



Ctrl IQ, Inc.

Rocky Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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1 General

1.1 Overview

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version Rocky8.20250314 of the Rocky Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 1 module.

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1.1.1 How this Security Policy was prepared

In preparing the Security Policy document, the laboratory formatted the vendor-supplied documentation for consolidation without altering the technical statements therein contained. The further refining of the Security Policy document was conducted iteratively throughout the conformance testing, wherein the Security Policy was submitted to the vendor, who would then edit, modify, and add technical contents. The vendor would also supply additional documentation, which the laboratory formatted into the existing Security Policy, and resubmitted to the vendor for their final editing.

1.2 Security Levels

Section	Title	Security Level
1	General	1
2	Cryptographic module specification	1
3	Cryptographic module interfaces	1
4	Roles, services, and authentication	1
5	Software/Firmware security	1
6	Operational environment	1
7	Physical security	N/A
8	Non-invasive security	N/A
9	Sensitive security parameter management	1
10	Self-tests	1

Section	Title	Security Level
11	Life-cycle assurance	1
12	Mitigation of other attacks	1
	Overall Level	1

Table 1: Security Levels

2 Cryptographic Module Specification

2.1 Description

Purpose and Use:

The Rocky Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as “the module”) is defined as a software module in a multi-chip standalone embodiment. It provides a C language application program interface (API) for use by other applications that require cryptographic functionality. The module is a software library supporting FIPS 140-3 approved algorithms developed by Ctrl IQ, Inc. for its use by other applications that require cryptographic functionality.

Module Type: Software

Module Embodiment: MultiChipStand

Cryptographic Boundary:

The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined as the libcrypto.so and libssl.so shared libraries and their respective integrity check files. libcrypto.so is the shared library that implements the cryptographic algorithms, while libssl.so is the shared library that implements the TLS/DTLS network protocols.

Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):

The TOEPP of the module is defined as the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed.

Figure 1 shows a block diagram that represents the design of the module when the module is operational and providing services to other user space applications. In this diagram, the physical perimeter of the operational environment is the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed. The cryptographic boundary is represented by the libssl and libcrypto shared libraries and their respective integrity check files.

The “Data/Control Input” and “Data/Status Output” arrows indicate the flow of data between the cryptographic module and its operator application, through the logical interfaces defined in Section 3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces.

Other components are only included in the diagram for informational purposes. They are not included in the cryptographic boundary (and therefore not part of the module’s validation). For example, the kernel is responsible for managing system calls issued by the module itself, as well as other applications using the module for cryptographic services.




Figure 1: Block Diagram

2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification

Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):

Package or File Name	Software/ Firmware Version	Features	Integrity Test
libcrypto.so, libssl.so, .libcrypto.so.1.1.hmac, .libssl.so.1.1.hmac	Rocky8.20250314	N/A	HMAC-SHA2-256

Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)

Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processors	PAA/PAI	Hypervisor or Host OS	Version(s)
Rocky Linux 8	SuperMicro SuperServer 5039MS	Intel Kaby Lake Xeon E3-1270 v6	Yes	N/A	Rocky8.20250314
Rocky Linux 8	SuperMicro SuperServer 5039MS	Intel Kaby Lake Xeon E3-1270 v6	No	N/A	Rocky8.20250314

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Table 3: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid

Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

N/A for this module.

2.3 Excluded Components

There are no components excluded from the requirements of the FIPS 140-3 standard.

2.4 Modes of Operation

Modes List and Description:

Mode Name	Description	Type	Status Indicator
Approved	Automatically entered whenever an approved service is requested.	Approved	Equivalent to the indicator of the requested service.
Non-Approved	Automatically entered whenever a non-approved service is requested.	Non-Approved	Equivalent to the indicator of the requested service.

Table 4: Modes List and Description

After passing all pre-operational self-tests and cryptographic algorithm self-tests executed on start-up, the module automatically transitions to the approved mode. No operator intervention is required to reach this point. The module operates in the approved mode of operation by default and can only transition into the non-approved mode by calling one of the non-approved services listed in the Non-Approved Services table of the Security Policy.

In the operational state, the module accepts service requests from calling applications through its logical interfaces. At any point in the operational state, a calling application can end its process, causing the module to end its operation.

Mode Change Instructions and Status:

The module automatically switches between the approved and non-approved modes depending on the services requested by the operator. The status indicator of the mode of operation is equivalent to the indicator of the service that was requested.

2.5 Algorithms

Approved Algorithms:

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A6738, A6739, A6740	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CCM	A6738, A6739, A6740	Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38C
AES-CFB1	A6738, A6739, A6740	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128	A6738, A6739, A6740	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CFB8	A6738, A6739, A6740	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CMAC	A6738, A6739, A6740	Direction - Generation Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38B
AES-CTR	A6738, A6739, A6740	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A6738, A6739, A6740	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A6741, A6742, A6743, A6744, A6745, A6746, A6747, A6748, A6749	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External, Internal Key Length - 128, 192, 256 IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1, 8.2.2	SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC	A6741, A6742, A6743, A6744, A6745, A6746, A6747, A6748, A6749	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38D
AES-KW	A6738, A6739, A6740	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F
AES-KWP	A6738, A6739, A6740	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38F
AES-OFB	A6738, A6739, A6740	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0	A6738, A6739, A6740	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38E
Counter DRBG	A6738, A6739, A6740	Prediction Resistance - No, Yes Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - No, Yes	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5)	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Component - No, Yes	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A6760	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 Component - No, Yes	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A6760	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512	FIPS 186-5
EDDSA KeyGen	A6763	Curve - ED-25519, ED-448	FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigGen	A6763	Curve - ED-25519, ED-448 PreHash - No Pure - Yes	FIPS 186-5

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
EDDSA SigVer	A6763	Curve - ED-25519, ED-448 PreHash - No Pure - Yes	FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512/224	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512/256	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-224	A6760	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-256	A6760	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-384	A6760	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
HMAC-SHA3-512	A6760	Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A6762	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - FB, FC, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192 Scheme - dhEphem - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2	A6761	Derived Key Length - 2048 Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-2048 Increment 8 HMAC Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224, SHA2-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512	SP 800-56C Rev. 2
KDF SSH (CVL)	A6751, A6753, A6755, A6757, A6759	Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF TLS (CVL)	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	TLS Version - v1.0/1.1	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
PBKDF	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758, A6760	Iteration Count - Iteration Count: 1000-10000 Increment 1 Password Length - Password Length: 8-128 Increment 1	SP 800-132
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Key Generation Mode - probable Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192 Primality Tests - 2powSecStr Private Key Format - standard	FIPS 186-5

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758, A6760	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758, A6760	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss	FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes Key Generation	A6762	Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP- 8192	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
Safe Primes Key Verification	A6762	Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP- 8192	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
SHA-1	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512/224	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
SHA2-512/256	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA3-224	A6760	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 202
SHA3-256	A6760	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 202
SHA3-384	A6760	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 202
SHA3-512	A6760	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 Large Message Sizes - 1, 2, 4, 8	FIPS 202
SHAKE-128	A6760	Output Length - Output Length: 16-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 202
SHAKE-256	A6760	Output Length - Output Length: 16-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 202
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL)	A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758	Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
TLS v1.3 KDF (CVL)	A6761	HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 KDF Running Modes - DHE, PSK, PSK-DHE	SP 800-135 Rev. 1

Table 5: Approved Algorithms

Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:

Name	Properties	Implementation	Reference
Asymmetric Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG)	Key type:Asymmetric	N/A	SP 800-133r2, section 4, example 1

Table 6: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms

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Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:

Name	Caveat	Use and Function
MD5	Only allowed as the PRF in TLSv1.0 and v1.1 per IG 2.4.A	Message digest used in TLSv1.0/v1.1 KDF only

Table 7: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed

Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:

Name	Use and Function
AES-GCM with external IV	Authenticated encryption
HMAC with less than 112-bit keys, SipHash	Message authentication code (MAC)
Diffie-Hellman with domain parameters other than safe primes	Key pair generation; Diffie-Hellman public key validation; Shared secret computation
DSA with any key sizes	Digital signature verification
EC Diffie-Hellman with P-192 curve, K curves, B curves and non-NIST curves	Shared secret computation
ECDSA with P-192 curve, K curves, B curves and non-NIST curves	Key pair generation; Digital signature generation; Digital signature verification
HKDF standalone	Key derivation as a standalone service
PBKDF with non-approved message digest algorithms or using input parameters not meeting requirements stated in section 2.7.3	Key derivation
RSA with keys smaller than 2048 bits	Key pair generation; Digital signature generation; Digital signature verification
RSA encryption with any key sizes	Key encapsulation
RSA decryption with any key sizes	Key un-encapsulation

Name	Use and Function
SHA-1	Digital signature generation; Digital signature verification

Table 8: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms

The table above lists all non-approved cryptographic algorithms of the module employed by the non-approved services of the Non-Approved Services table in Section 4.4 Non-Approved Services.

2.6 Security Function Implementations

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
Message digest	SHA XOF	Message digest using SHA or SHAKE algorithms		SHA-1: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) SHA2-224: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) SHA2-256: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) SHA2-384: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) SHA2-512: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) SHA2-512/224: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) SHA2-512/256: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) SHA3-224: (A6760) SHA3-256: (A6760) SHA3-384: (A6760) SHA3-512: (A6760) SHAKE-128: (A6760)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				SHAKE-256: (A6760)
Encryption	BC-UnAuth	Encryption with AES	Key size (XTS):128, 256 bits Security strength (XTS):128, 256 bits Key size (Others):128, 192, 256 bits Security strength (Others):128, 192, 256 bits	AES-CBC: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-CFB1: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-CFB128: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-CFB8: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-CTR: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-ECB: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-OFB: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0: (A6738, A6739, A6740)
Decryption	BC-UnAuth	Decryption with AES	Key size (XTS):128, 256 bits Security strength (XTS):128, 256 bits Key size:128, 192, 256 bits Security strength:128, 192, 256 bits	AES-CBC: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-CFB1: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-CFB128: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-CFB8: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-CTR: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-ECB: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-OFB: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0: (A6738, A6739, A6740)

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
Authenticated encryption	BC-Auth	Authenticated encryption	CBC+HMAC:Key lengths: 128, 256 bits; Security strength: 128, 256 bits; Used as part of the cipher suites listed in Appendix A for the TLS protocol CCM, GCM:Key lengths: 128, 192, 256 bits; Security strength: 128, 192, 256 bits CCM, GCM (in TLS):Key lengths: 128, 256 bits; Security strength: 128, 256 bits; Used as part of the cipher suites listed in Appendix A for the TLS protocol	AES-CCM: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-GCM: (A6741, A6742, A6743, A6744, A6745, A6746, A6747, A6748, A6749) AES-CBC: (A6738, A6739, A6740) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758)
Authenticated decryption	BC-Auth	Authenticated decryption	CBC+HMAC:Key lengths: 128, 256 bits; Security strength: 128, 256 bits; Used as part of the cipher suites listed in Appendix A for the TLS protocol CCM, GCM:Key lengths: 128, 192, 256 bits; Security strength: 128, 192, 256 bits CCM, GCM (in TLS):Key lengths: 128, 256 bits; Security strength:	AES-CCM: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-GCM: (A6741, A6742, A6743, A6744, A6745, A6746, A6747, A6748, A6749) AES-CBC: (A6738, A6739, A6740) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			128, 256 bits; Used as part of the cipher suites listed in Appendix A for the TLS protocol	
Key wrapping	KTS-Wrap	Key wrapping with AES	Key size:128, 192, 256 bits Security strength:128, 192, 256 bits Compliance:FIPS 140-3 IG D.G	AES-KW: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-KWP: (A6738, A6739, A6740)
Key unwrapping	KTS-Wrap	Key unwrapping with AES	Key size:128, 192, 256 bits Security strength:128, 192, 256 bits Compliance:FIPS 140-3 IG D.G	AES-KW: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-KWP: (A6738, A6739, A6740)
Message authentication code (MAC)	MAC	Message authentication code computation using AES or HMAC	AES Key size:128, 192, 256 bits AES Security strength:128, 192, 256 bits HMAC Key size:>= 112bits HMAC Security strength:112-256 bits	AES-CMAC: (A6738, A6739, A6740) AES-GMAC: (A6741, A6742, A6743, A6744, A6745, A6746, A6747, A6748, A6749) HMAC-SHA-1: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756,

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				A6758) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) HMAC-SHA2- 512/224: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) HMAC-SHA2- 512/256: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) HMAC-SHA3-224: (A6760) HMAC-SHA3-256: (A6760) HMAC-SHA3-384: (A6760) HMAC-SHA3-512: (A6760)
Random number generation	DRBG	Random number generation using a SP 800-90A Rev. 1 compliant DRBG	Mode:CTR-DRBG using AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 with/without DF, with/without PR Key size:128, 192, 256 bits Security strength:128, 192, 256 bits	Counter DRBG: (A6738, A6739, A6740)
Key pair generation	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen CKG	Key pair generation using RSA, ECDSA, EDDSA, or Safe Primes	RSA:Key size: 2048-15360 bits; Mode: FIPS 186-5, Section A.1.3 - Random Probable	RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			Primes; Security strength: 112-256 bits ECDSA:Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521; Mode: FIPS 186-5, Section A.2.2 - Rejection Sampling; Security strength: 112, 128, 192, and 256 bits EDDSA:Curves: ED-25519, ED-448; Mode: FIPS 186-5, Section A.2.3 - EdDSA Key Pair Generation; Security strength: 128, 224 bits Safe Primes:Groups: MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192; Mode: SP 800-56A Rev. 3, Section 5.6.1.1.4 - Testing Candidates; Security strength: 112-200 bits	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) EDDSA KeyGen: (A6763) Safe Primes Key Generation: (A6762) Asymmetric Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG): ()
Key pair verification	AsymKeyPair-KeyVer	Key pair verification using ECDSA or Safe Primes	ECDSA:Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521; Security strength: 112, 128, 192, and 256 bits	ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			Safe Primes:Groups: MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192, ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192; Security strength: 112-200 bits	Safe Primes Key Verification: (A6762)
Digital signature generation	DigSig-SigGen	Digital signature generation using RSA, ECDSA or EDDSA	RSA:Modulus Size: 2048-16384 bits; Paddings: PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS; Hashes: SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2- 384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3- 256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 ECDSA:Curves: P- 224, P-256, P-384, P-521; Hashes: SHA2-224, SHA2- 256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3- 224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3- 512 EDDSA:Curves: ED-22519, ED-448 Security strength:112-256 bits	RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758, A6760) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758, A6760) EDDSA SigGen: (A6763)
Digital signature verification	DigSig-SigVer	Digital signature verification using	RSA (FIPS 186- 5):Key size: 2048-	RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5):

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
		RSA, ECDSA, or EDDSA	16384 bits; Security strength: 112-256 bits; Hashes: SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 RSA Paddings: PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS ECDSA (FIPS 186-5): Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521; Security strength: 112, 128, 192, and 256 bits; Hashes: SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 EDDSA: Curves: ED-25519, ED-448; Security strength: 128, 224 bits	(A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758, A6760) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758, A6760) EDDSA SigVer: (A6763)
Shared secret computation	KAS-SSC	Shared secret computation using DH or ECDH	DH: Groups: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192; Security strength: 112-200 bits; Scheme: dhEphem	KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A6762) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			ECDH:Curves: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521; Security strength: 112, 128, 192, and 256 bits; Scheme: ephemeralUnified KAS Role:initiator, responder Compliance:SP 800-56A Rev. 3, FIPS 140-3 IG D.F. Scenario 2(1) and Scenario 2(2)	
Key derivation with HKDF	KAS-56CKDF	Key derivation using HKDF	MACs:HMAC with SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224, SHA2-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 Shared secret length:224-8192 bits Security strength:112-256 bits	KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2: (A6761)
Key derivation with TLS	KAS-135KDF	Key derivation using TLS v1.0, v1.1, v1.2, v1.3	TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627:Hashes: SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512; Support: extended master secret TLS v1.3 KDF:Hashes: SHA2-256, SHA2-384; Running modes: DHE, PSK,	KDF TLS: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758) TLS v1.3 KDF: (A6761)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			PSK-DHE Security strength:112-256 bits	
Key derivation with SSH KDF	KAS-135KDF	Key derivation using SSH KDF	Ciphers:AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Hashes:SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Shared secret length:224-8192 bits Security strength:112-256 bits	KDF SSH: (A6751, A6753, A6755, A6757, A6759)
Password-based key derivation	PBKDF	Key derivation using PBKDF	Option:1a Password length:20-128 characters Salt length:128-4096 bits Iteration count:1000-10000 Hashes:SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA2-512/224, SHA2-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 Derived-key length:112-4096 bits Security strength:112-256 bits	PBKDF: (A6750, A6752, A6754, A6756, A6758, A6760)

Table 9: Security Function Implementations

2.7 Algorithm Specific Information

2.7.1 AES GCM IV

For TLS 1.2, the module offers the AES GCM implementation and uses the context of Scenario 1 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The module is compliant with SP 800-52 Rev. 2 Section 3.3.1 and the mechanism for IV generation is compliant with RFC 5288 and 8446.

The module does not implement the TLS protocol. The module's implementation of AES GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module's cryptographic boundary. The design of the TLS protocol implicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key.

In the event the module's power is lost and restored, the consuming application must ensure that a new key for use with the AES GCM key encryption or decryption under this scenario shall be established.

Alternatively, the Crypto Officer can use the module's API to perform AES GCM encryption using internal IV generation. These IVs are always 96 bits and generated using the approved DRBG internal to the module's boundary, compliant to Scenario 2 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H.

The module also provides a non-approved AES GCM encryption service which accepts arbitrary external IVs from the operator. This service can be requested by invoking the EVP_EncryptInit_ex2 API function with a non-NULL IV value. When this is the case, the API will set a non-approved service indicator.

Finally, for TLS 1.3, the AES GCM implementation uses the context of Scenario 5 of FIPS 140-3 IG C.H. The protocol that provides this compliance is TLS 1.3, defined in RFC8446 of August 2018, using the cipher-suites that explicitly select AES GCM as the encryption/decryption cipher (Appendix B.4 of RFC8446). The module supports acceptable AES GCM cipher suites from Section 3.3.1 of SP 800-52 Rev. 2. The module's implementation of AES GCM is used together with an application that runs outside the module's cryptographic boundary. The design of the TLS protocol implicitly ensures that the counter (the nonce_explicit part of the IV) does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values for a given session key.

2.7.2 AES XTS

The length of a single data unit encrypted or decrypted with AES XTS shall not exceed 2^{20} AES blocks, that is 16MB, of data per XTS instance. An XTS instance is defined in Section 4 of SP 800-38E.

To meet the requirement stated in IG C.I, the module implements a check that ensures, before performing any cryptographic operation, that the two AES keys used in AES XTS mode are not identical. As the module does not generate symmetric keys, the check is performed when keys are input the service APIs.

Key_1 and Key_2 shall be generated and/or established independently according to the rules for component symmetric keys from NIST SP 800-133rev2, Sec. 6.3.

The XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices. It shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in transit.

2.7.3 Key Derivation using SP 800-132 PBKDF2

The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF2), compliant with SP 800-132. The module supports option 1a from Section 5.4 of SP 800-132, in which the Master Key (MK) or a segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK).

In accordance to SP 800-132 and FIPS 140-3 IG D.N, the following requirements are met:

- Derived keys shall be used only for storage applications, and shall not be used for any other purposes. The length of the MK or DPK is 112 bits or more.
- Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF2, shall not be used as cryptographic keys.
- The minimum length of the password or passphrase accepted by the module is 20 characters. The probability of guessing the value, assuming a worst-case scenario of all digits, is estimated to be at most 10^{-20} . Combined with the minimum iteration count as described below, this provides an acceptable trade-off between user experience and security against brute-force attacks.
- A portion of the salt shall be generated randomly using the SP 800-90A Rev. 1 DRBG provided by the module. The minimum length required is 128 bits.
- The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. The minimum value accepted by the module is 1000.

If any of these requirements are not met, the requested service is non-approved (see Non-Approved Services table in Section 4.4 Non-Approved Services).

2.7.4 SP 800-56A Rev. 3 Assurances

To comply with the assurances found in Section 5.6.2 of SP 800-56A Rev. 3, the operator must use the module in the context of the TLS or SSH protocols. Additionally, the module's approved key pair generation service (see Approved Services table in Section 4.3 Approved Services) must be used to generate ephemeral Diffie-Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman key pairs, or the key pairs must be obtained from another FIPS-validated module. As part of this service, the module will internally perform the full public key validation of the generated public key.

The module's shared secret computation service will internally perform the full public key validation of the peer public key, complying with Sections 5.6.2.2.1 and 5.6.2.2.2 of SP 800-56A Rev. 3.

2.7.5 RSA Signatures

Approved moduli for 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits are CAVP tested in compliance with FIPS 186-5 for RSA key generation, signature generation, and signature verification.

All other RSA moduli mentioned in the Security Function Implementation table in Section 2.6 Security Function Implementations and not mentioned above cannot be tested by CAVP but are approved for RSA key generation, signature generation, and signature verification in IG C.F.

2.8 RBG and Entropy

Cert Number	Vendor Name
E219	Ctrl IQ, Inc.

Table 10: Entropy Certificates

Name	Type	Operational Environment	Sample Size	Entropy per Sample	Conditioning Component
Rocky Linux OpenSSL 1 CPU Time Jitter RNG Entropy Source	Non-Physical	Rocky Linux 8 on Intel Kaby Lake Xeon E3-1270 v6	256 bits	full entropy	SHA3-256 (A5807); SHA2-512-HMAC-DRBG (A5807); AES-256-CTR-DRBG (A6740)

Table 11: Entropy Sources

The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on SP 800-90A Rev. 1. This DRBG is used internally by the module (e.g. to generate seeds for asymmetric key pairs and random numbers for security functions). It can also be accessed using the specified API functions.

The DRBG supports the CTR_DRBG mechanisms. The DRBG is initialized during module initialization; the module loads by default the DRBG using the CTR_DRBG mechanism with AES-256, with derivation function, and without prediction resistance.

The module uses an SP 800-90B-compliant entropy source. This entropy source is located within the physical perimeter, but outside of the cryptographic boundary of the module. The module obtains 384 bits to seed the DRBG, and 256 bits to reseed it, sufficient to provide a DRBG with 256 bits of security strength.

The operational environment on the ESV certificate is identical to the operational environment listed in this document. There are no maintenance requirements for the entropy source.

As per the Public Use Document of entropy certificate E219, the entropy source provides full entropy of 256 bits

2.9 Key Generation

The module implements asymmetric key pair generation compliant with SP 800-133 Rev. 2. When random values are required, they are obtained from the SP 800-90A Rev. 1 approved DRBG, compliant with Section 4 of SP 800-133 Rev. 2 (without XOR):

- Safe primes key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133 Rev. 2, Section 5.2, which maps to SP 800-56A Rev. 3.

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- RSA key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133 Rev. 2, Section 5.1, which maps to FIPS 186-5.
- ECC (ECDH and ECDSA) key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133 Rev. 2, Section 5.1, which maps to FIPS 186-5.
- EDDSA key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133 Rev. 2, Section 5.1, which maps to FIPS 186-5.

The key pair generation methods implemented for each of the services mentioned above have been CAVP tested and are described in Section 2.6 Security Function Implementations.

Intermediate key generation values are not output from the module and are explicitly zeroized after processing the service.

Additionally, the module implements the following key derivation methods according to SP 800-135 Rev. 1:

- KDF for the TLS protocol used as pseudo-random functions (PRF) for TLS v1.0/1.1, TLS v1.2, TLS v1.3;
- KDA HKDF for the TLS protocol, used as pseudo-random function (PRF) for the TLS v1.3;
- SSH KDF for the SSHv2 protocol.

The module also supports password-based key derivation (PBKDF). The implementation is compliant with option 1a of [SP800-132].

2.10 Key Establishment

The module implements SSP agreement and SSP transport methods as listed in the Security Function Implementations table in Section 2.6 Security Function Implementations.

2.11 Industry Protocols

The module implements KDF for the TLS protocol TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2.

No parts of the TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2, other than the key derivation functions mentioned above, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

The module implements HKDF for the TLS protocol TLSv1.3. The implementation of the KDA HKDF has been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

AES-GCM with internal IV generation is offered in the approved mode compliant with TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 (RFC 5288 and RFC 8446). This functionality shall only be used in conjunction with the TLS protocol.

The module implements the SSH key derivation function for use in the SSH protocol (RFC 4253 and RFC 6668). No parts of the SSH protocol, other than those mentioned above, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces

3.1 Ports and Interfaces

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
N/A	Data Input	API input parameters
N/A	Data Output	API output parameters
N/A	Control Input	API function calls
N/A	Status Output	API return codes

Table 12: Ports and Interfaces

The logical interfaces are the APIs through which the applications request services. These logical interfaces are logically separated from each other by the API design. The module does not implement a control output interface.

4 Roles, Services, and Authentication

4.1 Authentication Methods

The module does not support authentication methods.

4.2 Roles

Name	Type	Operator Type	Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer	Role	CO	None

Table 13: Roles

The module does not support multiple concurrent operators.

4.3 Approved Services

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Message digest	Used to generate a SHA-1, SHA-2, or SHA-3/SHAKE message digest	fips_sli_SHA*_is_approved returns 1	Message	Message digest	Message digest	Crypto Officer
Encryption	Perform AES encryption	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_CIPHER_CTX returns 1	Plaintext, AES key, IV	Ciphertext	Encryption	Crypto Officer - AES key: W,E
Decryption	Perform AES decryption	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_CIPHER_CTX returns 1	Ciphertext, AES key, IV	Plaintext	Decryption	Crypto Officer - AES key: W,E
Authenticated encryption	Perform authenticated	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_CIPHER_CTX returns 1	Ciphertext, AES key or	Ciphertext, MAC tag	Authenticated encryption	Crypto Officer - AES key: W,E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	encryption		HMAC key, IV			- HMAC key: W,E
Authenticated decryption	Perform authenticated decryption	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_CIPHER_CTX returns 1	Ciphertext, AES key or HMAC key, IV, MAC tag	Plaintext or failure	Authenticated decryption	Crypto Officer - AES key: W,E - HMAC key: W,E
Key wrapping	Perform AES-based key wrapping (compliant to SP 800-38F and FIPS 140-3 IG D.G)	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_CIPHER_CTX returns 1	Key to be wrapped, AES key	Wrapped key	Key wrapping	Crypto Officer - AES key: W,E
Key unwrapping	Perform AES-based key unwrapping (compliant to SP 800-38F and FIPS 140-3 IG D.G)	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_CIPHER_CTX returns 1	Wrapped key, AES key	Unwrapped key	Key unwrapping	Crypto Officer - AES key: W,E
Message authentication code (MAC)	Compute a MAC tag using AES or HMAC	fips_sli_is_approved_CMAC_CTX, fips_sli_HMAC_is_approved, or fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_CIPHER_CTX return 1	Message, AES key or HMAC key	MAC tag	Message authentication code (MAC)	Crypto Officer - AES key: W,E - HMAC key: W,E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Random number generation	Generate random bytes using CTR-DRBG	fips_sli RAND_bytes_is_approved or fips_sli RAND_priv_bytes_is_approved returns 1	Output length	Random bytes	Random number generation	Crypto Officer - Entropy input: G,E,Z - DRBG seed: G,E,Z - DRBG internal state (V value, Key): G,W,E
Key pair generation	Generate an asymmetric key pair	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_PKEY_CTX returns 1	Group or Curve or Modulus bits	DH key pair; EC key pair; RSA key pair; EDDSA key pair	Key pair generation Random number generation	Crypto Officer - Module-generated RSA private key: G,R - Module-generated RSA public key: G,R - Module-generated DH private key: G,R - Module-generated DH public key: G,R

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- Module-generated EC private key: G,R - Module-generated EC public key: G,R - Module-generated EDDSA private key: G,R - Module-generated EDDSA public key: G,R - Intermediate key generation value: G,E,Z - DRBG internal state (V value, Key): W,E
Key pair verification	Verify a generated asymmetric key pair	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_PKEY_CTX returns 1	Safe Primes key pair or EC key pair	Pass/Fail	Key pair verification	Crypto Officer - DH private key: W,E

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- DH public key: W,E - EC private key: W,E - EC public key: W,E
Digital signature generation	Generate a digital signature	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_PKEY_CTX returns 1	Message, private key	Signature	Digital signature generation Random number generation	Crypto Officer - RSA private key: W,E - EC private key: W,E - EDDSA private key: W,E - DRBG internal state (V value, Key): W,E
Digital signature verification	Verify a digital signature	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_PKEY_CTX returns 1	Message, public key, signature	Pass/Fail	Digital signature verification	Crypto Officer - RSA public key: W,E - EC public key: W,E - EDDSA public key: W,E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Shared secret computation	Compute a shared secret	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_PKEY_CTX returns 1	Private key, public key (peer)	Shared secret	Shared secret computation	Crypto Officer - DH private key: W,E - DH public key: W,E - EC private key: W,E - EC public key: W,E - Shared secret: G,R
Key derivation with HKDF	Key derivation with KDA HKDF in the context of TLS v1.3	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_KDF_CTX returns 1	Shared secret	HKDF derived key	Key derivation with HKDF	Crypto Officer - Shared secret: W,E - HKDF derived key: G,R
Key derivation with TLS	Perform key derivation using TLS KDF	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_KDF_CTX returns 1	TLS pre-master secret	TLS derived key	Key derivation with TLS	Crypto Officer - TLS pre-master secret: W,E - TLS master secret: E,G,Z - TLS

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						derived key: G,R
Key derivation with SSH	Perform key derivation with SSH KDF	fips_sli_is_approved_EVP_KDF_CTX returns 1	Shared secret	SSH derived key	Key derivation with SSH KDF	Crypto Officer - Shared secret: W,E - SSH derived key: G,R
Key derivation from a password	Derive a key from a password or passphrase	fips_sli_PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC returns 1	Password or passphrase	PBKDF Derived key	Password-based key derivation	Crypto Officer - Password or passphrase: W,E - PBKDF derived key: G,R
Show status	Show the current status of the module	None	N/A	Module status	None	Crypto Officer
Show module name and version	Show module name and the version of the module	None	N/A	Name and version information	None	Crypto Officer
Transport Layer Security (TLS)	Provide supported cipher suites	SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id or SSL_get_current_cipher return a two-byte ID matching	Cipher-suites listed in Appendix	Return codes and/or log	Message digest Authenticated	Crypto Officer - RSA private

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Network Protocol	(listed in Appendix A) in approved mode	an approved cipher suite (listed in Appendix A)	x A, Digital Certificate, Public and Private Keys, Application Data	messages, Application data	encryption Authenticated decryption Message authentication code (MAC) Key pair generation Key pair verification Digital signature generation Digital signature verification Shared secret computation Key derivation with HKDF Key derivation with TLS	key: W,E - RSA public key: W,E - EC private key: W,E - EC public key: W,E - TLS pre-master secret: G,W,E - TLS master secret: G,W,E,Z - DH private key: G,W,E - DH public key: G,W,E - TLS derived key: G,W,E - HKDF derived key: G,W,E
Self-test	Perform CASTs and integrity test	None	N/A	Pass/fail result of self-tests	Message digest Encryption Decryption	Crypto Officer

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					Authenticated encryption Authenticated decryption Message authentication code (MAC) Random number generation Digital signature generation Digital signature verification Shared secret computation Key derivation with HKDF Key derivation with SSH KDF Key derivation with TLS Password-based key derivation	
Zeroization	Zeroize SSPs	None	Any SSP	N/A	None	Crypto Officer

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- AES key: Z - HMAC key: Z - Module-generated DH private key: Z - Module-generated DH public key: Z - Module-generated RSA private key: Z - Module-generated RSA public key: Z - Module-generated EC private key: Z - Module-generated EC public key: Z - Module-

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						generated EDDSA private key: Z - Module- generated EDDSA public key: Z - DH private key: Z - DH public key: Z - RSA private key: Z - RSA public key: Z - EC private key: Z - EC public key: Z - EDDSA private key: Z - EDDSA public key: Z - Shared secret: Z - Password or passphras e: Z

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- HKDF derived key: Z - SSH derived key: Z - TLS derived key: Z - PBKDF derived key: Z - Entropy input: Z - DRBG seed: Z - DRBG internal state (V value, Key): Z - Intermediate key generation value: Z - TLS pre-master secret: Z - TLS master secret: Z

Table 14: Approved Services

The module provides services to operators that assume the available role. All services are described in detail in the API documentation (manual pages). The convention below applies when specifying the access permissions (types) that the service has for each SSP.

- **Generate (G):** The module generates or derives the SSP.
- **Read (R):** The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).

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- **Write (W):** The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
- **Execute (E):** The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
- **Zeroize (Z):** The module zeroizes the SSP.
- **N/A:** The module does not access any SSP or key during its operation.

The “Indicator” column shows the service indicator API functions that must be used to verify the service indicator for each of the services. A value of 1 indicates that the service is approved, and 0 indicates that the service is non-approved.

Additionally there is a separate indicator used for the following services:

- The API function used to determine the indicator for the “TLS network protocol” service returns the cipher suite established for the TLS session. If the returned cipher suite ID belongs to one of the cipher suites listed in Appendix A, then the service is approved, otherwise, it is non-approved.

4.4 Non-Approved Services

Name	Description	Algorithms	Role
Authenticated encryption	Perform authenticated encryption using AES-GCM with an externally provided IV	AES-GCM with external IV	CO
Message authentication code (MAC)	Compute a MAC tag	HMAC with less than 112-bit keys, SipHash	CO
Shared secret computation	Perform shared secret computation	Diffie-Hellman with domain parameters other than safe primes EC Diffie-Hellman with P-192 curve, K curves, B curves and non-NIST curves	CO
Signature generation	Generate a digital signature	ECDSA with P-192 curve, K curves, B curves and non-NIST curves RSA with keys smaller than 2048 bits SHA-1	CO
Signature verification	Verify a digital signature	DSA with any key sizes ECDSA with P-192 curve, K curves, B curves and non-NIST curves RSA with keys smaller than 2048 bits SHA-1	CO
Key pair generation	Generate a key pair	Diffie-Hellman with domain parameters other than safe primes	CO

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Name	Description	Algorithms	Role
		ECDSA with P-192 curve, K curves, B curves and non-NIST curves RSA with keys smaller than 2048 bits	
Key derivation	Derive a symmetric key	HKDF standalone PBKDF with non-approved message digest algorithms or using input parameters not meeting requirements stated in section 2.7.3	CO
Key encapsulation	Encapsulate a symmetric key using RSA	RSA encryption with any key sizes	CO
Key un-encapsulation	Unencapsulate a symmetric key using RSA	RSA decryption with any key sizes	CO

Table 15: Non-Approved Services

4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded

The module does not load external software or firmware.

5 Software/Firmware Security

5.1 Integrity Techniques

The integrity of the module is verified by comparing a HMAC-SHA2-256 value calculated at run time with the HMAC-SHA2-256 value that was computed at build time (stored in the .hmac file) for each software component. The MAC key is hardcoded in the module.

5.2 Initiate on Demand

Integrity tests are performed as part of the pre-operational self-tests, which are executed when the module is initialized. The integrity test may be invoked on-demand by unloading and subsequently re-initializing the module.

6 Operational Environment

6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements

Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable

How Requirements are Satisfied:

Any SSPs contained within the module are protected by the process isolation and memory separation mechanisms, and only the module has control over these SSPs.

If properly installed, the operating system provides process isolation and memory protection mechanisms that ensure appropriate separation for memory access among the processes on the system. Each process has control over its own data and uncontrolled access to the data of other processes is prevented.

6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions

The module shall be installed as stated in Section 11 Life-Cycle Assurance.

Instrumentation tools like the ptrace system call, gdb and strace, userspace live patching, as well as other tracing mechanisms offered by the Linux environment such as ftrace or systemtap, shall not be used in the operational environment. The use of any of these tools implies that the cryptographic module is running in a non-validated operational environment.

7 Physical Security

The module is comprised of software only and therefore this section is not applicable.

8 Non-Invasive Security

This module does not implement any non-invasive security mechanisms, and therefore this section is not applicable.

9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management

9.1 Storage Areas

Storage Area Name	Description	Persistence Type
RAM	Temporary storage for SSPs used by the module as part of service execution.	Dynamic

Table 16: Storage Areas

The module does not perform persistent storage of SSPs. The SSPs are temporarily stored in the RAM in plaintext form. SSPs are stored until they are zeroized by the operator (using a zeroization call or removing power from the module) or zeroized automatically.

9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods

Name	From	To	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	SFI or Algorithm
API input parameters	Operator calling application (TOEPP)	Cryptographic module	Plaintext	Manual	Electronic	
API output parameters	Cryptographic module	Operator calling application (TOEPP)	Plaintext	Manual	Electronic	

Table 17: SSP Input-Output Methods

The module only supports SSP entry and output to and from the calling application running on the same operational environment. This corresponds to manual distribution, electronic entry/output (“CM Software to/from App via TOEPP Path”) per FIPS 140-3 IG 9.5.A Table 1.

There is no entry or output of cryptographically protected SSPs.

9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Free cipher handle	Zeroizes the SSPs contained within the cipher handle.	Memory occupied by SSPs is overwritten with zeros, which renders the SSP values irretrievable. The successful completion of the zeroization routine indicates that the zeroization procedure succeeded.	By calling the appropriate zeroization functions: <code>EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free</code> , <code>EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset</code> , <code>HMAC_CTX_free</code> , <code>RSA_free</code> , <code>EC_KEY_free</code> , <code>DH_free</code> , <code>EVP_PKEY_free</code> , <code>FIPS_drbg_free</code> , <code>SSL_free</code> , <code>SSL_clear</code>
Automatic	Automatically zeroized by the module when no longer needed	Memory occupied by SSPs is overwritten with zeroes, which renders the SSP values irretrievable. The successful completion of the running service indicates that zeroization has completed.	N/A
Module Reset	De-allocates the volatile memory used to store SSPs	Volatile memory used by the module is overwritten within nanoseconds when power is removed. The successful completion of the module reset indicates that zeroization has completed.	By unloading and reloading the module

Table 18: SSP Zeroization Methods

The application that uses the module is responsible for the appropriate zeroization of SSPs. The module provides key allocation and destruction functions, which overwrites the memory occupied by the SSP's information with zeros before its deallocation.

Calling the `SSL_free()` and `SSL_clear()` will zeroize the SSPs stored in the TLS protocol internal state and also invoke the corresponding API functions listed in Table 18 to zeroize SSPs.

All data output is inhibited during zeroization.

9.4 SSPs

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
AES key	AES key used for encryption, decryption, and computing MAC tags	AES-XTS: 128, 256 bits; Other modes: 128, 192, 256 bits - AES-XTS: 128, 256 bits; Other modes: 128, 192, 256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP			Encryption Decryption Authenticated encryption Authenticated decryption Key wrapping Key unwrapping Message authentication code (MAC)
HMAC key	HMAC key used for computing MAC tags	112-524288 bits - 112-256 bits	Authentication key - CSP			Authenticated encryption Authenticated decryption Message authentication code (MAC)
Module-generated RSA private key	RSA private key generated by the module	2048-15360 bits - 112-256 bits	Private key - CSP	Key pair generation		Key pair generation
Module-generated RSA public key	RSA public key generated by the module	2048-15360 bits - 112-256 bits	Public key - PSP	Key pair generation		Key pair generation
RSA private key	RSA private key written to the module	2048-16384 bits - 112-256 bits	Private key - CSP			Digital signature generation

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
RSA public key	RSA public key written to the module	2048-16384 bits - 112-256 bits	Public key - PSP			Digital signature verification
Module-generated DH private key	DH private key generated by the module	2048-8192 bits - 112-200 bits	Private key - CSP	Key pair generation		Key pair generation
Module-generated DH public key	DH public key generated by the module	2048-8192 bits - 112-200 bits	Public key - PSP	Key pair generation		Key pair generation
DH private key	DH private key written to the module	2048-8192 bits - 112-200 bits	Private key - CSP			Key pair verification Shared secret computation
DH public key	DH public key written to the module	2048-8192 bits - 112-200 bits	Public key - PSP			Key pair verification Shared secret computation
Module-generated EC private key	EC private key generated by the module	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 bits - 112, 128, 192, 256 bits	Private key - CSP	Key pair generation		Key pair generation
Module-generated EC public key	EC public key generated by the module	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 bits - 112, 128, 192, 256 bits	Public key - PSP	Key pair generation		Key pair generation

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
EC private key	EC private key written to the module	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 bits - 112, 128, 192, 256 bits	Private key - CSP			Key pair verification Digital signature generation Shared secret computation
EC public key	EC public key written to the module	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 bits - 112, 128, 192, 256 bits	Public key - PSP			Key pair verification Digital signature verification Shared secret computation
Module-generated EDDSA private key	EDDSA private key generated by the module	ED-25519, ED-448 bits - 128, 224 bits	Private key - CSP	Key pair generation		Key pair generation
Module-generated EDDSA public key	EDDSA public key generated by the module	ED-25519, ED-448 bits - 128, 224 bits	Public key - PSP	Key pair generation		Key pair generation
EDDSA private key	EDDSA private key written to the module	ED-25519, ED-448 bits - 128, 224 bits	Private key - CSP			Digital signature generation
EDDSA public key	EDDSA public key written to the module	ED-25519, ED-448 bits - 128, 224 bits	Public key - PSP			Digital signature verification

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
Shared secret	Shared secret generated by ECDH or DH shared secret computation	224-8912 bits - 112-256 bits	Shared Secret - CSP		Shared secret computation	Shared secret computation Key derivation with HKDF Key derivation with SSH KDF
Password or passphrase	Password or passphrase used by PBKDF to derive symmetric keys	20-128 character - N/A	Password - CSP			Password-based key derivation
TLS pre-master secret	Used to derive the master secret in the TLS protocol	224-8912 bits - 112-256 bits	Shared secret - CSP		Shared secret computation	Key derivation with TLS
TLS master secret	Derived from the pre-master secret using the TLS KDF per SP 800-135 Rev. 1	384 bits - 128-256 bits	Master secret - CSP	Key derivation with TLS		Key derivation with TLS
TLS derived key	Generated using the TLS v1.0/1.1/1.2/1.3 KDF	112-4096 bits - 112-256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP	Key derivation with TLS		Key derivation with TLS
HKDF derived key	Derived using the HKDF	112-4096 bits - 112-256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP	Key derivation with HKDF		Key derivation with HKDF
SSH derived key	Generated using the SSH KDF	112-4096 bits - 112-256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP	Key derivation with SSH KDF		Key derivation with SSH KDF

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
PBKDF derived key	Derived using the PBKDF	112-4096 bits - 112-256 bits	Symmetric key - CSP	Password-based key derivation		Password-based key derivation
Entropy input	Entropy input string used to seed the DRBG (IG D.L compliant)	128-384 bits - 128-256 bits	Entropy input - CSP			Random number generation
DRBG seed	DRBG seed derived from entropy input (IG D.L compliant)	256, 320, 384 bits - 128, 192, 256 bits	Seed - CSP	Random number generation		Random number generation
DRBG internal state (V value, Key)	Internal state of the CTR_DRBG	256, 320, 384 bits - 128, 192, 256 bits	Internal state - CSP	Random number generation		Random number generation
Intermediate key generation value	Intermediate key generation value generated during key pair generation (SP 800-133 Rev. 2 Section 4, 5.1, and 5.2)	112-15360 bits - 112-256 bits	Intermediate value - CSP	Key pair generation		Key pair generation

Table 19: SSP Table 1

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
AES key	API input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
HMAC key	API input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	
Module-generated RSA private key	API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	Module-generated RSA public key:Paired With Intermediate key generation value:Generated From
Module-generated RSA public key	API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	Module-generated RSA private key:Paired With Intermediate key generation value:Generated From
RSA private key	API input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	RSA public key:Paired With
RSA public key	API input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	RSA private key:Paired With
Module-generated DH private key	API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	Module-generated DH public key:Paired With Intermediate key generation value:Generated From
Module-generated DH public key	API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	Module-generated DH private key:Paired With Intermediate key

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
					generation value:Generated From
DH private key	API input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	DH public key:Paired With TLS pre-master secret:Derivation of
DH public key	API input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	DH private key:Paired With TLS pre-master secret:Derivation of
Module-generated EC private key	API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	Module-generated EC public key:Paired With Intermediate key generation value:Generated From
Module-generated EC public key	API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	Module-generated EC private key:Paired With Intermediate key generation value:Generated From
EC private key	API input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	EC public key:Paired With TLS pre-master secret:Derivation of
EC public key	API input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	EC private key:Paired With TLS pre-master secret:Derivation of
Module-generated EDDSA private key	API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	Module-generated EDDSA public key:Paired With Intermediate key

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
					generation value:Generated From
Module-generated EDDSA public key	API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	Module-generated EDDSA private key:Paired With Intermediate key generation value:Generated From
EDDSA private key	API input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	EDDSA public key:Paired With
EDDSA public key	API input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	EDDSA private key:Paired With
Shared secret	API input parameters API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	DH private key:Established By DH public key:Established By EC private key:Established By EC public key:Established By HKDF derived key:Derives SSH derived key:Derives
Password or passphrase	API input parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	PBKDF derived key:Derives
TLS pre-master secret		RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until	Free cipher handle	DH private key:Established By DH public

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
			cipher handle is freed	Module Reset	key:Established By EC private key:Established By EC public key:Established By TLS master secret:Derives
TLS master secret		RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	TLS pre-master secret:Derived From TLS derived key:Derives
TLS derived key	API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	TLS master secret:Derived From
HKDF derived key	API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	Shared secret:Derived From
SSH derived key	API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	Shared secret:Derived From
PBKDF derived key	API output parameters	RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Free cipher handle Module Reset	Password or passphrase:Derived From
Entropy input		RAM:Plaintext	From generation until DRBG seed is created	Automatic Module Reset	DRBG seed:Derives
DRBG seed		RAM:Plaintext	While the DRBG is instantiated	Automatic Module Reset	Entropy input:Derived From DRBG internal state

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
					(V value, Key):Generates
DRBG internal state (V value, Key)		RAM:Plaintext	From DRBG instantiation until DRBG termination	Free cipher handle Module Reset	DRBG seed:Generated From
Intermediate key generation value		RAM:Plaintext	From service invocation until cipher handle is freed	Automatic Module Reset	Module-generated RSA private key:Generates Module-generated RSA public key:Generates Module-generated ECDSA private key:Generates Module-generated ECDSA public key:Generates Module-generated DH private key:Generates Module-generated DH public key:Generates Module-generated EDDSA private key:Generates Module-generated EDDSA public key:Generates

Table 20: SSP Table 2

9.5 Transitions

The SHA-1 algorithm as implemented by the module will be non-approved for all purposes, starting January 1, 2031.

10 Self-Tests

10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details
HMAC-SHA2-256	256-bit key	Message authentication	SW/FW Integrity	Module becomes operational and services are available for use	Integrity test of the shared library component of the module. Verified by comparing an HMAC SHA-256 value calculated at run time with the HMAC SHA-256 that was computed at build time

Table 21: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The pre-operational software integrity tests are performed automatically when the module is initialized, before the module transitions into the operational state. While the module is executing the self-tests, services are not available, and data output (via the data output interface) is inhibited until the tests are successfully completed. The module transitions to the operational state only after the pre-operational self-tests are passed successfully.

Prior the first use, a CAST is executed for the algorithms used in the Pre-operational Self-Tests.

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
SHA-1 (A6750)	448-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA-1 (A6752)	448-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA-1 (A6754)	448-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
SHA-1 (A6756)	448-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA-1 (A6758)	448-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA2-256 (A6750)	72-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA2-256 (A6752)	72-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA2-256 (A6754)	72-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA2-256 (A6756)	72-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA2-256 (A6758)	72-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA2-512 (A6750)	120-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
SHA2-512 (A6752)	120-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA2-512 (A6754)	120-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA2-512 (A6756)	120-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA2-512 (A6758)	120-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA3-256 (A6760)	144-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHA3-512 (A6760)	144-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHAKE-128 (A6760)	128-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
SHAKE-256 (A6760)	144-bit message	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message Digest	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-ECB - Encrypt (A6738)	128-bit key, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-ECB - Encrypt (A6739)	128-bit key, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-ECB - Encrypt (A6740)	128-bit key, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-ECB - Decrypt (A6738)	128-bit key, decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-ECB - Decrypt (A6739)	128-bit key, decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-ECB - Decrypt (A6740)	128-bit key, decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-CCM - Encrypt (A6738)	192-bit key, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-CCM - Encrypt (A6739)	192-bit key, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-CCM - Encrypt (A6740)	192-bit key, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-CCM - Decrypt (A6738)	192-bit key, decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-CCM - Decrypt (A6739)	192-bit key, decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-CCM - Decrypt (A6740)	192-bit key, decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6741)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6742)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6743)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6744)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6745)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6746)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6747)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6748)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6749)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6741)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, decryption	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6742)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, decryption	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6743)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, decryption	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6744)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, decryption	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6745)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, decryption	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6746)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, decryption	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6747)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, decryption	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6748)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, decryption	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6749)	256-bit key, 96-bit IV, decryption	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Authenticated decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Encrypt (A6738)	256, 512-bit keys, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Encrypt (A6739)	256, 512-bit keys, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Encrypt (A6740)	256, 512-bit keys, encrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Encryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Decrypt (A6738)	256, 512-bit keys, decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Decrypt (A6739)	256, 512-bit keys, decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Decrypt (A6740)	256, 512-bit keys, decrypt	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Decryption	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-CMAC (A6738)	128-, 192, 256-bit keys	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-CMAC (A6739)	128-, 192, 256-bit keys	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
AES-CMAC (A6740)	128-, 192, 256-bit keys	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6750)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6752)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6754)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6756)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6758)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A6750)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A6752)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A6754)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A6756)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A6758)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A6750)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A6752)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A6754)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A6756)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A6758)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A6750)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A6752)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A6754)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A6756)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A6758)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A6750)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A6752)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A6754)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A6756)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A6758)	160-bit key	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA3-224 (A6760)	224, 1152, 1376 bits keys	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA3-256 (A6760)	256, 1088, 1344 bits keys	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA3-384 (A6760)	384, 832, 1216 bits keys	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
HMAC-SHA3-512 (A6760)	512, 576, 1088 bits keys	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Message authentication code computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6750)	2048-bit key with SHA-256, with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6752)	2048-bit key with SHA-256, with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6754)	2048-bit key with SHA-256, with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6756)	2048-bit key with SHA-256, with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6758)	2048-bit key with SHA-256, with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6760)	2048-bit key with SHA-256, with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6750)	2048-bit key with SHA-256, with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6752)	2048-bit key with SHA-256, with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6754)	2048-bit key with SHA-256, with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6756)	2048-bit key with SHA-256, with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6758)	2048-bit key with SHA-256, with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6760)	2048-bit key with SHA-256, with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS padding	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6750)	P-256 with SHA-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6752)	P-256 with SHA-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6754)	P-256 with SHA-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6756)	P-256 with SHA-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6758)	P-256 with SHA-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6760)	P-256 with SHA-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6750)	P-256 with SHA-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6752)	P-256 with SHA-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6754)	P-256 with SHA-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6756)	P-256 with SHA-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6758)	P-256 with SHA-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6760)	P-256 with SHA-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
EDDSA SigGen (A6763)	ED-25519, ED-448	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
EDDSA SigVer (A6763)	ED-25519, ED-448	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Signature verification	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A6762)	ffdhe2048	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Shared secret computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A6750)	P-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Shared secret computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A6752)	P-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Shared secret computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A6754)	P-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Shared secret computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A6756)	P-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Shared secret computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A6758)	P-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Shared secret computation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A6750)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A6752)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A6754)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A6756)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A6758)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
TLS v1.3 KDF (A6761)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
KDA HKDF SP800-56Cr2 (A6761)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
KDF SSH (A6751)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
KDF SSH (A6753)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
KDF SSH (A6755)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
KDF SSH (A6757)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
KDF SSH (A6759)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
PBKDF (A6750)	24 characters password, 288-bit salt, 4096 iterations, SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
PBKDF (A6752)	24 characters password, 288-bit salt, 4096 iterations, SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
PBKDF (A6754)	24 characters password, 288-bit salt, 4096 iterations, SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
PBKDF (A6756)	24 characters password, 288-bit salt, 4096 iterations, SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
PBKDF (A6758)	24 characters password, 288-bit salt, 4096 iterations, SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
PBKDF (A6760)	24 characters password, 288-bit salt, 4096 iterations, SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Key derivation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
Counter DRBG (A6738)	CTR-DRBG with AES with 256-bit keys with and without DF, with and without PR	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Random number generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
Counter DRBG (A6739)	CTR-DRBG with AES with 256-bit keys with and without DF, with and without PR	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Random number generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
Counter DRBG (A6740)	CTR-DRBG with AES with 256-bit keys with and without DF, with and without PR	KAT	CAST	Module becomes operational	Random number generation	Test runs at power-on before the integrity test
Safe Primes Key Generation (A6762)	N/A	PCT	PCT	Key pair generation is successfull	PCT according to SP 800-56A Rev.3, Section 5.6.2.1.4	Key pair generation
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6750)	SHA2-256	PCT	PCT	Key pair generation is successfull	Signature generation and verification	Key pair generation
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6752)	SHA2-256	PCT	PCT	Key pair generation is successfull	Signature generation and verification	Key pair generation
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6754)	SHA2-256	PCT	PCT	Key pair generation is successfull	Signature generation and verification	Key pair generation
ECDSA KeyGen	SHA2-256	PCT	PCT	Key pair generation is successfull	Signature generation and verification	Key pair generation

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
(FIPS186-5) (A6756)						
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6758)	SHA2-256	PCT	PCT	Key pair generation is successfull	Signature generation and verification	Key pair generation
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6750)	SHA2-256 with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS paddings	PCT	PCT	Key pair generation is successfull	Signature generation and verification	Key pair generation
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6752)	SHA2-256 with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS paddings	PCT	PCT	Key pair generation is successfull	Signature generation and verification	Key pair generation
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6754)	SHA2-256 with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS paddings	PCT	PCT	Key pair generation is successfull	Signature generation and verification	Key pair generation
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6756)	SHA2-256 with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS paddings	PCT	PCT	Key pair generation is successfull	Signature generation and verification	Key pair generation
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6758)	SHA2-256 with PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS paddings	PCT	PCT	Key pair generation is successfull	Signature generation and verification	Key pair generation
EDDSA KeyGen (A6763)	N/A	PCT	PCT	Key pair generation is successfull	Signature generation and verification	Key pair generation

Table 22: Conditional Self-Tests

Data output through the data output interface is inhibited during the conditional self-tests. The module does not return control to the calling application until the tests are completed. If any of these tests fails, the module transitions to the error state (Section 10.4 Error States).

10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-256	Message authentication	SW/FW Integrity	On demand	Manually

Table 23: Pre-Operational Periodic Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
SHA-1 (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA-1 (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA-1 (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA-1 (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA-1 (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-256 (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-256 (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-256 (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-256 (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-256 (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-512 (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-512 (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-512 (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-512 (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-512 (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA3-256 (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA3-512 (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
SHAKE-128 (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHAKE-256 (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-ECB - Encrypt (A6738)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-ECB - Encrypt (A6739)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-ECB - Encrypt (A6740)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-ECB - Decrypt (A6738)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-ECB - Decrypt (A6739)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-ECB - Decrypt (A6740)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CCM - Encrypt (A6738)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CCM - Encrypt (A6739)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CCM - Encrypt (A6740)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CCM - Decrypt (A6738)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CCM - Decrypt (A6739)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CCM - Decrypt (A6740)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

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Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6741)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6742)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6743)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6744)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6745)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6746)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6747)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6748)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Encrypt (A6749)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6741)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6742)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6743)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6744)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6745)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

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Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6746)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6747)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6748)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM - Decrypt (A6749)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Encrypt (A6738)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Encrypt (A6739)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Encrypt (A6740)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Decrypt (A6738)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Decrypt (A6739)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0 - Decrypt (A6740)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CMAC (A6738)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CMAC (A6739)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
AES-CMAC (A6740)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA-1 (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-224 (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-384 (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512 (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA3-224 (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA3-256 (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA3-384 (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA3-512 (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

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Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5) (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
EDDSA SigGen (A6763)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
EDDSA SigVer (A6763)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A6762)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

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Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
TLS v1.3 KDF (A6761)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDA HKDF SP800- 56Cr2 (A6761)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SSH (A6751)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SSH (A6753)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SSH (A6755)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SSH (A6757)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SSH (A6759)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
PBKDF (A6750)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
PBKDF (A6752)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
PBKDF (A6754)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
PBKDF (A6756)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
PBKDF (A6758)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
PBKDF (A6760)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
Counter DRBG (A6738)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
Counter DRBG (A6739)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
Counter DRBG (A6740)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
Safe Primes Key Generation (A6762)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6750)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6752)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6754)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6756)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6758)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6750)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6752)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6754)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6756)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A6758)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
EDDSA KeyGen (A6763)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually

Table 24: Conditional Periodic Information

10.4 Error States

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
Abort	If the module fails any of the preoperational self-tests or CASTs, the module enters this error state. In this error state, the module immediately stops functioning and ends the application process	Integrity test failure Any CAST failure	Module reinitialization	Message to stderr: "OpenSSL internal error, assertion failed: FATAL FIPS SELFTEST FAILURE". Module does not load.
PCT Error	A PCT fails after generation of a key pair is requested	Any PCT failure	Module reinitialization	FIPS_selftest_failed() returns 1. The module returns an error code and stops functioning. Any

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
				cryptographic operation is inhibited.

Table 25: Error States

In the “PCT Error” state, errors are reported through the regular ERR interface of the modules and can be queried by functions such as `ERR_get_error()`. See the OpenSSL man pages for the function description.

10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests

Both conditional and pre-operational self-tests can be executed on-demand by unloading and subsequently re-initializing the module, or by calling the `OSSL_PROVIDER_self_test` function. The pair-wise consistency tests can be invoked on demand by requesting the key pair generation service.

11 Life-Cycle Assurance

11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

Before the openssl-libs-1.1.1k-12.el8_6.ciqlfips.0.10.x86_64 RPM package is installed, the Rocky Linux 8 system must operate in the FIPS validated configuration. This can be achieved by:

- Adding the fips=1 option to the kernel command line during the system installation. During the software selection stage, do not install any third-party software.
- Switching the system into the FIPS validated configuration after the installation. Execute the fips-mode-setup --enable command. Restart the system.

In both cases, the Crypto Officer must verify the system operates in the FIPS validated configuration by executing the fips-mode-setup --check command, which should output “FIPS mode is enabled.”

11.2 Administrator Guidance

After the installation of the openssl-libs-1.1.1k-12.el8_6.ciqlfips.0.10.x86_64 RPM package, the Crypto Officer must execute the “Show module name and version” service by issuing the openssl version command. The output of this command must read:

```
OpenSSL 1.1.1k FIPS 25 Mar 2021 Rocky release Rocky Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module  
Rocky8.20250314
```

11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance

There is no administrator guidance.

11.4 Design and Rules

Not applicable.

11.5 Maintenance Requirements

Not applicable.

11.6 End of Life

As the module does not persistently store SSPs, secure sanitization of the module consists of unloading the module. This will zeroize all SSPs in volatile memory. Then, if desired, the openssl-libs-1.1.1k-12.el8_6.ciqlfips.0.10.x86_64 RPM package can be uninstalled from the Rocky Linux 8 system.

12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

12.1 Attack List

The module implements blinding against RSA timing attacks.

RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can measure the time of RSA decryption or signature operations, blinding must be used to protect the RSA operation from that attack.

The module provides the API functions `RSA_blinding_on()` and `RSA_blinding_off()` to turn the blinding on and off for RSA. When the blinding is on, the module generates a random value to form a blinding factor in the RSA key before the RSA key is used in the RSA cryptographic operations.

Appendix A. TLS Cipher Suites

The module supports the following cipher suites for the TLS protocol versions 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 compliant with section 3.3.1 of [SP800-52rev2]. Each cipher suite defines the key exchange algorithm, the bulk encryption algorithm (including the symmetric key size) and the MAC algorithm.

Cipher Suite	ID	Reference
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0x00, 0x31 }	RFC3268
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0x00, 0x33 }	RFC3268
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0x00, 0x37 }	RFC3268
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0x00, 0x39 }	RFC3268
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	{ 0x00, 0x3F }	RFC5246
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	{ 0x00, 0x67 }	RFC5246
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256	{ 0x00, 0x69 }	RFC5246
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256	{ 0x00, 0x6B }	RFC5246
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0x00, 0x8C }	RFC4279
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0x00, 0x8D }	RFC4279
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0x00, 0x9E }	RFC5288
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0x00, 0x9F }	RFC5288
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0x00, 0xA0 }	RFC5288
TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0x00, 0xA1 }	RFC5288
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x04 }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x05 }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x09 }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x0A }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x0E }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x0F }	RFC4492

Cipher Suite	ID	Reference
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x13 }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	{ 0xC0, 0x14 }	RFC4492
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x23 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x24 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x25 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x26 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x27 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x28 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x29 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x2A }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x2B }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x2C }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x2D }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x2E }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x2F }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x30 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0xC0, 0x31 }	RFC5289
TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0xC0, 0x32 }	RFC5289
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM	{ 0xC0, 0x9E }	RFC6655
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM	{ 0xC0, 0x9F }	RFC6655
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8	{ 0xC0, 0xA2 }	RFC6655
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8	{ 0xC0, 0xA3 }	RFC6655
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	{ 0x13, 0x01 }	RFC8446
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	{ 0x13, 0x02 }	RFC8446
TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256	{ 0x13, 0x04 }	RFC8446

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Cipher Suite	ID	Reference
TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256	{ 0x13, 0x05 }	RFC8446

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Appendix B. Glossary and Abbreviations

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
API	Application Programming Interface
CAST	Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Test
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFB	Cipher Feedback
CKG	Cryptographic Key Generation
CMAC	Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CTR	Counter
CVL	Component Validation List
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB	Electronic Code Book
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EdDSA	Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EVP	Envelope
FFC	Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
GMAC	Galois Counter Mode Message Authentication Code
HKDF	HMAC-based Key Derivation Function
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE	Internet Key Exchange
KAS	Key Agreement Scheme
KAT	Known Answer Test
KDA	Key Derivation Algorithm
KDF	Key Derivation Function
KTS	Key Transport Scheme

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KW	Key Wrap
KWP	Key Wrap with Padding
MAC	Message Authentication Code
NIST	National Institute of Science and Technology
OFB	Output Feedback
PAA	Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PAI	Processor Algorithm Implementation
PCT	Pair-wise Consistency Test
PBKDF2	Password-based Key Derivation Function v2
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standard
PRF	Pseudo-Random Function
PSP	Public Security Parameter
PSS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SSC	Shared Secret Computation
SSH	Secure Shell
SSP	Sensitive Security Parameter
TLS	Transport Layer Security
XOF	Extendable Output Function
XTS	XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with cipher text Stealing

Appendix C. References

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