AWS Link Encryption Module, Version 1.0
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Amazon Web Services, Inc.
AWS Link Encryption Module
Version: 1.0
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Prepared by:
Lightship Security, Inc.
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Table of Contents
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 Security Levels ............................................................................................................... 4
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ................................................................................... 6
2.1 Description...................................................................................................................... 6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ...............................10
2.5 Algorithms .....................................................................................................................11
2.6 Security Function Implementations .............................................................................12
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ....................................................................................13
2.8 RBG and Entropy...........................................................................................................13
2.9 Key Generation..............................................................................................................14
2.10 Key Establishment ......................................................................................................14
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces .......................................................................................15
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ......................................................................................................15
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication...................................................................................16
4.1 Authentication Methods................................................................................................16
4.2 Roles ..............................................................................................................................16
4.3 Approved Services ........................................................................................................16
4.4 Non-Approved Services................................................................................................18
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded............................................................................18
5 Software/Firmware Security................................................................................................19
5.1 Integrity Techniques......................................................................................................19
5.2 Initiate on Demand ........................................................................................................19
6 Operational Environment ....................................................................................................20
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements.....................................................20
7 Physical Security .................................................................................................................21
8 Non-Invasive Security..........................................................................................................22
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management .....................................................................23
9.1 Storage Areas ................................................................................................................23
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ...........................................................................................23
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods..............................................................................................23
9.4 SSPs...............................................................................................................................23
10 Self-Tests............................................................................................................................25
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests..........................................................................................25
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................25
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10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information....................................................................................28
10.4 Error States..................................................................................................................28
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests .................................................................................29
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.........................................................................................................30
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ...................................................30
11.2 Administrator Guidance..............................................................................................30
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance......................................................................................30
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...............................................................................................31
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)...10
Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware.............................................10
Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid .................................10
Table 5: Modes List and Description .........................................................................................10
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - CS8210 with Credo CMS50216...............................................11
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - AZ3324 with Acacia AX1200 ...................................................11
Table 8: Approved Algorithms - AS7772 with Broadcom BCM82391 ........................................11
Table 9: Approved Algorithms - CS8320 with Acacia AC1200...................................................11
Table 10: Approved Algorithms - [EVM] AWC-LC Bound Module (Integrity Check)...................12
Table 11: Security Function Implementations............................................................................13
Table 12: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................15
Table 13: Roles.........................................................................................................................16
Table 14: Approved Services ....................................................................................................17
Table 15: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................23
Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................23
Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................23
Table 18: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................24
Table 19: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................24
Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................25
Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................27
Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................28
Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................28
Table 24: Error States...............................................................................................................28
List of Figures
Figure 1: Acacia AC1200 (with Pico DSP) physical perimeter.................................................... 6
Figure 2: Acacia AX1200 (with Jannu DSP) physical perimeter. ................................................ 7
Figure 3: Broadcom BCM82391 physical perimeter. .................................................................. 7
Figure 4: Credo CMS50216 physical perimeter.......................................................................... 8
Figure 5: Module cryptographic boundary. ................................................................................. 9
1 General
1.1 Overview
This non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the AWS Link Encryption Module, version
1.0 describes how the module meets the security requirements specified in FIPS 140-3 for an
overall security level 1 module and outlines the security rules and operating procedures required
to maintain compliance.
1.2 Security Levels
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Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security 1
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
MACsec and DWDM link encryption is used by AWS networking infrastructure to secure traffic
across its core network consisting of long-distance and large-scale data communications across
the globe. Traffic flowing across the AWS global network is protected by strong cryptography
and meets regulatory requirements.
Module Type: Software-hybrid
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary of the AWS Link Encryption Module consists of a hardware and a
software component, which is represented by the red dash line in Figure 4, below. The physical
perimeter of the module is defined as the entire MACsec chip. The software components of the
module consist of the GCM IV Helper, Self-test & Error Manager, and a pre-loaded HMAC
digest for integrity testing.
Tested Operational Environment’s Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):
The Acacia AC1200 (with Pico DSP) (figure 1), Acacia AX1200 (with Jannu DSP) (figure 2),
Broadcom BCM82391 (figure 3), Credo CMS50216 (figure 4), are pictured below. The chips
represent the entire physical perimeter and implement the core cryptographic functionality of the
module, AES-GCM encryption and decryption used within the MACsec protocol.
Figure 1: Acacia AC1200 (with Pico DSP) physical perimeter.
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Figure 2: Acacia AX1200 (with Jannu DSP) physical perimeter.
Figure 3: Broadcom BCM82391 physical perimeter.
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Figure 4: Credo CMS50216 physical perimeter.
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Figure 5: Module cryptographic boundary.
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2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File
Name
Software/ Firmware
Version
Features Integrity Test
AWS Link Encryption
Module
1.0 Self-test & Error
Handler, HMAC File,
GCM IV Helper
HMAC-SHA2-256
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
Model and/or Part Number Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
Broadcom AES ECB 128bit & 256bit
Encryption/Decryption Engine
BCM82391 - BCM82391 Single
chip
Credo EIP-366h crypto core CMS50216 - CMS50216 Single
chip
Acacia OTN Payload Encryption AC1200 - AC1200 (Pico
DSP)
Single
chip
Jannu DSP - CIM8 Modules AX1200 - AX1200 (Jannu
DSP)
Single
chip
Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
NetOS 2024 CS8320 Annapurna N/A K2X-N Yes - 1.0
NetOS 2024 CS8210 Annapurna N/A K2X-N Yes - 1.0
NetOS 2024 AS7772 NXP T-Series T2080 Yes - 1.0
NetOS 2024 AZ3324 NXP Layerscape LX2080 Yes - 1.0
Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
mode
The approved mode of
operation
Approved syslog (code=exited,
status=0/SUCCESS)
Table 5: Modes List and Description
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When the module is powered up, the integrity of the module software is checked, using an
approved software integrity check mechanism, by the bound module (“AWS-LC Cryptographic
Module (dynamic build)”, version “AWS-LC FIPS 1.29.0”). Once these self-tests have
completed successfully, the module transitions into the approved mode of operation. There are
no other modes of operation implanted by the module.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
CS8210 with Credo CMS50216
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-ECB A1359 Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A1359 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-XPN A1359 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
IV Generation - External
SP 800-38D
Table 6: Approved Algorithms - CS8210 with Credo CMS50216
AZ3324 with Acacia AX1200
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-ECB A4847 Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A4847 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38D
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - AZ3324 with Acacia AX1200
AS7772 with Broadcom BCM82391
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-ECB AES 4545 Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM AES 4545 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-XPN AES 4545 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38D
Table 8: Approved Algorithms - AS7772 with Broadcom BCM82391
CS8320 with Acacia AC1200
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-ECB C373 Direction - Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM C681 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38D
Table 9: Approved Algorithms - CS8320 with Acacia AC1200
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[EVM] AWC-LC Bound Module (Integrity Check)
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A5425 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A5433 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
A5434 Key Length - Key Length: 112-524288
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
SHA2-256 A5425 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A5433 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A5434 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536
Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
Table 10: Approved Algorithms - [EVM] AWC-LC Bound Module (Integrity Check)
The Approved Algorithms tables above list the approved algorithms implemented by the AWS
Link Encryption Module and the algorithms implemented within the bound module, which are
used to perform the software integrity test upon the module.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The module does not implement any vendor-affirmed algorithms.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not implement any non-approved, allowed algorithms.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
The module does not implement any non-approved, allowed algorithms with no security
claimed.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
The module does not implement any non-approved, not allowed algorithms.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Encrypt Data BC-Auth Encryption of
data in MACsec
protocol
Publication:NIST
SP 800-38D
IG:C.H
AES-GCM:
(AES 4545,
A1359, C681,
A4847)
AES-ECB: (AES
4545, A1359,
C373, A4847)
AES-XPN:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
(A1359, AES
4545)
Decrypt Data BC-Auth Encryption of
data in MACsec
protocol
Publication:NIST
SP 800-38D
IG:C.H
AES-GCM:
(AES 4545,
A1359, C681,
A4847)
AES-ECB: (AES
4545, A1359,
C373, A4847)
AES-XPN:
(A1359, AES
4545)
Software
Integrity Test
MAC [EVM] Integrity
check using
HMAC-SHA2-
256
implementation
within the AWS-
LC library
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A5425,
A5433, A5434)
SHA2-256:
(A5425, A5433,
A5434)
Table 11: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
The AES-GCM Initialization Vector (IV) generation is compliant with IG C.H, resolution 1(c).
The module generates IVs deterministically following the guidance in IEEE 802.1AE.
While operating the approved mode of operation, the module should only be used to form a
MACsec link with another FIPS 140 validated module operating in the approved mode. The
device on each end of the MACsec link plays the role of either the Peer or the Authenticator.
No authentication server is involved.
As required by the MACsec module (IEEE 802.1AE), the IV has a length of 96 bits and is
constructed by the “GCM IV Helper” as follows:
- AES-GCM: The GCM IV Helper will construct the IV by concatenating the 64-bit Secure
Channel Identifier (SCI) with the 32-bit Packet Number (PN)
- AES-XPN: The GCM IV Helper will construct the IV by concatenating the 32-bit Short
Secure Channel Identifier (SSCI) with the 64-bit Extended Packet Number (XPN) using a
96-bit Salt value.
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for AES-GCM encryption
and decryption operations shall be redistributed.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The module only generates SSPs used in the MACsec protocol deterministically. Therefore, the
module does not implement a DRBG and does not require an entropy source.
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2.9 Key Generation
The module only generates AES-GCM IVs and keys deterministically per the guidance given in
IG C.H and IEEE 802.1AE.
2.10 Key Establishment
The module does not implement any key establishment schemes.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
(BCM82391) MDIO_A, MDIO_B; (AC1200)
PCIE_TDP, PCIE_TDN, PCIE_RDP, PCIE_RDN,
PCIE_REFCLK_P, PCIE_REFCLK_N;
(CMS50216) PHY_MDIO_0, PHY_MDIO_1;
(AX1200) TX0-15P/N
Data Input Plaintext data to be
encrypted, Encrypted data
to be decrypted
(BCM82391) MDIO_A, MDIO_B; (AC1200)
PCIE_TDP, PCIE_TDN, PCIE_RDP, PCIE_RDN,
PCIE_REFCLK_P, PCIE_REFCLK_N;
(CMS50216) PHY_MDIO_0, PHY_MDIO_1;
(AX1200) RX0-15P/N
Data Output Plaintext data that has
been decrypted, Encrypted
data that has been
encrypted
N/A Control
Input
Command signal invoking
cryptographic services
(BCM82391) MDIO_A, MDIO_B; (AC1200)
PCIE_TDP, PCIE_TDN, PCIE_RDP, PCIE_RDN,
PCIE_REFCLK_P, PCIE_REFCLK_N;
(CMS50216) PHY_MDIO_0, PHY_MDIO_1;
(AX1200) RX0-15P/N
Status
Output
Status information
regarding the module and
the invoked
service/function.
(BCM82391) VDD3P3; (AC1200) Voltage_1.8V;
(CMS50216) Voltage=1.85V; (AX1200)
Voltage_1.8V
Power Electrical power to the
module
Table 12: Ports and Interfaces
The Ports and Interfaces table above specifies the cryptographic module interfaces. The
physical interfaces are defined as the data input/output pins of the MACsec chips. The logical
interfaces are logically separated from one another by the AWS Link Encryption software
design. The power interface is physically separate from the other physical interfaces as the
voltage pins are distinct from the data input/output pins of the chips.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The module does not implement any authentication mechanisms. The sole role (Crypto Officer)
is assumed implicitly.
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role CO None
Table 13: Roles
The module supports the Crypto Officer role only. This sole role is implicitly assumed by the
operator of the module when performing a service.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descripti
on
Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Acce
ss
Show
Status
Output
approved
mode
status
Global
(completi
on of
service)
Command Status Output
(status=0/SUCC
ESS, or
status=1/FAILUR
E)
None Crypt
o
Office
r
Show
Module's
Versioni
ng
Informati
on
Output the
module
name and
version
identifiers
Global
(completi
on of
service)
Command Status Output
(AWS Encryption
Module, version
1.0)
None Crypt
o
Office
r
Perform
Self-
tests on
demand
Perform
the
module's
cryptograp
hic self-
tests on
demand
Global
(completi
on of
service)
Command/Proce
dure
(Command/Proce
dure (reboot/re-
initialize)
Status Output None Crypt
o
Office
r
[EVM]
Perform
Self-
Tests on
demand
Perform
the EVM's
CASTs,
and the
Integrity
Check
upon the
IUT
Global
(completi
on of
service)
Command/Proce
dure (reboot/re-
initialize)
Status Output Softwar
e
Integrity
Test
Crypt
o
Office
r
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Name Descripti
on
Indicato
r
Inputs Outputs Securit
y
Functio
ns
SSP
Acce
ss
Perform
Zeroisati
on
Zeroise
SSPs
stored
temporaril
y in RAM
Global
(completi
on of
service)
Command/Proce
dure
Status Output None Crypt
o
Office
r
-
AES-
GCM
Key:
Z
-
AES-
GCM
IV: Z
Encrypt
Data
Encrypt
plaintext
data
Global
(completi
on of
service)
Plaintext Data
(Network Traffic)
Encrypted Data
(Network Traffic)
Encrypt
Data
Crypt
o
Office
r
-
AES-
GCM
Key:
G,E
-
AES-
GCM
IV:
G,E
Decrypt
Data
Decrypt
ciphertext
data
Global
(completi
on of
service)
Encrypted Data
(Network Traffic)
Plaintext Data
(Network Traffic)
Decrypt
Data
Crypt
o
Office
r
-
AES-
GCM
Key:
G,E
-
AES-
GCM
IV:
G,E
Table 14: Approved Services
The module provides approved services to the operator who assumes the Crypto Officer role as
defined in this document.
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The approved services defined in this section implement the security function implementations
defined in section 2.6 of this document.
Note: The status output “AWS Encryption Module, version 1.0” denotes the AWS Link
Encryption Module, version 1.0. No FIPS module is or will be called “AWS Encryption Module”.
4.4 Non-Approved Services
The module does not implement any non-approved services.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module does not allow the loading of external software or firmware.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module’s software integrity self-test is managed within the module boundary by the Self-test
and error handler, which calls the function fips_helper.py. During the module’s pre-operational
self-tests, the self-test and error handler passes the stored HMAC-SHA2-256 digest to the
bound module (AWS-LC FIPS 1.29.0) to which calculates the HMAC of the module software
package and passes the result back to the Self-test and error handler. The Self-test and error
handler compares the result with the stored HMAC file. If the 2 HMAC values do not match, the
integrity test fails, and the module enters the error state.
The bound module (AWS-LC FIPS 1.29.0) must have passed its own software integrity test
before performing the HMAC calculation of the AWS Link Encryption module’s software.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The conditional algorithm self-tests are run at module startup in addition to the software integrity
test. The crypto officer can initiate the self-tests on demand by power-cycling the host platform
(TOEPP).
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
The operating environments for the module are the AWS CS8320, CS8210, AZ3324, and
AS7772 network devices running NetOS 2024, which are modifiable operating environments.
The module operational environments are physically housed within a secure AWS facility and
come pre-configured in the approved mode by AWS engineers. Module operators have no
direct system-level access to the host OS.
The Crypto Officer should confirm that the module is operating in the approved mode by
checking for the approved mode indicator per the instructions in Section 11.2 of this document.
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7 Physical Security
Each module’s hardware consists of a single chip made with production grade components,
protected by a conformal coating as a standard passivation technique. As the software portion
of the hybrid module execute within a modifiable operational environment, the module is defined
as a multi-chip standalone embodiment.
The module itself provides no additional physical security techniques. However, the module will
reside inside of an AWS device which is installed within a secure AWS facility. The module will
therefore inherit these additional physical characteristics and protections.
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8 Non-Invasive Security
The module does not implement any security mechanisms which protect against non-invasive
attacks.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
Volatile
Memory
Stored temporarily in memory within MACsec module. Dynamic
External Stored temporarily in memory location associated with the
calling application.
Dynamic
Table 15: Storage Areas
The module stores keys and input/output data temporarily in volatile memory. The module does
not store keys or data persistently.
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
SSP
Output
Volatile
Memory
External Plaintext Automated Electronic Encrypt
Data
SSP
Input
External Volatile
Memory
Plaintext Automated Electronic Decrypt
Data
Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods
SSPs are only input from or output to the calling applications within the module’s TOEPP. This
method is categorized as manual distribution, electronic entry/output (“CM Software to/from
App via TOEPP Path”).
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Remove
Power
Remove power
from the host
platform
Keys are procedurally zeroized by
rebooting the host platform, which
is acceptable at Software level 1.
Crypto Officer
reboots or removed
power from host
platform
Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods
SSPs are zeroised procedurally by power-cycling the host platform.
9.4 SSPs
The following table summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the
cryptographic services implemented:
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated
By
Established
By
Used
By
AES-
GCM
Key
Encryption and
Decryption
128 or 256
bits - 128
or 256 bits
Authenticated
Symmetric Key
- CSP
Encrypt
Data
Decrypt
Data
Encrypt
Data
Decrypt
Data
AES-
GCM
IV
Initialization
Vector for
AES-GCM
MACsec
encryption
96 bits -
N/A
Keying
Material - CSP
Encrypt
Data
Decrypt
Data
Encrypt
Data
Decrypt
Data
Table 18: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
AES-
GCM Key
SSP
Output
Volatile
Memory:Plaintext
Until
zeroised
Remove
Power
AES-GCM
IV:Used With
AES-
GCM IV
SSP
Input
Volatile
Memory:Plaintext
Until
zeroised
Remove
Power
AES-GCM
Key:Used With
Table 19: SSP Table 2
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10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5425)
SHA2-256 KAT SW/FW
Integrity
syslog
entry
[EVM] Performed by the
bound module. Calculate
hash of entire module
software and compare to
known answer
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5433)
SHA2-256 KAT SW/FW
Integrity
syslog
entry
[EVM] Performed by the
bound module. Calculate
hash of entire module
software and compare to
known answer
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5434)
SHA2-256 KAT SW/FW
Integrity
syslog
entry
[EVM] Performed by the
bound module. Calculate
hash of entire module
software and compare to
known answer
Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module’s startup integrity test is performed upon the module’s software by the bound
module (Amazon’s AWS-LC Cryptographic module).
As the modules do not implement bypass capability or any FIPS-defined critical functions, no
additional pre-operational self-tests are required.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-XPN
(AES
4545)
256 bits KAT CAST syslog entry
("encryption
test passed"
/ "encryption
test failure"
OR
"decryption
test passed"
/ "decryption
test failure")
Encrypt/Decrypt
(using extended
packet
numbering
function)
Before first
operational
use of AES-
GCM /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
AES-GCM
(AES
4545)
256 bits KAT CAST syslog entry
("encryption
test passed"
/ "encryption
test failure"
Encrypt/Decrypt Before first
operational
use of AES-
GCM /
Immediately
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
OR
"decryption
test passed"
/ "decryption
test failure")
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
AES-GCM
(C681)
256 bits KAT CAST syslog entry
("encryption
test passed"
/ "encryption
test failure"
OR
"decryption
test passed"
/ "decryption
test failure")
Encrypt/Decrypt Before first
operational
use of AES-
GCM /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
AES-XPN
(A1359)
256 bits KAT CAST syslog entry
("encryption
test passed"
/ "encryption
test failure"
OR
"decryption
test passed"
/ "decryption
test failure")
Encrypt/Decrypt
(using extended
packet
numbering
function)
Before first
operational
use of AES-
GCM /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
AES-GCM
(A4847)
256 bits KAT CAST syslog entry
("encryption
test passed"
/ "encryption
test failure"
OR
"decryption
test passed"
/ "decryption
test failure")
Encrypt/Decrypt Before first
operational
use of AES-
GCM /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5425)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module is
Operational
[EVM] CAST
performed by the
bound module on
it's own HMAC-
SHA
implementation
before running
Integrity Test on
itself or the IUT
[EVM] Before
first
operational
use of bound
module
integrity test /
Immediately
when the
module
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5433)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module is
Operational
[EVM] CAST
performed by the
bound module on
it's own HMAC-
SHA
implementation
before running
Integrity Test on
itself or the IUT
[EVM] Before
first
operational
use of bound
module
integrity test /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A5434)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Module is
Operational
[EVM] CAST
performed by the
bound module on
it's own HMAC-
SHA
implementation
before running
Integrity Test on
itself or the IUT
[EVM] Before
first
operational
use of bound
module
integrity test /
Immediately
when the
module
enters the
approved
mode of
operation
Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests
On the CS8320 and AZ3324 operational environments, the conditional self-test for AES-GCM is
run at module power up, before the first operational use of the algorithm. The underling AES-
ECB algorithm’s self-test requirements are satisfied by the running of the AES-GCM self-test
per IG 10.3.A, Resolution 1.
On the AS7772 operational environment, the conditional self-tests for AES-XPN and AES-GCM
are run at module power up, before the first operational use of the algorithms. The underling
AES-ECB algorithm’s self-test requirements are satisfied by the running of the AES-GCM self-
test per IG 10.3.A, Resolution 1.
On the CS8210 operational environment, the conditional self-test for AES-XPN is run at module
power up, before the first operational use of the algorithms. The underling AES-GCM and AES-
ECB algorithms’ self-test requirements are satisfied by the running of the AES-XPN self-test per
IG 10.3.A, Resolution 1.
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10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5425)
KAT SW/FW Integrity Upon module
startup
Manual (reboot
host platform)
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5433)
KAT SW/FW Integrity Upon module
startup
Manual (reboot
host platform)
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5434)
KAT SW/FW Integrity Upon module
startup
Manual (reboot
host platform)
Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-XPN (AES
4545)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually
AES-GCM (AES
4545)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually
AES-GCM
(C681)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually
AES-XPN
(A1359)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually
AES-GCM
(A4847)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup
Manually
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5425)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup of
[EVM]
Manually
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5433)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup of
[EVM]
Manually
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A5434)
KAT CAST On Demand /
On Startup of
[EVM]
Manually
Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information
The operator can perform the pre-operational and conditional self-tests on demand by power-
cycling the host platform.
10.4 Error States
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error Hard Error State:
MACsec interfaces do
not come up
Module fails
any self-test
Reboot host
platform
syslog entry
(status=1/FAILURE)
Table 24: Error States
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When the module fails any self-test, the module will immediately print a self-test failure indicator
to the syslog (Self test failed on port - <failed port #>). The module will automatically perform
zeroisation of all SSPs and transition to the Error state, printing an error state indicator to the
syslog (code=exited, status=1/FAILURE). When in the error state, the TOEPP’s interfaces will
not be available and therefore, all cryptographic operation is inhibited.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
The operator can perform the conditional self-tests on demand by power-cycling the host
platform.
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The AWS Link Encryption Module is pre-installed and configured at an AWS facility and offered
to end users as an integrated part of AWS’ service offerings. As such, there are no installation,
initialization, or startup procedures to be performed by the Crypto Officer.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The Crypto Officer should ensure that the module is running in the approved mode of operation
before use. This can be determined by checking the syslog for the approved mode indicator
(code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS).
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for MACsec encryption and
decryption shall be redistributed.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not implement any security mechanisms which protect against other attacks.