functions Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSH. Operator password, SSHv2 private key, SSHv2 public
key, SSHv2 session key, SSHv2 integrity key, DRBG
entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and
DRBG key (r, w, d)
HTTPS Functions
(TLSv1.2)
Negotiation and encrypted data transport via
HTTPS/TLS(TLSv1.2).
Operator password, ECDSA private key, ECDSA public
key, TLS RSA private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS
pre-master secret, TLS master secret, TLS encryption
keys and TLS integrity key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG
seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
Table 3 User Services
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2.7 Crypto Officer Services
A Crypto Officer (CO) enters the system by accessing the console port with a terminal program
or SSH v2, HTTPS/TLSv1.2 session to a LAN port or the 10/100/1000 management Ethernet
port. The Crypto Officer authenticates in the same manner as a User. A Crypto Officer may
assign permission to access the Crypto Officer role to additional accounts, thereby creating
additional Crypto Officers.
The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration of the module. The services available
to the Crypto Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and
zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:
Services and Access Description Keys and CSPs
Configure the Security Define network interfaces and settings, create command
aliases, set the protocols the router will support, enable
interfaces and network services, set system date and time, and
load authentication information.
DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG
key, DRBG C, Diffie-Hellman private key, Diffie-
Hellman public key, Diffie-Hellman shared secret, EC
Diffie-Hellman private key, EC Diffie-Hellman public
key, EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret, SSHv2 private
key, SSHv2 public key, SSHv2 session key, SSHv2
integrity key, ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key,
TLS RSA private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS pre-
master secret, TLS master secret, TLS encryption keys,
TLS integrity key, ISAKMP preshared, skeyid,
skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE session encryption key,
IKE session authentication key, IKE authentication
private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPSec
encryption key and IPSec authentication key (r, w, d)
Firmware Installation Install the firmware during the System Initialization N/A
Configure External
Authentication Server
Configure Client/Server authentication RADIUS secret, TACACS+ secret
Define Rules and Filters Create packet Filters that are applied to User data streams on
each interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules, which
define a set of packets to permit or deny based on
characteristics such as protocol ID, addresses, ports, TCP
connection establishment, or packet direction.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
View Status Functions View the router configuration, routing tables, active sessions
health, temperature, memory status, voltage, packet statistics,
review accounting logs, and view physical interface status.
Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
Configure
Encryption/Bypass
Set up the configuration tables for IP tunneling. Set preshared
keys and algorithms to be used for each IP range or allow
plaintext packets to be set from specified IP address.
ISAKMP preshared, Operator password, Enable
password, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session
authentication key, IKE authentication private Key,
IKE authentication public key, IPsec encryption key,
IPsec authentication key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG
seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
TLS VPN (TLSv1.2) Configure SSL VPN parameters, provide entry and output of
CSPs.
ECDSA private key, ECDSA public key, TLS RSA
private key, TLS RSA public key, TLS pre-master
secret, TLS master secret, TLS encryption keys and
TLS integrity key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed,
DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
SSHv2 Function Configure SSHv2 parameter, provide entry and output of
CSPs.
SSHv2 private key, SSHv2 public key. SSHv2 session
key, SSHv2 integrity key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG
seed, DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
IPsec VPN Function Configure IPsec VPN parameters, provide entry and output of
CSPs.
ISAKMP preshared, skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED,
IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication
key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE
authentication public key, IPsec encryption key, IPsec
authentication key, DRBG entropy input, DRBG seed,
DRBG V, DRBG C and DRBG key (r, w, d)
Self-Tests Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand N/A
User services The Crypto Officer has access to all User services. Operator password (r, w, d)
Local Certificate Authority Allows the ASA to be configured as a Root Certificate
Authority and issue user certificates for SSL VPN use
N/A
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(AnyConnect and Clientless). The ASA can then be
configured to require client certificates for authentication.
Zeroization Zeroize cryptographic keys/CSPs by running the zeroization
methods classified in table 6, Zeroization column.
All CSPs (d)
Table 4 Crypto Officer Services
2.8 Non-FIPS mode Services
The cryptographic module in addition to the above listed FIPS mode of operation can operate in
a non-FIPS mode of operation. This is not a recommended operational mode but because the
associated RFC’s for the following protocols allow for non-approved algorithms and non-
approved key sizes a non-approved mode of operation exist. So those services listed above with
their FIPS approved algorithms in addition to the following services with their non-approved
algorithms and non-approved keys sizes are available to the User and the Crypto Officer. Prior
to using any of the Non-Approved services in Section 2.8, the Crypto Officer must zeroize all
CSPs which places the module into the non-FIPS mode of operation.
Services 1
Non-Approved Algorithms
SSH
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC MD5
Symmetric: DES
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
IPsec
Hashing: MD5
MACing: HMAC-SHA-1, MD5
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
TLS
Symmetric: DES, RC4
Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
Table 5 Non-approved algorithms in the Non-FIPS mode services
Neither the User nor the Crypto Officer are allowed to operate any of these services while in
FIPS mode of operation.
All services available can be found at
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/firepower/60/configuration/guide/fpmc-config-
guide-v60.pdf. This site lists all configuration guides.
2.9 Unauthenticated Services
The services for someone without an authorized role are to view the status output from the
module’s LED pins and cycle power.
2.10 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management
The module administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as
passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-protection of the Crypto Officer role
login, and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of overwriting the memory
that stored the key or refreshing the volatile memory. Keys are both manually and electronically
distributed but entered electronically. Persistent keys with manual distribution are used for pre-
shared keys whereas protocols such as IKE, TLS, and SSH are used for electronic distribution.
1
These approved services become non-approved when using any non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or
curve sizes. When using approved algorithms and key sizes these services are approved.
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All pre-shared keys are associated with the CO role that created the keys, and the CO role is
protected by a password. Therefore, the CO password is associated with all the pre-shared keys.
The Crypto Officer needs to be authenticated to store keys. Only an authenticated Crypto Officer
can view the keys. All Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys agreed upon for individual tunnels are directly
associated with that specific tunnel only via the IKE protocol. RSA Public keys are entered into
the module using digital certificates which contain relevant data such as the name of the public
key's owner, which associates the key with the correct entity. All other keys are associated with
the user/role that entered them. The entropy source (NDRNG) within the module provides at
least 256 bits of entropy to seed SP800-90a DRBG for use in key generation.
Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
DRBG entropy
input
SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256) or
HASH_DRBG
(SHA-512)
384-bits/512-bits This is the entropy input for SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG and HASH_DRBG, used
to construct seed.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG Seed SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256) or
HASH_DRBG
(SHA-512)
384-bits/888-bits Input to the DRBG that determines the
internal state of the DRBG. Generated
using DRBG derivation function that
includes the entropy input from the
entropy source.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG V SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
(AES-256) or
HASH_DRBG
(SHA-512)
128-bits/888-bits The DRBG V is one of the critical
values of the internal state upon which
the security of this DRBG mechanism
depends. Generated first during DRBG
instantiation and then subsequently
updated using the DRBG update
function.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG C SP800-90A
HASH_DRBG
(SHA-512)
888-bits Internal critical value used as part of SP
800-90A HASH_DRBG. Established per
SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
DRBG key SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
(using AES-256)
256-bits Internal critical value used as part of SP
800-90A CTR_DRBG. Established per
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret
DH 2048 - 4096 bits The shared secret used in Diffie-
Hellman (DH) exchange (as part of SSH,
IKE/IPSec, and TLS). Established per
the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
private key
DH 224-384 bits The private key used in Diffie-Hellman
(DH) exchange (as part of SSH,
IKE/IPSec, and TLS). This key is
generated by calling SP800-90A DRBG.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Diffie Hellman
public key
DH 2048 - 4096 bits The public key used in Diffie-Hellman
(DH) exchange (as part of SSH,
IKE/IPSec, and TLS). This key is
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 15
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
derived per the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement.
EC Diffie-
Hellman
shared Secret
ECDH P-256, P-384,
P-521 Curves
The shared secret used in Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange.
Established per the Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) protocol.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie-
Hellman
private key
ECDH P-256, P-384,
P-521 Curves
Used in establishing the session key for
an IPSec session. The private key used
in Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) exchange. This key is
established per the EC Diffie-Hellman
key agreement
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
EC Diffie-
Hellman
public key
ECDH P-256, P-384,
P-521 Curves
Used in establishing the session key for
an IPSec session. The public key used in
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
exchange. This key is established per the
EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
skeyid Keying material 160 bits A shared secret known only to IKE
peers. It was established via key
derivation function defined in SP800-
135 KDF and it will be used for deriving
other keys in IKE protocol
implementation.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
skeyid_d Keying material 160 bits Keying material known only to IKE
peers. It was derived via key derivation
function defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2) and it will be used for deriving
IKE session authentication key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
SKEYSEED Keying material 160 bits Keying material known only to IKE
peers. It was derived via key derivation
function defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2) and it will be used for deriving
IKE session authentication key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IKE session
encrypt key
Triple-DES/AES Triple-DES 192
bits or AES
128/192/256 bits
The IKE session (IKE Phase I) encrypt
key. This key is derived via key
derivation function defined in SP800-
135 KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IKE session
authentication
key
HMAC-SHA-
1/256/384/512
160-512 bits The IKE session (IKE Phase I)
authentication key. This key is derived
via key derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
ISAKMP
preshared
Pre-shared secret Variable 8 plus
characters
The secret used to derive IKE skeyid
when using preshared secret
authentication. This CSP is entered by
the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 16
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
IKE
authentication
private Key
RSA/ECDSA RSA (2048 bits)
or ECDSA
(Curves:
P-256/P-
384/512)
RSA/ECDSA private key used in IKE
authentication. This key is generated by
calling SP800-90A DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA/ECDSA
keypair deletion
command
IKE
authentication
public key
RSA/ECDSA RSA (2048 bits)
or ECDSA
(Curves:
P-256/P-
384/512)
RSA/ECDSA public key used in IKE
authentication. The key is derived in
compliance with FIPS 186-4
RSA/ECDSA key pair generation
method in the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA/ECDSA
keypair deletion
command
IPsec
encryption key
Triple-DES, AES
and AES-GCM
Triple-DES 192
bits or AES
128/192/256 bits
The IPsec (IKE phase II) encryption key.
This key is derived via a key derivation
function defined in SP800-135 KDF
(IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
IPsec
authentication
key
HMAC-SHA-
1/256/384/512
160-512 bits The IPsec (IKE Phase II) authentication
key. This key is derived via a key
derivation function defined in SP800-
135 KDF (IKEv2).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
Operator
password
Password 8 plus characters The password of the User role. This CSP
is entered by the User.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
Enable
password
Password 8 plus characters The password of the CO role. This CSP
is entered by the Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new password
RADIUS
secret
Shared Secret 16 characters The RADIUS shared secret. Used for
RADIUS Client/Server authentication.
This CSP is entered by the Crypto
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret
TACACS+
secret
Shared Secret 16 characters The TACACS+ shared secret. Used for
TACACS+ Client/Server authentication.
This CSP is entered by the Crypto
Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret
SSHv2 private
key
RSA 2048 bits
modulus
The SSHv2 private key used in SSHv2
connection. This key is generated by
calling SP 800-90A DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
SSHv2 public
key
RSA 2048 bits
modulus
The SSHv2 public key used in SSHv2
connection. This key is derived in
compliance with FIPS 186-4 RSA key
pair generation method in the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
SSHv2 session
key
Triple-DES/AES 192 bits Triple-
DES or
128/192/256 bits
AES
This is the SSHv2 session key. It is used
to encrypt all SSHv2 data traffics
traversing between the SSHv2 Client
and SSHv2 Server. This key is derived
via key derivation function defined in
SP800-135 KDF (SSH).
DRAM
(plaintext)
Power cycle the
device
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 17
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
SSHv2
integrity key
HMAC-SHA-1 160 bits Used for SSH connections integrity to
assure the traffic integrity. This key was
derived in the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when SSH
session is
terminated
ECDSA
private key
ECDSA Curves:
P-256,384,521
Key pair generation, signature
generation/Verification. This key is
generated by calling SP 800-90A
DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
ECDSA keypair
deletion
command
ECDSA public
key
ECDSA Curves:
P-256,384,521
Key pair generation, signature
generation/Verification. This key is
derived in compliance with FIPS 186-4
ECDSA key pair generation method in
the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
ECDSA keypair
deletion
command
Enable secret Shared Secret At least eight
characters
The obfuscated password of the CO role.
However, the algorithm used to
obfuscate this password is not FIPS
approved. Therefore, this password is
considered plaintext for FIPS purposes.
This password is zeroized by
overwriting it with a new password. The
Crypto Officer optionally configures the
module to obfuscate the Enable
password. This CSP is entered by the
Crypto Officer.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Overwrite with
new secret
TLS RSA
private keys
RSA 2048 bits Identity certificates for the security
appliance itself and also used in IPSec,
TLS, and SSH negotiations. This key
was generated by calling FIPS approved
DRBG.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
TLS RSA
public keys
RSA 2048 bits Identity certificates for the security
appliance itself and also used in TLS
negotiations. This key is derived in
compliance with FIPS 186-4 RSA key
pair generation method in the module.
NVRAM
(plaintext)
Zeroized by
RSA keypair
deletion
command
TLS pre-
master secret
Keying material At least eight
characters
Keying material used to derive TLS
master key during the TLS session
establishment. This key entered into the
module in cipher text form, encrypted by
RSA public key.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated.
TLS master
secret
Keying material 48 Bytes Keying material used to derive other
HTTPS/TLS keys. This key was derived
from TLS pre-master secret during the
TLS session establishment
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 18
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Name CSP Type Size Description/Generation Storage Zeroization
TLS
Encryption
keys
Triple-
DES/AES/AES-
GCM
Triple-DES 192
bits or AES
128/192/256 bits
Used in HTTPS/TLS connections.
Generated using TLS protocol. This key
was derived in the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
TLS Integrity
Key
HMAC-
SHA256/384
256-384 bits Used for TLS integrity to assure the
traffic integrity. This key was derived in
the module.
DRAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
when TLS
session is
terminated
Table 6 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
2.11 Cryptographic Algorithms
The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.
2.11.1 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm implementations:
Table 6 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms and Associated Certificate Number
Notes:
 There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module.
Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown
in this table.
 The module's AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC
7296 for IPsec/IKEv2 and RFC 5288 for TLS. The module is compatible with TLSv1.2
Algorithm
Cisco
Security
Crypto
(Firmware)
Cavium Octeon III
(ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X,
5506W-X, 5508-X,
5516-X)
Cavium
Nitrox PX
(ASA 5525-X)
Cavium
Nitrox PX
(ASA 5545-X,
5555-X)
AES (128/192/256 CBC, GCM) 4905 3301 2472 2050 & 2444
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key) 2559 1881 1513 1321
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512) 4012 2737 2091 1794
HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) 3272 2095 1514 1247
RSA (KeyGen, SigGen and SigVer;
PKCS1_V1_5; 2048bits)
2678
ECDSA (PKG, SigGen and SigVer;
P-256, P-384, P-521)
1254
CTR_DRBG (AES-256) 1735 819
HASH_DRBG (SHA-512) 336 332
CVL Component (IKEv2, TLSv1.2,
SSHv2)
1521
CKG (vendor affirmed)
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 19
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and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52 Rev1,
Section 3.3.1. The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic
boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given
session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a
handshake to establish a new encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then
restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be
established. The module uses RFC 7296 compliant IKEv2 to establish the shared secret
SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived. When the IV
exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party,
client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new
encryption key. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use
with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
 Each of TLS, SSH and IPSec protocols governs the generation of the respective Triple-
DES keys. Refer to RFC 5246 (TLS), RFC 4253 (SSH) and RFC 6071 (IPSec) for details
relevant to the generation of the individual Triple-DES encryption keys. The user is
responsible for ensuring the module limits the number of encryptions with the same key
to 220
.
 No parts of the SSH, TLS and IPSec protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by
the CAVP and CMVP.
 In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation as per scenario 1 of section 5 in SP800-133. The resulting
generated symmetric key and the seed used in the asymmetric key generation are the
unmodified output from SP800-90A DRBG
2.11.2 Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in
the FIPS approved mode:
 Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1521, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
 EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #1521, key agreement; key establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption
strength)
 NDRNG
2.11.3 Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms
The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used
in FIPS mode of operation:
 Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of
encryption strength; non-compliant)
 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology less than 112 bits of encryption
strength; non-compliant)
 DES
 MD5
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 20
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 RC4
 HMAC-SHA1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits
2.12 Self-Tests
The module includes an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during
operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to insure all components are
functioning correctly. The FIPS power-on self-tests are run regardless of the FIPS mode setting.
Self-tests performed
 POSTs – Cisco Security Crypto (Firmware)
o AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
o DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A Section 11.3
are performed)
o ECDSA (sign and verify) Power On Self-Test
o Firmware Integrity Test (SHA-512)
o HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) Known Answer Tests
o RSA KATs (separate KAT for signing; separate KAT for verification)
o SHA-1/256/384/512 KATs
o Triple-DES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
 POSTs –On-board (Hardware)
o AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
o DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A Section 11.3
are performed)
o HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512) Known Answer Tests
o SHA-1/256/384/512 KATs
o Triple-DES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
 Conditional tests - Cisco Security Crypto (Firmware)
o RSA pairwise consistency test (encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify)
o ECDSA pairwise consistency test
o Conditional IPSec Bypass test
o Continuous Random Number Generator test for SP800-90A DRBG
o Continuous Random Number Generator test for NDRNG
 Conditional tests - On-board (Hardware)
o Continuous Random Number Generator test for SP800-90A DRBG
o Continuous Random Number Generator test for NDRNG
Note: DRBGs will not be available should the NDRNG become unavailable. This will in turn
make the associated security service/CSP outlined above in Table 6 non-available.
The module performs all power-on self-tests automatically when the power is applied. All
power-on self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The
power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the
initialization of the LAN’s interfaces; this prevents the security appliances from passing any data
during a power-on self-test failure. In the unlikely event that a power-on self-test fails, an error
message is displayed on the console followed by a security appliance reboot.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 21
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2.13 Physical Security
The FIPS 140-2 level 2 physical security requirements for the modules are met by the use of
opacity shields covering the front panels of modules to provide the required opacity and tamper
evident seals to provide the required tamper evidence.
2.13.1 Opacity Shield Security
The following table shows the tamper labels and opacity shields that shall be installed on the
modules to operate in a FIPS approved mode of operation. The CO is responsible for using,
securing and having control at all times of any unused tamper evident labels. Actions to be taken
when any evidence of tampering should be addressed within site security program.
ASA Models Number
Tamper
labels
Tamper Evident Labels Number
Opacity
Shields
Opacity Shields
5506-X 4 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 1 ASA5506-FIPS-KIT=
5506H-X 4 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 1 ASA5506-FIPS-KIT=
5506W-X 4 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 1 ASA5506-FIPS-KIT=
5508-X 5 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 1 ASA5508-FIPS-KIT=
5516-X 5 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 1 ASA5516-FIPS-KIT=
5525-X, 5545-X, 5555-X 3 AIR-AP-FIPSKIT= 0 None
Table 7 Tamper Labels and Opacity Shield Quantities
ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X Opacity Shield
To install an opacity shield on the ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X, follow these steps:
Step 1: Remove the three screws from the bottom of the Cisco ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and
5506W-X.
Step 2: Slide the ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X into the FIPS enclosure.
Step 3: Turn the FIPS enclosure with the chassis securely inside and use the three screws you
removed in Step 1 to screw the FIPS enclosure to the Cisco ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-
X.
Step 4: Apply the tamper evident label over the screw on the bottom. Please see Figure 24 for
placement of the TEL.
Step 5: Apply another tamper evident label so that one half of the tamper evident label attaches
to the enclosure and the other half attaches to the Cisco ASA 5506-X, 5506H-X and 5506W-X
chassis. Please see Figure 24 for placement of the TEL.
Figure 13 ASA 5506-X, ASA 5506H-X and ASA 5506W-X Opacity Shield Placement
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 22
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ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Opacity Shield
To install an opacity shield on the ASA 5508-X or ASA 5516-X rear, follow these steps:
Step 1: Power off the ASA.
Step 2: Remove the two screws.
Step 3: Place the shield over the vent areas and insert the screws.
Figure 14 ASA 5508-X and ASA 5516-X Opacity Shield Placement
2.13.2 Tamper Evidence Labels (TELs)
The tamper evident seals (hereinafter referred to as tamper evident labels (TEL)) shall be installed
on the security devices containing the module prior to operating in FIPS mode. TELs shall be
applied as depicted in the figures below. Any unused TELs must be securely stored, accounted
for, and maintained by the CO in a protected location.
Should the CO have to remove, change or replace TELs (tamper-evidence labels) for any reason,
the CO must examine the location from which the TEL was removed and ensure that no residual
debris is still remaining on the chassis or card. If residual debris remains, the CO must remove
the debris using a damp cloth.
Any deviation of the TELs placement such as tearing, misconfiguration, removal, change,
replacement or any other change in the TELs from its original configuration as depicted below by
unauthorized operators shall mean the module is no longer in FIPS mode of operation. Returning
the system back to FIPS mode of operation requires the replacement of the TEL as depicted below
and any additional requirement per the site security policy which are out of scope of this Security
Policy.
The Crypto Officer shall inspect the seals for evidence of tamper as determined by their deployment
policies (every 30 days is recommended). If the seals show evidence of tamper, the Crypto Officer
shall assume that the modules have been compromised and contact Cisco accordingly.
To seal the system, apply tamper-evidence labels as depicted in the figures below.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 23
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Figure 15 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Front TEL Placement
Figure 16 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Right Side View
Figure 17 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Left Side View
Figure 18 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 19 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Top View
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 24
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Figure 20 ASA 5506-X and ASA 5506W-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 21 ASA 5506H-X Front View
Figure 22 ASA 5506H-X Right Side TEL Placement
Figure 23 ASA 5506H-X Left Side TEL Placement
Figure 24 ASA 5506H-X Rear TEL Placement
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 25
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Figure 25 ASA 5506H-X Top View
Figure 26 ASA 5506H-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 27 ASA 5508-X Front View
Figure 28 ASA 5508-X Right Side TEL Placement
Figure 29 ASA 5508-X Left Side TEL Placement
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 26
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Figure 30 ASA 5508-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 31 ASA 5508-X Top TEL Placement
Figure 32 ASA 5508-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 33 ASA 5516-X Front View
Figure 34 ASA 5516-X Right Side TEL Placement
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 27
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Figure 35 ASA 5516-X Left Side TEL Placement
Figure 36 ASA 5516-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 37 ASA 5516-X Top TEL Placement
Figure 38 ASA 5516-X Bottom TEL Placement
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 28
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Figure 39 ASA 5525-X Front TEL Placement
Figure 40 ASA 5525-X Right Side View
Figure 41 ASA 5525-X Left Side View
Figure 42 ASA 5525-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 43 ASA 5525-X Top TEL Placement
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 29
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Figure 44 ASA 5525-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 45 ASA 5545-X Front TEL Placement
Figure 46 ASA 5545-X Right Side View
Figure 47 ASA 5545-X Left Side View
Figure 48 ASA 5545-X Rear TEL Placement
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 30
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Figure 49 ASA 5545-X Top TEL Placement
Figure 50 ASA 5545-X Bottom TEL Placement
Figure 51 ASA 5555-X Front TEL Placement
Figure 52 ASA 5555-X Right Side View
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 31
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Figure 53 ASA 5555-X Left Side View
Figure 54 ASA 5555-X Rear TEL Placement
Figure 55 ASA 5555-X Top TEL Placement
Figure 56 ASA 5555-X Bottom TEL Placement
Appling Tamper Evidence Labels
Step 1: Turn off and unplug the system before cleaning the chassis and applying labels.
Step 2: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper evident labels.
Alcohol-based cleaning pads are recommended for this purpose.
Step 3: Apply a label to cover the security appliance as shown in figures above.
© Copyright 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. 32
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The tamper evident seals are produced from a special thin gauge vinyl with self-adhesive backing.
Any attempt to open the device will damage the tamper evident seals or the material of the
security appliance cover. Because the tamper evident seals have non-repeated serial numbers,
they may be inspected for damage and compared against the applied serial numbers to verify that
the security appliance has not been tampered with. Tamper evident seals can also be inspected for
signs of tampering, which include the following: curled corners, rips, and slices. The word
“OPEN” may appear if the label was peeled back.
3 Secure Operation
The module meets all the Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped only to
authorized operators by the vendor, and the module is shipped in Cisco boxes with Cisco
adhesive, so if tampered with the recipient will notice. Follow the instructions provided below to
place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining the
following settings prevents the module from being placed into FIPS approved mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Initialization
The Cisco FTD on ASA Cryptographic Module was validated with ftd-boot-9.8.2.3.lfbff and ftd-
6.2.2-81.pkg then patch with Cisco_FTD_Patch-6.2.2.3-66.sh.REL.tar (ASA 5506, 5508, 5516)
and ftd-boot-9.8.2.3.cdisk and ftd-6.2.2-81.pkg then patch with Cisco_FTD_Patch-6.2.2.3-
66.sh.REL.tar (ASA 5525, 5545, 5555). Those are the only allowable images for FIPS-approved
mode of operation.
The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps:
Step 1: Install boot image on ROMMON through TFTP
Step 2: Move form “firepower-boot>” to “setup”
walk through all the prompts to setup (ip, netmask, GW)
Step 3: Install the FTD image (either FTP or SSH)
Step 4: Log into platform (admin and Admin123)
enter in new password
Step 5: Config management IP and answer all the prompt questions. After this is done
you have set up the configure file. It will ask if you want to manage it
locally. This will mean you are managing it through FDM for local or FMC.
Note: ASA with FTD can be managed by FMC or FDM.
Step 6: After installation completed you will have a > prompt
if you set it for FDM you can now enter in the ip address on a browser to set up via
FDM or you can enter in IP and set up on FMC.
Step 7: Install Triple-DES/AES licenses to require the security appliances to use
Triple-DES and AES
Step 8: Enable “FIPS Mode” to allow the module to internally enforce FIPS-compliant
behavior by using the following commands
firepower# scope security
firepower /security # [enable | disable] fips-mode
firepower /security # [enable | disable] enable fips-mode
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firepower /security # commit-buffer
firepower /security # connect local-mgmt
firepower(local-mgmt)# reboot
Step 9: Issue the following command to verify the FIPS mode:
firepower /security # show fips-mode
Note: the output from ‘show fips-mode’ should be “FIPS Mode Admin State: Enabled”
Step10: If using a RADIUS/TACACS+ server for authentication, the
RADIUS/TACACS+
shared secret must be at least 8 characters long.
Step 11: Configure the module such that any remote connections via Telnet are secured
through IPSec.
Step 12: Configure the module such that only FIPS-approved algorithms are used for
IPSec tunnels.
Step 13: Configure the module such that error messages can only be viewed by Crypto
Officer.
Step 14: Disable the TFTP server.
Step 15: Disable HTTP for performing system management in FIPS mode of operation.
HTTPS with TLS should always be used for Web-based management. The CO
shall only use FIPS approved/Allowed cryptographic algorithms listed above for
TLS configuration.
Step 16: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using FIPS approved
algorithms.
Step 17: Reboot the module.