REV EN NO. SECTION DESCRIPTION BY DATE
A All Initial Review J.Hurd 10-Nov-14
B All Updates from submission review B. Hannigan 2-Dec-14
C 1, 3, 4, 5 Update from CMVP comments B. Hannigan 20-May-15
D 3, 9 Update from CMVP comments B. Hannigan 1-Sept-15
E All Update to fix typos, minor errors B. Hannigan 10-Apr-18
PRODUCT CODE NO. 4W00
Pitney Bowes, Inc.
APPROVALS
BY DATE TITLE MS1 X4 PSD Security Device (PSD)
Policy
PREPARED J. Hurd DATE 10-Apr-18
CHECKED B. Hannigan DATE
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 MODULE OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................... 3
2 SECURITY LEVEL............................................................................................................... 4
3 MODES OF OPERATION.................................................................................................... 5
3.1 FIPS MODE INDICATOR................................................................................................ 6
4 PORTS AND INTERFACES ................................................................................................ 7
5 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION POLICY......................................................... 7
6 ACCESS CONTROL POLICY ............................................................................................. 9
7 SOFTWARE UPDATE ACCESS CONTROL POLICY ...................................................... 15
7.1 PSD SOFTWARE UPDATE........................................................................................... 15
8 DEFINITION OF CRITICAL SECURITY PARAMETERS (CSPS) ..................................... 16
9 FUNDS RELEVANT DATA ITEMS.................................................................................... 22
10 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT...................................................................................... 22
11 SECURITY RULES............................................................................................................ 23
12 PHYSICAL SECURITY POLICY........................................................................................ 25
13 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS POLICY .................................................................. 25
14 REFERENCES................................................................................................................... 25
15 ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................... 27
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1 Module Overview
This document describes the Security Policy for the Pitney Bowes MS1 X4 Postal Security Device
(PSD) Cryptographic Module created by Pitney Bowes, Inc.
Table 1 – Pitney Bowes X4 MS1 Postal Security Device (PSD) components
Item Version
Pitney Bowes MS1 X4 Postal Security Device
Cryptographic Module
Part # 4W84001 Rev AAA
Hardware:
MAX32590 Secure Microcontroller Revision B4
Firmware components:
Device Abstraction Layer (DAL)
PRNG Library
AES Library
ECDSA Library
DSA Library
HMAC Library
DESMAC Library
KAS Library
DH Library
RSA Library
Hash Library
Common Crypto Library
Bootloader Interface Library
01.01.00F4
01.01.0009
01.01.0008
01.01.000A
01.01.000A
01.01.0008
01.01.0008
01.01.0008
01.01.0008
01.01.000C
01.01.0008
01.01.000A
00.00.000C
PB Bootloader 00.00.0016
PSD Application 21.04.007E
Digital postal payment systems, such as the Digital Meter Program, rely on secure accounting of
postage funds and printing a cryptographic digital postage evidence mark on a mail piece in the form
of an indicium. A PSD provides security services to support the creation of digital postage marks that
are securely linked to accounting. A PSD provides two types of data protection: secrecy of critical
security parameters (CSPs), such as cryptographic keys, and data integrity protection for funds
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relevant data items (FRDIs) such as accounting data. CSPs and FRDIs reside inside the physical
protections of the PSD.
The MS1 X4 PSD is defined as a single chip cryptographic module
Figure 1 - MAX32590 Secure Processor
The MS1 X4 PSD’s cryptographic boundary is defined as the package that comprises the Maxim
Integrated MAX32590 secure microcontroller. PB executable code is stored in external memory and
copied to internal SRAM to be executed. On each power-up the firmware components listed in Table
1 are authenticated via digital signatures and then copied to internal SRAM for execution:
1. The ROM Bootloader validates the PB Bootloader using RSA-PSS 2048 signature verification. The
RSA-PSS 2048 SigVer function part of the ROM Bootloader has been validated (Cert. #1539).
2. Once the PB Bootloader has been authenticated, the PB Bootloader bootstraps and authenticates
the Device Abstraction Layer (DAL) and its firmware components using an ECDSA P-256 with
SHA-256 signature verification. The ECDSA P-256 SigVer function part of the PB Bootloader has
been validated (Cert. #529).
2 Security Level
The MS1 X4 PSD cryptographic module meets the overall requirements applicable to Level 3 security
of FIPS 140-2.
Table 2 - Module Security Level Specification
Security Requirements Section Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 3
Module Ports and Interfaces 3
Roles, Services and Authentication 3
Finite State Model 3
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Physical Security 3 + EFP
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 3
EMI/EMC 3
Self-Tests 3
Design Assurance 3
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
3 Modes of Operation
The PSD uses FIPS approved algorithms contained in the DAL. The DAL module supports the
following FIPS Approved algorithms:
Table 3 – Approved Algorithms
Algorithm Usage
FIPS 197 AES
(Cert. #2826)
Used to encrypt data output from the module and decrypt data input into the
module. Key sizes supported are 128 bits and 256 bits.
SP 800-38F AES
Key Wrapping
(KTS)
(Cert #2936)
Used to protect secret data. Key sizes supported are 128 bits and 256 bits.
FIPS 186-4 CVL
(Cert. #254)
ECDSA component for signature generation.
SP 800-90A DRBG
(Cert. #487)
Hash-Based Deterministic Random Bit Generator using SHA-256.
FIPS 186-4 DSA
(Cert. #871)
Used to generate cryptographic key pairs, generation of digital signatures and
digital signature verification for L=2048, N=256 & SHA-256.
Also, supports legacy systems when used to verify signatures for L=1024, N=160
& SHA-1.
FIPS 186-4 ECDSA
(Cert. #529)
Used to generate cryptographic key pairs, generation of digital signatures and
digital signature verification for P-256 curves (SHA-256). Cryptographic key pair
generation per FIPS 186-4 Section B.4.2.
Also, supports legacy systems when used to verify signatures for P-192 curves
(SHA-1).
HMAC
(Cert. #1769)
Used to generate HMAC-SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-256 Message Authentication
Codes. Minimum key size is 160 bit.
KAS
(Cert. #49)
Key Agreement Protocol used to establish a session key (Ephemeral Unified Model
C (2, 0, ECC CDH))
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FIPS 186-4 RSA
(Cert #1539)
Used for key generation, digital signature generation and encryption (key
encapsulation) with key size of 2048.
Also, supports legacy systems when used to verify signatures for key size = 1024.
SHS
(Cert. #2369)
SHA-1 provides the hashing algorithm used as part of the digital signature
verification process for DSA and ECDSA. It is also used in the generation of HMAC-
SHA-1 message authentication codes.
SHA-256 provides the hashing algorithm used as part of the digital signature
process for RSA, DSA and ECDSA and in the generation of HMAC SHA-256 message
authentication codes.
Triple-DES
(Cert. #1690)
Legacy encryption support 2-key Triple-DES and 3-key Triple-DES keys. Life of
the module is designed to perform fewer than 2^20 blocks of data encryption.
Triple-DES MAC
(Cert. #1690,
vendor affirmed)
Legacy SP 800-57 Part 1 (Revision 3) message authentication.
The module supports the following non-Approved but Allowed security functions:
Table 4 – Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions
Diffie Hellman Key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of security using 2048 bit keys
NDRNG The hardware RNG is used to initially seed the Approved DRBG
The module supports the following non-Approved security functions while operating in non-FIPS
mode:
Table 5 - Non-Approved Security Functions
Diffie Hellman
(non-compliant)
Key Agreement Protocol used to establish a session key. Key agreement using
1024 bit keys
DSA
(non-compliant)
This algorithm is used to generate key pairs and generate signatures for L=1024,
N=160 & SHA-1.
ECDSA
(non-compliant)
This algorithm is used to generate key pairs, digital signatures for P-160 (SHA-1)
and P-192 (SHA-1) curves.
RSA
(non-compliant)
This algorithm is used to digitally sign using schemes PKCS 1.5, X9.31 and PSS,
PKCS 1 version 2.1 for 1024 bit modulus using SHA-1.
3.1 FIPS Mode Indicator
The module supports a single mode of operation in which the module alternates service by service
between Approved and non-Approved modes of operation. When the module executes the services
not relying on cryptographic functions or relying on Approved algorithms it is said to operate in an
Approved mode of operation. Corollary, when the services relying on non-Approved algorithms are
executed, the module is said to operate in a non-Approved mode of operation.
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The MS1 X4 PSD has a Non Fips Mode Parameter that can be set via a Load Parameters message. If
the non-FIPS Mode Parameters is set, the most significant bit of the status word in each message
response is set, reflecting that the MS1 X4 PSD is operating in a non-FIPS Mode.
4 Ports and Interfaces
The MAX32590 is supplied in a 324-pin BGA package where all power input, data input, data output,
control input, and status output interfaces are supported.
Ball Grid Array Pin Horizontal from “x”
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Ball
Grid
Array
Pin
Vertical
from
“x”
A - - - - - - O - - - - - - - - - - -
B - - - - - - I - - - - - - - - - - -
C - - P - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
D - - P - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
E - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
F - - - - - P P P P P P P IO IO - - - -
G - - - - S P - - - - - P C - - - - -
H - - - - P P - - - - - P S - - - - -
J - - - - C P - - - - - P C - - - - -
K - - - - C P - - - - - P C - - - - -
L - - - - - P - - - - - P - - - - - -
M - - - S - P - - - - - P - - - - - -
N - - - - - P P P P P P P - S - - S S
P - - - O - O O O O O O - O O O O O O
R - - - - - - - - - IO IO IO IO O O O O O
T - - - - - - - - - IO IO IO IO - O O O O
U - - - - - - - - - IO IO IO IO - - O O O
V - - - - - - - - - IO IO IO IO - - O O O
I = Data In O = Data Out S = Status Out C = Control In P = Power - = Disabled
Figure 2 – Interface Mapping
5 Identification and Authentication Policy
There is no traditional login process for an operator for any role in the MS1 X4 PSD design. No role or
identity is active other than during the processing of a valid authorized transaction. Each request sent
to the MS1 X4 PSD is digitally signed with a particular key. The MS1 X4 PSD authenticates the entity
by verifying the digital signature with the associated public certificate.
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Table 6 - Roles and Authentication Type
Role Authentication Method Authentication Type
Crypto-Officer Digital Signature Verification Identity-based
PSD Administrator Digital Signature Verification Identity-based
Printing Administrator Digital Signature Verification Identity-based
Financial Officer (User) Digital Signature Verification Identity-based
Customer On behalf of the PSD Administrator,
Printhead Administrator, or Financial
Officer
None
Table 7 - Authentication Strength
Authentication Mechanism Strength of Mechanism
Digital Signature Based on number of protected bits in the key or signature, the
probability is 1 in 2X tries, where x is the number of protected bits
and thus, less than 1 in 1,000,000.
External entities are authenticated using digital signatures based
on the ECDSA P-256 curve. This provides 128 bits of key strength
or a probability of random success in 1 in 2^128. The module can
execute 17.85 ECDSA P-256 Signature Verifications per second
therefore the probability of a success in a one minute period is 1 in
3.2 X 1035 which is less than 1/100,000.
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6 Access Control Policy
Each identity and corresponding services are described in the following section.
Crypto-Officer (CO):
The CO is responsible for the high level key management within the PSD. The primary functions are to
load keys into the MS1 X4 PSD and to authorize the generation and use of a Debit and Operation Keys.
The services allocated to this role are as follows:
 Generate PSD Key: The Crypto Officer sends this block to instruct the PSD to generate a
Public/Private key pair that is the PSD Authentication Operation Key OR the PSD
Authentication Debit Key. The message contains a Signed Parameter Record with the
parameters for use in the generation of the private and public key values. The cryptographic
algorithm supported for use as the PSD Authentication Operation Key is ECDSA. The
cryptographic algorithms supported for use as the PSD Authentication Debit Key is DSA and
ECDSA. The algorithm used is determined by the Key Descriptor in the Signed Parameter
Record and is based on postal requirements.
 Load PRNG Seed: The Crypto Officer sends this block to instruct the PSD initialize the Pseudo
Random Bit Generator. The PSD shall retrieve data from the TRNG to create the DRBG-V, Key
Encryption Key, Key Authentication Key and DRBG-WS.
 Load Certificate Key: The Crypto Officer sends this certificate to instruct the PSD to load the
Domain MS1 Auth Certificate Key from the host or PB Infrastructure systems in a certificate
signed by the Domain MS1 Auth Vendor ECDSA P-256 Key. The key is to be stored in the NVM
for later use in verification of signed records. The PSD shall receive the Load Certificate Key
message and then validate the message header and data content. If accepted as valid, the PSD
shall verify the Domain Auth MS1 Certificate Key Certificate with the Domain MS1
Authentication Vendor Key. If valid, the PSD shall store the Domain MS1 Auth Certificate Key.
The Domain MS1 Auth Certificate Key is an ECDSA P-256 Key. Otherwise an error message
shall be generated
 Load Vendor Key: The Crypto Officer sends this certificate to instruct the PSD to load the
Domain MS1 Vendor Key from the host or PB Infrastructure systems in a certificate signed by
the Domain Comet Auth Sigma Mfg ECDSA FP256 Key. The key is to be stored in the NVM for
later use in verification of signed records. The PSD shall receive the Load Vendor Key message
and then validate the message header and data content. If accepted as valid, the PSD shall
verify the Domain Auth MS1 Vendor Key Certificate with the Domain Comet Auth Sigma Mfg
Key. If valid, PSD shall store the Domain MS1 Authentication Vendor Key. Otherwise an error
message shall be generated. The Domain MS1 Authentication Vendor Key is an ECDSA P-256
Key.
 Load CRL: The Crypto Officer sends this message to request the PSD to store the Certificate
Revocation List and the CRL version if needed and store the list in internal memory. The CRL
is a signed structure, signed by the Domain MS1 Authentication Vendor Key. The version of
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the CRL must be greater than or equal to any previously loaded otherwise an error will be
reported and the PSD will be disabled. The version number of the currently loaded PSD is
recorded in Flash memory for future comparison. Once the PSD is out of Manufacturing state,
it will require that a CRL be loaded. Prior to loading a CRL, all functions requiring
cryptographic operations other than Load CRL will be blocked. Any public key identified by
the CRL will be blocked from use in the PSD.
 Load Encrypted Key: The Crypto Officer sends this certificate to instruct the PSD to load a
signed key record containing an encrypted symmetric or private key. The following keys can
be loaded with the Load Encrypted Key command:
o P’UPsdA-Dbt
o P’UPsdP-Dbt
o KUPsdA-Dbt
PSD Administrator (PSDA):
The PSD Administrator manages non-key data used to set internal parameters and settings in the MS1
X4 PSD. The Postage by Phone system and the Manufacturing Systems are the only entities who act as
the PSD Administrator.
 Load Parameters - The PSD Administrator sends this block to load either functional
parameters or data parameters to the PSD. The parameter blocks are signed by the Domain
MS1 Auth Certificate Key. If the PSD is in the operational state, the first parameter in the
parameter block must be the challenge value from the most recent “Get Challenge” command
to the PSD.
Supported functional parameters are:
o Transition to Operational State: The Transition to Operational State parameter shall cause
the MS1 X4 PSD to transition to operational state. This shall place the MS1 X4 PSD in the
Operational State.
o Transition to Base State: Triggers an event to transition the PSD from Manufacturing state
to Base state. Should only be sent to PSD after all parameters required for sign on with the
Data Center have been successfully loaded
o Disable PSD: This command shall place the MS1 X4 PSD in the Disabled state. No indicia
shall be generated and no postage value downloads shall be performed.
o Enable PSD: This command may transition the MS1 X4 PSD from the Disabled state to the
Serial Number Locked state. It shall be valid only if no other lockout states are met.
o Reinitialize PSD: Causes PSD to erase all NVM data except for HW Mfg Data and ‘persistent’
data (total device cycles, reinit count) and then invalidates the PSD App. Used in the
remanufacturing process, or to ‘clean’ the PSD to retry configuration from scratch. This
command zeroizes the Unique PSD Key Encryption Key which results in the loss of all other
Private and Secret Keys.
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o Transaction Start: Triggers event to have the PSD prepare for a multi-message transaction
that must be completed successfully as a unit (atomic transaction). This means that if any
one of the messages within the transaction fails, all messages must be rolled back.
Not all messages sent after start of a transaction are processed to allow commit/rollback.
The messages that are handled in the transaction are PVD (one occurrence), Load
Parameters (only data parameters), Load Encrypted Key, and Generate PSD Key.
o Transaction Commit: Triggers event to ‘commit’ the updates made by PVD, Load
Parameters, Load Encrypted Key, and / or Generate PSD Key made after the Transaction
Start event was processed.
o Transaction Rollback: Triggers event to rollback (cancel) the updates made by PVD, Load
Parameters, Load Encrypted Key, and / or Generate PSD Key made after the Transaction
Start event was processed.
 Process Flex Debit Block: The PSD Administrator sends this block to load flex debit templates into
the PSD. The flex debit template defines the indicia content for subsequent debit operations. The
flex debit template is signed by the Domain MS1 Auth Certificate Key.
 Generate Session Key: The PSD Administrator sends this block to instruct the PSD to generate a
key via Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement procedure that will be used for either:
o Infrastructure session, where the generated key will be used once for wrapping a
secret/private key to be loaded into the PSD via Load Key Request
o Printer session where the generated key will be used for applying a MAC to all PSD
responses for authentication by the ‘printer’
o The message contains a Key Block with the initiator public key including EC-DH key
parameters signed by the Domain MS1 Auth Certificate Keyfor generating the responder
private key and deriving the shared secret key. The response contains the data required
for the device doing the key Agreement to compute the shared key.
o If a printer session is required (Communication Authentication Type parameter value is 1)
then the PSD will restrict the same functions that are blocked prior to loading the CRL, with
the exception of Generate Session Key to allow session to be initiated, and Load Parameters
to allow session requirement to be toggled.
 Start Software Update Triggers event to invalidate the current loaded PSD App and jump to the
Software Update Utility entry point to allow start of software download with new PSD Application.
The Allow SW Updates – this parameter must be set to TRUE before this command can be
executed.
Software Update is described in section 7.1 Software Update
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Printing Administrator (PHA):
The Printing Administrator is in charge of downloading information used in conjunction with the
Printing such as images and page layouts.
 Verify Hash Block: The Printing Administrator sends these blocks to instruct the PSD to verify a
MS1 binary SHA 256 Hash Block.
The PSD shall receive the MS1 Download Certificate and MS1 Binary Hash Block and then validate
the message header and data content. If accepted as valid, the PSD shall verify the MS1 Download
Certificate with the Domain MS1 Authentication Vendor Key. If valid, the PSD will extract the
Domain MS1 Auth Download key from the download certificate. This key will be used in verifying
the input MS1 Binary Hash Block. Otherwise, an error message is returned.
The PSD shall validate the message header and data content of the I_BLK_MS1_BIN_HASH_BLK
binary hash block. If accepted as valid, the PSD shall verify the MS1 Binary Hash Block with the
Domain MS1 Auth Download Key that was previously loaded. Otherwise, an error message is
returned
Financial Officer (FO):
Funds transfer into and out of the MS1 X4 PSD is the responsibility of the Financial Officer. This
corresponds to the “User” role as identified by FIPS 140-2. Postage by Phone is the Financial Officer.
 Process Postage Value Download Block: The Funds Officer sends this block to perform a
postage value download operation. The PSD will validate the message header and data content
and verify the signature of the MS1 PVD Response Block with the Domain MS1 Authentication
Certificate Key.
 Withdraw Request: The Funds Officer sends this message to request the PSD prepare to
perform a Withdrawal operation. The PSD will enter a locked state (Withdrawal Pending) that
will not permit any debit or credit operations. The PSD creates a Withdraw Request block
containging the PSD’s register values. The PSD signs the Withdraw Request block with the
Unique PSD Operational Key. The only way to exit the locked state is by the Data Center
aborting the withdraw operation in the Withdraw Request
 Process Withdraw Response: The Funds Officer sends this message to complete the withdraw
process. The postage is removed from the PSD upon receiving the MS1 Withdraw Response
Block. This block is signed to verify the integrity and authenticity of the content using the
Domain MS1 Auth Certificate Key
The PSD shall receive the message, and then validate the message header and data content. If
accepted as valid, the PSD shall verify the MS1 Withdraw Response Block. If valid, the PSD will
remove the funds from the funds registers and set the state to the Withdrawn State. If the Data
Center status indicates that the refund is to be aborted, the PSD will not reset the descending
register and will exit the withdraw pending state and return to Operational State if no other
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lockout conditions exist. If any other Data Center error is indicated, the PSD will remain in the
Withdraw Pending state.
 Prepare Audit Record: The Funds Officer sends this command to request that the PSD prepare
a signed Audit Request Block. The Audit Request Block contains the PSD register values and
real time clock value. The record is signed by the Unique PSD Operational Key and sent to the
Financial Officer
 Process Audit Response: The Funds Officer sends this commandto the PSD so that it may
process the MS1 Audit Response Block returned from the Pitney Bowes infrastructure in
response to the immediate previous Audit Request command. The MS1 PSD shall verify the
signature of the MS1 Audit Response Block with the Domain MS1 Auth Certificate Key.
Depending on PCN parameter settings, this command may cause clearing of the inspection
lockout or the resetting of the next inspection due date.
The PSD shall use clock offset correction to update its clock drift correction parameter
 Generate Finalizing Franking Record: The Funds Officer sends this command to request that
the PSD prepare a signed Finalizing Franking Record. This message is valid only for Germany
FrankIt and includes a hash implemented according the FrankIt specification. The
IndiciaSecurityType parameter must be set to Germany FrankIt. Data items include Indicia
Serial Number, ascending register, descending register, piece count, and other defined data
items.
Customer (CU):
This role performs services on behalf of the PSD Administrator, Financial Officer and Printing
Administrator; services allocated to this role require other authorized transactions to occur in
conjunction with the service being invoked.
 Precompute r for Debit: The Host sends this message to the PSD to have it pre-compute the ‘r’
signature component for the PSD Auth Key signature (DSA or ECDSA). This message is used
for countries whose debit certificate is signed by a DSA or ECDSA key.
 Create Debit Certificate: The Host sends this message to the PSD to have it create a debit
certificate in the format defined by the Flex Debit Certificate Template. Input to this command
is defined by the Flex Debit Templates.
The data included in this command is dependent on the country requirements. Typical data
includes Debit Value, Mail Date and Data Capture Recovery Data. The definitions of the data
input and output by the Debit command is provided in the Flex Debit Templates that are
loaded by the host device on each power up or when debit certificate format is updated.
Based on PCN parameter settings, invocation of this command will cause required
cryptographic calculations to create the debit certificate. This command will return an error if
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input data is out of allowable ranges and if Origin Postal Code is NULL, indicating that the
postal code data was never set.This is done on behalf of the Financial Officer.
 Finalize Debit: The Host sends this message to have the PSD perform post-debit housekeeping
and prepare for the next Debit operation by precomputing the ‘r’ signature parameter if
necessary
Unauthenticated Services:
Miscellaneous functions that do not require the MS1 X4 PSD authentication of the entity;
Unauthenticated Services are available to all roles, both authenticated and unauthenticated.
 Get Challenge: The Host shall instruct the MS1 X4 PSD to output an eight byte nonce (random
number), which shall be used in a subsequent command that requires that nonce word for
authentication. This is always done in conjunction with another authorized transaction, and is
then considered as being done on behalf of any role that requires a nonce value.
 Get Key List: Instructs the PSD to return a list of all active keys stored in the PSD.
 Set Clock: The Host sends this command to setup the real time clock in the PSD. The real time
clock can only be programmed when the PSD is in manufacturing state. It cannot be changed
once the PSD is ‘locked’. It is assumed that the clock is set to GMT.
 Get Clock Offsets: Returns the MS1 X4 PSD clock offset values
 Get Local Time: This command shall cause the MS1 X4 PSD to return the value of the real time
clock with all of the offsets calculated, including the GMT offset and drift correction.
 Get GMT Time: Returns the clock value with the drift correction added (GMT Time if clock is
set correctly).
 Set GMT Offset: The Host sends this command to set the GMT offset in the PSD. The GMT
offset is a combination of offsets (daylight savings time offset, time zone offset, etc.) that need
to be set by the customer.
 Get Parameters: The Host sends this message to the PSD to retrieve parameter values from the
PSD. The Host can request individual parameter IDs or all of the Parameters in the PSD.
 Perform Full Diagnostics: The Host device sends this command to the PSD to request the PSD
perform its diagnostic processing. The PSD will run its power up tests as well perform other
maintenance activities.
 Perform Diagnostic Test: The Host sends this message to request that the MS1 X4 PSD perform
a diagnostic test.
 Read Log File: The Host device sends this message to the PSD to get Log Data. The number of
available entries, the size of each entry, and the data contained in each entry will depend on
the log that is being requested.
 Get PSD Status: The Host device sends this message to the PSD to request PSD status
information. Included in the status information is the PSD Application status word (32 bits),
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the HW Status word (32 bits), current PSD State (16 bits) and the current PSD internal state
(16 bits).
The Get PSD Status command is also used to invoke transition of the PSD state from a state
where a specific message is expected (i.e. Process Audit Response) to the normal idle state
where most PSD commands are processed.the MS1 X4 PSD is in a state where a specified
command is expected, this command is used to return the MS1 X4 PSD to its Idle state and
provide status.
 Get PSD Attributes: The Host requires that the PSD to request its attribute data.
 Reboot: The Host sends this command to reboot the PSD application.
7 Software Update Access Control Policy
The PSD supports a secure software update process. In order to achieve this, the PSD must relinquish
control to DAL. The DAL contains a Software Update Utility which is used to update the PSD application
in a safe manner. This layer is referred to as the Software Update Utility.
7.1 PSD Software Update
The Start Software Update event triggers the software update process. This event instructs the PSD
relinquish control to the Software Download Utility in the DAL. PSD Software applications are loaded in
chunks. Each chunk is signed by the Domain MS1 Authentication PSD Software Key (ECDSA 256). In
addition a record containing a signed SHA 256 Hash of the entire application is verified by the PSD prior
to accepting the new application. This record is also signed by the Domain MS1 Authentication PSD
Software Key.
The Software Download Utility supports the following messages:
PSD Administrator (PSDA):
 Setup Download Data: The Host sends this signed record to make the Software Download Utility
aware of the parameters of the software (application) to be downloaded. This message is signed
by the Domain MS1 Authentication PSD Software Key. Receipt of this message triggers a transition
to the state required to load chunk information. The Setup Download Data message is only valid if
the SDU is idle and waiting to begin a download.
 Setup Download Chunk: The Host sends this signed record to make the Software Download Utility
aware of the parameters of the software (application) chunk to be sent in the following message.
Receipt of this message triggers a transition to the state required to load the chunk. The Setup
Download Chunk message is only valid if the SDU has received a valid Setup Download Data
message.
 Download Chunk: This message contains the data referenced in the Setup Download Chunk
message.
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Utility Functions
The following utility functions are unauthenticated and intended to aid the host application in managing
the software update process.
 Get PSD Attributes: This function is invoked using the same command ID as the PSD Application.
It returns a ‘PSD Attributes’ response message with all fields set to ‘0’ except for the SDU Version,
which is set appropriately, and the HW Version Number (PB SMR) and Device Serial Number
which are retrieved from the Manufacturing Data written by the HW manufacturer. The structure
and memory location of the Manufacturing Data is defined in X4 Manufacturing DAL Interface
Specification (refer to mfgdata.h in PSD Application project for structure used to parse the
Manufacturing Data).
 Reboot: This function is invoked using the same command ID as the PSD Application. It returns a
‘Reboot’ response message, waits for 1 second, then resets the MAX32590.
 Get PSD Status: The Host device sends this message to the PSD to request PSD status information.
Included in the status information is the PSD Application status word (32 bits), the HW Status
word (32 bits), current PSD State (16 bits) and the current PSD internal state (16 bits).
8 Definition of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
The following table describes the CSPs contained in the module:
Table 8 – CSPs
Key Key Name Description /
Usage
Generation /
Agreement
Storage Entry /
Output
Destruction
KEK Unique HSM Key
Encryption Key
AES256 Key
Encryption Key
Internally by
FIPS approved
DRBG
cleartext in
BBREG,
ciphertext
in BRAM
Entry: N/A
Output: N/A
Zeroized on
Tamper or
Reinitialize or
removal of all
power
KAK Unique HSM Key
Authentication
Key
HMAC256 Key
Authentication
Key
Internally by
FIPS approved
DRBG
Ciphertext
in BRAM
Entry: N/A
Output: N/A
Encrypting
key zeroized
on Tamper or
Reinitialize
or removal of
all power
P’UPsdA-Dbt Unique PSD
Authentication
Debit Private
Key
ECDSA or DSA key
used sign debit
records
Internally by a
FIPS Approved
DRBG
cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: N/A
Output: N/A
Encrypting
key zeroized
on Tamper or
Reinitialize or
removal of all
power
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Key Key Name Description /
Usage
Generation /
Agreement
Storage Entry /
Output
Destruction
KUPsdA-DBT Unique PSD
Authentication
Debit Secret Key
AES, TDES, HMAC
key used to
generate Message
Authentication
codes on debit
Records
External cleartext in
SRAM
Entry:
Encrypted
Output: N/A
Encrypting
key zeroized
on Tamper or
Reinitialize or
removal of all
power
P’UPSDA-Op Unique PSD
Authentication
Operational
Private Key
ECDSA keys used
to communicate
with the
infrastructure
Internally by a
FIPS Approved
DRBG
cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: N/A
Output: N/A
Encrypting
key zeroized
on Tamper or
Reinitialize or
removal of all
power
P’UPSDP-Dbt Unique PSD
Privacy Debit
Key
RSA public keys
used to
encapsulate postal
generated debit
keys
External cleartext in
SRAM
Entry:
Encrypted
Output: N/A
Encrypting
key zeroized
on Tamper or
Reinitialize or
removal of all
power
KUPSDP-Dbt Unique PSD
Privacy Debit
Key
TDES key used to
encrypt postal
security related
parameters to the
PSD
External cleartext in
SRAM
Entry:
Encrypted
Output: N/A
Encrypting
key zeroized
on Tamper or
Reinitialize or
removal of all
power
KSPSDA-Prt Session PSD
Authentication
Printer Key
HMAC Key used to
authenticate
messages sent to
the system
controller
Key
Agreement
per SP 800-
56A
cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: N/A
Output: N/A
End of
session or
zeroized on
Tamper or
Reinitialize or
removal of all
power
KUSPDP-Op Session PSD
Privacy
Operation Key
AES Key used to
wrap secret or
private key data
sent from the
infrastructure
Key
Agreement
per SP 800-
56A
cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: N/A
Output: N/A
End of
session or
zeroized on
Tamper or
Reinitialize or
removal of all
power
DRBG WS DRBG Working
State
Values for V and C
of the DRBG
Updated
during each
internal call to
the DRBG
ciphertext
in BRAM
Entry: N/A
Output: N/A
Encrypting
key zeroized
on Tamper or
Reinitialize or
removal of all
power
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Key Key Name Description /
Usage
Generation /
Agreement
Storage Entry /
Output
Destruction
DRBG V DRBG Entropy
Input
Random bits
obtained from the
Hardware RNG
Hardware
RNG
ciphertext
in BRAM
Entry: N/A
Output: N/A
Encrypting
key zeroized
on Tamper or
Reinitialize or
removal of all
power
The following table describes the public keys contained in the module:
Table 9 - Public Keys
Key Key Name Description / Usage Generation /
Agreement
Storage Entry / Output
MRK Maxim Root Key RSA PSS 2048 public
key used to validate
CRK when it is loaded.
Externally cleartext in
OTP
Entry: Hard
Coded in
MAX32590 ROM
Output: N/A
CRK Customer Root
Key
RSA PSS 2048 public
key used to validate PB
Bootloader
Externally cleartext in
OTP
Entry:
Authenticated
Output: N/A
SWAK HSM Software
Authentication
Download Key
ECDSA P-256 public key
used to validate
firmware
Externally cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: Hard
coded in BL SDU
Output: N/A
PDCmtA-
SigMfg
Domain Comet
Authentication
Sigma
Manufacturing
Key
ECDSA used to validate
Software Download
Utility and Vendor
Certificate
Externally cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: Certificate
form
Output: N/A
PDMS1A-C Domain MS1
Authentication
Certificate Key
ECDSA used to validate
Authority Data
Externally cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: Certificate
form
Output: N/A
PDMS1A-Dl Domain MS1
Authentication
Download Key
ECDSA used to validate
data blocks for the
Trusted Printer from
the infrastructure
Externally cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: Certificate
form
Output: N/A
PDMS1A-PsdS Domain MS1
Authentication
PSD Software
Key
ECDSA key used to
authenticate PSD
application Software
Externally cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: Embedded
with DAL
Software Update
Utility form
Output: N/A
PDMS1A-V Domain MS1
Authentication
Vendor Key
ECDSA vendor
authentication
Externally cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: Certificate
form
Output: N/A
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Key Key Name Description / Usage Generation /
Agreement
Storage Entry / Output
PUMS1KA-B Unique MS1 Key
Agreement Base
Key
ECDH Key used in key
agreement between the
Base an PSD
Externally cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: Certificate
form
Output: N/A
PUMS1KA-Op Unique MS1 Key
Agreement
Operation Key
ECDH Key used in Key
Agreement between
Infrastructure and PSD
Externally cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: Certificate
Form
Output: N/A
PUPsdA-Dbt Unique PSD
Authentication
Debit Key
ECDSA or DSA key used
sign debit records
Internally by a
FIPS Approved
DRBG
cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: N/A
Output:
Certificate Form
PUPSDA-Op Unique PSD
Authentication
Operational Key
ECDSA keys used to
communicate with the
infrastructure
Internally by a
FIPS Approved
DRBG
cleartext in
SRAM
Entry: N/A
Output:
Certificate Form
The following table describes the modes of access for each key to each role supported by the module. The
modes of access are defined as:
 Zeroize: The module zeros the key memory location.
 Generates: The module generates the key using the FIPS Approved PRNG.
 Establishes: A key agreement process is used to establish the specified key.
 Load: Inputs the key.
 Decrypt: Decrypts something with the specified key.
 Sign: Signs with the specified key.
 Revokes: Revokes a key based on identifiers in the CRL.
Table 10 – Modes of Access
Roles Services CSP Modes of Access
CO
PSDA
PHA
FO
CU
X
Generate PSD
Key
Generates P’UPsdA-Op and P’UPsdA-Dbt corresponding public key
is output signed by current version of P’UPsdA-Op P’UPsdA-I,
Encrypt with KEK
X Load CRL Revokes the key(s) identified in the CRL
X Load Vendor Key Verifies and loads PDMS1A-V
X
Load Certificate
Key
Verifies and loads PDMS1A-C
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Roles Services CSP Modes of Access
CO
PSDA
PHA
FO
CU
X
Load Encrypted
Key
Verifies and loads KUPsdA-DBT, P’UPSDP-Dbt, KUPSDP-Dbt, PDCmtA-SigMfg,
PDMS1A-Dl, PDMS1A-PsdS, PUMS1KA-B, PUMS1KA-Op,
X
Load PRNG Seed Triggers generation of DRBG V, KEK, KAK and intial DRBG
WS
X
Withdraw
Request
Sign with P’UPSDA-Op
X
Process Postage
Value Download
Block
N/A
X
Process
Withdraw
Response:
N/A
X
Process Audit
Response
N/A
X
Prepare Audit
Record
Sign with P’UPSDA-Op
X
Generate
Finalizing
Franking Record
N/A
X
Verify Hash
Block
N/A
X Load Parameters N/A
X
Process Flex
Debit Block
N/A
X Disable PSD N/A
X Enable PSD N/A
X Reinitialize PSD Zeroizes all Secret and Private key data
X
Transition to
Base State
N/A
X
Transition to
Operational State
N/A
X Generate Session Loads PUMS1KA-Op, generates KUSPDP-Op
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Roles Services CSP Modes of Access
CO
PSDA
PHA
FO
CU
Key or
Loads PUMS1KA-B, generates KSPSDA-Prt
X
Start Software
Update
N/A
X
Setup Download
Data
N/A
X
Setup Download
Chunk
N/A
X Download Chunk N/A
X Finalize Debit Sign with P’UPsdA-I
X
Precompute r for
Debit
N/A
X Create Debit
Certificate
Sign with P’UPsdA-Dbt
X Finalize Debit N/A
X X X X X Get Challenge N/A
X X X X X Get Key List N/A
X X X X X Get Parameters N/A
X X X X X Reboot N/A
X X X X X
Get PSD
Attributes
N/A
X X X X X Get PSD Status N/A
X X X X X Get Clock Offsets N/A
X X X X X Get GMT Time N/A
X X X X X Get Local Time N/A
X X X X X
Perform
Diagnostic Test
N/A
X X X X X
Perform Full
Diagnostics
N/A
X X X X X Read Log File N/A
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Roles Services CSP Modes of Access
CO
PSDA
PHA
FO
CU
X X X X X Set GMT Offset N/A
9 Funds Relevant Data Items
FRDIs are data items (reflecting financial data) whose authenticity and integrity are critical; however,
are not CSPs and should not be zeroized. All FRDIs are stored in nonvolatile memory in the module.
FRDIs include:
 Indicia Serial Number is the identification number associated with the meter license.
 Ascending Register. This register contains the total amount of funds spent over the lifetime of the
module.
 Descending Register: This register contains the amount of funds currently available in the module.
 Control Sum: This register contains the total amount of funds credited to the module over the
lifetime of the module. The Control Sum must equal the sum of the Ascending Register and the
Descending Register values.
 PSD Piece Count: The number of indicia plus the number of correction indicia dispensed by the
MS1 X4 PSD.
 Zero Piece Count: The number of indicia containing zero for the postage value.
10 Operational Environment
The FIPS 140-2 Area 6 Operational Environment requirements for the module are not applicable
because the device does not contain a modifiable operational environment.
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11 Security Rules
This section documents the security rules enforced by the module to implement the security
requirements of this FIPS 140-2 Level 3 module.
 The module shall not process more than one request at a time (i.e., single threaded). While
processing a transaction, prior to returning a response, the module will ignore all other inputs
to the module. No output is performed until the transaction is completed, and the only output
is the transaction response.
 The module shall validate identities using digital signatures.
 All keys generated in the module shall have at least 112 bits of strength for FIPS Approved
operation
 All methods of key generation shall be at least as strong as the key being generated.
 All methods of key establishment shall be at least as strong as the key being established.
 Signed digital indicium data shall not be output unless the proper funds accounting has been
performed.
 The module shall not provide a bypass state where plaintext information is just passed
through the module.
 The module shall not support a maintenance mode.
 The module shall not support a safety state.
 The module shall not output any secret or private key in plaintext form.
 The module shall not accept input of any secret or private key in plaintext form.
 There shall be no manual entry of keys into the system.
 There shall be no entry or output of split keys from the system.
 There shall be no key archiving.
 Keys shall be either generated via an Approved method or entered into the system through
valid processes.
 Only those keys necessary for the domain specified by the PCN shall be loaded during
manufacturing or generated during operation
 The module shall support the following conditional tests:
o Pairwise consistency test for DSA2048 key pair generation
o Pairwise consistency test for ECDSA P-256 key pair generation
o Continuous RNG test for the DBRG – Stuck Seed, Stuck Number
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o Continuous RNG test for internal hardware Random Number Generator
o ECDSA P-256 Signature Verification - Firmware Load Test
o ECDSA P-256 Public Key Validation as part of SP 800-56A Key Agreement Protocol
 The module shall support power up self-tests, which can also be run as requested by the user,
include:
o Firmware Integrity Tests:
 Digital Signature - ECDSA P-256
o Bootloader Power On Self-Tests (POST)
 ECDSA P-256 Verification Known Answer Test
 SHA-256 Known Answer Test
o Critical functions tests:
 RTC Test
 Bootloader Test
 BRAM Pattern Test
o Cryptographic Algorithm Known Answer Tests: (DAL POST)
 2-key and 3-key Triple DES Known Answer Test
 DSA1024 and DSA2048 Verification Known Answer Test
 SHA-1 and SHA-256 Known Answer Test
 AES256 Key Wrap / Unwrap Known Answer Test
 AES256 Encrypt / Decrypt Known Answer Test
 RSA2048 Sign/Verify Known Answer Test
 DSA2048 Pairwise Consistency Test
 ECDSA P-256 Pairwise consistency
 HMAC SHA-1 Known Answer Test
 HMAC SHA-256 Known Answer Test
 KAS SP800-56A (C(2, 0, ECC CDH)) Known Answer Test
 HASH DRBG SP800-90 Known Answer Test
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 Self-tests may be initiated by the following means:
o Perform Diagnostic Test service
o Perform Full Diagnostics service
o Physically recycling the module's power
 The status of self-tests shall be available via the Get Low Level Status service.
12 Physical Security Policy
The MAX32590 is a single chip cryptographic module which protects key material from unauthorized
disclosure. The security features in the module include real time environmental monitoring
(temperature, battery, voltage) and tamper detection. Triggering the environmental monitors or
damaging the tamper shield results in a destructive result, which halts the processor and
automatically zeroizes the internal encrypting key.
The module shall protect two types of data items:
 Funds Relevant Data Items (FRDIs)
 Critical Security Parameters (CSPs).
13 Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-2.
14 References
The following documents are referenced by this document, are related to it, or provide background
material related to it:
 Financial Institution Retail Message Authentication – ANSI X9.19, 1996
 Digital Signature Standard (DSA) – FIPS PUB 186-4, July, 2013
 Performance Criteria for Information-Based Indicia and Security Architecture for Closed IBI
Postage Metering Systems, PCIBI-C, Draft January 12, 1999
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) FIPS PUB 197, November 26, 2001
 Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special
Publication 800-38A, December 2001.
 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special
Publication 800-67, Jan 2012.
 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 198-1, July 2008
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 Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators,
Special Publication 800-90A, January 2012.
 AES Key Wrap – NIST Special Publication 800-38F - December 21, 2012
 International Postage Meter Approval Requirements (IPMAR) - S30 UPU Standard
 Secure Hash Standard – FIPS PUB 180-4, March 2012
 NIST SP 800-56A Rev 2., Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment SchemesUsing
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography – May 2013
 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules – FIPS PUB 140-2, Change Notices December 3,
2002
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15 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI American National Standards Institute
BBREG Internal Battery-backed Key Register (auto zeroizable).
BRAM Internal Battery-backed Random Access Memory
CM Cryptographic Module
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DSS Digital Signature Standards
EFP Environmental Failure Protection
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic interference
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
FRDI Funds Relevant Data Items
GMT Greenwich Mean Time
IPMAR International Postal Meter Approval Requirements
ISO International Standards Organization
NVM Nonvolatile Memory
OTP One-Time Programmable Memory
PB Pitney Bowes
PCN Product Code Number
PHC Print Head Controller
PSD Postal Security Device
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
PVD Postage Value Download
SDR Signed Data Record
SDU Software Download Utility
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SKR Signed Key Record
SRAM Internal Random Access Memory
TDEA Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TDES Triple Data Encryption Standard
UIC User Interface Controller