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IDEMIA
ID-One PIV 243 in SPE
Configurations
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version 1.3
Last update: 2025-06-03
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
4516 Seton Center Parkway, Suite 250
Austin, TX 78759
www.atsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 General.........................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Levels.......................................................................................................................5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification.............................................................................................6
2.1 Description.............................................................................................................................6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ............................................8
2.3 Excluded Components............................................................................................................8
2.4 Modes of Operation................................................................................................................8
2.5 Algorithms..............................................................................................................................9
2.6 Security Function Implementations......................................................................................12
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information.............................................................................................15
2.8 RBG and Entropy..................................................................................................................17
2.9 Key Generation ....................................................................................................................17
2.10 Key Establishment..............................................................................................................17
2.11 Industry Protocols ..............................................................................................................17
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ...............................................................................................18
3.1 Ports and Interfaces .............................................................................................................18
3.2 Trusted Channel Specification..............................................................................................18
3.3 Control Interface Not Inhibited.............................................................................................18
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication ...........................................................................................19
4.1 Authentication Methods .......................................................................................................19
4.2 Roles ....................................................................................................................................21
4.3 Approved Services ...............................................................................................................22
4.4 Non-Approved Services........................................................................................................66
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded ....................................................................................66
5 Software/Firmware Security .......................................................................................................67
5.1 Integrity Techniques ............................................................................................................67
5.2 Initiate on Demand...............................................................................................................67
6 Operational Environment ...........................................................................................................68
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..............................................................68
7 Physical Security ........................................................................................................................69
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required.......................................................................................69
7.2 EFP/EFT Information .............................................................................................................69
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7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges ...............................................................................69
8 Non-Invasive Security.................................................................................................................70
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..............................................................................71
9.1 Storage Areas.......................................................................................................................71
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ...................................................................................................71
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods......................................................................................................71
9.4 SSPs .....................................................................................................................................72
10 Self-Tests..................................................................................................................................91
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests..................................................................................................91
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests.........................................................................................................91
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ............................................................................................93
10.4 Error States ........................................................................................................................96
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ................................................................................................................97
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures.............................................................97
11.1.1 Initialization..................................................................................................................97
11.1.2 Startup Procedures ......................................................................................................97
11.2 Administrator Guidance .....................................................................................................97
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..............................................................................................97
11.4 Design and Rules ...............................................................................................................97
11.6 End of Life ..........................................................................................................................97
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks.......................................................................................................98
12.1 Attack List ..........................................................................................................................98
12.3 Guidance and Constraints..................................................................................................98
References ....................................................................................................................................99
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels ..................................................................................................................5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware ..........................................................................8
Table 3: Modes List and Description................................................................................................9
Table 4: Approved Algorithms .......................................................................................................11
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ............................................................................................11
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed ........................................11
Table 7: Security Function Implementations .................................................................................15
Table 8: Entropy Certificates.........................................................................................................17
Table 9: Entropy Sources ..............................................................................................................17
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces.......................................................................................................18
Table 11: Authentication Methods.................................................................................................19
Table 12: Roles..............................................................................................................................22
Table 13: Approved Services.........................................................................................................65
Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required................................................................................69
Table 15: EFP/EFT Information ......................................................................................................69
Table 16: Hardness Testing Temperatures....................................................................................69
Table 17: Storage Areas ................................................................................................................71
Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods.............................................................................................71
Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods ...............................................................................................72
Table 20: SSP Table 1....................................................................................................................81
Table 21: SSP Table 2....................................................................................................................90
Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests .............................................................................................91
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................93
Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.............................................................................94
Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information....................................................................................96
Table 26: Error States....................................................................................................................96
List of Figures
Figure 1: Depiction of Physical Form ...............................................................................................6
Figure 2: Block Diagram ..................................................................................................................7
Figure 3: Bottom View.....................................................................................................................8
Figure 4: Top View...........................................................................................................................8
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document defines the Security Policy for the ID-One PIV 243 cryptographic module from
IDEMIA when configured by IDEMIA in FIPS 140-3 Level 3 mode of operation, and hereafter
denoted the module. The module, validated to FIPS 140-3 overall Security Level 3, is a single
chip module implementing the Global Platform operational environment, with Card Manager and
ID-One PIV 243 Applet.
1.2 Security Levels
The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the module are as follows:
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks 3
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The ID-One PIV 243 in SPE Configurations module implements cryptographic services for the
Global Platform operational environment, with Card Manager and ID-One PIV Applet.
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: SingleChip
Cryptographic Boundary:
The module is designed to be embedded into a plastic card body, with a contact plate and/or
contactless antenna connections, or in a USB token or other standard IC packaging, such as
SOIC, QFN or MicroSD.
The physical form of the module is depicted in Figure 1 below. The cryptographic boundary of the
module is the surface and edges of the die and associated bond pads for the module's interfaces,
shown as circles in the figure. See Table 12: Ports and Interfaces for the function of each
interface.
Figure 1: Depiction of Physical Form
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Figure 2: Block Diagram
Section 4 describes applet functionality in greater detail. The JavaCard and Global Platform APIs
are internal interfaces available only to applets. Only applet services are available at the card
edge (the interfaces that cross the cryptographic boundary). In the figure above, the Security
Domain Verifier prevents loading an unauthorized (unsigned) code package into the module and
does not provide separate services.
The POST application provides on-demand execution of the conditional Cryptographic Algorithms
Self-Test (CAST) and the MSFT PNP application provides identification of the associated mini-
driver when the module is used within a Microsoft Windows Environment. All code is executed
from ROM and NVM.
The chip family provides accelerators for AES, RSA, ECC, CRC and an SP800-90B ESV. The
communications options for contact and contactless configurations are present in the physical
circuitry of all members of the processor family but are selectively enabled during module
manufacturing.
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2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model
and/or
Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware Version Processors Features
Cosmo X
FIPS
09A4D1 418424 (612433XX00,
612433XX10)
32-bit
Arm®
Contact-Only, Contactless-
Only or Dual Interface
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2.3 Excluded Components
There are no components within the cryptographic boundary excluded from the FIPS 140-3
requirements.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
SPE (Secure PIN
Entry)
(612433XX00)
This configuration
enforces the encryption of
the PIN when submitted to
the module for card holder
verification.
Approved The indicator of mode of
operations of a given ID-One PIV
instance can be retrieved at any
time using the READ BINARY
command (PIV Info
Unauthenticated service) on its
Elementary file (EF) with SFI=01.
The module will return "Running in
FIPS140-3 Level 3 Mode of
Operations" in ASCII
SPE-EP (Secure
PIN Entry with
Enhanced
This configuration
enforces the encryption of
the PIN when submitted to
Approved The indicator of mode of
operations of a given ID-One PIV
instance can be retrieved at any
Figure 3: Bottom View Figure 4: Top View
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Mode Name Description Type Status Indicator
Privacy)
(612433XX10)
the module for card holder
verification. Additionally
prevents the leaking from
the card of any traceable
or PII over the contactless
interface.
time using the READ BINARY
command (PIV Info
Unauthenticated service) on its
Elementary file (EF) with SFI=01.
The module will return "Running in
FIPS140-3 Level 3 Mode of
Operations" in ASCII
Table 3: Modes List and Description
The mode of operation is defined by IDEMIA during manufacturing and cannot be changed. The
module does not allow the changing of modes after manufacturing.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
The module only implements approved algorithms and does not implement any non-approved
algorithms. Therefore, the module only has approved mode of operation.
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A4945 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CMAC A4945 Direction - Generation
Key Length - 192, 256
SP 800-38B
AES-ECB A4945 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
Counter DRBG A4945 Prediction Resistance - No
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) A4945 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - Testing
Candidates
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-4) A4945 Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) A4945 Component - No, Yes
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-
256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A4945 Component - No, Yes
Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
FIPS 186-4
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-
256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
HMAC-SHA-1 A4945 Key Length - Key Length: 8-1016
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A4945 Key Length - Key Length: 8-1016
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A4945 Key Length - Key Length: 8-1016
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC CDH-Component
(CVL)
A4945 Function - Key Pair Generation
Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3 A4945 Domain Parameter Generation
Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521
Function - Key Pair Generation
Scheme -
onePassDh -
KAS Role - Responder
KDF Methods -
oneStepKdf -
Key Length - 1024
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF SP800-108 A4945 KDF Mode - Counter
Supported Lengths - Supported
Lengths: 64, 256
SP 800-108
Rev. 1
RSA Decryption Primitive
Sp800-56Br2 (CVL)
A4945 - SP 800-56B
Rev. 2
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) A4945 Key Generation Mode - B.3.6
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - Table C.3
Private Key Format - Chinese
Remainder Theorem
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) A4945 Signature Type - PKCSPSS
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA Signature Primitive
(CVL)
A4945 Private Key Format - crt FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A4945 Signature Type - PKCSPSS
Modulo - 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
SHA-1 A4945 Message Length - Message Length:
0-65536 Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A4945 Message Length - Message Length:
0-65536 Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A4945 Message Length - Message Length:
0-65536 Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A4945 Message Length - Message Length:
0-65536 Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A4945 Message Length - Message Length:
0-65536 Increment 8
Large Message Sizes - 1
FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG HMAC keys:112 to 1016 bits
AES keys:128, 192, 256 bits
Generated by:CTR DRBG
ID-One Cosmo X FIPS SP800-133r2
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
Name Caveat Use and Function
RSA RSA decryption primitive with 1024-bit modulus
only for legacy usage
RSA decryption primitive using
1024-bit modulus
Table 6: Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
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2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithm
s
AES-ECB BC-UnAuth Symmetric
encryption and
Decryption
Key Size:128, 192,
256 bits
Key Strength:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-ECB:
(A4945)
AES-CBC BC-UnAuth Symmetric
encryption and
Decryption
Key Size:128, 192,
256 bits
Key Strength:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CBC:
(A4945)
AES-CMAC MAC Message
Authentication Code
Key Size:128, 192,
256 bits
Key Strength:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CMAC:
(A4945)
CTR DRBG DRBG CTR_DRBG using
AES-256
Derivation
Function:Enabled
Prediction
Resistance:No
Key Size:256 bits
Key Strength:256
bits
Counter
DRBG:
(A4945)
ECDSA keyGen AsymKeyPair
-KeyGen
CKG
ECDSA key
generation using
Testing Candidates
Curves:P-224, P-
256, P-384, P-521
Strength:112, 128,
192, 256 bits
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4): (A4945)
ECDSA keyVer AsymKeyPair
-KeyVer
ECDSA key
verification
Curves:P-224, P-
256, P-384, P-521
Strength:112, 128,
192, 256 bits
ECDSA
KeyVer
(FIPS186-
4): (A4945)
ECDSA sigGen DigSig-
SigGen
ECDSA Digital
Signature Generation
Message
Digest:SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
Curves:P-224, P-
256, P-384, P-521
Strength:112, 128,
192, 256 bits
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
4): (A4945)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithm
s
ECDSA sigGen
component
DigSig-
SigGen
ECDSA Digital
Signature Generation
Component
Curves:P-224, P-
256, P-384, P-521
Strength:112, 128,
192, 256 bits
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-
4): (A4945)
ECDSA sigVer DigSig-
SigVer
ECDSA Digital
Signature
Verification
Message
Digest:SHA2-224
Curves:P-224, P-
256, P-384, P-521
Strength:112, 128,
192, 256 bits
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-
4): (A4945)
KAS-ECC KAS-Full ECDH Key
Agreement Scheme
Scheme:onePassD
h
KDF
Method:oneStepKd
f
Curves:P-256, P-
384, P-521
Strength:128, 192,
256 bits
KAS-ECC
Sp800-
56Ar3:
(A4945)
KAS-ECC CDH
Component
KAS-SSC ECDH Component Curves:P-224, P-
256, P-384, P-521
Strength:112, 128,
192, 256 bits
KAS-ECC
CDH-
Component
: (A4945)
RSA keyGen AsymKeyPair
-KeyGen
CKG
RSA Key Generation Generation
Method:A.1.6
Probable Primes
with conditions
based on Auxiliary
Probable Primes
Key Size:2048,
3072, 4096 bits
Key Strength:112,
128, 150 bits
RSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-
4): (A4945)
RSA sigGen DigSig-
SigGen
RSA Digital Signature
Generation
Scheme:PSS
Key Size:2048,
3072, 4096 bits
Key
Strength:Strength:
112, 128, 150 bits
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-
4): (A4945)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithm
s
RSA sigPrim DigSig-
SigGen
RSA Digital Signature
Generation primitive
Key Size:2048,
3072, 4096 bits
Key Strength:112,
128, 150 bits
RSA
Signature
Primitive:
(A4945)
RSA sigVer DigSig-
SigVer
RSA Digital Signature
Verification
Scheme:PSS using
SHA2-256
Key Size:2048 bits
Key Strength:112
bits
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-
4): (A4945)
RSA Decryption
Primitive
KTS-Wrap RSA decryption
primitive
Key Size:2048,
3072, 4096 bits
Key Strength:112,
128, 150 bits
RSA
Decryption
Primitive
Sp800-
56Br2:
(A4945)
HMAC MAC Message
Authentication Code
using HMAC with
SHA
Key Size:112 to
1016 bits
Key Strength:112
to 1016 bits
HMAC-SHA-
1: (A4945)
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(A4945)
HMAC-
SHA2-512:
(A4945)
KBKDF SP 800-108 KBKDF Key Based Key
Derivation with
Counter
Fixed Data
Order:Middle Fixed
Data
Key Size:128, 192,
256 bits
Key Strength:128,
192, 256 bits
KDF SP800-
108:
(A4945)
SHA SHA Message Digest
Generation using
SHA-1, SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-
384, SHA2-512
SHA-1:
(A4945)
SHA2-224:
(A4945)
SHA2-256:
(A4945)
SHA2-384:
(A4945)
SHA2-512:
(A4945)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithm
s
KTS (AES + HMAC)
key
wrapping/unwrappin
g
KTS-Wrap Symmetric key
wrapping/unwrappin
g
Key Size:128, 192,
256 bits
Key Strength:128,
192, 256 bits
AES-CBC:
(A4945)
AES-CMAC:
(A4945)
AES-ECB:
(A4945)
Table 7: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
Compliance to SP 800-56ARev3 assurances
For KAS-ECC, the module satisfies IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2) (i.e., tested compliance with One
Pass DH key agreement schemes followed by the derivation of the key as shown in Section 5.8 of
SP 800-56Arev3). The key derivation function complies to SP 800-56C rev2 (i.e., One-Step KDF).
Furthermore, the module obtained the appropriate assurances, as required in Sections 5.6.2 of
SP 800-56A rev3.
5.6.2.1 Assurances Required by a Key Pair Owner:
5.6.2.1.1 Owner Assurance of Correct Generation: The module performs key generation for
ephemeral keys. Using the key generation algorithm validated by the CAVP (ECDSA KeyGen Cert.
#A4945). For static keys, a trusted third party (TTP) generates the key pair and securely enters
the module using SP800-38F key wrapping (AES + CMAC). The module will perform a pairwise
consistency check upon generating ECDH keys.
5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity: For ephemeral key pair, the module provides
the assurance since the module generates it. For static key pairs, after receiving the key pair, the
module performs a separate check to determine that the private key is in the correct interval.
5.6.2.1.3 Owner Assurance of Public-Key Validity: For both static and ephemeral key pairs, the
module performs a full public-key validation as a separate process from the key-pair generation
process.
5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency: The module performs a pair-wise
consistency test when the module generates ephemeral key pairs and when static key-pairs are
entered into the module.
5.6.2.1.5 Owner Assurance of Possession of the Private Key: For ephemeral key pairs, the owner
generates the key pair as specified in Section 5.6.1 and for static key pairs, the module performs
a pair-wise consistency test when the key pairs are entered.
5.6.2.2 Assurances Required by a Public Key Recipient
5.6.2.2.1 Recipient’s assurance Static Public-Key Validity: The module makes used of approved
EC curves listed in SP800-140D and performs a successful full public-key validation of the
received public key i.e., ECC Full Public-Key Validation Routine specified in SP800-56A rev3
section 5.6.2.3.3.
5.6.2.2.2 Recipient Assurance of Ephemeral Public-Key Validity: Not applicable. The module
generates ephemeral keys and does not ever receive them.
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5.6.2.2.3 Recipient’s assurance of owner’s possession of private key can be met via the use of a
Trusted Third party that requires the key confirmation procedure. Both of which are handled by
the entity outside of the module that requested the ECDH Key Agreement service from the
module. That is, such checks are out of the module's scope.
5.6.2.2.4 Recipient Assurance of the Owner’s Possession of an Ephemeral Private Key: Not
applicable. The module generates ephemeral keys and does not ever receive them.
5.6.2.3 Public Key Validation Routines
The module performs the required public key validation before initiating the handshake following
5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation Routine.
Compliance to SP 800-56BRev3 assurances
For KTS RSA, the tester verified the implementation satisfies IG D.G by employing an approved
RSA-based key transport scheme as specified in SP 800-56Brev2.
The following summary of assurances, as defined in Sections 5 and 6 of SP 800-56Brev2:
Section 5.1 – The module uses an approved hash function (SHS, Cert. #A4945) for mask
generation during RSA-OEAP encryption.
Section 5.2 and Section 5.6 – N/A, The module does not implement key confirmation.
Section 5.3 - The module uses an approved random bit generator (CTR_DRBG, Cert. #A4945)
when generating random values.
Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 – N/A, The module does not implement a key agreement scheme
(i.e., KAS1).
For addition assurances found in its Section 6 (specifically SP800-56Brev2 Section 6.4 Required
Assurances):
1) The entity requesting the RSA key unwrapping (decapsulation) service from the module, shall
only use an RSA private key that was generated by an active FIPS validated module that
implements FIPS 186-4 compliant RSA key generation service and performs the key pair validity
and the pairwise consistency as stated in section 6.4.1.1 of the SP 800-56Brev2. Additionally, the
entity shall renew these assurances over time by using any method described in section 6.4.1.5
of the SP 800-56Brev2.
2) For use of an RSA key wrapping (encapsulation) service in the context of key transport per IG
D.G,
a) the entity using the module, shall verify the validity of the peer's public key using the public
key validation service of the module.
b) the entity using the module, shall confirm the peer's possession of private key by using any
method specified in section 6.4.2.3 of the SP 800-56Brev2.
Only after the above assurances are successfully met, shall the entity use the peer's public key
to perform the RSA key wrapping (encapsulation) service of the module."
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2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E107 Infineon Technologies AG
Table 8: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample Size Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Infineon SLC37
32-bit Security
Controller V11
Entropy Source
Physical SLC37 32-bit
Security
Controller V11
32-bit blocks
which can be
concatenated.
13.376-
bits per
32-bit
block
non-vetted
conditioning
function
Table 9: Entropy Sources
RNG Information: The module implements an approved SP 800-90Ar1 Deterministic Random
Bit Generator in the form of CTR_DRBG. The DRBG seed is generated from the SP 800-90B
entropy source.
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements key generation services for RSA, ECDSA, EC Diffie-Hellman, and AES
keys in compliance to SP800-133rev2 Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG, vendor affirmed).
2.10 Key Establishment
The module provides an approved SP800-56Arev3 EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Scheme that
is fully compliant with IG D.F scenario 2 path (2).
The module provides an approved SP800-38F Key Transport that is fully compliant to IG D.G i.e.,
employing an approved key-wrapping technique using a “combination” method: AES-CBC
together with an approved authentication method AES-CMAC.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The GP Secure Channel Protocol '03' establishment provides mutual authentication service as
well as establishment of a secure channel to protect confidentiality and integrity of the
transmitted data.
The PIV Secure Messaging protocol defined in SP800-73-4 and ANSI 504-1 establishes a secure
channel to protect confidentiality and integrity of transmitted information and allows the off-card
entity initiating the PIV Secure Messaging to authenticate the module. Unlike GP Secure Channel,
the PIV Secure Messaging does not allow the module to authenticate the off-card entity.
The PIV Secure Messaging protocol conforms to SP800-56A for the establishment of a shared
secret and key derivation for session keys.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
RST [ISO 7816: Reset] Not available
in contactless-only configurations
Control Input None
CLK [ISO 7816: Clock] Not available
in contactless-only configurations
Control Input None
I/O [ISO 7816: Input/Output] Not
available in contactless-only
configurations
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
APDU Command data field; ATR and
APDU Response data field; APDU Header
(CLA INS P1-P2); Status Word SW1-SW2
LA, LB [ISO 1443: Antenna] (Not
available in contact-only
configurations)
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
APDU Command data field; ATR and
APDU Response data field; APDU Header
(CLA INS P1-P2); Status Word SW1-SW2
Vcc, GND [ISO 7816: Supply
voltage] (Not available in
contactless-only configurations)
Power None
Table 10: Ports and Interfaces
The module does not implement any control output interface.
3.2 Trusted Channel Specification
The module does not transmit unprotected CSPs over any interface.
The module does not implement a trusted channel.
3.3 Control Interface Not Inhibited
The control interface is inhibited while in the error state without any exceptions.
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method Name Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each
Attempt
Strength per
Minute
GP Secure
Channel
Protocol
Authentication
Provides
authentication
for the CO role
AES-CMAC
(A4945)
1/(2^128) 9/(2^128)
PIV Symmetric
Key
Authentication
Provides
authentication
for the PIV
Application
Administrator
AES-ECB
(A4945)
1/(2^128) 9/(2^128)
PIV Secret
Value
Authentication
Provides
authentication
for the user
PIN Input 1/((10^6)(11^2))
or
1/((94^6)(95^6))
15/((10^6)(11^2))
or
15/((94^6)(95^6))
BIO
Authentication
Biometric
person
authentication
On-Card-
Comparison
(OCC)
Biometric
authentication
using facial,
fingerprint, or
iris.
See section 4.1 See section 4.1
Table 11: Authentication Methods
GP Secure Channel Protocol Authentication Method
The Secure Channel Protocol authentication method is provided by the Secure Channel service.
The SD-DAK and SD-DMK keys are used to derive the SC-ENC and SC-C-MAC keys, respectively.
The off-card entity participating in the mutual authentication sent a 64-bit challenge to the Smart
Card together with the key set version to use. The Smart Card together with the key set version
to use generates its own challenge and computes a 64-bit cryptogram with SC-C-MAC key and
both challenges. The Smart Card cryptogram and challenge are sent to the off-card entity which
checks the Smart Card cryptogram and creates its own 64-bit cryptogram with both challenges.
A 64-bit message authentication code (MAC) is also computed on the command containing the
off-card entity cryptogram with AES-CMAC and SC-C-MAC key, the MAC is concatenated to the
command, and the command is sent to the Smart Card. The Smart Card checks the message
authentication code and compares the received cryptogram to the calculated cryptogram. If all
of this succeeds, the two participants are mutually authenticated (the external entity is
authenticated to the Module in the CO role).
The probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:
• 1/(2128) = 2.9E‐39 (MAC||cryptogram using a 128‐bit block for authentication)
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The module enforces a “slowdown mechanism” that increases the response time between two
authentications attempts following a failed authentication, such that no more than nine (9)
attempts are possible in a one-minute period. The probability that a random attempt will succeed
over a one-minute interval is:
• 9/(2128) = 2.6E‐38 (MAC||cryptogram using a 128‐bit block for authentication)
GP Secure Channel Protocol establishment provides mutual authentication service as well as
establishment of a secure channel to protect confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data.
GP Secure Channel Protocol Authentication Method using Pseudo Random
The module supports Global Platform Authentication using an optional Pseudo Random method,
described in "GP Secure Channel Protocol '03' Card Specification v2.2 Amendment D". The CO
can determine the challenge which will be generated by the module. The use of a pseudo-
random card challenge allows the offline preparation of personalization scripts while the module
is not present and the processing of these scripts on the module without an online connection to
the entity that prepared the scripts. When this option is called, the card challenge mentioned in
the above section is the result of an AES-CMAC computed on a 24-bit counter value, a constant
AID value, and a host challenge. The counter is initialized to 0 when the key is created or
replaced, and the module returns an error when the counter reached 224-1.
The use of the optional pseudo random card challenge does not impact the probabilities listed
above.
PIV Symmetric Key Authentication Method
The external entity obtains a 16-byte challenge from the module, encrypts the challenge, and
sends the cryptogram to the module. The module decrypts the cryptogram, and the external
entity is authenticated if the decrypted value matches the challenge. This method is used by the
PIV Application Administrator Authentication services. The minimum key strength used for this
method is AES-128, using 16 bytes (a single AES block).
The probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:
• 1/(2128) = 2.9E-39
The module enforces a “slowdown mechanism” that increases the response time between two
authentication attempts following a failed authentication, such that no more than nine (9)
attempts are possible in a one-minute period. The probability that a random attempt will succeed
over a one-minute interval is:
• 9/(2128) = 2.6E-38
PIV Secret Value Authentication Method
The external entity submits an identifier and corresponding secret value. The format of the
secret value is checked for conformance to a defined format template (Numeric in ASCII,
Alphanumeric with at least one upper case, one lower case, one digit and one special character,
Alphanumeric with at least three of the previous 4 categories, Numeric in BCD, HEX value, etc.),
and for its minimum number of characters before padding. If the check passes, the module
compares all eight (8) or sixteen (16) bytes to the appropriate stored reference instance (e.g.
Cardholder PIN, Pin Unblocking Key or Administrator PIN). The enforcement of minimum number
of characters before padding is not the same as a fixed length for the secret. For example, a
minimum of six (6) characters means secrets can be created from six (6) to eight (8) characters,
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determined by the user (or six (6) to sixteen (16) if the module was configured during production
to support 16-byte PINs).
The minimum length of the PIN is 6 bytes and the maximum 8 or 16 bytes depending on
configuration.
The worst-case scenario permitted by the module is a minimum length of six (6) characters with
the Numeric in ASCII character set and a maximum length of eight (8) characters. The character
space for the first six (6) bytes in this scenario is 10 (the values ‘30’ through ‘39’ are permitted)
and in the last two (2) characters is 11 (the values ‘30’ through ‘39’ and ‘FF’ are permitted). The
probability that a random attempt will succeed using this authentication method is:
• 1/(106 *112) = 8.3E-9
The maximum number of consecutive failed authentication attempts can be configured up to 15,
so the probability that a random attempt will succeed over a one-minute interval is:
• 15/(106 * 112) = 1.2E-7
BIO Authentication method
The module performs a biometric person authentication On-Card-Comparison (OCC) using one of
the following methods:
• A live fingerprint template as defined by FIPS 201-2. (BIT Format Owner = 0x0101)
• An iris template. (BIT Format Owner = 0x001D)
• A facial template. (BIT Format Owner = 0x001D)
The default threshold applied to scores from the fingerprint OCC algorithms has been set to
achieve false match rates (FMR) at or below the respective values defined by NIST in Table 16 of
SP800-76-2, i.e., an FMR of 0.001 for on-card fingerprint minutia matching.
As required by SP800-76-2 section 5.7.4.1, the on-card-matching algorithm matches single-finger
native templates with False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) less than or equal to 0.02 when the FMR is
at or below 0.0001.
The default threshold for Facial OCC has been set to achieve false match rates (FMR) of 0.001.
The default threshold for Iris OCC has been set to achieve false match rates (FMR) of 0.001.
The above default threshold values can be adjusted by the Crypto-Officer and/or the PIV
Application Administrator.
The maximum number of consecutive failed Bio authentication attempts can be configured up to
15 per modality (Fingerprints, Iris, Facial) so the probability that a random attempt will succeed
over a one-minute interval is:
• 15/(103) = 0.015
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Identity CO GP Secure Channel
Protocol Authentication
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Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
PIV Application
Administrator
Identity Administrator PIV Symmetric Key
Authentication
PIV Secret Value
Authentication
User Identity User PIV Symmetric Key
Authentication
PIV Secret Value
Authentication
BIO Authentication
Table 12: Roles
The module does not include a maintenance role.
The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4.3 Approved Services
The following convention is used to specify access rights to SSPs:
• Generate (G): The module generates or derives the SSP.
• Read (R): The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
• Write (W): The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
• Execute (E): The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
• Zeroize (Z): The module zeroizes the SSP.
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Reset
(Show
Version)
Power cycle
or reset the
module.
Module
version
information
returned in
the card
Answer to
reset (ATR)
N/A N/A Module ATR
(Contact) or
ATS
(Contactless)
that contains
configuration
information
None Unauthenti
cated
Select Select an
application
instance.
N/A AID of
Applicatio
n to
Select.
Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenti
cated
Run Self-
Tests
Run all pre-
operational
and
N/A 'FFFFFFFFF
F'
Applicatio
Successful
execution
status
AES-ECB
CTR DRBG
ECDSA sigGen
Unauthenti
cated
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Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
conditional
self-tests.
n identifier
(AID) in
'Select'
command'
s data
field.
ECDSA sigVer
KAS-ECC
KBKDF SP 800-
108
RSA sigGen
RSA sigVer
SHA
Get DRBG Retrieve
random
numbers.
N/A Number of
bytes or
DRBG to
retrieve.
Up to 252
bytes
(2040 bits)
of DRBG
per
command
Requested
number of
bytes from the
DRBG
generator
CTR DRBG Unauthenti
cated
- OS-DRBG-
SEED: G,E
- OS-DRBG-
STATE: G,E
Open PIV
Secure
Messagin
g
Establish a
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
communica
tions
channel.
N/A ECC keys Secure
messaging
communicatio
n channel
established
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
KAS-ECC
Unauthenti
cated
- OS-DRBG-
SEED: G,E
- OS-DRBG-
STATE: G,E
- SM-C-
MAC: G,E
- SM-R-
MAC: G,E
- SM-CFRM:
G,E
- PIV-SM-
PUB: R
- PIV-SM: E
- SM-ENC: E
Open
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
Establish a
Global
Platform
Secure
Communica
tions
Channel
(SC) with
Mutual
N/A AES Keys GP Secure
Channel
established
AES-ECB
AES-CMAC
KBKDF SP 800-
108
Crypto
Officer
- OS-DRBG-
SEED: G,E
- OS-DRBG-
STATE: G,E
- SC-ENC:
G,E
- SC-C-MAC:
G,E
- SC-R-MAC:
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Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Authenticat
ion.
G,E
- SD-DAK: E
- SD-DMK: E
- SD-DEK: E
Get Data
(Cleartext
)
Retrieve
from the
Module
data
objects
transmitted
over a
plaintext
channel.
N/A Tag of the
Data
Object to
Retrieve.
Data Object
Retrieved and
Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenti
cated
Get Data
(SM)
Retrieve
from the
Module
data
objects
transmitted
with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
N/A Tag of the
Data
Object to
Retrieve
for which
the AC are
satisfied
Data Object
Retrieved and
Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenti
cated
Get Data
(SC)
Retrieve
from the
Module
data
objects
transmitted
through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Tag of the
Data
Object to
Retrieve
for which
the AC are
satisfied
Data Object
Retrieved and
Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenti
cated
Get Data
with
Attestatio
n using
RSA
(Cleartext
)
Retrieve
from the
Module
data
objects
together
with its
attestation
value.
Transmitte
N/A Tag of the
Data
Object to
retrieve
for which
the AC are
satisfied
Data Object
retrieved
followed by its
attestation and
Successful
execution
status.
None Unauthenti
cated
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Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
d over a
plaintext
channel.
Compliant
with IG
4.1.A.
Get Data
with
Attestatio
n using
RSA (SM)
Retrieve
from the
Module
data
objects
together
with its
attestation
value.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
Compliant
with IG
4.1.A.
N/A Tag of the
Data
Object to
retrieve
for which
the AC are
satisfied
Data Object
retrieved
followed by its
attestation and
Successful
execution
status.
None Unauthenti
cated
Get Data
with
Attestatio
n with
RSA (SC)
Retrieve
from the
Module
data
objects
together
with its
attestation
value.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
Compliant
with IG
4.1.A.
N/A Tag of the
Data
Object to
retrieve
for which
the AC are
satisfied
Data Object
retrieved
followed by its
attestation and
Successful
execution
status.
None Unauthenti
cated
Get Data
with
Attestatio
n Using
Retrieve
from the
Module
data,
N/A Tag of the
Data
Object to
retrieve
Data Object
retrieved
followed by its
attestation and
None Unauthenti
cated
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Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
ECDSA
(Cleartext
)
together
with its
attestation
value.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
Compliant
with IG
4.1.A.
for which
the AC are
satisfied
Successful
execution
status.
Get Data
with
Attestatio
n using
ECDSA
signature
(SM)
Retrieve
from the
Module
data
objects
together
with its
attestation
value.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
Compliant
with IG
4.1.A.
N/A Tag of the
Data
Object to
retrieve
for which
the AC are
satisfied
Data Object
retrieved
followed by its
attestation and
Successful
execution
status.
None Unauthenti
cated
Get Data
with
Attestatio
n using
ECDSA
(SC)
Retrieve
from the
Module
data
objects
together
with its
attestation
value.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
Compliant
N/A Tag of the
Data
Object to
retrieve
for which
the AC are
satisfied
Data Object
retrieved
followed by its
attestation and
Successful
execution
status.
None Unauthenti
cated
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Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
with IG
4.1.A.
Card
Validation
using RSA
Card
Authentic
ation Key
(CAK) 9E
(Cleartext
)
Validate
the card
with its
asymmetric
Card
Authenticat
ion Key 9E,
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
Compliant
with IG
4.1A.
N/A challenge
data,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenti
cated
Card
Validation
using RSA
Card
Authentic
ation Key
(CAK) 9E
(SM)
Validate
the card
with its
asymmetric
Card
Authenticat
ion Key 9E,
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
Compliant
with IG
4.1A.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
challenge,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenti
cated
Card
Validation
using RSA
Card
Authentic
ation Key
Validate
the card
with its
asymmetric
Card
Authenticat
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
challenge,
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
None Unauthenti
cated
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Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
(CAK) 9E
(SC)
ion Key 9E,
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
Compliant
with IG
4.1A.
algorithm,
Key)
execution
status
Card
Validation
using ECC
Card
Authentic
ation Key
(CAK) 9E
(Cleartext
)
Validate
the card
with its
asymmetric
Card
Authenticat
ion Key 9E,
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
Compliant
with IG
4.1A.
N/A challenge
data,
algorithm
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenti
cated
Card
Validation
using ECC
Card
Authentic
ation Key
(CAK) 9E
(SM)
Validate
the card
with its
asymmetric
Card
Authenticat
ion Key 9E,
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d with PIV
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
challenge,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenti
cated
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Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Secure
Messaging.
Compliant
with IG
4.1A.
Card
Validation
using ECC
Card
Authentic
ation Key
(CAK) 9E
(SC)
Validate
the card
with its
asymmetric
Card
Authenticat
ion Key 9E,
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
Compliant
with IG
4.1A.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
challenge,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenti
cated
Authentic
ation with
RSA PIV
Authentic
ation Key
9A
(Cleartext
)
Validate
the card
module
with its PIV
Authenticat
ion Key 9A,
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
challenge,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
RSA sigPrim User
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Authentic
ation with
RSA PIV
Authentic
Validate
the card
module
with its PIV
Authenticat
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
RSA sigPrim User
- PIV-AUTH
(including
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Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
ation Key
9A (SM)
ion Key 9A,
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
challenge,
algorithm,
Key)
execution
status
intermediat
e values): E
Authentic
ation with
RSA PIV
Authentic
ation Key
9A (SC)
Authenticat
e with PIV
Authenticat
ion Key 9A,
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
challenge,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
RSA sigPrim User
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Authentic
ation with
ECC PIV
Authentic
ation Key
9A
(Cleartext
)
Authenticat
e with PIV
Authenticat
ion Key 9A,
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
challenge,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
ECDSA sigGen
component
User
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Authentic
ation with
ECC PIV
Authentic
ation Key
9A (SM)
Authenticat
e with PIV
Authenticat
ion Key 9A,
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
challenge,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
ECDSA sigGen
component
User
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values): E
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 31 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
Authentic
ation with
ECC PIV
Authentic
ation Key
9A (SC)
Authenticat
e with PIV
Authenticat
ion Key 9A,
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
challenge,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
ECDSA sigGen
component
User
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Digital
Signature
with RSA
PIV Digital
Signature
Key 9C
(Cleartext
)
Sign an
externally
generated
hash with
PIV Digital
Signature
9C in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
N/A Algorithm,
Hash
Value, Key
Digital
Signature
RSA sigPrim User
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Digital
Signature
with RSA
PIV Digital
Signature
Key 9C
(SM)
Sign an
externally
generated
hash with
PIV Digital
Signature
9C in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d with PIV
N/A Algorithm,
Hash
Value, Key
Digital
Signature
RSA sigPrim User
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): E
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 32 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Secure
Messaging.
Digital
Signature
with RSA
PIV Digital
Signature
Key 9C
(SC)
Sign an
externally
generated
hash with
PIV Digital
Signature
9C in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Algorithm,
Hash
Value, Key
Digital
Signature
RSA sigPrim User
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Digital
Signature
with ECC
PIV Digital
Signature
Key 9C
(Cleartext
)
Sign an
externally
generated
hash with
PIV Digital
Signature
9C in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
N/A Algorithm,
Hash
Value, Key
Digital
Signature
ECDSA sigGen
component
User
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Digital
Signature
with ECC
PIV Digital
Signature
Key 9C
(SM)
Sign an
externally
generated
hash with
PIV Digital
Signature
9C in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d with PIV
N/A Algorithm,
Hash
Value, Key
Digital
Signature
ECDSA sigGen
component
User
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): E
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 33 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Secure
Messaging.
Digital
Signature
with ECC
PIV Digital
Signature
Key 9C
(SC)
Sign an
externally
generated
hash with
PIV Digital
Signature
9C in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Algorithm,
Hash
Value, Key
Digital
Signature
ECDSA sigGen
component
User
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Full
Digital
Signature
(RSA PSS)
(Cleartext
)
RSA PSS
Signature
with full
message
hashing
performed
within the
module.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
N/A Algorithm,
Message,
Keys
Digital
Signature
RSA sigGen User
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Full
Digital
Signature
(RSA PSS)
(SM)
RSA PSS
Signature
with full
message
hashing
performed
within the
module.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
N/A Algorithm,
Message,
Keys
Digital
Signature
RSA sigGen User
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): E
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 34 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Full
Digital
Signature
(RSA PSS)
(SC)
RSA PSS
Signature
with full
message
hashing
performed
within the
module.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Algorithm,
Message,
Keys
Digital
Signature
RSA sigGen User
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Full
Digital
Signature
(ECDSA)
(Cleartext
)
ECDSA
Signature
with full
message
hashing
performed
within the
module.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
N/A Algorithm,
Message,
Keys
Digital
Signature
ECDSA sigGen User
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Full
Digital
Signature
(ECDSA)
(SM)
ECDSA
Signature
with full
message
hashing
performed
within the
module.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
N/A Algorithm,
Message,
Keys
Digital
Signature
ECDSA sigGen User
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Full
Digital
Signature
(ECDSA)
(SC)
ECDSA
Signature
with full
message
hashing
N/A Algorithm,
Message,
Keys
Digital
Signature
ECDSA sigGen User
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): E
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 35 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
performed
within the
module.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
System
Key
Services
with PIV
Key
Managem
ent Keys
(RSA)
(Cleartext
)
Decrypt a
key or
generate a
shared
secret
using the
module Key
Manageme
nt Keys, in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
Key
decryption
is the use
of SP800-
56B Section
7.1.2
RSADP key
decryption
primitive.
N/A Algorithm,
RSA
Wrapped
System
Key
Unwrapped
key. The
unwrapped
key is for the
outside system
and is not
used by the
module.
RSA Decryption
Primitive
User
- PIV-KMK
(including
intermediat
e values): E
System
Key
Services
with PIV
Key
Managem
ent Keys
(RSA)
(SM)
Decrypt a
key or
generate a
shared
secret
using the
module Key
Manageme
nt Keys, in
accordance
with SP800-
N/A Algorithm,
RSA
Wrapped
System
Key
Unwrapped
key. The
unwrapped
key is for the
outside system
and is not
used by the
module.
RSA Decryption
Primitive
User
- PIV-KMK
(including
intermediat
e values): E
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 36 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
73-4.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
Key
decryption
is the use
of SP800-
56B Section
7.1.2
RSADP key
decryption
primitive.
System
Key
Services
with PIV
Key
Managem
ent Keys
(RSA) (SC)
Decrypt a
key or
generate a
shared
secret
using the
module Key
Manageme
nt Keys, in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
Key
decryption
is the use
of SP800-
56B Section
7.1.2
RSADP key
decryption
primitive.
N/A Algorithm,
RSA
Wrapped
System
Key
Unwrapped
key. The
unwrapped
key is for the
outside system
and is not
used by the
module.
RSA Decryption
Primitive
User
- PIV-KMK
(including
intermediat
e values): E
System
Key
Services
with PIV
Decrypt a
key or
generate a
shared
N/A Algorithm,
ECC Public
key
Unwrapped
Shared Secret.
The
unwrapped
KAS-ECC CDH
Component
User
- PIV-KMK
(including
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 37 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Key
Managem
ent Keys
(ECDH)
(Cleartext
)
secret
using the
module Key
Manageme
nt Keys, in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
Shared
secret
generation
is the use
of SP800-
56A Section
5.7.1.2.
shared secret
is for the
outside system
and is not
used by the
module.
intermediat
e values): E
System
Key
Services
with PIV
Key
Managem
ent Keys
(ECDH)
(SM)
Decrypt a
key or
generate a
shared
secret
using the
module Key
Manageme
nt Keys, in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
Shared
secret
generation
is the use
of SP800-
56A Section
5.7.1.2.
N/A Algorithm,
ECC Public
key
Unwrapped
Shared Secret.
The
unwrapped
shared secret
is for the
outside system
and is not
used by the
module.
KAS-ECC CDH
Component
User
- PIV-KMK
(including
intermediat
e values): E
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 38 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
System
Key
Services
with PIV
Key
Managem
ent Keys
(ECDH)
(SC)
Decrypt a
key or
generate a
shared
secret
using the
module Key
Manageme
nt Keys, in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
Shared
secret
generation
is the use
of SP800-
56A Section
5.7.1.2.
N/A Algorithm,
ECC Public
key
Unwrapped
Shared Secret.
The
unwrapped
shared secret
is for the
outside system
and is not
used by the
module.
KAS-ECC CDH
Component
User
- PIV-KMK
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Card
Validation
using
Symmetri
c Card
Authentic
ation Key
(Cleartext
)
Authenticat
e the
module
with its
Symmetric
Card
Authenticat
ion Key, in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
Compliant
with IG
4.1A.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
challenge,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenti
cated
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 39 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Card
Validation
using
Symmetri
c Card
Authentic
ation Key
(SM)
Authenticat
e the
module
with its
Symmetric
Card
Authenticat
ion Key, in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
Compliant
with IG
4.1A.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
challenge,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenti
cated
Card
Validation
using
Symmetri
c Card
Authentic
ation Key
(SC)
Authenticat
e the
module
with its
Symmetric
Card
Authenticat
ion Key, in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
Compliant
with IG
4.1A.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
challenge,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module
and Successful
execution
status
None Unauthenti
cated
External
Authentic
ation with
PIV Admin
Key
External
Authenticat
ion of AA
role to the
module
using PIV
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
Cryptogra
Authentication
Challenge,Suc
cessful
execution
status
AES-ECB PIV
Application
Administrat
or
-
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 40 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
(Cleartext
)
Admin Key
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
m,
algorithm,
Key)
ADMIN_KEY
: E
External
Authentic
ation with
PIV Admin
Key (SM)
External
Authenticat
ion of AA
role to the
module
using PIV
Admin Key
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
Cryptogra
m,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
Challenge,Suc
cessful
execution
status
AES-ECB PIV
Application
Administrat
or
-
ADMIN_KEY
: E
External
Authentic
ation with
PIV Admin
Key (SC)
External
Authenticat
ion of AA
role to the
module
using PIV
Admin Key
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
Cryptogra
m,
algorithm,
Key)
Authentication
Challenge,Suc
cessful
execution
status
AES-ECB PIV
Application
Administrat
or
-
ADMIN_KEY
: E
Mutual
Authentic
ation with
Mutual
Authenticat
ion of AA
N/A Authentica
tion
material
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
AES-ECB PIV
Application
Administrat
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 41 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
PIV Admin
Key
(Cleartext
)
role to the
module
using PIV
Admin Key
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
(Authentic
ation
Cryptogra
m,
algorithm,
Key,
Authentica
tion
challenge)
the module,
Authentication
Challenge,Suc
cessful
execution
status
or
-
ADMIN_KEY
: E
Mutual
Authentic
ation with
PIV Admin
Key (SM)
Mutual
Authenticat
ion of AA
role to the
module
using PIV
Admin Key
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
Cryptogra
m,
algorithm,
Key,
Authentica
tion
challenge)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module,
Authentication
Challenge,Suc
cessful
execution
status
AES-ECB PIV
Application
Administrat
or
-
ADMIN_KEY
: E
Mutual
Authentic
ation with
PIV Admin
Key (SC)
Mutual
Authenticat
ion of AA
role to the
module
using PIV
Admin Key
in
accordance
with SP800-
73-4.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Authentica
tion
material
(Authentic
ation
Cryptogra
m,
algorithm,
Key,
Authentica
tion
challenge)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module,
Authentication
Challenge,Suc
cessful
execution
status
AES-ECB PIV
Application
Administrat
or
-
ADMIN_KEY
: E
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 42 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Mutual
Authentic
ation with
Mutual
Authentic
ation Key
(Cleartext
)
Mutual
authenticati
on between
the module
and an
Administrat
or Key.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
N/A Authentica
tion
Cryptogra
m,
algorithm,
Admin
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module,
Authentication
Challenge,Suc
cessful
execution
status
AES-ECB PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- MUTUAL-
AUTH: E
Mutual
Authentic
ation with
Mutual
Authentic
ation Key
(SM)
Mutual
authenticati
on between
the module
and an
Administrat
or Key.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
N/A Authentica
tion
Cryptogra
m,
algorithm,
Admin
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module,
Authentication
Challenge,Suc
cessful
execution
status
AES-ECB PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- MUTUAL-
AUTH: E
Mutual
Authentic
ation with
Mutual
Authentic
ation Key
(SC)
Mutual
authenticati
on between
the module
and an
Administrat
or Key.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Authentica
tion
Cryptogra
m,
algorithm,
Admin
Key)
Authentication
cryptogram
computed by
the module,
Authentication
Challenge,Suc
cessful
execution
status
AES-ECB PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- MUTUAL-
AUTH: E
Global
Platform
Lock /
Unlock
Temporarily
lock &
unlock the
full module
or one of its
applications
using
Global
N/A Global
Platform
card life
cycle
status to
set, and
AID of the
application
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto
Officer
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC:
E
- SC-R-MAC:
E
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 43 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Platform
card life
cycle
status.
Module
Terminati
on
Set the
card life
cycle status
to
TERMINATE
D). All the
CSPs are
zeroized
when the
life cycle
status is set
to
TERMINATE
D
N/A N/A Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto
Officer
- SC-ENC:
E,Z
- SC-C-MAC:
E,Z
- SC-R-MAC:
E,Z
- OS-DRBG-
SEED: Z
- OS-DRBG-
STATE: Z
- SD-DAK: Z
- SD-DMK:
Z
- SD-DEK: Z
- DAP-AES:
Z
- PIV-SM: Z
- SM-ENC: Z
- SM-C-
MAC: Z
- SM-R-
MAC: Z
- SM-CFRM:
Z
- PIN: Z
- OCC-
Fingerprints
: Z
- OCC-
Facial: Z
- OCC-Iris:
Z
- PUK: Z
-
ADMIN_PIN:
Z
-
ADMIN_KEY
: Z
- PIV-AUTH
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 44 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- PIV-KMK
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- MUTUAL-
AUTH: Z
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- SAM-
CMAC: Z
- SAM-KDF:
Z
- SAM-KDF-
ENC: Z
- HOTP: Z
- TOTP-
SHA1: Z
- TOTP-
SHA256: Z
- TOTP-
SHA512: Z
- DAP-PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- PIV-SM-
PUB: Z
- PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- PIV-DS-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- PIV-KMK-
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 45 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- DS-HASH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
Load FW
with RSA
DAP
Load and
install
application
packages
(FW).
N/A Signed
Packages
(FW)
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
RSA sigVer
Crypto
Officer
- DAP-PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): E
Load FW
with AES
DAP
Load and
install
application
packages
(FW).
N/A Signed
Packages
(FW)
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto
Officer
- DAP-AES:
E
Manage
SD Keys
and PIV
Global
Reference
Data
Update SD
keys and
reset PIV
Global
Reference
Data (PINs
& BIO with
an ID in the
Global ID
Range).
N/A SD keys or
PIV Global
Reference
Data
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto
Officer
- DAP-PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,E
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC:
E
- SC-R-MAC:
E
- SD-DAK:
W
- SD-DMK:
W
- SD-DEK:
W
- DAP-AES:
W
- PIN: W
- PUK: W
-
ADMIN_PIN:
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 46 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
W
- OCC-
Fingerprints
: W
- OCC-
Facial: W
- OCC-Iris:
W
Manage
SD Data
Create or
update
Security
Domain
(SD) data.
N/A SD Data Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto
Officer
- SD-DEK: E
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC:
E
- SC-R-MAC:
E
Show
Status
Retrieve
the
identificatio
n and
status of all
applications
present in
the module
N/A Level of
details to
retrieve
Requested
application
status and
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto
Officer
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC:
E
- SC-R-MAC:
E
Global
Platform
DELETE
APPLICATI
ON
Remove an
application
and all its
data and
keys from
the module.
N/A AID of the
application
to remove
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto
Officer
- PIN: Z
- OCC-
Fingerprints
: Z
- OCC-
Facial: Z
- OCC-Iris:
Z
- PUK: Z
-
ADMIN_PIN:
Z
-
ADMIN_KEY
: Z
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 47 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
e values): Z
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- PIV-KMK
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- MUTUAL-
AUTH: Z
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- SAM-
CMAC: Z
- SM-R-
MAC: Z
- SM-CFRM:
Z
- HOTP: Z
- TOTP-
SHA1: Z
- TOTP-
SHA256: Z
- TOTP-
SHA512: Z
- DAP-PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- PIV-SM-
PUB: Z
- PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- PIV-DS-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
- PIV-KMK-
PUB
(including
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 48 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
intermediat
e values): Z
- DS-HASH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): Z
Personaliz
e PIV Data
(Cleartext
)
Write data
into the PIV
application.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
N/A Data
Object or
Elementar
y file to
update.
Successful
execution
status
None PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- SC-ENC: Z
- SC-C-MAC:
Z
- SC-R-MAC:
Z
Personaliz
e PIV Data
(SM)
Write data
into the PIV
application.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
N/A Data
Object or
Elementar
y file to
update.
Successful
execution
status
None PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- SM-ENC:
E,Z
- SM-C-
MAC: E,Z
- SM-R-
MAC: E,Z
Personaliz
e PIV Data
(SC)
Write data
into the PIV
application.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Data
Object or
Elementar
y file to
update.
Successful
execution
status
None PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- SD-DEK: E
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC:
E
- SC-R-MAC:
E
Manage
PIV Local
Reference
Data
(Cleartext
)
Personalize
authenticati
on datum
or local
biometric
data for
OCC (i.e.
N/A Local
authentica
tion datum
or
biometric
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto
Officer
- SC-ENC: Z
- SC-C-MAC:
Z
- SC-R-MAC:
Z
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 49 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
with an ID
in the local
ID range).
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
data for
OCC
- PIN: W
- PUK: W
-
ADMIN_PIN:
W
- OCC-
Fingerprints
: W,Z
Manage
PIV Local
Reference
Data (SM)
Personalize
authenticati
on datum
or local
biometric
data for
OCC (i.e.
with an ID
in the local
ID range).
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
N/A Local
authentica
tion datum
or
biometric
data for
OCC
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto
Officer
- SM-ENC:
E,Z
- SM-C-
MAC: E,Z
- SM-R-
MAC: E,Z
- PIN: W
- PUK: W
-
ADMIN_PIN:
W
- OCC-
Fingerprints
: W,Z
Manage
PIV Local
Reference
Data (SC)
Personalize
authenticati
on datum
or local
biometric
data for
OCC (i.e.
with an ID
in the local
ID range).
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Local
authentica
tion datum
or
biometric
data for
OCC
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
Crypto
Officer
- SD-DEK: E
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC:
E
- SC-R-MAC:
E
- PIN: W
- PUK: W
-
ADMIN_PIN:
W
- OCC-
Fingerprints
: W,Z
On-Board-
Key-
Generatio
n (CKG) -
Generate
Asymmetric
Key pair
(RSA)
N/A CKG
parameter
s
(algorithm,
Public Key
generated,
Successful
RSA keyGen
RSA sigPrim
RSA sigVer
PIV
Application
Administrat
or
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 50 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
RSA
(Cleartext
)
inside the
module,
and export
the public
key value.
Not
supported
for PIV Key
Manageme
nt Keys.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
key size,
Key ID)
execution
status
- SC-ENC: Z
- SC-C-MAC:
Z
- SC-R-MAC:
Z
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-DS-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-SM: G
- PIV-SM-
PUB: G
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- DS-HASH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
On-Board-
Key-
Generatio
n (CKG) -
RSA (SM)
Generate
Asymmetric
Key pair
(RSA)
inside the
module,
and export
the public
key value.
Not
supported
N/A CKG
parameter
s
(algorithm,
key size,
Key ID)
Public Key
generated,
Successful
execution
status
RSA keyGen
RSA sigPrim
RSA sigVer
PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- SM-ENC:
E,Z
- SM-C-
MAC: E,Z
- SM-R-
MAC: E,Z
- PIV-AUTH
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
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Page 51 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
for PIV Key
Manageme
nt Keys.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-DS-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-SM: G
- PIV-SM-
PUB: G
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- DS-HASH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
On-Board-
Key-
Generatio
n (CKG) -
RSA (SC)
Generate
Asymmetric
Key pair
(RSA)
inside the
module,
and export
the public
key value.
Not
supported
for PIV Key
Manageme
nt Keys.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
N/A CKG
parameter
s
(algorithm,
key size,
Key ID)
Public Key
generated,
Successful
execution
status
RSA keyGen
RSA sigPrim
RSA sigVer
PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- SD-DEK: E
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC:
E
- SC-R-MAC:
E
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 52 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Platform
Secure
Channel.
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-DS-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-SM: G
- PIV-SM-
PUB: G
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- DS-HASH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
On-Board-
Key-
Generatio
n (CKG) -
ECC
(Cleartext
)
Generate
Asymmetric
Key pair (
ECC) inside
the module,
and export
the public
key value.
Not
supported
for PIV Key
Manageme
nt Keys.
Transmitte
d over a
plaintext
channel.
N/A CKG
parameter
s
(algorithm,
key size,
Key ID)
Public Key
generated,
Successful
execution
status
ECDSA keyGen
ECDSA sigGen
component
ECDSA sigVer
ECDSA keyVer
PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- SC-ENC: Z
- SC-C-MAC:
Z
- SC-R-MAC:
Z
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-DS-
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 53 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-SM: G
- PIV-SM-
PUB: G
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- DS-HASH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
On-Board-
Key-
Generatio
n (CKG) -
ECC (SM)
Generate
Asymmetric
Key pair (
ECC) inside
the module,
and export
the public
key value.
Not
supported
for PIV Key
Manageme
nt Keys.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
N/A CKG
parameter
s
(algorithm,
key size,
Key ID)
Public Key
generated,
Successful
execution
status
ECDSA keyGen
ECDSA sigGen
component
ECDSA sigVer
ECDSA keyVer
PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- SM-ENC:
E,Z
- SM-C-
MAC: E,Z
- SM-R-
MAC: E,Z
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-DS-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-SM: G
- PIV-SM-
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 54 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
PUB: G
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- DS-HASH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
On-Board-
Key-
Generatio
n (CKG) -
ECC (SC)
Generate
Asymmetric
Key pair (
ECC) inside
the module,
and export
the public
key value.
Not
supported
for PIV Key
Manageme
nt Keys.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A CKG
parameter
s
(algorithm,
key size,
Key ID)
Public Key
generated,
Successful
execution
status
ECDSA keyGen
ECDSA sigGen
component
ECDSA sigVer
ECDSA keyVer
PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- SD-DEK: E
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC:
E
- SC-R-MAC:
E
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-DS-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- PIV-SM: G
- PIV-SM-
PUB: G
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values): G
- DS-HASH-
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 55 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values): G
PIV Put
Key (SM)
Secure
inject PIV
Application
keys.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
N/A Algorithm
&
Encrypted
Key value
Successful
execution
status
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
KTS (AES +
HMAC) key
wrapping/unwr
apping
Crypto
Officer
- SM-ENC:
E,Z
- SM-C-
MAC: E,Z
- SM-R-
MAC: E,Z
-
ADMIN_KEY
: W,Z
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-DS-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-KMK
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-KMK-
PUB
(including
intermediat
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 56 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-SM:
W,Z
- PIV-SM-
PUB: W,Z
- MUTUAL-
AUTH: W,Z
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- DS-HASH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- SAM-
CMAC: W,Z
- SAM-KDF:
W,Z
- SAM-KDF-
ENC: W,Z
- HOTP:
W,Z
- TOTP-
SHA1: W,Z
- TOTP-
SHA256:
W,Z
- TOTP-
SHA512:
W,Z
PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- SM-ENC:
E,Z
- SM-C-
MAC: E,Z
- SM-R-
MAC: E,Z
-
ADMIN_KEY
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 57 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
: W,Z
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-DS-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-KMK
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-KMK-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-SM:
W,Z
- PIV-SM-
PUB: W,Z
- MUTUAL-
AUTH: W,Z
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- DS-HASH-
PUB
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 58 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- SAM-
CMAC: W,Z
- SAM-KDF:
W,Z
- SAM-KDF-
ENC: W,Z
- HOTP:
W,Z
- TOTP-
SHA1: W,Z
- TOTP-
SHA256:
W,Z
- TOTP-
SHA512:
W,Z
PIV Put
Key (SC)
Secure
inject PIV
Application
keys.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Algorithm
&
Encrypted
Key value
Successful
execution
status
AES-ECB
AES-CMAC
KTS (AES +
HMAC) key
wrapping/unwr
apping
Crypto
Officer
- SD-DEK: E
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC:
E
- SC-R-MAC:
E
-
ADMIN_KEY
: W,Z
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values):
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 59 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
W,Z
- PIV-DS-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-KMK
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-KMK-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-SM:
W,Z
- PIV-SM-
PUB: W,Z
- MUTUAL-
AUTH: W,Z
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- DS-HASH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- SAM-
CMAC: W,Z
- SAM-KDF:
W,Z
- SAM-KDF-
ENC: W,Z
- HOTP:
W,Z
- TOTP-
SHA1: W,Z
- TOTP-
SHA256:
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 60 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
W,Z
- TOTP-
SHA512:
W,Z
PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- SD-DEK: E
- SC-ENC: E
- SC-C-MAC:
E
- SC-R-MAC:
E
-
ADMIN_KEY
: W,Z
- PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-DS-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-KMK
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-KMK-
PUB
(including
ID-One PIV 243 FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
© 2025 IDEMIA / atsec information security.
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Page 61 of 102
Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- PIV-SM:
W,Z
- PIV-SM-
PUB: W,Z
- MUTUAL-
AUTH: W,Z
- DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- DS-HASH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values):
W,Z
- SAM-
CMAC: W,Z
- SAM-KDF:
W,Z
- SAM-KDF-
ENC: W,Z
- HOTP:
W,Z
- TOTP-
SHA1: W,Z
- TOTP-
SHA256:
W,Z
- TOTP-
SHA512:
W,Z
Verify
Reference
Data
(Cleartext
)
Send
authenticati
on datum
(PINs or
BIO) for
verification.
Transmitte
d over an
N/A Authentica
tion Data
Successful
execution
status
None PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- PUK: E
-
ADMIN_PIN:
E
User
- PIN: E
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Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
unprotecte
d channel.
- OCC-
Fingerprints
: E
- OCC-
Facial: E
- OCC-Iris: E
Verify
Reference
Data (SM)
Send
authenticati
on datum
(PINs or
BIO) for
verification.
Transmitte
d with a PIV
Secure
Messaging.
N/A Authentica
tion Data
Successful
execution
status
None PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- PUK: E
-
ADMIN_PIN:
E
User
- PIN: E
- OCC-
Fingerprints
: E
- OCC-
Facial: E
- OCC-Iris: E
Verify
Reference
Data (SC)
Send
authenticati
on datum
(PINs or
BIO) for
verification.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Authentica
tion Data
Successful
execution
status
None PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- PUK: E
-
ADMIN_PIN:
E
User
- PIN: E
- OCC-
Fingerprints
: E
- OCC-
Facial: E
- OCC-Iris: E
Un-verify
Reference
Data
(Cleartext
)
Clear the
verification
status of
previously
verified
reference
N/A Authentica
tion Data
Successful
execution
status
None PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- PUK: E
-
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Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
data (PINs
or BIO).
Following
execution
of this
service, a
new Verify
Reference
Data shall
be called to
set its
status to
"verified"
and unlock
the
associated
Access
Condition
(AC).
Transmitte
d over an
unprotecte
d channel.
ADMIN_PIN:
E
User
- PIN: E
- OCC-
Fingerprints
: E
- OCC-
Facial: E
- OCC-Iris: E
Un-verify
Reference
Data (SM)
Clear the
verification
status of
previously
verified
reference
data (PINs
or BIO).
Following
execution
of this
service, a
new Verify
Reference
Data shall
be called to
set its
status to
"verified"
and unlock
the
associated
Access
N/A Authentica
tion Data
Successful
execution
status
None PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- PUK: E
-
ADMIN_PIN:
E
User
- PIN: E
- OCC-
Fingerprints
: E
- OCC-
Facial: E
- OCC-Iris: E
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Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Condition
(AC).
Transmitte
d with a PIV
Secure
Messaging.
Un-verify
Reference
Data (SC)
Clear the
verification
status of
previously
verified
reference
data (PINs
or BIO).
Following
execution
of this
service, a
new Verify
Reference
Data shall
be called to
set its
status to
"verified"
and unlock
the
associated
Access
Condition
(AC).
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Authentica
tion Data
Successful
execution
status
None PIV
Application
Administrat
or
- PUK: E
-
ADMIN_PIN:
E
User
- PIN: E
- OCC-
Fingerprints
: E
- OCC-
Facial: E
- OCC-Iris: E
SAM
computati
on (SM)
Use the PIV
card as a
SAM to
compute
CMAC, KDF
or
authenticati
on
N/A Diversifica
tion data
AES-CMAC
value, or KDF
or
Authentication
Cryptogram
depending on
the SAM Key
being used
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
User
- SAM-
CMAC: E
- SAM-KDF:
E
- SAM-KDF-
ENC: E
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Name Descriptio
n
Indica
tor
Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
cryptogram
to unlock a
target card.
Transmitte
d with PIV
Secure
Messaging.
(SAM-CMAC,
SAM-KDF,
SAM-KDF-ENC)
SAM
computati
on (SC)
Use the PIV
card as a
SAM to
compute
CMAC, KDF
or
authenticati
on
cryptogram
to unlock a
target card.
Transmitte
d through a
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel.
N/A Diversifica
tion data
AES-CMAC
value, or KDF
or
Authentication
Cryptogram
depending on
the SAM Key
being used
(SAM-CMAC,
SAM-KDF,
SAM-KDF-ENC)
AES-CBC
AES-CMAC
User
- SAM-
CMAC: E
- SAM-KDF:
E
- SAM-KDF-
ENC: E
One-Time-
Password
Generatio
n (HOTP)
Compute
an HMAC-
Based One
Time
Password
(HOTP)
N/A N/A for
HOTP (the
counter is
managed
by the
module)
HMAC-Based
One-time
Password
(HOTP) value
computed as
per RFC 4226
HMAC User
- HOTP: E
One-Time-
Password
Generatio
n (TOTP)
Compute a
One Time
Password
(TOTP)
N/A time
stamp
Time-based
One-time
Password
(TOTP)
algorithm
specified in
RFC 6238
SHA User
- TOTP-
SHA1: E
- TOTP-
SHA256: E
- TOTP-
SHA512: E
Table 13: Approved Services
The module supports unauthenticated services which perform cryptographic operations yet do
not claim any security provided by the compliant to exception '1b' in IG 4.1.A "Additional
Comments" section.
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4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module includes a firmware load process (Manage Content service) to support necessary
updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the
FIPS 140-3 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this
validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
When new firmware is loaded into the module using the "Load FW with RSA DAP" and "Load FW
with AES DAP" services, the Module verifies the SHA-256 digest computed over the all firmware,
and the AES-CMAC authentication code computed with SD-SMAC on each block of the firmware
and the SHA-256 digest. In addition to the previous method, the firmware load process verifies
an RSA PSS signature computed with DAP-PUB or an AES-CMAC authentication code computed
with DAP-AES key on the firmware SHA-256 digest.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module performs an integrity test over the executable firmware loaded in non-volatile
memory (NVM) (i.e. Javacard Packages) and over the ROM Code (i.e. Operating System). The
integrity test uses a 16-bit CRC.
The module does not provide any services via the HMI, SFMI, HFMI, or HSMI interface that allow
the operator to examine the executable code.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The pre-operational integrity test can be performed on demand by power cycling or resetting the
module. The module may perform conditional cryptographic algorithm self-tests on demand
through the "Run Self-Tests" service.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
The module is classified as a single chip hardware module running on limited modifiable
firmware, the requirements of this section are not applicable.
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7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Hard tamper-evident
coating
Determined by the
operator
Observe the coating surroundings of the chip
for any signs of damage
Table 14: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 EFP/EFT Information
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature
or Voltage
EFP
or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature -25C EFP Module stops all operations and shuts down
HighTemperature 112C EFP Module stops all operations and shuts down
LowVoltage 1.5V EFP Module stops all operations and shuts down
HighVoltage 6.6V EFP Module stops all operations and shuts down
Table 15: EFP/EFT Information
7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges
Temperature
Type
Temperature
LowTemperature -25°C
HighTemperature 115°C
Table 16: Hardness Testing Temperatures
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8 Non-Invasive Security
This module implements non-invasive security techniques that are not listed in SP800-140F.
These techniques are mentioned in Section 12.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
RAM Volatile Memory Dynamic
NVM Non-volatile Memory (FLASH) Static
Table 17: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
PIV Secure
Messaging (SM)
[Import]
Outside
entity
NVM Encrypted Manual Electronic AES-CBC
PIV Secure
Messaging (SM)
[Export]
NVM Outside
entity
Encrypted Manual Electronic AES-CBC
Global Platform
Secure Channel
(SC) [Import]
Outside
entity
NVM Encrypted Manual Electronic AES-CBC
Global Platform
Secure Channel
(SC) [Export]
NVM Outside
entity
Encrypted Manual Electronic AES-CBC
Table 18: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Securely zeroizes all
stored SSPs within the
module. Zeroisation
operation takes less than 1
second to erase all
plaintext SSPs
All stored keys
zeroized
By setting the
module in the
GLOBAL PLATFORM
TERMINATED STATE
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Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Global Platform
DELETE KEY
Securely zeroizes global
platform keys
Key values are
zeroized, this is also
followed by garbage
collection to clear any
values in memory
Global Platform
DELETE KEY
Command.
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
Remove an application and
all its data and keys from
the module
Key values are
zeroized, this is also
followed by garbage
collection to clear any
values in memory
Global Platform
DELETE APPLICATION
Command.
PIV PUT KEY Zeroizes all buffers held by
the key object
Values in memory
cleared
PIV PUT KEY
Command.
M_CLEAR_APDU Zeroizes the APDU buffer
memory which is used as
temporary memory buffer
Values in memory
cleared
Automatically upon
completing the
processing of a
service
SELECT Context Clears global platform
session keys from memory
Values in memory
cleared
SELECT Context
Command.
New key
generation
Overwrites the previous
key with a newly
generated value.
Previous key
overwritten
Automatically upon
generation of a new
key
Error handling Secure messaging keys
are zeroized once an error
occurs
Values in memory
cleared
Automatically upon
error detection
Module Reset Power cycles the module The module resets
clearing the contents
of SSPs stored in RAM
memory
By invoking Module
Reset service, or by
removing power
from the module
Table 19: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
The table below summarizes the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the
cryptographic services implemented in the module.
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
OS-DRBG-
SEED
Entropy input
and nonce
provided by the
entropy source,
used to seed
the Approved
DRBG
256 - 256 CSP - CSP CTR DRBG
OS-DRBG-
STATE
The current
AES-128
CTR_DRBG
Internal State
(V, Key)
128 - 128 CSP - CSP CTR DRBG CTR DRBG
SD-DAK Security
Domain Data
Authentication
Key (DAK) used
to generate SC-
ENC
256 - 256 CSP - CSP AES-CMAC
KBKDF SP
800-108
SD-DMK Security
Domain Data
MAC Key (DMK)
used to
generate SC-C-
MAC/SC-R-MAC
256 - 256 CSP - CSP AES-CMAC
KBKDF SP
800-108
SD-DEK Security
Domain Data
Encryption Key
(DEK) used to
decrypt CSPs
256 - 256 CSP - CSP AES-CBC
SC-ENC Session key
used to encrypt
/ decrypt Secure
Channel (SC)
data once
Mutual
Authentication
is successful
256 - 256 CSP - CSP KBKDF SP
800-108
AES-CBC
SC-C-MAC Session key
used to verify
inbound
256 - 256 CSP - CSP KBKDF SP
800-108
AES-CMAC
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
(Command)
Secure Channel
(SC) data
integrity
SC-R-MAC Session key
used to verify
outbound
(Response)
Secure Channel
(SC) data
integrity
256 - 256 CSP - CSP KBKDF SP
800-108
AES-CMAC
DAP-AES Data
Authentication
Pattern AES
Key. New
firmware
signature
verification key
256 - 256 CSP - CSP AES-CMAC
PIV-SM PIV Secure
Messaging Key
Establishment
Key as
described in
SP800-73-4 and
ANSI 504-1
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 -
128, 192,
256
CSP - CSP ECDSA
keyGen
KAS-ECC
SM-ENC PIV Secure
Messaging Key
Establishment
Key as
described in
SP800-73-4 and
ANSI 504-1
128, 256
- 128,
256
CSP - CSP KAS-ECC AES-CBC
SM-C-MAC Session key
used to encrypt
/ decrypt Secure
Messaging (SM)
Data
128, 256
- 128,
256
CSP - CSP KAS-ECC AES-CMAC
SM-R-MAC Session key
used to verify
data integrity of
128, 256
- 128,
256
CSP - CSP KAS-ECC AES-CMAC
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
inbound
(Command)
Secure
Messaging (SM)
SM-CFRM Secure
Messaging (SM)
session key
confirmation
key
128, 256
- 128,
256
CSP - CSP KAS-ECC AES-CMAC
PIN Card Holder
Verification
datum:
Authentication
datum (PIN or
Password) used
to verify the
Card Holder
(User)
Variable
length up
to 8 or
16 bytes
- Variable
length up
to 8 or
16 bytes
CSP - CSP
OCC-
Fingerprints
Fingerprints
Biometric Data
extracted from
the user to
verify its
identity
N/A - N/A CSP - CSP
OCC-Facial Facial Image
Biometric Data
extracted from
the user to
verify its
identity
N/A - N/A CSP - CSP
OCC-Iris Facial Image
Biometric Data
extracted from
the user to
verify its
identity
N/A - N/A CSP - CSP
PUK PIN Unblocking
Code used by
the PIV
Application
64 bits or
128 bits -
64 bits or
128 bits
CSP - CSP
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
Administrator to
reset the PIN
ADMIN_PIN Authentication
datum (PIN or
Password) used
to verify the PIV
Application
Administrator
64 bits or
128 bits -
64 bits or
128 bits
CSP - CSP
ADMIN_KEY PIV Application
Administrative
Key used to
authenticate
the PIV
Application
Administrator
128, 192,
256 -
128, 192,
256
CSP - CSP AES-ECB
PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediat
e values)
PIV
Authentication
Key (9A) used
to Authenticate
the PIV
application in
the
module.Intende
d to be used
with either
RSASP1 or
ECDSA primitive
RSA:
2048,
3072,
4096;
ECDSA P-
224, P-
256, P-
384, P-
521 -
RSA:
112,
128, 150;
ECDSA:
112, 128,
192, 256
CSP - CSP ECDSA
keyGen
RSA
keyGen
ECDSA
sigGen
componen
t
RSA
sigPrim
PIV-DS
(including
intermediat
e values)
PIV Digital
Signature Key
(9C).as
described in
SP800-78-4.
Intended to be
used with either
RSASP1or ECC
DSA Primitive
RSA:
2048,
3072,
4096;
ECDSA P-
224, P-
256, P-
384, P-
521 -
RSA:
112, 128,
150;
CSP - CSP ECDSA
keyGen
RSA
keyGen
ECDSA
sigGen
componen
t
RSA
sigPrim
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
ECDSA:
112, 128,
192, 256
PIV-KMK
(including
intermediat
e values)
PIV Key
Management
Keys (9D) and
Retired Key
Management
Keys ('82'to
'95').as
described in
SP800-78-4.
Intended to be
used with either
RSADP or ECC
DH
RSA:
1024,
2048,
3072,
4096;
ECDSA P-
224, P-
256, P-
384, P-
521 -
RSA: 80,
112, 128,
150;
ECDSA:
112, 128,
192, 256
CSP - CSP KAS-ECC
CDH
Componen
t
RSA
Decryption
Primitive
MUTUAL-
AUTH
Mutual
Authentication
Key. Key type is
identical to
SP800-78-4
Symmetric Card
Authentication
Key (9E), except
that the key is
used to enforce
mutual
authentication
access control
rules
128, 192,
256 -
128, 192,
256
CSP - CSP AES-ECB
DS-HASH
(including
intermediat
e values)
Digital
Signature key
with built-in
Hash (SHA2-
224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384 &
SHA2-512), and
RSA PSS or
ECDSA
RSA:
2048,
3072,
4096;
ECDSA P-
224, P-
256, P-
384, P-
521 -
RSA:
CSP - CSP ECDSA
keyGen
RSA
keyGen
ECDSA
sigVer
RSA sigVer
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
112, 128,
150;
ECDSA:
112, 128,
192, 256
SAM-CMAC Symmetric key
for generic
CMAC
computation
128, 192,
256 -
128, 192,
256
CSP - CSP AES-CMAC
SAM-KDF Symmetric
Master Key
used to execute
the AES CMAC
KDF Counter
Mode derivation
algorithm (as
per NIST SP800-
108) and
retrieve the
diversified key
value of a
target card
(SAM
functionality)
128, 192,
256 -
128, 192,
256
CSP - CSP KBKDF SP
800-108
SAM-KDF-
ENC
Symmetric
Master Key
used for
Administrator to
unlock a child
PIV card
128, 192,
256 -
128, 192,
256
CSP - CSP AES-CMAC
HOTP HMAC-Based
One-time
Password
(HOTP)
algorithm
specified in RFC
4226
160 - 160 CSP - CSP HMAC
TOTP-SHA1 Time-based
One-time
Password
(TOTP)
160 - 160 CSP - CSP SHA
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
algorithm
specified in RFC
6238
TOTP-
SHA256
Time-based
One-time
Password
(TOTP)
algorithm
specified in RFC
6238
256 - 256 CSP - CSP SHA
TOTP-
SHA512
Time-based
One-time
Password
(TOTP)
algorithm
specified in RFC
6238
512 - 512 CSP - CSP SHA
DAP-PUB
(including
intermediat
e values)
RSA 2048 new
firmware
signature
verification key.
2048 -
112
PSP - PSP RSA sigVer
PIV-SM-PUB The public key
component
used by the PIV
Secure Message
protocol. A
superset of key
types specified
by SP800-78-4
is supported: P-
256, P-384 and
P-521 curves.
P-256, P-
384, P-
521 -
128, 192,
256
PSP - PSP KAS-ECC
PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values)
Public
Component of
PIV
Authentication
Key
RSA:
2048,
3072,
4096;
ECDSA P-
224, P-
256, P-
384, P-
521 -
PSP - PSP ECDSA
keyGen
RSA
keyGen
ECDSA
sigVer
RSA sigVer
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
RSA:
112, 128,
150;
ECDSA:
112, 128,
192, 256
PIV-DS-PUB
(including
intermediat
e values)
Public
Component of
PIV Digital
Signature Key
RSA:
2048,
3072,
4096;
ECDSA P-
224, P-
256, P-
384, P-
521 -
RSA:
112, 128,
150;
ECDSA:
112, 128,
192, 256
PSP - PSP ECDSA
keyGen
RSA
keyGen
ECDSA
sigVer
RSA sigVer
PIV-KMK-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values)
Public
Component of
PIV Key
Management
Keys
RSA:
2048,
3072,
4096;
ECDSA P-
224, P-
256, P-
384, P-
521 -
RSA:
112, 128,
150;
ECDSA:
112, 128,
192, 256
PSP - PSP KAS-ECC
CDH
Componen
t
RSA
Decryption
Primitive
DS-HASH-
PUB
(including
intermediat
e values)
Public
Component of
Digital
Signature key
with built-in
HashPublic
Component of
RSA:
2048,
3072,
4096;
ECDSA P-
224, P-
256, P-
PSP - PSP ECDSA
keyGen
RSA
keyGen
ECDSA
sigVer
RSA sigVer
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Name Description Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Categor
y
Generate
d By
Establishe
d By
Used By
Digital
Signature key
with built-in
Hash
384, P-
521 -
RSA:
112, 128,
150;
ECDSA:
112, 128,
192, 256
Table 20: SSP Table 1
The following table continues to summarize the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are
used by the cryptographic services implemented in the module.
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
OS-DRBG-
SEED
RAM:Plaintext Until zeroized Module Reset OS-DRBG-
STATE:Derives
OS-DRBG-
STATE
RAM:Plaintext Until zeroized Module Reset OS-DRBG-
SEED:Derived
From
SD-DAK PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until zeroized Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
SC-
ENC:Derives
SD-DMK PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until zeroized Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
SC-C-
MAC:Derives
SC-R-
MAC:Derives
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
SD-DEK PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until zeroized SELECT Context
Module Reset
SC-ENC RAM:Plaintext Until Secure
Channel
closed
SELECT Context
Module Reset
SD-
DAK:Derived
From
SC-C-MAC RAM:Plaintext Until Secure
Channel
closed
SELECT Context
Module Reset
SD-
DMK:Derived
From
SC-R-MAC RAM:Plaintext Until Secure
Channel
closed
SELECT Context
Module Reset
SD-
DMK:Derived
From
DAP-AES PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until zeroized Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE KEY
PIV-SM PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until zeroized Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE KEY
SM-
ENC:Derives
SM-C-
MAC:Derives
SC-R-
MAC:Derives
PIV-SM-
PUB:Paired
With
SM-
CFRM:Used
With
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
SM-ENC RAM:Plaintext Until Secure
Messaging
closed
New key
generation
Error handling
Module Reset
PIV-
SM:Derived
From
SM-C-MAC RAM:Plaintext Until Secure
Messaging
closed
New key
generation
Error handling
Module Reset
PIV-
SM:Derived
From
SM-R-MAC RAM:Plaintext Until Secure
Messaging
closed
New key
generation
Error handling
Module Reset
PIV-
SM:Derived
From
SM-CFRM RAM:Plaintext Automatically
zeroized by
the module
once the SM
is
established.
M_CLEAR_APDU
Error handling
Module Reset
PIV-SM:Used
With
PIN PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
OCC-
Fingerprints
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
OCC-Facial PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
OCC-Iris PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PUK PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
ADMIN_PIN PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
ADMIN_KEY PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediate
values)
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
New key
generation
PIV-AUTH-PUB
(including
intermediate
values):Paired
With
PIV-DS
(including
intermediate
values)
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
New key
generation
PIV-DS-PUB
(including
intermediate
values):Paired
With
PIV-KMK
(including
intermediate
values)
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
New key
generation
PIV-KMK-PUB
(including
intermediate
values):Paired
With
MUTUAL-
AUTH
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
(SC)
[Import]
DS-HASH
(including
intermediate
values)
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
DS-HASH-PUB
(including
intermediate
values):Paired
With
SAM-CMAC PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
SAM-KDF PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
SAM-KDF-
ENC
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
HOTP PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
TOTP-SHA1 PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
TOTP-
SHA256
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
TOTP-
SHA512
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
DAP-PUB
(including
PIV Secure
Messaging
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
intermediate
values)
(SM)
[Import]
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Export]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Export]
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
PIV-SM-PUB PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Export]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Export]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
PIV-SM:Paired
With
PIV-AUTH-
PUB
(including
intermediate
values)
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
PIV-AUTH
(including
intermediate
values):Paired
With
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
[Export]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Export]
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
PIV-DS-PUB
(including
intermediate
values)
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Export]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Export]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
PIV-DS
(including
intermediate
values):Paired
With
PIV-KMK-PUB
(including
intermediate
values)
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Export]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
PIV-KMK
(including
intermediate
values):Paired
With
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
(SC)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Export]
DS-HASH-
PUB
(including
intermediate
values)
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Import]
PIV Secure
Messaging
(SM)
[Export]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Import]
Global
Platform
Secure
Channel
(SC)
[Export]
NVM:Obfuscated Until changed
or zeroized
Global Platform
TERMINATED
STATE
Global Platform
DELETE
APPLICATION
PIV PUT KEY
DS-HASH
(including
intermediate
values):Paired
With
Table 21: SSP Table 2
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10 Self-Tests
The module performs the following self-tests: pre-operational firmware integrity test, conditional
cryptographic algorithm test, conditional firmware load test and conditional pair-wise consistency
test.
The module does not support any of the following self-tests: Pre-operational Self-tests - pre-
operational bypass nor pre-operational critical functions test, conditional manual entry test,
conditional bypass test, nor conditional critical functions test.
Determination of pass or fail of each self-test is made by the module, without external controls,
externally provided input test vectors, expected output results, or operator intervention.
The module can also perform preoperational self-tests on demand for all pre-operational self-
tests by power cycling the module or by calling the “Run Self-Tests” service.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module performs pre-operational firmware integrity test automatically as a first action at
power on. The module first performs a CAST on the cryptographic algorithm test used to perform
the approved integrity technique. The module will enter the error state if the either the
conditional CAST or integrity test fails or proceed to test the conditional CASTs listed in Table 25
if both passes.
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
CRC (ROM) 16-bit CRC EDC SW/FW
Integrity
1 Performed over all ROM code
CRC (NVM) 16-bit CRC EDC SW/FW
Integrity
1 Performed over all executable
code in NVM
Table 22: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
The module performs conditional CAST prior to the algorithm’s first use. The module performs
Conditional Pair-wise Consistency Tests upon generating RSA, ECDSA or ECDH asymmetric key
pairs. The test is implemented by calculating a signature on predetermined data and
subsequently performing a verification of the signature. If the signature cannot be verified, the
generated key-pair is discarded. The module performs a conditional firmware load test when the
module loads new firmware.
Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
CRC 16-bit CRC KAT CAST 1 CAST
performed
prior to use of
algorithm for
Device
power-on or
reset
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
firmware
integrity test
AES-ECB
(A4945)
128-bit key KAT CAST 1 Decrypt Boot Up or
"Context"
service
KDF SP800-
108 (A4945)
CTR mode KDF
using AES-CMAC
with 128-bit key
KAT CAST 1 Key
Derivation
Boot Up or
"Context"
service
Counter
DRBG
(A4945)
256-bit key KAT CAST 1 Instantiate,
Generate,
Reseed
Boot Up or
"Context"
service
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
signature
generation
followed by
signature
verification using
curve P-256
PCT PCT 1 Sign/Verify On ECDSA
Key
Generation
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
ECDSA Signature
Generation using
curve P-256
KAT CAST 1 Sign
generation
comparison
First Use or
"Context"
service
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
ECDSA Signature
Generation using
curve P-256
KAT CAST 1 Sign
verification
comparison
First Use or
"Context"
service
KAS-ECC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A4945)
KAS-ECC using
curve P-256
followed by One-
step KDF
KAT CAST 1 KAS
comparison
First Use or
"Context"
service
HMAC-
SHA2-256
(A4945)
128-bit key KAT CAST 1 HMAC Boot Up or
"Context"
service
SHA2-256
(A4945)
N/A KAT CAST 1 SHA2 Boot Up or
"Context"
service
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Algorithm
or Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
SHA2-512
(A4945)
N/A KAT CAST 1 SHA2 Boot Up or
"Context"
service
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
signature
generation
followed by
signature
verification using
2048-bit key
PCT PCT 1 Sign/Verify On RSA Key
Generation
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
Signature
Generation using
PKCS1-PSS with
2048-bit key
KAT CAST 1 Sign Boot Up or
"Context"
service
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
Signature
Verification
using PKCS1-PSS
with 2048-bit
key
KAT CAST 1 Verify First Use or
"Context"
service
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
SW/FW Load
test
Signature
Verification
using PKCS1-PSS
with 2048-bit
key
Firmware
Load Test
SW/FW
Load
1 Using RSA
signature
Firmware
integrity
test
AES-CMAC
(A4945)
AES-CMAC
message
authentication
code using 128
bit key
Firmware
Load Test
SW/FW
Load
1 Using CMAC Firmware
Load Test
SHA2-256
SW/FW Load
test
SHA-256
performed over
loaded firmware
Firmware
Load Test
SW/FW
Load
1 Message
Digest
Firmware
Load Test
Table 23: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
The module has the capability to perform the pre-operational and conditional self-tests
periodically. This may occur after a predefined number of -minutes passes, or, depending on the
factory configuration, after invoking a predefined number of commands (APDUs).
The default configuration triggers a Periodic Self-Tests every 2 weeks of uninterrupted power.
That time can be adjusted by the Application Administrator from 1 to 32767 minutes.
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
CRC (ROM) EDC SW/FW Integrity Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
CRC (NVM) EDC SW/FW Integrity Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
Table 24: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
CRC KAT CAST Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
AES-ECB (A4945) KAT CAST Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
KDF SP800-108
(A4945)
KAT CAST Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
Counter DRBG
(A4945)
KAT CAST Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
PCT PCT Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
KAT CAST Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
KAT CAST Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
KAS-ECC Sp800-
56Ar3 (A4945)
KAT CAST Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A4945)
KAT CAST Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
SHA2-256
(A4945)
KAT CAST Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
SHA2-512
(A4945)
KAT CAST Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
PCT PCT Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
KAT CAST Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A4945)
KAT CAST Every 1 to 32767
min / After
invoking 1 to
32767 APDUs
Time / Counter
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
SW/FW Load test
Firmware Load
Test
SW/FW Load Upon loading of
new firmware
N/A
AES-CMAC
(A4945)
Firmware Load
Test
SW/FW Load Upon loading of
new firmware
N/A
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Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
SHA2-256
SW/FW Load test
Firmware Load
Test
SW/FW Load Upon loading of
new firmware
N/A
Table 25: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
The module enters an error state upon failing any self-test. When the test fails, a special memory
zone called the “Kill Card Zone” records the reason for the failure. All cryptographic functions are
inhibited while the module is in an error state. The table below describes the error states in
detail:
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Kill
Card
State
No further
communication is
possible with the
module until the
module is reset.
Pre-operational firmware
integrity test fail
any conditional self-test failure
other than PCT
Resetting the
module
An error
code is
provided
through the
status
interface
BAD
APDU
Entered when an
incorrectly
formatted or
unknown command
is received.
The module outputs a status
word indicating the error
condition and returns to the
Idle state, clearing the error.
This state includes Manage
Content service firmware load
attempts that fail the firmware
load test; i.e., an attempt to
load new firmware that fails
the firmware load test will
result in rejection of the
command, and the new
firmware will not be accepted
by the module.
Recovers
automatically
after reporting
the error
An error
code is
provided
through the
status
interface
Table 26: Error States
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
11.1.1 Initialization
The module must have been initialized, within IDEMIA factory, to run in FIPS 140-3 level 3 mode
of operation (e.g., NPIVP, CIV, etc.).
11.1.2 Startup Procedures
After manufacturing, the module is locked by a PIN Activation Code. The PIN Activation Code
allows the card holder to set his or her own PIN value upon getting possession of the card. The
PIN Activation Code can only be used as an authentication value for the initialization of the PIV
PIN. The card holder's PIV PIN is then used for card activation.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The module does not implement an administrator guidance.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
The module does not implement a non-administrator guidance.
11.4 Design and Rules
The module enforces the following security rules:
1. The module provides three distinct operator roles: Cryptographic Officer, PIV Application Administrator
and User.
2. The module provides identity-based authentication.
3. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
4. The module’s firmware is in executable form that does not require further compilation and there is no
dynamically modified code.
5. Pre-operational Integrity self-tests do not require any operator action.
6. Data outputs are inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
7. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise
of the module.
8. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
9. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
10. The module does not support manual key entry.
11. The module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
12. The module does not output intermediate key values or plaintext CSPs.
No additional interface or service is implemented by the module which would provide access to
CSPs.
11.6 End of Life
The Module Termination service can be used to set the module's status to TERMINATED. All SSPs
will be zeroized upon module reset.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
12.1 Attack List
The Module implements defenses against:
• Light attacks: The chip includes sensors to detect light attacks. A hardware attack event triggers the
Kill Card behavior described below.
• Invasive fault attacks: The chip includes sensors for fault attacks. A hardware attack event triggers
the Kill Card behavior described below.
• Side-channel attacks (SPA/DPA, timing analysis): The chip implements hardware countermeasures,
such as induced clock jitter. The operating system enables the hardware counter measures and
implements independent countermeasures in code, such as constant time execution.
• Electromagnetic attacks: This includes the defenses against side-channel attacks described above,
where the detection mechanism is monitoring chip emissions rather than physical power connections.
In addition, the hardware includes sensors to detect electromagnetic attacks, invoking Kill Card
behavior if detected.
• Differential fault analysis (DFA): The operating system provides checks of expected conditions in
areas of code deemed sensitive. If the check detects an error, the Kill Card behavior is initiated.
• Card tearing attacks: The operating system implements methods to assure protective measures are
completed in the next cycle if the module loses power (i.e., is removed from the reader) before
completion of the protective function.
12.3 Guidance and Constraints
The Kill Card function logs the detected attack type in a table. The table has a preset limit; when
the limit is reached, the module initiates card termination, including overwrite of the CSPs, and
the module is no longer operable.
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References
ANS X9.63-
2001
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, Key
Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography
2001
https://webstore.ansi.org/standards/ascx9/ansix9632001
ANSI X9.62 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
September 1999
https://webstore.ansi.org/standards/ascx9/ansix9621998
ANSI 504-1 Information Technology - Generic Identity Command Set - Part 1: Card
Application Command Set - Amendment 1
May 2016
https://webstore.ansi.org/standards/incits/incits5042013am12016
FIPS 140-3 FIPS PUB 140-3 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
November 2023
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf
FIPS 140-3 IG Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic
Module Validation Program
https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/fips-
140-3-ig-announcements
FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
March 2012
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf
FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf
FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS 198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198-1/FIPS-198-1_final.pdf
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FIPS 201-3 Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and
Contractors
January 2022
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.201-3.pdf
FIPS 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions
August 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf
GPC_SPE_014 GlobalPlatform Card Technology Secure Channel Protocol '03' Card
Specification v2.2 – Amendment D Version 1.1.1
July 2014
https://globalplatform.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/GPC_2.2_D_SCP03_v1.1.1.pdf
GPC_SPE_014 GlobalPlatform Card Technology - Card Specification v2.3.1
March 2018
https://globalplatform.org/specs-library/card-specification-v2-3-1/
ISO 7816 Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards
2004
ISO 14443 Identification cards — Contactless integrated circuit cards
2016
ISO 24787 Information technology — Identification cards — On-card biometric
comparison
2010
JavaCard JAVA CARD CLASSIC PLATFORM SPECIFICATION 3.1 CE
February 2021
https://www.oracle.com/java/technologies/javacard-downloads.html
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1
February 2003
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
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SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and
Techniques
December 2001
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC
Mode for Authentication
May 2005
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for
Key Wrapping
December 2012
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
SP 800-56Ar3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography
April 2018
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
SP800-56B
Rev2
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Using Integer
Factorization Cryptography
March 2019
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Br2.pdf
SP 800-56Cr2 Recommendation for Key-Derivation Methods in Key-Establishment
Schemes
August 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr2.pdf
SP 800-73-4 Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification – Part 1: PIV Card
Application Namespace, Data Model and Representation
May 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-73-4.pdf
SP 800-76-2 Biometric Specifications for Personal Identity Verification
July 2013
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-76-2.pdf
SP 800-78-4 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity
Verification
May 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-78-4.pdf
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SP 800-85A-4 PIV Card Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines (SP
800-73-4 Compliance)
April 2016
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-85A-4.pdf
SP 800-90Ar1 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators
June 2015
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
SP 800-90B Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit
Generation
January 2018
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90B.pdf
SP 800-108r1 NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key
Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
August 2022
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-108r1.pdf
SP 800-131Ar2 Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
March 2019
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.pdf
SP 800-133r2 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
June 2020
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf
SP 800-140Br1 CMVP Security Policy Requirements
October 2022
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
140Br1.2pd.pdf